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Fisheries Research 97 (2009) 183–195

Contents lists available at ScienceDirect

Fisheries Research

journa l homepage: www.e lsev ier .com/ locate / f i shres

rofile of the illegal abalone fishery (Haliotis midae) in the Eastern Cape Province,outh Africa: Organised pillage and management failure

erge J.-P.N. Raemaekers ∗, Peter J. Britzepartment of Ichthyology and Fisheries Science, Prince Alfred Street, Rhodes University, Grahamstown 6140, South Africa

r t i c l e i n f o

rticle history:eceived 16 October 2008eceived in revised form 2 February 2009ccepted 8 February 2009

eywords:

a b s t r a c t

Since 1997 the Eastern Cape of South Africa has become a major source of supply for the illicit abalone tradeas illegal fishers have located a substantial abalone (Haliotis midae) resource. We determined illegal fishingeffort and yield in the Port Elizabeth-based abalone fishery, and used biological indices to determine theimpact of fishing on the abalone stock. The failure of the state to issue fishing rights and conduct effectivesea-based compliance, combined with the incentives to fish abalone (high price, low cost, ease of access)

baloneomplianceisheries managementllegal fishingUUURF

created the conditions for a full scale illegal fishery to emerge very rapidly. By 2005, the scale of the fisherywas remarkable: a fleet of 30 purpose built vessels existed, harvesting 1000–2000 tons of abalone withan export value of 35–70 million USD per year. The uncontrolled fishing effort had a dramatic effect onthe stock: the average size of abalone decreased significantly, densities declined in the sampling areas,but recruitment of young abalone was still observed at the heavily fished Cape Recife site. It is concludedthat the illegal fishing operations and the resultant ecological effects on the abalone resource, reflect

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deficiencies in South Afri

. Introduction

Illegal, unreported and unregulated (IUU) fishing has been iden-ified as a major contributing factor to the worldwide collapse of fishtocks (Le Gallic and Cox, 2006; Pitcher et al., 2002). Several abalonesheries around the world have collapsed or are facing collapse dueo unsustainable levels of legal harvesting, and increasing levelsf IUU fishing for this high-valued commodity. Fisheries depart-ents and management authorities have sought to implement

ights-based approaches in the hope of curbing this trend (Vega etl., 2006; Wyner et al., 1977), but with limited success (Mitchellnd Baba, 2006). Total Allowable Catches (TACs) have graduallyeen decreased in almost every abalone fishery (Heasman, 2006;uchette and Clavier, 2004; Roberts et al., 2007; Shepherd andodda, 2001; Uchino et al., 2004) and some countries with majorbalone fisheries have closed their fishery entirely (Daniels andloren, 1998; Dowling et al., 2004; Karpov et al., 2000; Lessard andampbell, 2007; Rogers-Bennett et al., 2004). South Africa’s abalone

Haliotis midae) resource, locally known as ‘perlemoen’, is underarticularly severe pressure from highly organised illegal fishinghich has boomed since the 1990s (Hauck and Sweijd, 1999; Tarr,

000).

∗ Corresponding author. Tel.: +27 46 6038415/6; fax: +27 46 6224827.E-mail addresses: s.raemaekers@telenet.be, serge.raemaekers@gmail.com

S.J.-P.N. Raemaekers).

165-7836/$ – see front matter © 2009 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.oi:10.1016/j.fishres.2009.02.003

urrent abalone fisheries management and compliance paradigm.© 2009 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.

For many years, South Africa’s abalone commercial and recre-ational fishery in the Western Cape Province (Fig. 1) was verystable (Tarr, 2000), but since the mid-1990s traditional manage-ment measures to sustain a rights-based fishery have been renderedincreasingly ineffective by rampant illegal fishing. Authors such asTarr (2000) and Steinberg (2005) ascribed the spectacular rise ofthe illicit abalone trade in the 1990s to numerous factors, includingthe abolition of restrictive Apartheid laws in the early 1990s and thetransition to democracy in 1994, which saw the concurrent trans-formation of state structures including the South African PoliceService (SAPS) and Marine and Coastal Management (MCM; theauthority responsible for managing fisheries). Moreover, the weak-ening South African Rand (ZAR) against the U.S. dollar (USD) in thesame period, made the export price of abalone attractive. Contribut-ing to this, weak border control systems allowed illegal product tobe exported with ease. Finally, the presence of an established andhighly efficient Chinese organised crime network in South Africa,promoted the bartering of drugs for abalone.

The growing illegal harvest led to measures to reduce legal fish-ing effort, including the closure of the recreational fishery in 2003(DEAT, 2003), the progressive reduction of the commercial TAC, andthe closure of the commercial fishery in 2008 (DEAT, 2007). The

introduction of a Territorial User Rights Fishery (TURF) model in2003 failed to draw the 302 rights holders into participation in pro-tecting abalone stocks. Furthermore, illegal fishing by members ofthe local coastal communities where the rights holders reside, con-tinued to rise. Various state-led compliance efforts failed to halt the

184 S.J.-P.N. Raemaekers, P.J. Britz / Fisheries Research 97 (2009) 183–195

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ig. 1. Map of South Africa, showing the biogeographical region of H. midae, the commrom which organised illegal fishing in the Eastern Cape has developed.

ise of illegal abalone fishing (Hauck and Kroese, 2006; Herbig andoubert, 2002; Steinberg, 2005). By 2007, almost the entire Southfrican abalone catch, estimated to be well over 2000 tons of wholeass (Bürgener, TRAFFIC, pers. comm.), was caught illegally: save

or the TAC of 75 tons.In the Eastern Cape Province (Fig. 1), illegal abalone fishing

as followed a similar trend to the Western Cape Province. How-ver, a large-scale commercial fishery was never established asarine resource managers historically believed that the distribu-

ion pattern and abundance of the species in the Eastern Capeas too discontinuous and patchy to justify commercial exploita-

ion (Tarr, 2000). A shore-based recreational fishery with dailyag limits did exist and was well established near the urban cen-res. An initiative in 1998 to allocate experimental commercialuotas in the Eastern Cape coast was halted due to the ris-ng illegal fishing phenomenon. In 2002, a proposed TURF-based

anagement plan was implemented briefly in rural areas whereubsistence fishers were targeting abalone. This plan was latererminated due to declining catch rates. As in the Western Cape,ecreational harvesting was halted in 2003. Since 1997 the East-rn Cape has become a major source of supply for the illicit

balone industry as illegal divers have located a substantial abaloneesource.

A large illegal and highly organised network developed fromhe urban centre of Port Elizabeth (the third largest city alonghe coast of South Africa; Fig. 1), and systematically targeted the

l fishery zone in the Western Cape, and the Port Elizabeth city with its surroundings,

species across the entire Eastern Cape for transport inland andexport to the Far East. The high Asian demand for abalone fuelsthis exceptionally lucrative trade, believed to be run by Chinesetriads, as well as other national and international organised crim-inal enterprises (Gastrow, 2001; Steinberg, 2005; Willock et al.,2004).

Information on the scale and dynamics of South Africa’s ille-gal abalone fishery is essential to understanding the problem andformulating appropriate management options. In this paper wepresent research undertaken to develop a profile of the illegalabalone fishery based in Port Elizabeth, Eastern Cape, as well asits effect on the resource. Our study approach combined bothsocial and biological research methods. The demographic and socio-economic characteristics of the offenders were profiled, followedby an estimate of illegal fishing effort and description of fisherbehaviour in this effectively ‘open access’ – free-for-all – fishery.The effect of illegal fishing on the resource is illustrated by means offishery dependent and independent data. We show that the illegalfishery is of a larger scale and is more sophisticated than previouslyacknowledged, and discuss how the lack of appropriate manage-ment interventions has allowed abalone fishing to rapidly boom

into a full scale, highly organised industry run by several syndi-cates. It is concluded that the illegal operations and the resultantecological effects on the abalone resource reflect deficiencies inSouth Africa’s current abalone fisheries compliance and manage-ment paradigm.

