Representing BlueRepresentative Bureaucracy and Racial Profiling in the Latino Community

Representing BlueRepresentative Bureaucracyand Racial Profiling in theLatino CommunityVicky M. WilkinsBrian N. WilliamsUniversity of Georgia, Athens

This study examines whether the presence of Latino police officers reducesthe racial disparity in traffic stops in divisions in which they work.Specifically, the link between passive and active representation for ethnicityin the context of racial profiling is tested. This context allows one to examinethis link within an organization that relies heavily on socialization. It is foundthat the presence of Latino police officers increases the racial disparity withinthe division in which they work. This finding seems to suggest that the pressureto “represent blue” weighs heavily on Latino officers and may affect theirprofessional attitudes and behaviors.

Keywords: representation; socialization; racial profiling; policing; Latino

The research on the theory of representative bureaucracy is concernedwith understanding the conditions under which we can expect passive

representation to lead to active representation. Numerous studies have high-lighted the role that institutional and contextual factors play in the linkbetween passive and active representation (Keiser, Wilkins, Meier, &Holland, 2002; Wilkins, 2007; Wilkins & Keiser, 2006). However, thesestudies of active representation have examined organizations with low tomoderate levels of socializations (i.e., public schools, Child SupportEnforcement, and Farmer’s Home Administration) and found that minoritybureaucrats use their discretion to reduce negative outcomes or increasepositive outcomes for minority clientele. We offer a much harder test for the

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Authors’ Note: Please address correspondence to Brian N. Williams, Department of PublicAdministration and Policy, University of Georgia, 204 Baldwin Hall, Athens, GA; e-mail:[email protected].

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theory of representative bureaucracy by testing the link between passiveand active representation for ethnicity in an organization that relies heavilyon socialization—police departments. Police departments are known fortheir use of socialization to modify the behavior and attitudes of theiremployees.

We make this extension to the research on representative bureaucracyby examining the case of racial profiling in the Latino community. Thereis a longstanding research tradition examining the intersection of policingand race; however, most of this extant research focuses on the experienceof African Americans. Little has been done to incorporate Latinos intopolicing research. Martinez’s (2007) search of articles published between1990 and 2006 with the keywords “Hispanic” or “Latino” and “police” inthe Criminal Justice Abstracts netted 68 items when compared with 485articles with the keywords “African-American” or “black” and “police.”Even less research has examined racial profiling and the experience of theLatino1 community. There is clear evidence that like African Americans,Latinos experience excessive vehicle stops and searches (Fagan & Davies2000; Spitzer, 1999). In addition, Latinos hold less favorable attitudestoward police than Whites (Weitzer, 2002) and the vast majority ofLatinos believe that law enforcement should discontinue the use of racialprofiling techniques (Newport, 1999). Given these findings, researchersshould examine racial profiling from the perspective and context of theLatino community.

In this article, we turn to the literature on representative bureaucracy toexamine one aspect of racial profiling in the Latino community. We focuson how the representation of Latino police officers influences vehicle stopbehavior in their divisions. In other words, will the presence of Latino offi-cers reduce the racial disparity in traffic stops in the division they work in?Using the lens of representative bureaucracy, we address the followingquestion: Are there conditions under which minority bureaucrats will beless likely to provide active representation? We contend that organizationalsocialization may hinder the link between passive and active representa-tion.2 At first glance we should expect to find that the proportion of Latinoofficers working in a police department is correlated with a decrease in theracial disparity in vehicle stops, by that police department, all else beingequal. But, does organizational socialization strip the racial identity ofpolice officers, somehow changing them from “brown” to “blue” and lim-iting their provision of active representation?

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Previous Research on Representative Bureaucracyand Organizational Socialization

The bureaucrats working in public agencies are often the first, and some-times the only, contact that the public has with the bureaucracy. Becausethis contact is most often with street-level bureaucrats who may exercisediscretion, his or her attitudes, values, and predispositions are important inunderstanding policy implementation (Lipsky, 1980). The theory of repre-sentative bureaucracy concerns how the demographic characteristics ofbureaucrats affect the distribution of outputs to clients who share thesedemographic characteristics.3 The literature distinguishes between twoforms of representation—passive and active. Passive representation is con-cerned with the bureaucracy having the same demographic origins (sex,race, income, class, religion) as the population it serves (Mosher, 1982).Studies of passive representation examine whether the composition of thebureaucracy mirrors the demographic composition of the general popula-tion or whether women and minorities are underrepresented in the bureau-cracy (Dolan, 2000, 2002; Kellough, 1990; Naff & Crum, 2000; Riccucci& Saidel, 1997). These studies seldom examine the effects of representa-tion or the lack of representation on the agency’s policy outputs. Active rep-resentation, in contrast, is concerned with how representation influencespolicy making and implementation. Active representation assumes thatbureaucrats will act purposely on behalf of their counterparts in the generalpopulation (Pitkin, 1967).

