Reviving Campbell's Paradigm for Attitude Research

Personality and Social Psychology Review14(4) 351 –367© 2010 by the Society for Personality and Social Psychology, Inc.Reprints and permission: sagepub.com/journalsPermissions.navDOI: 10.1177/1088868310366452http://pspr.sagepub.com

Reviving Campbell’s Paradigm for Attitude Research

Florian G. Kaiser1,2, Katarzyna Byrka2, and Terry Hartig3

Abstract

Because people often say one thing and do another, social psychologists have abandoned the idea of a simple or axiomatic connection between attitude and behavior. Nearly 50 years ago, however, Donald Campbell proposed that the root of the seeming inconsistency between attitude and behavior lies in disregard of behavioral costs. According to Campbell, attitude–behavior gaps are empirical chimeras. Verbal claims and other overt behaviors regarding an attitude object all arise from one “behavioral disposition.” In this article, the authors present the constituents of and evidence for a paradigm for attitude research that describes individual behavior as a function of a person’s attitude level and the costs of the specific behavior involved. In the authors’ version of Campbell’s paradigm, they propose a formal and thus axiomatic rather than causal relationship between an attitude and its corresponding performances. The authors draw implications of their proposal for mainstream attitude theory, empirical research, and applications concerning attitudes.

Keywords

attitudes, attitude measurement, environmental attitudes, conservation (ecological behavior), attitude–behavior relationship

It’s not because things are difficult that we dare not venture. It’s because we dare not venture that they are difficult.

Lucius Annaeus Seneca

Prompted by recurrent findings of people saying one thing and doing another (e.g., DeFleur & Westie, 1958; LaPiere, 1934; Rokeach & Mezei, 1966; Wicker, 1969), many con-temporary social psychologists now conceptualize attitude as a disposition tangible in evaluative responses (Eagly & Chaiken, 1993) or in the strength of the association between an evaluation and an object (Fazio, Sanbonmatsu, Powell, & Kardes, 2008). Because of the apparent inconsistency between attitudes and behavior, social psychologists have also ceased to believe in either a tight and simple or an axiomatic con-nection between a general attitude and a specific behavior.1 Rather, they regard this connection as error prone, complex, and causal (Ajzen & Fishbein, 2005). As a consequence, atti-tude research has progressively confined itself to investigat-ing cognitive processes (e.g., Deutsch & Strack, 2004; Fazio & Towles-Schwen, 1999; Schwarz, 2000) and novel factors (e.g., perceived behavioral control: Ajzen, 1991; implemen-tation intention: Gollwitzer, 1999; attitude strength: Krosnick & Petty, 1995; habits: Ouellette & Wood, 1998) behind spe-cific behaviors and to exploring moderators of the attitude–behavior link (e.g., Fazio & Zanna, 1978).

Almost 50 years ago, however, Donald T. Campbell (1963) challenged the then already notorious attitude–behavior gap as a methodological rather than a theoretical conundrum. In opposition to the conventional wisdom of the time, Camp-bell argued that verbal claims and other behavioral responses toward an attitude object arise from a single “acquired behavioral disposition” (p. 97). According to Campbell, the apparent inconsistency between verbal evaluations and other behavioral performances originates from the disregard of the relative difficulties or costs of the various performances (cf. Dawes & Smith, 1985; Wicker, 1969). For example, ver-bally endorsing the importance of financially supporting an environmental cause is probably easier for most people than actually donating money to an environmental organization. At the same time, correlation coefficients are known to be sensitive to extreme differences in the difficulties of, for example, the two behaviors involved (e.g., Ferguson, 1941). Thus, extensive differences in difficulties can artificially

1Otto-von-Guericke University Magdeburg, Magdeburg, Germany2Eindhoven University of Technology, Eindhoven, the Netherlands3Uppsala University, Uppsala, Sweden

Corresponding Author:Florian G. Kaiser, Otto-von-Guericke University, Institute of Psychology I, P.O. Box 4120, D-39016 Magdeburg, GermanyEmail: [email protected]

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352 Personality and Social Psychology Review 14(4)

make correlations between verbal and other behavioral performances toward an attitude object appear trivially small.

In this article, we argue for a paradigm for attitude research that is grounded in Campbell’s idea. This paradigm treats individual behavior as a function of a person’s attitude and of the difficulty of performing the given behavior. In arguing for Campbell’s paradigm, we also adopt Greve’s (2001) notion of an axiomatic and, thus, formal—not causal—attitude–behavior relationship. In doing this, we recognize that Greve has addressed a circularity problem that previ-ously was thought to undermine Campbell’s position (e.g., Raden, 1977).

According to Greve, treating the attitude–behavior rela-tionship as a causal one involves a conceptual misunder-standing. The problem becomes apparent when a behavior is conceptualized as an evaluative behavioral response. Such responses confound the behavioral effect with the indicator for its presumed cause, the attitude. For example, when a person circulates a petition opposing the construction of a nuclear power plant,2 the observation of the behavior would be circularly explained with reference to an opposition-to-nuclear-power-plant attitude for which circulating a petition is also taken as its indicator. It follows that, if the definitions of attitude and behavior are mutually dependent, then estab-lishing an empirical connection between an attitude and behavior implied by that attitude involves making a circular argument (cf. Campbell, 1963).

Treating the attitude and behavior concepts as formally rather than causally related means treating them as inseparable aspects of a unity; they are seen as two sides of one coin. A latent atti-tude is a disposition to act, which becomes a manifest reality in its behavioral indicators. Vice versa, the attitude denotes the subjective significance of the behaviors through which it becomes a subjective reality, as health concerns may, for instance, turn the use of a bicycle into a health performance.

Arguably, a causal—rather than a formal—understanding of the attitude–behavior connection leads to unresolvable debates about its direction. History shows that it has also led to the problematic conceptual distinction between general and specific attitudes (e.g., Ajzen & Fishbein, 2005). Unfor-tunately, a causal understanding governs many (if not all) of the contemporary attitude models, such as the tripartite model (Rosenberg & Hovland, 1960), self-perception (Bem, 1967), cognitive dissonance (Festinger, 1957), planned behavior (Ajzen, 1991), and the social cognitive theory of self-regulation (Bandura, 1991).

In the following, we detail our own version of Camp-bell’s paradigm and then review evidence concerning four essential constituents of the paradigm, including the formal link between people’s attitudes and actions. The evidence we review comes mainly from work in environmental psy-chology on ecological or proenvironmental behavior. We go on to discuss implications of Campbell’s paradigm for contemporary attitude theory, particularly for models

within what we call the “behavior-explanation paradigm,” such as the theory of planned behavior (e.g., Ajzen, 1991). We also note some implications for empirical research and practical applications.

Campbell’s ParadigmIn this section, we first specify the way in which behaviors are thought to be conceptually connected with a particular attitude, namely, as behavioral means to attitudinal ends, and how the end or object of the attitude can be determined solely through reference to the behavioral means. Second, we elab-orate on how we think the order of behaviors, or the behav-ioral structure that defines an attitude, comes into existence. Third, we explain how the level of a person’s attitude is determined solely through reference to behaviors and their “difficulty order.”3 Fourth, we explain the difference between Campbell’s original proposal and our variant of the Camp-bell paradigm. Finally, we formally specify, mathematically and verbally, our version of Campbell’s paradigm.

Attitudes Distinguish Sets of Behaviors. From Campbell’s per-spective, stating the importance of environmental preserva-tion and engaging in paper recycling would both stand as behavioral means by which people realize their latent proen-vironmental dispositions. In other words, a behavioral dispo-sition such as a person’s environmental attitude is anticipated to be observable in evaluative statements and ecological behaviors alike. When discrepancies between declarative and other relevant behaviors occur, they are caused by the differential difficulties of the behaviors.

