Private Sector Institutional Reform Project Final Evaluation

Private Sector Institutional Reform Project

Final Evaluation

Contract No. 527-598-0772.16-C-OO-5368-00

00//11

Submitted to:

USAIDJPeru

Submitted by:

Development Associates, Inc. 1730 North Lynn Street

Arlington, Virginia 22209 Telephone: (703) 276-0677

Fax: (703) 276-0432

Conducted By Russell Stout

Gustavo Guerrero

October 1995

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Development Associates, Inc. PSIR Project Final Evaluation

PAGE

Glossary .. . .............. .... . .............. ..... . ...................... i

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY ......... . ......................................... iii

Chapter I: Purpose of the Evaluation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. 1

A. Background. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. 1 B. The Institute for Liberty and Democracy ............................ 4 C. The Evaluation Purpose ................ . ........................ 5 D. Measurement of Impact ................................... . ..... 5

Chapter II: Evaluation Findings . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. 7

A. Background and Prior Evaluations Threshold Evaluation, March 1992 ..... . . . ......................... 7

B. Administrative/Financial. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8 Orgaruzation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. 9 Staffing and Personnel Policy/Salaries .. . ... .... .................... 10

C. Technical Programs ................. . ........................... 15 Democratization ........ . ........... ........................... 15 Administrative Simplification Program .............................. 17 Property Formalization (PROFORM) ................................ 18 Unified Business Registry (UBR) ................................... 19 International Activities ................................. . ... . . ... 20

D. The ILD and the Government of Peru ............................... 20 E. Women in Development ............................ ..... .... .... 21

Chapter III. Sustainability ................................................. 23

A. Sustainability - Background ......................... . .. ..... . .... 23 Income Generation, Cost Recovery and Indirect Costs .............................................. 23 Other Funding Sources . . . . .. .. ......................... . . . .... ... 25 Indirect Costs ............. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28 Conclusion ......... . ....... . .................. . ...... . .. . .... 29

PSIR Project Final Evaluation October 1995

Development Associates, [tic.

PAGE

Chapter IV.General Conclusions and Recommendations ............ . ........... .. 30

A. Introduction . ... .... .... . . . .. ........ . ........................ 30 B. Administration/Financial .................................. .. . .. . 31 C. Technical Programs ................................... .. ........ 33 D. The Unique Contribution of ILD to

USAID/Peru, USAID/W, and USAID worldwide ............... . ...... 35 E. Women in Development .... . ... ............ . ................. . . . 36

Chapter V.Lessons Learned ................................................ 37

A IT ACHMENTS

1. ILD's Staff Distribution by Function as of September 1995. lA. ILD's Staff Distribution by Grade as of September 1995.

2. Evaluation Team's Suggested Staff levels in accordance with ILD's Current Operational Status as of September 1995

3. Mortgage Loans by Financial Institutions Registered in Predial as of Sept. 1995.

4. Detail of Properties Registered in Predial as of August 1995.

5. Detail of Businesses Registration by Unified Business Registry (UBR)

6. Number of Employees Registered by UBR. (Does not include one-person or family members).

7. SUNAT (Peru's IRS) Taxation Statistical Charts.

8. ILD's Other Donors Contribution Detail.

9. ILD's Record of Events, April 1992.

10. ILD's One Year Budget Summary presented to USAID/W for the Globalization of ILD as a Teaching and Research Institution.

11. Sample Questionnaire given to street vendors in four areas of Lima.


Development Associates, Inc.

ANNEXES

1. Evaluation Scope of Work 2. Evaluation Methodology 3. Evaluation Work Plan 4. The Composition of the Team and the Qualifications of the Team Members. 5. List of Documents Reviewed 6. List of Persons Contacted/Interviewed

CHAPTERS.R38

PSI R Project Final EvaJua1ion October 1995

GLOSSARY

Deuelopment Associates, Inc. PSIR Project Final Evaluation

ADEC-ATC Asociaci6n Laboral para el Desarrollo (Labor Association for Development)

,

APOYO NGO - Consulting, Survey Research

APRA Alianza Peruana Revolucionaria Americana (Peruvian Alliance for Revolution in the Americas) - Political party

BUSFORM Business Formalization Program

IBRD International Bank for Reconstruction & Development - World Bank

lOB Interamerican Development Bank

ILD Instituto Libertad y Democracia (Institute for Liberty and Democracy)

INAP Instituto Nacional de Administraci6n Publica (National Public Administration Institute).

CADE Conferencia Anual de Ejecutivos (Annual Executives Conference)

CAMBIO 90/ President Fujimori's political party NUEVA MA YORIA

CAU Cooperativa Agraria de Usuarios (Users Agrarian Cooperative)

CEDRO Centro de Educaci6n e Informaci6n para la Prevenci6n del Abuso de Drogas (Education & Information Center for the Prevention of Drug Abuse)

FUNDES Fundaci6n para el Desarrollo Social y Econ6mico (Social & Economic Development Foundation - Swiss NGO)

GAMARRA Small business zone.

GRADE Grupo de Analisis para el Desarrollo (Group of Analysis for Development)

PACT Private Agencies Collaborating Together


PETI

PSIR

PREDIAL

PROFORM

RUE

SUNAD

SUNARP

SUNAT

TUPA

UBR

UNDP

USAID

GLOSSARY.R38

Proyecto Especial de Titulaci6n de Tierras (Rural Titling Project)

Private Sector Institutional Reform Project

Simplified Land Titling Registry

Property Formalization Program

Registro Unificado de Empresas (Unified Business Registry (UBR))

Superintendencia Nacional de Aduanas (National Customs office)

Superintendencia Nacional de Registros Pliblicos (National Public Registry Office)

Superintendencia Nacional de Administraci6n Tributaria (National Tax Administration Office)

Texto Unico de Procedimientos Administrativos (Primary Administrative Procedures Manual)

Unified Business Registry

United Nations Development Program

United States Agency for International Development.

PSIA Project Anal Evaluation October 1995

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY


"More powerful than marching armies is an idea whose time has come." Victor Hugo

Purpose of the Activities Evaluated

The pages that follow contain a detailed final evaluation of the Private Sector Institutional Reform Project (PSIR), 598-0772, USAID/Peru. This final evaluation follows the guidelines of the USAID Evaluation Manual and the Scope of Work (SOW) prepared by the Office of Democratic Initiatives and Training (ODIT), USAID/Peru. The SOW, which is attached to the full report, outlines the particular issues that concern USAID/Peru, and asks for specific accomplishments that can be attributed to USAID support for the non-government organization (NGO), Institute for Liberty and Democracy (ILD), Lima, Peru. In every instance we have respected and complied with the guidelines and requirements of our contract with USAID /Peru. However, the detailed examination of the administration, financial management, and accomplishments of the ILD tells only part of the story of the institute's success and influence that USAID /Peru began supporting in 1984. The USAID /Peru funding for ILD began with a small grant for research into the feasibility of using private property rights as a lever to improve the Peruvian economy and to provide wider access to the social and economic benefits of the Peruvian mainstream economy to so-called "informal sector" economic activities in areas such as trade, housing, and transport. That minor commitment has grown, over the years, to a long term commitment (almost 12 years) of over $15 million of USG funding for the ILD. The PSIR project evaluation however, only addresses the years 1989-1995.

The most visible achievement of ILD activities in the past ten years was the publication of the book EL OTRO SENDERO, which first appeared in Peru in 1986, and has now been translated into English, French, Russian, etc. The book has been an international best-seller in both hard cover and paper back editions.

Purpose of the Evaluation

The questions of the SOW are clear and unequivocal. They ask whether or not the ILD has made a difference in the current political, social, and economic condition of Peru. The answer to that series of questions is just as clear and unequivocal: Yes. The details of the basis for the affirmative response are in the full text of the report. The purpose of this executive summary is to summarize why our response is affirmative, and to identify the long-term development policy implications of the ILD successes.

The PSIR project is not an ordinary USAID general development or technical sector support project. The unsolicited proposal from ILD (1989) that is the basis for USAID funding over the past six years and eight months has no LogFrame, no verifiable indicators linked to specific outputs linked to inputs, linked to purpose, linked to goal, etc. However, there are ample formal indicators built into the cooperative agreement and the project documents that followed in the implementation of the project. Based on the formal benchmarks developed by

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USAIO/ Peru and what we observed of ILO operations, we think the best way to evaluate ILO's activities is to consider the project's contribution not just to the reform of the private sector in Peru, but to strategic objectives, and to USG concerns in South America and in the developing world. The persons interviewed in the course of the evaluation were unanimous on one theme: It is at the policy level, at the level where decisions have been made that affected the future of Peru and the behavior of its citizens that ILO has had the most profound impact.

ILO has had its greatest imp-act on USAIO/Peru Strategic Objective No.1: "Strengthened democratic institutions that sustain individual rights and freedoms and are responsive to their constituencies. This activity contributes significantly to the objective by supporting and advocating deregulation of the economy, simplification of administrative procedures, and introduction of transparent criteria and methodologies in the decision-making processes of regional governments."

The project also supports Strategic Objective No.2: "Sustainable economic growth led by the private sector by supporting the formalization of land plots and thus increasing the price value of land in informal rural and urban areas. Formal titles help secure credit, hence, working capital and investment."

In order to determine how well ILO has met the purpose of the project, the policy agenda it has set for itself in the original unsolicited proposal, and how well the institute has performed in terms of the questions asked in the evaluation SOW, the evaluation team pursued four distinct paths of review and research. First, we examined all available USAIO, ILO, World Bank, and GOP documents that deal with the issues listed above as they pertain to activities of the ILO. Included in this document review was a six year content analysis of Peruvian press articles and critiques, journal reviews, and international discussions of ILO, its President, and its activities. Second, we interviewed a broad range of opinion leaders, government officials, representatives of other Peruvian NGOs, private sector executives, journalists, academics, and community organization leaders (urban areas Villa El Salvador, Huaycan, and rural area Huando). Third, we spent time inside ILO, reviewing administrative procedures, interviewing personnel, observing how the staff works and how tasks are allocated and administered. Finally, to get a better sense of the ILO recognition factor among its primary target population, we conducted an informal survey of four centers of "informal" trading activity in the Lima Metropolitan area. At the end of each day, we summarized the results of the document review, the interviews, and our observations. The findings are based on our intensive (but constrained by time limitations) examination of the ILO record in Peru and internationally. We found it impossible to verifiably quantify the influence of the ILO on the Peruvian society and economy, except in the broad indicators such as the number and amount of loans made by banks and other financial institutions, and the tax data provided by the Peruvian tax agency. Other items, such as increases in land value that could not be verified independently of ILO are not discussed, because we had neither the time nor the means to investigate further.

Summary of Broad Concerns from the Scope of Work

• Relevance: All of the development concerns in the initial project design have been addressed by ILO.

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D/l1Je/opment Associates, Inc.

• Effectiveness: The project has not achieved all its stated objectives. But this is due more to over-ambitious design than any failing on the part of ILD and its staff. In addition, it could not have been contemplated in the original design that President Fujimori would dismiss Congress in April 1992, change the Peruvian Constitution in 1993, be reelected in 1995, and rule by decree since 1992.

Efficiency: The visibility of ILD and its founder, the impact of ILD on policy, law making, and in re-thinking the tenets of development in Peru and the world are a bargain at the project's cost.

• Impact:

Positive:

1. A reorientation and rethinking by policy makers at the highest level on Peru's development policy.

2. Institutionalization of the property registry, the unified business registry, and simplified administrative procedures in government.

3. The introduction and institutionalization of the concepts and practice of initiative, effectiveness and efficiency in government.

4. Increased tax revenues because of the rise in registered title to property and businesses.

5. Development of a secondary real estate market in the new towns around Lima. 6. Development of a credit market for consumer credit, mortgages, and small

business loans where none had existed prior to ILD intervention. 7. Formation of tax-paying private sector entities to provide goods and services to

formalized property and small business owners. 8. Increased visibility of government decision making - even though it's by decree.

Peruvians are aware of the procedure, if not the actual decision-making process. 9. Increased visibility of Peru's move toward a free market economy, and the

attendant interest of foreign investors. 10. An entire generation of attorneys, economists, and social science professionals

who have been involved in the ILD process and retain their interest and commitment to democracy and a free market economy.

Negative:

1. A failure to institutionalize the ILD. There is still an unavoidable link between Hernando de Soto the person and the institute.

Sustainability: The effects of the project will probably survive no matter what happens to ILD. The positive impacts outlined above are part of the GOP and are unlikely to disappear.

ILD cannot be sustained without continued donor support from USAID, the World Bank, or other bi-lateral or multi-lateral agencies.

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1. Democracy and a free market economy can be encouraged and promoted by a private non-governmental organization.

2. USAID can invest in NGOs to have an impact on overall national economic policy, not just in a technical sector.

3. Early success should not automatically lead to expanding the charter of project support. In the case of ILD, follow-up on property registration, publishing research findings, documenting contributions to Peruvian economic and democratic institutions and maintaining ILD visibility should have taken precedence over expanding into international activities.