Early scholars assumed that passive representation would naturallytranslate into active representation, but recent work has identified a coupleof necessary conditions for the link to occur (Keiser et al., 2002; Meier,1993). First, the policy area must be salient to the demographic group inquestion (Keiser et al., 2002; Meier, 1993; Selden, 1997). As discussed ear-lier, the issue of racial profiling is highly salient in the Latino community.The second necessary condition is that the policy area must be one in whichbureaucrats exercise discretion. Discretion is a necessary condition becauseit provides bureaucrats with the opportunity to shape outputs to reward aparticular group (Meier, 1993). In bureaucracies where most decisions aredictated by rules, bureaucrats have few opportunities to shape outputs toreward a particular group within their clientele (Meier, 1993). Street-levelbureaucrats normally make decisions, major and minor, that can influencethe outcome of cases and the benefits received by agency clients. It is thesedecisions that can produce what we term as active representation—bureaucrats

Wilkins, Williams / Representative Bureaucracy and Racial Profiling 777



advocating the interest of their clients and eliminating discrimination that hasan impact on one group or another among the agency’s clientele (Mosher,1982). Police officers, described by Muir (1977) as street corner politicianswho can monopolize the exercise of power, are the quintessential street-levelbureaucrats and clearly exercise a necessary amount of discretion (Davis,1975; Lipsky, 1980; Vinzant & Crothers, 1998). There are numerous waysthat minority police officers could influence outcomes for minority drivers,either through their own actions or by influencing the organization.

Race and ethnicity are the most common demographic characteristicsexamined by the existing research on both passive and active representation(Cayer & Sigelman, 1980; Hindera, 1993; Meier, 1975, 1993; Rehfuss1986; Riccucci & Saidel, 1997; Saltzstein, 1989; Selden, 1997; Thompson,1976, 1978). In the case of race and ethnicity, numerous studies (Hindera,1993; Meier & Stewart, 1992; Meier, Stewart, & England, 1989; Selden 1997)have concluded that minority bureaucrats implement policies or use theirdiscretion to reduce the disparate treatment minority clients have histori-cally received from various public bureaucracies. At first glance we shouldexpect, therefore, that passive representation will lead to active representa-tion in police departments. However, previous research and our understand-ing of organizational socialization present in police departments requirethat we modify this expectation.

Recent research on representative bureaucracy focuses on the role thatinstitutional and contextual factors play in the link between passive andactive representation (Keiser et al., 2002). One of the institutional variablesconsidered is organizational socialization. Scholars argue that administra-tors are socialized by the organizations they work in and they adopt behav-iors and preferences that are consistent with organizational goals, therebyminimizing the influence of their own personal values on bureaucraticbehavior (Downs, 1967; Gawthrop, 1969; Meier & Nigro, 1976; Simon,1957; Thompson, 1976; Weber, 1946). Employees may be willing to adoptthe organization’s values to increase the chance of promotion and careersuccess chances either because they feel peer pressure to do so, or simplybecause they come to agree with and internalize the dominant organiza-tional view (Romzek, 1990; Simon, 1957; Thompson, 1976).

In previous research (Wilkins & Williams, 2008), we tested the hypothesisthat the link between passive and active representation can be hindered byorganizational socialization by examining how the presence of black policeofficers affect vehicle stops. Analyzing traffic stop data from the San DiegoPolice Department, we find that the presence of Black police officers in adivision is related to an increase in racial disparity in traffic stops in the




division. These findings, in conjunction with insights from individual inter-views and focus group discussions with police officers and police execu-tives, suggest that the behavior of Black police officers is influenced by thestrong need to fit into the culture of the organization. It appears that thestructure and processes of an organization can affect the representation pro-vided by the bureaucrats working there. In this article, we will test if theeffect is similar for Latino police officers.

In related research, Smith and Holmes (2003) examine how the repre-sentation of minority police officers (both Black and Latino) affects thenumber of police brutality complaints filed each year in 114 U.S. cities.They argue that the demographic composition of the police departmentswill influence the likelihood that the citizens of the city will experiencepolice brutality. Specifically, they hypothesize that when Blacks or Latinosare better represented among the police officers there will be fewer com-plaints of police brutality. Their findings offer mixed support for theirhypotheses. The presence of Black police officers in the police departmentdoes not appear to be related to the number of complaints filed. On theother hand, they find a sizable positive effect for the variable measuring therepresentation of Latino police officers. Specifically, the findings indicatethat the more closely the proportion of Latino officers in a police depart-ment matches the proportion of Latinos in the general population, there willbe fewer complaints of police brutality. They speculate that the differentfindings for Black and Latino police officers stem from differences in thesocial organization of the Black and Latino communities. They suggest that“Latino police officers may be more integrated into their community pro-ducing empathy for Latino citizens and counteract socialization pressuresfrom the occupational subculture” (Smith & Holmes, 2003, p. 1054).

Although Smith and Holmes (2003) do not test their proposition thatLatino police officers may be more integrated into their community, there issome evidence of this from other lines of research. Studies of the social andeconomic structures of the African American and Latino communitiesdescribe rather different circumstances. African American communities aredeeply impoverished and highly segregated (Massey & Denton, 1993;Wilson, 1987). Working- and middle-class African Americans have movedout of inner-city neighborhoods that were once heterogeneous with respect tosocial class, leaving behind the most disadvantaged segments of the popula-tion (Wilson, 1987). This has created a social and economic divide betweenrelatively affluent African Americans and poor African Americans (Massey &Denton, 1993; Wilson, 1987). For a number of reasons, African Americansfrom these highly disadvantaged areas generally would be less-qualified




police candidates than those from the working- and middle-class neighbor-hoods (Williams & Murphy, 1993). Given the significant separation withinthe African American community, African American police officers mayperceive citizens in impoverished African American neighborhoods asthreats to their physical well-being and authority (Alex, 1969).

