Review of Michael Fried's Menzel's Realism (Zeitschrift für Kunstgeschichte)

Menzel's Realism: Art and Embodiment in Nineteenth-Century Berlin by Michael FriedReview by: Todd CronanZeitschrift für Kunstgeschichte, 69. Bd., H. 4 (2006), pp. 578-592Published by: Deutscher Kunstverlag GmbH Munchen BerlinStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/20474381 .

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Shaken Realism. Review of Michael Fried, Menzel's Realism: Art and Embodiment in Nineteenth-Century Berlin. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2002., 328 p.,

I00 b/w + 70 color illus., $ 55-, ISBN 0-3000-92I9-9

Realism is a corruption of reality. - Wallace Stevens

I. Adolf Menzel, the Painter of Natural History

As Lionel Trilling put it some years ago, >>We perceive nowadays that realism is a manner and a subject rather than a virtue.<? In Menzel's Real ism: Art and Embodiment in Nineteenth-Cen tury Berlin, Michael Fried reverses this modern truism. For Fried, realism is the chief virtue. Quoting the French critic Edmond Duranty, Fried praises Menzel's >>sincerity of accent<< and >>art that rejects all false seduction, all charlatan ism, all artifice.<<2 The force of Menzel's realism - contrasted with that of the Barbizon School on one side and that of Gustave Courbet and Edouard Manet on the other - lies in its adher ence to the real even within an imaginative fan tasy. Menzel's realism was not just a theme to be taken up; it was in his bones. Everything he painted or drew was marked with a sense of what reality feels like, not just looks like. For that reason, Courbet's putative >>realist<< retort to Ingres, >>show me an angel and I'll paint an angel,<< establishes an alternative that would not make sense to Menzel. According to Fried, Men zel could not help but to see things - clothing, armor, landscapes, even bookcases and the world of Frederick the Great - from the perspective of

his own bodily experience, his matter-of-fact, material situatedness in the world. >>Self-portrai ture<< and its vicissitudes were his principle enter prise. Through Menzel's eyes and brush, objects are seen in light of their full life history, they carry the marks of ?lived?, or >>extensive<< time, as Fried calls it. The paradox of Menzel's Realism is that Fried helps us not only to see, but to feel along with Menzel what it is like to be in the world - a world that above all includes one's >>self.<< One of the techniques by which Fried brings

Menzel's art to life is through a series of wide ranging analogies with artists, writers, and phi losophers of the period: S0ren Kierkegaard, Gus tave Courbet, Thomas Eakins, Theodor Fontane,

Henry David Thoreau, Karl Marx, and Franz Kafka, to name the most significant. The major ity of these comparisons are illuminating - the affinities with Kierkegaard in particular (living for a time in Menzel's Berlin) are persuasive and bring out a shared pattern of concerns in an otherwise puzzling period of post-Romantic German art - while others feel forced.3

Fried displays his greatest strength when he is looking closely at particulars. Sections on >>The >Private< Pictures,<< >>Time and the Everyday; Menzel and Kierkegaard's Either/Or,<< and >>Menzel's >Real Allegory<,? show with remark able subtlety the stresses and contours of Men

I Lionel Trilling, The Promise of Realism, in: Speaking of Literature and Society, ed. by Diana Trilling, Oxford 1982, 27.

2 Duranty is referring to the well-known Iron Rolling Mill painted between 1872-75, a tour de force of Men zelian realism. See Michael Fried, Menzel's Realism: Art and Embodiment in Nineteenth-Century Berlin, New Haven (CT), 2002, 126-28, hereafter cited in the text with the page number(s) in parentheses.

3 Some analogies are less than illuminating. For instance, section 8, -Menzel with Courbet and Eakins? and sec

tion 9, >>The French Response to Menzel: Edmond Duranty,<< are the book's weakest moments. In these sections, rather than opening up a new perspective onto a relatively unknown field, readers are drawn back to the all-too-familiar ground of Fried's previous books and essays: the narrative framework of absorp tion and theatricality (the guiding schema of Fried's interpretation of modern French art from I 750-I85 o), when it is programmatically applied to every modern artist of the nineteenth century (French or not), is claustrophobic at times and often simplifies the works

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zel's peculiar habitus - something that has eluded commentators since the nineteenth century. Fried explores the multiple facets of Menzel's practice, tacking back and forth between thoughtfully constructed (and often beautiful) descriptions and a series of elucidating side-lights into a broader cultural milieu. After surveying

Menzel's themes and techniques of embodiment in his depictions of landscapes, interiors, and figurative work, Fried concludes that to truly understand Menzel's artistic demeanor one must see it as engaged in an attempt to represent the fullness of ?lived time.<< In contrast to the ideal of disembodied seeing found in Impressionist painting, lived time and a ?lived perspective? (the latter phrase borrowed from phenomenologist

Maurice Merleau-Ponty) are Fried's ways of de scribing Menzel's desire to grasp the extra-visual components of perceptual activity. Menzel's art, Fried contends, presents us with the life of bodies and objects: we can see, as it were, the strata of their natural history written on their surfaces. In all of his discussions, though, Fried returns to Menzel's peculiar drive towards an art of embodiment: the artist's overarching desire to imaginatively project himself - his bodily expe rience - into the world around him. As the au thor makes clear, however, Menzel's desire for an art of embodiment is rife with doubts and con tradictions.

II. Embodiment and Specularity in The Balcony Room

The framing concern of Menzel's Realism is the distinction between an embodied, empirical,

