CHAPTER FOUR

Protestant Reactions to the Nationalism Agenda in Contemporary China

Carsten T. Vala

The Chinese Communist Party-state seeks continued domination over society.1

Like other elite groups trying to impose hegemony, it promotes an ideology of its

own legitimacy to lessen the costs of governance, as David Laitin puts it

(Kindopp 2004; Laitin 1986). According to the regime, this ideology succeeds

among Protestants to the extent that they view all political issues through the lens

of sovereignty and see defending Chinese sovereignty as the most important

political issue of all (Kindopp 2004: 19; Laitin 1986: 29; Metzger 1977: 14).

Among Protestants, sovereignty ranks such a high value because the Chinese

Communist Party (CCP) views Protestants in China with political suspicion.

Protestants have historic (and ongoing) ties to foreign organizations and countries

that in the official historiography have been labeled as “foreign imperialist” (Wu

1963). In fact, in the eyes of the Communist regime, Protestants only became

“fully Chinese” after 1949 when they proclaimed support for the regime-backed

Three Self Patriotic Movement (TSPM) association and cast off links with foreign

missionaries and churches (Vala 2009a). As China has opened to the world in the

reform era, Protestants outside the official churches that are under TSPM

authority continue to be under suspicion, because they remain outside regime

2

control and foster relations with the many foreign groups that have entered the

country to strengthen Chinese Christianity. The Chinese Communist Party-state

therefore propagates a hegemonic agenda to tame Protestants by socializing them

in TSPM churches to be “patriotic,” understood to constitute loyalty to the CCP

leadership. In this chapter, I investigate how Protestants respond to the party-

state’s nationalist agenda by asking how effective are efforts to inculcate party-

state loyalty by the regime and its official Protestant associations, the Three Self

Patriotic Movement and the Christian Council (CC). I begin with a brief note on

the sources of data and then discuss the contingent membership of all religious

believers in the party-state’s definition of the nation. Next, I elaborate on the

regime’s blend of different elements of nationalism (state-led, civic, and cultural)

as they apply to Protestants. These elements provide a schema for matching

Protestant responses to aspects of the regime’s nationalist agenda. After analyzing

the range of responses from leaders in official and unofficial churches and

seminaries, I conclude with discussion of the limited success of the party-state

nationalist agenda.

INTERVIEWING PROTESTANT LEADERS

This chapter draws primarily on interviews I conducted in 2009 and 2010 among

Protestants in “official churches” and unofficial “house” churches. Official

churches are registered with the state and affiliated with the Three Self Patriotic

3

Movement (TSPM) association because they have official authorization and are

staffed by leaders trained (or at least approved) by the TSPM (Vala 2009b). I refer

to them as TSPM leaders and as TSPM or official churches. I also refer to the

Three Self Patriotic Movement and Christian Council associations as the lianghui

(“two committees” or TSPM/CC) because in most areas they work in such close

concert that their attitudes and interaction with the regime are indistinguishable.

Because not all Protestant “house” churches meet in private homes, I use the

broader term “unregistered churches” to encompass congregations that meet in

rented office space and also to emphasize all these churches’ lack of formal state

approval.

The data were collected in 2009 and 2010, when I conducted nearly 40 interviews

in Mandarin Chinese with pastors, provincial and municipal leaders of the “two

committees,” seminary teachers and students in the official churches as well as

with leaders in unregistered churches.2 Because interviewees were developed

through snowball sampling, the data are not meant to be statistically

representative of the Chinese Protestant churches although they do come from a

range of urban areas (cities, provincial capitals, and Beijing) and provinces

(southeastern coastal areas, the central region, and the Northeast). The data

instead are intended to illustrate a variety of Protestant reactions to patriotic

education and state-led nationalism. I focus on Protestant leaders because elites,

according to Antonio Gramsci (1971), are key actors in the process of establishing

hegemony (Gramsci 1971: 135, 145, 150). They enjoy social authority, have

4

greater influence than do non-elites (such as common believers), and, among

Protestants, leaders typically interpret key religious texts through a variety of

activities such as preaching sermons, culminating in their ability to develop the

Gramscian “common sense” that Protestant congregants accept as truth.3 For my

purposes, interviewing current and future Protestant leaders about their attitudes

towards the party-state’s nationalist agenda offers insight into the receptivity of

important grassroots actors among a population that generates anxiety for the

CCP.4

THE CHINESE COMMUNIST PARTY-STATE VIEWS PROTESTANT

LOYALTY AS QUESTIONABLE

The CCP worries about the loyalty of Chinese Protestants for historical and

contemporary reasons. First, Protestant history in China is darkened by

association with “enemy forces” and countries; second, Protestants are arguably

the fastest growing religious population in China today; third, domestic dissidents

and democracy activists abroad have become Protestant; and, fourth, because the

CCP blames Christianity in the collapse of Eastern European Leninist regimes.

Historically, Protestants have been viewed as tainted by historical association

with the “foreign imperialism” of the United States and other Western powers.

Foreign Protestants first entered China in great numbers after the Qing

government was forced to sign “Unequal Treaties” in the mid-nineteenth century

that pried open Chinese ports to Western powers. Then, shortly after the Chinese

5

Communist Party unified the country in 1949, foreign missionaries were expelled

and Protestants and Catholics had to declare loyalty to the regime by joining

“patriotic” religious associations. In the People’s Republic of China under Mao,

only Christians deemed loyal to the CCP were permitted to organize. Protestants

today continue to be contingent members of “the nation,” whose belonging

depends on whether they join the party’s United Front by participating in

churches under the Three Self Patriotic Movement association.

The rapid expansion of Protestant numbers in the reform era further raises

concern among the party-state leadership. By official count, which records only

believers who are 18 years old or older in official churches, the Protestant

population has ballooned ten percent annually from three million in 1982 to

fifteen million by 1999 (Vala 2009b). A recent nationwide survey put the number

of all Protestants at more than 40 million (Horizon 20075), but roughly half of all

believers worship outside official religious venues that are monitored by state

officials (Yang 2006). In addition to increasing numbers, dissidents (such as the

“rights defense” lawyers Xu Zhiyong and Gao Zhisheng who were arrested in

2009 (Jacobs 2009)), former June 4th 1989 democracy activists (Chen 2009), and

growing numbers of intellectuals are also Protestants (Carnes 2006).

Adding to anxieties over rising Protestant numbers and critical voices, CCP

leaders worry about Christian loyalty because churches played a significant role

in the collapse of Leninist regimes in Eastern Europe (Gong 2003: ch. 5, esp. 147-

6

9; Zhao and Zhuang 1997: 552). Social scientists sent by the CCP to study the

downfall of Communist states concluded that Western powers had supported

religious groups to instigate democratic movements (Chan and Carlson 2005: 19;

Gong 2003: 148). Given these perceived threats to Chinese sovereignty, Chinese

Communist Party-state leaders seek to inculcate in Protestants a form of

patriotism that binds them to the nation and solidifies their loyalty to the regime.