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. Material and methods

In order to understand the nature and the extent of illegalbalone fishing activities in the Eastern Cape we adopted a multi-isciplinary research approach, employing a wide array of bothuantitative and qualitative data gathering tools. Anecdotal infor-ation and quantitative data from a variety of direct and indirect

ources were combined.

.1. Qualitative data

Consultations were held with a wide spectrum of stakehold-

rs (Table 1) using semi-structured interviews where questionsere gradually evaluated and refined. Attitudes towards enforce-ent activities and possible recommendations were discussed, asell as the respondent’s viewpoints on the extent of the illegal

ctivities and the possible impact on the resource. A total of 55

able 1ist of organisations, institutions and population groups interviewed.

rganisation, institution or population group Number of individualsinterviewed

ecreational dive operator and shop owner 3hale, dolphin and seal watching operator 1

oat shop owner 1pear fishermen 3

llegal abalone fishers• Shore-based divers 3• Boat owner 1• Operator of syndicate 1

oastal property owner 2oastal conservancy 1outh African National Defence Force (SANDF)(Military Intelligence)

1

nvironmental Journalist 1ational Ports Authority (NPA) (Harbour Master) 1

outh African Police Services (SAPS)• Dog Unit 3• Organised Crime Unit 1• Abalone Task Team member 4• Air Support 1

outh African Revenue Services (SARS)—CustomsDepartment

2

ational Intelligence Agency (NIA) 1

ational Prosecuting Authority:• Public Prosecution & Asset Forfeiture Unit 1• Directorate Special Operations (Scorpions) 1

epartment of Justice• Ex Eastern Cape Attorney General 1

outh African Maritime Safety Association 1elson Mandela Metropolitan Municipality:onservation Services 1x Western District Council Nature Conservation 1dlambe Local Municipality Nature Conservation 3outh African National Parks (SANParks) 2

arine and Coastal Management:Directorate Resources Research –

1. Inshore Research 32. Cross-cutting biological research 1

Chief Directorate Monitoring Control & Surveillance 11. Compliance/Control 52. Environmental Patrol Vessels 3

otal 55

es Research 97 (2009) 183–195 185

semi-structured interviews were conducted. Five confessed ille-gal abalone divers were also interviewed, including the head of aPort Elizabeth-based syndicate—the openness about their activitiesmainly stemmed from the hope of one day obtaining a legitimatefishing right. This provided substantial information on the socio-economic status, motivation and the modus operandi of the illegalfishing groups.

Participatory observation of illegal abalone fishing activity wasundertaken with the enforcement arms of MCM and the SAPS. Thisincluded (i) road patrols along known abalone fishing sites near PortElizabeth and Port Alfred (Fig. 1), (ii) observation of suspected fish-ers launching their boats at commonly used launching sites, (iii) anextended stay in the Bird Island Marine Protected Area (MPA), (iv)witness of arrests and confiscations at dive sites and catch accumu-lation points, and (v) attendance at a court case of suspected illegalabalone fishers.

2.2. Quantitative data

2.2.1. Study areaAbalone in the vicinity of the Port Elizabeth city are distributed

between Cape Recife and Kini Bay, a predominantly rocky coastlineapproximately 35 km long, interspersed with a few sandy beachesand a small marine protected area (Sardinia Bay MPA) (Fig. 1). TheBird Island Group of Islands on the eastern edge of Algoa Bay hasextensive reefs which support a large abalone population. East-wards, to East London, and westwards, to Cape St. Francis, the coastis characterised by long sandy stretches interspersed by extensivebut shallow low aspect reefs where abalone occur.

2.2.2. Monitoring and estimating illegal effortFew studies nationally, and internationally have attempted to

quantify or describe IUU in fisheries (Ainsworth and Pitcher, 2005;Mann, 1995; Sumaila et al., 2006), as illegal fishing activities arenotoriously difficult to research. Even less information exists to con-firm the size of the illegal abalone catch, and very few attempts havebeen made to estimate the scale of the illegal abalone fishing oper-ations (Gordon and Cook, 2004). Therefore we set out to quantifyillegal fishing effort by means of various indicators.

As illegal abalone fishing related arrests occur almost weeklyin the Port Elizabeth area, the weight and size of confiscated orabandoned abalone was used as an indicator of trends in dis-tribution of illegal fishing effort along the coast. Confiscated orabandoned abalone have been sampled regularly and measuredsince 1997 by MCM and by ourselves. An intelligence database onillegal abalone fishing activity, maintained by the South AfricanNational Defence Forces (SANDF) was used to obtain estimates ofnumber of suspected abalone fishers. Direct illegal effort data forthe Port Elizabeth area was obtained sporadically, based on our ownobservations during sampling trips, or snapshot surveys under-taken by MCM. As illegal fishers use a distinctive class of vessel;typically highly powered (230–500 horsepower (hp)), semi-rigidinflatables known as ‘superducks’ (Fig. 2), the boat licensing recordsat the main launching site on the Swartkops River estuary (Fig. 1)were used as an indicator of the size of the illegal fishing fleet. Onlysemi-rigid inflatable boats, with twin engines of a combined min-imum 160 hp and with a minimum length of 6 meters (m) wereincluded for analysis.

Illegal fishing effort data from the Bird Island MPA1 wereobtained from three sources. Firstly, the logged ‘Incident Reports’of suspected illegal fishing activity filed by rangers of the SouthAfrican National Parks (SANParks) based on Bird Island were con-

1 The Bird Island Group of Islands were declared as a Marine Protected Area on 4June 2004 (DEAT, 2004).

186 S.J.-P.N. Raemaekers, P.J. Britz / Fisheries Research 97 (2009) 183–195

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unpublished data). The complex microhabitat along the fringe ofthe rock pool, made up of cobbles and medium sized boulders,covered with crustose coralline algae, and exposed to all currentdirections at high tide, attracted regular abalone settlement. Bian-

ig. 2. Purpose built semi-rigid, inflatable, ‘superduck’ used by organised abaloneivers. The vessel has a carrying capacity of up to 14 people, is equipped with twinigh-powered outboard engines (up to 250 hp per motor) and is capable of speedsf up to 50 knots.

ulted. Rangers had been reporting corresponding illegal fishingncidents since April 2002, even prior to the promulgation of the

PA. Secondly, since the data reported by the rangers was believedo be incomplete (Padayachee, SANParks Woody Cape Section Man-ger, pers. comm.), procedures for on-site monitoring of illegalshing activities were standardised, and the SANParks rangersere trained accordingly to collect data pertaining to observed

ctivities.Monitoring on site began in January 2007 and is ongoing. Lastly,

our two-week visits by the research team to Bird Island betweenebruary 2006 and March 2007 allowed validation of the dataecorded by the rangers, and a more thorough observation of thebalone fishing operations.

During 2006, a shift in illegal activity occurred as illegalbalone fishers began targeting new areas outside of Port Eliza-eth. The Ndlambe Local Municipality’s coastline to the north-eastFig. 1) became a ‘hotspot’ of illegal fishing activity. An intelli-ence database was designed; photographs of illegal activities,aken or obtained by the local Environmental Conservation Officerere analysed, and vehicles, boats and people involved were regis-

ered and subsequently classified by individual and by group. Localnvironmental Conservation Officials and SAPS personnel recordedhore- and boat-based operations on separate datasheets, whichere then linked to the intelligence database.

