Prudence and the Rules for Guiding Life. The Development of Pragmatic Normativity in Kant's...

Nuria Sanchez Madrid (Madrid, Spain)

Prudence and the Rules for Guiding Life.The Development of PragmaticNormativity in Kant’s Lectures onAnthropology *

As is well known, Kant held Anthropology lectures every winter semester from1772 until 1796, namely for twenty-four years in all, covering the entire criticalphase of his career. This fidelity confirms Kant’s interest in laying down a newbasis for an ancient subject that deals with knowledge of the human being [Men-schenkenntniß], i. e. anthropology or – as Kant asserts in one of the lectures –Antropognosie1. One key feature of this knowledge is that human beings, in con-trast with the stability of animal life, undergo an evolution that brings the speciescloser to its moral destination by the efforts of generations of individuals:

Every bee is born, learns to make cells and prepares honey, and dies, and has come to thehighest degree of its vocation. But the bee has done that just as well from the beginning ofthe world up to now; thus it does not alter itself at all.With the human being it is entirely different. The ancient and first times were farther dis-tant from their vocation than the following ones, and in recent times having achieved hisvocation seems to have been reserved for the human being.2

The text displays that the experience of time available for the human species can-not be compared with the activity of animals on the earth. But actually the senseof existence itself is completely heterogeneous for each of them. As the Men-schenkunde lecture ironically states, «if a horse could grasp the thought ‹I›, Ishould dismount and consider it as my company»3. In contrast to animals, humanbeings bring forth a pragmatic behavior. Therefore, they require prudence inorder to have success in society and not to ruin the most basic rules of humancoexistence. I share with others the view that we should approach these materials

* This paper is part of a research programme undertaken with the support of the research pro-ject Poetics of Selfhood: memory, imagination and narrativity (PTDC/MHC-FIL/4203/2012), gran-ted by the FCT of the Government of Portugal, and also supported by the research projects Natu-raleza humana y comunidad (III). ¿Actualidad del humanismo e inactualidad del hombre?(FFI2013–46815-P) and Retoricas del Clasicismo. Los puntos de vista (contextos, premisas, men-talidades) (FFI2013–41410-P), granted by the MINECO of the Government of Spain.1 V-Anth/Busolt, AA 25.2: 1435.2 V-Anth/Pillau, AA 25.2: 839.3 V-Anth/Mensch, AA 25.2: 859.

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of Kant’s philosophical legacy with caution, so that I chiefly aim at consideringthem as documents always subordinated to the main, the published works.4 Tak-ing this into account, I shall first pose the following question: how far could thereader of these Kantian lectures assign an autonomous scope and a place outsidethe boundaries of Kant’s morals to anthropology? In this context, I deal with therelation of anthropological knowledge to Kant’s moral doctrine. Second, I attemptto reconstruct the unity of scattered materials of a worldly prudence, which yieldsvaluable help for guiding the actions of a man of the world [Weltmann]. Finally, Ifocus on the empirical traits of knowledge of the human being, that neverthelesscontribute to an enquiry on the character of the human species, which goes far be-yond the boundaries of phenomenal anthropological observation. I claim thatKant’s Anthropology lectures display a certain evolution, one which leads to anincreasing consciousness of the meaning and limits of pragmatic normativity.

1 The Anthropology Lectures and the EmpiricalSide of Morals

Kant holds that the proper study of human nature could never proceed physio-logically or according to an experimental method, since human existence shouldbe thought as a permanent dialogue with others. As Allen Wood notes, «the ac-tions of others and the influence of society» must be regarded as part of the prag-matic self-making of the human being.5 This approach to the human being as asocial product legitimates the assignment of the title of Weltkenntnis to the studyof its worldly education. Anthropology Friedländer especially highlights this so-ciable feature of knowledge of the human being:

«Nothing interests us as much as another human being, not nature but the human being isthe object of our affects. We attend to nothing more than we attend to what can accrue to usin other people’s regard. Nature can offer us nothing but comfortableness and maintenance,

4 See Louden 2001, 67: «Kant’s lecture notes are important documents, but they should be usedconservatively as added support for claims made in his published works – not as stand-aloneindications of his position». Cf. Stark 2003, 19 f.: «Historically noteworthy, however, is the factthat [Kant] never composed and published his own textbook for use in any of his courses. Pre-sumably, one explanation for this noteworthy fact is Kant’s deep pedagogical conviction that hisstudents should not ‹learn philosophy›, but rather ought to learn ‹how to philosophize›. Thus, interms of form, the oral doctrine of Kant’s lectures stands in a special tension with his publishedworks. It is only in the case of the Anthropology that Kant would later resolve this tension, thatis, with the publication of his ‹textbook› in 1798». See also Stark 1992.5 Wood 2003, 41.