THE PARTY-STATE, STATE-LED NATIONALISM, AND RELIGIOUS

BELIEVERS

Protestants, like all religious believers in China, have an ambiguous status with

respect to the “nation,” the content of which the Chinese Communist Party-state

asserts the right to determine (Dunch 2008: 160; Guo 2004: 30). According to the

Constitution, the CCP defines the “nation”6 in secular terms as “the people”

(renmin) who comprise the classes of workers, peasants, and intellectuals (Dunch

2008: 163; Guo 2004: 42). But because the party-state recognizes that many

others within its territorial borders fall outside these categories of “the people,” it

promotes an expanded version of the Chinese nation as “Chinese peoples”

(zhonghua minzu) through the United Front strategy (Townsend 1996: 117).

Participation in the United Front requires that Protestants (like all other religious

believers) accept the party-state definition of the state’s “key task” and its

enemies (Guo 2004: 17; Zhao 1998: 297; Zheng 1999: 89). The regime’s top goal

7

is building a strong, wealthy, sovereign state that is united under party leadership;

foreign threats and internal ethnic disunity constitute important enemies. Hence,

to unite all ethnic groups and gather support behind itself, the regime rejects the

closest Chinese equivalent for the word “nationalism” (minzuzhuyi) for suggesting

narrow and divisive ties to ethnic identities (Zhao 1998: 290). Instead, the party-

state casts nationalism in terms of “love of country” or “patriotism” (aiguozhuyi,

lit. love the country-ism) (Guo 2004: 30). The regime then promotes its own

interests as the interests of the nation so that loyalty directed towards the nation

shifts onto itself (Zhao 1998: 291). This is what Charles Tilly calls a “state-led

nationalism” (Zhao 1998: 290). Religious believers, according to the Chinese

Communist Party-state ideology, join the nation by supporting the leadership of

the party as part of their “love of country” or patriotism (Guo 2004: 42-3).

The Party-state, State-led Nationalism, and Protestants

For Protestants in particular, the Chinese Communist Party-state melds strands of

what He Baogang and Guo Yingjie (2000: 46) have identified as state-led

nationalism, civic consciousness, and cultural nationalism together to create what

I view as the requirements for Protestant membership in the nation.7 This

nationalist agenda becomes clearer by analyzing how speeches by state officials

and “patriotic” textbooks connect nation, citizen, and traditional Chinese culture.

Then-director of State Administration of Religious Affairs (SARA) Ye Xiaowen

8

drew together the strands of CCP state-led nationalism in a speech at the 2008

national lianghui conference. Director Ye put the core issue as to how “Western”

Christian culture will assimilate into Chinese culture, an ancient, “uninterrupted”

civilization (Ye 2008). This question is crucial because in the past Christianity

had been a “tool of invasion controlled and used by imperialism and colonialism”

(Ye 2008). It was the party that had delivered Chinese believers from this ugly

past, but calling on religious believers to love the (atheist) party would be a hard

sell. Therefore Ye called on Chinese believers to look to the guo, the nation or

state, as a kind of savior, or, putting it in Ye’s words, that “patriotism” is the

foundation for “Chinese peoples (zhonghua minzu)” to “stand tall” in the world.

More than a source of political salvation or ethnic pride, patriotism, according to

Ye, acts as the “spiritual force” of Chinese civilization (Ye 2008). For Chinese

Protestants to be welcomed by the Chinese peoples they must align themselves

with the socialist system and “assimilat[e] into Chinese cultural traditions” (Ye

2008).8 The strands of cultural adaptation, loyalty to the state (and hence the

party), and civic participation in the socialist state come together for Protestants in

this version of “patriotism.”9

To flesh out this sketch of Protestant patriotism, it helps to turn to the first-ever

nationwide patriotic education textbook for Protestants, which was published in

2006. The Protestant Patriotic Curriculum (Trial Edition) is now required for use

in all official Protestant seminaries (Zhongguo Jidujiao Sanzi Aiguo Yundong

2006). The text argues that “everyone must love their country (guo),” implicitly

9

making patriotism more “fundamental” than religious faith, which is a choice

(Zhongguo Jidujiao Sanzi Aiguo Yundong 2006: 2). An individual’s attachment

to country is therefore so basic that it doesn’t depend on the type of regime,

continues the text, so one must support whichever regime governs the country in

which one lives. Further, the nation-state, despite its being a “product of

humankind,” has a “sacred nature” bestowed on it by the Bible (Zhongguo

Jidujiao Sanzi Aiguo Yundong 2006: 14). Because it is linked with a “specific

social system” and therefore a “particular” nation-state, patriotism for Chinese

Protestants means “loving the People’s Republic of China and the socialist

system” (Zhongguo Jidujiao Sanzi Aiguo Yundong 2006: 2). In short, Protestants

must love the state and implicitly support its rulers, the party.

Second, the Protestant Patriotic Curriculum promotes regime loyalty in terms of

a CCP form of civic consciousness. It reminds readers that after the 1996-1997

national conference the lianghui put forth the slogan “a good Protestant must be a

good citizen” (Zhongguo Jidujiao Sanzi Aiguo Yundong 2006: 439). A good

Protestant takes “patriotic” obedience to laws and regulations as the “standard of

all behavior,” rather than Biblical norms (Zhongguo Jidujiao Sanzi Aiguo

Yundong 2006: 439). Further, a Protestant must do nothing that violates “the

country [and] its laws, regulations, [or] policies, as well as rules, institutions, and

social conventions,” always keeping the “interests and benefits of the nation-state

and collective” above those of the individual (Zhongguo Jidujiao Sanzi Aiguo

Yundong 2006: 439). By becoming part of “the people” (renmin), the “sacred

10

mission” of Protestants becomes “protecting the unity of the motherland,” the

“site of our…unceasing prosperity” and “sacred earth given to us by God,”

against “foreign enemy forces” seeking to “destroy the socialist motherland”

(Zhongguo Jidujiao Sanzi Aiguo Yundong 2006: 439-41). In short, because the

Chinese Communist Party claims that benefiting the people is its “basis” and

“source of power,” then Protestants should “sacrifice” for “the people’s benefits

and interests” and support party leadership to protect the country (Zhongguo

Jidujiao Sanzi Aiguo Yundong 2006: 439-41).

