Resistance to Military Service as an Act of

Patriotism

Shlomit Asheri-Shahaf

Inaugural Conference of the Stockholm Center for the

Ethics of War and Peace, Stockholm University, Stockholm,

Sweden, 24-25/5/2014

The purpose of this paper is to show that

resistance to military service (RMS) is essentially

not a dilemma of freedom of conscience versus the

duty to obey the law (as defined in 20th century

liberal philosophy), but a dilemma between two

conflicting patriotic motivations. On one hand the

patriotic duty to serve in the military, and on the

other hand the patriotic obligation to resist

service in the military in certain political

circumstances, in which case the question of

illegality is secondary. Furthermore, the paper

demonstrates that RMS is justifiable on the basis of

what is known as 'moderate patriotism', that is, out

of a patriotism which is committed simultaneously to

universal and particular values.

The paper begins with a critical discussion of

theoretical weaknesses in liberal theories of

disobedience. Then, the notion of the 'patriotic

dilemma' is discussed, followed by a brief

presentation of the conception of 'moderate

patriotism'. The next stage shows how the idea of a

1

'patriotic theory of resistance to military service'

differs from other liberal theories of disobedience.

The conclusion is that if resistance to military

service on patriotic grounds is morally justifiable,

it follows that this is an act committed within the

framework of legitimate political discourse. In

other words, patriotic RMS is politically legitimate

even if it is not always legally legitimate. This

insight has implications for public and state

attitudes towards patriotic military resisters.

Therefore, the discussion of patriotic RMS offers a

theoretical distinction between political and legal

legitimacy.

Introduction

20th century liberal philosophy regards resistance to

military service (henceforth RMS) essentially as a

dilemma of freedom of conscience versus the duty to obey

the law. Consequently, liberal philosophers tend to see

this dilemma as a good example of the tension between

liberalism and democracy.

However, in the majority of democratic states today,

RMS is legal when it appears as principled resistance,

2

such as pacifism, or absolute objection to violence. RMS

is generally illegal when it appears as a resistance on

specific grounds, for example, out of objection to what

is defined by the resisters as an 'unjust war'. It should

be mentioned that RMS on specific grounds is legal today

in several states, such as Denmark and Holland. Also, it

was legal in England, for example, during the Second

World War, as well as conscientious refusal, which was

legal in England (and in other states) since the First

World War onwards.1

In addition, during the second half of the 20th

century, most of the democratic societies gradually moved

from compulsory conscription to volunteer military

service. Nevertheless, we still see today RMS, as well as

public opposition to RMS, for example, in the wars in

Iraq and Afghanistan.2 So, being legal or not, RMS always

gave and still gives rise to fierce public opposition.

So, unlike other liberal theories of disobedience, I

would say that my approach seems to me better captures

the dilemma. I argue that RMS is, above all, a dilemma1P., Singer, 1973. Democracy and Disobedience. Oxford: Clarendon Press,101; C., Moskos, and Chambers, J., 1993. The New Conscientious Objection.Oxford: Oxford University Press, 36, 109, and 224.2 For data on refusal in the Unites States during the wars in Iraqand Afghanistan see: D., Jamail, 2009. The will to resist: Soldiers who refuse tofight in Iraq and Afghanistan. Chicago: Haymarket books. For data on refusalin Britain during the Iraq War see: World survey of conscription andconscientious objection to military service, March 7, 2013/Countryreport and updates: United Kingdom, available from: www.wri-irg.org.For a discussion on liberalism and military service see: A., Carter,1998. Liberalism and the Obligation to Military Service. PoliticalStudies, 46 (1-3), 68-80. For a critical discussion of the lack ofcompulsory service in the US, see: R., Maddow, 2012. Drift: TheUnmooring of American Military Power. New York: Crown Publishing Group.

3

between two conflicting patriotic motivations: the

patriotic duty to serve in the military versus the

patriotic obligation to resist service in the military in

certain political circumstances, in which case the

question of illegality is secondary.3 It should be

stressed that I do not claim that the question of

legality - or rather, of illegality - is always

nonexistent or never relevant. What I argue is that when

it does exist, the question of legality is secondary in

relation to the issue of conflicting patriotic

motivations.