Although the residents of Latino barrios have also experienced socialand economic disadvantages, there are several factors present that may pro-mote higher levels of social organization when compared with poor AfricanAmerican neighborhoods (Martinez, 2002). First, Latinos have higher ratesof formal and informal labor force participation, albeit in lower paying jobs(Martinez, 2002). Furthermore, the close social networks of Latinos areoften credited with assisting Latinos, especially new immigrants in findingwork (Mouw, 2003). Second, the Latino immigration has been a constantpattern since the 1800s. As a result, each successive wave of immigrantshas served to reinforce various aspects of the Latino culture and encouragethe use of the Spanish language within the United States (Martinez, 2002).Next, the size and distribution of the Latino population also serves to keepthe community integrated. The majority of Latinos continue to live inneighborhoods with very high concentrations of Latino inhabitants. Thus,the potential for interaction with other Latinos is extremely high. Many, ona daily basis, will work, go to school, go to church, and attend various com-munity events with other Latinos. Although Latinos confront difficult con-ditions, they may also experience high levels of social integration. Thesehigher levels of integration may make Latino police officers less suscepti-ble to organizational socialization and ultimately increase the likelihoodthat they work to eliminate racial disparities experienced by Latino citizens.

The theory of representative bureaucracy would predict that minorityrepresentation should create a police department that is more sensitiveto the experiences of minority citizens and should reduce negativeoutcomes—such as excessive vehicle stops. The findings on this point aremixed. We have evidence that the number of Black police officers is relatedto an increase in racial disparity in traffic stops (Wilkins & Williams 2008).Contrary to our findings, Smith and Holmes (2003) find that the represen-tation of Black officers is not related to police brutality. However, they dofind that the representation of Latino officers is associated with a lowerincidence of police brutality complaints. In addition, there is evidence thatthe social organization of African American communities differ in importantways from the Latino communities and these differences could effect theprovision of active representation by Latino police officers. These inconsis-tent findings motivate this research. We question whether organizational




socialization can strip away the racial identity of Latino police officers andreplace it with an organizational identity. In essence, can this process trans-form those officers so they no longer represent their ethnic identity andinstead represent blue?

Police Socialization

Police socialization is part and parcel of organizational socialization—the process by which members of an organization learn the required behav-iors and attitudes to be recognized as member of the organization (Caplow,1964; Manning, 1970). The objective of police socialization, like occu-pational socialization, is the long-term internalization and subsequentaction congruence with organizational values (Bennett, 1984). Similar toMilgram’s (1974) concept of “agentic shift,” police socialization seeks tocontrol and limit individual behavior in order to facilitate a transition awayfrom autonomous behavior by individual officers, toward organizationalfunctioning of officers. This process may co-opt minority police officers toengage in conduct contrary to the interests of minority citizens, includingracial profiling.

Police departments are characterized by a uniquely robust subculturethat insulates its members and fosters in-group cohesiveness (Skolnick,1975). The cohesion and degree of solidarity for police officers has longbeen noted as one of the most noticeable, yet unusual aspects of the policeprofession (Hahn, 1971). As such, this profession reflects and projects asense of fraternal support and fidelity, which in turn encourages and rein-forces an overarching police culture. This culture has been found to be aresult of three factors: the continuous presence of danger, the use of coer-cive authority, and police professionalism (Harrison, 1998; Paoline, 2003;Paoline, Myers, & Worden, 2000; Waddington, 1999). Almost immediatelynew officers are cognizant that the brotherhood that they are members oftranscends their jurisdictional, operational, or hierarchical boundaries. Intheory, this esprit de corps or common spirit of comradeship and devotionto the cause of law enforcement is of value to the public. However, whencarried too far this solidarity can produce negative outcomes, includingracial profiling.

For several reasons we think that the solidarity promoted among policeofficers may actually facilitate profiling behavior, especially among minor-ity officers. First, officers quickly learn that their allegiance is to each otherand that they are to never “rat” on another officer. So, even in departments




where racial profiling is not sanctioned and/or promoted, officers may lookthe other way if they observe their peers profiling. Second, the focus ongroup cohesion serves to give birth to the “us versus them” line of thinkingand isolates the officers from the citizenry. This isolation can desensitizeminority officers to the concerns of minority communities and citizens.Finally, in a culture where solidarity is so highly valued the behavior ofminority officers is influenced by the strong need to fit into the organiza-tion. The following quote highlights this possibility,

This one (white) sergeant here that loves to refer to black people as ‘thosepeople.’ If you’re black and you refer to black people as ‘those people’ you’retreated okay by him. Otherwise, you may not be. You get a few black copswho do that sort of thing, guys who have no backbone. They’re treated by thisone sergeant as one of the guys. (Leinen, 1984, p. 38)

Furthermore, in a recent interview with the chief of a local police agencyregarding the cultural and organizational dynamics affecting the workingrelationship between his agency and the local Latino community, the chiefhighlighted the pressure that one Latino officer faced to conform and betteralign himself with his occupational identity.4

One of our greatest challenges is building and sustaining a strong relationshipwith our local Hispanic community. We’ve had some success. Right now wehave approximately 8 officers who are Hispanic or bilingual. We are tryingto recruit more, but it is a challenge. With our success, we also have had somefrustrations. We had one Hispanic officer who was working in specialoperations—you know floating around town, spending time in the variousHispanic communities, meeting the people, building the needed rapport,gaining trust . . . A couple of months back he put in a request to switch backto shift work [working in a set geographic area, during a set time]. I askedhim why did he want to make that move considering how effective he was inspecial operations—you know, Hispanic residents were responsive to him,they knew him, they trusted him, they liked and respected him . . . He said hefelt as if he needed to prove himself to the other officers . . . I guess to letthem know that he could do more than work with the Hispanic community. . . to let them know he was a police officer and not just a Hispanic policeofficer. (Interview with Police Chief of local department, June 2007)

Although we concede that all police officers face pressure to fit in, weargue that the pressure weighs more heavily on minority and female policeofficers, who have historically been outsiders in the field of law enforcement.




