Prospects and Challenges of Constructing a Democratic Developmental State in Ghana

Prospects and Challenges of Constructing a Democratic

Developmental State in Ghana

Worlanyo A. K. Ocloo

Culture Works Consulting, Accra, Ghana.

#15 Second Street, Atomic Gate, Haatso, Accra

Abstract

Constructing a developmental democratic state in Ghana depends on an intricate mix of external

factors and internal competencies and political will. Of great importance is the prevailing

economic and political circumstances that Ghana finds itself juxtaposed against the prevailing

regional and global conditions. The regional and global dimensions are critical to this discussion

because countries do not exist in a vacuum and neither do they develop in one. Beyond a nation’s

socio-cultural existence, regional and global considerations must necessarily come into play.

Also of critical importance is the challenges of building a developmental state in in a developing

mineral-rich country such as Ghana vis-à-vis the “resource curse” et al and how this interacts

with the need of having clearly defined socio-economic objectives that require active state

interventions.

Ghana has made giant strides in entrenching its democracy and is thus benefiting from the

accountability and transparency in the exploitation of its resources that democracy brings. This is

a cardinal requirement for the building of a developmental state. In addition to these if Ghana

takes advantage of the stability and relative peace that democracy has afforded it, to begin the

task of institutional reform and the development of relevant policies that allow the state to play a

more effective role in the development agenda then the construction of a democratic

developmental state will not only be feasible but successful.

Key Words: Democratic developmental state, Democracy, Development, Ghana, Resource curse,

First Submitted to KAIPTC

Teshie- Accra

Ghana

www.kaiptc.org

Conflict Peace and Security

Program

2 | P a g e [email protected] July 8, 2013

Introduction

In discussing the prospects and challenges of constructing a democratic developmental state in

Ghana, this paper will first discuss the current economic and political circumstances that the

country finds itself juxtaposed against the prevailing regional and global conditions. The regional

and global dimensions are critical to this discussion because countries do not exist in a vacuum

and neither do they develop in one. Beyond a nation’s socio-cultural existence, regional and

global considerations must necessarily come into play.

This will be followed by an overview of the prospects and challenges of building a

developmental state in in a developing mineral-rich country. The next phase will focus on

determining the prospects and challenges of building such a state in Ghana. The approach to this

task will be to address four key challenges that have traditionally undermined the efforts of a

country such as Ghana’s efforts in developing. Similarly the paper will be addressing the

prospects of Ghana overcoming these challenges in order to successfully build a democratic

developmental state.

The Global Environment

The current financial crisis, the worst the world has seen, since the Great Depression of the

1930’s has unleashed an economy paralyzing deluge of bank failures, a credit crunch, private

defaults and massive layoffs (Yale Global, 2010). In spite of this monumental failure of the

markets of the developed world and its impact on the global economy, Africa has remained

relatively unscathed. As a matter of fact some Sub Saharan African countries including Ghana,

Uganda, Kenya, Nigeria and Mauritius stock markets experienced extraordinary performance

during this period (Massa & te Velde, 2008). Even more remarkable is the fact that in these

trying moments when the West is struggling and the Chinese economy begins to show signs of

slowing down, African countries are expected to provide the leadership in sustaining global

economic growth with the projection that seven of the world's ten fastest-growing economies

will be African countries including Ghana (IMF, 2013).

The foregoing provides an impelling force of confidence that can drive countries such as Ghana,

to go on and successfully build a democratic developmental state. This dose of confidence is as

important as other factors in the toolbox of any state wishing to build a developmental state. Ake

mailto:[email protected]


(1996), made the observation that, lack of confidence on the part of Africans is a serious problem

and a formidable obstacle to development. Thus judging from the monumental failures of an

unbridle market economies and weaknesses being shown by the Chinese example, the

construction of a democratic developmental state in Ghana is no longer a question of prospects

or possibilities. It has transcended this threshold into a realm of absolute necessity. This

argument is aptly summed up by Edigheji, when he points out that, the current global economic

crisis has exposed the fragilities of the ‘efficient market hypothesis’ and that of self regulating

markets. He emphasizes that this state of affairs strengthens the case for the state to participate

actively in development. He concludes this argument by stating that “the case for a

developmental state that is democratic and engenders social inclusion is more compelling than

ever” (Edigheji O. , 2010).