At first glance, my argument might seem to lack

internal consistency, because many believe that RMS is

necessarily antagonistic to patriotism. This is an

erroneous assumption, that is, patriotic RMS is

internally consistent. Patriotic RMS stems from and can

be justified on the basis of what is known as 'moderate

patriotism', namely, a form of patriotism that is

committed to universal and particular values at the same

3 For a discussion of patriotism, see: M. Dietz, 2002. Patriotism: ABrief History of the Term in I. Primoratz, ed., Patriotism. New York:Humanity Books, 201-215.; M. Viroli, 1995. For Love of Country: An essay onPatriotism and Nationalism. Oxford: Clarendon Press, Chap. 1-3; D. Bar-Tal, and Staub E., eds., 1997. Patriotism In the Lives of Individuals and Nations.Chicago: Nelson-Hall, 45-54; I., Primoratz, 2002b. Patriotism: ADeflationary View. The Philosophical Forum, 33 (4), 444. See also R.,Schatz, and Staub, E., 1997. Manifestations of blind and constructivepatriotism: Personality correlates and individual-group relations inD. Bar-Tal and E. Staub, eds., Patriotism In the Lives of Individuals and Nations,229-245; J., Sullivan, Fried, A., and Dietz, M., 1992. Patriotism,Politics, and the presidential elections of 1988. American Journal ofPolitical Science, 36, 200-235.

4

time.4 Thus I suggest that patriotic RMS is an act

committed within the framework of legitimate political

discourse, even if it is not (always) legal.5

My argument consists of the following stages. The

first part critically discusses a theoretical weakness in

20th century liberal theories of disobedience. The second

part presents the conception of 'moderate patriotism'

that forms the justification of patriotic resistance to

military service (henceforth PRMS) and shows how the

latter stems from the former. The third part explains the

notion of PRMS and indicates the ways in which the idea

of a 'patriotic theory of resistance to military service'

differs from other liberal theories of disobedience. The

conclusion is that when resistance to military service is

4 S., Nathanson, 1989. In Defense of Moderate Patriotism. Ethics, 99(3), 535-552. On the criticism of moderate patriotism and theresponses to it, see: M., Canovan, 2000. Patriotism Is Not Enough.British Journal of Political Science, 30 (3), 413-432; S., Nathanson, 1997.Should Patriotism Have a Future? D. Bar-Tal and E. Staub, eds., 318-319. Paul Gomberg offers a radical criticism of all forms ofpatriotism discussed above, including its moderate variant, arguingthat patriotism of any kind is tantamount to racism. See: P.,Gomberg, 1990. Patriotism Is Like Racism. Ethics, 101 (1) 144-150. ForNathanson’s response to Gomberg’s racism claim, see: S., Nathanson,1992. Is Patriotism Like Racism? APA Newsletter on Philosophy and the BlackExperience, 91(2), 9-12. 5 It should be emphasized that this argument does not necessarilyimply that patriotic RMS is politically legitimate only when it isillegal, nor does it necessarily imply that a different form of RMS,one not based primarily on patriotism (but, for example, on justiceor religious belief) is not legitimate. For a discussion of politicallegitimacy, see: B., Manin, 1987. On Legitimacy and PoliticalDeliberation. Political Theory, 15, 338-368; T., Nagel, 1987. MoralConflict and Political Legitimacy. Philosophy and Public Affairs, 16 (3),215-240; A., Buchanan, 2002. Political Legitimacy and Democracy.Ethics, 112 (4), 689-719; J. M., Coicaud, 2002. Legitimacy and Politics: AContribution to the Study of Political Right and Political Responsibility. Cambridge:Cambridge University Press.

5

undertaken on patriotic grounds, it is politically legitimate

even if it has no legal legitimacy.

(I)

There are two theoretical weaknesses in liberal

theories of disobedience, which are relevant to the

discussion over RMS. As noted earlier, one weakness stems

from the definition of the dilemma. The second weakness

is the well-known distinction between conscientious

refusal (CR) and civil disobedience (CD). Liberal

philosophy tends to begin its discussion on disobedience

by making a distinction between them.6 RMS was at first

conceived as CR, but subsequently more and more elements

of civil disobedience were identified in it. In 1993

Margaret Levi and Stephan DeTray wrote that:

"Conscientious objection bears an obvious family resemblance to civil

disobedience. Where it differs is that it has become a legal act of resistance." 7

