Science as a Hunt

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TTILLIAM EA,MON

SCIENCE AS A HUNT

FIRENZELEO S. OLSCITKI EDITORE

MCMXCIV

Estratto do:

PHYSISRTVISTA INTERNÁZIONAI,EDI STORIA DELLA SCIENZA

Vor.. )ffiI (1Ð4) Nuov¡ SnnreFasc. 2

SCIENCE A,S A HUNT

I7u.r¡¡rvr E¡¡vro¡l

Deparxneøt of HistoryNeu Mexico Søæ Uniuedty

demonstrations of the known and familiar aspects of nature to a hunt for unknown'secrets of nature', modern science was bo¡n.

The metaphors and visual or literary images used to describescientífic activity are often clues to an age's conéeption of the nature,aims, and purposes of science. For example, someone v¡ho describesscience

^s 'an endless frontier' obviously has in mind a radically

EIR4TYM: On pages 410,411, and 41g, due to a printer,s error, the word¡tfirtç (mêtis) is mistakenly printed as mei¡. I apologize to readers for thisprinter's error.

394 \ø. EAMON

different conception of scientific activity than someone who describesscience as'puzzle-solving'.1

Do such metaphors really matter? Do they, as some scholars argue,influence the construction of theories? Accotding to these arguments,metaphors are essential to the language of science; índeed, areconstitutive of scientific theories and of the experiential categoriesunderlying theory-construction. Richard Boyd contends that in certaincases <(metaphorical expressions constitute [...] an irreplaceable pat oÍ.the linguistic machinery of a scientific theorp>. Metaphors, he asserts,<<are constitatiue of the theories they express, rather than merelyexegetical>>.2 Michael Arbib and Mary Hesse claim that <<Scientificrevolutions are, in fact, metaphoric revolutions>>.3 ì(/hether or notmetaphors actually rule scientific discourse, evidently language itself isso metaphor-laden that the ancient goal of constructing a completelyIiteral scientific language, whose words exactly match the externalworld, is practically inconceivable.

If these arguments about language are correct, we should be able tofind characteristic sets of metaphors associated with various scientificparadigms, dísciplines, and cultures. In fact, we do find suchcorrelations. Mechanical metaphors, for example, v¡ere associated withthe 'new philosophy' of the seventeenth century, while Darwinappropriated various metaphors about competition and the 'survival ofthe fittest' from the culture o{ the Industrial Revolution.a Theproliferation of metaphors drawn from computer science andinformation theory in cognitive psychology is a more recent example ofthe conspicuous role metaphors play in science. Given the apparentlyclose relation between language and the content of science, the study of

1 The fi¡st metaphor was made famous by the physicist and former U.S. science policyadviso¡ Vannevar Bush; the second is from the historian and philosopher of scíence ThomasS. Kuhn.

2 R. Bovo, Metapbor and Theory Change:'What Is 'Metaphor' a Metaphor For?, tn A. Onro¡¡v(ed.), Metaphor and Thougþt, Cambridge, Cambridge Universíty Press, 1979, pp. 356-404: )60.

3 M. -4,. AnnI¡, M. B. Hessr, The Construction of Realitl, Cambridge, CambddgeUniversity Press, 1986; J. J. Boro, Scimce, Discourse, an¿ Literatrffe, in S. Petpn¡n¡uNo(ed-), Literature and. Science: Theory and. Practice, Boston, Northeastern University Press, 1990,pp. 59-89.

a S. A. Beon'u, The Mechønical Clock and the Scientific Reuolution, in K. Meunrcr, O.M¡vn (eds.), The Clocleuork \Jnfuene: Genn¿x Clocks and Autonata, 1551-1650, New Yotk,Neale \Øatson, 1980, pp. 19-26; nd B. G. G¡rt, Darutin ¿nd the Concept of a Struglz forExistence: a Study ìn tbe Extrescientific Origins of Scientifh Ideas, <<Isis>, LXfiI, 1972, pp. )21-)44.For other examples, see J. J. BoNo, Medical Spirix and tbe Medieoal Langaage of Life, <Traditio>,XL, 1984, pp. 91-130; and N. Srneerv, Race and Geødct the Rolc of Analogy in Science, <<Isis>>,

LXXVI, 1986, pp. 261-277.

scientific Revolution would probably accept this statement more or less

inqyilf: first, to trace rhe origins and developmenr of the cognitivemodel implied by the h-unt; and second, ro examine the significaãce foready modern science of this model.

Sciexce as a Hunt 395

1. Trrr Hr;¡ru ron rHp Srcnnrs op N¡runn

of heof heer tobo of

shape theNeapolitaniambattistagaze upon

. t f. Rossr,_Philosophl, Technology and the Arn in the Earþ Moderz Era, Engl. trans. by S.Attanasio, New York, Hæper md Row, 1970, p. 42.

e M. ,C/rvtzz1^, Meøfore aenatorie e para¿;gftii indiziari netla fondazione dell¿ scienzasperinmtale, <Annali dell'Istituto di discipLine filoiofiche dell'universiià di Bologna>, I, 19g0,pp.101-133.

7 N. Beo¡¡,o¡¡r, I Fratelli Dell¿ Pota e !¿ caltara magica e astrologica a Napoli nel '500, <<studtstoricb, I,_ 1960, pq. 677-7L5: 688. In addition, see rill. Et¡vtoi, Sciencà and the Secrex ofNah,ne..., cit., chap. 4.

396

internallp>.e Another academy, the short-lived Accademia Cacciatore(Academy of Hunters) founded in Venice trr 1596, adopted as irs devicethe symbol of a dog pursuing a hare.lo

Not surprisingly, images of the hunt turn up frequently in theRenaíssance courts. Hunting was the signorial spott par excellence,<(a true pastime for great lords>>, according to Castiglione.ll Theconception of science as a venatio permeated courtly science. TheRenaissance princes quested passionately after natural <<secrets>>,

especially those pertaining to alchemy and magic. The Holy RomanEmperor Rudol{ II, Europe's most famous patron o{ the occultscíences, was an avid collector of secrets. A Venetian observer at theimperial court reported that Rudolf <delights in hearing secrers abourthings both natural and artificial, and whoever ís able to deal in suchmatters will always find the ear of the Emperor ready>>.12 The MedicíGrand Dukes were also zealous seekers of alch.mii al, mag;cal, andtechnical secrets. Francesco I de' Medici was famous for hispreoccupation with alchemical and technological experiments, which hecarried out in a laborutory at the ducal pa1ace.13 Arriving at thelaboratory early in the morning and staying until late at night,

8 G. B. Dp¡.r¡ Ponre, De i milacoli et maruuigliosi effetti ãalk natarø ptoãatti, Veneíta,1560, p. 2: <<i secreti, Ii quali al tutto stavano rinchiusi nel grembo della naturo>; Io., Maginendt.tlalis, siae de nirøcølis rcram natarclian libri Ifil, Antwerpiae, 1560, p. 6: <<arcarra Natwaegtemío penitus latentio>.

e Francesco Stelluti, quoted in G. G¡¡næu, Spigolnørc Dellzportiaxe, <Rendicontí dellaReale Accademia Nazionale dei Lincei. Classe di scienze morali, storiche e filologiche>>, ser. 6,XI,L935,p.507; D. Cenuru,Breue *oria d.ella Accaà¿miadeiLincei,Roma, Salviucci, 1883, p. 8.

r0 M. Mlyr.¡¡¡oen, Storia dell¿ aecadenie d'Iølìa, Bologna, Capel\, 1926-30, vol. I,pp.478-9.

t1 B.C,rsrrcrrorz,TheBook.of theCotrtier,Engl.trans.byC.S.Singleton,GardenCity,N.Y., Doubleday and Co., 1959, p. )8.

t2 R. J. rùø. EvrNs, Rudolf II axd His 'Vorll. A Study iø løtell¿ctttøl History 7576-761,2,Oxford, Cla¡endon Press, 1973, p. 196.

13 G. L¡Nsr On:-¡¡¡¡r, Cosino e Fraxcesco de'Med,ici abhemisti, Firenze, Nardíni, L978;L.B¡nrr, I/ Princþe dello stadioln: Frøncesco I dei Medici e It fine del Rizascinento fiorentino,Fi¡enze, EDAM , 1967:P. Gtts-uzzr, Il mecen¿tismo nediceo e le scienze, ix Idee, istituzioxi, scienzeed. arti nell¿ Firenze dci Medici, a c. di C - Vasoli, Fi¡enze, Giunti Matello, 1980, pp. I89-21r.

Science as a Hunt 397

Francesco experimented with porcelain, enamel, and majolica, distilledmedicinal waters, raised silkworms, and made incendiaries, counterfeítjewels, and china.l4 Francesco's son Don Antonio, a devotee ofalchemy, personally conducted alchemical experíments in the fonderiahe built at the palace. Don Antonio recorded his experiments in a hugefour-volume manuscript containing secrets on everything from tñetransmutation of metals to chiromancy, and from astrology to b¡llistícs.Agnolo della Casa, one of the alchemists. active at Don Antonio'slaboratory, recorded axother eighteen volumes of alchemical expe-riments.ls The same fervent interest in secrets consumed Galileã'spatron, Cosimo II de' Medici, whose court in Florence was a magnerfor every sort of 'experimenter' who claimed to have some new'secret'.1ó Galileo, eager to win Cosimo's patronage, assured the Grand

<<partigreat.l forv/ith

interested some great ruler, which I have not hitherto done orattempted>>.17

The logic of discovery implied by the metaphor of the hunt alsoinfluenced the fashioning of professional identities at rhe Renaissance

ra S. J. ScHerrrt, The Studiolo of Frcncesco I de' Med.ici iø tÍte Pal¿zzo Veccltio in Flormce,Diss. Bryn Maw¡,1976, pp. 186-198.

ls P. GN-tuzz\ Motitti patacehiaú nell¿ Toscana di Cosino II e di Don Antonio dei Medici:liuelli di cøltara,i al Casino di Saøbeing exchangedarocchi, Firenze,

ra P. Gttt-uzzt, Motiui Pancelsiana..., cit., pp.56-59.1z S. Dn¡x¿ (ed. and Eans.), Discooeries and Opinions of Gatìteo, New york, Anchor Books,

L957, pp. 62-63.

tionshíps, see M.pp. l-62; andP.T. MoneN (ed.),Court 1500-1750,

\ø. EAMON

398 Iø. EAMON

recipes, mirabilin, exotica, and 'secrets' were more appropriate gifts togive princes than practical, technological devices. Perhàps rhe mosrspectacular scientific gift of the era was that of the Medicean stars,which Galileo dedicated to his parron Cosimo de' Medici, catapultingGalileo into the Tuscan court.