The Regional Environment

Apart from difficulties with trade within the region and fiscal policy, one of the difficulties

confronting countries in the Africa region and especially the West- African sub region in their

pursuit of development is insecurity. Some of the literatures on the development challenges of

Africa have argued that insecurity is in part as a result of a lack of development and or

inequitable development. Richard (2012) for example argues that the persistent security

dilemmas on many parts of the continent are exacerbated by “discordant development” or deep

inequalities and rapid progress juxtaposed with group distress. Be that as it may, the Niger Delta

issue, and Boko Haram crisis in Nigeria (Onuoha, 2010) and the crisis in Mali are but a few

examples of how insecurity can petrify development into stagnation. To this end, the regional

body, the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) has in the past responded

swiftly and decisively to unrest in member countries (Jaye, Garuba, & Amadi, 2011). However

the same cannot be said about cases of insecurity and instability in the region as a result of

conflicts and instability. The current crisis in Mali and the time it took for the regional block to

respond is a case in point.

However attitudes seem to be changing in the face of emerging threats. In the case of Ghana at

least the, current President, John Mahama has acknowledged that even though Ghana had not

been directly affected by the Malian crisis, no country was safe if insurgency was allowed to take

hold elsewhere (BBC, 2013). Giving meaning to this belief by doing more in terms of consistent



troops and cash support to the ECOWAS and the African Union (AU) standby force as well as

good political will, will ensure that the right environment is created for uninterrupted

development (Ajayi, 2008).

Constructing a Democratic Developmental State

The concept of a democratic developmental state requires the state to have clearly defined socio-

economic objectives that require active state interventions. Edigheji enumerates some of the

objectives as:

“(the) alleviation of absolute and relative poverty; the correction of glaring inequalities

of social conditions (between genders, classes, regions, and ethnic groups); provision for

personal safety and security; and the tackling of looming threats such as environmental

degradation” (Edigheji O. , 2005)

He concludes by indicating that, to the extent that the outcome of democratic politics are the

organizing of socio-economic progress along the lines stated above, they can be described as

developmentally successful.

Consequently the import of development is the provision of effective political goods to the

citizens of a state. The people are the central pivot around whom development must be

conceptualized and activated. Ake (1996) takes this a notch higher, positing that, citizens are not

only at the end of developmental spectrum but must be part of the spectrum as its means and

agents as well. The developmental state literature is replete with human centered themes; this is

the underlying principle that unifies the different variants that are widely discussed. Based on the

foregoing Edigheji (2005), defines a developmental state “as one whose ideological

underpinnings are developmental and one that seriously attempts to construct and deploy its

administrative and political resources to the task of economic development”. This definition

places a high premium on objectives and institutions.

Challenges and Prospects of Constructing a Democratic Developmental State in Ghana

The challenges that confront states like Ghana in constructing a developmental state are well

articulated in the developmental state literature. Ghana like many other mineral-rich countries in

the developing world is perceived as poor candidates for the successful construction of a

democratic developmental state. Edigheji ( 2010), points out that the susceptibility of mineral-



rich countries to the effects of the “resource curse” which include the Dutch disease and

susceptibility to conflict. Other notable writers on the developmental state, including Ake,

Mkandawire, Johnson, Wade and Evans point out other challenges to that such states face. These

include: the perception of democracy as being inimical to the very concept of development, the

lack of institutional capacity to prosecute the developmental state agenda and endemic

corruption.