My claim is that - besides the question of legality

- the distinction between CR and CD is terminologically

problematic; specifically, it reflects a narrow (and

incorrect) conception of CR and of CD as well. The three6 For definitions of conscientious objection, see: Rawls (1990, 368-371), Raz (1979, 263-264), Walzer (1970, 12), Moskos and Chambers(1993, 5). For definitions of civil disobedience, see: Bedau (1961,661), Rawls (1990, 363-368), Raz (1979, 263), Walzer (1970, 24-25),Zinn (1968, 281), Singer (1973, 72-92), Greenawalt (1987, 232-240),Lefkowitz (2007, 204-205). For a different definition of civildisobedience, see: Bedau, ed. (1991). Kimberley Brownlee claims thatthere is no use in trying to hone the existing definitions anyfurther, and instead suggests that an appropriate paradigm be sought(Brownlee 2004, 337-351).7 M., Levi and S., DeTray, 1993. A Weapon against the war:Conscientious Objection in the United States, Australia, and France.Politics and Society, Vol. 21 (4), 425.

6

main errors arising from the distinction between them are

as follows: (1) its possible implication that one of the

two is 'morally superior' to the other; (2) its

distinction between foreign and domestic affairs; (3) its

distinction between personal and political motives. I

will now discuss each of these three problems.

(1) First, the distinction between CR and CD might

imply some kind of 'moral superiority' of conscientious

objectors over those committing civil disobedience, or

vice versa. When the claim is to 'moral superiority' of

conscientious objection over civil disobedience, what is

meant is that the former is a conscientious (hence not

political) and principled (not ad-hoc) kind of

resistance, and is therefore deemed more moral. By

contrast, those who commit civil disobedience - that is,

those whose resistance is specific and undertaken with

the explicit intention of bringing about political change

- are perceived as making use of moral justifications

according to momentary convenience, in the service of

some ideological or political goal, and therefore civil

disobedience can be perceived in the general public as

less conscientious or moral than CR.

When the claim to 'moral superiority' is asserted in

the opposite direction, it can have two meanings. In one

sense, it may be argued that civil disobedience is

'morally superior' to CR because those who commit it

display a recognition of their responsibility for their

act, whereas conscientious objectors refuse in effect to

7

assume such responsibility. The second sense in which it

may be claimed that civil disobedience is 'morally

superior' to CR, especially when applied to RMS, is based

on the doctrine of just and unjust wars. It may be

argued that RMS as civil disobedience is compatible with

the just war doctrine and hence is morally valid. That

is, RMS as civil disobedience is ethical because it stems

from the distinction between just and unjust wars (and

not because of its political motive). By contrast, RMS as

principled conscientious objection (pacifism, principled

objection to violence, anti-militarism) rejects the

doctrine of just and unjust wars, for it does not accept

the possibility of a 'just' war. Consequently, it cannot

derive its moral validity from the conception of just

wars, which is the accepted conception in liberal

democracies today.

(2) The second error is that of associating CR with

resistance to foreign affairs, in contrast to civil

disobedience which is conceived as a form of protest

against domestic policy. In reality there are cases of

RMS as a form of resistance to domestic policy, for

example, against racial discrimination or unjust economic

8

policy.8 This error creates internal as well as external

theoretical weaknesses. Let me explain.

Internal weakness is a lack of coherence or consistency

within the theory itself, and it may arise from a tension

or contradiction between different elements of the theory

(definitions, justifications), or from a sense that these

elements are counter-intuitive. External weakness, as was

shown by Jonathan Wolff and Avner de-Shalit, exists when

the theory is inconsistent with empirically existing

intuitions, theories, actions or situations related to

RMS which are external to the theory.9 Hence they can

serve as a mirror from which the degree of its external

validity is reflected back to it. External weaknesses

exist when it is difficult to make use of the theory in

real cases of RMS, rendering it irrelevant to the

political reality.10

The internal weakness is that according to the

distinction at hand it is unclear whether in those cases

RMS constitutes conscientious objection or civil

disobedience, giving rise to confusion regarding the mode

of justification (and even the degree of legality)8 Rawls, 377; for examples of Afro-American refusal on the grounds ofracial injustice see: Moskos and Chambers, 52-55; James, C. L. R. etal. eds., 1980. Fighting Racism in World War II. New York: Monad Press. Forexamples of CR out of objection to a specific social-economic policysee: H., Matar, 2012. Following Silman: New CR initiative. Available from:www.mysay.co.il (July 16, 2012); R., Gazit, 2013. Officer's Letter: Do notturn the Israeli IDF into an army in service of Gaz Barons. Available from:www.facebook.com/events/613596205318527/ (May 27, 2013). 9 J., Wolff and A., de-Shalit, 2007. Disadvantage. Oxford: Oxford University Press.10 A., de-Shalit, 2006. Power to the People: Teaching Political Philosophy in SkepticalTimes. Oxford: Lexington Books.