4. It is probably unrealistic to expect a policy-oriented NGO to have multiple major donors to replace USAID until they have established a broad enough appeal to attract other bi-lateral and multi-lateral agencies.

5. More emphasis should be placed on project oversight and strengthening of the internal management of the organization.

Findings and Conclusions

At the policy level, ILD has more than satisfied the requirements demanded of a private, notfor-profit institution supported primarily by US tax dollars. It has done so through a unique combination of institutional talent and individual genius. That blend of skills and thinking has produced a series of ideas, policies, and accomplishments whose "".time has come." For this reason, the evaluation of the PSIR and ILD is a particularly difficult task. We are called upon to measure the accomplishments of an institution. Yet that institution is made up of people, and their actions have been guided and reinforced by the ideas and leadership of an individual, Hernando de Soto. We would like nothing better than to state that ILD's accomplishments can be appraised apart from Mr. de Soto. And while that may be true of the internal administration and staff selection process of ILD, and may be partly true of the specific activities undertaken by ILD, it most certainly is not true of the formation of ILD and the guiding principles that prompted USG support from the beginning.

The team members agree that ILD has met and even exceeded the objectives of the PSIR. The ILD has not only surpassed the substantive goals that were set, but the institute's approach to Peru's economic and social problems has engendered a number of positive unintended consequences that will provide additional benefits to the u.s. Government, USAID, Peru, and other developing nations throughout the world.

Administrative/Financial

The internal administrative and financial systems of ILD are satisfactory. The financial system meets all standard accounting practices. Personnel and administrative manuals exist and are adhered to. But despite the relatively good record ILD has had in managing operations in the past, the uncertainty of its future, and the potential redirection of its activities require more emphasis on internal management. It is not so surprising to find that the very strength of ILD, that is, the vision of the role of property in development, is a weakness for internal management. The President is busily working with international agencies and USAID/W to secure funding for training and research to consolidate ILD's position as a pioneer in

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formalizing property rights for the poor, and democratization of government. Because this support has not yet been confirmed, and because the PSIR project is coming to an end without immediate follow-up funding, staff members are beset by uncertainty. There has not been a major ILD initiative in any area since the failed constitutional reform signature campaign in 1994. In its current state, ILD would most certainly benefit from an experienced administrator, able to manage human and material resources to maximize the funds available and minimize the likelihood of external criticism of mismanagement. The ILD is currently staffed primarily with professionals (attorneys), and they are not directly involved, nor should they be, in the administration of funds and personnel. The current administrator is an excellent operations manager, but what is needed is ~n extremely capable general manager with either the experience or the ability to run a medium sized institution with annual gross revenues of $2-3 million dollars. At present, the vision, the imagination, and the authority generated by the ILD President is not even approached by anyone within the institute. The ILD has developed an overall business plan to project the visionary insights of the founder into the future. ILD is planning to consolidate its progress in property formalization into a marketable "product". This vision must be balanced by pragmatism. The President's efforts to promote the gains of the past fourteen years must be guided by an administrator that can deliver on promises made and commitments entered into. Without funding and without adequate internal administration, the ILD has no future.

The staff are concerned about the future of ILD, about their salaries, about social benefits, and the pursuit of their individual preferred research or activism. But their major preoccupation is the direction in which the institute is headed. It appears that ILD has been drifting for the past year or so. New program initiatives have not been identified, the staff has not been informed of new funding proposals, and new roles for the existing staff have not been defined. If Mr. de Soto were adequately supported and advised by a stronger internal management team, these concerns could be dealt with before they become problematic and affect institutional performance. The role of institutional management, especially in non-profit NGOs is to buffer the core staff from external uncertainties that arise from the difficulties of fundraising and the need to remain flexible in terms of staff size, composition, and task orientation. The most successful NGOs, although usually founded by visionaries, are able to make the transition from wide-open participation of all in decision making to compartmentalized administration which exploits the lack of hierarchy and bureaucratic rules and institutes a degree of separation between role definition and task accomplishment. This is a difficult process, but one that must be accomplished if ILD is to survive as an organization.

There is no ques'ion but that the ILD founder provides institutional vision, international visibility, and leadership at a level that's impossible to match. At the same time, he does not have the time (nor should he) to attend to all the administrative details within the institute. Mr. de Soto's ideas are powerful, and he does have the attention of the world with these ideas, but without the mechanism to implement them in Peru, or to deliver the "product" to potential ILD clients, he runs the risk of losing ownership and quite possibly influence over the institute and its environment. For a person who is so concerned about property, intellectual as well as real, it is unfortunate that this aspect of ILD activities has so far escaped his attention. Like many NGO's founded by visionaries, ILD is at a point where a hard look at internal operations is required. Specific recommendations in this area are as follows:

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a. Hire an experienced administrator, a person that is able to cope with the uncertainties of NGO management.

b. Consolidate office space and conference facilities into one leased/ owned space. c. Refine their business plan, with options, costs, and staff size identified. d. Develop a fair and competitive salary scale based on the Peru "Sondeo Salarial", and

stick to it. e. Determine how many staff must be keep full time to deliver services and activities. f. Contract temporary advisers and consultants to augment permanent staff skills.

Technical Programs:

Democratization of Government Decision-Making Program

This activity has not enjoyed the same success as the PROFORM and BUSFORM programs. But this has not been due to lack of effort on the part of Hernando de Soto and the ILD staff. ,

The ILD collected 500,000 signatures on a petition (only 30,000 were required) to have a referendum to change the constitution and the method of electing members of Congress. The signatures were not received by the sitting congress and referundum, the law was changed retroactively to require 10% of the electorate to sign - about 1.2 million signatures. The tribunals an administrative simplification no longer exist, but they were instituted during former President Alan Garcia's government and it was never considered that his successor would keep them. Reviving them is unlikely.

There are indirect effects of ILD activities on other national institutions, the academy, and the press. Because of the signature initiative, Peruvian ministries and law-makers do make an attempt to publish rules and legislative proposals before they are enacted. This allows citizens to comment, object, or support the proposals before they are formalized. This process enhances the transparency of government decision making and prompts citizens to get more involved in governance. This is not true, however, of Presidential decrees, the most common lawmaking device.

Administrative Simplification Program

The Administrative Simplification Law has been enacted and is in force throughout the government. However, the administrative tribunals that provided a forum for citizen complaints about bureaucratic abuses was discontinued by President Fujimori in 1991, and have not been resumed. Since the President sees the tribunal as an (former President) Alan Garcia initiative, it is highly unlikely they will be resumed. If President Fujimori's hand picked candidate, Jaime Yoshiyama. wins the election for Mayor of Lima, there is a possibility for the resumption of the tribunals at the municipality level, with some pressure on the president to resume them at the national level. Mr. Yoshiyama's election is by no means assured. He and the other leading candidate, Alberto Andrade (former Mayor of Miraflores) were in a virtual tie in the election polls as of 28 October 1995.

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Property rights:

Lot Registration - Formalization (PRO FORM)

This program is institutionalized in the Government of Peru's Predial office of SUNARP, and there is every indication that the software and systems designed for Predial may well become the model for all future property registrations and transfers.

Business Registration - Formalization (Business Form) , ,

This program is also institutionalized in the Registro Unificado de Empresas (RUE). The RUE is to be absorbed by the Peruvian Internal Revenue Service (SUNAT). In our interview with the SUNAT Superintendent, he indicated that the RUE model would remain the standard system for registering all businesses.

International Activities

The international activities we reviewed were all funded by USAID. According to the ILD president this is unlikely to change in the foreseeable future. To the extent that USAID missions are interested in the services to be provided, i.e., training and research, they can "buy in" and help support the program, but the source of funding will continue to be USAID in one form or another. According to Mr. de Soto, USAID/W sent a cable to all missions to see how many would be interested in having host country officials trained in the ILD approach and methods. A number of missions do appear to be interested; this would keep ILD busy for the next few years, provided financial support continues to flow from USAID.

Other Programs:

Research

Except for a compendia of newspaper and magazine articles in Peru and internationally, and the impact analysis done under the separate grant agreement with USAID, there's no published evidence of serious research. The reports on PRO FORM and BUSINESS FORM use data from the GOP organizations, Predial and RUE. Our findings ' on the institutionalization of the property registries in the Peruvian government are consistent with the ILD studies. The ILD President says that additional research has been conducted in Japan, the U.s., and Switzerland on land titling process, but it has not yet been published.

Information and Education

In the early days of ILD there was an initial push to publish and disseminate information about the government and its activities, but that program has apparently been abandoned. Among the elite interviews we conducted, some people said they had heard nothing of ILD in almost two years. To determine ILD's recognition factor among the presumed target audience, the urban small traders, we conducted a series of intercept interviews in Gamarra, Polvos Azules, Mercado Central, and Ciudad de Dios. (See Table # 1.) Only 18.3% of those interviewed recognized ILD as an institution. What is interesting is that the recognition is

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uevewpment fiSSOctutes, Inc.

higher (26.7%) in Polvos Azules, one of the older concentrations of small traders in Lima, and an area that is almost totally "formalized", that is, registered and titled. In the newer area, with far more "informal" activity, Gamarra, ILD was recognized by no one. Recognition is also higher among an older population (arithmetic mean of 21.6%), and lower in the under 30 group (14.3%). Name recognition also seems to be a function of education, 45% of people educated beyond primary school knew about ILD, while only 14.3% with only primary and 12.8% with secondary recognized ILD. The team does not wish to make extravagant claims for a very modest survey (N=120) in specific areas. But we would suggest that this does indicate that ILD has an identity problem among the people who have benefited most from its activities, and stand to gain the most from potential future ILD collaboration with the Mayor of Lima.

Sustainability

Except for small grants from the World Bank, UNDP and FUNDES (NGO -Switzerland) ILD has been totally dependent on USAID funding. The property registration work in El Salvador and Honduras was paid for with funds from the respective USAID missions. Hernando de Soto, the ILD president, considers USAID as his principal "core" funder. He has a promise of an additional $400-500K from USAID/W to continue ILD operations through the end of the 1995 calendar year. Mr. de Soto informed the team that he has been assured by the USAID Administrator and his Chief of Staff that ILD will be funded from the USAID/W Global Bureau to conduct training sessions on property registration for representatives of other nations and to publish the results of their research and to consolidate the findings ofILD and its activities. Without the support promised, ILD is technically bankrupt and will cease to exist when the current project ends.

Recommendations

That USAID support for ILD continue. Whether the funding is provided from Washington or from the USAID/ Peru mission is beside the point. What matters is that ILD survive. In our interviews and we found that everyone agreed that ILD is an important national institution. In response to direct questions about other ways of carrying out ILD objectives, lawyers, journalists, Members of Congress, businessmen and economists all declared that ILD is unique.

That more oversight and perhaps technical assistance be provided to ILD to improve internal management. To reemphasize the point made in the Findings above, ILD ideas and activities have taken hold in Peru. The property registration process is installed in government, (subject to revision when Predial reverts to SUNARP), and it would be difficult if not impossible for the GOP to abandon the reforms that are in place. At the same time, ILD internal management requires improvement if they are to succeed in delivering on commitments made to USG or international agencies. As one journalist put it: "Sometime ILD promises more than it can deliver." That is probably the quickest way for ILD to lose credence and legitimacy in Peru and with international agencies that might provide further funding or business in the future.

That ILD refine their business plan. The plan should not shackle the institute to specific activities in an imponderable future, but rather should outline where the president would like ILD to be a few years hence, and how the institute intends to get there. The time frame should not extend beyond two years, with detail provided only for the first year. The second year

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should outline further goals for ILD. That is, how they intend to build on past successes, avoid past errors, and pursue new objectives and targets of opportunity as they present themselves. The current plan meets some of these requirements, but should be refined to show options, costs, and staffing levels for the various activities contemplated for the future.

That ILD develop and broadcast a series of short radio or TV spots and CLEAR newspaper ads to explain who they are, what they are working on, and why ILD is an important resource for Peru. It is self-promotion, but that's been done in the past with the less-than-effective newspaper notices campaign that reached few of the people who have benefited most from ILD activities. SUNAT is publishing tax registration and payment information in small cartoon books and illustrated cartoon inserts in newspapers and other publications for small businesses. This is a good model for ILD to emulate.

TABLE N2 1 ILD's RECOGNITION AMONG STREET VENDORS

PERCENTAGE OF STREET VENDORS INTERVIEWED N = 120

VIDEOS/MOVIES/ELECTRICAL APPLIANCES

MEDICINE/CLEANING/SWEETS! LIQUORS

27,3 72 ,7

20,0 80 ,0

xi

100,0

100,0


CHAPTER 1 PURPOSE OF THE EVALUATION


A. Background

Peru's Current Socio-Economic Condition

Since the return to civilian rule in 1980, Peru has had two democratic and peaceful transitions of power from one president to another. The full democracy that was restored in 1980 has been interrupted in April 1992 by the so called "auto golpe" of President Fujimori who was elected to succeed APRA leader Alan Garcia Perez in 1990 under the banner of "Cambio 90". President FUjimori, faced with catastrophic inflation, a corrupt and cumbersome public bureaucracy, and an intransigent legislature, dismissed Congress in 1992, and with the full support of the military, ruled by decree and plebiscite until the elections of 1995. In the intervening years, President Fujimori succeeded in changing the Peruvian constitution by plebiscite. (This technique was also successfully employed by President DeGaulle in France when he had to deal with a domestic terrorist threat [OAS] and a shaky economy in the early 1960s.) The changes introduced by President Fujimori and approved by the Peruvian electorate also effectively eliminated the former political parties and alliances from the 1995 elections.