The “Resource Curse”

Challenges

In addition to being a major producer of Gold and being rich in bauxite, Ghana since the

discovery of oil in 2007 has become an oil producing country. According to Edigheji ( 2010), the

logic of the susceptibility of mineral-rich countries in the developing world to the resource curse

means that such states are less likely to build a developmental state. Thus the questions that

confront Ghana are as follows: After failing to utilize gold and cocoa to facilitate development,

can the country take advantage of the second opportunity offered by the oil find to avoid the

pitfalls associated with oil producing nations in the developing world? How does the country

break the mould and become an example of how a mineral-rich country can develop rather than

contribute to the statistics that support the impossibility theory? Edigheji argues that the answers

to this question and the policy initiatives they engender are crucial to the success of building a

developmental state. The reason for this is succinctly encapsulated in his observation that:

“Most mineral-rich countries in the developing world are the opposite of developmental

states as they are marked by weak institutions; that is to say, the institution of policy-

making and implementation are generally weak and there is considerable lack of

accountability and transparency. Furthermore, in most mineral-rich countries in the

developing world, political leaders in particular and policy makers in general rely on

mineral wealth as the main source of state revenue. Consequently they have little

incentive to create developmentalist institutions that will enable the state to intervene to

diversify the economy. It therefore comes as no surprise that the contribution of

manufacturing to GDP in most mineral-rich developing countries is low…” “Focusing

on the institutional arrangements that underpin social and economic development in



developmental states like Norway therefore provides useful lessons for a mineral-rich

country…” (Edigheji O. , 2010)

Ghana’s history is replete with examples that support the foregoing argument. In fact it can be

argued that over the years the basic infrastructure that existed during the nascence of these

industries have gradually fallen into ruins.

Ghana must also manage another dimension of the resource curse that goes beyond the Dutch

disease. Research undertaken by the World Bank and others has identified a nexus between

violent conflict and natural resources. The suggestion is that developing countries are more

susceptible to violent conflict and poor governance if they are highly dependent on primary

commodities (Bannon & Collier, 2003). The study found that the higher the contribution of

export of primary commodities to GDP, the higher the risk of conflict. A country with a primary

commodity exports around 25 percent of GDP was found to have a 33 percent risk of conflict,

but when such exports are only 10 percent of GDP, the risk drops to 11 percent. In the face of

this study, the recent upsurge in violence associated with legal and illegal mining activities

(Grant, Mitchell, & Nyame, 2011), (Nyame & Grant, 2012) and the agitations of the youth of the

oil producing Western region is of real concern and constitutes a threat to the state.

Prospects

Despite the gloomy historical background, Ghana is well placed to take advantage of the second

chance provided by the oil find at becoming a developmental state. At least there seems to be

genuine commitment from the political elite of the two main political parties who have ruled the

country since the re-institution of democratic governance in 1992 to pursue an agenda that will

accelerate development. In this regard subsequent governments have made efforts to facilitate

the building of institutions to strengthen the capacity of the state to intervene in the development

agenda. These include: social interventions such as the much touted school feeding program, the

national youth employment program with its numerous appendages. Anti corruption institutions

such as the Commission for Human Rights and Administrative Justice (CHRAJ), the Economic

and Organized Crime Office (EOCO), the Financial Intelligence Center (FIC) have also been

setup as well as the publication of the National Anti-Corruption Action Plan (NACAP)

(Government of Ghana, 2012). Institutional reform and capacity building, evident in the set up of

Savannah Accelerated Development Authority (SADA) and the National Development Planning



Commission (NDPC) is in progress with the development of an ambitious national plan called

the Ghana Shared Growth and Development Agenda (GSGDA, 2010–2013) (USAID/GHANA,

2013).

Politicians across party lines have consulted widely and openly on how to manage the country’s

oil resources efficiently along the lines of country’s such as Norway, Canada and Australia

(Collier, 2012). The result has been that the country has put into place laws and institutions to

help manage revenue from the oil and other mineral wealth. One of such is the Revenue

Management Act (RMA) and the Ghana Public Interest Accountability Committee (PIAC), a 13

member committee with membership from organized professional bodies, think tanks, pressure

groups and traditional institutions (Dovi, 2013). The global interest in dealing with the policy

issues surrounding the difficulties of mineral-rich developing countries inability to develop has

ensured that on a lot of literatures from scholarship (Collier, 2012), (Breisinger et al, 2010), think

thanks (ISSER, 2011), (Kuzu & Nantogmah, 2010) and development partners (USAID/GHANA,

2013) now exist to guide the country through its policy options.

