PUBLIC–PRIVATE PARTNERSHIPS: PERSPECTIVES ON PURPOSES,PUBLICNESS, AND GOOD GOVERNANCE

DERICK W. BRINKERHOFF1* AND JENNIFER M. BRINKERHOFF2

1RTI International (Research Triangle Institute), USA2George Washington University, USA

SUMMARY

Public–private partnerships (PPPs) have long been advocated and analyzed as organizational solutions to pressing societal problemsthat call for the comparative advantages of government, business, and civil society. However, ongoing questions remain about how todesign, manage, and assess PPPs. The large literature on PPPs suffers from conceptual imprecision, and is weakly integrated. Thisarticle seeks to address these problems. It offers a discussion of partnership definitions and builds a framework that examines thefeatures of PPPs as they relate to achieving particular purposes: policy, service delivery, infrastructure, capacity building, andeconomic development. The article summarizes the contributions to the symposium: social enterprise PPPs that target povertyreduction, health service delivery partnerships with faith-based organizations, diasporas as partners for international development,the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative, and the Better Factories Cambodia partnership. In examining cross-cutting themes,the analysis focuses on publicness and potential to promote international norms associated with good governance. Conclusionsaddress the role of new partners in PPPs, the difficulties in finding a balance of interests and incentives among partners, theimplications of embodying and promoting international good governance norms and values, the different sources of authoritythat operate within PPPs, and the trade-offs among PPPs’ advantages. Copyright # 2011 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.

key words—good governance; international norms; public–private partnerships; publicness

INTRODUCTION

To observe today that solutions to societal problems require the combined efforts of the public, private, and

voluntary sectors is a truism. While this observation may be axiomatic, how best to combine those efforts continues

to be a topic of ongoing discussion and debate. The question is all the more pressing given the current global

challenges facing individual societies; among the most often listed are: climate change, failed states, terrorism,

economic downturns, poverty, citizen safety and security, affordable goods and services, and immigration.

Addressing these challenges, taking advantage of the opportunities they provide, and mitigating threats calls for

new organizational arrangements and commitments across sectors (government, business, and voluntary), with an

expanded array of actors, and across borders.

Among the responses to the need for cross-sectoral engagement has been the development of public–private

partnerships (PPPs). PPPs have traditionally been pursued for service delivery and infrastructure, achieving what

Hodge and Greve (2008: p. 2) refer to as iconic status within public administrations around the world. An extensive

literature has emerged on PPPs, much of it focused on these two traditional applications.

An enduring concern regarding PPPs in both traditional and emerging applications is the balance between

the public and private benefits that such partnerships generate. This symposium issue examines this question of

publicness, along with one other topic.1 This latter is the role of PPPs, both actual and potential, in realizing the

public administration and development

Public Admin. Dev. 31, 2–14 (2011)

Published online in Wiley Online Library

(wileyonlinelibrary.com) DOI: 10.1002/pad.584

*Correspondence to: D.W. Brinkerhoff, RTI International (Research Triangle Institute), 701 13th Street NW, Suite 750,Washington, DC 20005-3967, USA. E-mail: dbrinkerhoff@rti.org

1We recognize that the concept of publicness involves a significant degree of complexity, where the relevant considerations are not either-ordeterminations (for example, public–private, individual–communal, state–market), but questions of relative degree (see Koppell, 2010; Pesch,2005).

Copyright # 2011 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.

spread and implementation of global norms and liberal values, such as human rights, good governance, and the

‘freedoms’ associated with economic development (Sen, 1999). These are the dual focuses of this symposium issue

and the individual articles that comprise it.

Pursuing this analytic agenda to reach a better understanding of the range and potential of PPPs in this context

calls for clarifying the concept and developing an organizing framework that enables us to draw inferences

and lessons across the increasing diversity of experiences. The literature on public–private partnerships (PPPs) is

enormous, yet it remains confused and inconclusive. Among the reasons are conceptual vagueness, multiplicity of

definitions, ideologically-based advocacy (both pro and con), and disparate research traditions (Wettenhall, 2003;

Weihe, 2006; Hodge and Greve, 2008).

This article sorts through some of the confusion, and summarizes our current understanding of the rationales for,

and contributions of, PPPs. We offer a framework based on partnership purposes, building on Bovaird (2004),

that characterizes each purpose in terms of predominant organizational structures and process, major performance

metrics, and normative dimensions. Next, we discuss the challenges to ensuring the ‘public’ in PPPs, that is, public

benefits which, necessarily, must be balanced with the private interests that impel private sector actors to join PPPs.

Our framing then turns to the potential for PPPs to promote international good governance norms. The next section

summarizes the contributions to the special issue, flagging some key issues. We close with several observations and

conclusions drawn from our examination of PPPs.