Finally, in terms of cultural nationalism, the textbook teaches that Protestant

theology needs to “integrate” with traditional Chinese culture. Such integration

involves recognizing that Chinese scholars from the era of the Hundred Schools

of Thought to the time of the Confucian classics have embraced a “nationalist

spirit” in seeking principles to realize “new societies” (Zhongguo Jidujiao Sanzi

Aiguo Yundong 2006: 399.) To help build a “brilliant Chinese civilization” now,

Protestant Christianity should build on the inheritance of cultural values of

“forbearance, justice, propriety, wisdom, faith, unity of heaven and man” to

develop a “reconciled” theology that is “harmonious” with Chinese society and

culture (Zhongguo Jidujiao Sanzi Aiguo Yundong 2006: 399, 400). Chinese

culture has been the “power” of China’s “non-stop prosperity” and a “spiritual

source” for ethnic unity (Zhongguo Jidujiao Sanzi Aiguo Yundong 2006: 398,

399). Chinese culture in turn “shows care for the spirit of nationalism of the

country, people, and society” and puts “the people (renmin) of the country at its

11

center” (Zhongguo Jidujiao Sanzi Aiguo Yundong et al. 2006: 399). The circle is

therefore complete: as “patriotic” Protestant theology should draw upon

traditional cultural values to “fit” China’s socialist conditions, it will take on the

focus of “the people”, whose representative is the CCP. In the official seminaries,

lianghui leaders have introduced Theological Construction to continually “adjust

[theology] to the times” (Zhongguo Jidujiao Sanzi Aiguo Yundong 2006: 430-1).

To reduce this complicated argument, in the following sections I look for

expressions of state-led nationalism, civic consciousness, or cultural nationalism

to assess the degree to which the party-state agenda has taken hold (He and Guo

2000: 46). We will see whether Protestant leaders express:

1. support for party leadership and condemnation of religious infiltration,

as evidence of state-led nationalism;

2. support for obeying laws and regulations in terms of good citizenship,

as evidence of civic consciousness; and

3. support for adaptation of Christianity that puts traditional cultural

values of assimilation above historic Protestant doctrine (such as

justification by faith alone), as evidence of cultural nationalism.

Before turning to the interview data, I offer several hypotheses about the

differences between attitudes of leaders in official churches and seminaries and

attitudes of leaders in unregistered churches. If the regime’s agenda has taken

12

hold, I expect that leaders in the official churches will express stronger support for

various pro-party elements of the agenda than unregistered church leaders do.

Second, related to the first hypothesis, presidents of official seminaries, as the

putative leaders of institutions training the future pastors for official churches,

should be even more supportive than TSPM pastors of the nationalism agenda.

Third, I expect unregistered church leaders to be least supportive of the agenda,

especially if they lead churches that have endured heavy state pressure to be

shuttered.

STATE-LED NATIONALISM: PATRIOTISM AS “LOVE OF PARTY”

Does patriotism (aiguozhuyi, lit. love of country-ism) connote love of party, in

Protestant eyes? According to most scholars of nationalism in China, the Chinese

Communist Party’s promotion of patriotism includes “love of party” or of the

New China (Guo 2004: 30; Townsend 1996: 117; Zhao 1998: 290; Zheng 1999:

93).10 As He Baogang and Guo Yingjie (2000: 34-6) have argued, the Chinese

term for “country” (guojia, lit. country-home) is so broad that it connotes land,

nation, and state as well as government and the Chinese Communist Party also.

The editor of The Protestant Patriotic Curriculum confirmed this etymological

understanding (Interview, Nanjing, September 2010). According to this view,

being patriotic means attachment to all these entities, including support for the

party.

13

Those who have experienced heavy state pressure echoed this identity between

love of country and love of party. A TSPM teacher who had been jailed for

several days said that “the nation and country should represent ‘guojia’” but “in

[officials’] eyes, if you don’t love the party…you don’t love your ‘guojia’.”

(Interview, June 2009) Protestant leaders in the unregistered churches also

criticized the party’s claim that the meaning of the “country” equaled the ruling

party. As one leader in Wuhan put it, the “(guojia) and ruling party is the same

thing. There’s no difference. If we are ‘patriotic’ (aiguo) then that includes

‘loving the party’ (aidang)…they control the country so if we are ‘patriotic’

(aiguo) [they think that] we must love them too.” Or, as another Beijing

unregistered church leader explained, “[they say that] to be a Chinese person

under the leadership of the Communist Party, you must love the party that is

currently ruling” (Interview, Beijing, July 2009).

Although most interviewees in the official churches privately rejected an identity

of patriotism with love of party, a few Protestant leaders enthusiastically promote

the party-state agenda. Such leaders rise rapidly into the upper ranks of the

official Protestant associations or party-state. For example, in Harbin, the

municipal leaders of the TSPM and CC repeated the party-state line that

Protestant Christianity’s main challenge “comes from the outside” in that overseas

organizations are backing “underground religious forces” that “make being

patriotic and loving God oppositional” rather than a “natural thing.” (Interview,

Harbin, July 2009) Echoing the CCP’s formulation of patriotism, this husband-

14

and-wife couple have not only secured the top two positions in both the Harbin

municipal TSPM association and Harbin Christian Council, they have also

cemented their power by appointments as a vice president of the national China

Christian Council and a National People’s Congress representative, respectively

(Fang 2010).

Other Protestant leaders in the official churches appear to support the party-state

agenda but only because lianghui and CCP policies demand that they do so. In

their views, the multiple understandings of guo mean that support for patriotism

includes support for the party. In interviews, principals at a major regional

seminary and a smaller provincial seminary at points suggested that the concept

“country” (guojia) conflates the ruling party, political system, land, society, and

everything else contained within the borders of the People’s Republic. The head

of one regional seminary put it colorfully,

“To love the country means to love everything in the country, including the [political] system. It’s like the evening news; it has weather, economics, politics, society, religion. The country includes religion… So to love the country means we should love and protect (aihu) and support the government.” (Interview, Wuhan, June 2009)11

Less directly, a provincial seminary principal, despite dismissing the idea

that patriotism meant loving the party, made inadvertent comments that suggested

that the broadness of the “country” concept included the party, too. He explained

that the slogan “uniting China through a national (country) consciousness (guojia

15

de yishi)” really meant that “the Communist Party unites China.” (Interview, June

2009) Even so, he still refrained from expressing unqualified support by saying

that, in dealing with disagreements with the party-state, “Jesus didn’t teach

‘oppose the government,’ [rather] he said, ‘be as cunning as serpents, innocent as

doves.’” Therefore, declarations by lianghui leaders about “warmly loving the

country, warmly loving the socialist system,” he explained, “are just routine

sayings….a stand…[that] doesn’t really have any meaning.” Instead, the seminary

leaders craft strategies to suit the problems they face without confronting the

party-state head-on.