>>lived<< perspective and a more specular and detached one. Fried places a great deal of stress on the bodily or anti-optical qualities of Men zel's enterprise. This stress, however, is over determined. In the past, Fried has been noto riously charged with advocating an optically based art. And Menzel's Realism seems more than a little marked by Fried's attempt to extri cate himself from this criticism. It should be made clear, then, just what the stakes of the term >>opticality<< are, in order to see what Menzel's art, according to Fried, is not after. While the Oxford English Dictionary catalogs

some twenty illustrations of the term >>optical ity<<, from Wordsworth to Clement Greenberg, all re-enforcing its association with illusion and deception, with art historians the term has come to broadly signify an idealist strain of modernist art practice.4 For these reasons, Fried is at pains to distinguish Menzel from the artistic and philo sophical tradition of ocularism and idealism - a tradition that he propounded in his early career as an art critic, but that he now rejects. Fried fleshes out the distinction between bodily and optical modes of perceiving with a series of com parisons between Menzel and his artistic and philosophical contemporaries. He contrasts Menzel's profoundly bodily art to the predomi nantly optical and classical nature of French Modernist and German Romantic painting, as well as German Idealist thought. According to Fried, the bulk of the commentaries on Menzel - from Meier-Graefe at the turn of the century,5 up to the recent collection of essays edited by Claude Keisch6 - have overwelmingly assented to dualism in his career. As they see it, Menzel's

to meet the demands of the historical-aesthetic pro gram. It could also be said that this lapse into system atic aesthetics is out-of-step with the casual character of the rest of the book. As Fried describes it, the or ganization of the book is >>structurally loose<< and di vided into sections, rather than chapters, as a means to keep it ?fast-moving in its overall sense of flow<< (17). Artists and art historians became sensitized to the issue of opticality in the I96os when it was seen to bear a complicitous relation to the pro-war politics of the day. For a wide range of responses to an optically based for

malism see part VII, ?Institutions and Objections,<< of Charles Harrison's and Paul Wood's (eds.), Art in Theory: I900-I990, Oxford/Cambridge (MA), I992.

5 Julius Meier-Graefe, Der junge Menzel: Ein Problem der Kunstokonomie Deutschlands, Leipzig I906.

6 Adolph Menzel, I8I5-I905: Between Romanticism and Impressionism, exh. cat., ed. Claude Keisch and Marie Ursula Riemann-Reyher, Washington, D.C.: National Gallery of Art, I996.

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ti~~~~~~~;+

i. Adolf von Menzel, The Balcony Room, I845, Oil on cardboard, S 8.o x 47.0 cm.

Berlin, Staatliche Museen zu Berlin - Stiftung Preugischer Kulturbesitz, Alte Nationalgalerie

small-scale ?privateo< works are marked by modernist qualities of instability and fragmenta riness, while the large-scale public works (most notably the series of paintings depicting the life of Frederick the Great) are examples of Menzel's conservatism, as these works are thought to exemplify unity and stability. In seeking to dis place the division between these two genres, Fried gives equal time to the private and public works, finding them united by a common set of themes and issues. From bottom to top, Fried contends, all of Menzel's pictures struggle to work through the contradictions between bodily and optical modes of perceiving. The intensity of the struggle marks the special depth and interest of the artist's enterprise.

One of the most fascinating moments in the book is Fried's description of an allegorical un raveling of the contradictions between a bodily and an ocular orientation in Menzel's much ad

mired Balcony Room (i845; fig. i). The conflict, as he sees it, hinges on the contrast between the >>bodily< curtains and the manifestly >reflective< mirror<< (go). Most commentators on this paint ing have focused on this and other similar pic torial ambiguities, such as the painting's com positional asymmetry, its sketchiness (especially the far wall), the precipitousness of the ground plane as it moves toward the viewer, and most centrally, >>the lack of match between the reflec tion in the standing mirror [ ...] and the portion of the room toward the left of the composition< (90). There is a dissociation between the densely particular image in the mirror and the indeter minate, vague space to the left of it. While Fried is also concerned with these problematic mo

ments, he resists the simplistic interpretation that starts and finishes with such ambiguities. At bottom, Fried's effort is to see the unity

behind - the particular problematic engaged within - the lapses and ambiguities of Menzel's art. As we find out, the frictions and tensions in the private works are just as present as in the public ones, and in Fried's view the only way to make sense of these aesthetic dissonances is to see them in light of Menzel's greater effort to work through contemporary notions of specu larity and embodiment (whether Menzel did so consciously or not). We are invited to see Bal cony Room as both embodying and thematizing >the essential separateness or non-coincidence - the inner difference - of bodiliness and reflec tion<< (90).

It is worth pausing here to linger over Fried's discussion of Balcony Room as it is here that he >comes clean<< with the stakes of Menzel's aes thetics of embodiment. In the following passage he meditates on the possible import of the pic ture's play of reflections (between the mirror and its objects, the light and the floor) as an expres sion of Menzel's >aspectual< mode of depiction: >Mirroring or reflection in [The Balcony Room] is also what might be called perspectival or, bet ter, aspectual in its mode of operation. [...] [W]e are made to feel that only from the present van tage point would those things [the closer chair

S 80 ZEITSCHRIFT FUR KUNSTGESCHICHTE 69. Band / 2006



back that is reflected in the mirror, the particular gleam of reflected light on the polished floor, the view of the sofa and print on the far wall] appear precisely as they do. At the same time the impli cation of our >actual< presence at or to the de picted scene does not give us means to assess the extent to which the larger thematic of reflection plus-embodiment [or mirror-plus-curtains] in the painting is a function of the embeddedness and contingency of our own reflective self-deter mining, which is to say we are forever uncertain whether or to what extent the subjectivity we are led to intuit in the picture is in any sense >ours<<< (89). As Fried explains it, aspectual seeing carries

both a positive and a negative valence; it is both confirming and unsettling. On the one hand, we are fictively solicited to project ourselves into this pleasantly sun-filled space - an airy world that we are made to feel exists only for our being there to compose it. On the other hand, once we try to fix our bearings, we become immediately and anxiously aware of the thick material facts of our fictive invitation. We are made aware, that is, of the infinite series of such >>perspectives<< - both lived and unlived - at play within every act of perceptual cognition (a potentially horrifying experience for an integrated ego). The distressing awareness of our merely projective mastery over the scene destroys the fiction of specular total ization posited by a mastering ego. The slowly evolving pull that one feels between these two possibilities - between fictive totalization on the one hand, and the potential dispersal of the view er's subject position across the imaginary scene on the other - produces the unmistakable effects of dislocation and disorientation. In The Balcony Room, the beholder is simultaneously drawn into an imagined space of subjective determination and at the same time made agonizingly aware of the uncertainty as to whether this world is of our own making. Fried sums up the work's pictorial effects as follows: >>Menzel's canvas offers a high ly nuanced structure, keyed to but not exclusive ly consisting in relations of reflection, that point edly confounds any clearcut distinction between