DEFINING PPPS

The literature has addressed the term, partnership, from a variety of perspectives, including references to

partnerships as contracting-out (Johnston and Romzek, 2005), NGO-government alliances (Brinkerhoff and

Brinkerhoff, 2002), and community-local government cooperation (Krishna, 2003; World Bank, 2005), just to

name a few. Contributing to the analytic cacophony related to PPPs is the multiplicity of arguments, some based on

empirical study and others promoting partnership based on normative agendas, making it difficult to sort the

rhetoric from the reality (Brinkerhoff, 2002b; Wettenhall, 2003).

PPPs have a long history in municipal infrastructure and urban services, and are addressed by a substantial

literature (see, for example, Ghobadian et al., 2004; Grimsey and Lewis, 2007). A dominant thread in the definition

of PPPs concerns infrastructure financing, construction, operation, and maintenance. For example, Koppenjan

(2005: p. 137) defines a PPP as ‘a form of structured cooperation between public and private partners in the

planning/construction and/or exploitation of infrastructural facilities in which they share or reallocate risks,

costs, benefits, resources and responsibilities.’ This definition is echoed in that of Grimsey and Lewis (2007; p. 2):

‘PPPs can be defined as arrangements whereby private parties participate in, or provide support for, the provision of

infrastructure, and a PPP project results in a contract for a private entity to deliver public infrastructure-based

services.’

Such function-specific definitions are less than helpful in delineating the key features of PPPs. For the purposes

of this analytic exercise, Bovaird’s (2004: p. 200) definition is a step in the right direction: PPPs are ‘working

arrangements based on a mutual commitment (over and above that implied in any contract) between a public

sector organization with any other organization outside the public sector.’ This conceptualization highlights the

importance not simply of cross-sectoral engagement, but of shared dedication to achieve some kind of joint

outcome, and of going ‘above and beyond’ the principal-agent dynamic of a contractual relationship. Thus,

partnership implies a cross-sectoral relationship where the actors involved bring both commitment and competence

to the table, thereby creating the classic synergy (the whole being more than the sum of the parts).

The approach that Brinkerhoff (2002a) takes to analyzing partnership employs these two concepts to develop a

nuanced definition that, rather than categorically determining what is or is not a partnership, recognizes partnership

as a relative phenomenon in which a given PPP may exhibit more or less of partnership’s defining elements. These

elements are: mutuality and organization identity. Mutuality encompasses the commitment to a shared goal and the

extent towhich partners operatewithin the spirit of shared control and responsibility. Organization identity captures

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PUBLIC–PRIVATE PARTNERSHIPS 3

the rationale for selecting particular partners according to their distinctive competences; capitalizing on and

maintaining them constitute the basis of partnership’s value-added.

More specifically, mutuality refers to mutual dependence, and entails the respective rights and responsibilities of

each actor vis-a-vis the others. Embedded in mutuality is a joint commitment to the partnership’s goals, and their

alignment to be consistent with each partner organization’s mission and objectives. Mutuality also means some

degree of equality in decision-making, as opposed to domination of one or more partners. All partners have an

opportunity to influence their shared goals, processes, outcomes, and evaluation.

Organization identity captures the distinctive competence and capabilities of the individual partner

organizations. Organization identity can be examined at two levels. First, an individual organization has its

own mission, values, and identified constituencies to which it is accountable and responsive. The maintenance of

organization identity is the extent to which an organization remains consistent and committed to its mission, core

values, and constituencies. Second, from a broader institutional view, organization identity also refers to the

maintenance of characteristics—particularly comparative advantages—reflective of the sector or organizational

type from which the partner organization originates. A primary driver for partnerships is accessing key resources

needed to reach objectives, but lacking or insufficient within one actor’s individual reserves. Such assets can entail

the hard resources of money and materials, as well as important soft resources, such as managerial and technical

skills, information, contacts, and credibility/legitimacy.

Based on these two dimensions, PPPs, in practical terms, can be defined as a matter of degree. The ideal type

would maximize organization identity and mutuality, including equality of decision making. Since support and

respect for the identity of partners inevitably require compromises, and as exact equality of power in decision

making is unrealistic, partnership becomes a relative practice. Nevertheless, these dimensions can be used

to contrast partnership (high organization identity, high mutuality) from other types of inter-organizational

relationships, such as contracting (high organization identity, low mutuality), extension (low organization

identity, low mutuality), and cooptation or gradual absorption (low organization identity, high mutuality)

(Brinkerhoff, 2002a).

Thus, our definition recognizes a cross-sectoral collaboration with the following features as representing the

fullest expression of partnership:

� Jointly determined goals.

� Collaborative and consensus-based decision making.

� Non-hierarchical and horizontal structures and processes.

� Trust-based and informal as well as formalized relationships.

� Synergistic interactions among partners.

� Shared accountability for outcomes and results.

PARTNERSHIP RATIONALES

Partnership has most commonly been promoted as a means to enhancing governance effectiveness; this is most

evident, for example, in the New Public Management—NPM (see Osborne, 2000; Bovaird, 2004). Partnership is

also a value-laden endeavor, and may be promoted for purposes of maximizing appeal to stakeholders and voters,

representation, and conflict resolution. In general, individual actors choose to partner for one or more of the

following four reasons:2

(1) To enhance efficiency and effectiveness through a reliance on comparative advantages, a rational division of

labor, and resource mobilization.3 This combination can lead to incremental (though possibly dramatic)

improvements in the purposes the partnership is designed to achieve.