165Prudence and the Rules for Guiding Life |

which can only be used among human beings, and only insofar as we cannot have these incommon with other people, are we unable to bear all miserable circumstances in regard tocomfortableness and maintenance. We do not complain about nature itself in regard to ourmeager circumstances, but because other people are better off than we are. [. . .] The humanbeing thus interests us more than nature, for nature exists for the sake of the human, thehuman being is the purpose of the nature.»6

Beyond its social genealogy, the Anthropology lectures shed light on essentialissues regarding the human capacity to fulfill what the moral law commands,helping to grant access [Eingang] to moral laws and efficacy for fulfillment of them[Nachdruck zur Ausübung]7 as they are applied to human nature. Admittedly,Kant’s practical philosophy often emphasizes that morals do not require any an-thropological feedback in order to see its imperative fulfilled, but this thesis iscompatible with the fact that moral anthropology displays «the subjective con-ditions in human nature that hinder people or help them in carrying out the lawsof a metaphysics of morals»8. To put it in a nutshell, anthropology suppliesawareness of the empirical features of human behavior relevant to moral law, abehavior which inevitably occurs in a social context and is influenced by psycho-logical reasons. Some Kant scholars have drawn attention to the strong declara-tion regarding these two subjects contained in the following introductory pas-sage of Collins Moral Philosophy lecture:

The science of the rules concerning how a human being ought to behave is practical phi-losophy, and the science of the rules concerning his actual behavior is anthropology; thesetwo sciences [morality and practical anthropology] are closely connected, and moral phi-losophy cannot endure without anthropology, for one must first know of the agent, whetherhe is also in a position to accomplish what is required of him that he should do. It is natu-rally possible to consider anthropology without the knowledge of the subject, but this isonly a speculative [anthropology] or an idea. [. . .] People are always preaching about whatought to be done, and nobody thinks about whether it can be done, so that even the admo-nitions, which are tautological repetitions of rules that everyone knows already, strike us asvery tedious, in that nothing is said beyond what is already known, and the pulpit orationson the subject are very empty, if the preacher does not simultaneously attend to humanity.9

Of course, pragmatic observations and rules – what we call pragmatic normativity– could go through many different applications, but the most purposive use ofthem will refer to morals.10 Moreover, the same schedule of Kant’s lectures proves

6 V-Anth/Fried, AA 25.1: 470.7 GMS, AA 04: 389, emphasis added.8 MS, AA 06: 217.9 V-Mo/Collins, AA 27.1: 244.10 See Louden 2011, 70: «Pragmatic anthropology becomes moral anthropology when wechoose to make use of our knowledge of human nature for moral purposes. Thus, in principle, allaspects of pragmatic anthropology are potentially moral anthropology: all that is needed to turn




that from winter 1772/73 he regularly held a course on Ethics with a parallelcourse on Anthropology.11 Despite interpretations such as Foucault’s commen-tary on Kant’s pragmatic anthropology, there is something inconsistent in theidea that these sometimes fragmentary materials can shape an independent mat-ter, apart from the basic tenets of morals. Kant never hints at a similar assump-tion regarding the science of the human being. One finds in the Menschenkundelecture a broad definition of what practical knowledge is, i. e. «a knowledge ofthe art of how one human being has influence on another and can lead him ac-cording to his purpose»12. Moreover, pragmatic knowledge will be called so «inso-far as it serves to fulfill our overall aims»13, but the «public matters» which re-quire pragmatic skills could not prevail over the moral ends that only thedoctrine of wisdom conveys. Actually, the discretionary ends of culture andthose corresponding to the worldly cognition characteristic of every civilized so-ciety are subordinated to the ends that reason deems appropriate for the morali-zation process.14 Since anthropology delivers essential information about thesubject’s hindrances and helps to fulfill the commands of the moral law, as wellas displaying a moral education program for the destination of human species,stamped by an evident cosmopolitan commitment, Weltkenntnis has to be consid-ered as an indirectly moral Weltkenntnis. That all pragmatic doctrines give us«the means to make a proper use of everything»15 unfailingly refers to the moralfeature of the Klugheitslehre. Against a narrower understanding of Kant’s prac-tical secondary writings, defended by scholars as Paton and Gregor16, RobertLouden argues that without