.2.3. Indicators of resource effectVery little substantiated abundance and stock health data

xisted for the abalone resource near the urban centres of theastern Cape. Research was conducted primarily at one particulareef (Daly, Nelson Mandela Metropolitan University, unpublishedata; Godfrey, Rhodes University, 2003, unpublished data; Woodnd Buxton, 1996a,b). Fishery dependent and independent dataere obtained which could be used to assess the impact of the

llegal fishing activities on the abalone stocks. Our aim was not toodel stock size, but rather to use the different data sources to cre-

te indicators of the effect of fishing on the abalone populations.ishery dependent data were sourced entirely from confiscated orbandoned abalone that were sampled since 1997 by MCM and our-elves. These samples were predominantly comprised of de-shelledshucked) and eviscerated or whole abalone in fresh or frozen state,riginating from bags of abalone that (i) were retrieved followingbandonment by fleeing illegal fishers, (ii) were found at sea byshers, (iii) were washed ashore, or (iv) were hidden in the coastalush.

Alternatively, catches were confiscated during the arrest of sus-

ected abalone fishers. Occasionally, the amount of dried abalonehich had been obtained from large seizures at illegal drying facil-

ties was recorded. Confiscated abalone from as many police casess possible were counted, weighed and measured to obtain a rep-esentative sample from the different areas over time. In cases with

Fig. 3. Non-isometric power regression between shell breadth (mm) and evisceratedmass (g) of H. midae after 12 h of dehydration (R2 = 0.9792; p = 0.05; n = 476). Data isobtained from morphometric studies undertaken by MCM.

large amounts of confiscated abalone a random representative subsample of up to 200 units was used for analysis.

Of the 481 cases and 81 466 abalone analysed, 99.15% of abalonewere measured in an eviscerated state. Mixed samples, withabalone in shell, were converted to eviscerated mass using a non-isometric power regression (Fig. 3):

Shell breadth (mm)

= 19.0177 × Eviscerated mass (after 12 h) (g)0.3480

(R2 = 0.9792; p � 0.05; n = 476)

The regression analysis was based on morphometric studiesundertaken by MCM to determine the weight loss associated withdehydration and freezing (MCM, 2001; unpublished data). Effectsof area and year on mean weight, % under the legal size, and meantotal catch confiscated were tested using the Statistica 8 and R soft-ware packages (R Development Core Team, 2007; StatSoft, 2007).Only cases originating from the urban areas of the Eastern Capewere included in the analysis.

The size and density of wild abalone was obtained by means ofin situ sampling and measurement in two heavily fished areas. Inthe Bird Island MPA, four sites were chosen which had been previ-ously sampled by MCM in 1986 and 1987, and which we observedas being fished actively by the illegal groups. Random collectionsof live emergent2 abalone and freshly shucked abalone shells wereperformed during the four two-week visits to Bird Island. Size fre-quencies of these collections were analysed. Additionally, fourteen30 m × 2 m transect counts of emergent abalone were completed atthe same four sites.

At the historically heavily fished Cape Recife (Fig. 1), a shallowrock pool was used to monitor abalone recruitment, continuingprior research undertaken by Godfrey (Rhodes University, 2003,

2 Space limitations, greater food availability and higher reproductive success causelarger juveniles to move from their cryptic positions into more open or emergentpositions (Officer et al., 2001).

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ual destructive surveys were undertaken from mid-2005 onwardsor long-term monitoring purposes. Quadrats were placed haphaz-rdly within a gridded area where rocks were overturned duringearches designed to minimise impact on habitat.

.2.4. EnforcementIn order to complement the qualitative information gained from

he semi-structured interviews, metadata from the confiscationsnd arrest records obtained from the SANDF intelligence arm, theCM Port Elizabeth Compliance Section, and the Ndlambe Munic-

pality’s Environmental Conservation Department were consulted.hese were used to quantify and understand the efficiency of thenforcement efforts by the various government agencies. Theseata sets were discontinuous over time and across the variousnforcement authorities.

. Results

Organised illegal abalone fishing spread from the Western Caperovince to the Eastern Cape Province in the mid-1990s and wasell publicised in the local press due to the brazen approach of ille-

al fishers who openly fished in public areas at Port Elizabeth. Theelatively sheltered and accessible Cape Recife area of Port Eliz-beth was the first ‘hotspot’ for illegal fishing (Fig. 1), and wasonsidered a training ground for aspiring fishers. As they gainedxperience and inshore stocks showed signs of decline, power-ul boats were acquired to access more productive reefs furtherfield. Progressively, two types of illegal abalone fishing operationsvolved: opportunistic, shore-based fishers with a small capitalnvestment and weaker networks, and highly organised and expe-ienced boat-based fishers with a high capital investment andfficient intelligence and marketing networks.

.1. Fisher profile

Our interviews revealed that abalone fishers from the urbanentres of the Eastern Cape were of multi-ethnic origin, but pre-ominantly white Afrikaner males, aged between 16 and 55 years.dolescents assisted as helpers or ‘lookouts’, with the potentialf becoming divers. Since 2005, there has been a small influx ofoloured3 males into the illegal abalone industry. These individu-ls, originating locally and from the Western Cape Province, servedainly as shore-based divers or middlemen. Black African indi-

iduals, often indigent individuals, usually worked as helpers orrunners’.

The majority of abalone fishers were unemployed or had leftheir jobs to pursue abalone fishing. Many used to fish recreationallyor abalone for personal consumption or informal local sale prioro the dramatic increase in the overseas price for this commodity.nterviews indicated that none, however, had traditional or arti-anal fishing links, unlike in the Western Cape Province (Hauck andweijd, 1999). Those who were employed were typically involvedn blue collar occupations such as panel beating, building or break-own services. While some interviewees justified their activities byn inability to find regular jobs due to their often low school educa-ion levels, the lifestyle was considered desirable as it yielded easy

oney and a degree of power and status within their social cir-le. The white Afrikaans speaking fishers interviewed questionedhe legitimacy of the post-Apartheid government, and were unwill-ng to accept the values of the new democratic dispensation. They

3 Coloured: is an official term used in South Africa to refer to a diverse group ofeople of mixed racial origin or of certain other non-white descent. They are thehird largest population group in the country.

es Research 97 (2009) 183–195 187

expressed feelings of marginalisation as a result of the govern-ment’s transformation policies (such as employment equity andblack economic empowerment) designed to promote racial equitywithin society. As a result, many fishers characterised and justi-fied their illegal abalone fishing activities as a “Robin Hood” typeof enterprise which had resulted in the injection of a large amountof money into the local ‘white’ economy. Drivers behind the fisherywere thus not only economic but also socio-political.

3.2. Fisher effort

3.2.1. Modus operandiIllegal abalone fishing near the urban centres of the Eastern Cape

has developed from being a largely shore-based activity in the late1990s to a substantial boat-based fishery.

Prior to 1999, hard hulled ski-boats were used for abalonefishing, but as boat-based fishing became more prevalent, groupsstarted using more specialised ‘superducks’ with a carrying capac-ity of up to 14 people and equipped with twin high-poweredoutboard engines (Fig. 2). Interviews with fishers revealed that‘superducks’ were preferred for their manoeuvrability and poten-tial for accessing shallower reefs in the surf zone. They were towedwith 4 × 4 vehicles and could be launched rapidly from publicslipways in harbours or rivers. Interviewees reported that the boat-based operations were carefully planned beforehand: dive locationswere chosen, boats prepared and loaded with dive cylinders, andlaw enforcement activities monitored. ‘Lookouts’ were placed atstrategic points (harbours, police road blocks, etc.) and were in per-manent cellular phone contact with the boat skipper. Illegal fishinggroups have also been known to organise decoy divers in a key area,to divert law enforcement efforts from the target area. A single boatcould conduct two trips per day.

Upon arrival at the designated dive location, reconnaissancedivers using snorkelling gear would be deployed to assess the reefsfor abalone. Only then would divers equipped with self-containedunderwater breathing apparatus (SCUBA; with 15–18 l cylinders)be deployed. The divers were equipped with waist bags for theabalone and torches, if diving at night. Abalone were lifted fromthe rocky substrate using a flat-bladed tool, de-shelled (shucked),and eviscerated in the water. After diving, boats were washed downwith fuel, and gloves discarded, in order to remove any abalone tis-sue and mucous which might provide deoxyribonucleic acid (DNA)evidence of illegal abalone possession. The returning boats carryingthe divers then acted as a diversion from the boat with the abalonebags for possible patrol boats.