If a person’s attitude is revealed behaviorally, it also should be possible, vice versa, to identify a person’s attitude by inspecting what he or she says and does. However, the problem with behavior is its indeterminacy (Greve, 2001). For example, consider a woman riding her bike along a city street. Her bike riding looks the same regardless of her spe-cific attitude. Whether or not she believes bike riding is a perfect means to stay healthy, to save money, or to act eco-logically, the behavior itself looks virtually identical. The same holds for verbal behavior: A confession can, for instance, be a means to fulfill one’s personal morality, to rationally avoid punishment, or to courteously reciprocate an interrogator’s agreeableness.

The indeterminacy problem can be solved if one inspects an assemblage of verbal and other behavioral responses implied by the attitude in question. Depending on their per-sonal level of environmental attitude, people can show their appreciation of a particular attitude object in a variety of activities. For example, people can wash their laundry in an energy-efficient way, vote for green political parties, and admit a certain degree of environmental concern in surveys. In other words, a disposition generically manifests in a mul-titude of verbal and other behaviors.



Kaiser et al. 353

Conceptually defining an attitude within Campbell’s par-adigm thus involves carving out a set of behaviors. This set of behaviors in turn is thought to represent the means people can use when implementing their personal levels of an atti-tude, or, put somewhat differently, when pursuing their per-sonal attitudinal goal. However, the definition of an attitude is dependent not only on the set of behaviors but also on the order or structure of the behaviors.

Sets of Behaviors Are Ordered Transitively in Terms of Difficulty. Necessarily, any behavior being performed involves costs, which include effort and other personal resources, such as time and money. In Campbell’s (1963, p. 160) terminology, costs constitute the “situational threshold” or the difficulty of a behavior. This difficulty may be rather small, as when a person claims to be an environmentalist, or it may be rela-tively substantial, as when a person rides a bike to work every day.

The costs of a behavior are specific to the behavior, as they depend on the situation in which the behavior takes place. In other words, costs are thought to derive from the conditions that people face when performing an act; they do not depend solely or even primarily on individual actors. Thus, when different actors have the same conditions for performance, behaviors can be transitively ranked according to difficulty in an order that is independent of persons.4 This transitive order or structure in the set of behaviors ultimately defines an attitude.

In line with Campbell, we expect that people deliberately choose among behavioral means to cost-effectively realize their personal attitudinal goals. Generally, we assume that people favor relatively more convenient, socially accepted, and undemanding behaviors over more strenuous, socially proscribed, and demanding behaviors when they manifest their personal level of a certain attitude. That a person acts in a particular way, therefore, is anticipated to be a function of two components: (a) the person’s disposition, for example, the level of his or her environmental attitude, and (b) the specific difficulty of the particular behavior, which is the composite of the costs involved when enacting the behavior. Thus, various behavioral records can be used to assess the specific level of a person’s attitude.

Behaviors Can Be Used to Identify an Individual’s Level of an Attitude. A person’s attitude toward a certain object is most obvious in the face of increasingly demanding hurdles or progressively intolerable sacrifices (Schultz & Oskamp, 1996). The more obstacles a person overcomes and the more effort that person expends to implement his or her attitude, the more evident that person’s commitment to the particular goal implied by the attitude.

Why would someone suffer every morning riding a bike through rain and snow, struggle with his or her children to save warm water, spend money on home insulation, and

donate money to environmental organizations if he or she was not highly committed to environmental conservation? Conversely, when a slight difficulty is enough to stop a per-son from taking behavioral steps beyond the easiest ones, devotion to the attitudinal goal must be rather low. For instance, when a person claims to be environmentally ori-ented, but avoids recycling, he or she probably does not care strongly about environmental conservation. Technically speaking, the more demanding the behavioral tasks a person takes on, the more intensely he or she cherishes the goal implied by the attitude, and vice versa.

In contrast to Campbell, we do not expect a personal dis-position to operate in a compulsory or exclusive manner when people realize it through their behavior. Clearly, indi-vidual differences in intellectual and physical capabilities do matter when it comes to overcoming behavioral costs. Nor do we believe that the various behavioral costs deter-ministically impose themselves on people. The fact that individuals differ in their personal capabilities to perform certain acts, that they have unique life circumstances, and that they can often choose from various behavioral options to implement their attitudes creates irregularities. Irregularities, however, cannot readily be modeled. Rather than predicting factual engagement, we, in opposition to Campbell, aim to explain only the probability of engagement in a behavior. This distinction has crucial implications with regard to the choice of the psychometric model used to assess the specific level of a person’s attitude on the basis of different behav-ioral records.

Beyond Campbell’s Original Proposition. Campbell himself sug-gested implementing his idea with the Guttman model (e.g., Guttman, 1944), which would serve the prediction of factual engagement. Lowering the aspiration from predicting factual engagement to predicting the probability of such engage-ment is in essence what follows from our choice to abandon the deterministic Guttman model in favor of an analogous but probabilistic model.

Why abandon Guttman’s model? It imposes unrealistic demands. First, it demands that behaviors form a perfectly transitively ordered set of tasks. That is, all behaviors are ordered in respect to behavioral costs, and this order holds for all actors. Second and concurrently, it demands that per-sons respond unvaryingly to the behavioral challenges. That is, people must implement their attitudes in an absolutely regular manner. Without exceptions, people have to engage in all behaviors with costs below their particular attitude level (and in none of the more costly ones). In sum, all peo-ple are expected to implement identical disposition levels in a uniform manner. This expectation basically ignores per-sonal and contextual particularities. Given the unfeasibility of satisfying these requirements, operational Guttman scales are a rarity in the scientific literature. It is the allowance for irregularities in people’s behavioral performances that stands




as the main conceptual advantage of a probabilistic over a deterministic item-response model.

In contrast to Campbell’s original deterministic proposi-tion, we adopt a less rigid model to implement his paradigm. In our version, we expect a personal disposition to reveal itself in a more discretionary manner. Also, the costs of performing a behavior are seen as stochastic rather than deterministic con-straints. Our variant thus leaves room for personal preferences and contextual irregularities. Such irregularities and prefer-ences are handled as nuisance factors, and frank acknowledge-ment of this unpredictability necessarily implies a lower aspiration regarding explanatory precision.

Our Version of Campbell’s Paradigm. Campbell’s paradigm is, we believe, more sensibly implemented with Rasch’s model than with Guttman’s model. The Rasch model describes the probability of engaging in a specific behavior as the arithme-tic difference between the strength of a person’s attitude and the difficulty of the specific behavior in question (see Bond & Fox, 2001; Embretson & Reise, 2000). The formal link between a person’s attitude and his or her probability of engaging in a specific behavior can thus be mathematically depicted with the following formula:

ln( pki ) = θk–δi1– pki

In this model, the natural logarithm of the ratio of the probability of person k’s engagement (pki) relative to the probability of nonengagement (1 – pki) in a specific behavior i (i.e., its odds) is given by the difference between k’s attitude level (i.e., his or her disposition, θk) and the difficulty of behavior i (δi).

As the transitive difficulty order within a given class of behaviors normally holds for a population, it thus also describes and hence defines the particular attitude for that population. Conversely, an individual person’s attitude level translates into the individual engagement likelihoods for each behavior in the given class. This notion also surfaces in DeFleur and Westie’s (1963) atypical definition of attitude as “an inferred property . . . [that] is equated with the probabil-ity of recurrence of behavior forms of a given type or direc-tion” (p. 21, italics original).

Note that in the mathematical formalization of Camp-bell’s paradigm people are distinguishable with respect to their attitude levels, irrespective of the specific behaviors used in the assessment (as long as those behaviors are part of the recognized class of behaviors implied by the attitude). Simultaneously, behaviors are distinguishable by how diffi-cult they are to realize, irrespective of the particular persons used in the assessment of difficulties. These two constituents of Campbell’s paradigm, together with two more, are at odds with the current wisdom in social psychology and with main-stream attitude research, as we show next.