\X/hat is significant about these examples is that all were premisedon the idea of scientific inquiry conceived as the discovery of newthings rather than as attempts to demonsÚate the known. The themesof newness and novelty appeatthe early modern period. Lynnnoous and 'unheard-of' recur in the titles of hundreds of scientificbooks of the seventeenth century.le The Ne plas ultra inscribed on theancíent pillars of Hercules became a favoríte device to illustrate thetyranny of ancient philosophy over creative thought.20 The growingawareness that superstitious reverence for antiquity hampered progressin learning aroused a sense of the importance of nev¡ discoveries and ofthe value of novelty for its own sake.

One of the most important events contributing to Europe'sheightened consciousness of novelty was the discovery of the New\Øorld. News of the discovery, which revealed regions completelyunknown to the ancients, raised Europe's awareness of the sheerimmenseness of the wodd. The explorers brought back specimens ofexotic plants and animals, hair-raising tales of adventure, and accountsof completely new cultures. Above all, the new geographical discoveriesdemonsffated that ancient philosophy and science were not necessarilyeternal verities. The relations of the voyagers to distant parts of the

re L. Tr¡omorr¡, Neuness ard Nooelty in Seaexteeltb-century Science atd Medicine, irì P. P.\ímrvrn, A. Nor¡ro (eds.), Roots of York, Basic Books, 1957, pp.443-457; M. B. H¡¡.r, The Spilit of In Cennry, in O. Grxennrcr (ed.),The Nature of Scientific Discooery,llashington, D.C., Smíthsonian Institution Press, 1957, pp.)09 -321; P. RossI, Pbilosopby, Tecbøo hg1t..., cit., pp. 65-70.

20 Fo¡ refe¡ences to the Ne plus ultra in English literatue, see R. F- JoNss, Ancients andModtms: a Study of tbe Rise of the Sciextific Mouement in SeÐeflteenth Century England, Berkeley,University of Californía Press, 19652, chap. 6.


world seemed to confirm that, as one explofer wrote, <<expefience iscontrary to philosophp>.2r Sir Thomas Browne thought ancienrphilosophy and science were so fraught with error that <<the Americaand untavelled parts of Truth>> still awaited discovery.22

The <<search for secrets>> in unl<nown regions of nature was an imagethat appeared in the period's scientific literature with monotonousregularity. The promise of revealing secrets hidden even ftom the eyesof the ancients made excellent copy for books aimed at middle-classteaders, whose curiosity about novelty was aroused by the revival ofmagic, the discovery of new worlds, and the revelation of new andbizarre natural phenomena. At the end of the sixteenth century, theFrench historian Louis Le Roy was positively giddly with excitemenr ashe contemplated the marvels of the age:

AII the mysteries of God and secrets of nature are not discovered at onetime [...] How many have bin first knowen and found out in this age? I say,new lands, new seâs, new formes of men, mannefs, lawes, and customes; newdiseases, and nerv remedies n,never before found out; and tobe known by our posteritie? toIight; and our successours will wonder that wee were ignorant of them.23

In the mid-seventeenth century, the English virtuoso JosephGlanvill still envisioned the opening up of an <<,America of secrets andan unknown Peru of nature>>. As long as we stick to Aristotle, wroteGlanvill, <<\re are not líkely to reach the Treasures on the other side ofthe Atlantic,ë, the directing of the ìüorld the way to which, is the nobleend of true Philosophyrr.'o Like the New World, natuÍe stood beforeinvestígators as uncharted territory.

2. Count P¡.rnox¡.cr.aND THE HuNr FoR NATURE's Spcnnrs

Since antiquity, the metaphor of the hunt provided a literarystructure for all kinds of quests. In ancient and medieval literature, the

2t Loyrz rE Gówene, des Indns, Paris, 1568, quoted in G. .A.rxnsoN, Iesllot¿oeauv borizons de I¿ Rena Paris, E. Dtoz, 1935, p.-257.

zz T. Bnovlæ, Pseudodoxiø Epidemica, inThe'V/o*s, ed. by G. Keynes, 4 vols., Chicago,University of Chicago Press, 1964, vol. I, p. 5.

, 23 .L. Ln Rov, Of tbe Interchangeable Coarse, or Vaiety of Things in tlte Vlbote World, trans.

by R. ,A.., London, 7594, p.727o.z+ J. Gr,rmrrr, The Vanity of Dogmatizing, London, L66t, p. L7B.

repeatedlyThorndike

in the scientific literature ofobserved that words such as

400 Iø. EAMON

hunt was appropriated as a metaphor for the quesr for spiritual andintellectual truth, the hero's journey into the unknown, and the lover'sattempt to win a laåy's heart. Sophocles described Oedipus as a hunterwho, ironically, became his own quarry. Plato used the metaphor of thehunt to describe geometers, astronomers, and calculators, who are<<hunters>> after the nature of being, while, for Cicero, the scientist wasa <<seatcher and hunter of nature>> (specalator aeftatorque naturøe).lVordssignifying various stages of the hunt passed naturally into the languageof inquiry: the Latin indago, for example, meant both 'track down- and'search into', whíIe the word 'investigate' comes from vestigo, to followa footprint (oestigium).2s

Although the metaphor of the hunt for knowledge is ancienr, Ibelieve Rossi v/as correct in stressing its novelty in the lateRenaissance. For, while images of the chase abound in medievalIiterature, they were rarely used to describe the search for secular orscientifíc knowledge. The scholastics did nor seem to regard the hunt as

an appropriate metaphor for scientific discovery. They believed thatknowledge of what was 'inside' nature vr"s, in gêneral, directlyaccessible: one did not have to 'hunt' for the qualíties of matterbecause they were evident to the senses. \X/hile they acknowledged theexistence of occult properties in nature, the scholastics regarded suchproperties as idiosyncratic anå fundamentally unintelligible, and henceexcluded them from the province of scientific knowledge (scientiapropter quid). Having outlawed the'secrets'of nature from thedominion of reason, the scholastics consigned them to the domain ofmagic, which meant that the investigation o{ them led one dangerouslyinto the terrítory of forbidden knowledge.26

\X/hy did this logic of discovery, which seems so uncharacteristic ofmedieval scíence, gain such force during the Renaissance? In a previousessay, I argued that courtly patronage contributed to the creation of thenew scientific ethos in tv/o important ways. First, because theconception of scíence as a hunt mirrored the court's self-image, princesadopted it as a preferred style of research and, as a result, created anew cultural ideal. Second, princes, who were among the mainconsumers of scientific culture in the Renaissance, tended to patronize

2s M. THrÉRÂux, The Stag of Loue: the Chase in Med.ieul Literature, Ithaca, CornellUniversity Press, 1974, pp.47-58.

2ó See ¡ù7. Eeuon, Booås of Seoeß in Medieoal and Earþ lvlodem Science, <Sudhoffsfuchiw, LXIX, 1985, pp.26-49.

Scieøce as a Hunt 40r

nattral philosophers who practiced science according to the new idea1.27I shall not rehearse these arguments ín detail here. Instead, I want toexpand upon the conclusions I reached in that paper and suggest somepossible connections between the courtly image of science as a hunt andthe origins of the 'new philosophy' of the seventeenth centüy.

The first observation to be made about court culture is that courtlylife was organized around the prince. Everything and everyone servedhim. People were in the court solely to carry out the prince's wishes;they had no social identity aparr from rhe one defined by thefundamental relation of service and lordship. <<The courtier's end>>,

wrote Torquato Tasso in a dialogue on courtly virtues, <<is thereputation and honor of the prince, from which his own reputation andhonor flow as a stream from a spring>.28 The vocabulary of this basicrelation, expressed on the one side in the lexicon of obedience andadulation, on the other side in that of command and expectation,defined the conditions of courtly pamonage.

Th. ower, which radiated like a magneticfotce, a organizing people and spaces intorelatíons dship. Power ielations in the lateRenaissance rested not just upon military might, but also upon the actitself of exercisíng it: in other words, upon theater and ritual. Theluxurious ostentation at the couÍts was no mere show; it was a displayo{ power.2e \X/ithout such an exhibition, there was somehow nosu{ficient claím to the possession of power. All public occasions

- marriages, baptisms, funerals, coronations, state visits, religiousprocessions - gave princes the opportunity to self-glorify and to aÍfrmtheir titles to rule.3o The cultivation of self-images made courtly art aform of political propaganda, as princes commissioned works of art

_ n \Xl . Eevol, Coøt, Acadcrny, and Priøting Ho*se: Patrcøage and Scienffic Carcers inLate-Rexaissance løly, inB. T. MouN (ed.), Patronage and Inçitøtionl..., cit., pp. 25-50.

_- .'u T.T1s;9,-IlMalpiglio,inDialogues, Engl. trans. by C. L. and D. A. Trafton, Berkeley,University of Califotnia Press, 1982, p. 171.

S. Brnreru, F. Cenorxr, E. G¡¡¡¡-ro Zowt, The Coøtts of the. by M. Fitton and G. Culverwell, New York, Facts on File87; znà L. Menrwes, Power and. Imaginatioø: Ciþj-State inndom House, 1979, pp. 2L8-240.

edici Coart. I: The Faned of Cosimo I de' Medici,in Florenz>>, XI, 1965, pp. 30-54; andlo., Ax øxdof Filippo de' Meilici in 1517, <<Mitteilungen des1967, pp.95-114.

4

402 \ø. EAMON

representing them as Roman emperors, classical heroes, and deities.3lAccording to a learned contemporary handbook for arranging princeþfunerals, the appropriate ceremony for such occasions was theapotheosis, deifying the prince and confirming his heir's right to thesuccession.32 Power gfuded itself with ritual, and in the RenaissanceItalian courts, as we know from reading Castiglione's Il Cortegiano,ritual was raised to a fine art.

Although the swagger of power was acted out wherever the prínceshowed himself in public, nowhere, perhaps, was it demonstrated in a

more spectacular fashion than in the hunts staged for the court nobility.The expeditions organized by the 'hunting pope', Leo X, were away formonths at a time and included caravans of courtiers, musicians,attendants, and huntsmen, along with their horses, dogs, leopards, andfalcons.33 Hunting was the signorial spott par excellence. Princesannexed vast ateas for theír favorite sport, and made laws reservinggame for the nobility to kill at their pleasure. The pageantry of thehunt symbolized the prince's dominion over the earth's bounty.