2This list is adapted from Brinkerhoff (2002b).3North (2004) stresses the potential of partnerships to reduce transaction costs.

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4 D. W. BRINKERHOFF AND J. M. BRINKERHOFF

(2) To provide the multi-actor, integrated resources and solutions required by the scope and nature of the problems

being addressed. In some cases, partnership is pursued for compliance reasons where legislation has

determined that a cross-sectoral solution is necessary.

(3) To move from a no-win situation among multiple actors to a compromise and potential win-win situation

(i.e., in response to collective action problems or the need for conflict resolution). It may be possible to continue

without partnership, but stakeholders would remain dissatisfied and continue to incur losses.

(4) To open decision-making processes to promote a broader operationalization of the public good. The normative

dimension seeks to maximize representation and democratic processes; the pragmatic perspective views this as

a means to ensure sustainability.

In addition to these general rationales, governments may choose to partner with particular types of actors for

more specific reasons related to the substantive purpose of the partnership. However, these reasons may reflect

incorrect or non-representative stereotypes that contribute to naive expectations about whether and how partnership

objectives can be achieved. For example, NGOsmay provide comparative advantages in trust building and outreach

(see, for example, Brinkerhoff and Brinkerhoff, 2002; Brinkerhoff et al., 2007), but due to sector blurring, despite

rhetoric to the contrary, many NGOs have lost these advantages through their participation in the ‘alms bazaar’

(Smillie, 1995).

The rationales for government partnerships with the for-profit private sector encompass both instrumental and

normative aims.4 From an instrumental perspective, partnering with the private sector can afford government access

to technical expertise and established networks for complementary resource sharing. For infrastructure PPPs that

access private financing, public–private risk sharing is one of the drivers, both as a means of leveraging investment

in public goods and of providing performance incentives. As Hodge and Greve (2007) point out, however, the track

record of PPPs as risk management vehicles is mixed; they cite a variety of assessments that raise questions about

the value for money rationale, and document governance and regulatory failures.

On the incentives side, PPPs may have an explicit objective of importing ‘businesslike’ practice and thinking,

including bottom-line enforcement mechanisms and competition. While presented as an effort to improve

efficiency and effectiveness, such an objective is also based on a normative belief that the private sector is inherently

‘better’ at management than the public sector. Such normative orientations have led to a dramatic under-

appreciation of the unique role governments must play in public service provision. Contracting out and purportedly

more mutual arrangements under the rhetoric of PPPs have significantly reduced many governments’ capacity to

effectively participate in and oversee these arrangements and to ensure they are responsive to citizen demands and

contribute to a broader, more strategic vision of the public good (see Rhodes, 1997). Put another way, we have yet to

sufficiently respond to the question ‘effectiveness for whom?’ (Provan and Kenis, 2007: p. 229). For these reasons,

we think it timely to more explicitly examine the publicness of PPPs and how various types of PPPs address the

balance between private and public impacts and benefits (see below).

PARTNERSHIP FRAMEWORK

No single analytic framework can capture the diversity, relevant parameters, and qualities of PPPs. We propose a

purpose-based framework here that examines the expression of the defining features of partnership identified

above as they relate to achieving particular purposes. These include: policy, service delivery, infrastructure,

capacity building, and economic development. These purposes to some extent reflect analytic streams and related

bodies of literature, though not completely. We select these as our organizing principle because in many cases the

decision to pursue a PPP derives from a desire to achieve a particular purpose. Thus this framework maps relatively

closely to the applications of PPPs in the real world, and facilitates the pursuit of policy- and practice-relevant

analysis.

4For a discussion of why businesses pursue partnerships, see Austin (2007).

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Policy PPPs seek to design, advocate for, coordinate, or monitor public policies of various types: sectoral,

national, and/or global. Partnership structures can vary from loose and informal issue-specific networks to more

formal cross-sectoral committees, task forces, or special commissions. Such PPPs can focus on the technical

aspects of policies, but they are often enmeshed in politics as well (see Rhodes, 1990).5 These policy networks have

emerged as important transnational structures for engaging governments on global policy issues (see Keck and

Sikkink, 1998).

Performance metrics for policy PPPs blend technical issues, such as enhancing the quality of the solutions to

the policy problem at hand through combining the expertise and experience of the partners, with political

considerations, such as state-society interest intermediation and responsiveness of the policy to particular societal

groups, the ability to build consensus among policy constituencies, and the legitimacy and ‘standing’ of the partners

(for example, whom do they speak for and with what authority?). These latter considerations exemplify the

normative principles frequently employed to assess policy PPPs. These include concerns about equity and

pluralist representation; opportunities for, and commitment to, participation; and transparency (related to various

operational aspects of the partnership as well as to the policy outcomes).