Abalone would be dropped off anywhere along the coast orin estuaries. Using information provided by ‘lookouts’, ‘runners’would swim the bags ashore and carry them to the waiting vehi-cles, which transported the abalone to catch accumulation pointsor drying facilities.

In contrast, shore-based diving activities were less organised,and were often considered as opportunistic outings by the divergroups and their families. Shore-based divers would most oftenspend the entire day at their familiar dive spots, and dive onlywhen enforcement activity was low. Divers would hide bags inbetween rocky ledges above or under the surface. From these points,‘runners’ transferred them through the dune vegetation to standbyvehicles.

3.2.2. EffortRecreational dive shop owners and dive operators estimated that

there were between 150 and 300 active abalone divers based in PortElizabeth in 2006. This figure was supported by a boat-based diverwho estimated that there were about 300 active boat-based divers,90% of whom had no other source of income. The number of shoredivers was more difficult to estimate accurately since they were a

188 S.J.-P.N. Raemaekers, P.J. Britz / Fisheries Research 97 (2009) 183–195

Fig. 4. Boat licensing records at the main launching site on the Swartkops Riverestuary (Fig. 1) were used as an indicator of the size of the illegal fleet. Boat registersare maintained and filed at the Municipal Nature Conservation office (mandatedto patrol the river) and Swartkops Ski-boat Club situated at the main slipway intc(m

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observed, away from the nearby fishing grounds of Cape Recife tothe Sardinia Bay MPA, possibly due to a declining resource.

During the first half of 2006, the Ndlambe Municipality, situatedeastwards of Port Elizabeth (Fig. 1) experienced a strong upsurge of

he village of Swartkops. Only semi-rigid inflatable boats, with twin engines of aombined minimum 160 horsepower (hp) and with a minimum length of 6 metersm) were included for analysis. This figure represents the number of boats with a

inimum length of 6 m.

ore fluid group and many of them had alternate sources of income.owever, the SANDF intelligence database in Port Elizabeth listedtotal of more than 1500 individuals who had either been arrested

or abalone trafficking, or who had come to the attention of theuthorities for involvement in the illegal abalone fishing indus-ry between 1998 and 2006. This database probably includes allnvolved in the illegal abalone fishery including helpers, ‘runners’,lookouts’, drivers and middlemen.

It was estimated by various stakeholders interviewed that theumber of vessels involved in illegal abalone fishing from the urbanentre of Port Elizabeth grew from 30 in 2005 to more than 50oats by June 2007. These boats were almost all large, semi-rigid

nflatable ‘superducks’. Since 2005, the majority of abalone fish-ng vessels were launched from the Swartkops River estuary. Thushe vessel licensing register at the launch site provided a reason-bly complete record of launches by ‘superducks’, which are usedlmost exclusively by abalone divers4. Superducks first began toaunch at Swartkops in 2003, and the number of registered semi-igid inflatable vessels increased to 34 by 2006. The largest of theseegistered vessels was a 10.8 m semi-rigid inflatable with twin 250p engines (Figs. 4 and 5). The value of a ‘superduck’ unit includ-

ng 2 × 200 hp engines, trailer, dive gear and towing vehicle waspproximately 14 6005 USD, and therefore the capital investmentn the 30 ‘superducks’ counted in 2005 was more than 4 millionSD.

The abalone fishing grounds for Port Elizabeth-based diversere initially the productive reefs between Cape Recife and the

ardinia Bay MPA. In 2002, a snapshot survey by the MCM Portlizabeth Compliance and Control branch along this 20 km stretchounted 140 abalone fishers over a 35 h observation period. How-ver, with the move to boat-based diving, divers rapidly expanded

4 Although recreational dive operators in Port Elizabeth also operate 7 semi-rigidnflatable vessels similar to the abalone divers’, their owners confirmed that theyever launch through the Swartkops River estuary (Boshoff, pers. comm.; Van Aardt,ers. comm.; Thungstead, pers. comm.).5 The average exchange rate between the Dollar (USD) and the South African Rand

ZAR) for the study period 2005–2007 was 1 USD = 6.5 ZAR.

Fig. 5. Boat licensing records at the main launching site on the Swartkops River estu-ary: number of boats with twin engines of a combined minimum 160 horsepower(hp).

their efforts to the reefs around Bird Island. Although they have beenoperating there since at least 1999, it was only from 2003 onwardsthat the abalone stocks around the island were heavily targeted(Fig. 6). Despite the declaration of an MPA in the waters surround-ing Bird Island in June 2004 (DEAT, 2004), illegal diving incidentsreported by the SANParks rangers stationed on Bird Island contin-ued to increase with an average of three to four and a maximumof twelve boats present on any diveable day in 2007. Data from thestandardised on-site monitoring revealed an average of four boatsper diveable day, an average of 30 boat observations per month anda maximum of 46 boat observations per month between Januaryand July 2007. Sightings recorded included a total of 210 vessels,and a total of 1913 crew entering the MPA over this 6-month period.

Since 2005, a clear shift in effort by the boat-based divers was

Fig. 6. Illegal fishing effort data from the Bird Island MPA. The data prior to 2007,is drawn from the log of ‘Incident Reports’ filed by rangers of the South AfricanNational Parks (SANParks) based on Bird Island. From 2007 onwards, a separate on-site monitoring form was standardised, and rangers were trained to observe illegalfishing activities and collect each operation’s details.

S.J.-P.N. Raemaekers, P.J. Britz / Fisheri

Fig. 7. Observed illegal diving activities in the Ndlambe municipality: ‘Boat-based’refers to the actual number of vessels observed. Some illegal groups might have beenworking together. ‘Shore-based’ refers to actual groups observed. An influx of atlbsf

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60 kg of abalone per diver per trip, four times a month and 1 dive atrip per occasion. This estimate slightly exceeds 2000 tons of wholemass abalone per year.

east 3 shore-based groups (with up to 10 observed individuals) and eight differentoat-based groups (with up to 25 observed members), using at least 20 differentemi-rigid inflatable boats and 80 cars were observed operating in the Ndlambe arearom January 2006 onwards. Data was recorded by Ndlambe municipality officials.

llegal abalone fishing activities (Fig. 7), with up to 41 ‘superducks’bserved a month (a maximum of 11 on 1 April 2006). These ves-els were launched from the public slipways of the 3 main rivers inhe Ndlambe district, and were observed to target divers to the lessxploited reefs of Ndlambe’s remote coastline. A slight increase inhore-based diving operations was also recorded (Fig. 7), althoughhis data might represent an underestimate, given the law enforce-

ent agency’s focus on boat-based operations during the sameeriod.

The Ndlambe intelligence database listed 49 identified individ-als, predominantly white Afrikaner males, of whom 95% resided

n Port Elizabeth. It was also observed that local Ndlambe residentsradually became involved in the illegal fishing operations, actings skippers or ‘lookouts’, or repairing and servicing vessels used forhe illegal abalone fishing activities.