Constituents of Campbell’s ParadigmFrom its mathematical formalization, four constituents of Campbell’s paradigm can be derived. These contrast with mainstream attitude theory. The four constituents imply that the probability of engagement in a behavioral performance can be explained with only two additively connected param-eters: one for a person’s attitude and one for the costs of the specific behavior involved. Without any person factors other than one’s attitude, without any moderators, and without unpacking behaviors and attitudes into progressively more fine-grained units, behavioral engagement can be made intelligible. Campbell’s paradigm thus stands as a parsimoni-ous alternative to what we call the “behavior-explanation paradigm” now conventionally used to research attitude–behavior consistency.

To reinforce its standing as a viable alternative, in the fol-lowing sections we elaborate on the four constituents of the paradigm and the empirical support for them. The first con-stituent involves seemingly diverse actions forming a transi-tively ordered set of behaviors. The second constituent involves an axiomatic and, thus, empirically perfect attitude–behavior link. The third constituent has to do with the rele-vance of an attitude to behavior; an attitude is assumed to release its motivational force on any action in the class of behavior that defines it in an identical, unmoderated fashion. The fourth constituent involves representing the factual costs of a singular behavior in terms of its difficulty. This diffi-culty is in turn expected to be specific to each behavior and to govern conduct, irrespective of the person involved and irrespective of attitude level. All four constituents have been addressed in previous research on ecological behavior, which we will overview.

Constituent 1: Transitively Ordered Sets of Behaviors. In Camp-bell’s paradigm, individual dispositions are conceptual-ized as the behavioral means through which people manifest their personal attitudes. Conceptualizing personal attitudes as behavioral dispositions implies that seemingly diverse actions, such as recycling and ownership of an energy-efficient car, form a distinct but uniform set of behaviors (for more examples, see Table 1). This in turn means that diverse behavioral performances can be mapped onto one dimension. Along this dimension, the behaviors are distinct only quantitatively, in terms of dif-ficulty. This contrasts with what is usually reported in psy-chological research, including that concerned with ecological behavior, the research domain in which most of the evidence concerning Campbell’s paradigm has been developed.

Ecological behavior is commonly found to be multidimen-sional (e.g., Gatersleben, Steg, & Vlek, 2002). Instead of one broad class of activities, it is expected to fall into several



Kaiser et al. 355

narrow and highly selective, independent sets, such as energy use, waste generation, and transportation (e.g., Stern, 2000). Because defining an attitude within Campbell’s paradigm involves carving out a set of behaviors transitively ordered by difficulty, in the following, we review evidence that speaks of a single class of ecological behaviors solely distinguishable on the basis of their difficulties. We then go on to present evidence that evaluative statements of the kind usually used to measure attitudes are in fact comparatively easy behaviors. This evidence is in line with the methodological explanation that Campbell offered for the attitude–behavior gap.

The example of general ecological behavior. To date, Camp-bell’s paradigm has been successfully implemented in the mea-surement of personal engagement with different sets of ecological behaviors with various samples in at least nine dif-ferent countries (e.g., Hartig, Kaiser, & Bowler, 2001; Hartig, Kaiser, & Strumse, 2007; Kaiser & Biel, 2000; Kaiser, Midden, & Cervinka, 2008; Kaiser, Schultz, Berenguer, Corral-Verdugo, & Tankha, 2008). Overall, the psychometric qualities of this General Ecological Behavior (GEB) measure look acceptable (e.g., Kaiser, 1998; Kaiser, Frick, & Stoll-Kleemann, 2001). For example, classical internal consistency coefficients range from a = .72 (Kaiser & Wilson, 2000) to a = .88 (Scheuthle, Carabias-Hütter, & Kaiser, 2005). Test–retest reli-abilities vary between rtt = .76 (Kaiser & Wilson, 2000) and rtt = .83 (Kaiser et al., 2001).

In their exploration of the dimensionality of a set of self-reported behaviors assumed to vary in difficulty, Kaiser and Wilson (2004) found that energy conservation, waste

avoidance, recycling, vicarious acts toward conservation (e.g., political activism), and ecological transportation and consumer behavior formed a highly oblique behavioral space. Because of its obliqueness, this multidimensional space could be parsimoniously projected onto a single dimension with only a marginal loss in measurement accu-racy (for similar findings and conclusions with different data sets, see Byrka, 2009; Kaiser, Oerke, & Bogner, 2007).

In summary, the evidence speaks of a single class of tran-sitively ordered ecological behaviors distinguishable by their difficulties. Given the volume and the uniformity of the find-ings, these calibrations corroborate Campbell’s claim of an underlying behavioral disposition at least with self-reported ecological behavior.

Verbal statements are behavioral responses. According to Campbell (1963, p. 97), evaluative claims and other behav-iors toward an attitude object all arise from a single “acquired behavioral disposition.” Such a disposition must, hence, be observable not only in a person’s behavioral self-reports but also in a person’s evaluative statements concerning an atti-tude object. Thus, conceptualizing environmental attitude as a behavioral disposition requires that evaluative statements and self-reported behaviors belong to one class of responses. In line with Campbell’s expectation, we anticipate that eval-uative statements are generally less demanding than corre-sponding behavioral self-reports.

With data from 1,746 residents in one of the major cities in the Netherlands, Byrka (2009) confirmed that expressing appreciation for a behavior in a questionnaire was relatively

Table 1. Twenty Ecological Behaviors, Ordered by Their Engagement Likelihoods

Behavior pavg phigh

1. I bought solar panels to produce energy. .02 .03 2. I refrain from owning a car. .06 .11 3. I buy meat and produce with eco-labels. .09 .17 4. I am a member of a carpool. .10 .19 5. I am a member of an environmental organization. .14 .24 6. I contribute financially to environmental organizations. .14 .25 7. I read about environmental issues. .16 .28 8. I drive on freeways at speeds under 62.5 mph. .30 .47 9. I buy unbleached and uncolored toilet paper. .38 .5510. I buy products in refillable packages. .40 .5711. In nearby areas (around 30 kilometers; around 20 miles), I use public transportation or ride a bike. .49 .6612. I ride a bicycle or take public transportation to work or school. .61 .7613. I drive in such a way as to keep my fuel consumption as low as possible. .70 .8314. I own energy efficient household devices. .72 .8415. I wash dirty clothes without prewashing. .79 .8916. I buy seasonal produce. .84 .9217. I wait until I have a full load before doing my laundry. .95 .9718. I bring empty bottles to a recycling bin. .96 .9819. I collect and recycle used paper. .97 .9920. I reuse my shopping bags. .98 .99

Engagement likelihoods are given for a person with a 1 standard deviation above average environmental attitude (phigh) and for one with an average such attitude (pavg).




less demanding than enacting the corresponding behavior. By and large, the difficulty of a behavior was lower for ver-bal behavior, such as evaluative statements, than for effec-tive behavior, even when these acts were only recalled, rather than overtly demonstrated for an observer (see Figure 1). This finding accords with colloquial wisdom that “talk is cheap” and “actions speak louder than words.”

Nevertheless, people’s behavioral dispositions become apparent in their evaluative statements as well as in other behavioral records, such as retrospective behavioral self-reports. Interestingly, Byrka (2009) found two instances in which the condemnation of unecological behavior was sig-nificantly more demanding than reports of refraining from the act itself (see circled plots in Figure 1). This occurred when the behavior was a relatively easy abstention and the evaluation involved blunt condemnation. For example, expressing disapproval for using oven cleaning spray was comparatively more difficult than actually not using oven cleaning spray. This latter finding speaks against a simplistic view in which evaluative verbal statements are always seen to be easier than other forms of behavior, although on aver-age they will be easier.