President Fujimori was easily re-elected in 1995 and set about consolidating the macroeconomic changes that he had set in motion in the years 1992-1994. The changes introduced have moved Peru beyond the economic backwater it had occupied in the later years of the APRA government. Inflation has now been reduced, and foreign investment is flooding into Peru. Recent Interamerican Development Bank (IDB) data indicate that Chile and Peru lead the South American continent in attracting foreign investors. President Fujimori and the Peruvian police intelligence services have also succeeded in breaking the back of the neoMaoist terrorist organization "Sendero Lurninoso". The maximum leader of the movement, Abimael Guzman, is in prison and his key lieutenants and other regional leaders have been either killed or imprisoned. For all his successes, however, President Fujimori still must resolve· the nagging socio-economic problems inherited from past administrations and past failed policies. Of the many issues that face the nation the following five demand the urgent attention of the president and his government:

Improving Income Distribution and Economic Access for the Poor

The most pressing action required of the current government is to devise the concepts and methods to deal with the rising expectations of poor Peruvians. The pressure for access to the benefits of a free market is prompted by economic improvements in Peruvian life. The currency is stable, inflationary pressures have been reduced, and consumer goods are more readily available throughout the nation. But the macroeconomic policies that reduced inflation and encouraged foreign investment have not yet produced a redistribution of wealth that would improve life for the overwhelming majority of Peruvians who live in conditions of

PSIR Proj9d: Final Evaluation October 1995


extreme poverty. Underemployment continues to be a problem. Peru faces a major urban unrest problem if sensible, realistic domestic economic policies are not developed and implemented soon. Increased foreign investment and the privatization of state corporations should also provide the means to improve access to the mainstream economy for the marginalized population of entrepreneurs in the so-called informal sector. This was the main thrust of the analysis and activities of the Institute for Liberty and Democracy (ILD), and to the extent that the ILD (or at least the ILD approach) has influenced decision making in the government, we should expect that the domestic economic policies are either in development or are already being implemented.

International Confidence in the Fujimori Government

Restoring the confidence of the world, but especially Latin America and the U.s. in Peruvian democracy is a key to furthering foreign investment in Peruvian industry and infrastructure. Many South American nations still consider President Fujimori's "auto golpe" as a break in the democratic process. There is a great deal of admiration for the accomplishments of his government in controlling the economic crises that faced Peru five years ago and almost eliminating the terrorist threat of the Sendero Lurninoso. But at the same time the President is criticized for his handling of the border war with Ecuador and his general "tough guy" image. The fact that he has been re-elected means he has the confidence of the Peruvian electorate, but the events of the past few years in Peru are viewed with suspicion in the rest of the continent. This is especially true in the Andean nations who face the same economic and social problems of Peru, but have not had congress dismissed or had democratic rights and privileges suspended.

Human Rights

Closely linked to the issue of confidence in Peruvian democracy is the need for the current government to improve its human rights record. The Peruvian Armed Forces and National Police agencies vigorously pursued and eventually defeated the Sendero Luminoso. But in so doing, many innocent people were rounded up and imprisoned without due process. The usual means of trying suspected terrorists was secret military courts martial. This is antithetical to all tenets or understandings of what constitutes democratic process. To the credit of the Fujimori government, as the cases of wrongful imprisonment come to light, they are publicized without apparent sanction against the press. But the government must actively seek out and identify those who have been unjustly accused and imprisoned and make restitution. This step would hasten the restoration of full democracy for all Peruvians and go far in restoring the confidence of other nations in Peruvian democracy.

Promotion of Civil Society

The long and tortuous years of terrorism through which Peruvians have lived had many perhaps necessary but nonetheless anti-democratic effects. During the era of curfew laws, public assembly was restricted and civic organizations did not flourish. The current government, by defeating the terrorists, now has a responsibility to promote a civil society. The economic climate has improved in Peru. There has been a great deal of progress in improving infrastructure and eliminating the governmental corruption that flourished in the years 1985-1990. All this has marginally improved the lot of most Peruvians. The next step is for the

2 PSIR Proj9d Final Evaluation

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government to provide the atmosphere in which freedom of association develops organizations and institutions that are at liberty to speak out in support or in opposition to the government and government policies. The ILD is a rather significant element in this new civil society.

Modernizing and Simplifying the Public Administration

Despite the efforts of President Fujimori and the influence of ILD, Peru's administrative system still typifies all that is wrong with the administration inherited by the republic from Spanish colonial rule. Like all South American nations, Peru has a highly centralized administration characterized by elaborate controls ' that perhaps were appropriate for the days of Spanish exploitation of American mineral wealth. These systems are, however, totally inappropriate for a modem industrial state and must be eliminated or modified if Peru's economic progress is not to be stopped dead in its tracks. More must be done by the current government to decentralize and simplify administrative procedures, policy making, and government decision making and implementation. The political mechanisms for realizing this have already been developed. Regions and micro-regions were mapped out during the 1985-1990 era and could be re-designed by the current government to fit the present reality. The question arises as to whether the current government really intends to decentralize and how the process of administrative simplification and rationalization might be expedited. Central to this process is whether Peruvian citizens are to playa real role in policy making.

Final Comment

The five issues identified are not exhaustive. Within each there are a myriad of other problems and issues that complicate the efforts of President Fujimori's government. However, what all the issues have in common is democratic process. By broadening the basis for decision making and policy evaluation, governments improve popular participation and information flows to public agencies. As Moises Nairn has noted in a recent essay in FOREIGN AFFAIRS', the biggest challenge facing Latin America today is to build the institutions that are needed to anchor the economic reforms of the past five years. This will enable the needed social reforms to proceed apace. Foreign investment has so far been concentrated in portfolio investment and the acquisition of state-owned industries (privatization or capitalization). As this source of revenue dries up, the tax base must be expanded. Property and income taxes, for example, should be more than a symbolic source of revenue. In addition, Peru must redirect public spending. Money that now goes to the military, to public universities, or urban infrastructure must be reallocated to primary education, preventive health care, and rural communities. The initial stage of macroeconomic reforms such as altering exchange rates was relatively easy to implement. The next step, deeper institutional change, is much more difficult and will take longer. But the step must be taken if Peru is to move beyond its current tenuous economic, social, and political condition. The ILD has played a key role in the process in the past, and the question now is: "What role will ILD play in the future of Peru?"

Moises Nairn, "Latin America the Morning After, Foreign Affairs, 74, 4, July / August 1995.

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B. The Institute for Liberty and Democracy (ILD)

The Institute for Liberty and Democracy (ILD) is a research and advocacy non-governmental organization in Peru which was founded in 1980 to study the impact of legal institutions on economic development. During the past fifteen years, the ILD has conducted extensive research on the "informal sector". This has enabled ILD to identify many of the legal constraints to competitive market systems and the development of democracy. More recently, the ILD has focused on promoting institutional reforms to reduce the negative impact of legal constraints while creating new programs to facilitate greater participation in rule making and in economic activity. '

ILD has had a long relationship with USAID. In January, 1982, USAID awarded ILD a $36,000 grant to finance technical studies of the informal sector and to conduct a conference on the informal sector in Peru. Between August 1982 and March 1984, ILD received a $210,000 grant to provide support to the ILD for a multidisciplinary study of Peru's informal sector and the implications for private enterprise development in Peru and elsewhere in the region. Between April 1984 and March 1985, a new grant was provided to ILD in the amount of $530,000 to support the ILD in its efforts to carry out research in the following areas: Costs of entry into the formal sector, Costs of remaining in the Formal Sector, and Preparation of Legal Framework aimed at integrating the informal sector into the rest of economy. The first institutional support grant to ILD was provided in April 1985. The purpose of the Grant was to provide ILD with instit\,ltional support to continue its research and analysis of the informal sector and on the economic and legal relationships between the formal and the informal sectors. The activities carried out were based on research supported by USAID and carried out by ILD under previous grant agreements. The total grant amount was $1,941,400 and covered project activities from April 1985 to March 1989.

The Private Sector Institutional Reform (PSIR) Project

On March 2, 1989, USAID/Peru signed a five-year $10,000,000 Cooperative Agreement with ILD. The Project Purpose for the Cooperative agreement is "To support the Institute for Liberty and Democracy in the continuation of its research program on public policy institutional reform in Peru and on expanding this program through training and the establishment of an international network, to other countries in the Latin America and Caribbean (LAC) region and in other regions of the world, if interest is demonstrated and resources are made available." This Cooperative Agreement was amended to increase funding to $12,188,192 for a six year and eight month agreement with a termination date of October 31, 1995. In addition USAID/Peru has provided a separate research grant of $354,000 to measure the impact of the ILD property titling program in Peru (527-0000-G-00-4412-00). Total USAID funding for ILD since 1989 is $12,542,192.

It should be noted at the outset that this long-term commitment (almost fourteen years) to a single institution is unusual for USAID. Added to the special character of USAID support to ILD is the fact that the project does not address the usual technical concerns that warrant USAID mission support in developing nations. The PSIR is neither a health or education/human resource development project, nor an agricultural project. Although its title is "Private Sector Institutional Reform" , the project does not address specific private sector activities such as export promotion or small business development.

4 PSIR Project Final EvaJuaHon

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C. Evaluation Purpose

The detailed Scope of Work is attached. In summary, the main purpose of our task was to conduct the final and comprehensive external evaluation of the Private Sector Institutional Reform (PSIR) Project (No. 598-0772), including the supplementary activity developed under Grant No. 527-0000-G-00-4412-00.

The evaluation is intended to measure the effectiveness and relevance of ILD and the PSIR Project in terms of: 1) Establishing ILD's technical, administrative and financial capabilities, after the completion of USAID assistance, to continue to carry out the different types of activities they have undertaken to resolve the legal constraints that delay the establishment of competitive market systems and democratic development in Peru; and 2) achieving the objectives of the PSIR project purpose described in ILD's original Democratic Initiatives Proposal to USAID dated September 13, 1990, detailed in the Cooperative and Grant Agreements signed with USAID, as well as in the Project Implementation Letters and Letters of Involvement.

USAID requires that the evaluation examine several broad concerns that are applicable to virtually any type of development assistance. These are the following:

" ~ Relevance: Are the development constraints that the project was initially designed to

address major problems that are germane (sic) to the current development strategies supported by USAID?

Effectiveness: Has the project achieved its stated objectives?

~ Efficiency: Are the effects of the project being produced at an acceptable cost compared with alternative approaches to accomplishing the same objectives?

Impact: What positive and negative effects have resulted from the project?

~ Sustainability: Are the effects of the project likely to become sustainable development impacts after USAID funding has stopped?

~ Lessons Learned: What are the lessons learned that can be drawn from the project?"

It is expected that this evaluation will have worldwide circulation and that the lessons learned will have applicability in other USAID-funded economic development projects.

D. Measurement of impact

In the case of the evaluation of PSIR and the ILD, impact is particularly difficult to measure. The project does not have a logical framework, so we have used the project purpose and the verifiable indicators in the Cooperative Agreement and project modifications since then to link ILD activities and outcomes. We did not however, find independent surveys and studies of ILD to measure the specific impact ILD has had on the three principal policy areas of the project. Finally, the ILD identity is very closely linked with the personality of the founder and

5 PSIR Project Final Evaluation

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DetJelopment Associates, Inc.

current president and it is difficult to separate the impact of the ILD leader from the impact of the program. All the programs are the ideas of the founder; ILD's institutional strategy and strategic vision are based on the overwhelming intelligence, charm, and sheer force of personality of Hernando de Soto. In most cases, we have been able to distinguish the activity and the institute from personality, but on the issue of sustained impact and institutional sustainability for ILD, it is impossible. The evaluation however, is of the institute, not the person of Hernando de Soto. Where these two elements are inseparable we have so noted in the body of the report. But we have made a distinction between the vision of Mr. de Soto and the activities and impact of th~ ILD. This issue is further developed in the sections on Findings and Recommendations, Sustainability, and Lessons Learned.

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October 1995

CHAPTER 2 EVALUATION FINDINGS


A. Background and Prior ~valuations

A Threshold Evaluation was conducted of the ILD in March 1992. The findings of that evaluation were overwhelmingly positive. In fact, our findings in terms of policy impact echo the earlier assessment. Property registrations continue to grow, from 84,350 in 1992 to 254,375 through September 1995. Small business registration has swelled as well, from 212,779 in 1991/1992 to 504,281 as of April 1995. Data obtained from SUNAT and the Ministry of Economy and Finance show that tax revenue as a percentage of GDP has risen from 6/7% in 1992 to 13.9% in 1995. The government target given to us by SUNAT is 20% of GDP, although a former Minister of Economy stated that 15% is more realistic both in terms of actual revenue generation and reasonable government spending limits.