.2.3. Yield and revenueThe prime motivation among the organised groups from the

rban areas of the Eastern Cape to harvest abalone illegally is theighly lucrative nature of the business. Money can be made quicklys the highly valued abalone are relatively easily accessible, andre in high demand in the Far East. In 2006, abalone divers in theastern Cape were paid between 40 and 60 USD per kg of de-shelledbalone, but could obtain up to 77 USD per kg depending on demande.g. peaks in demand typically occur during Chinese New Year cel-brations). In addition, this price is dependent on the fluctuatingAR to USD exchange rate. Moreover, the more product the diversere able to supply, the more reliable they were perceived to be

y the buyers, which resulted in a higher price for their abalone.otably, this price – also referred to as the beach price – reflects

he amount paid to the divers. Abalone sold to exporters in Johan-esburg is reported to fetch prices of up to 125 USD per kg for fresh

eat. Payments were mostly made in cash, or bartered for with

ther illicit goods such as drugs (Steinberg, 2005).During the study period, in 2006, a boat-based diver could

xpect to harvest 60–150 kg of de-shelled abalone on a success-ul trip, and could thus earn up to 6000 USD a day (at 40 USD

es Research 97 (2009) 183–195 189

per kg) before the deduction of running costs. The utilised ‘super-ducks’ had a capacity of over 1 ton of de-shelled abalone with atotal value of 40 000–60 000 USD per trip for the 10–14 divers onboard. Shore-based fishers who dived on the relatively depletedreefs between Cape Recife and Bushy Park were reported to harvestbetween 10 and 15 kg of abalone meat per day. This harvest is sig-nificantly reduced compared to the 40 kg of abalone meat reportedto be obtainable per dive in the past. Interviews with illegal diversindicated that boat-based groups embark on illegal fishing activitieson average between 4 and 6 times per month, while shore-baseddivers dived more often.

Despite the quantitative information provided above, calcula-tion of the total tonnage and value of illegally fished abalone in theEastern Cape is elusive. We used a variety of anecdotal informa-tion and quantitative indicators to develop a credible estimate oftotal yield and value. Anecdotal reports by law enforcement offi-cials indicated that in 2003, in the region of 130 tons of de-shelledabalone (390 tons of whole mass) was fished illegally from thereefs surrounding Port Elizabeth. However, the illegal fishers whowere interviewed in 2006 estimated that 30–50 tons of de-shelledabalone had been transported from Port Elizabeth to Johannesburgevery month over the preceding few years: equivalent to an annualtotal of 360–600 tons of abalone meat or 1080–1800 tons of wholemass. The fairly regular abalone confiscations by law enforcementagencies also provide some indication of the level of illegal harvestof abalone. The corresponding amount confiscated in the EasternCape between 1997 and 2007 is illustrated in Fig. 8. The majorityof these confiscations were made near the urban areas, and pre-dominantly in the vicinity of Port Elizabeth. The law enforcementagencies believed that they confiscated approximately 5% (Kant,MCM, pers. comm.) of the illegal abalone catch. Using this estimateof confiscation efficiency, the total take of de-shelled abalone wascalculated to be 335–487 tons per year in the period of 2004–2006.This is equivalent to 1005–1461 tons of whole mass per year. Usingour 2006 survey data we attempted to calculate the yield of thePort Elizabeth boat-based abalone diving operations. We derivedan estimate of 58 tons of de-shelled abalone per month (696 tonsper year) using our previously recorded figures of an illegal fishingfleet of 30 ‘superducks’, with an average of 8 divers each, harvesting

Fig. 8. Amount of abalone confiscated in the Eastern Cape between 1997 and 2007.Data obtained from MCM.

190 S.J.-P.N. Raemaekers, P.J. Britz / Fisheries Research 97 (2009) 183–195

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Densities of emergent adult abalone in the favoured diving sitesat Bird Island, obtained from counts along the 30 m transects, werehighly variable, ranging from 0.1 to 3.9 abalone m−2, depending onhabitat but also ease of access by the illegal abalone divers. Higher

ig. 9. The mean size (as eviscerated mass) of abalone from sampled confiscatedatches from the urban areas of the Eastern Cape.

The total value of the estimated 1000–2000 tons of wholeass abalone harvested in the Eastern Cape per year during the

004–2006 period was calculated to be between 13 and 26 mil-ion USD in non-taxable cash income per year to the illegal abalonesher groups based in Port Elizabeth. Notably, this value was basedn a conservative price of 40 USD per kg of de-shelled abalone. Ifhe average export price of legal South African abalone is used (ca.5 USD per kg of whole mass) the value of the illegal Eastern Capearvest rises to 35–70 million USD per year.

.3. Resource depletion

Confiscations of abalone have risen dramatically since recordsere first kept in the Eastern Cape Province. From 2002 to 2006

ver 15 tons of shucked abalone meat have been confiscated everyear, which is equivalent to about 45 tons of whole mass (Fig. 8).nalysis of the confiscated catches revealed that the very high

llegal fishing effort has had a dramatic effect on the stock. Theean size (as eviscerated mass) decreased dramatically over the

ears (Fig. 9; Box-Cox transformed: F = 673.5, df = 10, p � 0.05), withbalone divers targeting progressively smaller animals. Due to thenbalanced design of the input matrix (several regions had eithero confiscations, or were not sampled for particular years), it wasot possible to perform a factorial ANOVA for significant differencesver the years and regions together. Univariate analysis of vari-nce and post hoc tests, however, did reveal significant decreasesf mean size for all separate regions, as exemplified by the histor-cal illegal abalone fishing ground at Cape Recife (Fig. 10). In thisrea, reduced mean sizes in 1997 already indicated a reduction inhe standing stock biomass. A slight increase in mean size duringertain years most probably reflects large confiscations of abalonerom previously unexploited reefs, seized from transport vehiclesr catch accumulation points.

Concomitantly, the proportion of abalone below the minimumegal size6 in the confiscated catches has increased significantlyver the years. This is illustrated in Fig. 11, where the appar-

nt increase in the percentage of undersized abalone was fittedith a significant linear regression model (F = 7.269 on 1 and 9 df,< 0.05) in which the slope parameter was significant (t = 2.696,f = 9, p < 0.05). Interestingly, analysis of the number of abalone

6 114 mm shell breadth in the Western Cape commercial fishery, or 176 g of evis-erated mass based on the calculated regression curve presented in Fig. 3.

Fig. 10. The mean size (as eviscerated mass) of abalone from sampled confiscatedcatches from Cape Recife.

units confiscated revealed no significant decrease over the years.Smaller confiscations usually originated from abandoned bags orarrests of shore-based divers, while larger confiscations stemmedfrom catch accumulation points in and around Port Elizabeth.

Within the Bird Island MPA, in situ sampling in 2006 and 2007revealed that mean size (shell width) of newly shucked abalone(93.6 ± 16.8) from four favoured illegal diving sites was significantlylarger (t = 18.33, df = 1677, p < 0.05) than mean size of emergentabalone (75.92 ± 19.38) measured in the same areas. This indicateda preference by divers to collect the larger abalone first. However,as larger abalone have become less abundant over the last 5 years,divers have had to target those of smaller size. This trend is illus-trated in Fig. 12, where population size-frequency diagrams showthat 91% of illegally fished abalone were undersized, compared to98% of the live emergent abalone randomly collected, and only 72%of the emergent abalone sampled by MCM in exactly the same areasin 1986 (Fig. 13). These apparent changes in population size struc-tures provide a means of assessing changes in emergent abaloneabundance and for monitoring the health of the local abalone stock.

Fig. 11. Proportion of abalone below the minimum legal size in the confiscatedcatches (114 mm shell breadth in the Western Cape commercial fishery, or 176 geviscerated mass based on calculated regression curve).

S.J.-P.N. Raemaekers, P.J. Britz / Fisheri

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ig. 12. Bird Island in situ size distributions and indication of percentage underhe legal size (114 mm shell width) of live and shell collections. Abbreviation used:

LS—minimum legal size.

ensities were found in the shallower, high profile areas along theransect lines. MCM observed similar densities in their 1986 survey,sing the same method in the same areas. This potentially sup-orts the claim by the boat-based divers that the individual size ofbalone in their catches in the Bird Island MPA has decreased, buthat it was still worth their while diving around the islands as theyould achieve high total catches.

Monitoring of abalone recruitment at Cape Recife revealed thatarvae were still settling in the shallows despite the local depletionf large abalone. Densities of juvenile cryptic abalone at the rockool sample site were highly variable, ranging between 2.4 and3.7 abalone m−2, measured biannually between December 2005nd December 2007. These were slightly, but not significantly, lowerhan the average densities recorded by Godfrey (Rhodes Univer-ity, 2003, unpublished data) in prior work performed in the sameample site.