The research just discussed implies that environmental attitudes can be directly derived from what people claim to value and report doing. Essentially, these evaluative state-ments and behavioral reports represent means through which people realize their personal levels of an attitude (e.g., Kaiser, Oerke, et al., 2007). In sum, the individual variety of reports concerning a multitude of specific ecological behaviors can be adequately represented with one person parameter (i.e., attitude level) if those behaviors are transitively ordered in terms of their difficulty.

Constituent 2: A Perfect Attitude–Behavior Relationship. In line with Conrey and Smith (2007) and probably with many oth-ers, it strikes us not only as counterintuitive but also as a breach of the very idea of attitudes to imagine someone with a strong environmental attitude who does not engage in at least some of the corresponding behaviors. Yet this appears to be a finding in research on ecological behavior (e.g., Vining & Ebreo, 2002) and more generally (e.g., Ajzen & Fishbein, 1977). Attitudes alone—as a single determinant—have a rather bad reputation when it comes to accounting for spe-cific behavior (e.g., Schwarz, 2000). We argue, however, that the problem is conceptual, that it lies in the way we, in psychology, think about the attitude–behavior relation-ship, and that the problem can be addressed by applying Campbell’s paradigm.

In the following, we review evidence concerning the validity of the most central constituent of Campbell’s para-digm: the assumption of an axiomatic relationship between attitude and behavior. We first review research that has found attitude and behavior to be tightly empirically connected. This is what one should expect with an axiomatic attitude–behavior relationship. Second, we report a demanding test of the validity of such a conceptual attitude–behavior connec-tion. In this laboratory experiment, we tested the axiomatic link by forecasting an unlikely overt behavior solely on the basis of a participant’s environmental attitude. The behavior was judged to be unlikely because it involved the sacrifice of legitimate personal interests.

A virtually perfect empirical relationship. Defining an atti-tude in a Campbellian sense involves describing behaviors as a transitively ordered set of means to implement different levels of attitudinal goals. With such a definition goes a for-mally describable, axiomatic attitude–behavior connection. Necessarily, any empirical gap between attitude, measured exclusively with evaluative statements, and a set of behav-iors critical for an attitude undermines the validity of Camp-bell’s paradigm. In fact, construct validity in line with the paradigm requires a virtually perfect empirical attitude–behavior link.

Studies done in a conventional planned behavior frame-work but employing Campbell’s paradigm in the measure-ment of behavior have found proportions of explained behavior variance as high as 95% (e.g., Kaiser & Gutscher, 2003; Kaiser, Hübner, & Bogner, 2005). To implement Campbell’s paradigm, these studies used scales rather than single items for all of the conventional attitude measures as well as for the behavior measure. Predictably, the more items included in the concept measures used in these structural equation models, the more variance in the behavior that could be explained.

Similarly, with aggregated predictors from the planned behavior theory, Kaiser, Schultz, and Scheuthle (2007) could explain 91% of the variance in intention, which the theory describes as the ultimate predictor of behavior. They

Figure 1. Evaluative statements and retrospectively self-reported behavior in ascending order of difficultyN = 1,746. Vertical bars represent 95% confidence intervals. The circled plots are the cases in which verbal condemnation of the behavior appar-ently was more difficult than the self-report of the behavior itself. The two behaviors are abstaining from using oven cleaning spray and from dispos-ing of leftovers in the toilet.



Kaiser et al. 357

also found that intention explained 88% of the variance in a behavior measure grounded in Campbell’s paradigm. Sig-nificantly, Kaiser et al. attained their results even though they violated the compatibility principle,5 which is often regarded as essential to attain attitude–behavior consis-tency within the planned behavior framework (e.g., Ajzen & Fishbein, 2005).

Together, these findings corroborate the anticipated absence of any noteworthy gap. Instead of an empirical gap, there is evidence speaking of redundant information between intention and behavior when the attitudinal and behavioral concepts are both reliably captured with scales and when Campbell’s paradigm guides the measurement of individual behavior.

Although encouraging, these data are far from conclusive. The evidence in favor of an axiomatic attitude–behavior rela-tionship would be more compelling if an overt and, at the same time, improbable behavior could also be predicted on the basis of a person’s attitude level in laboratory experimentation.

Forecasting an improbable overt behavior from attitude. Such evidence of predictive validity comes from research on cooperation in a social dilemma experiment. Social dilem-mas are public good or resource dilemmas stemming from open access to a resource (see, e.g., Kollock, 1998; Messick & Brewer, 1983). In such dilemmas, people are confronted with a conflict between their motivation to cooperate with others and their motivation to maximize personal gains. Generally, it appears that people are inclined to maximize their gains at the expense of the greater collective benefit that would be realized through cooperation (Gifford & Hine, 1997). This means that cooperation is objectively improba-ble and, predictably, demanding.

Nevertheless, Byrka (2009) found that persons with high levels of environmental attitude removed relatively less of the common resource in her social dilemma experiment. Whether such cooperation increased, however, depended on the resource. If cooperation involved the attitude-relevant resource “energy,” persons high in environmental attitude demanded substantially less of it than high-attitude persons considering the attitude-irrelevant resource “points” as well as low-attitude persons considering either the relevant or irrelevant resource (see Figure 2).6

Conventionally, the reasons for cooperating with others in social dilemmas are expected to originate from individual prosocial considerations (e.g., Gifford & Hine, 1997) and not from concerns for the environment (see Smith & Bell, 1992). Accordingly, cooperation with others traditionally means dividing the common resources into equal portions of the maximum replenishable size (e.g., Messick & Brewer, 1983). For a collectively just and optimal solution in terms of gains, it is not necessary to take an amount that is less than one’s fair share and below the replenishable amount of the resource. Yet Byrka (2009) found such self-sacrificing cooperation.

On average, persons high in environmental attitude requested significantly less energy than what could be seen as their fair portion of the replenishable resource. The 95% con-fidence interval for the average amount of energy requested by the persons with a high environmental attitude did not cross the “line of social justice,” which represents the fair and optimal performance from the point of view of the collective (see Figure 2). This finding is not just an aggregate effect across the 10 rounds of the social dilemma experiment. Persons with high environmental attitude engaged in self-sacrifice from the first round on, but only if playing for energy.

Self-sacrificing is difficult to understand from an exclu-sively social interpretation of social dilemmas. It is, however, understandable with regard to the motivation of environmen-talists (cf. Hardin, 1968). Such a dilemma normally involves two unfavorable outcomes, destruction of the environment and forfeit of personal gains. One can reasonably expect self-sacrifice when forfeit of individual gains is the lesser of the two concerns. This could occur if the person’s concern for the environment (i.e., when holding a strong environmental atti-tude) rivals the egoistic concern for missing out on personal gains (cf. Hardin, 1968). This would explain Byrka’s (2009) discovery that persons with comparatively high levels of environmental attitude sacrificed their socially legitimate claims (even under artificial experimental conditions).

Constituent 3: Attitude’s Efficacy Is Unrelated to Difficulty. Our formal conception of Campbell’s paradigm demands that a given attitude impose its motivational force on any act that belongs to its corresponding class of behaviors. Necessarily, a certain environmental attitude is expected to be just as

Figure 2. Points or kWatt allocated as a function of people’s environmental attitude and the attitudinal relevance of the resourceN = 131 (from left to right, n = 38, n = 29, n = 36, n = 28). Vertical bars indicate 95% confidence intervals. The “line of social justice” represents the fair and optimal performance from the point of view of the collective. Resource requests along this line would leave each individual with an equal share and the collective with the maximal profit or gain.




effective with heavily obstructed behaviors, such as retrofit-ting homes for energy efficiency, as it is with less obstructed behavior and even with facilitated behavior, such as paper recycling. The assumption of uniformly effective attitudes contrasts, however, with contemporary research that has reported differentially effective, moderated environmental attitudes (e.g., Diekmann & Preisendörfer, 1998; Guagnano, Stern, & Dietz, 1995). This third constituent of Campbell’s paradigm also contrasts with the popular interactionist per-spective in contemporary social psychology.