9

associated with it. The external weakness is that in

reality, military service resisters not only do not make

an unequivocal distinction between domestic and foreign

policy, but actually link the two, such that their

resistance to domestic policy justifies, in their view, a

refusal to serve in the military or to participate in a

war.

(3) A third error that ensues from the distinction

between CR and civil disobedience is the reference to the

former as aimed at resolving some personal distress, as

opposed to civil disobedience which seeks to change

policy and thereby influence the public. My contention

(and that of others) is that the two are not mutually

exclusive. Quite the contrary, the two usually exist

simultaneously.

(II)

The dilemma of RMS shares similar features with the

general dilemma of disobedience. However, alongside

arguments that appear in discussions of disobedience more

generally, the argumentation of RMS also includes

arguments that are distinctive to it alone. For example,

security and military arguments, and arguments accusing

the resisters of treason, of disloyalty to the homeland,

of posing a security risk, and even of constituting a

danger to the very existence of the state. RMS challenges

a social convention considered by many to be a central

10

manifestation of citizenship and patriotism, namely,

military service. Therefore, RMS differs from other

dilemmas of disobedience primarily in its questioning of

certain (but common) conceptions of patriotism.

Hence, there are military resisters who wish to

serve in the military primarily because they are

patriotic, and not primarily because they are legally

obligated to do so (or from other reasons). But sometimes

their patriotic moral obligation tells them not to serve.

Therefore, their moral dilemma stems from the tension

between their patriotic duty to serve in the military and

their patriotic moral obligation to resist a specific

military service in certain circumstances. Furthermore,

one of the main accusations leveled against military

resisters, insofar as they are military resisters, is

that of lack of patriotism (and not necessarily that of

disobedience).

It may be argued against the formulation of the

dilemma in terms of a tension between two patriotic

motivations that there are reasons other than patriotism

for which citizens enlist. Nevertheless, when other

motivations for military service are involved (say, a

military salary or the prospect of social mobility or

fear of social sanctions and ostracism), then the tension

is neither between different values, nor between

conscience and values. Of course, one’s willingness to

enlist and to fight (or to resist service) may stem from

a variety of reasons. I argue that military service, and

11

even the willingness to die in battle, can also be driven

by non-patriotic reasons (albeit not unpatriotic either),

such as the wish to be a hero or to attain official

national commemoration. Just as the refusal of

conscription or service can be compatible with

patriotism, military service (including the willingness

to die in battle) does not necessarily testify

exclusively to patriotism. Thus, my argument is

applicable to cases in which the primary motivation is

patriotism.

As noted earlier, patriotic RMS (henceforth PRMS) is

based on a conception of patriotism. However, there is

more than one conception of patriotism. For example, one

approach to patriotism is identified with Alasdair

MacIntyre, who contends that patriotism and the loyalties

it involves are not just ordinary virtues, but primary

virtues (MacIntyre 2003). This approach regards

patriotism as a virtue, justifies it and gives it

preference over other values, even if patriotism,

according to this conception, is a fundamentally

particularistic value.

Another approach, identified with Jürgen Habermas

and others, offers a cosmopolitan conception of

patriotism, namely, one which rather than being based on

national identity (as in the first approach), is based on

exclusive commitment to universal principles (Habermas

1996; Nathanson 1997; Primoratz 2002b; Taylor 1996;

Cronin 2003). The claim is that patriotism justified in

12

terms of a particularistic moral duty towards a specific

community, nation or state, is dangerous due to its moral

proximity to chauvinism, nationalism, and even extreme

nationalism. That is, particularistic patriotism is

illegitimate, given the assumption that it is perforce

antagonistic to universal values (Will Kymlicka 1995;

Martha Nussbaum 2010).

A third approach criticizes both the particularistic

and the universalistic approaches, claiming that both

fail to reflect the complexity of reality and the

diversity of commitments held by most people. Stephen

Nathanson has formulated the 'moderate' conception of

patriotism, which assumes that commitment to particular

(alongside universal) values is an inextricable part of

the lives of most people, and therefore a moral theory

that disregards it would be inadequate. The moderate

character of this patriotism is achieved by reining in

the particularistic dimension and balancing it with

universal commitments.11 In other words, moderate

patriotism enables people to promote particular values

and interests of their country while taking into

consideration the values and interests of other

countries, and as long as compatibility with universal

morality is maintained.