.4. Enforcement

In this section, a description of the enforcement strategies andools employed by various government authorities in combating

ig. 13. Bird Island in situ size distributions and indication of percentage under theegal size (114 mm shell width) of live collections undertaken for this study and by

CM in the 1980s. Abbreviation used: MLS—minimum legal size. Both distributionsere recorded using a different size interval.

es Research 97 (2009) 183–195 191

the highly organised abalone fishing groups in the Eastern CapeProvince is provided based on interviews with members of the lawenforcement agencies, other stakeholders, and on data collected bythe authors.

South Africa’s fisheries authority, MCM, which is a branch of theDepartment of Environmental Affairs and Tourism (DEAT), is theprimary agency mandated to undertake fisheries monitoring, con-trol and surveillance (MCS). In response to the escalating IUU fishingin South African territorial waters, MCM restructured and upgradedtheir Compliance Directorate to a Chief Directorate ‘Monitoring,Control and Surveillance’ in 1999 (Hauck and Kroese, 2006). Thisdirectorate comprised of three sub-directorates, including: (i) Com-pliance/Control; (ii) Environmental Protection Vessels7 and (iii)Monitoring and Surveillance with a Specialised Unit and a SeriousOffences Unit (DEAT, 2006b).

However, illegal abalone fishing is not simply a marine resourceissue and involves a variety of criminal activities. Therefore otheragencies of state have played a role in combating crimes relatedto illegal abalone fishing, either in partnership with MCM, or inde-pendently. These have included: the various branches of the SouthAfrican Police Services (Organised Crime, Crime Intelligence, Bor-der Control, Dog Unit, Endangered Species Unit, Water Wing, AirWing and others), the SANDF, the National Prosecuting Authority(Asset Forfeiture Unit and the Directorate of Special Operations), theNational Intelligence Agency (NIA), South African Revenue Services(SARS), SANParks, the provincial nature conservation authority andthe environmental compliance arms of local authorities.

3.4.1. MCM monitoring, control and surveillance in Port ElizabethIn 1997 when organised abalone fishing began in Port Elizabeth,

the local Fisheries Compliance/Control inspectorate employed 8Marine Conservation Inspectors (Mostert, Chief Marine Conserva-tion Inspector, pers. comm.) who were essentially occupied withcommercial quota control in the harbour. Realising that their man-power was insufficient to meet the increase in illegal abalonefishing, and under heavy public pressure to react to the problemwhich had escalated, MCM Compliance/Control initiated a partner-ship with the SAPS in 2002. This partnership initiated the formationand funding of an Abalone Task Team (ATT) based in Port Elizabeth.Overtime commitment by the task team members was compen-sated by MCM, and this together with a 4 × 4 vehicle provided by thefisheries authority represented a commitment of 150 000 USD infunds per year. However, despite the ATT’s success in making arrests(see section below), this task team was disbanded and reinstated atleast 3 times since its inception, until MCM withdrew completelyfrom the initiative in early 2006.

The MCM Compliance/Control section in Port Elizabeth has beenthe least effective agency in combating illegal abalone fishing. Themonitoring of commercial landings in the Port Elizabeth harbourwas outsourced in October 2002, potentially freeing the Compli-ance/Control inspectors to focus on illegal abalone fishing. Despite

this, however, the morale of the inspectors had already been hithard by the apparent lack of dedicated funding from MCM head-quarters to upgrade their equipment in order to confront the highlyorganised abalone fishers, and to remunerate their overtime com-

7 The sub-directorate Environmental Protection Vessels (EPVs) is relatively young,with the acquisition of 5 new fishery protection vessels since November 2004. Thelargest one, the ‘Sarah Baartman’ is principally designed to monitor fishing activ-ity on the high seas. Three similar but smaller protection vessels patrol the inshorewaters, each 47 m long, 8 m wide, and capable of reaching a top speed of 25 knots.They are all equipped with a semi-rigid inflatable boat, allowing the fisheries inspec-tors to board and inspect fishing boats. MCM’s latest asset, is a 580 000 USD, hardhulled 14 m long vessel, designed for high speed chases in the inshore waters,and can reach speeds up to 60–70 knots (source: http://www.environment.gov.za;http://www.mcm-deat.gov.za).

192 S.J.-P.N. Raemaekers, P.J. Britz / Fisheries Research 97 (2009) 183–195

Table 2Performance of the various law enforcement bodies with respect to amount of abalone confiscated in 2004. Data was obtained from the Abalone Task Team.

Organisation/branch kg shucked % of total Beach price (40 USD/kg de-shelled) Legal price (35 USD/kg whole mass)

ATT 11487.1 70 $459 484 $1 206 146SAPS extern 1313.35 8 $52 534 $137 902S $14M $

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itment. Data obtained from the ATT shows that less than 1% ofbalone confiscated by law enforcement agencies was seized byCM personnel in 2004 (Table 2) reflecting the poor performance

f this agency in combating illegal abalone fishing.MCM provided additional resources and a fresh impetus to com-

at illegal abalone fishing in 2005 with the stationing of a newnvironmental Patrol Vessel (EPV) in the Port Elizabeth harbour.owever, the vessel proved largely ineffective in apprehendingbalone fishers as ‘lookouts’ posted in the harbour and along theoast warned fishers of its movements, and its relatively low speedompared to the highly powered ‘superducks’, restricted its strikeapabilities. Interviewed abalone fishers reported that EPV acteds a deterrent when deployed in remote areas such as Bird Island;owever, as soon as it left they would return to resume their illegalfforts (see data in section below on the presence of the EPV at Birdsland and observations of illegal fishing vessels).

To match the speed of the ‘superducks’, MCM invested in a rigidigh speed chase vessel, but its effectiveness also proved to be lim-

ted as it could not operate at the necessary speed in rough seaonditions. Furthermore, this vessel could not manoeuvre in theurf zone or river estuaries which were used by the illegal divingroups to escape with their responsive semi-inflatable boats. Lastly,CM did initially not have sufficient skippers with night rating and

hus no vessel operations were undertaken against illegal fishersfter dark.

.4.2. Involvement of other government agenciesThe highly organised nature of the illegal abalone fishing groups,

nd the large public outcry about the problem, led to several othergencies of state becoming involved in ‘anti-poaching’ efforts inort Elizabeth.

Through its various branches, SAPS has played the most sub-tantial role in combating illegal abalone fishing and trafficking inhe Eastern Cape Province. Data for 2004 indicate that more than9% of abalone confiscated was seized by SAPS agencies (Table 2).ranslated into values using the legal export price of 35 USD perg of abalone, the SAPS were responsible for the recovery of morehan 1.7 million USD in 2004. Port Elizabeth SAPS Organised Crimenit, which has preferred to operate fairly independently of otherAPS departments, the ATT and MCM, has been particularly effec-ive in effecting arrests and build strong cases against organisedyndicates.

On several occasions, the SANDF deployed military personnellong the coast to assist the ATT and MCM. While the presence ofoldiers was an extremely effective deterrent to the illegal fishers,his level of force could not be sustained for longer than a few weekst a time as it was a financial burden to the SANDF. Fishers returneds soon as the SANDF presence was withdrawn.

Additional actions to curb illegal fishing activity have included:

The restriction of access to the diving ‘hotspot’ in the Cape RecifeNature Reserve by the Nelson Mandela Bay Municipality.A review of by-laws for vessel use on the Swartkops Estuary (seeabove), with a view of prohibiting illegal fishers to launch theirhigh-powered boats in the municipal rivers.

2 200 $373 2752408 $6321

6 626 $1 723 643

• Closure of access to the public slipway in the Port Elizabethharbour in 2005, which was previously heavily used by the boat-based divers.