CIVIC CONSCIOUSNESS: PATRIOTISM AS GOOD CITIZENSHIP FOR

BOTH TSPM AND NON-TSPM

Pastors inside and outside the official Protestant structures expressed broad

agreement in their views that patriotism connotes being good citizens, a second

aspect of the nationalist agenda. Although the party-state and national “patriotic”

textbook set the standard for devout Protestant behavior as obeying all rules and

regulations, Protestant leaders themselves expressed more complex attitudes that

weighed church interests and their interpretation of Biblical principles. For

pastors and seminary teachers in the lianghui churches and schools, attitudes

toward civic consciousness ranged from pragmatic to what I call “conditional and

diminutive” perspectives. Pragmatists equated patriotism with good citizenship or

16

obeying laws and regulations because such agreement was like the ticket price to

enter into further work in the official structures. Teachers and principals in the

official seminaries expressed similar perspectives, referring to church interests as

the justification for uttering patriotic statements, rather than that being “patriotic”

was worthwhile for its own sake. As one provincial seminary vice principal put it,

“a person’s citizenship is most important, because if you don’t have citizenship

you can’t do anything else” and “So we still need to be patriotic, or else there is

no way for the church to develop.” (Interview, Changsha, June 2009)

But more frequently pastors and seminary students discussed good citizenship or

obedience of the law as conditional and diminutive. Conditionality required that

following rules and regulations not violate what they considered to be core tenets

of the faith. Diminution meant that being a good citizen is a weaker version of the

far stricter standards of the Bible. Conditional, diminutive expressions of

Protestant patriotism-as-citizenship were nearly indistinguishable between leaders

in the official churches and seminaries and their counterparts in the unofficial

structures.

According to a Beijing TSPM seminary student, “Of course I must obey national

laws and regulations, but as soon as it violates my faith, then I can no longer

obey.” (Interview, Beijing, July 2009) Similarly, a Shenzhen unregistered church

leader claimed, “[we Protestants shouldn’t] be managed by the government, but

being restrained by laws and regulations is needed.” (Interview, Shenzhen, June

17

2009) An unregistered church leader in Wuhan agreed, “we must respect the

government, and observe some of their rules, respect them when we talk to them,

but we shouldn’t totally obey them.” (Interview, Wuhan, July 2009) Another

unregistered Beijing preacher explained, “A good citizen will not go beyond the

bounds of the laws and regulations…[But] if you followed all these regulations,

then the Christian gospel would not have spread so widely, because the

regulations on public order restrict evangelism. Christians have the life of God,

and so we do not have to obey. Because we live for God so we can violate them.”

(Interview, Beijing, July 2009)

Such ideas reflect the widespread conviction among many adherents in TSPM and

non-TSPM circles that religious injunctions supersede policies, rules, and

regulations. For these Protestants, patriotism-as-citizenship reflects more stringent

and authoritative demands that God places on them such that good citizenship is a

diminution of devout faith. Two aspects of this diminutive view are shared by

Protestant leaders in both non-TSPM and TSPM settings: first, Protestants should

be good citizens as a way of demonstrating a moral lifestyle to others; second,

Protestants should be good citizens because the civic standards are far less

demanding than the standards required by God.

Viewing good citizenship as a demonstration of a virtuous way of life, one

Protestant recalled his work as a TSPM pastor in a small Hubei city where he

rarely discussed “patriotic” slogans like “loving one’s country (or “being

18

patriotic”) and loving one’s faith (aiguo aijiao).” (Interview, Beijing, July 2009)

Rather, he said, he preached about “being a Christian, being an example of a good

citizen. Because the Bible says in Acts, chapter 6, it gives seven words, the first is

to have a good reputation….not just in the church but in every area of life, in

society, so [that everyone] acknowledges you’re a good person.” Similarly, a

Beijing unregistered church preacher, when asked about differences between

being a good Christian and being a good citizen, answered, “in terms of virtue

there’s no conflict at all.” (Interview, Beijing, July 2009) Good citizenship is

simply a way to express one’s faith through behavior that promotes Christianity

among non-believers.

Both leaders in the official churches and in the unregistered churches also shared

the view that good citizenship was a weaker requirement compared to the

demands of being a Christian. A TSPM assistant pastor in northeastern

Changchun explained that “Being patriotic is just loving this country, obeying

laws and regulations…So what [a Protestant] obeys isn’t this country’s laws, what

he obeys is God’s will and his principles. God’s words surpass all laws and

regulations.” (Interview, Changchun, July 2009) A preacher in Beijing for an

unregistered church put it succinctly that “following God’s laws is far stricter than

following man’s laws” so that “what you do should be better than what a common

citizen does.” (Interview, Beijing, July 2009)

19

When analyzed from the perspective of civic consciousness, the Chinese

Communist Party-state’s nationalist agenda appears to have faltered. To be sure,

Protestant leaders in both official and unofficial structures accept the regime view

of citizenship as obeying laws and regulations and that Protestants should be good

citizens. But, on the other hand, Protestants believe that civic duties do not loosen

the strictures imposed by Christian faith. Even when official seminary leaders

express attitudes that appear to validate citizenship as a restraint on Protestant

behavior (implying that being a good citizen enables Protestants in official venues

to escape worse restrictions), they qualify such expressions as required utterances

to satisfy party-state requirements and continue Protestant work. More commonly,

Protestants inside and outside the official churches and seminaries share what I

call a “contingent and diminutive” civic view that obeying laws and regulations is

important, subject to three conditions: first, such obedience is contingent upon

these laws not conflicting with their understandings of the requirements of

Christian faith; second, good citizenship is important because it demonstrates the

morality and virtue of a Christian’s life as an instrument of evangelism; and third,

good citizenship reflects a less stringent standard of behavior than the more

demanding religious strictures of the Bible.

CULTURAL NATIONALISM: PATRIOTISM AS THEOLOGICAL

CONSTRUCTION VS. LOVING INDIVIDUALS

20

The third, cultural aspect of the nationalist agenda can be derived from the

varying Protestant reactions to party secretary Jiang Zemin’s 1993 call on

believers to “adapt religion to socialist society.” (Jiang 2003) Jiang called on

religious circles to reform doctrines that “don’t fit with socialist society” and

“utilize…positive doctrines to serve socialism.” (Jiang 2003: 255) In response,

Bishop Ding Guangxun launched Theological Construction (shenxue sixiang

jianshe) in the late 1990s to promote theological change through the official

Protestant associations and churches. (Interview, Harbin, November 2002; Dunch

2008) Almost immediately, all but a small minority of Protestants in the pulpit

and the pews rejected Ding’s ideas about weakening the Protestant doctrine of

“justification by faith.” (Kindopp 2004: ch. 7) Eventually, many TSPM leaders

used Theological Construction to correct fundamentalist theology, promote love

as the core of Christian teaching, and direct Protestant energies to doing social

work. (Interview, Beijing, September 2010; Interview, Changsha, August 2010) A

third group, Protestants in the unregistered churches, has taken Ding’s push to

weaken “justification by faith” and teach “God is love” to represent the goal of

Theological Construction: distorting what most Chinese Protestants would

recognize as orthodox theology.