As noted earlier, my aim here is not to develop a

discussion on different conceptions of patriotism, but to

11 Nathanson 1989; S., Nathanson, 1993. Patriotism, Morality and Peace.Boston: Rowman & Littlefield.

13

focus on the conception of 'moderate patriotism' which,

in my view, is the most relevant for justifications of

PRMS. Hence, without developing here my argument why the

'moderate patriotism' is the most suited for PRMS, I will

say that what makes both particularistic and cosmopolitan

patriotism almost irrelevant to PRMS is their (absolute

or partial) rejection of universalism, in general, as

well as particularism, in general.

Moderate patriotism is characterized by the

following four qualities: Special affection for one's

country, a special identification with it, special

concern for its well-being, and a willingness to

sacrifice to promote the country's good.12 Patriots,

according to this definition, can differ widely from each

other as long as they meet these four criteria. A

moderate patriot is obligated to act for one’s country

within the framework of universal morality, i.e., not

only are criticism, resistance, and protest during

wartime by no means unpatriotic, but patriots, precisely

because of their patriotism, are in fact morally

obligated to express their criticism for the sake of the

country (and of others) (Nathanson 1993). Thus the moral

dilemma faced by the moderate patriot with respect to

unjust wars arises from the need to choose one out of

four options:

12 Nathanson 1993, 134.

14

1. Obeying the law, participating in the war and

refraining from protesting against it (even though it is

unjust)

2. Obeying the law, participating in the war, but

protesting against it in legal ways

3. Protesting against the war while refusing to enlist or

to fight

4. Renouncing one’s patriotism and, consequently,

refusing to enlist and to participate in the war

Options (1) and (4) are the least reasonable for the

moderate patriot. Option (1) is unreasonable because the

moderate patriot’s moral duty is to resist an unjust war.

Option (4) is unreasonable because moderate patriots have

a sense of belonging and connection to their country and

of obligation to defend it, including during wartime.

This leaves options (2) and (3).

Many believe that the moderate patriot’s moral

decision must be option (2), and indeed, such a decision

may be based on patriotism. For example, it may be argued

that when the cannons roar and the country is in danger,

it is the duty of patriots to subordinate their personal

moral judgment to the country’s interests; or that the

decision to wage an unjust war has been made by a

legitimate representative of the state and therefore

patriots are bound to it (a specific variant of this

argumentative category would be the claim that the

decision has been made by the state’s democratic

15

institutions, which one proudly accepts); or that the

good of the country during wartime consists above all in

attaining victory, so anything that might prevent victory

is immoral or unpatriotic. Deciding in favor of option

(2) is, therefore, not unpatriotic. My argument is that

deciding in favor of option (3) is also a patriotic

decision.

Moderate patriotism implies a duty on the part of

the patriot to criticize a specific policy when one

believes that this policy is erroneous and might even be

harmful to the country’s interests. This argument may be

explained using the example of the relations between

parents and children. Parents relate to their children in

a manner similar to the way patriots relate to their

countries. Parents love their children and are proud of

them, willing to make sacrifices for them and regarding

them as part of their own selves. At the same time,

parents also have a sense of duty to criticize their

children and their behavior. It may be argued that the

right and even the duty to criticize children when, in

the parents’ opinion, they behave improperly, derives

precisely from the special relations between parents and

children and from the former’s feelings of concern and

responsibility for the latter. This moral right arises

from the parents’ sense of responsibility, their loyalty

to their children, their readiness to protect and make

sacrifices for them. The parents’ moral duty to criticize

their children arises from the fact that the probability

16

that the latter will change their ways following their

parents’ criticism is greater than the probability that

they will do so following criticism on the part of

someone who is not their parent.

Moderate patriotism, just like democracy, obligates

citizens to voice their criticism. If they succeed in

persuading others, using legal and accepted channels, so

much the better; but they must consider carefully whether

or not to persist in their attempts to persuade,

including through extraordinary measures such as PRMS. If

they decide to keep up their efforts at persuasion in

order to make their criticism heard (or because they must

follow their moral obligation) and to undertake PRMS, the

resisters must meet the four criteria of moderate

patriotism, including the requirement of personal

sacrifice for one’s country. If they meet the criteria of

'moderate patriotism', then this is a justified and

legitimate form of patriotic resistance to military

service.