Power, and the need to display power, had a profound influenceupon scientific activity in the courts. For scientists, when they servedprinces, were subjected to the same conditions of servitude as artistsand men of letters. Their fortunes rose and fell with princes, and whenthey were at court, they were there by the prince's will alone: theywere there because they had something to offer him.

One of the things scientists offered princes was technical expertise.For the rebuilding of cities and for the defense of their dominions,princes required the services of engineers, metallurgists, and can-nonmasters, while astronomers and mathematicians cast horoscopes,designed instruments, and made prognostications about future events.But if, in retrospect, the ptince's most pressing need was for technicalassistance, from a contempofafy perspective even more important v¡as'reputation', since what others thought of him was an important part ofwhat he actually was. Machiavelli, describing the qualities a prince

3r K. F. Fonsren, Metaphors of Rule: Political Ideolog aød History in the Portrcix of CosimoI de'Medici, <<Mitteilungen des Kunsthistorisches Institutes in Florenz>>, XV, 1971, pp. 65-104;M- Brlcrou, Gølil¿o the Enblcm M¿ker, <Isis>, LXXX, 1990, pp- TO-258.

32 E. Bonsoor, At and. Politìcs I.-., cit., p. 48.33 D. KNor-r-, Le cacce diLeonX, <<Nuova antologia>>, ser.3, XLm, 1893, pp. 433-458;J.

Kxusr., Hanting Magnificence, øtzd the Coutt of Leo X, <<Renaíssance Studies>, VII, 1993, pp.243-57. Accorð:ng to Kruse, <The hunt was a fo¡m of political theatre in which the í¡resistible,brutal force o{ the papal sovereígn was put in evidence>> (p.257).


should demonstrate to his subjects, stressed the political use of culturalpatronage, advising that <<a prince ought to show himself a lover ofability, giving employment to able men and honoring those who excelin a particular fielð>, and that a prince should <<above all endeavor towin to reputarion of being ^ great man of outstanding ability>>.34 Thecult of the learned prince, whích deployed the platonic image of thephilosopher-ruler who combínes power with wisdom, helped rolegitimize the political rule of the Medici dukes and the newly-established condottieri rulers at Milan, Mantua, Ferrara, and Urbino.3s

Among the qualities of the 'learned prince', two stand out as havingparticular significance for courtly science: curiosity and vírtuosity. Thepositive valuation of intellectual curiosity is one of the most significantcontributions of Renaissance culture to the modern outlook.36 Forcenturies in the Christian tradition, curiosity was condemned as a vice.St. Augustine placed curiosity nexr ro pride, the root of all sin, judgingit to be akin to gawking at monsrers and freaks in circuses. <From thãsame motive>, he pronounced, (<men proceed to investigate theworkings of nature, which is beyond our ken - things which it does nogood to know and which men only want to know for the sake ofknowing>.37 According to the patistic outlook, the universe is amystery because God intended it to be one. In order to protect naturefrom man's prying eyes, wrote Lactantius, God made Adam last so heshould not acqufue any knowledge of the process of creation.3s To pry

re was to trespass the boundary of legitimateGod's majesty, and to enter into the territory

This ancient attitude tov¡ard curiosity was completely absent fromthe courts. Not only was curiosity considered a virtue worthy of aprince, it was an important syrnbol of his powet. Striking visual

_ - _ .34 N. M-c.crnevrrrr, The Pñnce, Engl. trms. by G. 8u11, Harmondsvzo¡th, penguin Books,L961, p. 127.

rs A.-BnowN, Platonism ix Fifteenth-Centary Florence anà Its Contribution to Early ModernPoliticalThougþr, <<Journal of Modern History>, LVilI, 1986, pp. 183-4ß.

_ -ru F. Rr-uvEx¡nnc, Modem Age, Engl. trans. by R. M. rùflallace,

Cambrídge (Mass.), M.l. )61-401; J. C¿¡¡¡ (ed.), 'L¿

curiosité à laRexaissance, Paris, Société nt supédeui, 1986.

. ,t St. Aucusrnqe, Confessions, X. 35, Enf,. trans. by Rex \laner, New york, NewAmerican Library, L963, p. 246.

38 Lecr.rNrrus, Diuinae institutiones, II, 8.60-63; H. Br_u^¡sN¡pnc, The Legitiøzacy..., cit.,pp.104-5.

404 V. EAMON

demonstrations of the new valorization of curiosity could be seen ín thenumerous 'cabinets of curiosities' (Vund.erkarnnzern) that were collectedand put on public display by Renaissance princes.¡s In these fabulouscollections, the court projected an aora of the uncanny and thesuperhuman. Carved gems, watches, antiques, mummies, and me-chanical contrivances were displayed alongside fossils, shells, giants'teeth, unícorns' horns, and exotic specimãns from the New \iorld,making up an encyclopedia of the bnarre and the marvelous. Fulr oistrange and exotic naturalia and mirabilia, they v/ere meant to delightspectators and to provoke v¡onder rather than to serve as -nr.rr-,

-fo,

scientific research. Indeed, the curiosity-cabinets were arranged so as todeliberately exclude the normal nd the ordinary. object-s were notconsidered worth collecting unless they were either monstrous or hadsome bizarre peculiarity.ao As if to mock the Augustinian concept ofcuriositas, the curiosity-cabinets invited viewers to gawk at them, io beamused by them, and to be filled with wonder. For that matter, thecourt itself was a menagerie of bi rarre forms, where clowns, dwarfs,and exotic animals mingled amiably with princes and courriers.íl

The new estimation of curiosity, *hi.h affirmed the value ofinquisitiveness about nature, generated another cultural ideal, virtuosity(uirtuosità)- The 'virtuoso', one who is curious about all'aspects oinature and att, and one to whom learníng is an ornament, ïas thecodification of the 'learned gendeman' descJibed by castiglione at rhecourt of Urbino. For, _in essence, court culture $/as a miming of theprince's self-image. In his sensibility at least, the virtuoso rvas-a prince

Scieøce as a Hønt 405

in miniature, and was expected to model his behavior according to thedesires of his overlord. Among other things, virtuosity conditionedcourtly discourse, with its delight in variety, surprise, and nonchalance,and its distaste for the tiresome logic-chopping of scholasticdisputation.a2

The metaphor of the hunt profoundly influenced courtly mannersand discourse. To Renaissance observers, the hunt displayed nature'svariety, pleasure, and surprise. Beatrice d'Este, the Duchess of Mantua,writing from the Sforza hunting ground at VíIlanova, exclaimed,<<There are so many hares, leaping up from all sides, that sometimes weknow .not ryhich way,,to turn to have our pleasure, for the eye isincapable of seeing alf that which our desirè craves and which thecountry offers us of its animals>>.a3 So it was with scientific discourse atthe court, where the performance counted for more than the content of

causes, a

),nffiÍï;Duke of

Tuscany, fabricated a pleasant fable about a man who tried tounderstand the causes of sounds only to discover <<Nature's bounty inproducing her effects, as she employs means we could never think ofwithout our senses and our experiences to teach them to us - andsometimes even these ate insufficient to remedy our lack ofunderstanding>>.aa The Íable, part of Ga]ileo's response to an attack bythe Jesuit Father Oruzio Grassi, was meant to ridicule scholasticdogmatism and its presumption to reach certainty through cleversyllogisms. The professors, speaking ex catlted.ra, implied Galileo,worried too much about necessary causes and failed to observe the rules

!ø :Ï:,ili':i li1*,11x?¿.iof . C¡.srrcrro¡¡s, Book ofthe <Isís>, LXXXI, 1990,Pp-

a3 Quored in L. M¡¡rrxrs, Power and Irnagination..., cit., p. 239-aa F. Dnare, Discoueùes and Opinions.-., cit., p. 258.

406 !ø. EAMON

renders men cautious in passing judgment upon anything new>>.as Incontrast to scholastic argumentation, courtly discourse did not aím toresult in necessary logical conclusions, but to present paradoxes andriddles, just as nature continually surprised the observer with itswonders.

The hunt metaphor penetrated coütly scientific discourse in moredirect ways as well. In a recent paper, Paula Findlen has describedFrancesco Redi, the most prominent naturalist at the Medici court inthe mid-seventeenth century, as a scientist whose <<identity \¡/as sobound to court culture that he literally could not have existed withoutit>>.aó Redi, personal physician to two Grand Dukes, accompanied thecourt wherever it peregrinated, from the numerous villas that dottedthe Tuscan countryside to the famed hunting grounds at Artiminio. ForRedi, science was literally a uenatio: the Grand Duke's hunts suppliedhim with many of the specimens he used in his experiments. Redi wassometimes called upon to arbitrate the division between animals foreating and animals for experimenting. As a scientist, he spoke thelanguage of hunting, describing the senses as <<scouts, or spies, that seekto discover the nature of things, and report these observations toReason withiu. Like the hunter who tracked his prey by looking forclues, Redi characterized the îatural philosopher as one whosesharpened instincts enabled him to uncover the quarry hiding innature.47

The valorizatíon of curiosity and virtuosity gave rise to twocharactetistic features of courtly science. The first was the fascinationwith, and the display of, marvels, which can be seen in the princelygardens and cabinets of curiosities. Symbolic demonstrations of theprince's dominion over the natural and artificial world, thecuriosity-cabinets reassembled all rcality in miniature, while theelaborate botanical gardens, with their complex mathematical designsand fantastic floral displays, impressed viewers with the prince's power<<to change Natute herself>>.a8

The second outstanding feature of courtly science was the abidinginterest in the 'secrets of nature' at the courts, and especially with the

as lbid ,p.256.aó P. Fnwr-er.l, Coxtrollìng tbe Experìtnent: Court Patronage and the Experinenøl Metbod of

Francesco Rell, <History of Science>>, XXXI, 1993, pp. 35-64:39.47 Ibid., pp. 52-).a8 L. Toxcroncr Torr,re,sr, Projects for Botønical and Other Gard.ens: a Sìxæenth-Centary

MønaøL, <JorrnøJ. of Garden Historp>, III, 1981, pp. l-34.

Science as a Hant 407

subjects of alchemy anð magic. As I poínted out earlier, the HolyRoman Emperor Rudolph II and the Medici Grand Dukes wererenowned for their interest in alchemical and magical secrets. Yetprínces and monarchs throughout Europe drew into their courts naturalphilosophers engaged in a passionate quest after secrets, curiosities, andntirabiliø. As Bruce Moran has pointed out, in the cabinets ofcuriosities exhibited at the ceurts, the princely passion for collectingcuriosíties and 'secrets' merged with the new Manneríst style ín att,creating spectacles of diversity and variety.ae The fabulous displays ofrare and out-of-the-ordinary objects alongside technical gadgets,curiosities, and 'secrets' made the Renaissance court a sort of menagerieof the marvelous.