Service delivery PPPs engage non-state actors in delivering public services through separating the payment for

public services from their provision. Governments (in the case of poor countries, assisted by donors) retain

responsibility for financing and payment, and outsource service provision to the private and/or non-profit sectors.

The true partnership component of PPPs for this purpose is frequently debated, since the most common mechanism

connecting the partners is some form of contract, which reflects a low degree of mutuality. To the extent that the PPP

operates with shared commitment and accountability, and joint planning and consultation on service mix, the

relationship demonstrates more of the features (as opposed to simply the language) of partnership. Moving toward a

long-term relationship based on trust and commitment shifts the contractual basis of the PPP from a traditional

contract to a relational one (Bovaird, 2004). Both the performance metrics and the normative dimensions of service

delivery PPPs reflect their origins in NPM and the drive for public sector downsizing, deregulation, and reliance on

market mechanisms (see Rosenau, 2000). An additional metric driving government-NGO service delivery

partnerships is reaching underserved populations with specialized services.

Infrastructure PPPs, as noted above, bring together governments and the private sector to finance, build, and

operate infrastructure such as ports, highways, sewage and waste treatment facilities, telecommunications, electric

power generation, and so on (Sansom, 2006; Grimsey and Lewis, 2007; Andres et al., 2008). Infrastructure PPPs

employ a range of structures and processes, such as joint ventures with both national and multinational firms to

obtain technology and capital, build-operate-transfer agreements (BOTs) of various types, and loan or trust funds

(for example, housing credit funds). As with service delivery, performance metrics and norms for infrastructure

PPP derive from the privatization and deregulation principles underlying NPM: market mechanisms that promote

efficiency and quality, emphasis on value for money, and creation of sustained capacity for public infrastructure

operation and maintenance (see, for example, Koppenjan and Enserink, 2009).

Infrastructure PPPs are not without controversy: there are debates regarding whether indeed outsourcing to the

private sector through joint ventures or BOTs yields the cost savings and efficiencies for taxpayers that governments

advertise, and whether long-term PPPs lock in arrangements that limit government flexibility (Hodge and Greve,

2007). These debates concern the instrumental value of infrastructure PPPs; another controversy comes from the

normative side. When the provision of public goods, such as water and power, is outsourced to private providers

who seek to recover their costs through user fees, some critics consider that such PPPs deny those who cannot

pay—the poor and marginalized—basic rights to public goods.

Capacity building PPPs may in some cases address service delivery needs, but they explicitly focus on helping

to develop the skills, systems, and capabilities that allow those groups or organizations targeted for assistance to

help themselves. International donors are a major source of support for such PPPs, and they can be found in a wide

variety of sectors: health, education, environmental management, community development, and agriculture. For

5The policy network literature reflects some of the same debates as that on partnership related to defining concepts, analytic boundaries, andoperational dynamics. See, for example, Borzel (2002).

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6 D. W. BRINKERHOFF AND J. M. BRINKERHOFF

example, Wescott (2002) offers global, regional, and national examples of partnerships for capacity building in

integrated coastal management that combined governments, universities, and local communities. Several of these

are knowledge and research partnerships, such as the Australian Marine and Coastal Community Network; others

offer training courses and/or conduct pilot projects, such as the regional Partnerships in Environmental

Management for the Seas of East Asia (PEMSEA). Capacity building PPPs can take the form of loose knowledge

networks, organizational twinning, MOUs, or formal contracts. They often have a normative orientation that

highlights the autonomy and agency of assisted groups to apply their new capacities as they wish. Ownership and

empowerment are valued as enhancing independence and agency.

Capacity is a broad concept, and not easy to characterize in terms of performance metrics. Capacity building

PPPs are assessed using several measures, including (perhaps the simplest) skills and knowledge transfer, creation

of organizational systems posited as connected to the ability to perform (for example, planning, budgeting, human

resources, monitoring and evaluation), intellectual capital (demonstrated use of skills and knowledge), and social

capital (skills and knowledge plus networks of communication and trust).

Economic development PPPs are cross-sectoral collaborations that promote economic growth and poverty

reduction. In the US, Europe, and the UK, such partnerships are common at municipal, county, and state levels, with

a combination of local, state, and federal funding; for example, the Mainstreet USA program. Within this category

fall many of the partnerships born on the private sector side from corporate social responsibility programs and

commitment to the double or triple bottom line. Governments and international donor partners frequently play a

broker role, both in terms of finance and matching up private firms with NGOs and/or local communities. USAID’s

Global Development Alliance (GDA) is one example.6 Economic development PPPs can take the form of joint

ventures, contracts, or MOUs. At the global level, PPPs aim at resource mobilization, often for sector-specific

contributions to economic development in poor countries (see Bull andMcNeill, 2007). Examples of these latter are

the Global Fund to Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis and Malaria (GFATM), the Global Environment Facility (GEF), and

the Financing Facility for Remittances.7 Performance metrics focus on poverty reduction measures, profitability

and sustainability of newly created entrepreneurs (for example, microfinance programs), the above-noted triple

bottom line, and resource mobilization. Driving norms include empowerment and self-determination, equitable

distribution of benefits, and attention to the inclusion of economically or socially marginalized groups (for

example, women, indigenous peoples, and excluded castes).