3.4.3. Illegal abalone fishing spreads to other areas: Ndlambelocal municipality’s response

While Port Elizabeth was the base from which the organisedabalone fishers operated, their activities began to spread furtherafield in 2006 as they relocated off more productive abalone beds.A sudden influx of boat-based divers into Ndlambe Municipalityoccurred in 2006 prompting the Municipal Environmental Conser-vation Department to take the lead in countering this new threat.With limited personnel (3 municipal conservation officers and 2local SAPS Inspectors not solely dedicated to combating illegalabalone fishing) and limited equipment (4.7 m semi-rigid inflat-able boat with a single 65 hp engine), innovative methods wereused to disrupt the illegal operations. Diving activity was monitoredusing a network of informants and divers were confronted whenlaunching their boats or returning from sea in the Port Alfred har-bour. At every opportunity, divers were stopped and searched andrepeatedly fined for non-compliance with traffic (road worthinessand annual licenses) and South African Marine Safety Authority(SAMSA) regulations (mandatory life jackets and other safety equip-ment). Also, under the resolutions of the Prevention of OrganisedCrime Act (No. 121 of 1998) (Republic of South Africa, 1998b) andthe Marine Living Resources Act (No. 18 of 1998) (Republic of SouthAfrica, 1998a), empty dive waist bags and flat-bladed tools used forabalone harvesting were confiscated if found in the vehicles or boatsof the suspected illegal fishers. These actions served a dual pur-pose: disrupting the illegal fishers’ activities, and most importantly,building up intelligence information and profiles of the illegal fish-ers.

With the abalone diving activities along Ndlambe’s coastlinebecoming increasingly publicised, the local municipality and theProvincial SAPS formed a local ATT in May 2006 with 9 dedicatedmembers. A special telephone ‘hotline’ was set up for the pub-lic to report suspicious activities, and additional equipment waspurchased, including a 5.5 m semi-rigid inflatable with twin 60 hpengines. The ATT was disbanded after 3 months due to reallocationof resources by the SAPS. Support for the operation by MCM wasconspicuously lacking.

Despite the limited manpower, lifespan, support and capacityof the local ATT, shore-based as well as boat-based diver’s activi-ties were significantly disrupted: 10 arrests were made, 2035 unitsof abalone were confiscated (over 1 ton of whole mass), originat-ing mainly from shore-based groups. Moreover, the illegal activitiesof several boat-based groups were impeded by the confiscation ofwaist bags and tools, or the disturbance of these groups attemptingto dive at the targeted dive locations.

Illegal abalone fishers rapidly adapted to the new interventions,circumventing the Municipality by launching their vessels further

north, by engaging local recreational ski-boat owners to delivertheir waist bags and tools to their vessels at sea, or simply byincreasing their intelligence information on the whereabouts ofthe ATT members. Overall illegal fishing activities along Ndlambe’scoastline decreased significantly in 2007 (Fig. 7), but by the end

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f 2007, a second upsurge of illegal abalone fishing activitiesccurred, with boats arriving at night, directly from Port Elizabethy sea.

.4.4. Bird Island, MCM and SANParksThe Bird Island MPA is home to a rich abalone resource which

as increasingly targeted by boat-based divers from 2003 onwardsFig. 6). A period of intensive monitoring of the presence of illegalbalone fishing vessels and law enforcement operations was car-ied out for 6 months in 2007 by the SANParks personnel based onhe island. This monitoring revealed that the MCM EPV patrolled the

PA 27 times over a 6 month period, while at least 210 illegal divingoat observations were made in the MPA during the same period.uring this 6-month period, no arrests of the boat-based diversith their catch were made out at sea. Nevertheless, on those days

hat the MCM EPV was stationed within the MPA for longer periodsf time, no illegal abalone fishing boats were observed. The abilityf law enforcement agencies to defend Bird Island against illegalshers was further compromised by the opening of South Africa’sPA’s for recreational SCUBA diving in 2007 (DEAT, 2006a). It is

sually not possible to catch divers in possession of abalone, andhus arrest for illegal diving in an MPA was a useful instrument forombating illegal fishing. The diving ban at Bird Island was rein-tituted in 2008 as part of a regulation to protect abalone stocksDEAT, 2007).

The promulgation of the Bird Island Group of Islands in 2004tipulated SANParks as the manager of the MPA (DEAT, 2004),owever transfer of jurisdiction over the marine component toANParks was delayed until 2008 by bureaucracy within DEAT.ince 2006, SANParks has invested substantially in vessels, person-el and infrastructure on the island. This included the deploymentf a crack ‘anti-poaching’ team of eight personnel equipped with a

superduck’, dive capacity, and weaponry. Following the high pro-le arrest of 10 divers in the water at Bird Island in January 2008y MCM personnel, day time abalone fishing activity ceased andhifted to after dark.

. Discussion

The majority of interviewees in our study were of the opinionhat the government had failed to grasp the scale of the illegalbalone fishing problem in the Eastern Cape Province, and wasll-equipped to deal with the organised criminal nature of the enter-rise. This view is supported by our data which shows that despitehe involvement of several agencies of government in combatingllegal abalone fishing, a well organised, commercial illegal abaloneshery developed in Port Elizabeth. By 2005, the scale of the illegalshery was remarkable: a fleet of 30 purpose built vessels existedith a capital investment of 4 million USD, employing at least 300

ull time crew and harvesting 1000–2000 tons of abalone with anxport value of 35–70 million USD. The reason for the rapid devel-pment of the fishery is obvious: due to the high price of abalone, anndividual diver could make in the region of 6000 USD from 100 kgf abalone in a single trip, with minimal capital investment and risk.ur survey of government’s enforcement response to the problem

eveals that while considerable resources were deployed to com-at the various criminal activities associated with the problem,nforcement agencies lacked a coordinated strategy. Most ‘anti-oaching’ operations were short term, and the resources dedicatedo combating illegal fishing were no match for the well equipped

nd highly organised illegal syndicates with their sophisticatedntelligence network. Similarly, in the Western Cape Province, withlegal commercial fishery at stake, several large-scale law enforce-ent operations have been designed over the years to combat

llegal abalone fishing (Hauck and Kroese, 2006; Hauck and Sweijd,

es Research 97 (2009) 183–195 193

1999; Herbig and Joubert, 2002). However, implementation of theseoperations has also been fragmented, uncoordinated, largely reac-tive, and above all, unsustained.

With the shift from opportunistic shore-based diving, whichalmost certainly evolved out of a popular recreational fishery, tomore organised boat-based abalone fishing, arrests near the PortElizabeth city dropped and the abalone harvest increased. Theapparent contrast between the decrease in arrests and the increasein abalone confiscations (Fig. 8) is also explained by a shift in focusby the SAPS Organised Crime Unit from catching divers to breakingup syndicates. The majority of abalone are confiscated at catch accu-mulation points or from transport vehicles, resulting in only a fewindividual arrests. Boat-based divers interviewed in 2007 reportedthat their risk of arrest and successful prosecution was minimal.They estimated that on average law enforcement activities forcedthem to abandon their catch every 15–20 diving days, while shore-based divers would have to leave their bags for later pick up every6–7 dives. Our data and observations of the boat-based diving atBird Island and within Ndlambe Municipality confirmed that thestate had no effective sea-based force capable of halting the fishingoperations of the fleet of ‘superducks’. The illegal fishing operationswere effectively organised pillage of a high-value resource.

The high level of illegal fishing effort has had a dramatic effecton the abalone stock, which shows symptoms of decline and evencollapse in places. The average size of abalone decreased at all sitesmonitored, to as low as 80 g of flesh per individual abalone in 2007at Cape Recife, which has been heavily fished since 1997. Abalonedensity measured at Cape Recife and Bird Island also reflected adramatic decline. While indicators thus showed a decline in theresource, it remains to be studied how collected data would beable to project abundance trends when integrated into an age-structured production model such as the model developed forabalone resource assessments in the Western Cape. This model alsotakes into account confiscations data, which is recorded in the sameway as was for this study (Plagányi et al., 2001).