The desire to fit in and be treated as “one of the guys” likely influences theirbehavior, attenuates the provision of active representation, and can ultimatelylead them to profile minority drivers.

Police socialization is not a one time phenomenon. To the contrary, itoccurs at all stages of an officer’s career and incorporates both a formal andinformal dimension. The formal socialization process is hierarchical innature and begins with a police cadet’s initial contact with her instructor ina sterile, preoccupational environment—the classroom of the local policeacademy. This setting helps to instill the central values of the policing pro-fession as outlined in the International Association of Chiefs of Police(IACP) Law Enforcement Code of Ethics: service mindedness, integrity,public trust, team work, courage, and respect.

This initial process of socialization is followed by subsequent post acad-emy “street” experiences that further acclimates officers to the norms andmores of what it means to be blue. One very common process is the fieldtraining officer program that assigns more experienced officers to train andsupervise recent academy graduates. The final phase of the formal social-ization process persists along the career path of officers as they continue tocome into contact and interact with more senior supervisors and managers.Conversely, the informal socialization process transcends the police officerseniority continuum and affects both novice police cadets and more sea-soned police officers alike. The informal method counters the hierarchicalcharacteristic of the formal socialization process and is characterized bypeer to peer or officer to officer interactions. These interactions have beenfound to contradict the values articulated in the more formal socializationprocess. In particular, loyalty to the standards of the profession is oftenchallenged by a standard of loyalty to one’s peers or primary peer group.

In this research, we analyzed the data from a traffic stop study in SanDiego, California, a large urban municipality located in the western UnitedStates. This local law enforcement agency employs in excess of 2,000sworn police officers and its procedures and practices reflect those of mostbig-city police departments. The department embraces the community andproblem-oriented philosophies that dominate the landscape of Americanpolice agencies. The police department utilizes a decentralized approach topolicing with community collaboration in problem identification and prob-lem solving playing a vital role in the coproduction of public safety andpublic order.

The police officer selection process in this city is typical to the processin other large, urban police departments in the United States. This processbegins with an initial screening of potential applicants. Each applicant is




required to meet or exceed the following requirements: be at least 20.5years of age on the day of the written exam and 21 years of age at the timeof academy graduation; be a U.S. citizen or permanent resident alien whois eligible and has applied for U.S. citizenship prior to application foremployment; possess a valid Class C driver’s license; and possess certifica-tion of graduation from a high school in the United States or its equivalent(i.e., GED, successful completion of state proficiency examination). Thisinitial screening phase is followed by eight other steps in the officer selec-tion process: written examination, background investigation, physical abil-ity test, polygraph exam, departmental interview, psychological evaluation,medical examination, and academy training.

Academy training consists of 32 weeks of college-level training. Duringthis time period, recruits take courses that cover the principles of lawenforcement, criminal law, rules and evidence, search and seizure, laws ofarrest and control methods, traffic laws, juvenile laws, first aid, care and useof firearms, patrol theory and methods, the criminal justice system, andphysical conditioning and self-defense. This preservice training concludeswith 6 weeks of field training. On the successful completion of this curricu-lum, recruits graduate with the rank of Police Officer I and begin a12-week field training program under the tutelage of an experienced fieldtraining officer. Based on this high level of occupational socializationwithin the San Diego Police Department, we expect a conditioning effectwhere the confluence of the formal and informal dimensions of policesocialization will shape the values and behavior of police officers, regard-less of race, and limit or negate the provision of active representation.

Racial/Ethnic Profiling: The Latino Experience

The tension between the police and racial/ethnic minority communitiesremains a pressing issue facing American police organizations (Barak,Flavin, & Leighton, 2001; Culver, 2004; Websdale, 2001; Williams, 1998).American policing, with its history and heritage of legally sanctioned, dis-parate service delivery, and the enforcement of racially motivated laws andstatutes, has affected, and in many instances, continues to marginalize seg-ments of racial, ethnic, and socioeconomic communities (Cashmore &McLaughlin, 1991; Chambliss, 1994; Ellison & London, 1992; Fogelson,1968; Hahn, 1971; Murty, Roebuck, & Smith, 1990; Radelet, 1986; Rossi,Beck, & Edison, 1974; Russell, 1998; Websdale, 2001; Williams, 1998).Consequently, much merit is found in the argument that the public perception




of racial/ethnic profiling on the parts of racial and ethnic minorities is acontemporary by-product of the legacy of the disparate nature of Americanpolicing (Russell, 1998; Williams, 2000).

Racial profiling is the term used to identify law enforcement practicesthat use the race or ethnicity of an individual to make discretionary judg-ments. Ramirez, McDevitt, and Farrell (2000) define racial profiling as

Any police-initiated action that relies on the race, ethnicity, or national ori-gin rather than the behavior of an individual or information that leads thepolice to a particular individual who has been identified as being, or havingbeen, engaged in criminal activity. (p. 3)

Conceptualized as a perversion of criminal profiling,5 Harriott (2004)has noted that criminal profiling becomes racial profiling when race is ele-vated to the primary principle for predicting criminality. Consequently, pro-filing no longer serves as an investigative tool for solving cases, “butinstead as a tool for race differential surveillance and investigative arrests”(Harriott, 2004, p. 26). Moreover, this failure to focus and differentiate atthe individual offender level suggests a shift in the strategy of policing:from utilizing profiling as an investigative tool to an institutional mecha-nism for control and repression of certain populations based exclusively onrace (Verna, 1997).