moral anthropology, we are travelers without a map who know neither our destination norour means of reaching it. We do not know how to make moral principles and commitmentsefficacious, and we lack judgment concerning when, where, how and why to apply them indaily life.17

any aspect of pragmatic anthropology into moral anthropology is the decision to apply it tomoral rather than nonmoral ends». Louden, 2011, 82: «If people’s chosen ends are moral ones,then they can apply anthropology as a means towards this goal. But if their ends are nonmoral,anthropological knowledge of human beings can also be of service».11 See Stark 2003, 23 f.12 V-Anth/Mensch, AA 25.2: 855.13 V-Anth/Mensch, AA 25.2: 856.14 See V-Anth/Busolt, AA 25.2: 1436.15 V-Anth/Fried, AA 25.1: 471.16 Paton 1971, 32 and Gregor 1963, 8. Both argue that anthropological concepts could not belongto practical philosophy insofar as they are empirical, so that they would not be «entirely[grounded] on the concept of freedom» (KU, AA 05: 173).17 Louden 2011, 77. Alix A. Cohen shares basically this point of view, see 2008, 513: «The moralguidance of anthropology thus consists in recommending what helps the realization of duty (for




One of the two editors of volume 25 of the Academy Edition, W. Stark, has alsoargued that Kant’s anthropology is

an integral part of his philosophy (including his critical philosophy), and [. . .] it is not to bereckoned as a mere appendage to the system.18

Another Kant scholar who has written about the Anthropology lectures, Alix A.Cohen, compares anthropology with a GPS device that shows the subject whichpath leads to her moral destination.19 For this purpose, she uses the analogy withthe metaphor of the compass that Kant shaped in order to clarify how commonhuman reason knows a priori what is good and what is evil without drawing thisevidence from experience20.

The fact that anthropology shall always remain an unfinished and imperfectmatter has misled some readings of this part of Kant’s philosophical legacy thattend to reduce it to a mere prudential appendix. Yet Kant holds that this subject is«of great utility» for its «influence on morality and religion»21, since it facilitatesperformance of the duties which stem from moral laws. Independently of its sup-plementary outcomes, empirical knowledge of the human being ought to help inthe application of practical philosophy, which at least allows us to regard an-thropology as an important part of philosophia moralis applicata, which Kantdistinguishes from metaphysica pura, for instance in the Moral Mrongovius II22.The following passage from the Menschenkunde, one of the most articulated lec-tures of Kant’s Anthropology, focuses decidedly on this link:

All morals require knowledge of the human being, so that we do not chatter empty exhor-tations to people but know how to lead them, in order that they begin to hold moral laws inhigh regard and turn to their principles. I must know which avenues of human dispositionsI can have in order to bring forth resolutions; knowledge of the human being can give us theopportunity for this, so that the educator and preacher do not produce mere sobs and tearsbut are in a condition to produce true resolutions. Knowledge of the human being is just asindispensable for politics, for in order to be able to rule human beings one must knowhuman beings. Without knowledge of the human being the sovereign cannot lead such a

instance, politeness and sympathy) and warning against what hinders it (for instance, pas-sions). Of course, these helps and hindrances are by no means a guarantee of virtue. For beingsympathetic and polite is not sufficient to be genuinely moral: but it certainly helps.»18 Stark 2003, 21.19 Cohen 2008, 513.20 GMS, AA 04: 404.21 V-Anth/Busolt, AA 25.2: 1437.22 V-Mo/Mron II, AA 29: 599.




multitude of social classes; they will all oppose him and he cannot lead them according tohis will.23

The text points out that to know how to reach purposes in general facilitates theidentification of the most convenient means for accomplishing our own moraldestination. The famous claim of Kant, according to which the highest interest ofreason is always practical24, also confirms this subordination of anthropology tomorals.25 Since, in Kant’s eyes, «[t]he sciences are principia for the improvementof morality»26, a sketch of science as anthropology should not be excluded fromthis commitment. Kant’s distinction between skillfulness [Geschicklichkeit] andprudence [Klugheit] is also connected with this point, as the Menschenkunde lec-ture reports:

Skillfulness is directed toward things; prudence, toward human beings. The watchmaker isskilled if he makes a perfect watch; but if he knows how to bring it to the customer quicklybecause he repairs it according to fashion, then he is prudent. Only when we are able toacquire influence on human beings do we also have an influence on things, becausehuman hands produce everything out of raw nature. Prudence is therefore based merely onthe knowledge of the human being, by virtue of which we are in a position to direct othersaccording to our purpose.27

Skillfulness concerns only things, so that it does not entail a real feedback beforeother human beings. A skilled person in the manufacture of clocks – Kant’s ex-ample – does not need to bear in mind the foresights and strategies aimed at in-creasing his influence on others. Yet prudence cannot be understood as an all-embracing skillfulness, but as a knowledge of «the stage upon which we canapply all skill» which is constantly in progress28. Put differently, pragmatic know-ledge will be very useful for civilizing the human being and for educating him asa Weltmann.

The remark that anthropology should stop being considered as a part ofmetaphysics in order to emerge as a «coherent science» [zusammenhängendeWissenschaft29]30 does not first and foremost affirm its identity with the empiricalpsychology, to which the Critique of Pure Reason assigned the status of a refugee«until it [could] establish its own domicile in a complete anthropology (the pen-

23 V-Anth/Mensch, AA 25.2: 858.24 KpV, AA 05: 121.25 For a different approach to this question see Kain 2003, 251.26 V-Mo/Collins, AA 27.1: 462.27 V-Anth/Mensch, AA 25.2: 855.28 V-Anth/Fried, AA 25.2: 469.29 V-Anth/Collins, AA 25.1: 007.30 Cfr. Pirillo 2008, 305 f.




dant to the empirical doctrine of nature)»31. On the contrary, this approach opensa new enquiry that the ancients praised only nominally:

It is to be wondered why the ancients did not occupy themselves more with human cogni-tion, even though they declared this endeavor to be the most useful one. But there is noth-ing more usual than the fact that one believes himself to know what he is accustomed todeal with and holds it not to be worthy of this investigation. This opinion, which is implan-ted in us, has done uncommon harm to the sciences, and deprived us of the cognition ofmany things. At the same time, it is to be remarked that because the sciences are expoun-ded in academies in a certain order and separated from other sciences, they have grownand expanded greatly. It is precisely so with empirical psychology, for as long as it was de-pendent on metaphysics, and was not expounded especially, it had only a very small range.It even deserves a special set of lectures, in part because it does not at all belong to meta-physics, in part because it can be learned by everyone without requiring any prerequisitesciences.32

The passage states clearly that those who believe that anthropology does not re-quire any discipline, because its contents are so naturally learned and easy tograsp that the mere civil intercourse would yield all the expected materials,repeat a terrible mistake which morals traditionally committed, i. e. the idea thatto put the knowledge of the human being under a systematical articulationwould be superficial. Certainly the matters which anthropology considers shouldnot be confused with the «conceptus puri» (sic) that stem from reason33, since thefirst are «practical qualities» [praktische Eigenschaften34]35 that concern the phe-nomena of human intercourse, without regard to problems such as the mind-body union in human beings, studied by scientists such as Charles Bonnet. With-in the boundaries of this phenomenal enquiry, anthropology attempts todiscover what is natural in the human being and what proceeds from culture andcivilization, providing to morals the empirical space of its application, as theMrongovius lecture illustrates by a puzzling analogy:

Anthropology is pragmatic, but it is of service for the moral knowledge of the human being,since one must create the motives for morals from it, and without Anthropology moralswould be scholastic, not at all applicable to the world, and not agreeable to the world. An-thropology stands to morals as spatial geometry stands to geodesy.36

The knowledge about how world rules prevent an excessive abstraction in themoral realm and facilitate the implementation of the moral law in a space shapedby human beliefs and expectations brings forth a pragmatic normativity.