The threshold evaluation had five major recommendations:

1. Continued USAID support for ILD. 2. That ILD act to clearly define its identity. 3. That ILD establish an international affiliate to facilitate international outreach. 4. That ILD accrue working capital to avoid fund shortages and borrowing. 5. That ILD pursue research into uncharted territories - though it is not quite clear to this

team what the recommendation means. It appears to suggest that ILD look into " ... repositioning economic agents." If this means easing access to registration and credit through simplified procedures, this has already been done.

This team's findings, once again, (unfortunately) echo those of the earlier evaluation. We suggest continued USAID support for ILD, based on its accomplishments to date, and the potential for spreading the titling and registration technology beyond Peru to the rest of the developing world. In our discussions with ILD staff, we discovered from the beginning that ILD has an identity crisis. This early finding was reinforced in our interviews. Influential Peruvians commented on the future role and direction of ILD now that the titling and registration systems are firmly installed in government. The international ILD affiliate was established, but has so far failed to generate additional non-USAID funding. ILD has not accumulated working capital to buffer the institution from funding vagaries; it also continues to make short-term bank loans to cover payroll, utilities, and other fixed costs. ILD has undertaken research into the titling process in other areas of the world, but it is not yet clear what this means for the ILD in the immediate future.

In general terms, little has changed within the ILD since the threshold evaluation. The minor shortcomings identified at that time, for example, the need for audits, improved financial control system, etc. have been corrected. But the major recommendations of Truitt Enterprises, Inc. are still outstanding. This is not to say that nothing has happened in three years, only to


October 1995


suggest that ILD has not institutionalized conceptual and administrative leadership to continue its activities and provide follow-up to the accomplishments of the past.

B. Administrative/Financial

As noted above, little has changed in the administrative and financial systems of ILD. With that caveat in mind we conducted a detailed examination of ILD administration, financial management and personnel systems. Our findings are as follows:

Financial Management

The team considers that ILD current financial management practices adhere to all of the requirements set forth in the Cooperative Agreement. ILD has experienced the normal challenges of adapting their systems to the challenge of managing funds under a USAID Cooperative Agreement. The evaluation team commends USAID/Peru for providing financial and administrative guidance to ILD throughout the life of the grant, especially during the crucial early years. The administrative deficiencies identified by the 1992 threshold evaluation (commingling funds, inadequate accounting system, cash flow problems, etc.) have been corrected. The only exception is the establishment of a formal indirect cost rate.

Accounting Procedures and Financial Controls

The team's review of ILD's current administrative and financial controls indicates that they adhere to commonly accepted accounting procedures.

ILD's current accounting system incorporates all of the auditor's and USAID/ Peru recommendations regarding financial controls and accounting procedures.

ILD keeps different bank accounts for each of its donors and tracks expenditures accordingly. The institute has a clearly defined and well developed system of checks and balances. All of its financial procedures are contained in the USAID-approved Financial Procedures Manual dated January 1993.

No major discrepancies were found in ILD accounting and financial controls. However, the team found that time sheets are not currently required of ILD staff. The team was informed that time sheet requirements have been temporarily waived (1995) since there is no other source of funds other than USAID at present. Time sheets have been required in the past when ILD had more than one donor. ILD will reinstate time sheet use when they secure funds from other donors.

The evaluation team recommends that ILD reinstate time sheet requirements for all staff immediately. This is a basic management tool that should not be discontinued for even a brief period of time.

Financial Statements and Audits

The evaluation team reviewed ILD's current financial statements and all prior years audits. No major discrepancies were found. ILD adheres to currently accepted accounting practices. All

8 PSI R Project Final Evaluation

October 1995


prior audit recommendations have been implemented. The following are the only four outstanding issues that remain:

1. Establishment of overhead rates. 2. Need to generate other than USAID funding. 3. A $107,000 accounting discrepancy of funds provided by UNDP 4. A $100,000 tax due assessment by the Peruvian Social Security Institute (IPSS).

The establishment of overhead rates and the need to diversify ILD funding are addressed in detail in chapters III. and IV. of thi.s report.

The discrepancy with UNDP was caused by the extreme exchange rate fluctuation distortion during the years of Peru's hyper-inflation. ILD has exchanged correspondence with the UNDP many times the past few years. But UNDP keeps referring ILD to other offices within UNDP (Lima - New York, New York - Lima) and have never formally responded to ILD. According to ILD staff, the UNDP is well aware of the reasons for the funds discrepancy, but no one was willing to correct the situation. The ILD management staff informed the team that this accounting discrepancy with UNDP will be resolved this year when the statute of limitations for this donation expires.

The $100,000 (208,705 soles) tax-due assessment from the Peruvian social security agency arises from the IPSS definition of what constitutes a Peruvian-based contract employee. ILD is vigorously contesting this ruling and expects a favorable resolution in the near future. The evaluation team remains concerned regarding this issue. If ILD does not win a favorable ruling in its dispute with IPSS, they will be forced to pay the full or partial amount of the assessment out of ILD general unrestricted fund. USAID may not be willing to authorize use of grant funds for the original assessment, and whatever fines and penalties are levied on the original assessment.

A negative ruling in the IPSS challenge will also affect ILD administrative structure, because they use personal services contracts as a vehicle to pay some of the permanent staff.

Organization

The USAID/Peru Mission provided formative financial and administrative guidance to ILD throughout the life of the project, especially during the crucial early years. Because of the timely delivery of mission support to ILD, all organizational problems identified during ILD's first few years of operation have been corrected. The USAID mission support to ILD throughout the life of this project was effective and appropriate.

The evaluation team found no evidence of mismanagement or abuse of authority or funds in the internal management of ILD. However, despite the relatively good record ILD has had in its operations in the past, the uncertainty of the future and the potential redirection of its activities require added emphasis on internal management. It is not so surprising to find that the very strength of ILD, that is, the vision of the role of property in development, is a weakness for internal management. Mr. de Soto is busily working with international agencies and USAID/W to secure funding for training and research to consolidate ILD's position as a

9 PSI R ~roiect Final Evaluation

October 1995

r Development Associates, Inc.

pioneer in formalizing property rights for the poor and democratization of government. Because this support has not yet been confirmed, and because the PSIR project is coming to an end without immediate follow-up funding, staff members are beset by uncertainty. There has not been a major ILD initiative in any area since the failed constitutional reform signature campaign in 1994. When and if the promised funding is available ILD needs an experienced administrator, able to manage human and material resources to maximize the funds that are available and to minimize the likelihood of mismanagement. The ILD is staffed primarily with professionals (attorneys), and they are not directly involved, nor should they be, in the administration of funds and personnel. The current administrator is an excellent operations manager, but what is needed is an extremely capable general manager with the ability to run a medium sized institution with annual gross revenues of $2-3 million dollars. At present, the vision, the imagination, and the authority generated by the ILD President is not approached by anyone within the institute. The ILD has developed an overall business plan to project the visionary insights of the founder into the future. ILD is planning to consolidate its progress in property formalization into a marketable "product". This vision must be balanced by pragmatism. The President's efforts to promote the gains of the past fourteen years must be guided by an administrator that can deliver on promises made and commitments entered into. Without funding and without adequate internal administration, the ILD has no future.

The staff are concerned about the future of ILD, about their salaries, about social benefits and the pursuit of their preferred individual research or activism. But their major preoccupation is the direction in which the institute is headed. It appears that ILD has been drifting for the past year or so. New program initiatives have not been identified, the staff has not been informed of new funding proposals, and new roles for the existing staff have not been defined. If the ILD President were supported and advised by a stronger internal management team, these concerns could be dealt with before they become problematic and affect institutional performance. The role of institutional management, especially in non-profit NGOs is to buffer the core staff from external uncertainties that arise from the difficulties of fund-raising and the need to remain flexible in terms of staff size, composition, and task orientation. Successful NGOs, although usually founded by visionaries, are able to make the transition from wideopen participation to a compartmentalized administration without hierarchy and bureaucratic rules but with a degree of separation between role definition and task accomplishment. This is a difficult process, but one that must be accomplished if ILD is to survive as an organization.

Current Organizational Structure

Tables # 1 and 2 depict ILD's organizational structure as of March 1992 and September 1995 respectively. Table # 2 illustrates ILD's evolution from a project-oriented institution to a research institution. Attachment # 1A lists employees by function and grade. It should be noted that Hernando de Soto, ILD's founder and guiding force is not listed as his salary is paid by other-than-USAID funds.


October 1995

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Reduction of Personnel

Attachment # 1 reflects the minimwn nwnber of permanent staff (40 persons) that the ILD current General Manager and Administrator considers necessary in order to continue to be a viable institution. The organization is broken down into two broad categories and four subcategories:

PRODUCTION

General Manager · 1 Research Department (RD)* 15 Direct Support 7 INDIRECT SUPPORT Administration & Finance 17

TOTAL 40

* This includes ILD President and ILD's Washington, D.C. representative.

This configuration does not include the additional staff needed to carry out the training that is envisioned under the ILD strategic vision to become a training and research institution.

We consider the above staff configuration to be based on the early activist days of property titling and business registration to get these systems off the ground and operating. The team cannot develop a more appropriate staffing plan and organization chart for the future unless and until ILD redefines its future role and tasks. Based on current activities, however, we consider a staff reduction to 27 to be perfectly reasonable. Recommended staff pattern would be:

PRODUCTION

General Manager 1 Research Department 9 Direct Support 5 INDIRECT SUPPORT Administration & Finance 12

TOTAL 27

Attachment # 2 illustrates the reconfigured organization and function chart for ILD.

We base our reconfiguration on the following considerations. ILD is not carrying out any active research projects. If and when research is defined, the staff can be augmented as required, with contract personnel. Neither is ILD engaged in training as yet. There is no doubt that additional staff will be needed to design, manage, and conduct training sessions. ILD will probably also need an expanded housekeeping staff if training participants are in Peru for extended periods. We were told it could be up to eight months for any given group or person. But all this lies in the future, and ILD has to survive through the coming months until (if) the


October 1995


Another comment on ILD salaries. The ILD Chief of Administration and Finance stated that all salaries had been frozen as of November 1994. However, the salaries are frozen in U.S. dollars but are paid in soles at the current rate of exchange. This effectively indexes salary payment to the current exchange rate, and they are not frozen at all. As the value of the sole declines in relation to the dollar, ILD staff in effect receive cost of living adjustments. We recommend that salaries be frozen in soles and adjustments be made on a semi-annual or annual basis, depending on national practice usually set by the Ministry of Labor. Or ILD could base their salary review on the U.s. Mission schedule.

One final note on ILD salaries. The,pending proposal for ILD funding from USAlD/W Global Bureau includes salary increases in the range of 12-13% for all staff members. While we fully support continued USAlD assistance to ILD, we also consider such increases outside the range of feasibility. Without a full justification for the increases, based on current practice in Peru, position descriptions, salary history, and the responsibilities assigned to each employee or professional staff member and contractor, we do not support the increases. We suggest the responsible officials in USAlD/W take another look at the salaries proposed for ILD staff under the new arrangement.

C. Technical programs

Democratization

ILD achieved significant advances in increasing popular participation and improving governmental transparency in the late days of the Alan Garcia presidency (APRA, 1989-1990) and the first year or so of the Alberto Fujimori presidency (CAMBIO 90, 1990-present).

The Administrative Simplification Law was enacted in 1990. Immediately after this legislation there was a rush of simplification measures taken by a number of government ministries and other agencies. Since 1991, however there has been a marked slow down if not outright paralysis of simplification measures taken. Part of the explanation for this inaction is the disappearance of the Administrative Tribunals that thrived during Alan Garcia's last months in power. The tribunals enabled ordinary citizens to present grievances and complaints against a GOP agency that was then aired in a televised conference with ILD representatives and the President of the Republic. While this device was effective during Garcia's presidency, it was not continued by President Fujimori because of this very close association with Garcia.

When Mr. de Soto was Special Advisor to President Fujimori, the ILD had a measure of success in bringing administrative grievances to the attention of the senior members of government and the general public. Once de So to left government however, the simplification transparency process also disappeared. The tribunals no longer exist, and there is no formal mechanism remaining for citizens to make their dissatisfaction known to national leaders. ILD is considering a proposal for an "ombudsman" type post to be established, but without the political access once enjoyed by ILD, none of the persons interviewed thought there was any chance of establishing this post, or re-establishing the administrative tribunals.

All of the "democratizacion", "desburocratizacion", "descentralizacion", and "regionalizacion" programs that are associated with Alan Garcia and APRA are on the junk heap of history. In short, there has been no progress to wider participation and greater citizen involvement in

15 PSIA Project Final Evaluation

Oct0b9r 1995

decision making or politics in the past four years. It could be argued that with the "auto golpe" of April 1992, democratic reform in Peru came to a complete stop. Since then the President has effectively governed by decree and plebiscite. Journalists and political figures interviewed stated that of some fifty laws enacted each year, only one or two originate and are legislated by the Congress. The rest are Presidential or Ministerial resolutions or decrees.