>actual< and reflected elements at the same time as it implicitly addresses or interpellates the viewer,

who in effect is called upon to respond projec tively to the multiple evocations of a subjectivity that on the one hand seems to hover everywhere we look and on the other to come to rest, to con dense and stabilize, nowhere in particular. [...] [I]n Balcony Room, with its breeze-blown, light struck, and undeniably material curtains media ting the flow of light and air into the room, and also with its obliquely angled mirror ostensibly reflecting features of the room that lie beyond the painting's left-hand framing edge, outside and inside (in more than one sense of those words) are in the end little more than inflections of a single, in crucial respects seamless pictorial and phenomenological field. [...] And because that is the case, the viewer, at least this viewer, continually searches the painting as if for a solu tion that is not forthcoming (the inscrutability of the light patch on the far wall may be taken as emblematic of this)<< (89). Reading Fried's superbly interpretive descrip

tion, one cannot help but feel the vertiginous drift of Menzel's picture: a seemingly innocuous, >>impressionistic< genre-scene activates an in ordinate amount of epistemological uncertainty. Fried's description helps us to see with what remarkable proficiency Menzel is able to set into motion a tense confrontation between complex philosophical notions of specularity and embodi ment. In projecting ourselves into the encounter, we too are led in the end to the discovery, at turns painful and liberating, of a single continu um of inside and outside, mind and matter.

After a short discussion of Kierkegaard's >>The Seducers's Diary<< from Either/Or, Fried leads us to the denouement of his account of what one

might call >>the Menzelian subject.<< The discus sion closes in on a peculiar moment of inscruta bility in the picture, offering us a reading of the referentially ambiguous though densely particu larized image in the mirror. The specificity and literalness of the reflected image in the mirror grants it a quasi-autonomous relation to the room at large. But this autonomy is two-sided. I

ZEITSCHRIFT FUR KUNSTGESCHICHTE 69. Band/ 2006 58I



am reminded of the opening gesture of Schopen hauer's World as Will and Representation, >>the world is my representation.<< With these words consciousness is set loose from its material ref erent and at the same moment undermined in its claims to know the world. But with this loss, the subject is also relieved of the burden of his false pretensions. In Fried's words: >>We are drawn to the final conclusion, one of deep uncertainty as to the place and status of the subjectivity on offer: >Are we to imagine >>deep<< subjectivity simply indifferent to the question of the relation of its reflections to external reality?<<< (9I). What makes Menzel's and Fried's work so

compelling is the way each of them draws us to their unexpected conclusions. In Fried's analysis, Balcony Room should be seen as staging a powerful deconstruction of Idealism. That is, if we take the logic of the painting seriously (some thing commentators have not sufficiently done) we find a complex working out of the Kantian ego (the ?I think? that accompanies all of our representations [881) to its logical - and ultimate ly illogical - conclusion. Once reflection (embo died in the standing mirror) is made the ground of the self, rather than providing the speculative potential of subjective authority it becomes an empty and mechanical mirroring device without any real depth or autonomy.

III. The Menzelian Subject

Fried has long been criticized for his putative over-investment in the subjective authority of the artist and this book is no exception. In >>Em body Language,<< a review of Menzel's Realism in Artforum, Christopher Wood criticizes what he takes to be the fundamental solipsism of Fried's account.7 For Wood, Fried implies that >>[a]ll you can count on, in the end, are modalities of the self.<< This conclusion strikes me as mistaken. If one grasps the fullest import of Fried's argument, it seems fairer to say that all you can count on, in the end, are modalities without a self. In this and his other books on Eakins, Courbet, and Manet, Fried describes a much more radical notion of

the self than he is usually given credit for. Behind the overarching solipsism that Menzel's obsessive activities as an artist would seem to imply, we can intuit a purely receptive understanding of the self as perpetually - even sublimely - open to the world around it. Hiding beneath the solipsism lies a self that is >>nothing but traces, nothing but the evidence of exchange or transfer in the ab sence of living originals<< (246). I believe Fried is being quite literal in his notion of >>nothing but traces,<< that the world in fact permeates the sub ject through and through. For this reason, the term that best describes modernism for Fried is not fragmentation, but a constellation of terms including mobility, circulation, makeshiftness, and transference. Menzel activates a range of modalities within

the terms of makeshiftness: the solidity and pro ximity of sheer thinglyness in Hand Holding a Paint Dish (I864), to the flickering and glimmer ing evanescence of Flute Concert of Frederick the Great at Sanssouci (18 50-52). Fried's Menzel can be seen to spread across the full range of materi ality, from the blunt to the iridescent, the dense to the insubstantial, shifting between these two

modes in a seemingly endless oscillation. What ever sense of integration we can gather from his works, it occurs only within the limits of each representation, perpetually caught in a state of movement and transition. In contrast to Menzel's modernist and post-modern advocates, Fried's Menzel is never integrated enough to become fragmented, for fragmentation must imply a whole from which pieces have broken off.

Take, for example, Studio Wall (1872; fig. 2), a painting depicting an enclosure full of plaster casts and other studio paraphernalia. The charnel house arrangement of the latter implies some thing more serious, perhaps more sinister, than (mere) fragmentation. In Fried's provocative description of the work, the artistic >>subject<< potentially becomes the object of its representa tions. What Fried suggests is being dramatized on the Studio Wall, filled with reliefs of faces, torsos, and limbs, is the essential unity of the viewing subject (and artist) with the world at




large and, as a consequence, the nonidentity of the subject as subject. He concludes this section with a forceful account of the work: >One might even be moved to characterize the Hamburg can vas as >phantasmagoric,< albeit not in Adorno's and Benjamin's understanding of the term as sig nifying the derealizing and disembodying of the world by capitalist reification. Rather, the tri umph of >phantasmagorias< in this instance would signify the total saturation of the world by empathic projection, to the extent that the world itself, in what might loosely be called its objec tive otherness, threatens to disappear or become sublimated. If we were to follow [Werner] Hof mann's suggestion and try to understand the Hamburg canvas as a >real allegory,< this would seem to me what it is allegorical of< (246; empha sis mine). The gesture to Adorno and Benjamin is well

taken. Menzel as it were inverts the Benjaminian paradigm of a capitalist phantasmagoria and ar tistic counter-phantasmagoria. According to Benjamin and Adorno, the illusory experience proffered by capitalist pseudo-culture is (or at least was) coupled with the avant-garde's imagin ing of an artistic counter-phantasmagoria, a strategy of skeptical >second-reflection< of capi talist efforts to mystify reality.8 But Menzel's phantasmagoria is at once more thorough and more totalizing. Under his brush the phantasma goric unity of the subject itself is charged both with the sense of loss (of the integrated, solipsis tic >>I<) and a complementary dispersal and im mersion into the world >>around< itself.