What do all these 'secrets' and experiments signify? To some extentthey attest to an interest in applied science. Many secrets recordedexperimental attempts to improve artistic or technologícal processes.

But the preoccupation with secrets at the courts also had a politicalpurpose, in that it represented the prince as a repository ofpraeternatural, superhuman secrets, and as the heir to a tradition ofesoteric wisdom. The curiosity-cabinets and courtly gardens glorifiedthe prince and celebrated his deeds and his power. In this respect thehunt was a particularly suitable metaphor for courtly science. For justas hunting demonstrated in a spectacular fashion that the goods of theearth existed first and foremost for the prince, so science carried out as

a hunt -i.e., as a capturing o[. rarc secrets- demonstrated that nature'soccult forces existed for the use and delight of the prince.

Yet the influence of the court was not confined to the immediatespace surrounding the prince. It radiated outward to touch other,alternative cultural institutions, íncluding, for example, the academíesthat were established in practically every city in sixteenth-century Italyand in many cities of northern Europe as well.sO Many of the earlyscientifíc academies were founded ot patronizedby princes. The earliestexperimental academy of which we have any record was the AccademiaSegreta founded in Naples in the 1.540s, probably under the paftonage

4e B. T. Mot¡.N, Patronage and Institutions: Coarx, Uniuetsities, and Academies in Gertaanl;an Ouenieu: 7550-7750, inIo., Patronage and Institations..., cit., pp. l7l-173; L. S¡¡.en¡o, .4r¿øscßrc4a..., ctt.

s0 See tff. EluoN, Couft, Acad.eny, and Pritttiøg House ., cit. For northern Europeanacademies, see (fot Germany and France) B. T. Mon¡,N (eð.), Pa*onøge and Institutions..., cit.

408 \I. EAMON

gy ofthan

ne oftrue

anatomy of the workings of nature itself>>, as opposed nature as it wasdescribed in books. To this end, the group undertook a cooperativesearch for 'secrets' -meaning alchemícal, medicinal, and tèchnicalrecipes- which they found in books and manuscripts, and then testedthem by experiment in a laboratory designed specifically for thatpurpose. The Segreti resolved to publish only those secrets that theycould verify by experiment. The rest, 'mere rumors' and'exftavagantpromises'., they discarded. In other words, the Segreti wanted tosubject the claims of written tradition and conventional wisdom toexperimental trial. For hearsay, they would substitute 'the fruit of ourlabor'.s2

Other sixteenth-century societies emulated the Accademia Segreta'sscientific style. Giambattista Della Porta founded a similar organizationin Naples, and supposedly admitted no one into it who had notdiscovered some 'new secret of nature'. Della Porta's first publishedwork, the Magia natural^ (1558), consisting of recipes and experimenrsin medicine, the crafts, optics, and other 'secrets of nature', is sosimilar to Ruscelli's Secreti nuoui (7567) and to the Seueti (7555) o{'Alessio Piemontese' -the trvo experimental works published by theAccademia Segreta- that there can be no mistaking its closerelationship to the general aims of experimental science articulated byRuscelli. Indeed, the Magia naturalis reads like a manifesto for a newscientific methodology: that of science as a aer.øtio, a hunt for 'newsecrets of nature'. Similarly, the Accademia dei Lincei, founded in 1601by the eccentric young prince Federico Cesi, was comprised of devoted<<searchers of the arcane sciences>>.53 Motivated by Della Porta's ideal ofscience as a quest for rare secrets of nature, Cesi founded the society as

an attempt to put these ideals into practice. In adopting the lynx as

sr On this organization, see ìí. E¡¡lo¡r, F. Peureu, The Accademia Segeta d GirolamoRuscelli: a Siuteenth-Century Italian Scientific Society, <<Isís>, LXXV, 1984, pp. 327-342. lnaddition, see \7. EnuoN, Science and. the Secrets of Nøture..., cit., chap. 4; and N. B¡o¡.ro¡n, Ifratelli Delk Porta..., cit., pp. 696-699.

s2 The Segreti's experimental work was published in two works: the Secreti (Naples, 1555)of <rAlessio Piemonteser> (probably a pseudonym fo¡ Gi¡olamo Ruscelli) and Ruscelli's .Secretixaooi (\'Ienice, 1568). On these works and the activities of the Segreti, see W. Et*roN, Scienceand the Secrets ofNature..., cit., chap. 4.

s3 \(/. EAMoN, Coart, Acaàeny, and PùntingHoøse..., cit., pp. 44-45.

Science as a H*nt 409

their emblem, the Lincei were inspired by the inzpresa Della Porta hadchosen for the 1589 edition of his Møgia naturalis and by the words in

that the academy's.plrpose was to <<penetrate into the inside of thingsin order to know theír causes and the operations of nature that woikinternally, just as it ís said of the lynx that ir sees not just what is infront of it, but what is hidden inside>>.sa Cesi evidently envisioned thesociety as a sort of monastic order devoted to secular learning ratherthan religion, its members sworn to vows of chastity and completelydedicated to experimental investigation of 'the secret mira.l.r ofnature'.55

3. T:rtn EprsrEryrorocy oF THE Huxr

out, record, interpret, and classify such infinitesimal traces as trails ofspittle>>.s7 The <<venatic methodology)> was essentially the same as thatof the ancient diviner, who used clues found in the guts of animals, in

54 Fr¿ncesco Stelluri, quored in G. Gelnrelr, Spigolatøru Deltapottiane, cít., p. 507.ss E. Joaønes oan Heeck (1519-?), Co-Foander of tbe Accad.enzia dei

Lincei. A eøå, <Medelelingen van het Nederlands Institut te Rome>>,xxxvm, 18.

, - . tu. c_ Gnrzrure ,_ claes: Rooß of an Eaidentinl Paradigtz, in claes, Mytbs and tlte Histoñcal

Metb^of, Enfl'. rrans- bv J. and A. Tedeschi, BaJtimore, Jõhns Hopkins u-niversity press, 19g9,pp. 96-125.

s? Ibid ,p. I02.

T

l,

I

l410 \ø- E¡{MON

the heavens, or ín the flight of birds to look into future. It was theforerunner of the psychoanalytic methodology, which, as Freud put it,<<is accustomed to divine secret and concealed things from unconsideredor unnotíced details, from the rubbish heap, as it were, of ourobservations>>.s8 Conan Doyle's fictional detective Sherlock Holmesused a similar method of interpretation when he looked for clues inmarginal data to reconstruct the circumstances of a crime.

Ítt. Greeks called this type of knowledge mÁtij, by whichthey meant a kind of practical intelligence based upon acquiredskill, experience, subtle wit, and quick judgement:- in-_ short,cunning.so MÁtij, or cunning intelligence, was entirely differentfrom philosophical knowledge. It applied in transient, shifting, and

ambiguous situations that did not lend themselves to precise

-.urrr..-.tt or rigorous logic. Its stratagems \¡/ere especially applicable

that woodworkers <<have to understand their wood by chiromancy of it,what it res his routethrough , winds, and

water. T of sYmPtoms

in order Primed with

were no ready-made rules {or success, and where agiJty, intuition,and quick judgement wefe more valuable intellectual traits than f.agfity

radigm contrasted sharply with philosophicalGrèek philosophy posed a rz'ðicd. dichotomy

f being and becoming, between the intelligible and

s8 Ibid. , p.99.se M. DErm¡lNr, J.-P. VønNe.m, Cunninglntelligence iø Greek Cøltare and Society, EngI.

trans. byJ. Lloyd, Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 1991.

oo Quoted in M. A. Baxmoer,r,, The Limewood Sculptors of Renaissønce Genrzany, NewHaven, Yale University Press, 1980, p. 32.

Science as a Hunt 4tr

the sensible. The sphere of being, the unchanging, was the domain oftrue and definite knowledge. The sphere of becoming, of the sçnsibleand the unstable, was tñe world

-of changing opifuon.ól MÁtij or

conjectural knowledge, which is oriented toward the sensible world ofbecoming rather than the intelligible world of being, can have no placein the realm of philosophy understood this way. Hence the conjecturalparadígm was pushed into the background by philosophy, erased fromthe realm of knowledge and relegated, according to the circumstances,to speculation, opínion, or charlatanry. Plato condemned all knowledgebased on experience, conjecture, and practical skills, whether it be inmedicine, divination, or the crafts. Such knowledge, he maintained,cannot be the object of exact science, whose domain is the absolute andthe measurable. \X/hle fuistotelian philosophy rehabilitated some formsof conjectural knowledge (e.g., prudence), it did not accept that suchknowledge could become the basis of science.

\ühereas the classical concept of truth dominated scholasticdiscussions of method, the venatic paradigm reemerged inseventeenth-century discussions of scientific method. Many naturalphilosophers rejected the classical idea that only rigorous logic andexact measurement could provide scientific knowledge. Such methods,they argued, offered few insights into the changing, shifting world ofbecoming. OnIy through experiments v¡as it possible to make knownthe vast regions of unknown nature. The hunt metaphor was usedincreasingly as natural philosophers attempted to elucidate and tovindicate experimentalism. The French savant Pierre Gassendidescribed scientific discovery as a way of <<sagaciously>> (sagaciter)examining nature, looking for clues or signs (rnedia) that will lead thesearcher to the hidden aspects of nature. Knowledge, he wrote, can beeither about things manifest oi hidden. The trurh rhar naturalphilosophy seeks <<is not of manifest things since that is publicknowledge; nor is it of totally hidden things Qtenitus occultae) sínce ourignorance of them is invincible>>. Rather, it is about things that areeither temporarily hidden (occultae ad tempus) because of some obstaclesuch as distance, or that are nat:urally hidden (occultae natula), <whichcannot become evident by their own nature, or by themselves, butwhich we can nevertheless somethingelse>. Although vze cannot ly, we canknov¡ them by means of si . Gassendi

ór M. Drrmrxe, J.-P. Vrnr,tr.rr, Cunninglntelligence..., cit-, pp.308318.