The quandary in the democratization program of this project is that the ILD leadership thinks that to be most effective, the institute requires access to the highest levels of government. Yet that very access can be counter-l?roductive because of the political enmity it may generate. This is a problem that confronts all development projects whose goal it is to improve democracy or to change a national government's policy. The team does not recommend that political access be a prerequisite for grant awards to policy-oriented NGOs. Certainly it can be an advantage for NGOs to have political access. But in the case of the ILD, political access was both a positive and negative factor. The close association with the Alan Garcia government caused initial negative reactions when President Fujimori was elected in 1990. Later, ILD was able to significantly influence President Fujimori to revise the terms of the "auto golpe" and to regain a degree of confidence for Peru in the OAS and the UN. It is a fine line that NGOs must tread in attempting to influence governmental policy-making. But even without the political access, ILD is in a unique position. Peruvian policy-oriented NGOs look to ILD for a degree of leadership. The institute is in the position of either affecting policy through direct access to the political leadership, or by identifying policy areas where ILD and other Peruvian NGOs can exert pressure on public opinion and the government to influence policy making and implementation.

There is a free and unrestricted press in Peru, and there are no limitations on citizen participation in local elections, or on speaking out to criticize the government and its policies. There are none of the abuses associated with military rule or other forms of authoritarian governance. The model that seems to be emerging in Peru resembles the Singapore of Lee Yuan Kew, whose beneficent authority moved that island nation from a backwater to a thriving modern city / state. There are scores of restrictions on so-called "anti-social" behavior, (smoking, gum-chewing, graffiti) in Singapore but Singaporeans are otherwise free to criticize government and voice opinions. We question, however, that this is what is meant by "democratization" in the project description.

The last major democratic initiative undertaken by ILD was the attempt to have the current Constitution revised through referendum in 1994. At the time a constitutional referendum could be demanded by gathering 30,000 signatures favoring the change. ILD collected 500,000 signatures for a constitutional program that included:

• Multi-district congressional elections, on the U.s. model for the House of Representatives.

• New procedures for recall of elected officials to allow a recall petition at any point in their incumbency. At present, sitting officials can only be recalled during the first year or last year of their office.

Popular election of members of congress, vs. the current practice of party lists.


Odober 1995


The Peruvian Congress refused to receive the ILD delegation, claiming the petition was a "rabble rousing" technique intended to destabilize the government. After prolonged debate, the Congress finally enacted a law that RETROACTIVELY changed the referendum petition process to require the signature of 10% of the electorate, roughly 1.2 million signatures. Needless to say, the effort died. ILD has not initiated a democratic process program since that failed effort. In fact, almost all persons interviewed commented that they thought ILD was out of business because they had heard nothing about them since May 1994.

Although public and private support for NGOs in the developing world has shrunk in recent years, ILD's long-term prospects appear promising. As noted, USAlD has been the principal supporter for ILD in the past eleven years. USAID/W is particularly interested in !LOs work, senior officials have described the institute as being " ... on the cutting edge of change in the Americas." ILD has briefed USAID/W Bureau of Newly Independent States and representatives of other bureaus in order to familiarize them with ILD's accomplishments.

In its Congressional Presentation for the 1996 fiscal year, USAID acknowledged that ILD's work has applications outside of Peru and Latin America. ILD has a proposal pending with the Global Bureau to "globalize" their programs. ILD proposes to run a series of workshops for government officials, NGOs, and others from developing nations to teach its methods. The institute would follow these workshops with in-country technical assistance when requested. The proposal, which would provide core support for ILD, has been well-received by USAID /W and field missions.

Funding would come from the USAID Fiscal Year 1996 budget, and although Congress will be directing USAID to cut back on its programs for FY 1996, this may not necessarily apply to ILD. In the conference report to accompany fiscal 1996 foreign aid appropriations the conferees urged USAID " ... to give a high priority to programs that directly support sustainable economic growth.", and noted that " ... organizations such as the Institute for Liberty and Democracy can help stimulate private sector-led growth by helping to apply to other settings the experience in Peru in generating economic growth through land titling, removal of cumbersome regulations on business, and guaranteeing security of investment."

In spite of the problems, ILD has had a major role in promoting democracy in Peru. There is little doubt that ILD's presence modified the potential impact of the Fujimori "auto golpe" of 1992. Without the intercession of ILD, democracy could have been stifled even more. Even after that critical point, and through 1994, ILD was very active and visible in efforts to promote democracy and transparency in government decision making in Peru. However, the ILD presence and activities in this area have diminished since May 1994. Without political access, and without a willingness of the ILD to be a leader of Peruvian NGOs in increasing the public visibility of the need for democratic reforms and increased transparency of governmental processes, ILD's impact on the promotion of democracy in Peru is likely to be minimal in the future.


As noted above, the enactment of the administrative simplification law in 1990 produced a rush of simplification procedures in the last days of the Garcia presidency and the first year


Odober 1995


or so of the Fujimori incumbency through September 1994. Since then, however, little has happened that can be documented.

Data provided by ILD show measures taken under the simplification law occurred in three stages. In the first stage, 180 simplification edicts were issued. This was during the seven months of the administrative simplification tribunal. In the second stage, July 1990 through December 1991, 137 simplification orders were issued. In the third stage, December 1991 through September 1994,217 simplifications were ordered or processed. These numbers are based on procedures appearing in "El Peruano", the official government gazette for publishing government decrees, laws, and proposed laws. It does not include internal measures that may have been taken within ministries and other government agencies.

The simplification data are not graphically portrayed. But it is clear that after an initial surge of 137 simplified procedures in seven months, or an arithmetic mean of 19.5 per month, there was a decline in the second stage to 9 per month in the fifteen months July 1990 to December 1991. Finally, in the period December 1991 through September 1994 the figure further declines to 6.3 per month. We also must consider the source and type of simplifications that were ordered. Many originated in and affected only the National Institute of Public Administration (INAP), an institution that no longer exists. Others deal with the Texto Unico de Procedimientos Administrativos (TUP A) within each ministry. TUP A only applies at the ministerial level, and not to semi-autonomous agencies. According to a source in the Ministry of Economy and Finance, TUPA, instead of promoting simplification, has been a vehicle for complicating and confusing the administrative process. Other actions taken under the administrative simplification law approved new forms or procedures taken under the rubric of simplification. We were unable to determine, in the limited time available, whether they were, in fact, simplification measures, or simply were done under that law. Without the tribunal, it's impossible to assess the impact of administrative simplification. Government officials state that after the initial rush of pressure generated by the tribunals everything returned to normal. That's not entirely true, but it is probably close enough.

Property Formalization Program (PROFORM)

This is the unqualified success story of the ILD. To begin at the end, the simplified registration process for the titling of property in the "new town" squatter settlements that surround Lima is now successfully installed, (as Registro Predial), in government as a semi- autonomous subunit of the National Public Registry (SUNARP), the Peruvian formal property registration agency. The Predial registry has an agreement with a consumer credit consortium (Orion Group), and a building materials vendor (KARPA), to assist in the titling process and provide loans for construction and home improvements. In addition, a secondary real estate market has developed in the more established new towns such as Villa El Salvador. There is every indication that this will extend to all other areas as they are titled. As evidence of the success of PROFORM, Banco Wiese, the second largest bank in Peru, is also involved in the mortgage market. According to the bank representative we interviewed, other commercial banks such as the Banco de Credito (the largest Peruvian bank) are looking into this market, preparing for entry. Banco Wiese is also active in providing small business loans, with $65,000,000 outstanding as of December 31, 1994.

18 PSIR Project Final Evalualion

October 1995


Attachments # 3 - 4 contain the detail of the properties registered by Predial for the years 1990 through September 1995. The total for the entire period is 254,375 lots registered, with a total of $10,680,007.16 of mortgages written on these properties. This an entire market, and industry that did not exist prior to 1990, and is still growing. The principal private lender is the Orion Consumer Credit Corporation, with Banco Wiese following.

We think it is impossible to exaggerate the importance of this success. Thanks to the work of ILD with the support provided by USAID/Peru, an entire industry has been created. It is institutionalized in the public sector in Predial and SUNARP, and in the private sector with organizations like Grupo Orion and Banco Wiese. In the process, people who had existed on the margin of society without any stake in the future of the city and the nation, are now stakeholders. They are property owners with all the rights, privileges, and responsibilities that attend that status.

Property registration in the rural areas of Peru is the objective of an lOB-funded "Proyecto Especial de Titulacion de Tierras" (PETI) in the Ministry of Agriculture. This project is ~apping and registering the rural lots and parcels that were "liberated" in the Peruvian agrarian reform of 1969. We interviewed the responsible staff in the ministry to determine if they were using Predial simplified techniques as a titling and registration tool. They are not. The reason given is that the land they are registering has had prior owners, and in order to give clear title, they must research the national public registry system and change those records, A daunting task. Persuading the Ministry of Agriculture to adopt Predial methods is beyond our SOW, however, some type of contact should be established between the two systems before Predial is formally incorporated into SUNARP.

Unified Business Registry (UBR)

This is another notably successful ILD initiative supported by USAID funding in the Private Sector Institutional Reform (PSIR) Project. As a result of the early efforts of the ILD to simplify small business registration, the Government of Peru now has a Registro Unificado de Empresas (RUE) in the Ministry of Industry. This registry is in the process of being reassigned to SUNAT, the Peruvian Internal Revenue Service. This transfer is an obvious move to capitalize on simplification. By registering with the UBR in SUNAT, businesses are now not only registered as a private sector entity, they are also enrolled as tax payers. This eliminates the need for a two-step process, that is, registering as a business and then registering to obtain RUC (Registro Unificado de Contribuyentes). Obtaining RUC not only obligates the business to collect the IGV (Impuesto General de las Ventas - General Sales Tax), it also allows the businesses to deduct IGV paid to its material and service providers. (Though called a sales tax, the IGV is really a VAT - value-added tax (or IVA, Impuesto de Valor Aumentado).

We interviewed officials in the Ministry of Industry's UBR and SUNAT. The data on the number of businesses registered, by the number of persons employed are displayed in Attachments # 5 - 6. The SUNAT director sees the numbers of businesses registered increasing as the publicity campaign being conducted by SUNAT makes more small businesses aware of the simplified process for registering as a business and for RUe. As the data on aggregate tax revenue show (see Attachment # 7), the number of taxpayers registered has gone down while tax revenue has risen. Under the old tax and business registration system even occasional service providers (renting out a spare room occasionally in a private home, for

19 PSIR Proj&et Final Evaluation

October 1995

DevelopttU!1lt Associates, Inc.

example) had to register for RUe. What happened is that a lot of people registered but then they did not generate revenue, and it was a too big a job for SUNAT to track down all RUC holders to determine whether or not they had generated income through manufacturing or providing a service.


The international activities of ILD have been thought of as a means of moving the institute toward self-sustainability through income derived from services delivered to international clients. So far that objective has not been realized. The principal activities undertaken by ILD outside of Peru, namely in El Salvador and Honduras were paid for with USAID funds by the missions in the countries affected.

The only significant other contributors to ILD programs the team was able to find during the life of PSIR were the World Bank, FUNDES (a Swiss NGO) and UNDP. Please refer to Attachment # 8 for program funding details. Except for those contributions there has been no other support provided to ILD other than USAID. ILD informed us that a land titling project with a budget of $3,000,000 was presented to the World Bank by the CAMBIO 90 - NUEVA MA YORIA candidate for mayor of Lima, Jaime Yoshiyama. Mr. Yoshiyama's election platform includes a promise to register 550,000 new properties in Lima during his tenure. ILD's claim was supported by other independent sources who confirmed that ILD is supplying data and technical assistance to the Yoshiyama campaign team, and is speaking out publicly in favor of his candidacy. Our Ministry of Economy source confirmed that the project and budget were presented to the Bank by Mr. Yoshiyama during his visit to Washington in mid-October 1995. Since Mr. Yoshiyama is very close to President Fujimori, his election would probably mean renewed policy access for the ILD, at least at the municipal level. Since Lima is by far the most powerful political constituency in Peru, this would mean more influence and potential impact on municipal policy by ILD - and by extension to the Presidential palace, with or without a reconciliation between ILD and President Fujimori.

Interamerican Development Bank support for ILD has not been forthcoming. There have been a number of discussions and meetings over the years between the ILD and IDB representatives, but this contact has not been converted into IDB funding for the ILD.

The issue of other financial support for ILD is more extensively explored in the following chapter on sustainability. For this section, it's enough to state that ILD's technical programs have not generated contributions and/ or income to supplement the core support provided by USAID. As Mr. de So to told this team: "I consider USAID to be the core funding source for maintaining ILD activities." This is not likely to change in the foreseeable future.

D. The ILD and the Government of Peru

In the course of this evaluation the team interviewed more than 50 persons in a number of professions, in government, and in the private sector. We talked with journalists, businessmen, NGO leaders, Members of Congress, lawyers, engineers and community leaders in the new towns and a rural settlement. We also conducted a survey of people in the street in four main commercial centers of Lima. Not all persons interviewed are admirers of ILD, and not all persons interviewed agreed with the importance of the "informal sector" in the development


October 1995

of Peru or the need for ILD in the democratization of political life in Peru. But the unanimous perspective of all those who know of ILD is positive. They all agreed that the efforts of the ILD have changed the character of the policy debate about development and democracy in Peru. This is a significant achievement for any institution, but is particularly noteworthy because it was USAID who recognized the value of the ILD in its early days, and has maintained support throughout the darkest days of 1989-1990, into the more stable and secure economy and society of Peru in 1995.