Fried is often criticized by prominent art theo rists (e.g. Rosalind Krauss,9 Hal Foster, Jonathan Crary) for an unreflective investment in ocula rism and opticality. In this book, however, the more radical premises of the theory and history

2. Adolf von Menzel, Studio Wall, I 872, Oil on canvas, I I I X 79.3 cm.

Hamburg, Hamburger Kunsthalle

of absorption and theatricality come to the fore.

Though Menzel's Realism is thankfully free of

the specific framework of absorption and theatri

cality (adequately discussed in his other books

and essays), for the first time it becomes apparent what the implications and significance of absorp tion - under the modified heading of embodi

ment, empathy, suggestion, and projection - are.

If one takes the time to read through Fried's en

cyclopedic footnotes, one finds a series of lengthy discussions with art historians and a treasure

7 Christopher S. Wood, Embody Language, in: Art forum, October 2002, 43 f., here 44.

8 As Fried notes, Benjamin's attitude to the phantasma goric quality of capitalist culture is >nothing if not am bivalent< (236). For further on the topic of phantasma goria and >-second reflection<< see section 14 of Men zel's Realism.

9 I was startled to see that Rosalind Krauss, in her answer to a questionnaire on her top-ten books of 2003 in Artforum, December 2003, replied with the singular response of Menzel's Realism. I leave it to the reader to weigh the possible significance of this.

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trove of source materials for further study. Among these sources I cite two as being the most fundamental, and the ones I am most interested in. First, the most frequently cited sources are the writings of Stanley Cavell on Ludwig Wittgen stein, Thoreau, and Kierkegaard. Cavell's writ ings have been a point of reference for Fried since the I96os and provide him with the positive means of describing Menzel's practice as >>aspec tual,<< >>makeshift,<< and >>everyday.<I0 This topic has been discussed at length by other commenta tors and I will not focus on it here. Rather, I will point to the second, more contemporary source that has been relatively unexplored in regards to his work. The writings of the so-called >>Stras bourg school<< of Continental philosophy offer Fried a powerful set of terms by which to de scribe the tensions and aporias between bodili ness and specularity. Most notable among these writers are Rene Girard, Philippe Lacoue-La barthe, Jean-Luc Nancy, and Mikkel Borch Jacobsen. Though I cannot explore here the deep er binds between these writers and Fried's work since at least the I98os, suffice it to say that many of their insights have filtered into Fried's aes thetics and affected certain primary claims in his (latent) theory of subjectivity. As Fried remarks in a footnote, >>A general question, which I shall not attempt to answer in this book, would con cern the relation between what I have been cal ling empathy and projection and what Borch-Ja cobsen [in The Freudian Subject and The Emo tional Tie] calls mimesis, suggestion, influence? (28I). And it should be further remarked that empathy and projection are closely related to the

larger concept of absorption. It is precisely this notion of the hypnotic-suggestive subject, or non-subject, which he is alluding to in his discus sion of Kierkegaard and The Balcony Room: >>The passage as a whole [from Part I of Kierke gaard's Either/Or] expresses a painful uncertainty on the part of the Seducer as to whether or not his consciousness or subjectivity possesses >secret depths< in which an image might be hidden, or whether on the contrary it is reflective on the model of an ordinary mirror; the very figure of reflection, because of its reliance on a metaphor ics of mirroring, makes >deep< subjectivity - a subjectivity that belongs essentially to the sub ject, not to the objects of the subject's thoughts and reflections - a source of anxiety<< (9I). As discussed earlier, the tension between

>>deep<< subjectivity and mere reflection, between the autonomous ego and the subject of imitation, marks the underlying argument of Fried's study.

Through the contemporary lens of Borch Jacobsen's discussion of Freud's early papers on hypnosis, Fried is able to draw out some of the more provocative claims made by the German Ein fiihlung theorists." Quoting Robert Vischer, Fried points to the heightened receptive quality of Men zel's engagement with objects: >>[Objective em pathy] finds itself, as it were, through [subjective sensation] and now imagines itself turning toward the interior of the phenomenon. Only now - by virtue of this central projection, exchange, and return - does it take on a life of its own. It looks at its second self as it sits reshaped in the object and intuitively takes it back to itself, yet without dis cerning it clearly or knowing why<< (38).12

io See Stanley Cavell, Must we mean what we say?, Cambridge I976, and id., The Senses of Walden, expanded edition, Chicago and London I98I.

II The most important of the figures discussed are Gustav Fechner, Friedrich and Robert Vischer, and Heinrich Wolfflin.

12 Robert Vischer, The Optical Sense of Form: A Con tribution to Aesthetics, in: id., Empathy, Form, Space: Problems in German Aesthetics, I873 -I893, intro. and trans. Harry Francis Mallgrave and Eleftherios Ikonomou, Santa Monica (CA) 1994, I08.

13 Compare Fried's discussion of empathy theory with that of T. J. Clark's (one of the book's two dedicatees)

in his book Farewell to an Idea: Episodes from a His tory of Modernism, New Haven (CT) I999, I57-67. Here Clark describes what he calls the >>two basic conditions of knowledge and representation<< that Cezanne's art brings to light. These conditions are summed up in a >>double figure,<< a collapsing of two bodies, one facing away and one crouching forward, into one duck-rabbit figure in the right-hand portion of Cezanne's Large Bathers in Philadelphia (ca. I904 o6). The first condition that the double-figure sug gests is our empathetic connection to the world: >>our representation of bodies [...] just is some such pro cess of interchange and duplication, of unstoppable

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Vischer refers to this state of >>intensification of sensuousness? as >>a higher form of natural physics<< (38). The >>subject<< of empathy is pro cessed through the object and returns to itself modified by his encounter with the object (or objects). Menzel is both caught by and able to manipulate his condition of intensification, amazement, passivity, and what Fried calls phan tasmagoria. As we find him, the artist is fixed in a seemingly endless, potentially unstoppable process of ?feeling himself into kindred objects<< (39),I3 Though never explicitly stated as a full blown theory of the subject, the Strasbourg and empathy theorists offer Fried a powerful and neglected set of ideas about how subjects and objects interrelate and the process of exchange, bordering on fusion, that occurs within percep tual activity.