Table 1 summarizes the framework. For each purpose, the table indicates the main organizational structures and

processes, the performance metrics, and the associated normative dimensions. The table shows that partnerships

can be operationalized through a variety of arrangements, ranging from informal to legally binding. Most often it is

assumed that formal agreements will be codified in a contract. However, partners may consider that mutuality is

more readily captured in the design process and outcome of these mechanisms through what may be called

‘Partnership Agreements’ (see Evans et al., 2004).

BEYOND CASE- AND COUNTRY-SPECIFIC PPPS: GOVERNANCE ISSUES

Our table is a practical mapping of a PPP typology, associated metrics, and normative aims associated with

individual partnerships in a particular sector or country. However, beyond this individual focus, PPPs are

expressions of alternative governance modalities to hierarchies and markets. As such, they need to be analyzed and

assessed from a perspective that accounts for them as instruments for achieving good governance (Bovaird, 2004;

Brinkerhoff, 2007; Edgar et al., 2006). That is, in addition to the specific benefits for which PPPs were designed, we

need to evaluate the extent to which (a) PPPs yield public benefits, and (b) partner behaviors align with the

principles and practices of good governance.

A focus on good governance leads to an examination of PPPs that moves beyond aims of incremental

modifications in existing practice to introducing systems change (Mandell and Steelman, 2003). This perspective

6See http://www.usaid.gov/our_work/global_partnerships/gda/7For a discussion of additional examples see Waddell and Khagram (2007).

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can also extend the role of PPPs beyond national governance systems to the international realm (see Borzel and

Risse, 2005; Bull andMcNeill, 2007). Thus, internationally recognized good governance principles and normsmay

be incorporated not just in the operationalization of PPPs but in their designated objectives.

PPPs and public benefits

As the above review suggests, despite their originating rationale, in practice many PPPs may not achieve their

intended public benefits, either due to poor implementation (including inadequate government regulation) or

skewed incentives; and/or they may yield unintended consequences, such as the long term ‘gutting’ of government

capacity (see Rhodes, 1997). Private sector benefits, such as reputation and profit, as well as shared partner benefits

(for example, cost/risk sharing and innovation), are necessary to the incentives that motivate actors to form and

participate in PPPs. However, these are not always consistent with the ultimate social goals for which PPPs are

designed. For example, PPPs may restrict competition and choice, increase costs to consumers, and limit access

to innovation. These risks are well known in the practice and literature on intellectual property rights, with

well documented cases concerning pharmaceuticals, and in the computer industry, for example, Microsoft’s

philanthropic programming in Africa (Sell, 2009).

All PPPs, to justify public sector participation, seek to produce at least some public benefits and incorporate

norms that in many cases are reflective of good governance principles, as the above typology summarized in Table 1

makes clear. However, empirical evidence suggests that their practice can fall short of the ideal. Figure 1 illustrates

a benefits distribution matrix (intended and/or realized). From a good governance perspective, an ideal PPP would

yield significant public benefits, and would fall in either Quadrant 2 or 4. For private partners, Quadrant 2—both

high public and high private benefits—would be desirable, but Quadrant 1 could hold some appeal as well. One

aspect of the debate regarding infrastructure PPPs is whether or not they fall into Quadrant 1 or 2. A PPP in

Quadrant 3 would not be likely to be initiated, or if launched would not be sustained for long, since it would be in

neither the government’s nor the private actors’ interests.

Table 1. Public–private partnerships: a purpose-based taxonomy

PPP purpose Organizational structuresand processes

Performance metrics Normative dimensions

Policy Network Technical quality Equity/representativenessTask force Responsiveness Citizen participationJoint committee Consensus-building TransparencySpecial commission Legitimacy

Service delivery Co-production Quality AccountabilityJoint venture Efficiency Business values and incentivesContract Effectiveness AccessPartnership agreement (MOU) Reaching targeted

beneficiariesResponsiveness

Infrastructure Joint venture Quality AccountabilityBuild-operate-transfer Efficiency Business values and incentivesBuild-operate-own-transfer Value for money AccessDesign-build-operate Maintenance and

sustainabilityResponsiveness

Capacity building Knowledge network Skills transfer OwnershipTwinning Intellectual capital AgencyContract Social capital EmpowermentPartnership agreement (MOU) Organizational systems

and outputAutonomy/independence

Economicdevelopment

Joint venture Poverty reduction EquityContract Profitability Social inclusionPartnership agreement (MOU) Sustainability Empowerment

Source: Authors.