To succeed, Ghana must emulate the successes of the mineral-rich states that made it whiles

avoiding the all so familiar pitfalls of other developing states such as Nigeria and Mexico. To

effectively manage development as an oil producing country, these measures must be combined

with robust oil revenue management policies such as oil price fiscal rules, generation funds, oil

committees and an agenda for transparency and public reform (Duong, et al., 2010).

The Issue of Democracy and the Developmental State

Challenges

After many years of military rule, Ghana has seen uninterrupted democratic governments since

1993 and is now regarded as one of the most stable democracies in Africa. As impressive as it

sounds, this feat does not seem provide any comfort because some of the commentary on the

developmental state claim that the nexus between democracy and development is contested

(DFID, 2007). In deed Thandika, Edigheji and other writers have acknowledged that the

evidence available shows that many developmental states are not democracies leading to the

view in some quarters that democracy is fundamentally an antithesis to development. The

example of the Asian Tigers where development took place outside democratic governance



suggests that it is perhaps best to sequence this process by developing first and then adopting

democracy later.

Democratic governance in developing countries in Africa is especially challenging, because by

and large politicians have succeeded in reducing democracy to a “legitimate tool” for the pursuit

of the same parochial interest they did under dictatorships and one party states. This dim view of

democracy in Africa is as a result of the performance of some of the undemocratic “democratic”

exploits of the continent’s leader who simply cloaked their repressive regimes with what Ake

refers to as “the crude simplicity of multiparty elections” (Ake, 1996). Ghana is touted as one of

the more stable democracies having experienced multiple peaceful transition of power from one

government to another and much recently a flawless transition from a deceased president to the

sitting vice president.

Despite the high praise for Ghana’s constitutional democracy for delivering on political rights,

much is yet to be done to translate these gains into economic and social rights. The inequalities

inherent in the socio-economic sphere ensure that access to political power still lies in the bosom

of the rich and powerful. Ake (1996) identifies this level of political engagement as not

condusive for building a developmental state. What is required in his opinion and to which I

hugely suscribe, is a democracy that allows citizens to participate in decision making beyond

voting for their leaders. A democracy that goes beyond political rights and ensures that

individual and collective rights are protected, A democracy that ensures that there is equal and

fair access to state resources.

One of the main draw back on Ghana’s political culture is what has been described as the

“winner takes all politics” (Adei, 2013), (Nkansah, 2011). A culture where only members of the

ruling governments, its symphatizers and bank rollers seem to benefit from governance. With a

deep and evenly divided country along party, it is imaginable that a sizeable proportion of the

political and social elite are excluded from governance at any given time.

Beyond the reprecussions that this may have for formenting civil unrest, it implies that any given

time the country is unable to use the full compliment of its human resource both home and

abroad. Consequently, with nothing to do and a lot of time to spare, the opposition can only



engage in opposing anything that government tries to do. In effect they become professional

opposers of all things, good and bad.

Prospects

Based on the examples of countries as diverse as Botswana, Mozambique, Chile, Korea, India,

Vietnam and China it is obvious that democracy is not necessarily required for economic growth,

development and poverty reduction (DFID, 2007). Whiles acknowledging this, the DFID, posits

that the:

“Evidence suggests that democracies have prevented the worst-case scenarios. Recent

studies highlight that democracies increasingly have a positive effect: directly on

education and indirectly on growth. In addition to enabling the full range of freedoms

and rights, and helping people to create the kind of societies they wish to live in,

democratic politics helps protect and sustain economic growth and development more

effectively in the long run. (DFID, 2007)