IV Realism Without Remorse

For Fried, realism pulls in two directions. On the one hand, artists try to adhere strictly to their visual sensations, to record them as accurately, objectively, as possible. On the other hand, real ism means a new attention to the entire body that is doing the sensing: sensations do not just passively enter by way of the retina but are syn thesized and inevitably associated with other, non-visual sensations. Both kinds of sensations enter into a ?fund? of experience (as John Dewey might have said) that is subsequently projected by the >>subject<< into the object. Starting roughly with Kant and gaining strength throughout the nineteenth century, philosophers and aestheti

cians place increasing stress on the projective and volitional elements within perception. Fried cites an early text by W6lfflin as an example of this trend, >>We read our image into all phenomena.

We expect everything to possess what we know to be the conditions of our own well-being? (36). But Kant's discovery of the categories of percep tion opened up an opposite possibility, the desire for a sphere - the aesthetic - that is free (at least relatively) from our subjective interests. Kant designates the realm of the aesthetic as a >>dis interested<< terrain wherein our categorical and cognitive claims on the world are ideally stilled. If I read Fried correctly, he sees realism as caught in the bind between these two Kantian claims of instinctual projective interest and a desire for dis interested contemplation. The force of these counter-demands - the strict recording of visual sensations and the felt experience of those same sensations - is the motivating mechanism behind the most ambitious works of nineteenth-century, post-Kantian, realism. If either demand is taken wholly seriously - either the belief that we con tinuously and unconsciously project ourselves into the world, or that we must try to extricate ourselves from our interests and try to see the world cleansed of our subjective coloring - the enterprise of realism is threatened from the start. Most accounts of modernism, or at least most

negative accounts, focus on one strand of the Kantian divide: the putative attempt by modern artists to create an isolated world of pure vision split off from the material requirements of bodily reference. From Manet to Pollock, so the story goes, opticality and its cognate, idealism, rule the

weird empathy, of our somehow putting an internal sense of what being in the body feels like into our picture of how another body looks<< (I57). The second point is an extension of the first: >>in the case of bodies [...] we are what fills, or reaches out to, the space another body occupies; and the space gets multiplied by our imagined acts, by the plurality of our own experience of our body getting beyond us.<< This double-experience of projection and dislocation is close to Fried's. But there are salient differences. Briefly stated, the difference lies in Fried's perceptual ly oriented, even biological, account of the tensions and ambiguities of projective cognition and Clark's

sociological dialectics of form and content. Here Clark puts particular stress on the body to body (here, predominantly male to female) dimension of empathic connection. Fried's Menzel, on the other hand, is rather indifferent to the historical-social engendered quality of objects of depiction. According to Fried he cannot help but feel himself into anything and everything. But, as we find out, this everything is substantially limited to Menzel's claustrophobic world of the self. For Fried's comments on Clark see section I 4 of Menzel's Realism.

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day. But the most rigorous and ambitious modern artists have struggled with and against this trend. That is, from its inception modern realism has taken up questions of bodiliness, and other neglected features of materiality. Accord ing to Fried, the driving mechanism of the great est works of realism has been the physical, embodied presence of the artist in direct con frontation with the seemingly de-materialized, flat image of the painting (or blank canvas or paper). To an even larger extent, the focus of Fried's work is on the inherent ambiguity of the primary and seemingly inescapable object of realist painting: the corporeal in both its bodily dimension as well as in its >>strictly visual< made (as vision itself carries an emphatically bodily feature). Fried is interested in the difficulties that artists have faced in attempting to come to terms with the sense of their own bodies as being both >theirs<< and, in a deeper sense, not belonging to them at all, as just another thing in the world. Perceptual activity itself, if taken up by the artist as a special object of inquiry, is inherently drawn in two directions, towards the ideational and the thing-like.'4 This, Fried suggests, is how we might describe the experience of viewing Men zel's remarkable depictions of his own body, as in Hand Holding a Book (i864), or The Artist's Foot (I876), as well as Suits of Armor Standing (i866). Just how strange and uncanny the body is, how thing-like and obdurate it appears when artists try to grasp it in its felt (not just seen) existence, is Menzel's idee fixe. All of these works are shot through with a deep sense of

3. Adolf von Menzel, Suits of Armor Standing, i 866, Gouache and pencil on light brown paper, 43.9 x 56.7 cm. Vienna, Graphische Sammlung

Albertina.

uncertainty concerning the status of one's >>self,< showing two conflicting sides: absence, loss, and withdrawal on the one hand and an unnerving sense of animation, presence, and vitality on the other. This antinomy of proximity and distance, presence and absence, is richly played out in Fried's description of the Suits of Armor Stand ing (fig. 3): >First, there is the obvious implica tion that the armor's seeming animateness ulti mately derives from the live bodies for which it was made and which it once enclosed - hence the impression of ghostliness or haunting. Second, the gouaches' insistence on the present vacancy of the armor, together with the sense they con vey of the grouping of whole and partial >figures<

14 One of the deeper strains, though not a dogmatic creed, of Fried's argument is that the resulting tension of these divergences may not be a question of history, but of an ontological oscillation inherent in the at tempt to represent the actualities of our material, bodily predicament in the world. It happens to be that modern art, detached as it is from a secure sys tem of patronage and social functionality, is left to dwell on a formerly latent contradiction within repre sentation. And according to Fried, upon grasping this contradiction, and trying to cope with it in a serious and convincing manner in the early days of modern ism, artists, one by one, fail. Or perhaps they cannot

but fail. The potentially fatal implications of realism come to the fore in the essay >Caillebotte's Impres sionism.< In the art of Gustave Caillebotte, Fried sug gests, the contradictory impulses of realism are taken to a tragic conclusion. Caillebotte's -withdrawal from ambitious painting< (and, implicitly, his untimely death at the age of forty-six), he writes, stems from a -dissonance between an emergent desire to represent sensations [...] and an unwavering commitment to a materialist epistemology.< See Gustave Caillebotte and the Fashioning of Identity in Impressionist Paris, ed. Norma Broude, New Brunswick (NJ) 2002, 98.