According to an interactionist perspective, different atti-tude levels are expected to be differentially effective depend-ing on behavioral costs (cf. Reis, 2008; Schmitt, Eid, & Maes, 2003). Schultz and Oskamp (1996), for example, argue that the influence of attitudes on behavior increases in the face of increasingly difficult tasks or progressively intol-erable sacrifices. Interestingly, research on moderation of the attitude–behavior correlation by behavioral costs has led to heterogeneous results. Some studies have revealed a positive linear relationship between the difficulty of a behavior and the strength of the attitude–behavior connection (Schultz & Oskamp, 1996), whereas others have found a monotonic negative relationship (Diekmann & Preisendörfer, 1998). Guagnano et al. (1995) even uncovered a curvilinear attitude–behavior relationship with a marked drop in strength when the behavioral costs were very high or low, that is, with easy and with difficult behaviors.

In opposition to these three models, the pooled data from five survey studies revealed that the influence of attitudes on their corresponding ecological behaviors did not depend on behavioral costs (Kaiser & Schultz, 2009). Instead, attitude (represented conventionally with evaluative statements) and behavior (as self-reported performances) had a substantial and unmoderated average relationship of r = .54.

Kaiser and Schultz’s (2009) data also showed that attitude–behavior relationships were weaker for extremely easy and extremely difficult behaviors; however, there are method-ological reasons for this reduction. With extremely easy behaviors (i.e., more than 95% of the persons reported acting accordingly), they found evidence for greatly restricted vari-ability, obvious in excessive positive kurtosis values. With heavily constrained behaviors (i.e., less than 5% of the per-sons reported acting accordingly), they found a different methodological reason for the apparently depressed correla-tions. The distributions for the respective evaluative state-ments used to measure attitudes and for the retrospective reports of the extremely difficult behaviors not only were nonnormal but also differed in the way they deviated from normality. In summary, the previously reported heteroge-neous findings may well have emerged for technical rather than psychologically substantial reasons.

This is not to say that attitudinal differences do not matter. On the contrary, attitudes matter with ecological behavior. This is evidenced by a relatively narrow bandwidth of

attitude–behavior correlations (from .40 to .69) around the mean of .54. Yet this rather uniform behavior relevance of atti-tudes is less evident and, thus, technically less easily recogniz-able with extremely difficult or easy activities (see Table 1). For example, under heavily obstructed conditions even the strongest attitude will render a behavior only a touch more probable than a rather weak attitude. Vice versa, even a weak attitude will result in a specific behavior nearly as much as a strong attitude under highly supportive circumstances.

Table 1 lists the likelihoods for engaging in various behaviors that Byrka (2009) describes for a person with a comparatively high level of environmental attitude (phigh) and for one with an average such attitude (pavg). The likeli-hoods are estimated with the Rasch model based on data from 1,746 Dutch people. Evidently, attitudes of different strength translate into different likelihoods for persons engaging in comparable behaviors. In the calculations for each of the two persons in question, attitude operates as a constant. Thus, for each person, distinct engagement proba-bilities solely depend on the difficulty of the various behav-iors: The more probable a behavior, the easier it is, and vice versa (see Table 1).

In sum, the reviewed research speaks of environmental attitude as uniformly effective with ecological behavior. This uniform efficacy of attitudes occurs regardless of the factual costs and so regardless of whether a behavior is obstructed or facilitated. An individual attitude is, thus, person specific and, as such, invariably effective irrespective of the diffi-culty of any one behavior that belongs to the class of behav-ior that defines the attitude.

Constituent 4: Behavioral Costs Are Facts for Populations. Enacting a behavior involves factual costs. These costs primarily depend on the specifics of the situation in which an act takes place. Accordingly, Campbell called these costs situ-ational thresholds. In the mathematical formalization of Campbell’s paradigm, these costs are represented by the difficulty parameter. Behavioral difficulties compose the second factor beside attitude that controls individual behavior.

Behavioral costs are assumed to be external to and, thus, independent of persons. Hence, a given situation is thought to impose its force on any particular act, irrespective of indi-vidual attitudes. In other words, each set of costs, each diffi-culty, has to be expected to be uniformly relevant to behavior. Although distinct in magnitude, behavioral difficulties are, consequently, presumed to hold for populations. This is the fourth constituent of the paradigm. In the following, we con-sider how behavioral costs are addressed (or not addressed) in other attitude research, how behavioral costs can be esti-mated, and how knowledge of behavioral costs enables the prediction of attitude levels.

Factual behavioral costs in psychology. In today’s psychol-ogy, it is often assumed that behavioral costs, or situational



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forces, are acknowledged or perceived before they become effective (e.g., Reis, 2008; Ross & Nisbett, 1991). For exam-ple, a blustery climate can discourage some from riding a bike, but it may be seen as a challenge by others. Apart from such motivational influences, behavior-explanation models frequently disregard the factual situational determinants of individual behavior that are independent of persons (Kaiser & Gutscher, 2003).

The planned behavior framework is a noteworthy excep-tion, by virtue of its perceived behavioral control concept. This concept is meant to represent the situational constraints affecting a behavior (e.g., Ajzen, 1991); however, using per-ceived control as a proxy for actual behavioral costs comes with a serious methodological shortcoming. Within planned behavior, the situational forces that affect a person’s actual control on a specific behavior show in perceived control’s direct influence on behavior. This, however, works only with a performance measure that stands for a single behav-ior or a narrow set of behaviors, affected by a limited array of constraints, as was shown by Kaiser and Gutscher (2003). With scales that represent a broad class of behaviors with a multitude of forces external to persons, perceived control loses its significance. In other words, perceived control fails as a proxy of actual behavioral costs when modeling a domain as broad as environmental conservation using highly aggre-gated (and so more reliable) measures for the planned behavior concepts.

Estimating behavioral costs. Situational influences can be regarded as forces of the circumstances that people face when enacting a behavior. Influences such as climate, infra-structure, and topography affect individual performances in a more or less objective manner. In other words, situational forces can be expected to facilitate or impede individual behavior in ways that are not specific to any one actor (Scheuthle et al., 2005). For example, a superior public transportation system will generally make it easier to abstain from using a car in a Swiss urban environment compared to a Swedish one (Kaiser & Biel, 2000), whereas buying bever-ages in returnable bottles is unavoidable if the store does not provide any beverages in alternative containers. Thus, situa-tional influences are best considered as effective for an entire population acting in its specific context.

In Campbell’s paradigm, situational influences are repre-sented by the difficulty of a behavior, and this difficulty is expected to operate independent of the actors involved, regardless of personal attitude levels, regardless of the per-ception of obstacles or facilitators, and regardless of any per-sonal differences in the capability to perform the behavior. The difficulty estimate is, thus, regarded as the one decisive feature of the behavior. This difficulty of a behavior surfaces in the engagement likelihoods of populations. That is, from what people generally dare or do not dare to venture, we derive the difficulty of a behavior. Correspondingly, difficulty of a behavior may be concealed by its appearance. For

example, the act of recycling a battery may look quite simple in and of itself, but actually engaging in that act can in fact be quite complicated when there is a lack of infrastructural sup-port. In other words, inspecting the behavior itself does not allow for recognition of its difficulty. Rather, its difficulty is recognized in the proportion of persons enacting it. This assertion echoes the point of Lucius Annaeus Seneca’s apho-rism at the start of this text.