Without ILD there would not have been the initiative to simplify government administrative procedures in 1990. Without ILD there would not be the interest of President Fujimori to make a serious attempt to restore a free market economy in Peru. Without ILD there would have been no reconciliation of the Fujimori government with international agencies following the "auto-golpe" of April 1992. It was the ILD and Hernando de Soto who did the leg work, the outreach, and the conceptual mobilization that enabled President Fujimori to regain access to international institutions. Peru is still perhaps not a full democracy, but according to the influential persons we interviewed, without ILD it would have been worse. (Please refer to Attachment 9) And without ILD there is no mass registration of private property in and around Lima; there's no mass registration of small businesses, no expanded tax base, and no interest in consolidating the gains that have been made in the past seven years. The mortgage, real estate, and small business loan industries serving former "informal" properties and businesses would not exist - nor would their impact on the Peruvian economy.

Peru has not come as far as we would wish on the path to restoring full democracy. Perhaps hundreds of people caught up in the massive police sweeps against Sendero Luminoso are still in prison. Most likely other human rights violations continue. And there has been little progress in the fight against drug production, processing, and trafficking in the coca growing areas of Peru. But with all the shortcomings, Peru is a much better nation now than it was before ILD. And perhaps even more importantly, the debate about the path Peru is to take to promote development and democracy in the future is informed by the reality of Peru, and a theory of property and free markets that no academic social scientist would have been able to promote in Peruvian government. ILD was and is in a position to demonstrate the power of property ownership as an incentive to improve the economy and the society from the bottom up. The demand for change comes from the people, but the means to satisfy those demands must come from government. The ILD has successfully bridged those two sectors of Peruvian society. To continue the democratization process, ILD must regain political access and/or be more visible in support of democracy and Peruvian NGOs in this field.

E. Women in development

ILD has made a concerted attempt to address the specific problems of women in development. To assist in this work, ILD had a USAID representative from the WID office in USAID/W conduct a two-week workshop on the subject.

Many of the most influential professionals on the ILD staff are women and they pointed out to the team ILD efforts on behalf of women in Peru. The major impact of their efforts has been in the property titling program, where the wife must be a signatory to all transactions affecting title to a jointly held property. The rights of the woman in the household are protected by law in the business and title registration process. In addition, simplifying the civil marriage process

21 PSIR Protect Anal Evaluation

October 1995


has formalized the rights of women under civil law. This is an important advance, because many of the residents of the new towns around Lima have not married in the past because of the delays and problems in processing paperwork. With the simplified civil marriage process the conjugal relationship is recognized under law as are women's property rights.

22 PSI R project Final Evaluation

Odober 1995


CHAPTER 3 SUST AINABILITY

A. Sustainability after PSIR

Background

PSIR Project Final Evaluation

The original grant agreement between USAID and ILD envisioned a gradual increase of other donor support for ILD programs, such that, by the fifth year of the grant, ILD would be receiving funding equivalent to 50% of USAID-generated funding. This percentage requirement was subsequently amended as depicted in Tables # 3 - 7.

A Threshold Evaluation was conducted on ILD in March 1992. The evaluation had four major recommendations to facilitate ILD's sustainability:'

1. Continued USAID support for ILD 2. That ILD establish an international affiliate to facility international outreach and receive

income from ILD international operations. 3. That ILD accrue working capital to avoid funds shortages and borrowing. 4. That ILD establish a formal indirect cost rate (overhead) and apply it to other than

USAID donors to accrue working capital.

This evaluation team's findings, once again, (unfortunately) echo those of the earlier evaluation. We see no other recourse for short-term ILD survival than continued USAID support. This finding is based on ILD accomplishments to date, and the potential for spreading the titling and registration processes beyond Peru to the rest of the developing world.

Income Generation, Cost Recovery and Indirect Costs

Without continued USAID support in the short-term (next year-calendar 1996), ILD will not survive after the Project Assistance Completion Date (PACD) of the Private Sector Institutional Reform Project (PSIR). The long-term future of ILD depends on its ability to attract other donors, national and international, as well as its ability to sell its services at the national and international level. Please refer to Table # 8, detailing ILD's international funding through September 1995.

The evaluation team was informed by ILD management that there are no other funds available or in the pipeline by any of its traditional donors other than USAID. Unless ILD is able to access new sources of funds or to generate income from selling its services, the institution will cease to exist in its present form. The institute has very limited assets (donated equipment and furniture), no income generating properties (it rents its headquarters) nor does it have an endowment fund.

23

--I

PSI R Project Final Evaluation Odober 1995


The threshold evaluation report conducted by Truitt Enterprises, Inc., in 1992, recommended the establishment of a $100,000 reserve fund. This fund would enable ILD to function for a limited time while waiting for funds from other donors. Unfortunately, this recommendation, while it makes sense, was unrealistic. ILD was forced to use the limited unrestricted fund donations to pay for necessary travel or other general administrative expenditures not covered by other donations. At the end of September 1995, ILD's unrestricted fund had a balance of less than $5,000.

Although public and private support for NGOs in the developing world has shrunk in recent years, ILD's long-term prospects appear promising. As noted, USAID has been the principal supporter for ILD in the past eleven years. USAlD/W is particularly interested in ILDs work, senior officials have described the institute as being " ... on the cutting edge of change in the Americas." ILD has briefed USAID/W Bureau of Newly Independent States and representatives of other bureaus in order to familiarize them with ILD's accomplishments.

In its Congressional Presentation for the 1996 fiscal year, USAID acknowledged that ILD's work has applications outside of Peru and Latin America. ILD has a proposal pending with the Global Bureau to "globalize" their programs. ILD proposes to run a series of workshops for government officials, NGOs, and others from developing nations to teach its methods. The institute would follow these workshops with in-country technical assistance when requested. The proposal, which would provide core support for ILD, has been well-received by USAID /W and field missions.

Funding would come from the USAID Fiscal Year 1996 budget, and although Congress will be directing USAID to cut back on its programs for FY 1996, this may not necessarily apply to ILD. In the conference report to accompany fiscal 1996 foreign aid appropriations the conferees urged USAID " ... to give a high priority to programs that directly support sustainable economic growth.", and noted that " ... organizations such as the Institute for Liberty and Democracy can help stimulate private sector-led growth by helping to apply to other settings the experience in Peru in generating economic growth through land titling, removal of cumbersome regulations on business, and guaranteeing security of investment."

ILD also informed the evaluation team that in response to a cable from the USAID Administrator, more than 40 positive replies expressing interest have already been received from USAID Missions throughout the world. Mr. de Soto is optimistic that the implementation of this course of action will ensure ILD's sustainability. For the future ILD will also market its concepts and processes through Path to Property (PtP) a non-profit organization incorporated in Switzerland. ILD established PtP with the mission of bringing the benefits of formal property and market systems to the poor of the developing world.

The ILD leader very clearly articulated his vision for the institute as a pioneer training and research institution. However, the evaluation team discerned a lack of knowledge of this vision among ILD's staff. Furthermore, according to the ILD President, most of ILD's staff members view themselves as "activists" not researchers. The evaluation team did review the multi-year business plan developed by ILD to implement this vision of ILD's future. The ILD President is aware of the internal requirements to fulfill the ambitious plan and is working with his senior staff and potential donors to refine the plan with an eye toward early implementation.


October 1995


The evaluation team considers the ILD business plan as an indication that the institute is looking toward the future. There are a number of potential multi-lateral donors interested in assisting the Government of Peru to formalize property rights at the national level. ILD would be a key player in these plans. If USAID/Global Bureau, or multi-lateral financing in support of extensive titling in Lima does not materialize then ILD's survival would be in doubt. The fact that ILD does have a business plan and a unified institutional vision should improve the likelihood that ILD will be able to implement the international training and research program if USAID/Global Bureau does make a formal multi-year grant commitment to ILD.

Other Funding Sources

The Cooperative Agreement requires that ILD raise funds from other donors. Tables #3- 8, show the evolution of the Cooperative Agreement's target contributions from other donors and ILD's accounting for "other donors" funds as of September 30, 1995. Other donor contributions as of the same date amount to $4,740,082. The tables show a marked decline in ILD's ability to capture other donor funds. Years one and two were the years of greatest success in receiving other donor funds for ILD. Most of these funds were for ILD's successful programs on Administrative Simplification, Property Registration and Business Registration. Attachment # 8, shows the detail of contributions to ILD by other donors. ILD states that the decline of funds by other donors is due to ILD's success in having its Administrative Simplification Program and Titling Registration Program fully institutionalized by the Government of Peru. These two innovations have by all accounts contributed to the thriving economic health of Peru in the last few years. It is beyond the ability of this team to attribute specific economic benefits to ILD's programs. When this question was directed to the economists and other officials we interviewed the response generally was the ILD impact was direct in the policy dimension. It was ILD influence that made the formalization process possible. The economic benefits that accrued to Peru and to Peruvians because of this formalization were at best, indirect, but nonetheless ILD made it possible.

ILD has not repeated its early years of international technical assistance successes. During those years it provided technical assistance (USAID-funded) to the Governments of El Salvador and Honduras on titling and administrative simplification techniques. However, the interest demonstrated by other nations (Bolivia, Guatemala, the Philippines, South Africa, Sri Lanka, etc.) have not resulted in technical assistance agreements with ILD.


October 1995


Source of YRI YR2 Funding

AID 1,659 1,815

. OTHER ** 1,264 963

Total 2,923 2,778

OTHER DONORS TABLE # 3

YR3 YR4 YR5 YR6 YR7 TOT A * L

2,114 1,798 2,001 1,907 894 12,188

572 663 350 671 257 4,740

2,686 2,461 2,351 2,578 1,151 16,928

YR7 includes expenditures projections for remaining of grant agreement.

Amend. # 2

Amend. # 6

Amend. # 15

Actual @

03/30/95

Attachment # 8 details the funds received by other donors

TABLE #4

YR1 YR2 YR3 YR4

22 33 40 45

22 28 35 49

41 29 19 26

43 35 21 27

26

YRS YR6

50

55 65

22 27

15 26

YR7 TOTAL

40

44

18 27

22 28

PSI R F'rojec:t Final Evaluation October 1995

Source of Funding

AID

OTHER

Total

Source of Funding

AID

OTHER

Total

Source of Funding

AID

OTHER

Total

YRI YR2 YR3 YR4 YR5

1,800 1,800 1,930 2,122 2,233

517 883 1,265 1,735 2,210

2,317 2,683 3,195 3,857 4,443

TABLE # 6

YRI YR2 YR3 YR4 YR5

1,800 2,289 2,387 1,800 1,800

517 883 1,275 1,735 2,210

2,317 3,172 3,662 3.535 4,010

TABLE # 7

YRI YR2 YR3 YR4 YR5

1,800 2,289 2,387 1,800 1,400

1,264 938 572 647 384

3,064 3,227 2,959 2,447 1,784

27

YR6

N/A

YR6

1,213

2,210

3,423

YR6

1,612

585

2,197

YR7 TOTAL

9,885

6,610

N/A 16,495

YR7 TOTAL

11,289

8,830

N/A 20,119

YR7 TOTAL

900 12,188

194 4,585

1,094 16,773

PSIR Proj9d Final Evaluation October 1995


* Per USAID Amendment # 15.

PNUD-SA 200.0 PNUD-HP 150.0 SMITH RICHARDS 176.9 CIPE 240.0 FUNDES 400.0 JOHN OLIN 25.0 EARHART 10.0 TINKER AID-EL SALVADOR COHEP-HONDURAS GENERAL ATLANTIC BANCO MUNDIAL (World Bank) ATLAS INTERCENA CANTRIL GROUP BORLAND LYNDE & BRADLEY PADF WESTMINSTER DEG GOBIERNO SUIZO (Swiss Gvt) IDRC/CIDA OTHERS

TABLE # 8

USAID GRANT No. 598-0772-A-OO-5910-00 FUNDS BY OTHER DONORS

(in $000)

DETAILS OF OTHER DONOR FUNDS

128.0 115.0

62.7 103.0 511 .9

17.7 7.7 50.0 250.2 253.0

111 .3 150.0

550.0 10.0 10.0 16.5 10.0 6.2

50.0 1.6

65

402.0 459.0 304.9 355.0

257.1 1,334.7

111 1 550.0

20.0 16.5 10.0

6.2


Odober 1995

De1Jelopment Associates, Inc.

Mr. Jaime Yoshiyama, a leading candidate in Lima's mayoral race, is using ILD's ideas and systems for formalizing property titles and improving access to credit to formalized property. These two concepts are detailed in an undated ILO document. Again, according to our sources this proposal and budget were presented by Mr. Yoshiyama to World Bank officials during his October 1995 to Washington, D.C.. Preliminary budgets for these two projects amount to $2.8 and $3.6 millions for property formalization and access to credit respectively. If Mr. Yoshiyama wins the mayoral race for Lima, then ILO would be an integral player in the implementation of these two projects and would once again be active among Peruvian policy makers.