I 5 It should be noted that in the past, and most likely in




to create an uncanny effect [... compel recogni tion of the artist's activity of projection, which is to say they underscore the counter-implication that the bodily feeling palpably animating the armor was originally Menzel's own. [...] [Als if for him the faculty of projection or empathy cru cially involved imaginatively reanimating the world of made things by >activating< a primal or originary relation to embodiment that lay at its core<< (57) The Suits of Armor Standing is a paradigmatic

image for Menzel's practice. The gleam of the armor, like the mirror (and floor) of The Balcony Room, entices us into a dream of pure visibility. And like the mirror, the seemingly vivid contents of these reflective surfaces are ultimately empty. But there is a difference in effect between The Balcony Room and the majority of Menzel's other works. Fried's phrasing, >>imaginatively reanimating the world of made things,<< in its very generality, elides an important distinction. I do not see that Menzel activates any such >>originary embodiment,<< though I admit I don't know what that would entail. More important for Menzel, it seems, are the actual things them selves (not always made) that he engages with. Both Fried and Menzel seem ultimately disinter ested in the actual historicity of the objects that are imaginatively brought to life. Or rather, Fried seems to align historicity with Kierkegaard's (and Heidegger's) quasi-existential notion of >>lived<< time. What he leaves out of his account is that Menzel's objects on the whole, as well as his bodily forms of animation, are themselves >>primitive.<< Menzel's realism, that is, is a kind of primitiv

ism. As Fried presents it, Menzel's practice manages an extraordinary retrenchment in artis tic understanding - no self, no soul, no pre-given knowledge of an external world. We are asked to follow the artist's investigation into the uncanny pastures of the real, into the psychological wil

derness of Foot; Hand Holding a Paint Dish; Hand Holding a Book; Rat in the Gutter; Dead Soldiers; Urinal Wall; and Studio Wall. Even Fried's most beloved work, Rear Courtyard and House, carries a supernatural charge that is meant to unsettle our assumptions about what is, after all, going on in our own backyards. If we are to take such images and their claims about the nature of the real seriously, we are led to a disturbing conclusion: when we examine our most intimate worlds, our selves or our domestic surroundings, they tend to peer back at us with an almost uncanny gaze. Far from offering us a >>world-preserving<< (234) picture of the dis enchantment of the world, Menzel sets out to undermine not only our deepest assumptions about modernity but about the world itself. Menzel draws us into a new, gnostic view onto the world we thought we knew. In Fried's imagining of Menzel, our comfortable illusions of inside and outside, subject and object, are deeply shaken and unsettled by the inhuman world on offer.

This leads me to a lingering reservation about Menzel's Realism. My concern rests with the decisiveness with which Fried has turned against ocularism and opticality, a concept he formerly held as an ideal, despite his later recantations. The pages treating major nineteenth-century French modernists such as Corot, the Impres sionists, and Cezanne are unsatisfying.'5 In the following passage, for instance, he discusses the fundamental differences he sees between Men zel's overarching interest in the >>situatedness<< of the lived body and French modernism's pre dominantly specular, optically oriented, ways of depicting: >It is as if Menzel's concern with embodiment called for thematizing the fact that the living body is always some place, in some particular spatial, actional, and orientational re lation to the world, which therefore is never pre sent to artist or viewer as pure >spectacle,< the

the future, Fried made some of the most important contributions to understanding eighteenth and nine teenth century French art. For this reason it is all the

more disappointing when he is forced to make such broad generalizations about an art that he is clearly devoted to.

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way in which the world appears to have been present to Claude Monet, whom Cezanne once famously described as >nothing but an eye<<< (22).

Fried goes on to claim that ?from David and Ingres through Corot, Monet, Cezanne, and Seu rat (and beyond)? (8o), French artists remain within the orbit of classical composition, adher ing to fundamentally hierarchical rules of com position. In regards to both aspects of French modernism, ocularism and classical composition, Menzel stands in sharp opposition. Menzel's work, we read, >>could [not] be more alien to the spirit, in particular to the pictorial syntax or structure, of French modernist and pre-modern ist pictures? (8o). My contention does not lay

with Fried's characterization of the dominant qualities of French modernism as being funda mentally committed to ocularism and classical composition; I accept the terms as he presents them. Yet I still find myself more deeply com pelled by the central tradition of French modern ism, and let me state my reasons why. One familiar way in which the question of

>>embodiment<< has been construed is in light of Ruskin's critique of what he called the >>pathetic fallacy<<: the human propensity to project needs and desires into the world around us and, by a ruse of logic, to call it an intrinsic property of that thing or, worse still, the cause of it.,6 Rus kin's critique, barring his practice, is still cogent. In current philosophical debates, embodiment is seen under the heading of >>projectivism,<< which as Simon Blackburn has recently defined it, >>is the philosophy of evaluation which says that evaluative properties are projections of our own sentiments (emotions, reactions, attitudes, com mendations).<<?7 While it is correct to say that we do project and feel ourselves into the world - that we feel that the perceived properties of objects have a material embodiment in the world,

regardless of our having cognized them - this claim merely states a condition of consciousness.

While W6lfflin (and Fried) are correct in seeing that >>we project ourselves into objects all the time,<< this is not all, or even most of what occurs

within perceptual activity. We can, and often do, free our mind of such cognitivist and realist pre judices and not only in states of high aesthetic contemplation or production. Briefly stated, the act of perceiving does not necessitate that its instinctual projective component be confused

with statements of material fact. Human value and feeling, that is, do not have to be converted into predicates of things, or, at the very least, they do not need to remain at such a primitive level of assertion. Further still, I would argue that these very problematics generated by the perceptual paradoxes of projection and predica tion are not ultimately the most interesting ques tions that modern art provokes.

If we take embodiment seriously as a theory or practice it can be seen as a necessary but not sufficient condition for explaining the self-con scious products of the imagination that am bitious works of art are. Fried's Menzel, in his sustained interest in primordial states of being and in non- or minimally social-historical ob jects, lacks a crucial degree of awareness of his habitual and conditioned desires. In the end, Fried's Menzel reiterates the very problematics of Merleau-Ponty's account of Cezanne in >>Ce zanne's Doubt.? Both writers overestimate the instinctual nature of their subjects, the >>doubt ful? nature of their projects, and underestimate the role of self-consciousness in cultural produc tion. The word >>doubt,<< for instance, to describe the late work of Cezanne, seems inapt. It is still an open question for me whether doubt is the best term for Menzel's practice, but it does sub stantially inform Fried's account.

i6 For Fried's remarks on Ruskin see section i of Men zel's Realism.

17 Simon Blackburn, Spreading the Word, Oxford I984, I 80.

I8 For a finely nuanced discussion and critique of cur

rent tendencies in materialist epistemology see John W. Yolton, Realism and Appearances: An Essay in Ontology, Cambridge 2000.