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8 D. W. BRINKERHOFF AND J. M. BRINKERHOFF

Figure 1 suggests that PPPs can be mapped along these dimensions and their appropriateness and/or

effectiveness assessed accordingly. This table moves beyond the identified performance metrics in Table 1 to

highlight the extent to which those metrics ultimately contribute to public benefits. Of course, definitions of ‘public

benefit’ are subjective and ideological, and PPPs are dynamic, so their precise location in Table 1’s matrix may be

subject to interpretation and may change over time.8 That said, the graphic places public benefit squarely as a

central evaluative criterion, given that PPPs blur the line between public and private roles and responsibilities.

Further, it suggests that those PPPs that are higher in public than private benefits (perceived and/or actual) may be

likely to enjoy greater public support, and be accorded more legitimacy by citizens.

PPPs and international good governance norms

Particularly for PPPs whose purposes address global policy issues or pursue economic development objectives,

transnational actors figure often among the partners; for example, multinational corporations, global advocacy

coalitions, and multilateral agencies (for example, Keck and Sikkink, 1998; Waddell and Khagram, 2007). The

extent to which such PPPs may reinforce or advance international good governance norms varies widely. A

contributing factor to that variation is the type of authority that members of the PPP have access to and can

mobilize. Avant et al. (2010: p. 11) identify five bases of authority for what they call ‘global governors’:

institutional, delegated, expert, principled, and capacity. PPPs most often function with delegated responsibilities,

where authority is ‘on loan’ from other authoritative actors, in this case national governments and/or multilateral

agencies (for example, European Union, United Nations, World Trade Organization). Such delegation can ‘muddy

the relationship between state preferences and outcomes’ (Ibid.: p. 12). This obscured territory opens the door for

promoting international norms that may not be the explicit intention of participating state actors, even when they

may ostensibly ascribe to a particular PPP’s rhetoric. Non-state PPP participants can augment their delegated power

with expert- and capacity-based authority to achieve the intended goals of the PPP. At the same time, theymay draw

upon principle-based authority to enact, disseminate, and promote particular international governance norms. Such

authority may resonate more for those actors who share these aims, than for governments who may have only

nominal or limited commitments to these norms.

This authority framework suggests that PPP participants can leverage their delegated, expert, and

capacity authority to promote international governance norms with resistant and/or low capacity governments,

while using principle authority to garner further support from like-minded partners and stakeholders. These

norms may include liberal democratic values such as basic freedoms (for example, speech, religion, and assembly),

human rights, and associated good governance behaviors. Several of these norms, such as accountability, equity,

social inclusion, and empowerment are part of the explicit rationales for many types of PPPs, as illustrated in

Table 1.

Figure 1. Mapping PPP benefits.

8See the discussion in Pesch (2005) of the ideological aspects of defining publicness and public benefits.

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SYMPOSIUM CONTRIBUTIONS

This section overviews and comments on the contributions to this volume. The discussion considers the purposes of

the PPP examples, and explores how those partnership cases illuminate the questions of provision of public benefits

and promotion of/compliance with international good governance norms introduced above. While each of the

articles holds implications for these two aims (publicness and international norms), their relative emphasis varies.

In terms of the PPP purposes enumerated in Table 1, the examples presented in the articles in the symposium

cover all of the purposes except infrastructure. Arthur Goldsmith’s article looks at social enterprise PPPs that target

economic development and poverty reduction. Alyson Lipsky discusses service delivery partnerships that engage

faith-based organizations as health service providers in Africa. Jennifer Brinkerhoff assesses the role of diasporas

as partners in international development PPPs for purposes of economic development and capacity building. The

articles by Susan Aaronson and Anna Wetterberg look at partnerships with both international policy and economic

development objectives. Aaronson reviews and analyzes the case of the Extractive Industries Transparency

Initiative (EITI), which establishes country-specific PPPs to combat corruption and ensure that the resources

generated by natural resources exploitation contribute to national development. Wetterberg examines the

experience of the Better Factories Cambodia (BFC) partnership, which sought simultaneously to protect workers’

rights and ensure that Cambodian apparel manufacturers met the labor standards that would enable them to profit

from multinational investments.

Provision of public benefits

In discussing particular PPP actors, three of the articles explicitly address publicness. Two of the contributions to

this volume address the comparative advantages of new private actors as partners, and how the defining features

of, and rationales for, partnership condition their engagement in PPPs. J. Brinkerhoff explores the prospects

of diaspora organizations as partners for international development. Diasporas—migrants who maintain a

connection, psychological or material, to their country of origin—represent enormous potential to contribute to the

development of their countries of origin. They do so through informal associations, such as Internet-based

communities, nonprofit philanthropic organizations, businesses, and advocacy associations (see, for example,

Brinkerhoff, 2009). Her article offers a range of lessons from the experience of NGOs to inform diaspora

organization partnership strategies.