Nevertheless, resource decline was also reflected in diverbehaviour with the shift to fishing areas further afield, and theincreasing involvement of abalone divers in other activities suchas the illegal trade in cycads, parrots, shark fins and rock lobster.Nonetheless, illegal abalone fishing near the urban centres of theEastern Cape continued unabated in 2007/2008, even on moredepleted reefs. Notably, it takes no more than six abalone per diver(1.5 kg of abalone meat) to cover the running costs of a boat-basedoperation.

Given the scale of the sea-based illegal fishing operationsrevealed by our research, MCM’s approach of visible policing andreaction to reports of illegal diving operations was clearly inade-quate. While MCM was slow to react, a number of successful arrestsof illegal fishers at sea were carried out in January 2008 with com-bined operations involving patrol vessels, helicopter air supportand shore-based teams to intercept the fleeing fishers. In addition,SANParks deployed a dedicated team of eight skilled personnelequipped with suitable vessels, dive capability and weaponry toprotect the Bird Island MPA. A further useful tool for combatingabalone fishing operations was the prohibition of any kind of div-ing, and the possession of prohibited diving gear on board any vesselin selected areas, specifically MPA’s (DEAT, 2007). For the EasternCape, only the Bird Island MPA has been listed.

While our study focussed primarily on the illegal abalone fish-ing operations, the criminal activity associated with the otheraspects of the illegal trade requires a much wider institutional

response. Other analysts have reported on the involvement of inter-national organised crime in the abalone trade and the South Africanstate’s response to it (Gastrow, 2001; Steinberg, 2005). There is agrowing recognition of the need for a coordinated, multi-agencyapproach if the state is to be effective in dealing with the prob-

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em (Vosloo, National Intelligence Agency, pers. comm.). This stemsrom the need to co-operate in the assembly of incriminating evi-ence, including the interchange of intelligence data on illegalsher profiles and whereabouts. Some even go as far as to statehat while the large-scale enforcement initiative ‘Operation Nep-une’ in the Western Cape had a positive impact on curbing illegalshing activity along its jurisdiction, its uncoordinated approachad been a contributing factor to the shifting of organised syndi-ates and fishing effort to the Eastern Cape (Hauck, University ofape Town, pers. comm.). Unfortunately, during the study period2004–2007) MCM centralised enforcement efforts and broke part-erships that it had developed with agencies such as the SAPS and

ocal municipalities. For example, agreements to support the rela-ively successful ‘anti-poaching’ programmes of the Port Alfred andverberg (Western Cape) municipalities were terminated on therounds that municipalities were “inappropriate agencies” for con-ucting marine compliance (Mayekiso, MCM, interviewed on SABCelevision’s ‘Special Assignment’ programme, 2007). A further blown 2006 was the suspension of the dedicated environmental courts

hich had been highly effective in prosecuting abalone cases.n their place, an Environmental Management Inspectorate wasstablished by DEAT to prosecute environmental cases in existingourts.

The preceding discussion highlights the lack of a national vision,nd concomitant strategies describing roles and mandates of theollaborating institutions as the most important causes underlyinghe mismatch between the law enforcement activities and illegalshing effort levels which we observed near the urban centres ofhe Eastern Cape.

The escalation in illegal abalone fishing operations, the inef-ective and centralised enforcement attempts, and the resultantcological effects on the abalone resource, described in this paperlso reflect a broader management failure within MCM, Southfrica’s authority responsible for fisheries management and com-liance. Despite the demonstrated presence of a substantial abaloneesource in the Eastern Cape Province by the illegal fishing activ-ty, MCM’s strategy to date focussed primarily on law enforcementnd neglected the obvious opportunity to develop a legal andustainable fishery. A ‘Management Plan for the Eastern Capebalone Resource’ which was drafted for MCM in 2002 was not

mplemented, effectively leaving the resource to the illegal fish-rs to harvest. The management plan recommended that abaloneshing rights be allocated using a Territorial User Right FisheryTURF) management system, which has shown promise in sev-ral other marine benthic invertebrate fisheries around the worldArbuckle, 2000; Bernal et al., 1999). The concept of managing thebalone resource as TURFs found some currency within MCM, asbalone fishing rights were allocated as ‘TURFs’ in the Western Caperovince in 2003. However, this rights-based model was flawed asivers from areas with depleted abalone stocks were allowed accesso neighbouring ‘TURFs’. In the Eastern Cape, the TURF-based man-gement plan was never implemented—save for a failed attempto establish ‘small-scale commercial TURFs’ in traditional commu-al areas. In 2007, in the light of the serious resource depletionemonstrated at Cape Recife, MCM in principle approved a planeseeding the site with hatchery-reared juvenile abalone by a com-ercial entity—effectively a ‘rehabilitation TURF’ as defined in theanagement plan.

. Conclusion

Illegal exploitation of abalone in South Africa is believed to be theost criminalised wildlife trade in Africa today (Bürgener, TRAF-

IC 2006, http://www.traffic.org). As illustrated in this paper, theastern Cape Province has become a major source of supply for

es Research 97 (2009) 183–195

the illegal abalone trade due to the failure of the state to imple-ment (i) effective sea-based compliance and (ii) a legitimate fishingrights regime. This, combined with the other incentives to fishabalone (high price, low cost, ease of access) created the conditionsfor the shore-based, relatively informal fishing operation to evolveinto a sophisticated and efficient sea-based operation. Althoughthe resource is facing serious decline, illegal abalone fishing willremain profitable, undiminished and unhindered for several moreyears if the current enforcement capacity and fisheries manage-ment approach remains unchanged.

The large illegal catches demonstrate a missed opportunity todevelop a legal fishery in the Eastern Cape, and that this legal fish-ery may have led to better control of illegal fishing efforts. Eventhough biological indicators suggest that abalone stocks are in seri-ous decline in the more accessible areas, significant catches are stillbeing made and larval recruitment has not been impaired to suchan extent as to result in a complete population collapse. Legalisinga fishery might thus still be a worthwhile consideration, althoughsignificant effort will be necessary with regards to the institutionalarrangements and the rehabilitation of depleted stocks, by meansof effort control or reseeding.

We conclude that the lack of compliance capability to combatboat-based illegal abalone fishing has been a “missing link” in SouthAfrica’s otherwise quite substantive, albeit poorly coordinated andcentralised, response to illegal abalone fishing in the Eastern Cape.While enforcement arms have done their best to combat abalonelinked criminal activity on shore, the unrestricted market supply ofproduct from the abalone fishing fleet meant that the state wouldalways be reactive to the illegal abalone trade and one step behindthe fishers. This has also come at a great economic loss to the coun-try, in the range of 35–70 million USD a year.

Although progress in combating illegal abalone fishing has beenmade over the years, the ‘counter-poaching’ measures suggestedhere and by others will only be effective in halting the demiseof the abalone resource if they are integrated into a holistic andadaptive management strategy. More importantly, the underlyingsocio-political and economic factors that are driving the illegaltrade near the urban areas of the Eastern Cape will need to beunderstood and incorporated into management decision-making.

Acknowledgements

This research was partially funded by the Marine and CoastalManagement branch of the Department of Environmental Affairsand Tourism, South Africa, through their Outsourced Provin-cial Research Projects (project P011). The authors would like toextend thanks to Roget Fox, Brian Godfrey and George Kant fortheir research assistance, constructive comments and collabora-tion which ranged from measuring confiscated abalone to groundproofing intelligence databases. Russell Chalmers and Albrecht Götzare also thanked for their help with surveys within the Bird IslandMPA, as well as the SANParks rangers for the on-site monitoring.This paper represents the views of the authors and not necessarilythose of their affiliated funders.

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