One of the major disappointments associated with the PSIR is that despite ILO's extensive contacts with national leaders of other nations, with directors of international banks, with major private and voluntary organizations, and the number of international prizes bestowed upon Mr. de So to, contributions to ILO by other donors markedly declined after the second year of the project.

The evaluation teams considers that the original targets to raise funds from other donors were unrealistic due to causes beyond ILO's control. ILO access to high level government officials was eliminated after the break with the Fujimori government. We heard a number of accounts of why the break occurred, from personality clashes to disagreement over coca substitution policies. But whatever the reason for the break, ILO visibility declined, and so did its alternative fund-raising capacity. The team thinks that ILO can increase it visibility in Peru and internationally by more actively pursuing its NGO leadership role.

Indirect Costs

By requiring ILO to recover administrative costs funds from other donors, there was an expliCit recognition by USAIO that ILO must be able to charge an overhead rate to cover its core administrative costs after the end of the Cooperative Agreement. Thus, it was essential for ILO to establish an overhead rate acceptable to other donors during the life of the grant in order to charge an overhead rate after the end of the agreement with USAIO. ILO did develop an overhead rate, but the only donor that accepted overhead charges (15%) on programs in the period 1989-1995 was the Honduras Private Business Council. It should be noted that this contract, to install administrative simplification procedures for exports and imports in Honduras, was funded through USAIO/Honduras.

Following USAIO/Peru and Threshold Evaluation Recommendations, ILO's Financial Unit determined an overhead rate of 34% for the year 1994 (January 1 - December 31). The overhead rate calculation was certified, on an informal basis, by ILO's auditors. The evaluation team reviewed the basic premises used to determine the overhead rates and found them sound. The overhead rates need to be updated for 1995 and formally certified by ILO's auditors.

ILO states that they attempted to negotiate overhead charges for programs financed by other donors. However, all were unwilling to pay for general administrative expenses (overhead) and were only willing to finance specific programs. Part of the reason for this refusal is the knowledge of other donors that USAIO was financing ILO administrative costs. It is customary

29 PSIA Project AnaJ Evaluation

October 1995


for multi-lateral donors to decline to pay indirect costs for administrative overhead that they feel is already fully covered by USAID.

This evaluation team's findings indicate that USAID effectively subsidized ILD's core administrative costs for all the programs that ILD carried out for other donors during the life of the grant. Please refer to Attachment # 8 for a detailed list of other donors contributions.

Conclusion:

It is hard to distinguish ILD from that of its founder and president, Hernando de Soto, to whom it owes its existence. ILD has a highly competent and motivated staff. However, at present, no one within the institute even approaches the vision and imagination of its founder. This finding is not meant as critical comment of ILD's staff and successes, rather it is a reflection of the inherent strengths and weaknesses of an organization totally dependent on the vision of one individual. Given this reality, the evaluation team considers that ILD could not continue being a viable institution without its founders continued presence and guidance.


October 1995

CHAPTER 4 GENERAL CONCLUSIONS AND

RECOMMENDATIONS


A. Introduction

The evaluation team members have visited Lima in the past few years, and it is clear from the improved condition of the streets, roads, buildings, and telephone system in Lima that something has happened. The super markets are full of food stuffs, the department stores and appliance stores are loaded with washers, dryers, refrigerators, etc. There's a Ferrari dealership in Lima now, and for every broken down old car still on the road there are two late model Japanese, Korean, or U.s. autos. The economic indicators compiled by Banco Continental tell a story of major change from the depths of 1990 to a still-improving Peruvian economy in terms of GOP, traditional and non-traditional exports, international reserve assets, etc. Prices are high, but the hyper-inflation of just a few years ago is only an unpleasant memory. Peru still carries a heavy load of external debt, but the nation's status as the number two foreign investment nation in South America according to the Inter-American Development Bank, (lOB), indicates that investors do not consider that a major problem.

While it is clear that Peru has improved economically, and that some of that improvement has trickled down to the general population, it is not entirely clear what role ILD has played in the general improvement. Our interviews showed unanimous agreement that ILD and its founder, Hernando de Soto, have had a profound impact on Peru. They talk about the difference in the debate about development in Peru. They point to the successful installation of a free market economy to replace the attempted disastrous market controls of the Alan Garcia years (1985-1990). And most of all the people we spoke to identified administrative simplification in government, the property titling system, and the unified business registry as major advances in improving Peruvian life and the ability of all Peruvians to participate in the economy of the nation. They were less enthusiastic about democratic reforms in the past five years and the relative invisibility of the ILD in the past year and half. There was a general sense of let-down that there was no follow-up, no continued ILD presence after the successes of 1990-1993.

As stated earlier, our charge is to update and finalize the findings of the threshold evaluation of March 1992 and to provide a comprehensive final evaluation of ILD activities to determine whether the investment of over $12 million over almost seven years by USAID/USG was worth it.

Our general observation is that institutionally, not much has changed since the 1992 evaluation. ILD staff still do not have a clear idea of what ILD's principal role is, and in what future direction the institute will be moving. The senior staff of ILD seem reluctant to talk about current or immediate past activities. Most of our briefings in the institute concentrated


October 1995


on events of 1990 through 1993, with mention of the constitutional change petition referendum campaign in 1994. It was hard for us to get copies of their work plans, and almost impossible to get clear answers about active research projects and plans for the future. It was not until we met with the ILD president, Hernando de Soto, on October 9 that we got a full picture of where the institute has been in the past two years and where it might be headed in the future.

B. Administrative and Financial

General Conclusion: The evaluation team finds that ILD will not be able to function in its present form without continued support from international donors. In addition, the founder and President is unable to carry out the fund-raising and design actions demanded of hiIn AND adequately manage the internal operations of ILD. The evaluation team suggests that ILD implement the following recommendations in order to achieve a measure of sustainability in the future.

General Recommendation: That ILD hire a full-time administrator that is capable of managing this institution through the uncertain immediate future and to restructure the ILD so that it is able to deliver on commitments already made to USAID/W and to potential clients in the future. The current administrator is a fine operations manager, but is not prepared to manage what is, in effect, a fair-sized business with potential gross revenues of over $2 million

Business Plan

Conclusion: ILD does have an administrative planning process to inform current and future activities. But we found that not everyone in ILD knew about the plan and how it is to be implemented. This produces the circumstance in which they are now. No one seems to know what to do and when to do it. While there is something to be said for institutional flexibility, too much of this promotes uncertainty and hesitation. This has led to relative obscurity for ILD in the past year or so, and could mean they would not be able to respond to opportunities as they arise. .

Recommendation: The evaluation team strongly recommends that ILD take a pragmatic look at its current staffing level and use their business plan to develop realistic staffing patterns to help them to deliver training and research and achieve self-sustainability. ILD cannot function as a viable catalyst for democratic change without substantial and continued support by USAID and/ or other international donors.

Endowment Fund

Conclusion: The ILD has not responded to the 1992 threshold evaluation recommendation to establish an endowment fund. As a result, the ILD is not only entirely dependent on USAID for current funding, they must also take out bank loans when these payments are delayed. This is an unacceptable position for an institute that is world-famous for its past work. If ILD is to survive, even with USAID funding, then an endowment must be established.

Recommendation: The evaluation team recommends the creation of an endowment fund for ILD. The endowment should be funded by general unrestricted donations and by the proceeds from overhead charges that the institution will assess for programs funded by other

32 PSIR Projecl Final Evaluation

October 1995


donors. It is understood that during this time its administrative costs would be fully covered by USAID/Global Bureau. All of the proceeds from overhead charges and general unrestricted donations should be placed in ILD's endowment fund and not be used to pay for current administrative charges.

Lease-Purchase Agreement

Conclusion: ILD is currently leasing its office space. No effort has been made in the past 6+ years to purchase a building for ILD offices. Property ownership would build equity for the institute, and provide continuity and stability for staff and activities.

Recommendation: The evaluation team recommends that ILD negotiate a lease-purchase agreement for its current office space or at another affordable location. This measure will enable ILD to start building real property equity, which would in time become part of its endowment fund. This is a strategy already pursued by drug awareness and education NGOs CEDRO in Peru, and SEAMOS in Bolivia, to provide a financial hedge to continued survival. USAID regulations permit such an arrangement, and should be explored by the ILD administrative office with the appropriate USAID official in the Washington Global Bureau.

Income Generation

Conclusion: There is little documentation that ILD has done anything to implement the recommendations of the 1992 threshold evaluation. While there has been some work done to establish cost recovery or overhead rates, this does not appear to have been a priority for the ILD management. This is due, in part, to the lack of administrative continuity in the institute.

Recommendation: ILD must develop a realistic marketing plan to sell its technical and research expertise, systems and processes on a private not-for-profit model at the national and international level. A "product" must be developed, realistically priced, and marketed. The marketing package must include appropriate cost-recovery overheads or indirect costs. Detailed cost accounting should be initiated to eliminate the likelihood of "double billing" administrative costs to each client.

Private Sector Approach

Conclusion: ILD has for most of the last decade had a great deal of success in propagating its ideas on democratization, administrative simplification techniques and titling processes. Notwithstanding ILD's successes, the evaluation team finds that ILD has yet to adjust their corporate thinking to make the needed structural adjustments inherent in the change from a reasonably well managed, USAID-funded organization to one competing in the marketplace for scarce economic resources.

Recommendation: The evaluation team recommends that ILD implement a pragmatic private sector approach, with a minimal staffing pattern, with frugal compensation packages and reduced administrative costs to ensure sustainability in this era of scarce economic resources.

33 PSIR project Final Evaluation

October 1995

Conclusion: ILD has proposed that USAID/W continue funding for ILD as a teaching and research institution. We found no evidence of an ability to deliver the products that have been promised to USAID/W.

Recommendation: The institute must institutionalize ILD's marketable concepts (administrative simplification, property titling and business registration) through the creation of a credible teaching institution. Successful transformation from a research and activist institution to a research and teaching institution would be a first step in differentiating the institution from its founder. .

Conclusion: ILD is currently having an identity crisis. The team was unable to ascertain whether the institute was to continue "business as usual", that is, keeping the same staff on board and seeking to raise the funds to pay them, to redefine the institute as a training and research institution, or to return to the thrilling days of yesteryear when they rode to the assistance of urban squatters, street vendors, and unlicensed transport operators. This activist image captured the attention of Peru, then the U.s., and eventually the world. Many of the staff members we spoke with continue to view themselves as pro-active social mobilizers to defend the property rights of the downtrodden "grass roots" people. Others, outside of ILD, consider the institute as a think tank gone awry. At worst, ILD is seen as a vehicle for the personal interests and political fortunes of the founder.

Recommendation: While we support further USAID support for ILD, we strongly suggest that the ILD President identify exactly what he wants ILD to be in the coming years. Is the institute to be a think tank? A social mobilization program? A campaign management consulting firm? Maybe ILD can be all of these things, but this would require a clear mission statement and a comprehensive articulation of goals and methods; neither of which exist right now. This recommendation is connected to our other comments about the adequacy of the business plan.

C. Technical programs:

Democratization

Conclusion: The democratization programs of ILD are judged to be a partial success. This is due to circumstances beyond the institute's control. And yet, the disappearance of the institute after the failed signature campaign in 1994 need not have happened. Some of the people we interviewed speculated that had ILD kept up the public pressure after the campaign, it would have at least kept the democratization issue in the public spot light. As it happens, the progress that was made and the momentum gathered in the early months has dissipated. There is no one speaking up for democratization in Peru right now. ILD must re-assert its leadership in this area.

Recommendation: We strongly recommend that continued USAID support for the institute be conditioned on further efforts by ILD to keep the issue of democratization on the policy agenda in Peru independently of access to political power. The ILD is in a unique position to act as a leader in the promotion of a renewed civil society in Peru.


October 1995



Conclusion: This program has been enacted into law, and its procedures have been extended into all elements of Peruvian government. The program's greatest impact has been in the areas of property registration and the unified business registration, but it has also affected the customs service and other areas of government notorious for mind-boggling paperwork "tramites" such as passports. It is not coincidental that property and business registration have had the most success in simplification. These are the areas where ILO efforts were concentrated through most of its history. These are also the areas where former ILO staffers are now the chief administrators of key Peruvian government organizations.

Recommendation: Future ILO activities in administrative simplification should be concentrated on research into the real impact of the law, and identifying leaders and "backsliders" in the campaign. Publicizing administrative simplification would not only keep the pressure on in terms of consolidating gains won, moving into areas as yet relatively untouched (the national public registry, for example), but would also serve to promote transparency in government, which is part of the democratization program.

Property Formalization (PRO FORM)

Conclusion: As we have noted throughout this report, this is one of the major successes for ILO and for Peru. The Predial registry system is institutionalized in the public administration, and there is every indication that this simplified system will be the national standard for reform of the public registry under the guidance of the parent institution, SUNARP. This is a major victory for ILO, one that could not have been contemplated when the program was first undertaken. This is another indication of the far-reaching policy impact ILO has had on governance in Peru.