She cautions the donor community regarding the unexamined assumption that the aims of diaspora contributions

to their homelands can be neatly coopted in the service of national development, a public good. While the private

interests of diaspora organizations must be carefully weighed against the joint public aims of such partnerships, the

issue she highlights is less one of public versus private interests, and more one of diminished public benefits over

time. The absorption of diaspora members into donor- or government-dominated partnerships may diminish the

very advantages that countries of origin and donors seek to capitalize on. Over time, the capacity of such

partnerships to produce a steady stream of public benefits risks deteriorating without careful attention.

Similarly, Lipsky explores the potential advantages of faith-based organizations (FBOs), specifically for

partnerships targeting health service delivery in Africa. FBOs have delivered public services to those in need

globally for some time, yet have often operated relatively independently. Their role in particular service arenas—

such as health service delivery—is receiving renewed attention, for several reasons. First, because of their track

record in serving hard-to-reach populations, theymay be important partners in efforts to meet health-relatedMDGs.

Second, current concerns with sustainable service delivery have led to interest in integrating FBOs more closely

into national health systems. Lipsky compares and contrasts FBOs and secular NGOs as partners, and illuminates

the advantages and weaknesses that characterize FBOs.

In terms of the public benefit criterion (Figure 1), the application of those advantages to partnerships for routine

service delivery or provision of services in emergency situations (a longstanding role for FBOs) is on occasion

controversial. For example, in the U. S., the Bush administration relaxed the rules that enjoin FBOs that accept

government funds for providing emergency relief from proselytizing among recipient populations, provoking

concern in some quarters for blurring the boundary between church and state. Some FBOs place limitations on the

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provision of HIV/AIDS services based on religious beliefs and strictures that ignore medical best practice. In

other words, FBOs have private faith-based objectives alongside service delivery aims. Thus, FBO-government

partnerships face differing interpretations of their desirability and appropriateness, and will require careful

negotiation of mutuality and organization identity issues in order to achieve intended public service delivery

outcomes.

Goldsmith’s article confronts head-on the public–private balance of interests and benefits in partnerships that

enlist private firms in reducing poverty and promoting economic development. He reviews the experiences of a

variety of social enterprises, looking at microfinance, pro-poor marketing to ‘base of the pyramid’ consumers,

equitable supply chains for both agricultural and non-agricultural products, appropriate technologies (for example,

cell phones), and social venture capital investments. These social enterprises typically create partnerships with

multinational and/or national companies, governments, NGOs, and community associations. His analysis notes that

while the theoretical rationale for social enterprises posits that reaching the poor (a public benefit for a developing

country) can become sufficiently profitable that it will be sustained through private investment alone. In practice,

PPPs that launch social enterprises depend heavily upon the contributions of the public sector and civil society

partners. He concludes that for social enterprise PPPs to continue to produce public benefits in the form of poverty

reduction, ongoing public resources are required.

Aaronson’s and Wetterberg’s cases enlarge publicness beyond national boundaries to reveal how those PPPs

contribute not simply to public benefits in individual countries, but also to the production of global public goods,

embodied in international norms (discussed more fully below). The EITI explicitly seeks to set limits on private

gains—notably those derived from corruption—through promoting transparency in extractive industry agreements

with governments, using national civil society and validators from the international community as watchdogs. The

BFC partnership encompasses labor rights into the operationalization of publicness.

International good governance norms

The EITI and BFC are examples of partnerships that seek to increase adherence to a set of international norms

linked to good governance: transparency, reduced corruption, and respect for human rights. Aaronson’s discussion

of the EITI notes the mixed record of progress in establishing the country PPPs despite the espoused commitment of

the various partners. Her analysis reveals the diversity of motivations among the partners, which highlights the

difficulties in achieving the mutuality that characterizes the fullest expression of partnership. A positive factor is

the increased worldwide acceptance of international norms around transparency regarding resource exploitation,

which has helped to push forward what is a voluntary compliance process. The PPP encompasses delegated

authority from the World Bank and other supporting international actors, the expert authority of validators, and, at

least in theory, the capacity authority of civil society as a watchdog. She observes that an important ancillary

objective in EITI is building capacity for civil society engagement in governance of natural resources exploitation,

which holds the promise for a fuller expression at a country level of the international norms to which EITI seeks to

give effect. She cautions, however, that civil society remains the weak partner in the PPPs, where power imbalances

favor governments and multinational corporations.

The BFC partnership illustrates how principle-based authority, combined with market incentives, can achieve

behavior change in line with international norms, in this case labor standards to protect Cambodian workers’ rights.

This PPP case combines the enactment of international norms with production of public benefits; in Cambodia,

factory working conditions were improved and abuses of organized labor curtailed. Wetterberg examines the BFC

in terms of the interplay between the distinctive competencies, interest, and authorities of the three partners

(government, the garment industry, and the International Labour Organization), which enabled the PPP to enforce

internationally mandated labor standards that no member of the partnership could achieve individually. Thus, the

BFC exemplifies how the twin characteristics of partnership—mutuality and organization identity—can combine

to generate synergistic results. The analysis shows that the success the BFC achieved has been strongly influenced

by global economic forces; reduced demand from advanced country consumers for fashion items revealed the

vulnerability of the PPP’s reliance on a single industry. Nevertheless, several other countries have indicated an

interest in the BFC partnership model.