Beginning in the early 1900s, “anti-drug warriors” invoked the imageof Chinese, African Americans, and Latinos as drug users and criminals topass the nation’s earliest drug laws. By 1915, more than 500,000 Latinoshad immigrated, bringing marijuana with them (Gray, 1998). In responseto increasing anti-Latino sentiment, 16 western states passed laws thatcriminalized marijuana use (Gray, 1998). These laws targeted the growingLatino community and were promoted as a way to decrease violent crime(Gray, 1998). By the 1980s, the link between minorities, drugs, and crimewas cemented in American rhetoric and motivated the effort of the U.S. gov-ernment to tackle drug trafficking. The U.S. Drug EnforcementAdministration (DEA) had, for some years, used lists of common charac-teristics of drug courier arrestees to construct what they called “drugcourier profiles” (Harris, 2002). DEA agents would use these profiles toidentify passengers of commercial airliners who might be transportinglarge quantities of narcotics. The DEA claimed that using these profilessucceeded and that agents using them made regular arrests of passengerscarrying illegal drugs. Convinced of the effectiveness of using profiles andfacing rising concerns about drug traffickers using the interstate highways to




move large quantities of narcotics, the DEA sought to incorporate profilinginto the enforcement of traffic laws (Harris, 2002). Traffic laws in theUnited States have always regulated both driving and the condition ofvehicles in incredible detail (Harris, 1997). As a result, any Americanpolice officer can easily observe a traffic offense by almost any driver afterfollowing the vehicle for just a few blocks (Harris, 1997). This means thatpolice officers have enormous discretion in making vehicle stops andcould use traffic regulations as a mere pretext for drug enforcement inves-tigations. Consequently, traffic stops were initiated by officers using theserace/ethnicity-based profiles.

Beyond the DEA’s actions, the U.S. government’s intelligence bulletinsfor state and local police also encouraged officers involved in drug interdic-tion to be increasingly suspicious of particular racial and ethnic groups. Atthe same time that the DEA trained police officers in drug interdiction andprofiling tactics, the U.S. government consistently disseminated intelli-gence reports to police agencies on drug trafficking that often includedinformation pointing to particular ethnic groups (Harris, 2002). For example,the intelligence might indicate that Hispanic gangs were moving cocaine byvehicle across a particular state. This information encourages police offi-cers to use visible physical characteristics of particular minority groups asindicators when making vehicle stops.

In addition to drug interdiction, law enforcement also relies on profil-ing to enforce immigration laws. Ethnicity remains central to the enforce-ment of the U.S. immigration laws, particularly in the southwestern partof the country. In fact, the Supreme Court stated in 1975 that “Mexicanappearance” constitutes a legitimate consideration under the FourthAmendment for making an immigration stop (United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 1975). At first glance, the reliance on “Mexican appearance” inimmigration enforcement might not appear problematic given the percep-tion that a large percentage of undocumented persons are of Mexican ori-gin. However, only about one-half of the undocumented persons in theUnited States are Mexican nationals (Johnson, 2001). More important,the vast majority of Latinos in the United States are U.S. citizens or law-ful permanent residents. These persons suffer the brunt of race-basedimmigration enforcement. In addition to the impact that racial profilinghas on the minority community, the allegation of racial profiling, and theperception of the police that it creates for minorities could lessen the like-lihood of meaningful collaboration with minority citizens and communi-ties in the coproduction of public safety and order (Williams, 1999;Williams, 2000).




Although the vast majority of research on racial profiling has focused onthe experience of African Americans, there is a growing body of work thatexamines Latino/non-Latino differences in police stops and arrests prac-tices. Spitzer (1999) and Fagan and Davies (2000) showed that Latinos (andAfrican Americans) were overrepresented in vehicle stops and in somecases searches. A 1999 analysis by Spitzer and a follow-up study by Faganand Davies (2000) of the New York City Police Department’s stop and friskpractices, found that Latinos (and African Americans) were stopped and/orfrisked substantially more than their representation in the population wouldpredict. When Fagan and Davies categorized the data by police division,they found that Latinos were two times more likely to be stopped foralleged weapons violations, especially in police divisions where the popu-lation was predominately Latino.

We build on this research and the research on representative bureaucracyand organizational socialization to examine how the representation ofLatino police officers influences the vehicle stop behavior in their division.This is an important endeavor when you consider the recent demographicshift in terms of Latinos, who now make up the largest percentage ofminorities within the United States population (as well as the projected con-tinued growth of this population). Consequently, this investigation goesbeyond the more traditional “driving while Black” approach of examiningtraffic stops and searches of Black drivers to examine how “being brown inblue” affects the behavior of Latino officers regarding traffic stops.

Data and Method

The data for this project come from the vehicle stop forms collected by theSan Diego Police Department for 2000.6 Starting on January 1, 2000, policeofficers in San Diego were required to complete a vehicle stop form each timethey stopped a vehicle. Use of the vehicle stop form was discontinued in2001. Vehicle stop forms recorded the context of traffic stop encounters (dateand time), the reason for the stop, driver demographics (gender, race/ethnic-ity, age), actions taken during the stop (search, search authority, search out-come), and the disposition of the stop (citation, arrest). Officers turned theseforms in at the end of their shifts. The data on the forms were entered into adatabase by personnel at police headquarters. For this project, we analyzedthe 168,901 stop forms compiled in the 12 months of 2000.7

The only piece of individual-level information the police officer isrequired to provide is the division they are assigned to. Given this, our level




of analysis for this project is aggregated to the division. The San DiegoPolice Department consists of eight divisions. These divisions (North,Northeast, East, Southeast, Central, West, South, and Mid-City) are geo-graphically arranged throughout the area and serve as the first-line of com-mand for the police officers.