I

412 \ø. EAMON

compared this method to that of the dog who hunts for hidden game byfinding a footprínt (uestigiurn) or by picking up the scent (subod.orarcdo)

of the prey, and by sniffing hís way to where the game is hiding. <Thismust be something we already know (prirno notuftx) and may be called a

sign since it leads us to the knowledge of something hidden in the waythat tracks are a sort of sign indicating to a dog which way he shouldpursue the chase in order to catch the quarrp>.62 Although the secretsof nature are hidden from the senses, Gassendi maintained, we canknow them by their traces.ó3

The most detailed elaboration of the hunt metaphor came, notsurprisingly, from Sir Francis Bacon, whose philosophy of science wewíIl examine more closely later on. Describing the experimentalmethodology he called <dearned experience>>, Bacon compared it to<<Pan's hunt>>, after the ancient god of hunting. According to thelegend, Pan, while hunting, accidentally discovered the hidden goddessCeres when all the other higher gods failed in their quest after her.Bacon interpreted the myth to mean that

the discovery of things useful to life [...] is not to be looked for from theabstract philosophies, as it were the greater gods, no not though they devotetheit whole powers to that special end - but only from Pan; that is fromsagacious experience and the universal knowledge of natute, which v¡ill oftenby a kind of accident, and as it wete while engaged in hunting, stumble uponsuch díscoveries.6a

As a scientific methodology, Pan's hunt proceeds from oneexperiment to another, as if being guided by an invisible hand, in thesame v/ay a hunter racks his prey deliberately, step by step, guided byfootprints and signs. Bacon called this method <<a sagacity and a kind of

62 P. G¡.ssew¡r, Syntøgna philosophicum, in Operc onnia, 6 vols., Stuttgart, F¡iedtichFrommann Yelag, 1964, vol. I, pp. 68-69, 120-l2l; fo., Selecteà Vlork, ed. a¡d t¡ans. by C. B.Brush, New York, Johnson Reprint Corp., 1972, pp. 290-291, t67-368. See also M. Cwtzzt,Metafore uenatorie..., cit., pp 107-111.

63 To illustrate how the mind <<deduces the existence of something not perceived by thesenses ftom some other thíng which is petceived by the senses>>, Gassendi gives the example offinding out whether pores exist in the skin: <<Despite the fact that they are not perceived by thesenses, reason ptoves that they exist on the gror:nds that if they did not, no passage would lieopen for the sweat that passes frorn the inside outward and is perceived by the senses> (P.

Gessenor, Operøonnia,cit.,vol.I,p.1.22;In.,SelectedVlotks,cit.,p.372).ó4 F. BA.coN, De Sapientia Veten'rm, cit., p.7L3. Bacon thought the myth of Pan was <bíg

almost to bursting with the sec¡ets and mysteries o{ Natu¡e>>. For discussion, see P' Rossr,Francis Bacott, cit., pp. 98, 155.

Scieøce as a Hant 413

hunting by scent, rather than a science>>.ós The experimental scientist isa hunter of the secrets of nature (uenator nnturoe according toGassendi),ó6 whose 'sagacity' and vast experience enables him to seethings others cannot see. Instead of 'groping in the dark', he patientlyreads the minute signs and clues that will lead him to his prey hiding inthe dense thicket of experience.

The advent of the hunt metaphor in the scientific discourse of theearly modern period testifies to the emergence of a new conception ofthe aims and methods of science. Instead of viewing narurd. philosophyas a sort of hermeneutics - 'natural phlosophy without nature', as JohnMurdoch aptly charucterized late-medieval physics-intellectuals of theearly modern period tended to think of science as a search for new andunknown Íacts, or of causes concealed beneath nature's outerappearances.ó7 This conception of science rested, in turn, upon aredefinition of what constitutes scientific knowledge. In medíevalnatural phlosophy Íactual knowledge, or knowledge of individual,isolated events did not qualify as science unless it could bedemonstrated that such {acts occurred by logical necessity. Medievalnatural philosophers <had not dweh upon phenomena and objects thatdid not fit within existing theories>>.ó8 Facts were tucked snugly inunder the blanket of scientiø.

ìThereas in the scholastic tradition the aim of science was rodemonstrate the known, early modern scíence began to include amongits aims the discovery of new and 'curious' phenomena. As Baconexpressed it, Aristotle's practice <<was not to seek information fromunfettered experiment but to exhibit experíence captive and bound. Hedid not introduce a wide impartial survey of experience to assist hisinvestigation of truth; he brought in a carefully schooled and selectedexperience to justify his conclu'síons>.óe In early modern science,

_ ut F.. Becot, De aøgrnentis scientiaran, ín \(orks, vol. I, p. 63Jt tîans. vol. IV, p. 421.Bacon's discussion oÍ experientia literata occrrs n ibii., vol. I, pp.- 623-633.

0ó F. Becou, Opera omnia, cit., vol. I, p. 1,26.

0a L. Desrorv, Tbe Factual Sensibility, <<Isis>>, LXXIX, 19gg, pp. 452-46j: 465.

_ _un Th" Refaøtion of Philasoplties, in B. F¡¡nnqcroN, The phitosophy of Bacon. An Essay onIts Deoelopment from 7603 to 7609, Chicago, University of Chicago e."ìr, Ue+, p. flO.

6t,

I

4t4

particularly in the Baconian tradition, facts in the sense of novel,unexplained åata began to take on powerful significance. As LorraineDaston has noted, Baconian science focused attention upon theparticulars and the anomalies of nature; by cataloguing discontinuitieswithin an assumed natural order, it gave rise to a 'factualsensibilty'.7o In the natural magic tradition, such novel, previouslyunnoticed facts were signs ('signatures') that might guide investigatorsto nature's deepest arcana. Such 'clues' were often marginal,apparently irrelevant, details. Della Porta wrote, <<True things be theynever so small, will give occasions to discover greater things bythem>>.71

To these contrasting images of science -one as logicaldemonstration and the other as a hunt- corresponded radicallydifferent images of nature. One conceived of nature as

^ geometrical

cosmos, a work of God who framed the world ftunzero, pondere, etrtensura, a rcality whose essential features could be known by reason.The other viewed nature as a dense forest, an uncharted domain, alabyrínth in which method offered but a thin thread to orient oneself,<<as if the dívine nature enjoyed the kindly innocence of suchhide-and-seek, hidíng only in order to be found>>.72 Renaissancenatural philosophy stressed nature's bounty, variety, andchangeableness. <<The infinite multitude of things is incompre-hensible>>, wrote Della Potta <<more than a man may be able tocontemplate>>.73 Bacon compared matter to the ancient god Proteus,who dwelt in an immense cave and who constantly changed his shapeto avoid capture.T4 Galileo thought nature's effects were so myriadthat many existed <<not only unknown but unimaginable>.7s Notingthat experiments often lead to unexpected and surprising tesults,Galileo observed <<hov¡ conclusions that are true may seem improbableat first glance, and yet when only some small thing is pointed out,

70 L. DrsroN, Tbe Føctual Sexsìbility, cit., p. 465.71 G. B. Drr.ur Ponr,t, Nøarøl MagicÞ, New York, Basic Books, 1957, Preface. Bacon

wrote, <<It often comes to pass that mean and small things discover great better than great candiscove¡ small> (F. Becor, De aagmentis scientiarurn, cit., p. 297).

72 F. BAcoN, Thouglt* and, Concl,t¿sions, tn B. Farrittgton, The Pltilosopby of Bacon, ctt., p.92. On this, see P. Rossr, The Aristotelians and tlte 'Modems', cr:t.

73 G. B. Der.re Ponr,l, Nataral Magìck, cít., Preface.74 F. BÂcoN, De sapientia oeter*tz, cit., pp. 725-726;l¡., De augnentis scientiaram, cit., in

V/orþs, cit., vol. III, pp. 3i3.7s F. Dn¡xs, Discooeries and Opinions of Galileo, cít., p. 258.


they cast off their concealing cloaks and, thus naked and simple,gladly show off their secrets>>.7ó

According to the epistemology of the hunt, since nature's secretswere hidden beyond the reach of ordinary sense perception, they had tobe sought out by extraordinary means. Instruments had to be made, forexample, which would enable researchers to <<look out at and look into>>(auspicit et inspicit) nature, as the motto of the Líncean Academyexpressed it. Experiments had to be devised that would enableresearchers to penetrate nature's interior, <<twisting the lion's tale>> tomake her cry out her secrets. As Bacon expressed it, nature, likeProteus, had to be constrained by experiments that forced it out of itsnatwal condítion, for <<the secrets of nature reveal themselves morereadily under the vexations of. at than when they go their orür'n way>>.

Finally, ne'ù/ methods of reasoning had to be found to take the place ofscholastic logíc, which according to the early moderns rü/as incapable ofreaching the inner recesses of nature and laying bare its secrets. <<Beforewe can reach the remoter and more hidden parts of nature)>, Bacon\Ã/rote, <<it is necessary that a more perfect use and application of thehuman mind and intellect be introduced>>.77

4. Becox AND THE Huur op PnN

In the Nouun Organum, Bacon described the difficulty of knowingnature in the following way:

The universe to the eye of the human understanding is ftamed like alabyrinth, on every side so many ambiguities of way, suchdeceitful r ts and signs, natures too irregular in their linesand so kn And then the way is still to be made by the

ometimes clouded over,while those who offero p:uzzled, and increase

Nature's opaqueness was a source of profound discouragement to

7ó G. G,trrer, Tuo Neu Sciences, Engl. trans. by S. Drake, Madison, University ofrWisconsin Press, 1974, p. 14.zz F. BecoN, Nouun Organarn, cit., in V/orks, cit., vol. IY, p. 95.78 Ibid., p. 18.

\./. EAMON

416 Tø. EAMON

ìt.

I

I

,

I

I

i

i

I

natural philosophers, thought Bacon. For whenever they try to weavetheir way through the labyrinth of natue, they <fall to complaíntsabout the subtlety of nature, the hiding places of rruth, the obscurity ofthings, the entanglement of causes, the weakness of the humanmind>>.7e Too easily they bow to authorities instead of striking out ontheir own. The empirics, on the other hand, commit themselves to the<<waves of experience>> and proceed without any method at all. Naturalphilosophy was in the same situation as navigation before the inventionof the compass:

As in former ages, when men saíIed only by observation of the stars, theycould indeed coast along the shores of the old continent or cross a few smalland Meditemanean seas; but before the ocean could be ffaversed and the newworld discovered, the use of the mariner's needle had to be found out; in likemanner the discoveries v¡hich have been hitherto made in the arts and sciences[...ì lay near to the senses and immediately beneath common notions; butbefore we can reach the remoter and more hidden parts of natute, it isnecessary that a more perfect use and application of the human mind andintellect be introduced.80

In circumstances so difficult we cannot hope for success by relyingupon authorities, Bacon insisted, nor by simply experimenting in arandom fashion. <<No excellence of wit, no repetition of chanceexperiments, can overcome such difficulties as these>, he wrote. <<Our

steps must be guided by a clue, and the whole way from the very firstperception of the senses must be laid out upon a sure plan>.81

Bacon devoted the bulk of his work De øugrnentis scientiarurn toelaborating such a methodology of discovery. He referred to hismethodology as <<learned experience>> (experientia literata) or, using a

{avorite simile, the <<Hunt of Pao>. The method v¡as meant to giveorder and direction to experimentation, so that scientists would nothave to waste time <groping in the dark>>.82 Learned experienceproceeds by anaTogy from experiments that produce known results tounknown situations in which similar experiments might prove equallyfruitful. According to this method, <<new knowledge is discovered by

7e Ibid.,p.16.80 lbid., p. 18. Cf. F. B.tcon, De aagmentis scientinrum, cit., p. 408; Io., Tboughx and

Conclusions, in B. F¡nnr¡leroN, Tbe Philosopby of Bacon, cit., p. 92.81 Ibil.., p. L8.8z F. B¡,coN, De augrnentis sciefltiarunt, cit., p- 473.