Now, in discussing PRMS, the element of willingness

to make sacrifices for one’s country (that is, a

willingness to be punished, to be put to trial, jailed

and socially stigmatized) is central, for it constitutes

a robust expression of patriotic sentiments (love,

identification, belonging, pride, concern,

responsibility) among military resisters.

17

Many regard the willingness to enlist, to fight, to

kill and be killed for one’s country as the highest

expression of the willingness to self-sacrifice, hence of

patriotism. This widespread conception of patriotism

posits a necessary link between itself and military

conscription and fighting for one’s country. If there is

a necessary link of this kind, then a pacifist cannot be

a patriot. Yet if such a necessary link does not exist,

but rather the willingness to make personal sacrifices

for one’s country can also be expressed in other ways,

then patriotism is not conditional upon just one type of

sacrifice, but upon the willingness to make sacrifices in

general.

Nathanson argues, therefore, that according to the

moderate patriotism approach, a pacifist can be a

patriot.13 My claim is that, logically, if a pacifist who

refuses military conscription on principled grounds can

be a patriot, then patriotism is all the more applicable

to non-pacifist military resisters. In other words, a

willingness to make personal sacrifices for one’s country

is possible and justifiable on the basis of patriotism

even if it falls short of an unconditional willingness to

kill and be killed for it.

The willingness to make personal sacrifices for the

country’s sake manifests itself at two levels, the social

and the legal. Sacrifice in the social sense means being

willing to be exposed to public and media criticism, to

13 Nathanson 1997.

18

be denounced and slandered, to find oneself outside the

consensus and so on. This sacrifice may be accompanied by

paying an economic price, for example, in the form of

difficulty finding a job, compromising on a job that

falls below one’s real earning potential, and even being

fired or finding one’s professional career to be blocked.

Sacrifice in the legal sense is the willingness to be put

to trial, punished, and jailed (sometimes recurrently).

When the PRMS is illegal, the willingness to

sacrifice is present in both senses (social and legal).

When PRMS is legal, the willingness to sacrifice is

present only in the social sense. It should be mentioned

that there are resisters who, while making personal

sacrifices in both senses, believe that the social cost

is the most difficult part of the sacrifice.14

(III)

The 'patriotic theory of resistance to military

service' is a liberal theory of RMS and consists of a

definition, justifications and functions. However, being

limited to my 30 minutes lecture, I will not elaborate on

this now. I will say that the theory is characterized and

therefore differs from other liberal theories of

disobedience by the following four elements:

14 J., Le Meur, 1959. Histoir D`un Acte Responsable – Le Cas Jean LeMeur. Esprit, 2, 690; Jamail 2009.

19

(1) It focuses on RMS (and not on conscientious

refusal or civil disobedience)

(2) It is based on empirical argumentation found in

public debates and subjected to critical scrutiny,

according to the Public Reflective Equilibrium

methodology15

(3) It justifies PRMS based not only on liberal or

universal values

(4) Patriotic justifications of RMS stem primarily

from love of country (and not from justice or rights)

The 'patriotic theory of resistance to military

service' is better at justifying specific PRMS than

principled PRMS (such as pacifism or anti-militarism),

and in this sense it is somewhat different from

Nathanson’s conception of moderate patriotism. For with

respect to specific PRMS it is easier to show the

presence of the conditions of public criticism and

willingness to make personal sacrifices for the country

(although we cannot completely rule out the possibility

of at least some of the patriotic motives existing in

cases of principled PRMS as well). I do not disagree with

Nathanson’s assertion that a pacifist can also be a15 de-Shalit (2006). The Public Reflective Equilibrium (PRE)methodology highlights the importance of public intuitions andtheories. The theories and intuitions of the public with respect toPRMS were drawn from two main sources, namely texts (primary andsecondary sources) and in-depth conversations with refusers,supporters and opponents of PRMS. An empirical examination of theargumentation was undertaken, which included (1) subjecting thearguments to critical scrutiny, (2) classifying the arguments and (3)producing a 'patriotic theory'.

20

patriot. My argument is that, compared to specific PRMS,

it is more difficult to justify PRMS on principled

grounds in terms of patriotism.

Finally, we should distinguish between

justifications of legal and illegal PRMS (both principled

and specific). The 'patriotic theory of resistance to

military service' is better at justifying illegal PRMS,

for it is easier to demonstrate the latter’s compliance

with the twofold requirement of willingness to sacrifice

(social and legal). In the case of legal PRMS, the

requirement of sacrifice in the legal sense (e.g. by

taking the risk of being jailed) is absent by definition.