At the extreme, only one TSPM association leader from my sample supported

Theological Construction by de-emphasizing justification by faith as the sole

criterion for being Christian. He stressed the importance of “good behavior” and

switched the starting point for theological thinking from the Bible to the societal

21

context. As the Harbin municipal lianghui leader asked, “In China, what kind of

church should we have? In Chinese society, what form should the Chinese church

take?” because the goal is that “non-believers have a good impression of

Christianity.” (Interview, Harbin, July 2009) His emphasis on contextualization

leads to a theology grounded neither in the Bible nor in moralistic views widely

held in official churches. Instead, his theology seeks universal approval by all in

society, because, the Harbin lianghui leader maintained, “it’s not necessary to say

who’s right and who’s wrong. You can think your thoughts, he can think this way,

I can think that way…and [we can] discuss what kind of thinking…that everyone

can accept.” (Interview, Harbin, July 2009) For such lianghui leaders, a cultural

transformation of Protestant principles into socially acceptable content is as

important as defending Chinese Christianity from what he called

“overseas…religious organizations [that]…support…underground religious

forces.” (Interview, Harbin, July 2009)

For other lianghui leaders, Theological Construction is a “cover” to carry out

theological changes that weaken fundamentalist understandings, substitute more

liberal theology, and promote a range of ideas on how Protestants can contribute

to society. (Dunch 2008: 172; Interview, Changsha, June 2009; Interview,

Chenzhou, June 2009). The vice chairman of the national TSPM committee

explained that fundamentalists believe that “getting rich [is] sinful” whereas in his

view “this is related to Chinese culture. You must preserve a balance [between

having wealth and being too attached to it].” (Interview, Nanjing, September

22

2010) Others insist that only one method of baptism (either sprinkling or

immersion) is efficacious. In Hunan Province, such True Jesus Church theology is

so influential that Protestants think that a believer who worships on Sundays,

doesn’t speak in tongues, or is baptized by someone who later commits a major

sin, is no longer “saved.” (Interview, Changsha, June 2009) Hence, the Hunan

Provincial Seminary principal (who is also the Provincial Christian Council

president) views Theological Construction as an opportunity to sweep away such

sectarian beliefs for the moderate idea that “What is important is whether in your

heart you believe in God” and to teach about social issues like the environment

and Protestant responsibility to society. (Interview, Changsha, June 2009;

Interview, Wuhan, July 2009) TSPM leaders in Hubei Province hosted

Theological Construction seminars to discuss techniques for better pastoral

management. (Interview, Beijing, July 2009) At the same time, Protestant leaders

are mindful that Theological Construction originated as a political movement to

“get along well with the government.” (Interview, June 2009) As one provincial

seminary vice principal illustrated, “The government first meant to strike us,

requiring us to do theological construction. But we’re turning it around to strike

the government… It’s like Chinese Taiqi…using others’ strength to hit [back].”

(Interview)

For Protestants outside the lianghui structures of churches and seminaries, any

state-backed attempt to alter theology weakens Christianity. Neglecting the intent

of some lianghui leaders to use it to correct theology, they refer to Ding’s original

23

ideas and point to extreme cases, such as when Harbin’s lianghui leaders advocate

popular agreement over Biblical standards to set church theology, as evidence for

how Theological Construction destroys historic Christian faith by weakening

doctrines like “justification by faith.” As Ryan Dunch summarizes in his own

analysis, Theological Construction may meet a pressing need but “has

produced…Christian theology…out of step with the faith held by most Chinese

Protestants…[leaving it] open to the criticisms of being too liberal, too political,

too accommodationist.” (Dunch 2008: 178)

Most unregistered Protestant interviewees went beyond rejecting Theological

Construction to suggest an alternative formulation of patriotism in place of the

regime’s “patriotic” allegiance to an abstract nation that is defined and

manipulated by the CCP. Unregistered leaders from the southeast coast to

northern China resisted the CCP’s nationalist formulation of allegiance to an

abstract “people” (renmin) and instead proposed reframing patriotism as concrete

service to specific individuals in one’s life. As a leader of an unregistered church

in Shenzhen put it, “I just [try to] persuade people [who claim] they are very

patriotic but…don’t even see very practical problems around them. They just say

very abstractly that they love an abstract nation-state. I teach them, ‘You want to

be patriotic? Love those around you; only by doing so can you really love the

country.’ Because individuals make up the nation (or country, guojia).”

(Interview, Shenzhen, June 2009) Or, as a former TSPM pastor now in charge of

a large unregistered Beijing church put it, “…what’s more important than being

24

patriotic is to love people… [because a] ‘people’ (renmin) without a person

doesn’t exist. When we love each individual then we can realize that we love ‘the

people’.” (Interview, Beijing, July 2009)

For these unregistered leaders, patriotism as loyalty to an abstract “country” is

less important than patriotism as helping real people with pragmatic, daily

struggles. In this way, care for individuals translates into a love of country. Even

some teachers in TSPM seminaries agree, as one who had been jailed for helping

foreign Christians said, “the party says if you don’t love the party, you don’t love

‘the country’…But I teach students that…‘we love the people, [which] means [to]

love ‘the country’…” As he claims, “It’s possible to be patriotic and not love the

[party-]state.” (Interview, July 2009) For still other unregistered church leaders,

the issue is that love for individuals in need supersedes concern for the political

system, as another Beijing unregistered church preacher emphasized, “A real

Christian should love his country. He should love this family. But the scope is

even larger. He should love people. [The concept of] ‘people’ (ren) is bigger than

the country (guojia) or nations (minzu).” (Interview, Beijing, July 2009)

Recognizing the political goals behind the nationalist agenda, unregistered church

leaders with experience in official churches reject the regime slogans to “love

one’s country, love one’s faith (aiguo aijiao)” as too politicized, because they

distort the focus of Protestant work and blur important differences between the

people as citizens who make up the nation and the people as CCP leaders who

rule.

25

A Wuhan unregistered leader criticized the aiguo aijiao slogan because it made

“‘loving one’s country’…more important than ‘loving one’s faith’.” He said that

further evidence that the TSPM was “too…political” is that Three Self leaders

“sing the national song at meetings,” which violates his principle that religious

gatherings should be free of political content. (Interview, Wuhan, July 2009) At

the same time, the other half of the slogan, “lov[ing] [one’s] faith,” continued the

leader, was so meaningless that TSPM leaders focused on the wrong things, such

as TSPM organizational needs, rather than “caring for society.” (Interview,

Wuhan, July 2009) Ignoring the substantial social service work by many official

churches, he sees organizational needs directing TSPM’s energies toward outward

projects like new church construction rather than on less visible activities like

evangelism. The result, according to this unregistered leader, is that official

Protestant associations were “almost locking people up inside the [official]

churches.” (Interview, Wuhan, July 2009) Patriotism, he continued, really meant

that “we [Protestants in unregistered churches] must warmly love this land, [and]

warmly love the people on this land, [and] when we warmly love the people on

this land we need to do some things for them.” He insisted that such concern for

others “must be separated from politics” and that means that “we should

differentiate between [serving] the people (renmin) of this country and [pleasing]

the leaders of the ruling party.”