Sciexce as a Hønt 417

ingenious adaptation of existíng knowledge, rathü than by formalinference from fundamental principlest>.83

,{lthough Bacon characterized learned experience as an inductivemethodology, he did not mean induction as it was commonlyunderstood, which was to him <<a peurile thing fthat] leads ro noresult>>.s4 The traditional ínterpretation of Baconian induction as a

mechanical procedure advancing by minute degrees from theobservation of particulars to the formulation of general laws is far fromthe method Bacon actualTy recommended. The methodology he had in

to the discovery of how nature works. Such clues, which Bacon called

83 For a detailed discussion of Bacon's methodology of 'learned experience', see L. Jen¡rNr,Fra*cis,Bacon: Discoaery and the Art of Discoarse, Lóndon-New yorÈ, cambiidge universityPress, 1974, pp. 1.43-749.

, p. 25. Bacon's 'inductivism' has been the subject ofers of science. For a summary of recent controversies,ce in the Scienffic Reoolation, in D. Lnorrnc, R. S.ientific Reuolation, CambÅðgq Cambridge University

, In Defence of Band Philosophy of<British Journal of

analogy, see K.

_ 8ó F. BtcoN, Nouum Organan, cit., Book Il, pp. 155-246. See-also L. J*nwr., FrancisBacon..., cit., pp. 724-126.

87 F. Brcox, Nouun Orgønant, cit., p.203.

5

4t8 !JI, EAMON

reign. <<The understanding must not [...] be allowed to jump and fly fromparticulars to axioms remote and of almost the highest generalitp>.Rather, it should proceed gradually by successive steps from particularsto lesser axioms, and from lesser axioms to generalities. Nor was learnedexperience intended merely to produce more experiments, but to lead<<by an unbroken route through woods of experience to the open groundof axioms>>.88

In an important sense, Baconian induction was an attempt totranslate mAtij - whether it be the artisan's cunning or the naturalmagician's intuition - into a method. As we have seen, mAtij was a kindof knowledge for which no recognized method existed in thephilosophicJ radition. For the ancient philosophers, mÁtij, orconjecture, was nothing more than guesswork, which could not possiblylead to certainty. Bacon's learned experience, by contrast, wasessentially an attempt to define a rigorous methodology for conjecturingfrom the seen to the unseen aspects of nature, and ftom effects tocauses. Thus Bacon condemned divination and natural magic, whichsupposedly conjectured by a kind of intuition or cunning that wasbeyond ordinary intelligence. He wanted to reduce cunning to a rule,and to provide an orderly and systematic way of proceeding fromparticulars to axioms. This required extensive experience with nature,which could only be gained through the combined efforts of manyresearchers working together. Such efforts, Bacon believed, wouldenable researchers to discover in experiments clues that would lead themto nature's interior, just as Pan, having long experience in the ways ofnature, fell upon Ceres apparently by accident, but in reality by a kindof 'sagacity'. This is why Bacon called his method <<a sagacity and a kindof hunting by scent, rather than a science>>.8e Only in Bacon's scheme

Pan's 'sagacity' would be replaced by learned experience, an orderlymethod that began with the compilation of experiments andobservations, then proceeded to the discovery of prerogative instances,and finally ended with the eduction of axioms and laws of nature.

5. Tnr Huur pon N,trune's Srcn¡ts rN THE New PHrLosoPHrES

The eatly modern natural philosophers often distinguishedthemselves from the medieval scholastícs by insisting that instead of

88 Ibid., pp.97, 81.8e F. BAcoN, De aøgnentis scimtiatatz, cit., p. 427

Science as a Hurzt 4t9

basing their scíence upon common-sense observations, they attemptedto discover the'hidden causes of things'. Thus Bacon criticized thescholastics for ending their investigations <<where sight ceases [...].Hence all the working of the spirits enclosed ín tangible bodies lie hidand unobserved. [...] And yet unless these [...] things [...] be searchedout and brought to light, nothing great can be achieved in nature>>.eo

Natural philosophers must be like lynxes, Francesco Stelluti declared,<<seeing not only that which is on the outside, but also that which ishidden inside>>.el Sir lØalter Raleigh pointed out that <<the schoolmenwere rather curious in the nature of terms, and more subtile in thedistinguishing upon the parts of doctrine already laid down, thandiscoverers of any thing hidden>>.e2 Logic was unhelpful for finding outnew things, he asserted. Experiment alone (by which he meant naturalmagic), gave access to nature's interíor and revealed the 'secretsof nature'. Raleigh contrasted the <brabblings of the Aristotelians>>with the methods of natural magic, <which bringeth to light theinmost vírtues, and draweth them out of Nature's hidden bosome tohumane use>>.93

As these passages suggest, the epistemology of science as a huntrested upon a distinction between knowledge of nature gained bycommon sense, which only revealed nature's outer appearances, versusknowledge of the inner causes of phenomena. Early modern naturalphilosophers understood this difference in terms of the distinctionbetween manifest and occult qualities, a problem that was at the focusof heated controversy in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. KeithHutchison has pointed our rhat the program of the new philosophies ofthe seventeenth century was to explain occult qualities in mechanicalterms rather than banishing them from the dominion of science, asthe new philosophers claimed scholastic science had done. In otherwotds, seventeenth-century natural philosophers sought mechanicalexplanations for phenomena which, they insisted, the scholastics

- :o Io., Nouun Organum, .i!., p. 58. CÍ. ibid., vol. II, p. 380; F. Becor, Thotghx ard.Conclasions, in B. F¡r¡¡,rcroN, Philosoplry of Bacon..., cit., p. 86.

el Quoted in D. C¡nurrr, Brcoe storia..., cit., p. 8.

_ :: \ø RlmreH, History of the V/orld, L1.7, in The Vorþs, 8 vols., New york, BurtFranklin, 1965, vo1. II, pp. 16-17.

,--. e3 Ibi|.r op. 284-85. See also P. M. R¡rr,rNsr, Atcheny and Natural Magic in Raleigþ,s

'History of the \hrlà'. <<Ambix>,XlIl, 1966, pp. 122-738.

420

e6 Ibid., pP.242-248.e? \(/. CH¡xmroN, Phjsiologid

Nataral, IJpon the Hgpothesis of Atons,

too much emphasis on the importance of sensation, and failed to solve

the central epistemological paradox posed by occult qualities: How cana science based on ,ãor. þ.t..ption handie agenciãs which by verydefinition are insensible?>>es

Far from banishing occult qualities, if anything the newphilosophers banished manifest qualities.argued, but are nevertheless knowable.eóCharleton maintained that to the casual o

Nature are meer Secrets>>.e7 Joseph Glanvill made precisely the same

most obvious and open to the Sense, as to their Effects>>, wtoteCharleton, <<may yet b. r.-ot. and in the dark to the Understanding,_

as to their Canseso. Charleton denounced the Aristotelian doctrine of

Science as a Hant 42L

occult qualities, which he claimed the scholastics used as a refuge tohide their ignorance of causes. <<That ill-contrived Sanctuary ofIgnorance, .álled occul-T QUATITIES>, he argued, prevented thesãhohstics from ínvestig ting nature's hidden workings:

Instead of setting their Curiosity on work to investigate the Causes [of a

probleml, they lay it in a deep sleep, with that infatuating opium of Ignote

Qualities; and yet expect that men should believe them to kno'¡' all that is tobe known, and to have spoken like Oracles [...]; though at the same instant,they do as much confess, that indeed they know nothíng at all. of its Natureand Causes. For, what difference is there, whether we say, that such a thing isOccult; ot that we know nothing of it.ee

In the new phílosophies, the concept of occu-lt qualities was not anending point but a beginning of inquiry. However, the newphilosophers maintained that the opaqueness of nature preventedreason from plumbing its depths. <<Nature is an immense Ocean,rvherein are no Shallows, but all Depths>>, wrote Charleton, <<and thoseingenious Petsons, who have but once attempted her with the soundingIine of Reason, will soon confess their despair of profounding her>>.r0o

Similarly Glanvill pointed out that only nature's grosser ways ofworking are sensíble. Her machinery is forever hidden from theunaided senses:

Nature is set a going by the most subtil and ltidden Instruments; which itmay be have nothing obøioas which resembles them. Hence judging by visibleappearances, we are discouraged by supposed Irnpossibilities which to Natureare none, but within her Spear of Action. And therefore what shews only theoutside, and sensible structure of Nature; is not likely to help us in finding outthe Magrcalia.lol

But if occult qualities were in principle knowable, as the newphilosophers claimed, by what means might they be known? If reasonand the unaided senses were incapable of unlocking the door to'nature's workshop', where was the key to that locked door to befound?

Seventeenth-century natural philosophers were in general agreement

ee \7. Cs¡p¿¡roN, Physiotogia Epicøro-Gassendo-Charltoniaxa, ..., cit., pp. 342-3.100 iana, p. 5.In the same work, Chaleton called

upon ex thick Cu¡tain of obscurity, which yet hangsbetwixt

r01 J. Greuvnr, Scepsis sciextifica, cit., pp. ß2-ß).

Iùø. EAMON

ea K. Hurcnrso¡t,'What Happened to Occ*lt Qualities in tbe Scientific Reuoløtion? <<Isis>>,

LXXII, L982, pp. ill-Z>1. In'addition, see B. CopsNHwøx, Tbe Occultis-t Ttadition in-{*ri*irr¡' Cäìrli pl';t".phy, ^ M. Ávsns, D. G¡,nssn (eds'), Cqrybtid'g Uitø'v gfS*r'n¿e"nllt-C"øoty'Pltilosophy,'(iorthcoming); and A. M. Srørru, Knou.ti,ttgTbings Inyd: Oat: the

Sc;eitlflc Reuolutilotz from'a'Meidieual PerspTctioe, <<Amerícan Historical Review>>, XCV, 1990,

pp.726-744.es H. HutcnrsoN,'What Happened' to Occ*lt Qualities?..., cít., p.215'

or a Fabrick of Sciettce1966, p.341.York, Johnson Reprint

eE J. GL,tNvt-L, Scepsis scientifica, New York, Garland Press, 1978, p- 133.