Our dependent variable is the percentage of vehicle stops involving aLatino driver in each division for each month in 2000. This yields a samplesize of 96 for our analysis. For example, in the month of May 11.59% ofthe stops made in the North division involved Latino drivers. For the sametime period, the number of stops involving a Latino driver in the South divi-sion was 75.85%. The mean of this variable is 30%. Table 1 presents thevehicle stops by race/ethnicity of the driver by division compared to the dri-ving age population for 2000.

To test the link between passive and active representation, our variableof interest is the percentage of Latino sworn police officers in each divisionin 2000.8 Latino officers are well represented in the San Diego PoliceDepartment. The mean of this variable is 17%. The division with the great-est representation of Latino police officers is the South division where41.7% of the officers are Latino.9 The theory of representative bureaucracyand past research on active representation for ethnicity would suggest thatas the percentage of Latino police officers in a division increases, the per-centage of Latino drivers involved in vehicle stops in that division willdecrease. Prior findings (Wilkins & Williams, 2008) and our understandingof organizational socialization leads us to modify our expectations. Instead,we expect to find that intense organizational socialization will negate the


Table 1Vehicle Stops by Race/Ethnicity of Driver by Division for 2000

Hispanic White

Division Stops (%) Population (%) Difference (%) Stops (%) Population (%) Difference (%)

Northern 12 10 2 76 80 −4Northeastern 12 9 3 61 67 −6Eastern 16 9 7 64 78 −14Southeastern 40 33 7 12 15 −3Central 39 52 −13 40 31 9Western 18 17 1 64 69 −5Southern 75 58 17 15 20 −5Mid-City 33 24 9 29 47 −18



possibility for active representation. In addition, the overwhelming pressureto fit into the culture of the organization may produce a “blue” mentality onthe part of Latino officers and may result in the increase of ethnic disparityin the division.

Our model also includes a number of control variables that allow us torule out alternative explanations for the increase in vehicle stops involvingLatino drivers. The most important control variable included in our modelis the percentage of the driving population in the division that is Latino. Weuse a measure of the Latino driving eligible population, as measured by thepopulation that is 15 years or older, in the division. We expect that the per-centage of stops that involve Latino drivers will be significantly related tothe Latino driving eligible population in the division. In fact, scholars andpoliticians studying racial profiling often use the difference between thepercentage of stops where the driver is Latino and some measure of theLatino population in the area as their primary measure of racial profiling(Harris, 1999; Lundman and Kaufman, 2003; Novak, 2004; Smith &Petrocelli, 2001).

Community-level factors are likely to influence vehicle stops and we cancontrol for some of them in our model. First, we include the median incomeof the division area according to the 2000 census data.10 Previous researchhas found that racial disparity in enforcement increases in high-povertyareas (Cox, Pease, Miller, & Tyson, 2001; Fagan & Davies, 2000; Smith &Petrocelli, 2001; Spitzer, 1999; Wilkins & Williams, 2008). It is possiblethat all police officers, regardless of race and ethnicity, target certain typesof drivers. Findings from in-depth individual interviews and focus groupdiscussions of police officers, as well as police executives, suggest thenotion of “low hanging fruit” can impact police practice based on the raceand socioeconomic status of the community. Given this, we expect to findthat Latino drivers are more likely to be stopped in divisions with lowermedian incomes. An additional way to get at the effects of poverty on policebehavior is to control for the monthly city unemployment rate. We hypoth-esize that unemployment will be positively related to traffic stops involvingLatino drivers.

The final community variable that we control for is the monthly overallcrime rate of the city.11 The measure of crime rates includes seven crimes:homicide, forcible rape, robbery, aggravated assault, burglary, motor vehi-cle theft, and larceny. Research suggests that area crime rates are positivelyrelated to the incidences of racial profiling (Cox et al. 2001; Fagan &Davies, 2000; Smith & Petrocelli, 2001; Spitzer, 1999). We hypothesizethat divisions will react to rising crime rates at the city level by intensifying




enforcement, which in turn could increase the percentage of vehicle stopsinvolving Latino drivers. Table 2 presents the summary statistics for all ourvariables.

To test the relationship between the percentage of stops involving Latinodrivers and the presence of minority officers in the eight divisions for themonths of 2000, we use ordinary least squares regression. Because pooledcross-sectional time series data sets often exhibit heteroskedasticity (i.e.,correlated error terms across units at each time point), we use panel-corrected standard errors (Beck & Katz, 1995, 1996). A second problem forour data set is correlation among error terms within the same unit (division)over time (i.e., autocorrelation). To control for bias in the standard errors,we specify an AR1 process.12

Results

The results of the model predicting the relationship between the pres-ence of Latino officers and vehicle stops involving Latino drivers are pre-sented in Table 3.13 The model performs well; the independent variables inthe model predict 86% of the variance in the dependent variable.14

However, it is the parameter estimates that are most interesting.We expected to find that due to high levels of organizational socializa-

tion the percentage of Latino police officers in the division would notreduce the ethnic disparity in vehicle stops for that division. This hypothe-sis was well supported by the analysis. The coefficient was both positiveand statistically significant (p < .01). In other words, as the presence of


Table 2Description of Variables

Standard Minimum andVariable Mean Deviation Maximum

Percentage Latino police 17 9.7 7-42officers in division

Median income for division (×1000$) 42.9 12.3 24.4-63.5Unemployment rate 3.9 0.37 3.2-4.6Crime rate 1,917 127 1,715-2,115Percentage of the division 26.5 18.3 9-58

driving eligible population that is LatinoPercentage of vehicle stops involving 31 20 10-77

a Latino driver by division



Latino police officers increases, so does the percentage of vehicle stops inthat division involving Latino drivers. Substantively speaking, the impact islarge; a 1% increase in Latino police officers in a division leads to an almost1% (0.98%) increase in the percentage of Latino drivers involved in vehi-cle stops for a division in a month.