I9 Blackburn (as note I7), 171. See also Glenn Tiller, from whom I first became aware of Blackburn's

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As I read Menzel's Realism I find myself con fused as to what Fried is affirming or denying. Drawing back from his detailed accounts of Menzel's work, I find two central claims about a materialist aesthetic, and am left puzzled about the priority of these claims within his ontology: (a) appearances can be explained in terms of or by reference to bodily projection, and (b) there are only bodily projections. To argue that optical images arise from, or emerge out of, a specific coordination of material, bodily processes is a clear statement of a materialist assumption. But Fried seems to draw on the second conclusion (b) in support of the prior claim (a). If this is the case, he is mistaken. If I read him right, Menzel's relentless search for the real bodily source be hind the merely phenomenal aspects of seeing leads him to an implicit, and for Fried explicit, totalization of the claims of the bodily over against the merely optical. Though the deeper questions of the relation between reality and appearances are far beyond the scope of this dis cussion, I find that Fried's account, which shares much with the Einfiihlung theorists, elides a dif ference in kind, although not in fact, between optical images and bodily ones. Although bodily projections may temporally precede optical ones, to imagine that they are more >primitive<< or >>originary<< for that reason is ambiguous. It is to assimilate the temporally prior and subsequent to a relation of cause and effect.'8 While it is salutary to note that visually oriented cognition is built upon a bodily foundation - just as the empathy theorists point out the empathic con ditions of cognitive awareness - and that this notion helps to keep vision intact and (literally) grounded, there is something overemphatic in Menzel's and Fried's reiteration of these condi tions. As I see it, this overemphasis does not let one get much beyond the problems of projection

and predication that artists are often aware of. Rather than helping us to work through such an ontological antinomy within realism, the pro cess of artistic creation becomes mystified under the veil of >>lived<< and extensive time and >>rea lism.<< One alternative to Menzel's skeptical realism

would be to draw out the consequences of his oft-remarked ambidextrousness into an actual view of the world: both empathic and detached. Any artist who fully recognizes that the optical and the bodily share a common corporeal foun dation has no need to fear the merely ocular. By this account Menzel's art could be seen to affirm that we can both understand our projective inter ests but nonetheless take these sensations merely as signs of the thing >>out there.<< That is, our per ceptive judgments about the world can lose their claim to objectivity thereby revealing their deep er expressive and semantic nature. As Simon Blackburn writes, >>the idea would be that if we were aware of these origins [of perception] we would give up some or all of our tendency to practice as if evaluative commitments had truth conditions, and were not expressive in origin and in their essential nature.<<09 (I should add that I do not think giving up all of our truth-condi tions is an option.) This double-sided position should not require a banal post-modern ironism as offered by someone like Richard Rorty, but rather a pragmatically based, non-terminal, skep ticism.20 In fact, I take this double-sided move ment between what Santayana called skepticism and animal faith to be at one with the dominant concerns of French modernism. To take a leading example, Matisse, particularly in the period be tween I905 and I9I7, could offer a more per spicuous understanding of >>aspectual<< seeing than Menzel's in his serial compositional practice and constant oscillation (usually in separate

work, Expressivism, Projectivism and Santayana, in: Journal of the History of Philosophy 38.2, April 2000, 239 -25 8.

20 Richard Rorty, Contingency, Irony, and Solidarity, Cambridge I989. For a powerful response to Rortian

ironism see John W. Yolton, Mirrors and Veils, Thoughts and Things: The Epistemological Problem atic, in: id., Perception and Reality: A History from Descartes to Kant, Ithaca/London I996, 67-83.

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works) between the poles of projective empathy and skeptical detachment. Menzel's route to the >>real,<< on the other

hand, is rooted exclusively in his bodily predica ment. Menzel is unwilling to give up the attempt to grasp the real in its literality. Fried cites Tho reau's words, which stand as the epigram to the book, >>Be it life or death, we crave only reality.<< I admit my hair bristles when I read this line. I share Santayana's reservations toward the American transcendentalists on this account. >>The first thing that we feel,<< he remarked in a talk on Emerson in i885, >>is his distance from the working day world [...]. His writing is con crete and poetic; but for one who takes such delight in mentioning miscellaneous objects, he leaves on the reader's mind a sense of strange unreality.<<2I This hits the nail on the head. For while I am convinced by Fried's analogy between Menzel and Thoreau, I feel that they share a problem in common. Like Emerson and Tho reau, in Menzel's hands reality has a remarkable way of coming-up strange and unreal, and the more commonplace the object the more unreal it is.

Within Fried's re-described realism he finds a clear separation between a specious version (he sees Dickens' Hard Times as a kind of >>anti-Wal den<< [174]) and a >>real? realism, one that is intent on clearing away the debris of the >>bad? everyday to retrieve an authentic, >>lived,<< exist ence underneath. And the really real, we find out, is deeply uncanny. Over and over again, Menzel finds himself confronted with an expe rience that carries tragic consequences - the pain ful experience of nonidentity with oneself is repeated with little consolation from beginning to end. Fried's Menzel finds himself repeatedly confronted by the dangers of embodiment as a practice, and yet is persistently driven to push

further into the depths of the real. As we find him, Menzel stands out as an emphatically anti nomian painter. Much as thinking was for Hei degger ?from the start tuned in a negative key? so is Menzel's imagination driven by the need for isolating his vision from that held by the world at large. Averting the demands of French-in spired realism to depict only those aspects of the world that we might value, Menzel incessantly converts, or refigures society's demands for real ity to the call of his inner voice. >>Every word they say chagrins us,<< said Emerson waving his finger at society. And similar images seem to flow from Menzel's brush. Menzel expresses a restiveness under belief of any sort, because it is precarious and a check, while it lasts, on his expression of spontaneous life. Unwilling to be pledged to a single faith, detesting to be taught, and wedded to nothing but the rigors of pur suing and deriding his successive illusions, Fried's Menzel strives to outgrow belief alto gether. Menzel, it seems, is such a passionate lover of truth that he would prefer to perish in the attempt to blaze a trail to the pathless >>real,<< than acquiesce in a renunciation which would weaken his possibility for freedom. In the end, I find that the obsessive qualities of Menzel's prac tice that Fried draws out so forcefully leaves me exacerbated and wondering whether, after all, this is what >>realism? of any stripe, looks like. Trilling and Stevens, whom I referred to in my

opening citations, saw realism as a style, or at least they held that it should be. >>How cold the vacancy,<< says Stevens in Esthetique du Mal, when >>the shaken realist first sees reality. The mortal no has its emptiness and tragic expira tions.<< The Menzelian realist is such a tragic figure who repeatedly proclaims his mortal >>no.? 22 Paging through the (very fine) reproduc tions in Menzel's Realism I begin to see that such