26

A former TSPM pastor in Beijing who now leads a large unregistered church

carried the analysis to its logical conclusion, explaining that “For thousands of

years, [in] China, collectivism has been used emptily as an abstract ‘people’ to

push many people around without…remorse. If [the CCP] doesn’t respect you as

an individual [they] can callously push…people [around, and] without blinking an

eye call it the people’s interests. [But] without persons where are ‘the people’?”

(Interview, Beijing, July 2009) For such a Protestant who formerly worked inside

the state structures but now leads an unregistered congregations, he views the

party as brandishing abstract concepts of “nation” or “people” as tools to

manipulate citizens. The party’s political values are replacing the people’s lost

sense of morality, he continued, in a voice rising in anger,

“When a nation (minzu) loses its heart and soul it’s frightening…day after day [the party-state is] talking about patriotism, receiving patriotic education, and [that] only when the country’s interests are served is something correct, and anything that doesn’t serve the national interest is from the enemy. This kind of logic is very frightening. Christians cannot support this kind of thinking.” (Interview, Beijing, July 2009)

In sum, Protestants outside official churches substitute an immediate, tangible

version of patriotism-as-concrete-service for the Chinese Communist Party’s

loyalty to an abstract “nation” or “country.”

THREE IMPLICATIONS OF PROTESTANT REACTIONS TO THE PARTY-

STATE NATIONALIST AGENDA

27

Pastors in the official churches were expected to express stronger support for love

of the Chinese Communist Party than leaders in unregistered churches, and

principals of official seminaries were expected to express even stronger

expressions of pro-party support. As we have seen, this support, as several

scholars have argued, partly comes from the multiple connotations of the term

“country” (guo). (He and Guo 2000: 34-6) Not surprisingly, church leaders

outside the official churches identified the patriotic agenda with love of the party.

And, certainly, for a few lianghui leaders, unqualified support for the regime does

blend easily with Protestant faith.12 But more commonly official church or

seminary leaders expressed support for the party or state through routine and

superficial formulations that did not indicate Protestant interests were subordinate

to the regime agenda.

Still, routinely repeated, public professions of party support by official leaders

helps perpetuate among official churchgoers the idea that Protestant churches

worship freely under a hegemonic party-state.13 Therefore, the first implication of

this analysis is that because leaders in the Protestant associational structures

express support (however perfunctorily) for the regime, they are also tied to the

fate of the party-state. This also means that the TSPM and CC associations

become implicated in broader regime goals as well, such as to preserve political

stability, because they are the only authorized, widespread, and public Protestant

organizations recognized by the regime.14 Evidence of this responsibility is that

28

seminary principals are focusing on how to avoid authoritarian church leaders by

“democratiz[ing]” church management through collective leadership structures

with accountability systems.15 Official Protestant leaders have long been

responsible for educating religious staff about religion policies that seek to allow

“normal” religious activities that do not harm public order. Although Protestant

leaders may hedge their expressions of party support with qualifications cited

from Biblical scriptures, because TSPM pastors regularly conduct activities under

party-state purview, it means that Protestants in official churches may well view

lianghui structures and official churches as discredited when the regime collapses.

In terms of civic consciousness, agreement among Protestant leaders inside and

outside official structures appears to signal failure of the party-state agenda.

Although most interviewees judged observance of laws and regulations as

important, the motivation for their law-abiding behavior comes from a common

religious understanding, not from the party-state’s promotion of shared political

interests. Three consequences result from prioritizing religious teaching over

political decree. First, Protestant leaders view being a good citizen as contingent

on whether the rules and ordinances “violate faith.” Protestants see less or more

evidence of violations depending on whether they work inside or outside official

churches. Second, good citizenship is valued as a way to demonstrate the morality

of a Christian lifestyle, especially because living virtuously is a channel for

proselytizing non-believers in a restrictive authoritarian setting. Third, good

citizenship is also perceived as a weaker version of the much stricter standards

29

imposed by Biblical scriptures. Both official and unofficial Protestant leaders

insist that they would not obey rules and ordinances that contradict their faith but

they draw different lines as to when requirements for church registration,

prohibitions on preaching in public, and TSPM approval of church leaders

constitute violations. Regardless of where the specific lines are drawn, at the most

basic level, as greater numbers of Chinese become Protestants, the believers will

also likely become better citizens. As long as regulations do not violate Biblical

principles, Protestants on both sides of official church boundaries will continue to

teach obedience to the state.16

Lastly, the cultural dimension of the nationalist agenda comprises, first, the

varying Protestant responses to the effort of Theological Construction to “adapt

religion to socialist society” and, second, unregistered church leaders’ counter-

framing of patriotism in terms of concrete service to individuals. Unregistered

church leaders have taken the initial Theological Construction topics of

weakening “justification by faith” as characteristic of the whole reform agenda,

whereas official church and seminary leaders now employ Theological

Construction for goals ranging from broadening narrow fundamentalist stances to

encouraging Protestant engagement in social service.

Most strikingly, however, unregistered church leaders across the country interpret

patriotism in terms of care for people rather than loyalty to the regime. In this

version of patriotism, Protestants best demonstrate their love of country by

30

attending to real needs of individual persons, rather than by proclaiming

allegiance to an abstract “people” (renmin) defined by the CCP. This view of

patriotism-as-particularistic-service ties into activities that most unregistered

church leaders see as fundamental to being a Christian. As one young preacher in

Beijing explained above, “A real Christian should love his country…But the

scope is even larger, he should love people. [The concept] ren is bigger than the

country or nations.” She continued, “So we can love the Tibetans, and do

missions there. Why? Because we love them.” (Interview, Beijing, July 2009)

This perspective defines love for country as love for individuals, not a collective,

abstract “people” (renmin) whose content is filled by the Chinese Communist

Party and whose interests the CCP claims to represent. Love for people is love for

individuals who comprise the “nation,” such that even when specific activities

(such as spreading Protestant faith among Tibetans) violate state regulations (on

where evangelism may occur and who may engage in it), such activities remain

the highest aspirations of a Protestant believer. For most Protestants within and

outside official structures, religious teachings, albeit interpreted more or less

strictly, trump political considerations in issues of patriotism.

A third implication is that the CCP “patriotic” agenda has been least successful in

its most ambitious aspect of cultural transformation of Christianity to “adapt to

socialist society.” Most official church pastors and seminary leaders reject

Theological Construction as a tool to weaken core doctrines while unregistered

church leaders question the party-state’s entire framework for nationalism. This

31

grassroots resistance suggests that the regime’s “patriotic” agenda is triggering an

equally strong backlash that means Protestants are less likely to accept the party-

state’s nationalist agenda now than before the effort to assimilate Christianity.