Three of the control variables are also statistically significant (p < .01).However, they offer mixed support for our hypotheses. First, as expected,our regression results show that the percentage of the driving eligible pop-ulation that is Latino had a positive and statistically significant effect on thepercentage of vehicle stops that involved Latino drivers. A 1% increase inthe Latino driving eligible population resulted in an increase in stops by0.59%. Next, the unemployment rate in the city is negatively related to thedependent variable. We hypothesized that higher unemployment rateswould increase the percentage of vehicle stops involving Latino drivers, butthis hypothesis is not supported. Instead, it appears that Latino drivers aremore likely to be stopped during periods of lower unemployment. Althoughwe have no evidence to support this, we might speculate that this finding isbecause of an increase in car usage by Latinos during periods of higheremployment. Finally, our hypothesis that higher crime rates would lead tomore Latino drivers being pulled over was also not supported. Lower crimerates are associated with more stops of Latino drivers. We might speculatethat this finding has something to do with police officers having additional


Table 3Regression Estimates for Vehicle Stops Involving Latino

Drivers in the San Diego Police Divisions in the Months of 2000

Unstandardized CoefficientVariable (Panel Corrected SE)

Percentage Latino police officers 0.98 (0.144)***Latino driving eligible population 0.59 (0.08)***Unemployment rate −0.92 (0.40)**Median income −0.02 (0.11)Crime rate −001 (0.0005)**Constant 4.59 (6.76)Rho 0.82N 96R2 .86F 1607.9***

**p < .05 (significance at better than .05; two-tailed test). ***p < .01 (significance at betterthan .01; two-tailed test).



time to focus on traffic enforcement; however, we would need to conductfurther research to support this proposition. Interestingly, the hypothesesfor unemployment rate and the crime rate are derived from research onAfrican Americans and racial profiling; our contrary findings suggest thatadditional research is necessary to understand the influence of these vari-ables in the Latino context.

Caveats and Conclusions

In this article, we tested the hypothesis that the link between passive andactive representation can be hindered by organizational socialization. Weposed the following question: Are there conditions under which minoritybureaucrats will not provide active representation? We addressed this ques-tion in an agency with high levels of formal and informal socialization andthe answer appears to be yes. Consistent with our findings examining thepresence of Black officers (Wilkins & Williams, 2008), the presence ofLatino police officers is related to an increase in racial disparity in the divi-sion. Taken together, these findings suggest that the structure and processesof an organization affect the representation provided by the bureaucratsworking there. If the socialization is intense enough the bureaucrats mayend up representing the occupational identity above all other identities.Regardless of the race and ethnicity, police officers may end up only repre-senting the blue they wear. This finding raises several important questions,most of which require individual-level data to address.

Considering our finding, it is evident that more systematic individuallevel research is necessary to explore the causal relationship behind thesefindings. With aggregate level data, it is impossible to know whether Latinopolice officers, because of high levels of organizational socialization, actu-ally profile Latino drivers, or if the presence of large numbers of Latinoofficers in a division changes the behavior of the other officers in the orga-nization, resulting in an increase in Latino drivers being stopped. We couldalso examine how rank and/or tenure in the police department influencestraffic stop behavior. By examining the number of years that a police offi-cer has served on the force, we would have a better test of the effect of orga-nizational socialization on officer behavior. Also, what about the impact oreffect of partnering? In particular, how does the partnering of two Latinoofficers, two White officers, or a mixed tandem influence traffic stopbehavior? Similarly, what about the effect of stratification? For example,does traffic stop behavior vary when there are Latino officers in senior posi-tions in the department?




The data we use for our analysis have some advantages and disadvantages.First, the high levels of representation of Latino officers in the San DiegoPolice Department are important to the analysis. At the same time, we admitthat the use of data from a border city may raise some concerns. In particu-lar, it is likely that proximity to the border would influence the behavior ofLatino officers in San Diego Police Department and that their behavior wouldbe different from that of Latino police officers in a Midwest city. It would beimportant to replicate this analysis with data from a nonborder town.

In sum, our findings make several contributions to the theory of repre-sentative bureaucracy. Most notably, our findings support our contentionthat institutional context affects whether passive representation will lead toactive representation. Specifically, our results empirically support thehypothesis that organizational socialization can hinder the translation ofpassive representation into active representation. Further research into theeffect of organizational socialization in additional policy areas is needed.Researchers should seek to identify cases where organizational socializa-tion can be treated as an independent variable in the analysis so its directinfluence can be ascertained. In addition, we see no reason why organiza-tional socialization would not also affect the translation of passive intoactive representation for gender as well, although future research is neededto explore this in more detail.

Notes

1. We realize that the term Latino is gendered and is associated with men. We choose touse the term for simplicity. However, it is not our contention that only males from the Latinocommunity experience discriminatory treatment by police officers.

2. It is important to note that our data do not allow us to directly test the effect of orga-nizational socialization. Instead, we are able to test the relationship between key factors andthe presence of racial profiling in an organization where socialization is known to be intense.To test the influence of organization socialization directly we would need additional data.