422 !ø. EA¡yION

that access to nature's secrets could be gained only by adopting atwo-fold strategy that consisted of right method combined withi¡struments to aid the senses. The English Paracelsian John \üebsterexpressed a view of peripatetic philosophy that most proponents of thenew philosophy would have accepted. The princþal defect of scholasticnatural philosophy was its superficiality, !üebster argued, for it <<is onlyconversant about the shell, and husk lof nature], handling theaccidental, external and recollacious qualities of things, confusedly, andcontinually tumbling over obscure, ambiguous, general and equivocalterms, [...] but in no way consorting or sympathizing with natureitself>>. Getting at <<nature itself> was only possible by experiment, <<the

only certain means [...] to discover and anatomize nature's occult andcentral operations>>. Although -ü/ebster's Paracelsianism and hisvigorous defence of natural magic were somewhat out of step with thenew philosophy, many contemporaries concurred with his assessment ofthe Aristotelians, urho, \Webster observed, <think they can argue DameNature out of her secrets, and that they need no other key butSyllogisns to unlock her Cabineo>.102

Instead of expecting nature to <<follow us into our Chambers, andthere in idlenesse communicate her secrets unto us)>, the nes/philosophers insisted that nature had to be interrogated by methodicalinquiry and 'anatomized' by experiment. In the 1680s, Robert Hooke,the Royal Society of London's curator of experiments, formulated adetailed set of research princíples to guide the Society's oirtuosi.Hooke's General Sclterne, or ldea of tbe Prcsent State of NaturalPbilosopby embodies many of the ideals of the new experimentalphilosophy of the seventeenth century. In spite of numerousimprovements over scholasticism, he asserted, natural philosophy wasstill defective and in need of reform. In attempting to account for thesedefects, Hooke noted that humans gain information about nature solelyby sensations. The senses, however, are deficient because they only giveus information about natute's exterior. i

Man is not indued with an intuitive Faculty, to see farther into the Natureof things at first, than the Superficies and out-sides, and so must go a longway about before he can be able to behold the Internal Nature of things.

Hooke maintained that logic was useful for some purposes, but

r02 J. \üEBsrER, Acaileniarun Exanen [L653], pp. 67-8, in A. Dr¡us (ed.), Science øndEducatioøinthe Set)enteeflth Celttl,try: the'Vebster-'VardDebaæ,1-andon, MacDonald, L970,p. L49.

Science as a Høat 423

as to the Inquiry into Natutal Operations, what are the Kinds of sectet and

subtile Actois, and what the abstruse and hidden Instruments and Engines

there made us. of, may be; It seems not, to me, as yet at oJl adapted and

wholly deficient.lo3

Hooke contended that to overcome these deficiencies natwaJ.

knowledge is sensation, he argued, we must first ensure that the mindis supplied with accurate sense information. The natural defects of thesenses first had to be identified, and then ways of overcoming thosedefects had to be found. Hooke proposed making a detailedexamination of the sensual faculties so that natural philosophers wouldhave a better understanding of the limitations of empirical knowledgeand how these limitations might be corrected. He then outlined a

method for collecting empirical data, aranging them into tables andhistories, and preparing them for the induction of axioms. Not only arethe unaided senses inadequate, he observed, but nature itself isdeceptive. Hence even when our perceptions are accurate, they cannotalways be taken at face value. Experiments would help surmount thisproblem. In the hunt for the secrets of nature, wrote Hooke, <<the

footsteps of Nature are to be tlac'å, not only inher ord,inary course,butwhen she seems to be put to her shifts, to make many d,oublings andturnings, and to use some kind of art in endeavouring to avoid ourdiscovery>. The experimental grethodology Hooke proposed v¡asessentially the same as Bacon''s learned experience, although hisexplication of the method was informed by an intimate familiarity withthe nuances andhazards of experimention.l0s

In addition to proper experimental methods, Hooke maintainedthat the senses had to be armed with instruments to enhance their

103 R. Hoolc, Geaerul Schene, or Idea of the Presext State of Nøtutal PbilosopbJ, :u;^Ir.., TbePosthønous Vorks of Robert HooÞ.e, ed. by R. Valler, New Yo¡k, Johnson Reprint Corp., 1969,pp. 8, 6.

roa Ibid., p. 7 .

tos R. Hooxr, Microg;raphiø: or Sorne Plrysiological Descþtions of Minute Bod.ies Madc byMagnifyixg G/zsses, New York, Dover Publications, 796l,Prcface.

424

such instruments were theimportant fteatise on the

e argued that wíth the aid of

the, subtilty of the composition of Bodies, rhe strucrure of thei¡ parrs, thevarious texture of their matter, the instruments and manner of their inwardmotions, and all the other possible appea may come to bemore fully discovered; all which the- ãnc were conrenr rocomptehend in two general and [...] useless nd Form.

Hooke was optimistic that the microscope would reveal themechanical causes of phenomena, enabling nãtwal philosophers to<<discern all the secret workings of Nature, almost in the tum. m"nner

find some reason to effects of Bodies, which have beencommonly attributed those confess'd to be occult, arcperfotm'd by the sm ture, which are not to be discern'dwithout these heþs, seeming the meer products of Motion, Figure, anð.Magnitude.loT

\T. EAMON

106 Io., General Scbeme..., øt., pp.45-62.107 Io., Micrographia..., at., Pteføce. Cf. J. Graxvnr, Vaøity of Dognatiziøg..., cit., pp. 5-6.

Science as ¿ Hunt 425

Henry Power, another champion of the microscope, pointed outthat the invisible aspects wn, are <<the

things that govern Natur e microscopewould enable the oirtuo wits of theAtomical and Corpuscularian Philosophers durst but imagíne, even thevery Atoms and their reputed Indivisibles and least realities of Mafter,[...] and those infinite, insensible Corpuscles which daily produce rhoseprodigious (though common) effects amongst us>>. Armed with themicroscope, Power asked, <,who can set a non-ultra to lnaturalphflosophy'sl endevours?>>108

Like Bacon, Hooke attempted . to elucidate a method whereby

discon.ry would not have to depend upôn the genius or cunning of afew investigators, but would rely instead upon the dedicated work ofteams of tesearchers. !7ith the newasserted, discovery <<'u¡ill not be so mua serious and industríous Prosecutionthe schools worked in the oppositescholastics grounded their docüines on a few observations and studied<<more to gain Applause and make themselves admired, or the Head of

108 lbid. See also C. nØnsoN, Visaal Sarface axd Vßøal Synbol: the Microscope and the Occultin Earþ Mod,ern Science, <<Jotu:naT of the Histãry of ldeas>>, Xí, USS, pp. a:-ióá:

"-- -

tos H. Powrn, Experimetø I philasop hy, London, 1664, sig. b2-c3.lto R. Hoorc, Postbamoøs 'WorÞs, cit., pp.7,4.rrl J. Grlnvnl, Scepsis sciextifica, preface, sþ. cl.

426 Tø. EAMON

6. Tnn SEcnEts or N¡,runn AND THE Scrr,Nrn'rc Rrvoruuotl

The repeated references to the hunt for the 'sectets of nature' inthe scientific literature of the seventeenth century should not be

dismissed as mere thetoric. Far from being a mere hackneyed metaphor,the continual appearance of that well-worn phrase indicates a

fundamental shift in the direction of natural philosophy. The conceptof nature's 'seclets' - i.e., the idea that the mechanisms of nature'ü/erehidden beneath the exterior appearances of things - was the foundationof the new phflosophy's skeptical outlook, and of its insistence upongetting to the bottom of things through active experimentation anddisciplined observation. The scholastics had been too trusting of theirsenses, the new philosophers asserted. Their naive empiricism was

responsible for the erroneous belief that nature exhibits her truecháracter on the outside. Moreover, scholastic phlosophy's inclinationto accept at face value whatevet the unaided senses revealed had givenrise to the sterile science of elements and qualities. In reality, the newphilosophers declared, natureundisciplined senses do notmakes nâture tick any more thhow the clock works. All thephilosophy \¡/ere but chimeras based upon unreliable empiricalfoundations.

The rejection of fuistote- its assumption that natuleessential precondition of the'secfets of nature' was onesciences', which according to Thomas Kuhn emerged simultaneouslywith the revolution in the classical sciences.llz This new cluster ofscientific interests, Kuhn argued, v¡as chaructetized by theaccumulation of observations and experiments rather than therevolutionary overthrow of existing paradigms. To the extent that these

sciences existed at all prior to the Scientific Revolution, he maifitained,

tr2 Ib;d., sþ.b2o.

Science as ø Haxt 427

whose paradigms were completely overthrown, the Baconian sciences

.*.r*.ã from a'pre-paradigm' condition. I 13

K-"uhn's thesis, which is based l*g.b upon a 'Copernícan

Revolution' model of the Scientific Revolution, seems to me todiminish the revolutionary significance of the Baconian sciences. Forthe ,Aristotehan pbilosophy of na.tufe was no less entrenched in thescholastic curriculum than were the 'quadrivial', or mathematical,

boundaries of research, this exclusion, I have argued, was one of theessential features of the Aristote]ian paradigm. In contrast to scholasticnatural phlosophy, which accepted the visible qualities of nature as realand excluded occult qualities from the domain of science, the newphilosophy made explanation of occult qualities one of its goals. Theinnet 'secrets of nature', not nature's outer appeafances, became theobject of the new science. The qhrust of the new philosophies was toexplain all physical change in terms of the motions of insensibleparticles. Manifest qualities became 'secondary qualities', hence occultqualities in the sense that they were considered to be the effects ofoccult causes. However, even if the causes of such phenomenaremained elusive, it was nevertheless possible to establish naturaleffects experimentally. In spite of its skepticism, the experimentalphilosophy could establish 'matters of fact'. The new philosophers didnot consider such experimental 'matters of fact' as ends in themselves,but, provided the propet method were followed, as the 'traces' ofnature that would lead to hidden cduses.lls

These considerations may give us a better understanding of the'Baconian' research programs of the Royal Society and otherseventeenth-centrüy scientific organizations. It is misleading to regardthe Royal Society's activities as involving merely random

113 T. S. Kv:uN, Mathematical enøl Tøditions in tlte Detelopment of PlrysicalScience, in The Essentiøl Tensiox: in Scientific Trcdition and Change, Chicago,University of Chicago P¡ess, 1977, pp.3t-65.