2I The Optimism of Ralph Waldo Emerson, in: George Santayana's America: Essays on Literature and Cul ture, ed. James Ballowe, Chicago/London I967, 8I. See also, Emerson, in: Interpretations of Poetry and Religion, critical edition, eds. William G. Holzberger and Herman J. Saatkamp, Jr., Cambridge (MA) I989,

I 3I- 40. Fried's deep and abiding interest in the A merican Transcendental tradition stretches back to his earliest art criticism. The powerful opening epigraph to Fried's essay Art and Objecthood (I967) is taken from Perry Miller's I949 book on Jonathan Edwards.

22 There are discriminations to be made. Some of Men




works as Balcony Room and the Garden of Prince Albert's Palace, the so-called quasi->>im pressionist< works, remain something of an anomaly within his ceuvre. Menzel's fundamen tal concerns seem to lie in a skeptical interroga tion of what it's like to be in the world, rather than what it's like to enjoy such a world. (The look on Menzel's face in the Self-Portrait in

Abrupt Foreshortening [i854; fig. 4] strikes me as embodying his essentially incredulous attitude toward the world.) The majority of the works Fried analyzes turn on a quasi-psychological investigation into the reality behind the nor malizing facade of everyday existence. Alternate ly, Stevens' realist, once he has reached the limit of his cognitive capacity to grasp the real, re verses direction and affirms our world of the >>minor< in its latent ideality; it is out of this that he will build his >supreme fictions.< (Or, as he says, his realist says yes, >because he must say yes [...] because under every no lay a passion for yes that had never been broken.<<23) As I see it, French modernism turns on precisely the dif ficulties within our man-made fictions while accepting their irresolvable status. Menzel, on the other hand, seems to accept no a priori con dition that he himself did not make. This is ideal ism with a fear of the merely ideal. Reality can, and should, be seen as a purely eulogistic term - a moral sense, not a literal one.

V A Not So Supreme Fiction

Fried's central notion of >makeshiftness,< which sums up the extensive temporality of Menzel's realism, is evidenced and thematized by a series of scenes of bricklayers. Fried takes these images as paradigms of Menzel's practice as a whole, and he is right to do so. Menzel, I would argue, stops short of reality's moral connotations, the sense of

4. Adolf von Menzel, Self-portrait, undated., Graphite on cardboard, 32 X 28.5 cm, Berlin, Staatliche Museen zu Berlin - Stiftung Preufischer Kulturbesitz,

Kupferstichkabinett

what is to come once the bricks have been laid. Like Kafka in the Great Wall of China, in which Fried sees another analog for Menzel's practice, experience and sensation have a way of breaking off midstream and the moment experience is about to turn into habit one is thrust into a dis orienting shift of perspective. I am left with the lingering sense that the building will go on in exorably, to no certain end. By maintaining this kind of stubborn naivete about the state of the real I feel that he ultimately falsifies the very object that he is exploring.

Thoreau's words - >Be it life or death, we crave only reality< - pays reality ominous praise; they seem to disallow the banal lessons of experi

zel's finest works present a seemingly satisfied vision of the conditions of non-extensive, or in Kierke gaard's words >bad< everydayness. For instance, those works most approximating impressionist paint ing (e.g. View of the Collegiate Church >>Unser Lie ben Frau zur Alten Kapelle.. in Regensburg, 1894) and

some works from the series on Frederick the Great. I recognize that this will likely sound heretical to most connoisseurs of Menzel's work.

23 Wallace Stevens, Esth6tique du Mal, in: Collected Poetry and Prose, ed. Frank Kermode and Joan Rich ardson, New York I997, 277-287, here 282.

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ence from falling into a more than continuously contingent order. A healthy dose of disinter estedness might help one to see reality again, cleared of the base foundations always threat ening to topple. The >>makeshift<< after all leaves more than traces. Traces upon traces lead to something more stable than their origins. A

thorough skeptic (presumably) need not till the same shifting soil day after day: with time, a channel for the foundation will open up, the bricks will be laid, the house will be built - and lived in.

Todd Cronan

Photo credits: I, 4 ? Bildarchiv Preussischer Kulturbesitz / Art Resource, NY; Photo: Joerg P. Anders. - 2 ? Bildarchiv PreuBischer Kulturbesitz / Art Resource, NY; Photo: Elke Walford. - 3 Graphische Sammiung

Albertina, Vienna.

Adressen der Autoren:

Albert Boesten-Stengel, Uniwersytet Mikolaja Kopernika w Toruniu, Katedra Historii Sztuki i Kultury, ul. Matejki 28, PL 87-IoO Torun

Todd Cronan, Post-Doctoral Fellow, The Getty Research Institute, I200 Getty Center Drive, Suite I I 00, Los Angeles, CA 90049- I 68 8, USA

Meinrad von Engelberg, Technische Universitat Darmstadt, Fachbereich I 5 Architektur, FG Kunstgeschichte, El-Lissitzky-Str. i, D-64287 Darmstadt

Dorothee Heim, Kufsteiner Str. 7, D-IO825 Berlin Karin Hellwig, Zentralinstitut fur Kunstgeschichte, Meiserstr. IO, D-80333 Miinchen Adrian S. Hoch, New York University, Villa Ulivi, Via dei Bruni, 27, 1-5OI39 Firenze Jiirg Meyer zur Capellen, Institut fur Kunstgeschichte, Universitat Miinster, Domplatz 23,

D-48I43 Miinster Ariana Riiueler, Danckelmannstr. Io, D-I4059 Berlin Koichi Toyama, 4-22-14, Nishiazabu, Minato-ku, Tokio I o6-oo3 I, Japan Fritz Wochnik, Pestalozzistr. 57, D-Io627 Berlin

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Review of Michael Fried's Menzel's Realism (Zeitschrift für Kunstgeschichte)

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Transcript of Review of Michael Fried's Menzel's Realism (Zeitschrift für Kunstgeschichte)