31 KrV, AA: B 876 f. / A 848.32 V-Anth/Parow, AA 25.1: 243 f.33 V-Anth/Parow, AA 25.1: 243.34 V-Anth/Collins, AA 25.1: 009.35 Cfr. Pirillo 2008, 308.36 V-Anth/Mron, AA 25.2: 1211.




2 The Reflective Gathering of Scattered MaterialKant rejects a scholastic approach to anthropology such as the one executed byPlatner, from which «one could not obtain any enlightenment of common life»37.In one of Kant’s famous letters to M. Herz anthropology appears as a Beobach-tungslehre, which provides «the sources of all the sciences»38 and «procure[s] thepragmatic element for all other acquired sciences and skills»39. Kant declares hisintention to renovate substantially the approach and goals of this empirical dis-cipline:

This winter for the second time I am offering a collegium privatum on anthropology, a sub-ject that I now intend to turn into a proper academic discipline. But my plan is quite differ-ent. The intention that I have is to disclose through it the sources of all the sciences that areconcerned with ethics, with the skill of social intercourse, of the method of educating andgoverning human beings, hence the skill of everything that pertains to the practical. I seekthen more phenomena and their laws rather than the first grounds of the possibility ofmodifying human nature in general. Hence the subtle and in my eyes eternally futile inves-tigation concerning how bodily organs stand in connection with thoughts is left out entire-ly. I include so many observations of ordinary life that my listeners have constant occasionto compare their ordinary experience with my remarks and thus, from beginning to end,find the lectures always entertaining and never dry.40

Weltkenntnis should be worked out as a Kenntnis des Menschen41, which shareswith the physiology of external senses the feature of gathering, according to sub-jective principles, disparate elements previously provided by the observationand the experience. Several Anthropology lectures also focus on this question42.Kant highlights that the display of the multiplicity and variety of human charac-ters and uses – the map of an Anthropographie43 – requires a previous groundingof anthropology, which orders the collected material and puts it under a certainunity. Moreover, the fragmentary structure of anthropological remarks shouldnot discourage the reader from reconstructing the unity of the entire corpus ofthis heterogeneous array of remarks. On the contrary, this is acknowledged as anunavoidable task. Kant is completely aware that the chosen handbook for his An-thropology lectures, i. e. Baumgarten’s Metaphysica, is a scholastic book, so that

37 V-Anth/Mensch, AA 25.2: 853.38 Br, AA 10: 145.39 VvRM, AA 02: 443.40 Br, AA 10: 145 f.41 V-Anth/Fried, AA 25.1: 470.42 V-Anth/Collins, AA 25.1: 007; V-Anth/Mensch, AA 25.1: 854 f.43 V-Anth/Busolt, AA 25.2: 1435.




«many other considerations will enter in»44. This might emphasize the impres-sion of a patchwork, as the following passage of Friedländer lecture suggests:

To observe human beings and their conduct, to bring their phenomena under rules, is thepurpose of anthropology. All anthropologies that we still have at this time, have not yet hadthe idea which we have here before us. Everything that bears no relation to the prudentconduct of human beings does not belong to anthropology.45

One paradoxical feature which goes across Kant’s Anthropology lectures is thecontrast between the empirical contents and the cosmopolitan vocation of theirobservations and commentaries. Everything seems disposed to fulfill Kant’s ideaof setting up «knowledge of the human being as a citizen of the world»46. But thiscosmopolitan purpose derives from a moral emphasis that internally concernsthis anthropological project. Several passages of the lectures uphold the subordi-nation of anthropological observation to a general guiding conception of humannature, as the distinction between a general and a local anthropology proves:

anthropology is not however a local but rather a general anthropology. In it one comes toknow not the state of human beings but rather the nature of humanity, for the local prop-erties of human beings always change, but the nature of humanity does not. Anthropologyis thus a pragmatic knowledge of what results from our nature, but it is not a physical orgeographical knowledge, for that is tied to time and place, and is not constant [. . .] Anthro-pology is not a description of human beings, but of human nature.47

The ability to use every learned science conveniently is a specific expression ofpermanent human endeavor to obtain happiness, but this should not shield thefact that the utility of every science must be subordinated to the instruments andmeans which contribute to the fulfillment of the moral destination of the humanbeing. To accomplish the last demand is a duty to all human beings. Neverthe-less, the ability of prudence [Klugheit] is not less necessary than the magnificenthorizon of wisdom, since human existence cannot ever leave aside «the skill inthe choice of one’s own greatest well-being [Wohlsein]»48.49 Kant argues that onlya general knowledge of the world could provide the pragmatic rules for guidingthe subject in common life, as the Pillau lecture states with glaring words:

1) A local knowledge of the world, which merchants [Kaufleute] have, which is also calledempirical. 2) A general knowledge of the world, which the man of the world has, and whichis not empirical but cosmological. Local knowledge of the world is tied to place and time,

44 V-Anth/Mron, AA 25.2: 1214.45 V-Anth/Fried, AA 25.1: 472.46 Anth, AA 07: 120.47 V-Anth/Fried, AA 25.1: 471.48 GMS, AA 04: 416.49 Concerning prudence and its relation to practical rationality, see KrV, AA: B 834/A 806.




and also gives no rules to a person to act in common life. He who becomes acquainted withthe world through travel has only this knowledge of it, which, however, also lasts only forawhile, for when the behavior in the place where he has been changes, then his knowledgeof it also ceases.50

The text casts light on the limitations of local knowledge of the world, too tied toa concrete space and time, so that it could train merchants, but not the man of theworld [Weltmann]. This kind of knowledge of the human being grasps only con-tingent and changing features of human behavior and situations, whereas gen-eral knowledge teaches the student to reflect about human nature through socialintercourse51. Kant mentions three main benefits that a general knowledge of thehuman being yields52. First, to consider with an attentive eye the human beingsaround us can take the place of frequent travels around the world, inasmuch asthis «strong reflection» guides the observer to the anthropological sources of ac-tions. Secondly, civil intercourse gets the subject acquainted with basic humanmotivations, no matter how plural their expressions may be. Third, plays, novels,history and biography provide a rich collection of remarks from which everyreader can benefit.

To pay attention to the historical sources of Kant’s Anthropology could be toa large extent useful in order to go further in the understanding of the incom-pleteness of these courses, compared to other scientific disciplines. I shall arguethat his Anthropology lectures display an approach to knowledge of the humanbeing that reveals at least an indirect influence from the «experiential Enlighten-ment»53 cultivated by Christian Thomasius’s Court philosophy on the develop-ment of this pragmatic enquiry. The main content that Kant draws from this tra-dition, completely opposed to the scholastic point of view of the Wolffians, wasprudence as a guide for orientating human beings in ordinary public life. I followother Kant scholars – especially Stark and Louden – as I attempt to reassess anewwhat Baumgarten’s empirical psychology supplies to the basic framework forKant’s Anthropology. Scholars interested in Kant’s Anthropology should notundervalue the fact that the tradition of Court Philosophy contributes significant-ly to this new academic discipline. The reception of Thomasius’s distinction be-tween Gelahrtheit, i. e. knowledge yielded by experience, and Gelehrtheit, i. e.

50 V-Anth/Pillau, AA 25.2: 734. See Louden 2011, 73: «It can be put to pragmatic, nonmoral usesas well as to moral ones. A businessman who uses his Weltkenntnis to expand his company’smarket share is using it for pragmatic purposes, but people who use Weltkenntnis in order moreeffectively and intelligently to apply pure moral principles to the human situation are using it formoral purposes».51 V-Anth/Fried, AA 25.1: 471.52 V-Anth/Pillau, AA 25.2: 734.53 I borrow this expression from Wilson 2001, 180.




knowledge gained from scholarly concepts,54 by Kant’s opposition between thescholastic and the cosmopolitan concept of philosophy will be an eloquent ex-ample of this influence. Naturally, one should not deny the fact that the third partof Baumgarten’s Ethics tackled the so-called officia erga alia, which contains acatalogue of social virtues (the decorum), but it is clear that Kant’s point of viewabout the use of these social abilities is nearer to Thomasius’s idea of man. TheGerman scholar argues that with the support of this capacity all humans couldlearn how «to feel satisfaction [complacentia] in common with others (social-ly)»55, as Kant will state later. Far from this cultural tradition, which leads Kant toview the sciences as aids for the moralization process, such a scholar who doesnot know how to contribute to the progress of the moral destination of humanspecies comes up in the Anthropology lectures as a comical figure with an ex-treme worldly disability. The Mrongovius Anthropology Lecture offers up aninteresting anecdote, akin to the rhythm and content of these courses:

The word ‹pedant› originally comes from Latin, for in Italy one called the domestic tutormagistri pedanei. The Italian word pedanto came from this, as one left off the magistro andchanged pedanei into pedanto; hence today the German word Pedant. These people weresupposedly not to be received outside their study rooms; they thus applied only their schoolknowledge when they were in social intercourse and therefore gave people the occasion tocall a person who did know how to conduct himself with human beings a ‹pedant›. A ped-ant can only make a scholastic use of his knowledge because he does not know how toapply it any better and does not know any other use for it.56

As formerly the magister pedaneus, the pedant lives in his «study room», de-prived of any social intercourse and apart from any interest in the world and itspractical features, so that the knowledge that he conveys will be completely use-less for the interests of human beings. In conclusion, a general knowledge ofhuman nature and culture must be presupposed when conveying the scientificpotential of anthropology. Without this background every teacher loses her peda-gogical capacity.

3 ConclusionKant’s Anthropology lectures could be read as a decided tribute to the phenom-enal existence of human beings, which yields up a surprising cooperative dimen-sion in regard to their moral destination. The Announcement of the academic

54 See Thomasius 1691. Cfr. Barnard 1971.55 Anth, AA 07: 244.56 V-Anth/Mron, AA 25.2: 1209.




courses of 1765 declares that Kant’s lectures on anthropology begin with a his-torical and philosophical consideration of «what happens, before specifyingwhat ought to happen»57. Moreover, the study of the human being deals with «theunchanging nature of human beings, and his distinctive position within the cre-ation»58, leaving aside the mutable shapes that they can contingently adopt overthe centuries. As Stark points out:

The relationship between anthropology and moral philosophy is determined by the differ-ence between is and ought: the same behavior can and will be considered from two per-spectives. Anthropology considers the actual behavior, the observable actions. Moral phi-losophy seeks to assess this behavior, these same actions, insofar as it establishes andgrounds criteria for judgment.59

Kant’s portrayal of social behavior assumes the framework of three faculties ac-cording to Baumgarten’s empirical psychology, so that the study of the empiricalcharacter becomes the core topic of the anthropology, while the intelligible char-acter remains the subject of morals.60 Yet to tackle empirical issues does not ex-clude the reconstruction of a certain purpose, decidedly useful for the moral de-velopment of the human species. As the Anthropology Parow lecture notes,«every trait of humanity» should be connected with its source, and the characterof human beings that one presently finds «scattered» in sciences, literature andmoral essays, should be systematically unified61. Despite the multiplicity of cus-toms, temperaments, and practices in different nations and cultures, Kant arguesthat there is more regularity in this complex map of human nature than thereseems to be. The Menschenkunde lecture claims that anthropology discoversrules that will entertain even women at the dressing-table, because «[e]veryhuman being is delighted over a rule»62, and all cultures contribute to the prag-matic normativity, which allows to better comprehend the world, suggesting «aguiding thread where there is apparent disorder»63. A similar remark appears inthe Mrongovius lecture

[A] solid knowledge of the human being interests everyone and provides material for con-versation, even for a woman; as Chremes in Terence says: ‹I am a human being, what relatesto human beings concerns me, too,› for here every human being can examine it; all that is

57 NEV, AA 02: 311.58 Ibid.59 Stark 2003, 24.60 See Munzel 1999.61 V-Anth/Parow, AA 25.1: 244.62 V-Anth/Mensch, AA 25.2: 856.63 V-Anth/Mensch, AA 25.2: 857.




abstract, namely, what one must for the most part examine [only] with great effort, thusdoes not belong here, yet it must not be completely commonplace either.64

The order that anthropology brings to light in human discourses and uses has ahigh interest for human beings, inasmuch as this matter increases our self-know-ledge and teaches us how to arrange our actions in order to enhance the soci-ability with others and to prevail over their intentions65. Kant states that the «sub-jective principles of all sciences»66 belong also to this anthropological scope,insofar as they are means through which teachers and preachers gain influenceover the public. Moreover, although the point of view of anthropological analysisis empirical, the evolution of the lectures leads to character, a perspective whichsuggests taking a wider perspective regarding the materials gathered by the threepreceding faculties, and which supports once more the dependence of these lec-tures from morals:

Characters are nothing other than that which is peculiar to the higher capacities. Indeed, ineach human being there lie the greatest incentives and preparations for every kind of activ-ity, but there also lies a higher principle in him to make use of all the capacities and incen-tives, to sacrifice and to restrain sensations, etc. The constitution of these higher powersmakes up the character. Thus one also says nothing, if one says the word ‹character› to referto a human being’s capacities. [What matters is] how he makes use of them, and what hewills to do.67

Kant’s Anthropology lectures prove that pragmatic normativity is always subjectto moral principles. Yet it is equally true that the progress of anthropologicalknowledge prevents the mistakes resulting from abstraction and shows channelsthat make the application of moral commands easier. It is a matter of fact thatanthropological remarks will never see their incompleteness entirely removed,but perhaps this is precisely the indisputable proof that the boundaries of life arealways broader than those of morals, which precludes an exact correspondencebetween these two realms. Such a correspondence should be rather regarded asimpossible according to Kant’s conception of the human being.

64 V-Anth/Mron, AA 25.2: 1213.65 V-Anth/Pillau, AA 25.2: 734 f.66 Ibid.67 V-Anth/Collins, AA 25.1: 227; cfr. V-Anth/Collins, AA 25.1: 008 and V-Anth/Parow, AA 25.1:244. See also Stark 2003, 28: «In a somewhat pointed manner one could say that the capacity forcharacter is the fourth faculty considered in the anthropology, a fourth element emerging from aconsideration of the foregoing triad».




ReferencesSources

Kant, Immanuel: Lectures on Anthropology. Ed. by A. Wood and R. Louden. New York: CambridgeUniversity Press, 2012.

Thomasius, Christian: Einleitung zur Vernunftlehre. Halle: gedruckt bei Christoph Salfelden,1691.

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Ideas 32, 1971, 221–246.Brandt, R.: «Reflexiones acerca de la prudencia en Kant». In: Isegorıa 30, 2004, 7–40.Cohen, A. A.: «Kant’s Answer to the Question ‹What is Man?› and its Implications for Anthropol-

ogy». In: Studies in History and Philosophy of Science 39, 2008, 506–514.Gregor, M. J.: Laws of Freedom. Oxford: Blackwell, 1963.Jacobs, B. / Kain, P. (eds.): Essays on Kant’s Anthropology. New York: Cambridge University

Press, 2003.Louden, R.: Kant’s Human Being. Essays on His Theory of Human Nature. New York: Oxford Uni-

versity Press, 2011.Louden, R.: Kant’s Impure Ethics. From Rational Beings to Human Beings. New York: Oxford Uni-

versity Press, 2000.Martinelli, R.: «Antropologia». In: L’universo kantiano. Filosofia, scienze, sapere. Ed. by S.

Besoli, C. La Rocca and R. Martinelli. Macerata: Quodlibet, 2010, 13–52.Munzel, G. F.: Kant’s Conception of Moral Character. The ‹Critical› Link of Morality, Anthropology

and Reflective Judgment. Chicago: Chicago University Press, 1999.Paton, H. J.: The Categorical Imperative. Philadelphia: The University of Pennsylvania Press,

1971.Pirillo, N.: «La conoscenza del mondo e la prudenza nelle trascrizioni delle lezioni kantiane di

antropologia». In: Filosofia e storiografia. Vol. 2. Galatina: Congedo, 2008, 299–310.Stark, W.: «Die Formen von Kants akademischer Lehre». In: Deutsche Zeitschrift für Philosophie

40, 1992, 543–562.Stark, W.: «Historical Notes and Interpretive Questions about Kant’s Lectures on Anthropology».

In: Essays on Kant’s Anthropology. Ed. by B. Jacobs and P. P. Kain. Cambridge: CambridgeUniversity Press, 2003, 15–37.

Wilson, H.: «Kantian Experiential Enlightenment and Court Philosophy in 18th Century». In: His-tory of Philosophy Quarterly 18, 2001, 179–205.

Wilson, H.: Kant’s Pragmatic Anthropology. Its Origin, Meaning, and Critical Significance. NewYork: SUNY Press, 2006.

Wood, A.: «Unsocial Sociability. The Anthropological Basis of Kantian Ethics». In: PhilosophicalTopics 19, 1, 1991, 325–351.



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