Yet even in this case, the willingness to sacrifice in

the social sense still exists. Furthermore, even when

PRMS is legal, what makes the resisters patriotic is

their very willingness to make personal sacrifices for

the country, even if they cannot express this patriotism

by means of PRMS (though expressing it in other ways).

Consequently, when legal PRMS is undertaken primarily out

of a patriotic motive, then it also meets (albeit with

some difficulty) the criteria and is justifiable in terms

of moderate patriotism.

Conclusion

The history of legalization of CR shows that

obtaining legal legitimacy did not necessarily lead to

political legitimacy. That is because political legitimacy of

RMS does not necessarily derive from its legality, but

21

from its moral justification. I have argued that if PRMS

is morally justifiable, it follows that this act is

politically legitimate, even if not (always) within the

legitimate legal framework. In other words, the

discussion of PRMS offers a theoretical distinction

between political and legal legitimacy.

If so, then the state can also acknowledge the

political legitimacy of patriotic military resisters: if

the law has been breached, the state may take the

accepted juridical steps, putting the resisters to trial

and even punishing and incarcerating them, not as

criminals or traitors or non-patriots, but as those who

have breached the law out of a sense of love, belonging,

responsibility and concern for the country. Resisters out

of patriotism may disobey the law, but they are patriots

nonetheless.

References

Bar-Tal, D. and Staub E., eds., 1997. Patriotism In the Lives of Individuals and

Nations. Chicago: Nelson-Hall.

22

Bedau, H., 1961. On Civil Disobedience. The Journal of Philosophy, 58 (21),

657.

Blattberg, C., 2012. We Are All Compatriots in W. Kymlicka and K.

Walker, eds., Rooted Cosmopolitanism: Canada and the World. Vancouver: UBC

Press, 13-14.

Brownlee, K., 2004. Features of a Paradigm Case of Civil

Disobedience. Res Publica, 10 (4), 337-351.

Brownlee, K., 'Civil Disobedience', available in:

http://plato.stanford.edu/cgi-in/encyclopedia/archinfo.cgi

Brownlee, K., 2012. Conscience and Conviction: The Case for Civil Disobedience.

Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Buchanan, A., 2002. Political Legitimacy and Democracy. Ethics, 112

(4), 689-719.

Canovan, M., 2000. Patriotism Is Not Enough. British Journal of Political

Science, 30 (3), 413-432.

Carter, A., 1998. Liberalism and the Obligation to Military Service.

Political Studies, 46 (1-3), 68-80.

Childress, J., 1985. Civil Disobedience, Conscientious Objection and

Evasive Non-compliance: A Framework for the Analysis and assessment

of illegal actions in Health Care. The Journal of Medicine and Philosophy, 10

(1), 63-83.

Coicaud, J. M., 2002. Legitimacy and Politics: A Contribution to the Study of Political

Right and Political Responsibility. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Cronin, C., 2003. Democracy and Collective Identity: In Defense of

Constitutional Patriotism. European Journal of Philosophy, 11, 1-28.

de-Shalit, A., 2006. Power to the People: Teaching Political Philosophy in Skeptical

Times. Oxford: Lexington Books.

Dietz, M., 2002. Patriotism: A Brief History of the Term in I.

Primoratz, ed., Patriotism. New York: Humanity Books, 201-215.

Feinberg, J., 1979. Civil Disobedience in the Modern World. Humanities

in Society, 2 (1), 37-60.

Gazit, R., 2013. Officer's Letter: Do not turn the Israeli IDF into an army in service of

Gaz Barons. Available from: www.facebook.com/events/613596205318527/

(May 27, 2013).

23

Gomberg, P., 1990. Patriotism Is Like Racism. Ethics, 101 (1) 144-150.

Habermas, J., 1996. Citizenship and National Identity. Between Facts and

Norms: Contributions to a Discourse Theory of Law and Democracy. Cambridge, Mass.:

MIT Press, 500-514.

Jamail, D., 2009. The will to resist: Soldiers who refuse to fight in Iraq and

Afghanistan. Chicago: Haymarket books.

James, C. L. R. et al. eds., 1980. Fighting Racism in World War II. New

York: Monad Press.

Kliengeld, P., 2000. Kantian Patriotism. Philosophy and Public Affairs, 29,

313-314.