Ake (1996), in dealing with the so called contradiction that exists between development and

democracy in relation to political authoritarianism, states that, once one get beyond confusing

economic growth for development, it is easy to understand that, democracy is part of the very

meaning of political development. The foregoing, suggests that with the right attitude, a truly

democratic dispensation that is people centered and people driven, the building of state capacity

to intervene effectively and the creation of the right institutions, development situated within a

democracy is not only possible but sustainable. Ghana’s democracy is well placed to construct

and sustain a democratic developmental state because its democracy is maturing. Politicians,

citizens and organizations are increasingly turning to institutions to resolve their problems. There

is also increased corporation among politicians as it dawns on them that the winner takes all

political culture is inimical to the nation’s development. This is evident by a recent comment by

the president which was reported as follows:

“President John Dramani Mahama, on Monday, said that the winner takes all in Ghana's

political dispensation was not helpful as the government and opposition remained

parallel even after elections. He said the current trend of democracy in the world needed

the cooperation of both government and the opposition to fine-tune the constitutional

demands of the people. President Mahama said the growing urbanization of Ghana



needed more socio-economic infrastructure that would improve the lives of the people

and said the country need concerted efforts and cooperation from all citizens, to achieve

development”. (GNA, 2013)

Building Institutional Capacity

Challenges

Building a democratic developmental state requires strong and efficient public institutions that

are capable of conceptualizing and implementing policies to facilitate this process. Ghana’s

record in managing state institution has been below abysmal. State properties became clan and

family properties and fair game to be raped and plundered for the benefit of a few. The

destruction of the infrastructural base of the country, the decline in manufacturing in the 1970’s

and 1980’s (LaVerle, 2004) are testaments of this fact. Years of military rule also ensured that

the judiciary, civil society stunted in growth and contributed very little to the country’s

development. Despite the recent efforts to build strong institutions more needs to be done in

terms of the politicization of appointments to state institutions and the weaning off of critical

state institutions from government control and support.

This is crucial if the institutions are to do their job without interference from the executive. The

current challenges stem from the fact that in as much institutions mandated to ensure

transparency and keep government in check rely on government for the approval of their budget

and the disbursement of their funds instead of parliament. Government can still starve these

institutions by approving only a fraction of their budget or unduly delay the disbursement of their

budget allocation. Despite the fact that this scenario has not played out yet to the extent that it

has become an issue, provides no comfort, because once it remains a possibility it may still

happen and potentially set back the clock of progress.

Prospects

Ghanaians are growing in leaps and bounds in their appreciation of democracy and the roles of

the institutions mandated to carry out essential tasks. They have learnt how to hold public

officials and institutions accountable for their deeds and misdeeds. The space provided for the

media and civil society has been greatly expanded, allowing them to play the watchman role

effectively thus keeping government from engaging in any shenanigans.



The impact of investigative journalism that has exposed the rot in several public institutions

including the security services, the consistent demand for information on how oil revenues are

used, the public and civil society pressure for the passing of the freedom of information bill, the

current presidential election petition being played out in the Supreme Court, the success of a

citizen in challenging a constitutional instrument CI78, the exploits of a former Attorney General

in overturning judgment debts are but a few cases in point, illustrating the efforts citizens and

organizations are putting in, to ensure that our institutions work. In addition to this, the current

government of Ghana has set up a task force to help put institutions on their toes. Even though

the foregoing represents only ad hoc attempts to get institutions working, it is a good starting

point. Eventually comprehensive institutional reforms have to ensure that institutions imbibe the

culture of transparency, professionalism and patriotism that is needed to prosecute a

developmental agenda.

The Scourge of Corruption

Challenges

Building developmental states requires strong and efficient public institutions that are corruption

averse and are ethical and professional. When corruption is rife and institutions mandated to rein

it in are weak, poorly trained or are just not motivated to do their job development does not

thrive. Corruption facilitates other crimes that adversely affect the economy. The observation is

that, ‘the negative economic effects of economic crimes, such as bribery, tax evasion, inflation of

prices and money laundering on economic development are difficult to quantify, yet it is clear

that such activity damages the financial sector’ (Bartlet, 2002). They distort the economy and

expose it to risks that affect the soundness and stability of financial institutions and financial

systems, increased volatility of international capital flows, and a dampening effect on foreign

direct investment’ (IMF, 2000). These are all pivotal in building a developmental state.