Therefore, the party-state’s patriotic agenda of state-led nationalism appears to

enjoy partial resonance rather than success. The regime has offered good

citizenship as a way for Protestants to formulate their understanding of patriotism.

Protestants have embraced it, even as they have put forward their own theological

underpinnings for being good citizens. The party-state has been less successful in

altering or filling the particular content of patriotism to lead many Protestants,

inside or outside official structures, to proclaim anything suggesting a “love of

party,” even if, etymologically, the “country” connotes the party, too. Protestants

outside the official churches offer a counter-hegemonic option in seeing

patriotism as concrete, particularistic aid to individuals, building on a strong,

evangelical Biblical foundation. Rather than being divided by the regime agenda,

Protestants inside and outside the official churches share a mostly conservative,

evangelical approach to the Biblical scriptures that strengthens a common

Protestant identity over against the party-state’s state-led nationalism. The Bible

and the historical traditions of the Chinese church provide rich resources to resist

the regime’s hegemony by reminding Protestants who they are. Patriotism, or

nationalism, for many Chinese Protestants therefore involves an allegiance to

regime that is subordinate to a higher loyalty to God.

32

Bibliography Carnes, T. (2006) “China’s New Legal Eagles,” Christianity Today. Online. Available HTTP: <http://www.christianitytoday.com/ct/2006/september/39.106.html> (accessed 22 October 2011). Chan, K.-K. and Carlson, E. (2005) Religious Freedom in China: Policy, Administration, and Regulation, Santa Barbara, CA: Institute for the Study of American Religion. Cheek, T. (1998) “From Market to Democracy in China: Gaps in the Civil Society Model,” in J. Lindau and T. Cheek (eds.) Market Economics and Political Change: Comparing China and Mexico, Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers. Chen, D.W. (2009) “How the Family of a Dissident Fled China,” New York Times (9 May 2009). Online. Available HTTP: <http://www.nytimes.com/2009/05/10/world/asia/10dissident.html> (Accessed 28 August 2009). Dunch, R. (2008) “Christianity and “Adaptation to Socialism,” in Yang, M.Y. (ed.) Chinese Religiosities, Afflictions of Modernity and State Formation. Berkeley, CA: University of California. Fang, Y. (2010) “The Second Plenum of this National Lianghui Committee Opens in Shanghai,” 9 April 2010. Online. Available HTTP: <http://www.ccctspm.org/news/ccctspm/2010/49/1049661.html> (Accessed 30 November 2010). Gong, X. (2003) Shehuizhuyi yu Zongjiao [Socialism and Religion], Beijing: Zongjiao Wenhua Chubanshe. Gries, P.H. (2004) China's New Nationalism, Pride, Politics, and Diplomacy, Berkeley, CA: University of California. Guo, Y. (2004) Cultural Nationalism in Contemporary China, The Search for National Identity under Reform, New York: RoutledgeCurzon.

He, B. and Guo, Y. (2000) Nationalism, National Identity, and Democratization in China, Brookfield, VT: Ashgate. Gramsci, A. (1971; 1999) Selections from the Prison Notebooks of Antonio Gramsci, trans. by Hoare, Q. and Howell-Smith, G. (eds.). London: Lawrence & Wishart. Horizon Research. (2007) Horizon Life Satisfaction Survey. Jacobs, A. (2009) “Arrest in China Rattles Backers of Legal Rights,” New York Times (9

33

August 2009). Online. Available HTTP: <http://www.nytimes.com/2009/08/10/world/asia/10rights.html> (accessed 28 August 2009). Jiang, Z. (2003) “Gaodu Zhongshi Minzu Zongjiao Gongzuo, [Greatly Stress Ethnic Minority and Religious Work (November 7, 1993)],” in Central Party Committee and the State Council Religious Affairs Bureau (eds.) Selections of Documents From Religious Work in the New Era, Beijing: Zongjiao Wenhua Chubanshe. Kindopp, J. (2004) “The Politics of Protestantism in Contemporary China: State Control, Civil Society, and Social Movement in a Single Party-State,” unpublished PhD thesis, George Washington University. Laitin, D. (1986) Hegemony and Culture, Politics and Religious Change Among the Yoruba, University of Chicago Press. Metzger, T. (1977) Escape from Predicament, New York: Columbia Press. Moll, R. (2008). “Great Leap Forward, China is Changing and So Is Its Church. How New Believers Are Shaping Society in Untold Ways,” Christianity Today. (19 May 2008). Available HTTP: <http://www.christianitytoday.com/ct/2008/May/19.22.html> (accessed 23 May 2008). No author. (2009) “Second Plenum of the Eleventh National People’s Congress, List of National People’s Congress representatives for Heilongjiang Province.” Online. (9 March 2009). Available HTTP: <http://www.npc.gov.cn/huiyi/dbdh/11_2/gdbtzy/2009-03/02/content_1480313.htm> (accessed 30 November 2010). Research Group of Institute of World Religions, CASS. (2010) “Zhongguo Jidujiao Ruhu Wenjuan Diaocha Baogao [An In-House Questionnaire Survey on Christianity in China],” In Zhongguo Zongjiao Baogao (2010) [Annual Report on China’s Religions (2010)], Beijing: Shehuikexue Wenxian Chubanshe. Stark, R., Johnson, B. and Mencken, C. (2011) “Counting China’s Christians,” First Things website. (June 2011). Online. Available HTTP: <http://www.firstthings.com/print/article/2011/05/counting-chinarsquos-christians> (accessed 18 June 2011).

Townsend, J. (1996) “Chinese Nationalism,” In Unger, J. (ed.) Chinese Nationalism, Armonk, NY: ME Sharpe. Vala, C.T. (2009a) “Monopolizing Protestantism through Church Leadership, 1949-1958,” Presentation at American Society of Church History Annual Conference, New York City.

34

----------. (2009b) “Pathways to the Pulpit, Leadership Training in “Patriotic” and Unregistered Chinese Protestant Churches,” in Ashiwa, Y. and Wank, D.L. (eds.) Making Religion, Making the State, The Politics of Religion in Modern China, Stanford University Press.

Wang, A. (ed.) (2008) Church Ministry Management [Jiaohui Shigong Guanli], Beijing: Zongjiao Wenhua Chubanshe. Wu, Y.T. (1963) “The Present-Day Tragedy of Christianity,” in Jones, F.P. (ed.) Documents of the Three-Self Movement, Source Materials for the Study of the Protestant Church in Communist China, New York: National Council of Churches in the USA.