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The actor-specific articles also address the potential for promoting international norms. Diasporas hold potential

for promoting international norms and values experienced and acquired through the migration experience and in

their newly adopted countries of residence. In their understandings of both the country of origin and the country of

residence culture and norms, they may be particularly well situated to act as norm announcers (Brinkerhoff and

Riddle, 2011). Faith-based organizations, by virtue of their comparative advantages in reaching the poor and their

moral and ethical standing, contribute to enacting international normative service delivery and governance targets,

such as the Millennium Development Goals. Finally, social enterprises, themselves, embody international norms

related to corporate social responsibility; that is, the principle that private businesses have societal responsibilities

beyond simply profit-making.

CONCLUSIONS

PPPs continue to seize the attention of policymakers, public administrators, and academic researchers in search of

organizational concepts and mechanisms that hold promise for (a) mobilizing resources beyond those available to

public sector entities alone, and (b) offering solutions to complex problems. The partnership ‘currency’ has been

devalued by overuse of the term, leading some to dismiss it as conceptually empty and merely politically expedient.

However, the premise behind the research workshop that led to this special issue and to the contributions to this

volume is that examination of PPPs remains both analytically valid and practically worthwhile.

Among the conclusions that can be drawn from the contributors’ and our shared exploration are the following.

First, public sector actors (national and transnational) are looking to new partners to contribute their unique

resources and capacities to address global challenges.9 The search has led to some uneasy ‘bedfellows,’ which

highlights the importance of understanding the comparative advantages and the interests of the actors coming

together in partnership. This places a heavy emphasis on the mutuality dimension of partnership if the anticipated

synergies are to be gained from the distinctive competencies derived from organization identity. This conclusion is

particularly salient for diaspora engagement in international development partnerships, as the J. Brinkerhoff article

points out.

Second, while public sector dominance can undermine the anticipated benefits of partnerships, if the publicness

inherent in PPPs is to be realized, neither should private interests dictate the terms of the joint relationship.

Achieving the right balance of interests and incentives among heterogeneous partners is challenging. Goldsmith’s

analysis of social enterprise PPPs and poverty reduction raises this question, as have others looking at the private

sector and international development partnerships (for example, Kolk et al., 2008). The potential for divergent

interests is also present in the use of FBOs for health service delivery, as discussed by Lipsky.

Third, the good governance aspects of partnership, as principles guiding the operation of the partnership and/or

as its explicit objective, add a layer of complexity to partnership design and operation beyond the metrics of

efficiency, effectiveness, and synergy. Acting on these principles means that inclusion, equity, transparency,

accountability and ethical behaviors become integral to partnership functions (Bovaird, 2004; Brinkerhoff, 2007).

These normative elements of PPPs—which can be argued are inherent to the PPP mechanism itself—have perhaps

heretofore been under-recognized. The potential for PPPs to embody and promote particular norms and values

has both instrumental and ethical implications in terms of beneficiary and/or partner self-determination and

ownership of PPP outcomes. Moreover, since PPP functioning requires commitment and trust, where the

operating environment discourages or undermines these core elements, such as in developing countries where good

governance is limited or lacking, the ability of the partnership to produce desired outcomes (either public goods/

benefits, good governance, or both) is put at risk. The high degree of variation in the progress that Aaronson

documents with the EITI country-level PPPs is a clear demonstration of this threat.

Fourth, the use of partnerships for addressing transnational problems draws attention to the different sources of

authority that operate in combination within such partnerships (Avant et al., 2010). Because partnerships as

9Batley (2006), for example, notes that many important non-state service providers, such as local entrepreneurs, individual practitioners, andcommunity-based organizations, are left out of PPPs, and may be unduly regulated without attention to shared objectives.

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organizational constructs tend away from the hierarchical, the standing of participants becomes important to

defining their power relationships among each other. The multiple sources of authority add nuance and complexity

to the determination of power and its exercise within PPPs. Partners bring more than one type of authority to the

PPP, and may be relatively weak in one, while relatively strong in another. Wetterberg’s analysis of Cambodia’s

BFC demonstrates this factor.

A final conclusion that emerges from our examination of PPPs is perhaps a statement of the obvious, but which

nonetheless bears repeating. The permutations of partnership purposes, structures, and processes are enormous.

This fact limits the generalized applicability of any set of conclusions, and suggests caution in transferring specifics

from one setting to another. It also opens the door to considering that, for some types of public goods and services,

partnerships may not be the most appropriate vehicle. The complexities and difficulties in making PPPs work

effectively suggest that they should be applied predominantly to those societal problems that call for partnership’s

particular advantages. Further, it suggests that there may be trade-offs among those advantages; for example, the

inclusivity benefits may add costs and complicate accountability. Making such choices raises once again the power

facet of partnerships embedded in Provan and Kenis’ (2007) question of who gets to decide which PPP benefits are

the most salient?

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