The negative impact is particularly injurious to productivity as it leads to depression of

productivity (Ajet-Nasam, 2013), (Bartlet, 2002) as capital is hoarded in non productive and

sterile investments such as real estate. It also undermines efforts to develop appropriate policies

that drives the developmental agenda becaus policy makers are misled by inaccurate finacial

information (McDowell & Novis, 2001).



Despite the debilitating effect of corruption on the economy, successive governments have

hidden behind the thin veil of lack evidence not to prosecute offenders especially those from the

ruling party. An example of this is the efforts of President Kuffour’s government to try and jail

officials of President Rawlings’s regime through the fast track courts (Gyimah-Boadi, 2004) but

asked for evidence when confronted with malfeasance of his own ministers. Recently a former

functionary of the Kuffour regime now turned anti corruption campaigner made a comment that

encapsulates the dilemma Ghana faces in dealing with endemic corruption. He opined that, even

as government officials demand evidence before prosecuting corrupt officials, every Ghanaian

knows the “official” bribe rate required for such things as getting a driver’s license or a passport,

getting an electricity or water meter among other services that are routinely required (GNA,

2013). The literature on the impact of corruption on development is damning indeed. A 2004

DFID report observed that:

“Corruption diverts the scarce resources needed to provide essential public services and

distorts decision making about investment priorities. It can lead to the building of

infrastructure that is substandard and badly located. And it can damage economic

growth by increasing the uncertainty and the cost of doing business.” (DFID, 2007)

Edigheji (2010), sums it all up when he posits that corruption compromise a governments ability

to construct a democratic developmental state.

Prospects

As indicated in the section that deals with the building of institutions, Ghana is doing a lot in

fighting corruption. The efforts of anti corruption networks the PAC and NACAP is putting

corruption actively on the to-do list and in the public domain. The effect of this is that people are

demanding more from politicians at the national and local government level. As indicated in the

discussion on the “resource question”, institutions are being built. Citizens are clamoring for

prosecution of persons found to have dipped their hands in the national purse thus putting

pressure on politicians to be serious in tackling corruption These efforts seem to be generating

positive response from politicians as the president of the Republic recently directed the Attorney

General, and Minister of Justice to set up a special desk to investigate and prosecute all offenders

who have been captured in the reports of the Auditor General concerning squandered state funds



and assets (GhanaWeb, 2013). This is a great start especiall combined with the numerous anti

grraft institutions that have bee setup and empowered to work. The work of the EOCO and the

FIC are especially encouraging as they purge the country of the scourge of financial crimes. The

sanity that is created gives a mojor boost to the economy as it restores confidence that both

international and local capital requires to migrate into it.

Concluding Thoughts

Constructing a democratic development state in Ghana is highly feasible considering the giant

strides the country has made in entrenching its democracy. Democracy in Ghana has come to

stay and the country is poised to reap benefits of accountability and transparency in the

exploitation of its resources, a cardinal requirement for the building of a developmental state.

Ghana has taken advantage of the stability and relative peace that democracy has afforded it, to

begin the task of institutional reform and the development of relevant policies that allow the state

to play a more effective role in the development agenda.

Despite the difficulties, investment in health, education and other critical social services is on the

increase and efforts are being made to tackle the predation of corruption on the national purse

thus freeing up resources for developmental projects. All these are positive pointers to the fact

that the relevant foundation is being built for the subsequent supplanting of a democratic

developmental state to the current state.

However more needs to be done if the gains made are to be consolidated and built upon.

Government needs to show genuine commitment in its desire: to fight corruption, empower

institutions to work and commitment to investment in the people.



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Prospects and Challenges of Constructing a Democratic Developmental State in Ghana

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