Yang, F. (2006) “The Red, Black, and Gray Markets of Religion in China,” Sociological Quarterly, 47: 93-122. Ye, X. (2008) “Zai Zhongguo Jidujiao Dibaci Daibiaohuiyishang De Jianghua [Talk at the Eighth National Christian Representatives Meeting],” (9 January 2008), Beijing, People’s Republic of China. Zhao, S. (1998) “A State-Led Nationalism: The Patriotic Education Campaign in Post-Tiananmen China,” Communist and Post-Communist Studies, 31(3): 287-302. Zhao, T. and Zhuang, W. (1997) Dangdai Zhongguo Jidujiao Fazhanshi, 1949-1997 [A History of Christianity in Socialist China, 1949-1997], Taipei, Taiwan: CMI Publishing.

Zheng, Y. (1999) Discovering Chinese Nationalism in China, Modernization, Identity, and International Relations, New York: Cambridge University.

Zhongguo Jidujiao Sanzi Aiguo Yundong Weiyuanhui Zhongguo Jidujiao Xiehui [National Protestant Three Self Patriotic Movement Committee and China Christian Council]. (2006) Jidujiao Aiguozhuyi Jiaocheng (Shiyongben) [Protestant Patriotic Curriculum (Trial Edition)], Beijing: Zongjiao Wenhua Chubanshe. Zhou, J. (2002) Zongjiao Gongzuo Tansuo [Investigation into Religious Work], Beijing: Zongjiao Wenhua Chubanshe.

  1 Thanks to Janine Holc, Nadav Shelef, Teresa Wright, and Francis Lim for comments on earlier drafts of this chapter. 2 Most interviews were recorded and translated; a few interviewees preferred to answer questions without any digital recording. In these cases, I remembered as much of the interviews as possible and wrote down details after the interviews. 3 I am not adopting Gramsci’s view of the clergy as “traditional intellectuals” who automatically support the regime, as the Catholic priesthood did in Italy in his day. As

35

Timothy Cheek points out in a study of the “gaps” in contemporary scholarly applications of civil society to China, Gramsci’s hegemony theory can elucidate much state-society behavior if his assumptions about class are relaxed. See Timothy Cheek, “From Market to Democracy in China: Gaps in the Civil Society Model,” in Juan D. Lindau and Timothy Cheek, eds., Market Economics and Political Change: Comparing China and Mexico (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 1998), 219-54. Instruction by leaders does not automatically translate into congregations’ acceptance, as studies of subalternates in other settings have made clear. 4 Officials keenly recognize preaching’s powerful impact on congregations, as one provincial Religious Affairs Bureau director lamented that “[we] still have no good educational form that can reach such a universal level as the 15 million person-times [assuming over 3,000 sites with an average 100 people per site and 50 weeks of preaching] of preaching given by preachers every year in the province.” Zhou Jiacai, Zongjiao Gongzuo Tansuo [Investigation into Religious Work], (Beijing: Zongjiao Wenhua Chubanshe, 2002), 150. 5 According to the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences’ Institute of World Religions, China has 23 million Protestants in 2010 (Research Group of Institute of World Religions, CASS, “Zhongguo Jidujiao Ruhu Wenjuan Diaocha Baogao [An In-House Questionnaire Survey on Christianity in China],” Annual Report on China’s Religions (2010) [Zhongguo Zongjiao Baogao (2010)] (Shehuikexue Wenxian Chubanshe: Beijing, 2010), 191. However, these data are unreliable because the survey used only one item to assess whether believers lived in any household (whereas the Horizon Survey used multiple items) and, according to a Chinese religions scholar, the survey’s administration and interpretation were politically influenced. A re-examination of the Horizon Survey estimated the total population at 70 million Protestants. See Rodney Stark, Byron Johnson, and Carson Mencken, “Counting China’s Christians,” First Things website, published June 2011, accessed June 18, 2011, http://www.firstthings.com/print/article/2011/05/counting-chinarsquos-christians?keepThis=true&TB_iframe=true&height=500&width=700. 6 The PRC Constitution translates the term guojia as nation, state, and country in the English version. Compare “Constitution of the People’s Republic of China,” People’s Daily online, accessed on 9 July 2011, http://english.peopledaily.com.cn/constitution/ constitution.html, and “Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Xianfa,” accessed on 9 July 2011, http://www.gov.cn/gongbao/content/2004/content_62714.htm. 7 I adapt three of He and Guo’s four components: “statist and socialist identity,” “cultural identity,” and “civic and territorial identity,” ignoring “Han identity” because all respondents were Han. I combine socialist ideology into state-led nationalism, maintain civic consciousness, and add elements of cultural transformation. 8 Notice that Ye Xiaowen uses the term cultural nationalist term minzu for Chinese peoples or nation when seeking to stress pride in China as an enduring civilization for all ethnic groups but switches to the socialist term renmin for peoples when stressing state-led nationalist ideas that Protestants should be loyal to the party. 9 This conceptualization of state-led nationalism has at least two major problems: first, if Christian culture is a kind of Western culture and Chinese civilization has been unbroken for thousands of years, surely Communism must also be recognized as a distinctly European cultural break in Chinese civilization? Second, he neglects to recognize that

36

Christian churches were “swept clean” of imperialism by the establishment of the Three Self Patriotic Movement in the 1950s. 10 Oddly, Peter Gries in his book on China’s New Nationalism, Pride, Politics, and Diplomacy (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2004) pays scant attention to the distinction between nationalism and patriotism, mentioning it in a single chapter on popular nationalism (see p. 133 especially). 11 Support however doesn’t mean unqualified subordination, because this principal has also deftly advanced church interests against what he perceived as the local state’s abuse of power. 12 The Harbin lianghui leadership insisted that believers enjoy domestic freedom and that foreign infiltration, rather than poor clergy training as many leaders say, is the top challenge to official churches (Interview, Harbin, July 2009). 13 In 2002, the Harbin municipal lianghui leader urged Protestants at the opening ceremony for a new church to study the spirit of the recent Chinese Communist Party Congress. Author’s observation, Shuangcheng, November 2002. 14 In the last five years, a new stream of unregistered, public churches has also emerged in Beijing, Shanghai, and other major cities. See Rob Moll, “Great Leap Forward, China is Changing and So Is Its Church. How New Believers Are Shaping Society in Untold Ways,” published 19 May 2008, accessed 23 May 2008, from http://www.christianitytoday.com/ct/2008/May/19.22.html. 15 The Hunan Provincial Christian Council president said that church management is the “biggest challenge”. Interview, Changsha, September 2010. One example of the church literature addressing this need is Wang Ai, ed., Church Ministry Management [Jiaohui Shigong Guanli] (Beijing: Zongjiao Wenhua Chubanshe, 2008). 16 Interestingly, unregistered church leaders and some TSPM preachers justify unrestricted evangelism by appealing to the Chinese Constitution’s statutes on protection of religious freedom over restrictive national or local regulations (Interview, Harbin, June 2006).