3. Of particular note here is how the theory of representative bureaucracy connects withthe underlying assumption for one of the recommendations of the Kerner Commission—thehiring of officers that better reflected and were more representative of the communities theyserved (i.e., the hiring of more minority officers). It was assumed that same-race police offi-cers would be able to better understand the cultural norms associated with their racial/ethniccommunities, act based on this understanding, and in turn, generate an increased communityacceptance to improved police–community relations and decrease the likelihood of the recur-rence of civil unrest.

4. This project is being conducted by Brian N. Williams at the University of Georgia, withthe assistance of Regan Byrd from the University of Denver. Williams and Byrd have beenconducting interviews with police executives, beat or patrol officers, members of the Latinocommunity, and members of the social service network that serves the Latino community to




explore and uncover the cultural and organizational dynamics that impede the coproduction ofpublic safety and public order in the context of Latino communities.

5. Criminal profiling is defined as a technique that uses the major personality, behavioral,and demographic characteristics of offenders for the purposes of analyzing the crimes thoseoffenders have committed.

6. It is interesting to note that at the time of the data collection the Chief of Police of theSan Diego Police Department was Chief David Bejarano. Chief Bejarano was the first Latinoto serve as police chief since Antonio Gonzales who served as San Diego’s top lawman from1838 to 1845. Chief Bejarano led the department from 1999 to 2003. As chief, he led theefforts to investigate police brutality and racial profiling by the department.

7. Although it is possible that police officers were not completing a form for every stopthey made qualitative research collected during focus groups suggest that the vehicle stopforms collected should be representative of all vehicle stops (Cordner, Williams, & Velasco,2002). The focus group participants did not believe that officers were falsifying informationon the stop forms or biasing the data by systematically completing forms for some stops andnot others. Rather participants felt that a few officers were never filling out the forms, whereasmost officers were completing forms when they had time, but not when they were busy(Cordner et al., 2002).

8. It would be preferable to have a time varying measure for this variable; unfortunatelyonly the annual numbers are available. We took two steps to assess the stability of thesenumbers over time. First, we compared the percentage of Latino police officers in each divi-sion in 2000 with the same numbers for 2005 (the next year that this report was available). Wefound that these measures were still highly correlated at .87. In addition, we interviewed a dataanalyst with the San Diego Police Department to discuss transfer policies in the department(C. Haley, San Diego Police Department, phone interview with authors, May 17, 2006). Thedata analyst reported that most transfers occur between service areas of the divisions and notbetween divisions. Transfers between divisions are considered only on an as-needed basis asthe department’s and individual division’s needs are reevaluated. Both these pieces of infor-mation suggest that the percentage of Latino police officers in each division is relatively sta-ble within a given year.

9. Unfortunately, the data are not available to separate the officers by rank so it is not pos-sible to know if the officers are on patrol or in a supervisory position. This would be impor-tant to test because researchers (Meier et al., 1989) have found that when minorities gainaccess to upper levels of an organization, they create an internal environment more conduciveto active representation. In addition, Wilkins and Keiser (2006) found that it was female super-visors in child support enforcement agencies, not female caseworkers, who provided activerepresentation.

10. We divide median income by 1,000 to make it easier to interpret the coefficient.11. Ideally, we would have a measure of the crime rate within each division; unfortunately

these data are not available. However, we argue that the crime rate in the city is likely to influ-ence the behavior across divisions. Increased levels of crime anywhere in the city are likely toheighten enforcement.

12. The model was estimated numerous ways with and without panel-corrected standarderror, with a random effects model, with and without the lagged dependent variable, and withand without the AR1 error process, and the substantive findings remained unchanged. In addition,alternative specifications of the model were tested. We ran the model using the measure forracial profiling commonly used in the criminal justice literature. For this analysis, the depen-dent variable was the difference between the percentage of stops in the division involving a




Latino driver and the percentage of the driving age population in the division that is Latino foreach month in 2000 the same set of independent variable were included, except for the drivingpopulation variable. This model produces identical substantive findings to the reported model.

13. We also ran an additional model to check the relationship between the representationof Black police officers and Latino traffic stops. In the model, we included the percentage ofBlack police officers in the division along with the percentage of Latino officers and the con-trol variables. The results for the variables included in the original model do not change. Thevariable for the percentage of Black police officers in the division is also positive and statisti-cally significant. This means that increasing the representation of Black police officers is alsorelated to an increase in traffic stops of Latino drivers. There are several possible explanationsfor this finding. Although this finding could suggest that Black officers are more likely to stopLatino drivers; an alternative explanation is that as the presence of minority police officers,both Black and Latino, increases, White officers in the division begin to target Latino drivers.Future research and individual-level data are needed to fully understand this relationship.

14. To check for multicollinearity in the model, we examined the bivariate correlations andthe variance inflation factors and no problems were detected.

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Vicky M. Wilkins is an associate professor in the Department of Public Administration andPolicy at The University of Georgia. Her teaching and research interests include public admin-istration, public personnel management, and representative bureaucracy. Her research hasappeared in American Political Science Review, Public Administration Review, Journal ofPublic Administration Research and Theory, Review of Public Personnel Administration, andLegislative Studies Quarterly.

Brian N. Williams is an assistant professor in the Department of Public Administration andPolicy at The University of Georgia. His primary areas of research explore the relationshipsbetween bureaucratic units and communities, in general, and community policing efforts withincommunities of color, in particular. He is the author of Citizen Perspectives on CommunityPolicing: A Case Study in Athens, Georgia (1998). His research has appeared in PublicAdministration Review, Policy Sciences, Police Quarterly, and the Journal of CommunityPsychology among other refereed outlets, book chapters, and government reports.




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