114 On tlús, see rùØ. E,rvoru, Science and. the Secreß of Nat*te..., cit., chap.2.lls On experimental 'mattets of fact' in he Royal Society, see S. Sn¡pnr, S. Scrm¡rBn,

Leaiathan and the Air-Pttrnp. Hobbes, Boylc, aød the Expeñmenøt Life, Pttnceton, PrinceronUniversity Press, 1985.

428 !ø. EAMON

experimentation and indiscriminate collection of 'curious' facts. Manyof the apparently random experiments performed by the airtuosi wercactually directed at the investigation of occult qualities - in Baconianjargon, the <hidden causes of things>>. The premise of the Society'sresearch program was that passive observation was incapable of seeingbeyond the surface of things. OnIy by experiment and disciplinedobservation was it possible to anive at a knowledge of causes. Whenthe new philosophers attacked occult qualities, they were attacking thescholastic doctrine of occult qualities, which they regarded as a refugefor ignorance that ended ínvestigation: it was the ne plus altra oÍscholasticism. For the Baconians, however, occult qualities were thebeginning point of experimental research. The fervent interest ínalchemical and 'hermetic' subjects in the early Royal Society, to whichrecent tesearch has called attention, v¡as not an eccentric deviationfrom the Society's 'scientific' research.lló Such interests were linked tothe Society's concern with unveiling the 'secrets of nature', and werepart and parcel of the Baconian program. As John Henry has pointedout, <<the investigation and demonstration of occult qualities in matter[...] were major factors in establishing experimentalism as the safest andsurest way to truth in natural philosophy>>.117

The Royal Society's fascination with monsters, 'singularities', and'curiosities' sheds additional light on the emergence of the Baconiansciences. A casual perusal of any of the volumes of the eady Society's<Philosophical Transactions>> will turn up dozens of reports of. bízaneoccurances and curiosities. This omnivorous fact-gathering,notwithstanding the pleasure it reportedly brought the airtuosi, was a

serious part of the Baconian approach to finding out the 'secrets ofnature'. According to Bacon, nature exists in three states: in herordinary course (the liberty of nature); forced out of her ordinarycourse by the <<perversity and insubordination of matter>>, as in theproduction of monsters (the errors of nature); and constrainedand molded by art (the bonds of nature). Natural history wastherefore threefold. In addition to amassing histories of 'natute's

normal productions, Bacon urged the compilation of histories of themechanical arts and o{ nature's anomalies and monsters.ll8 All thebizane

tto Q¡ ¡fi5 aspect of the Royal Society's activities, see T. K. Hoeerrv, Tbe Natarc of theEarþ Royal Society, <BritishJournal for the History of Science>>, IX, 1976, pp. l-24,243-273-

117 J. Hrrnv, Occult Qaalities and. the Expeiruentøl Pbilasophy: Actfue Pri*cþlcs inPre-Neutoxian MatærTheory, <<llistory of Science>>, XXIV, 1986, pp. J35-18L:163.

rr8 F. BAcoN, Parasceue, in Vorks, cit., vol. IY , p. 25).

Science ¿s a Huøt 429

objects and rarities that had fascinated and delighted visitors tothe Renaissance curiosity-cabinets became urgently relevant to theBaconian scientific enterprise. 1 le

nØhat have ostrich eggs, two-headed calves, and Indian featherworkto do wíth the Scientific Revolution? Such curiosities \¡/ere an essential

natural histories. T to thethat charucterized Such

sible clues and out- at theBaconians believed would lead to a knowledge of hidden causes. Amongthe 'prerogative instances' Bacon encouraged assembling were those hecalled 'singular instances'. Bacon was contemptuous of those who would<<go no further than to pÍonounce such things the secrets and mightyworks of natute, things as it were causeless, and exceptions to the generalrules>>. He '¡'as confident that such 'rniracles of nature' might beunderstood in terms of universal causes: <<For we are not to give up theinvestigation until the properties and qualities found in such things as

may be taken for miracles of nature be reduced and comprehended undersome form or fixed law>>.120 Bacon also urged collecting 'deviatinginstances', that is, the <<errors, vagaries, and prodigies of nature>>. Likethe former, they correct the erroneous impressions we have gotten ofnature by basing our generalizations rrpon ão*-on phenomenã and toofew instances. Such anomolies were the 'traces' that, lf properly read,would lead to the discovery of hidden causes.

CoxcrusroN

Today, the metaphor of science as a hunt for the secrets of nature ismerely a cliché. It does not influenðe scientific discourse inany essentialway. \X/hile in popular literature the metaphor may serve to advertisescíence to laymen, it does not frame impoftant scientific questions. But itwas so during the period of the Scientific Revolution. To the newphilosophers of the seventeenth century, the hunt for nature's 'secrets'-its inner workings - 'was the very goal of scientific inquiry and theconcept that separated their enterprise from that of the scholastics. I

_ lre The Royal Sociery's inte¡ests in curiosities is discussed by M. Hulrea, The CabinetIn-*itutionalized:, the Royal Society's 'Repository' and Ix Back[ror¿nd, tn O. Iupev, A.M¡cGn¡con (eds-), The Origins of ltiuseans.'.., cit.i pp. 159-168.

r20 F. B¡coN, Nooarz Orgznan, cit., p. 168

430 \ø. EAMON

have argued in this paper that the hunt metaphor framed early modernscientific discourse in essential ways. It did so, I suggested, because themetaphor evoked implications embraced by the cultural values of courtlysociety. These considerations will, I hope, serve as a caution agunstattributing the causes of the Scientific Revolution to such events as thebirth of capitalism or the rise of the middle class. Court culture continuedto exert its influence upon science in the eady modern era.

According to the phlosopher Max Black, metaphors are not merelyfigurative substitutions for concepts. Instead, they work interactively,evoking associations between different sets of ideas, and as a resultproduce new meanings. <<In this 'connection' resides the secret and themystery of metaphor)>.121 The system of implications evoked by themetaphor transforms, filters, and organaes our view of the subject forwhich the metaphor stands. Thus to say that science is a hunt ís totransfet an entíre system of commonplaces associated with the culture ofhunting to the concept of science. Aspects of scientific practice that canbe expressed in 'hunt-language' will be rendered prominent, while thosethat cannot wíll be pushed into the background.

Hunting evoked a rich body of implications.t22 Iî medieval andRenaissance literature, hunting signified a quest for perfect love, forreligious or moral truth, and for salvation. The linking of the hunt to thequest tended to invest hunting with heroic traits. Moreover, hunting was

thought to have an ennobling effect on its practitioners. The signorialspoft par excellence, itgestute and ritual. Thepenetrated courtly versoaring gtace, speed, a

self-image. A predominantly male sport, hunting was regarded as a

necessary pastime for the rniles, ot warriot, because it strengthened hisbody and honed his martial skílls.

Muny asp..ts of the rich system of implications connected withhunting were ttansferred to science in the early modern period. The

-"t.nli¡. characteristics of the hunt implied a view of science as a male

r2r M. BLAcK, Modek ønd Metøphors,Íthaca, Cornell University Press, t962, p. 39.

Medianl Cbase, <Speculum>>, XLII, 1967, pp. 260-214.

Science as a Hant 43t

enterPrissousht tsubãued.excellentand as it were hound nature in her wanderings>>. He encouraged all <<true

sons of knowledge, [..'] that passing by the outer courts of nature,

[to] find a way at chambers>>. SimilarlyHenry Oldenburg, the iety of London, invitedsuitois with <<boldnes enetrate into Nature'santechamber to her inner closet>>.l24 As we have seen, the ídea of science

as auenatio also carried certain epistemological implications. The huntet'smethodology was of a special sort. It was both empirical and conjectural.The experímental scientíst, like the hunter, had to be a keen observer tounderstand the meaning of the signs and clues his prey, the 'secrets ofnature', left behind. 12s

In the seventeenth century, the metaphor of the hunt for nature'ssecrets was appropriated by the 'new philosophy' and combined withvarious mechanical and technological metaphors. Francis Bacon,contrasting scholastic disputation to experimental natural philosophy,spoke of penetrating the secrets of 'nature's workshop' in order tounderstand how nature was put togethet. Undedying this connotation ofthe 'secrets of natute' metaphor was the view that nature could beunderstood in mechanical terms as a set of invisible techniques natureemploys for producing its various sensible effects. Hence nature's 'innerworkings' might be replicated as one might replicate a technique byfollowing a recípe. This sense of the hunt metaphor set nerü/ research goalsfor early modern science. The new philosophers tejected the scholasticdoctrine of occult qualities on the grounds that it was, in \7alterCharleton's words, nothing more than a <<sanctuary of ignorance>>. Toconcede that nature's secrets were unknowable was to lay the intellect ina <<deep sleep>>. For Charleton and for many of his contemporaries, the

metaphors i see E-Birth, <<The Xl, 19

ons: the Face , <<Critic

,124 F- Bacon, Vorks, øt., pp.296,32; Oldenburg quoted by E. Fox Ker¿en, Secrets ofGod., Nattffe, and Life, <<History oÍ the Homan Sciencesr>,1II, 1990, p. 239.

on of t¡acks ari exacttange of pursuit, butr,n¡¡s, Tåa Hound. andp.34.

432 V. EAMON

yrays>>-Jz: The principle of aerunz facturn (maker's knowledge) limitsknowledge of the 'secrets of nature' to the world of reconitructablephenomena.l3o The ultimate 'secrets of nature' - in the sense of causes oressences - is reserved to God alone.

: it brought thescience shiftedof nature to a

born.

12ó rüf. Cn¡nr¡roN, Physiologia Epicaro-Gassenilo-Cbarltoniana ..-, ctt-, p- 342.tzz F. Becou, Nouam Orgmtm, cit., p. 172.

-_.. . t': l. BoyLr., The Oagiy of Fonns atd. Qaalities, n The Vorks, ed. by T. Birch, 6 vols.,

Hildesheim, Georg Olms Yetlag, 1966, vol. IV, pp. 49:, ll2, et passim.

-_. ::,P Grsseror, Sytugrna philosophicum, cit., pp. 122-123; Io., Selected Vorks, pp.37 4-37 5.

r30 On the 'make¡'s knowledge' tradition, see A. ftn¡z-R¡¡vros, Francis Bacon's Ideø ofScience and the Maker's Knotolcdge Tradition, Oxford, Clarendon p¡ess, l-988.

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