To date, some research inspired by Campbell’s paradigm has illustrated how incomparable sociocultural and geopo-litical obstacles and opportunities eventually can play out in differences in the difficulty of some behaviors (e.g., Kaiser & Wilson, 2000). Action under factually distinct conditions can hence lead to disparities in what defines a given attitude for different populations. (Remember that the definition of an attitude is a function of two things, the set of behaviors relevant for the attitude and the specific transitive order of this behavioral class.)

In one study, Scheuthle et al. (2005) found that differ-ences in infrastructure, affluence, and climate were well reflected in the difficulties and transitive orders of 65 eco-logical behaviors in Spain and Switzerland. With a hit rate of 97.5%, they were able to accurately distinguish Swiss and Spaniards solely on the basis of what constitutes an environ-mental attitude in the two countries, that is, the patterns of preferences for various ecological behaviors with which to implement one’s environmental attitude. People apparently acted on their attitudes in a country-specific yet otherwise fairly uniform way, irrespective of attitude level.

Conversely, when individuals act in similar sociocultural and geopolitical conditions, such as within a country, the dif-ficulty order of the behaviors is rather uniformly applicable for anyone (Kaiser & Keller, 2001). The environmental atti-tude can then be described with respect to a single array of behaviors transitively ordered by difficulty. This implies in turn the possibility of forecasting individuals’ attitude levels on the basis of whether or not a person engages in a specific behavior for which there is valid quantitative knowledge about its difficulty. Anticipating attitude levels from engage-ment in specific acts is not a trivial matter, and previous attempts have not produced accurate forecasts (e.g., Ajzen, Brown, & Carvajal, 2004; Sheeran, 2002).

Forecasting levels of attitude from behavioral difficulty. One example of success can however be found in Byrka’s (2009) research with vegetarians and nonvegetarians. Refraining from eating animal products has objectively demonstrable relevance for conservation (e.g., Taylor, 2000), but it factu-ally is a highly unpopular behavior. Only about 4% to 7% of the population in most Western societies commit themselves to such a diet (e.g., Nederlandse Vegetariërsbond, n.d.; Stahler, 2006). Working from this rough quantitative evi-dence about the difficulty of the particular behavior, Byrka predicted that vegetarians would display higher average lev-els of environmental attitude than would nonvegetarians.




In Byrka’s (2009) study, environmental attitude was mea-sured in two distinct ways, with a traditional instrument and with a Campbellian measure. The former was the New Eco-logical Paradigm scale (NEP; Dunlap, Van Liere, Mertig, & Jones, 2000), probably the most often used environmental attitude measure to date. The NEP is exclusively based on evaluative statements, such as “Humans are severely abusing the environment” and “The balance of nature is very delicate and easily upset.” The latter was the GEB scale (Kaiser & Wilson, 2004). Already mentioned in our discussion of the first constituent of the paradigm, the GEB is an exclusively behavior-based attitude measure in the Campbellian sense. In her research, Byrka anticipated that only the Campbellian measure would prove sensitive to engagement in highly demanding behavior (i.e., refraining from eating meat and from consuming other animal products).

Byrka detected the predicted differences between vegetar-ians and nonvegetarians in their average level of environmen-tal attitude, but only with the GEB scale (see Figure 3, top panel). When the vegetarians were also distinguished con-cerning the degree of their devotion into basic, advanced, and extreme ones, the association became even stronger. No such difference could be established with the NEP, although the difference between basic and extreme vegetarians in NEP scores did approach significance (see Figure 3, bottom panel).

Byrka’s finding confirms that an increase in attitude level monotonically parallels the increase in difficulty that goes

along with adopting progressively more demanding behav-ioral means of expressing an attitude. In other words, with rising costs, engagement must be accompanied by higher levels of the corresponding attitude, which is precisely what one should expect when attitudes and behaviors are axiom-atically related.

Summary of the Literature Review. The literature just reviewed substantiates the four constituents of Campbell’s paradigm. First, we have listed a considerable number of successful applications of Campbell’s paradigm, confirming that an array of behaviors relevant for a specific attitude could be mapped onto one dimension. Along this dimension, the behaviors were transitively ordered with respect to diffi-culty. Second, we have described research in which we could corroborate a (nearly) perfect empirical association between attitude and behavior when the respective mea-sures were sufficiently aggregated. Given the postulated axiomatic link between attitude and behavior, such a finding had to be expected. Third, we also have shown that a per-son’s attitude manifests as a constant in each behavior that defines the attitude, irrespective of the specific difficulties of those behaviors. Fourth, we have similarly demonstrated that the situational forces that impinge on a behavior—its difficulty—factually affect individual behavior, irrespective of the strength of the individual attitudes of the particular actors, given that they act in the same geopolitical and sociocultural context.

Implications for Attitude Theory, Research, and PracticeThe viability of Campbell’s paradigm has several far reaching implications. In drawing out these implications in the follow-ing, we contrast Campbell’s paradigm to the planned behav-ior framework (e.g., Ajzen, 1991), which seems to be widely accepted in contemporary attitude research as the standard for addressing the problems following from attitude–behavior inconsistency (e.g., Ajzen & Fishbein, 2005). Note that the planned behavior framework is used here as the prototypical exemplar of what we call the behavior-explanation paradigm, a class of models that involve individual attitude or attitude-like belief as an independent concept standing next to inten-tion as the ultimate predictor of behavior. Other exponents of this paradigm are the health action process approach (Schwarzer, 2008), the theory of trying (Bagozzi & Warshaw, 1990), and the prototype/willingness model (Gibbons, Gerard, Blanton, & Russell, 1998), to name a few.

In the following subsections, we discuss four general implications of Campbell’s paradigm for attitude theory, research, and practice. We first discuss the resolution of one of the most critical conundrums in contemporary attitude theory, “evaluative attitude–behavior inconsistency.” We

Figure 3. Environmental attitude measured with the General Ecological Behavior scale (top panel) and the New Ecological Paradigm scale (bottom panel) as a function of the extent of self-reported vegetarianismN = 222 (from left to right, n = 45, n = 50, n = 60, n = 67). Vertical bars indicate 95% confidence intervals.



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next explain how the conceptually implied axiomatic reci-procity of attitude and behavior compels psychologists to pursue empirical questions other than ones concerning the direction of their causal relationship. In the third subsection, we show that employing Campbell’s paradigm implies that attitudes can as well be criterion as predictor when we model the psychological processes behind action. It also implies that questions about how to change behavior and how to change attitude are technically equivalent. By no means, however, does the adoption of Campbell’s paradigm ban from our research agenda questions concerning the develop-ment of attitudes or psychological mediation processes in which attitudes figure; this should become obvious when we consider questions about causation that require further study. In our fourth and final subsection, we argue that the concep-tion of attitudes as behavioral dispositions within Campbell’s paradigm holds tremendous potential for application, not least in the communication of psychological evidence.

Literal Versus Evaluative Consistency. The theory of planned behavior was intended for the explanation of variance in behavior (e.g., Ajzen & Fishbein, 2005). The theory is widely used, yet various meta-analyses have revealed that it can only account for approximately 25% to 30% of the variance in target behaviors (e.g., Ajzen, 1991; Armitage & Conner, 2001; Sheeran, 2002; Sheeran & Orbell, 1998). This is regarded as a minor issue, however, because empirical research guided by the theory actually demonstrates what Ajzen and Fishbein (2005) call “literal consistency” (see Figure 4); if one employs measures that are properly devel-oped in terms of specificity or generality, the proportion of explained variance will increase to higher levels with pro-gressively aggregated concept measures.