Kymlicka, W., 1995. Multicultural Citizenship. Oxford: Clarendon Press.

Laborde, C., 2002. From Constitutional to Civic Patriotism. British

Journal of Political Science, 32, 591-612.

Le Meur, J., 1959. Histoir D`un Acte Responsable – Le Cas Jean Le

Meur. Esprit, 2, 690.

MacIntyre, A., 2003. Is Patriotism a Virtue? in D. Matravers and J.

Pike, eds., Debates in Contemporary Political Philosophy. London: Routledge,

286-300.

Maddow, R., 2012. Drift: The Unmooring of American Military Power. New York:

Crown Publishing Group.

Manin, B., 1987. On Legitimacy and Political Deliberation. Political

Theory, 15, 338-368.

Markovits, D., 2005. Democratic Disobedience. Yale Law Journal, 114,

1897-1952.

Matar, H., 2012. Following Silman: New MR initiative. Available from:

www.mysay.co.il (July 16, 2012).

Miller, D., 1995. On Nationality. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Morreall, J., 1991. The Justifiability of Violent Civil Disobedience

in H. Bedau, ed., Civil Disobedience in Focus. London: Routledge, 134-139.

Moskos, C., and Chambers, J., 1993. The New Conscientious Objection. Oxford:

Oxford University Press.

Nagel, T., 1987. Moral Conflict and Political Legitimacy. Philosophy

and Public Affairs, 16 (3), 215-240.

24

Nathanson, S., 1989. In Defense of Moderate Patriotism. Ethics, 99

(3), 535-552.

Nathanson, S., 1992. Is Patriotism Like Racism? APA Newsletter on

Philosophy and the Black Experience, 91(2), 9-12.

Nathanson, S., 1993. Patriotism, Morality and Peace. Boston: Rowman &

Littlefield.

Nathanson, S., 1997. Should Patriotism Have a Future? in D. Bar-Tal

and E. Staub, eds., 318-319.

Nussbaum, M., 2008. Toward a Globally Sensitive Patriotism. Daedalus,

137(3), 78-93.

Nussbaum, M., 2010. Patriotism and Cosmopolitanism in G. Wallace and

D. Held, eds., The Cosmopolitanism Reader. Cambridge: Polity Press, 155-

162.

Pasternak, A., 2011. The Collective Responsibility of Democratic

Publics. Canadian Journal of Philosophy, 41 (1), 99-123.

Primoratz, I., ed., 2002a. Patriotism. New York: Humanity Books.

Primoratz, I., 2002b. Patriotism: A Deflationary View. The Philosophical

Forum, 33 (4), 444.

Rawls, J., 1990. A Theory of Justice. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Raz, J., 1979. The Authority of Law: Essays on Law and Morality. Oxford:

Clarendon Press.

Schatz, R., and Staub, E., 1997. Manifestations of blind and

constructive patriotism: Personality correlates and individual-group

relations in D. Bar-Tal and E. Staub, eds., Patriotism In the Lives of

Individuals and Nations. Chicago: Nelson-Hall, 229-245.

Sharp, G., 1984. The Politics of Nonviolent Action. Boston: Porter Sargent.

Singer, P. 1973. Democracy and Disobedience. Oxford: Clarendon Press.

Sullivan, J., Fried, A., and Dietz, M., 1992. Patriotism, Politics,

and the presidential elections of 1988. American Journal of Political Science,

36, 200-235.

Tamir, Y., 1993. Liberal Nationalism. Princeton: Princeton University

Press.

Tan, K.C., 2004. Justice without Borders: Cosmopolitanism, Nationalism and

Patriotism. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

25

Taylor, C., 1996. Why Democracy Needs Patriotism? in J. Cohen, ed.,

For Love of Country: Debating the Limits of Patriotism. Boston: Beacon, 119-121.

Viroli, M. 1995. For Love of Country: An essay on Patriotism and Nationalism.

Oxford: Clarendon Press.

Walen, A., 2001. Reasonable Illegal Force: Justice and Legitimacy in

a Pluralistic, Liberal Society. Ethics, 111, 345-352.

Walzer, M., 1970. Obligations. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.

Wolff, J., and de-Shalit, A., 2007. Disadvantage. Oxford: Oxford

University Press.

World survey of conscription and conscientious objection to military

service, March 7, 2013/Country report and updates: United Kingdom,

available from: www.wri-irg.org.

26