In the theory of planned behavior, Ajzen and Fishbein (2005) assert that strong correlations between attitude and behavior can be expected only if concepts are compatible in terms of the action involved, the target at which it is directed, and the context and time of its performance (cf. Note 5). Accordingly, that theory is conventionally applied in a spe-cific way, with measures of specific attitudes and specific behaviors. However, Ajzen and Fishbein maintain that spe-cific measures do not accurately capture the essence of more general attitudes, such as environmental attitude, particularly when assessed with single-item measures.

Aggregating across different behaviors from a domain leads to broader and more reliable concept measures and, subsequently, higher proportions of explained variance in behavior (e.g., Epstein, 1979, 1983). For example, instead of inquiring only about bicycle use, a more reliable measure of ecological behavior should result when it also encompasses paper, glass and car oil recycling, environmental organiza-tion membership, and other conservation activities. Employ-ing such compound measures simultaneously for attitude

and behavior is the traditional answer to developing more general (and more reliable) measures that have more predic-tive power (e.g., Weigel & Newman, 1976). The practice fol-lows what is called the principle of aggregation.

With proportions of explained behavior variance in the vicinity of 85% to 95%, our own research has corroborated the validity of the aggregation principle within the planned behavior framework (e.g., Kaiser, Schultz, et al., 2007). We are not the first to achieve such results and with them to confirm literal consistency on the general level (see, e.g., Fishbein & Ajzen, 1974). As we will see in the next subsec-tion, however, this cannot be taken as good news for the planned behavior framework because at best it merely cor-roborates the claimed circularity of such an empirical test (cf. Greve, 2001).

Unfortunately as well, neither compatibility nor aggrega-tion is a remedy for the attitude–behavior inconsistency issue that truly matters theoretically, which Ajzen and Fishbein (2005) call “evaluative inconsistency.” Evaluative inconsis-tency is the problem faced when trying to link a general atti-tude with specific performances (see Figure 4). For example, when we know the strength of a person’s general environ-mental attitude, we would like to translate this information into what he or she actually does specifically.

The planned behavior framework treats general attitudes as comparatively distant from a specific behavior and thus rather irrelevant to its performance (cf. Ajzen & Fishbein, 2005); it deliberately does not directly link general attitude with specific behavior. In contrast, this is precisely what our version of Campbell’s paradigm does when the likeli-hood of engaging in a specific ecological behavior is mod-eled as a function of a person’s environmental attitude and the behavioral costs of the specific act. That is, the para-digm quantitatively describes a person’s general attitude in terms of the likelihoods of engaging in various specific behaviors (see Table 1).

Evaluative Consistency and Circularity. Evaluative attitude–behavior inconsistency is not an empirical glitch but rather a

Figure 4. Consistency issues within the planned behavior framework




conceptual conundrum (Greve, 2001). Thus, consistency is not to be found in the proportion of explained variance but rather in the way we think about attitudes and how we con-ceptually connect attitudes and behavior.

Today, the attitude–behavior relationship is almost unanimously conceptualized as a causal one in which indi-vidual attitudes are thought to causally control behavior. This becomes obvious when, for example, an attitude has to be activated before it brings about a certain behavior (cf. Fazio et al., 2008). By contrast, we believe in what might be called a teleological linkage of behavioral means with attitudinal ends, formally describable with the Rasch model. According to this view, attitude and behaviors are conceptually confounded in means–end relationships; they are not separate entities. Portraying the attitude–behavior relationship as a causal one thus entails two significant conceptual misunderstandings.

The first of these is what the philosopher Gilbert Ryle (1949) has called a category mistake. A category mistake involves splitting a concept (e.g., attitude) and its indicators (e.g., behavior) into two separate categories or entities rather than seeing them as only one entity. The example that Ryle provides is that of the university. Imagine leading a col-league around on your campus and showing him or her the department buildings, the library, the laboratories, the admin-istration complex, the lecture halls, the staff, the students, the computers (the indicators, so to speak). Your colleague might still ask, “But where is the university (the concept, so to speak)?” The university is of course more than its indicators. It is also the way in which these components are organized. Yet seeing the indicators and their arrangement as separate from the notion of a university would nonetheless be a mis-take. The analogy is directly applicable to an attitude that is defined by a set of behaviors, transitively ordered from easy to difficult, and to Campbell’s paradigm, in which verbal behavior (i.e., evaluative statements) and other behaviors are mapped onto one, not two, dimensions.

The category mistake leads to a second conceptual mis-understanding. When the attitude concept is separated from its indicators, it allows for a view of attitudes as entities that are hidden in people’s minds, waiting to be launched (e.g., the association between a certain object and its evaluation; Fazio et al., 2008). From our perspective, attitudes do not need activation; they are present in a person’s deeds, feel-ings, and thoughts at all times (sometimes more apparent, sometimes less). This view, like Ryle’s, parallels more clas-sical notions, where an attitude is understood as a category that establishes the boundary for a set of individual behav-iors (e.g., Fishbein & Ajzen, 1974) through which an atti-tude becomes apparent.

Because of the category mistake, which has led psycholo-gists to think of attitude as the cause behind people’s behav-ior, Campbell’s idea has been regarded as circular despite a

fairly successful first empirical test (see Raden, 1977). If the definition of an attitude implies attitude–behavior consistency, then empirical consistency is trivial and cannot corroborate the validity of the attitude concept (Campbell, 1963). If a person’s attitude is apparent in the behaviors that a person realizes, we cannot really be surprised to empirically find behavior perfectly explained by the attitude. This only con-firms the circular nature of the empirical endeavor (see Dawes & Smith, 1985; Greve, 2001).

Strictly speaking, adopting Campbell’s paradigm to guide thinking about the attitude–behavior relationship renders behavior-explanation models of the planned behavior variety superfluous. There is no need to separate measures of behav-ior and of attitude as they are conceptually identical. This is not to say, however, that there are no meaningful empirical questions to pursue, including questions concerning psycho-logical processes.

New Meaningful Empirical Questions. As the definition of an attitude depends on a transitively ordered set of behaviors, any set of (overt, self-reported, or verbal) behaviors can only be said to represent an attitude with an empirical confirma-tion of its order. Thus, the key issue in defining an attitude in a Campbellian sense is finding a class of behaviors that can be calibrated as a Rasch scale. This is not a trivial matter, as such a calibration can fail (as indicated by the question mark in Figure 4), particularly when extremely varied behavioral costs are involved (see Table 1), which is the rule rather than the exception with behavior (see, e.g., Fishbein & Ajzen, 1974). With our research, we have repeatedly confirmed various classes of behavior to be transitively ordered (e.g., Byrka, 2009; Kaiser, Oerke, et al., 2007).

Furthermore, even if behavior and attitude are conceptu-ally confounded as within Campbell’s paradigm, we do not have to abstain from inquiries about causal and developmen-tal processes in attitude research. One set of those pursuits could include studies concerning, for example, the role of subjective utility considerations and social pressure in the formation of attitudes (cf. Ajzen & Fishbein, 2005). Another set of empirically meaningful pursuits could examine the interplay of distinct attitudes, such as that between attitude toward nature and environmental attitude. Campbell’s para-digm implies, however, that when the connection between two attitudes is researched, it is equivalent to researching the connection between two classes of behavior (cf. Brügger, Kaiser, & Roczen, in press).

Other meaningful pursuits concern the causal processes through which individual attitudes become established. For example, Frick, Kaiser, and Wilson (2004) tested the sig-nificance of and the ways by which different kinds of knowledge were thought to affect environmental attitude, which was measured as a behavioral disposition in the Campbellian sense.



Kaiser et al. 363

All of the foregoing research pursuits assume the validity of our attitude conception. We can however appreciate that our conceptualization will not go unchallenged. As a final example here we can mention a specific research question that involves competing attitude conceptions. It concerns the contrast between our understanding of attitude as an acquired behavioral disposition and the notion of attitude as an evalu-ative association with an object (e.g., Fazio et al., 2008). Attitude as evaluative association involves an explicit or implicit activation of the link between an attitude object—say, broccoli—and its evaluation—awful, for example. Depen-dent on the strength of the association, activation is expected to affect the speed with which the person executes a specific behavior, such as refusing to eat broccoli. The stronger the association is, and so the stronger the attitude, the shorter the response latency for executing the behavior.

Understanding attitudes the Campbellian way, by contrast, does not require that a person be reminded of an evaluation of the attitude object (again, say, broccoli) to engage in a particu-lar behavior (refusing to eat offered broccoli). Being reminded via priming that one hates broccoli might accelerate the rapid-ity of its refusal. Yet even without such activation, an antibroc-coli attitude alone is expected to lead to refusing offered broccoli provided that the distaste is strong enough to over-come the behavioral costs involved, such as acting discourte-ously. The question here is whether the individual’s attitude is more accurately reflected by the action as such, the refusal with its particular behavioral costs (i.e., what he or she does), or by the response latency of the refusal (i.e., how he or she does it). From a Campbellian perspective, it is expected to be the former, observable in the performance likelihoods of indi-viduals; from an attitude-activation perspective, it is antici-pated to be the latter, observable in individual response latencies. One empirical test would involve determining whether activation loses its significance for the response latency in persons with high levels of a Campbellian attitude.

Potential for Application. Apart from its various conceptual ben-efits, Campbell’s paradigm has some advantages for the application of psychological science as well. When it comes to applications such as interventions designed to change behavior, practitioners may not be interested in acquiring a deep psychological understanding of underlying processes nor intricate theoretical insights about the origins of behav-ioral problems. They may instead prefer that these insights be left to the experts, such as those charged with running behavior-change campaigns. This preference is presumably strong when a practitioner faces an urgent situation. When a patient is in agony, he or she first wants mitigation of the pain; the doctor’s explanations for the pain are a secondary matter. Similarly, we assume that policy makers under time pressure prefer to have quantitative evidence presented in such a way that it effectively facilitates their decision making, without

them having to acquire and evaluate a mass of theoretical knowledge. Behavior-based attitude measures grounded in our version of Campbell’s paradigm provide just that.

In their article, Kaiser, Midden, et al. (2008) work from the Campbell paradigm in presenting a decision support system for policy makers that embraces a double strategy. They describe significant differences in individual attitudes and, thus, in the overall behavioral performance of individuals at various geographical locations. Aggregated individual data for certain collectives are in turn used to identify sociocultural factors that control the differential preferences for various spe-cific actions for those collectives. As such, Kaiser, Midden, et al.’s system allows for evidence-based judgments regarding four generic policy questions concerned with the alteration of behavior: who, where, what, and how. Particularly advanta-geous for any practical purpose is the fact that, although still employing arbitrary metrics (Blanton & Jaccard, 2006), Rasch scales translate into easy-to-understand and meaningful prob-abilities because of the person-independent transitive order of the behaviors involved (Embretson, 2006). That is, when we know the strength of a person’s general environmental atti-tude, we can translate this information into what he or she probably does specifically (see Table 1 for an example).

ConclusionIn this article, we have provided arguments and evidence in support of an almost forgotten attitude conception, one that refers to attitude as an entity that directly shows in what peo-ple do in a particular behavioral category (e.g., DeFleur & Westie, 1963). What we call Campbell’s paradigm describes individual engagement in a specific behavior as the arithmetic difference between a person’s general attitude and the costs of the specific behavior in question. In contrast to Campbell’s original proposal, we have implemented the paradigm by using the probabilistic Rasch model rather than the determin-istic Guttman model. The assumption that seemingly diverse actions belong to one behavioral category is one of four con-stituents of Campbell’s conceptualization of personal attitudes as behavioral dispositions. Similarly essential is the assump-tion of an axiomatic and thus perfect attitude–behavior consis-tency. At the same time, both the strength of a personal attitude and the costs of a behavior are conjointly and additively perti-nent for individual action. In statistical terminology, one could say that attitudes and the costs of a behavior each work as main effects, and they do not interact.

As we have shown, evidence from different studies employing various research designs, samples, and statistical methods substantiates all four of these constituents. Although the evidence comes mainly from the environmental conser-vation domain, we have reason to believe that our arguments will generalize to other domains as well (see Byrka, 2009; Haans, Kaiser, & de Kort, 2007).




Finally, above all, Campbell’s paradigm rests on attitude–behavior consistency, which also is an indispensable ingre-dient of Leon Festinger’s cognitive dissonance theory (e.g., Festinger, 1957), another pillar of attitude research. Unlike previous models of consistency, we mathematically describe “evaluative consistency” between general atti-tude and specific behavior by using the Rasch model rather than the Pearson correlation. With this technical modifica-tion, individual attitude can be directly derived from peo-ple’s verbal and overt behaviors. Once again, the individual attitude becomes the motivational force that has to be strong enough to overcome the situational threshold involved in the realization of an activity (cf. Allport, 1935; Campbell, 1963).

In conclusion, we believe that Campbell’s conception of attitudes as behavioral dispositions holds tremendous poten-tial for theory and practice alike, including campaign evalu-ation and innovative behavior modification strategies. Campbell’s paradigm, as we call it, also holds the promise of a novel, parsimonious and prolific way to understand one of the core concepts in psychology.

Acknowledgments

We wish to thank Steven Ralston for language support in the preparation of preliminary drafts of this article. We also thank Adrian Brügger, Andreas Ernst, Gary Evans, Sam Gosling, Antal Haans, Jaap Ham, Wouter van den Hoogen, Wesley Schultz, Michaela Wänke, three anonymous reviewers, and the editor, Galen Bodenhausen, for substantive comments on earlier ver-sions of this article. In addition, our gratitude goes to all of the colleagues who helped us to develop our empirical and theoreti-cal arguments over the years.

Declaration of Conflicting Interests

The author(s) declared no potential conflicts of interests with respect to the authorship and/or publication of this article.

Financial Disclosure/Funding

The author(s) disclosed receipt of the following financial support for the research and/or authorship of this article: This research was supported by a grant from the J. F. Schouten Graduate School of User-System Interaction Research at Eindhoven University of Technology, Eindhoven, the Netherlands.

Notes

1. Behavior here refers to any real, unequivocally describable, verbal or nonverbal activity that is observable even beyond a given scientific method of investigation. This definition excludes behavior that is objectively identifiable only with psychologi-cal research methods (cf. Wicker, 1969).

2. The particular example for an evaluative behavioral response is from Eagly and Chaiken (1993, p. 12).

3. Instead of level, the technically correct term in attitude research would be extremity or intensity (see Eagly & Chaiken, 1993).

However, for readability, we also use level or the more collo-quial term strength throughout this text.

4. An order of objects is called transitive in mathematics under conditions exemplified by the following: If Object A is greater than Object B, and B is greater than C, then A must be greater than C.

5. According to the compatibility principle, strong correlations be-tween attitude and behavior can be expected only if both concepts are measured correspondingly in terms of the action involved, the target at which they are directed, and the context and time of the performance (e.g., Ajzen & Fishbein, 1977, 2005).

6. Note that the effect depicted in Figure 2 does not depend on the low-attitude persons considering the attitude-irrelevant resource being included in the comparison. With a comparison of the high-attitude persons considering the attitude-relevant resource to the remaining two conditions combined (i.e., high-attitude persons considering the attitude-irrelevant resource and low-attitude persons considering the attitude-relevant resource), the effect remains statistically significant.

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Reviving Campbell's Paradigm for Attitude Research

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