Recommendation: That ILO keep up the pressure to insure the gains that have been made do not get lost in the bureaucratic morass. ILO has succeeded where others have failed, primarily by getting the attention of Peruvians and of the world about the government's administrative limitations put on initiative and the free market in Peru. The institute must return to its early activism and publicity campaigns to make up for ground lost in the past year or so.

Business Formalization (BUSINESS FORM)

Conclusion: The Unified Business Registry (UBR) is institutionalized in the Ministry of Industry, but is to be transferred to SUNAT, the Peruvian Internal Revenue Service. This is a testimony to the success of UBR, since it is now considered as part of the expanded tax base that was a project objective from the beginning. This is another ILO success story.

Recommendation: That ILO continue to monitor the installation of the UBR in SUNAT to insure the simplified processing is maintained. The current chief of SUNAT is disposed to keep the process simple, but this must be institutionalized in SUNAT as it was in the Ministry of Industry. We found it difficult to get information from SUNAT, whereas the staff in the Ministry of Industry were very cooperative. ILO's vigilance of SUNAT would also serve to insure transparency in government.

35 PSIA Proj9d Final Evaluation

October 1995



Conclusion: ILD's international activities have been and should continue to be financed by USAID. As we have noted, this is a major advantage for USAID because the agency had the foresight to support ILD from the beginning, and is now prepared to see it through the difficult years ahead. On the other hand. continued reliance on one source of funding makes ILD vulnerable to reductions or elimination of funding, depending on the fate of the development assistance program in the U.S. Congress.

'. Recommendation: That USAID ' continue to fund ILD's international activities for the foreseeable future, and should the foreign assistance program suffer deep cuts, that ILD be (:onsidered a priority program in furthering U.s. foreign policy interests throughout the developing world. At the same, time ILD should pursue alternative sources of funding through the World Bank, the IDB, private foundations, the European Union and its member states. We also strongly recommend that ILD market its experience as an on-site trainer and a consulting not-for-profit organization.

A suitable and workable solution to the problem of ILD survival in the long-term is to have USAID provide the core funding for marketing ILD concepts, methods and research to an international market. The World Bank, the IDB, and the OAS should provide the funds for extending and consolidating ILD successes in Peru with property titling and business registration. In this manner ILD could maintain its presence and visibility in Peru in the furtherance of democratic process while enhancing Peru's progress toward self-sustaining economic development through free market mechanisms such as secured loans to improve capital formation.

D. The Unique Contribution of ILD to Peru, USAID/Peru, USAIDIW, and the U.S. Government Worldwide

Conclusion: As we have stated elsewhere in this report, the Institute for Liberty and Democracy has provided a unique opportunity for USAID to support an institution that has done much to reduce the oppressive weight of bureaucratic process on the poor householders and the small "informal" businesses of Peru. Now USAID has the opportunity to spread that process beyond Peru to other areas of the world. It is unusual for USAID to support an institution that has only a conceptual proposal, with targets geared to simplification of administrative process and democratization of government. USAID assistance is usually predicted on measurable, verifiable indicators, such as the number of vaccinations done, the numbers of people reached with a social marketing campaign. Or projects are linked to agricultural diversification or output, imports increased, etc. In the case of ILD, the purpose has been to transform a nation, to change the way people think about their economy, their society, and the path they are to take to sustainable development. It is too early to tell whether the ILD has succeeded completely. Administrative reforms and democratic improvements could be wiped out in one military coup. But what cannot be wiped out is the hope for the future that now exists in Peru. As we have learned in Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union, when there is a choice available people will choose freedom over control, and private property over collectivism. This is the lasting impact of ILD, and it was USAID that had the foresight to understand the potential impact of the ILD team. The institute has not delivered on all of the promises, but there are major positive unintended consequences of this project


October 1995


that go far beyond the original unsolicited proposal that USAID wisely supported. There are also solid achievements that exceed the amendments and supplements of the original project proposal. The ILD role in the "auto golpe" of 1992 is perhaps the most significant example of ILD's impact on salvaging democratic process in Peru and maintaining Peru's place in the world family of democratic free-market economy nations.

Recommendation: That USAID continue to support ILD. However it is time for the institute to document its progress to date, it is past time for the ILD to resume being a major player in Peruvian civil society. The ILD is looked to by other Peruvian think tanks and NGOs as a leader, like it or not. In the past year or so the ILD has failed in its leadership role. The support it is to receive from USAID/W must include provision for more research, more publications, and more ILD visibility, to promote the ILD program and the democracy promotion agenda of the U.s. government. The campaign would reduce ILD reliance on political access for democratic reforms. It would also enable ILD to re-establish its role as a lead NGO in a renewed Peruvian civil society. We would not suggest that the gains of the ILD would be lost without this campaign; we don't think that will happen. But we do think a major opportunity to consolidate the gains of the past six+ years will be lost if ILD does not act quickly to re-establish its presence in Peruvian society. Democracy will be fully restored in Peru only if institutions like ILD are willing to stand up and be counted. ILD has done this in the past, now is the time to do it again.

E. Women in Development

Conclusion: The ILD requested assistance from USAID/W in 1989 to address the special concerns of women. A USAID/W staff member provided a two-week workshop on Women in Development in response to that request. ILD's work since then reflects the institute's concern with this important issue. The law on property titling recognizes the rights of women in property transfers, etc. In addition, the law on civil marriage has been simplified to give women a more equitable voice in business and property matters.

Recommendation: The future design of all ILD programs take specific account of the role of women in its programs. This is particularly important in future property titling campaigns and business registration where women may have a significant role in managing property or a business without full rights as a property owner or entrepreneur.

37 PSIR Project Anal evaluation

October 1995

CHAPTER 5 LESSONS LEARNED


As we have tried to point out, the major early accomplishments of ILO are due to two important factors: 1) The dynamic vision of ILO's founder and President, Hernando de Soto, and 2) The access ILO has had to policy makers and decision makers at the highest level. Now the property and business registration process started by ILO are institutionalized in the Peruvian government. The activist way of thinking, of exercising initiative and developing strategies appropriate to the Peruvian reality are deeply inculcated in a group of young people within ILO, and in lawyers, government officials and economists throughout Peru. It is highly unlikely that the clock can be turned back to the status quo ante ILO.

Lesson 1:

Lesson 2:

Lesson 3:

Lesson 4:

Lesson 5:

Lesson 6:

Lesson 7:

Property registration is a real possibility even in the poorest, most ignored areas. But requires activist staff to go out and market the "product"

Democracy and a free market economy can be encouraged and promoted by a private non-governmental organization.

USAIO can invest in NGO's to have an impact on overall national economic policy not just in a technical sector

Early success should not automatically lead to expanding the charter of project support. In the case of ILO, follow-up on property registration, publishing research findings, documenting contributions to Peruvian economic and democratic institutions and maintaining ILO visibility should have taken precedence over expanding into international activities.

If major continued support from USAIO is contemplated, steps to achieving a measure of financial and institutional sustainability should be incorporated into the USAIO/W - ILO grant agreement (i.e., clearly defined Institutional Mission, creation of endowment fund, lease-purchase agreements, establishment of indirect cost rates to charge other donors, development of strong internal management, flexible multi-year plans, and more stringent USAIO oversight and guidance)

It is probably unrealistic to expect a policy-oriented NGO to have multiple major donors to replace USAIO until they have established a broad enough appeal to attract other bi-lateral and multi-lateral donors.

Internal administration in NGOs is a high-priority item for oversight and possible technical assistance. In the case of ILO, the transition from an organization based on a single person's conceptual leadership to a knowledge-

38 PS1R Project Final Evaluation

October 1995

based institution is incomplete, and likely to remain so until an internal administrator almost equal to Mr. de Soto is hired and installed.

Lesson 8: The ILD staff need to be kept apprised of and in agreement with ILD's vision for the future. This could be a function of a close relationship between the conceptual leader and the internal administrator.

Lesson 9: NGO's such as ILD require a strategic business plan, with options, costs, and staff size identified. This enables them to deal with current tasks, and prepare for targets of opportunity in the future.

Lesson 10: Maintain a hard-core staff of professionals who are able to respond to the direction provided by the leadership team (above). Contract specialists and technicians as required to fulfill other requirements, as they arise.

Lesson 11: ILD must develop a realistic marketing plan to sell its technical and research expertise, systems and processes on a national and international level following private sector parameters. A "product" must be developed and realistically priced.

Lesson 12: Institutionalize ILD's marketable concepts (property registration and administrative simplification) through the creation of a credible teaching institution. Successful transformation from a research and activist institution to a research and teaching institution would be a first step in differentiating the institution from its founder.

Lesson 13: ILD must follow up on its Property Registration and Simplified Business Registration Programs that have been institutionalized by the Government of Peru, in order to preserve these achievements.

Lesson 14: To succeed in the future ILD should develop and broadcast a series of short radio and TV spots and CLEAR newspaper ads to explain who ILD is, what they are working or have worked on, and why ILD is an important resource to Peru.

Lesson 15: Political access is not a sine qua non for NGO policy institutions, but it is a shortcut to legitimacy and efficacy. Follow up institutionalization is required if the gains of a political relationship are not to be lost.

PERUREPT.R38


October 1995

LIST OF ATTACHMENTS

1- ILD's Staff Distribution by Function as of September 1995.

I-A ILD's Staff Distribution by Grade as of September 1995.

2- Evaluation Team's Suggested Staff levels in accordance with ILD's Current Operational Status as of September 1995

3- Mortgage Loans by Financial Institutions Registered in PREDIAL as of Sept. 1995.

4- Detail of Properties Registered in Predial as of August 1995.

5- Detail of Businesses Registration by Unified Business Registry (UBR)

6- Number of Employees Registered by UBR. (Does not include one-person or family members).

7- SUNAT (peru's IRS) Taxation Statistical Charts.

8- ILD' s Other Donors Contribution Detail.

9- ILD' s Record of Events, April 1992.

10- ILD's One Year Budget Summary presented to USAID/W for the Globalization of ILD as a Teaching and Research Institution.

11- Sample Questionnaire given to street vendors in four areas of Lima.

ATTAOI.Il31

iii.muto uDen.a Yu_mocrllcla

DIstribucl6n del Personal ., mes de Set/embre f 995

G. GENERAl: Manuel Mayorga I lADMINISTRAC.: Elsa .10

H. de Solo M. Gago (sec) CONTRALORIA: E. Moteyr1I I. Galvez (sec) H. Velar ICONTABILIDAD' R. Espinoza

M.Luna

DD.PP. : M. Comejo I M. Oominguez (sec) ITESORERIA: E. Silva E. Mosq .... ira

A.L. Camaiora M.C. Delgado PRESUPUESTO: M. Mendieta D.Herenaa »-E. Vivar PERSONAl: G. Trenernan

...j

...j

L. Aliaga »-n

J. Sliva S. GRAlES.: Q Eyuguirre '" :J: J. Robles R. Espinoza

,., z

D. Castillo R. Falco ...j

R. Tronco M.Barnora .. G. Marini S.Ald_ A. Ayala

C. Villamarin

JR. H.ro F. Gamboa

Y COMC.: R. Mesalck II. Mckenzie I T. Romayna Gamarra .10. H.ro Eyzaguirre

ATTA CHMENT II I- A

PERSONAL DEL ILD

MES DE REFERENCIA: SETlEMBRE 1 ~5

Tipe de Ca,

CATEa. APELLIOOS Y NOMISRES GRADO CARGO

5TA ALDAVE HUARACA, MAXIMILIANO SAMUEL GO AUXILIAR UMPIEZA

5TA ALiAGA JIBAJA, LUIS AGUSTIN GB ABOGADO

5TA AYALA GUARDIA, ANGEL , G3 ASISTENTE B

5TA BARRERA VALDEZ, MILTORD EUSEBIO GO MENSAJERO

5TA CAMAJORA ITURRIAGA, ANA LUCIA Gl0 INVESTIGADOR ESPECIALISTA

5TA CORNEJO BATTIFORA, MARIANO HERBERT Gl0 ASESOR ESPECIAUSTA PROYECTO

5TA DELGADO MENENDEZ, MARIA DEL CARMEN G8 INVESTIGADOR A

5TA DOMINGUEZ SORIANO, MARTHA G3 SECRET ARIA A

5TA ESPINOZA CARRASCO, ROGER G5 ASISTENTE A

5TA ESPINOZA ESTRADA, RICARDO G5 ASISTENTE CONTABIUDAD

5TA EYZAGUIRRE GARCIA, CARLOS ORLANDO G3 ASISTENTEB

5TA EYZAGUIRRE GARCIA, LUIS ALBERTO Gl ASISTENTE C

5TA FALCO VELARDE, ROCIO Gl RECEPCIONISTA

5TA GAGO GUTIERREZ, MIRIAM Sa..EDAD G6 EJECUTIVO DE DEPARTAMENTO

5TA GALVEZ MARTINEZ, MARIA INES G5 ASISTENTEA

5TA GAMARRA AGUIRRE, JORGE LUIS GB · JEFE CENTRO DOCUMENT ACION

5TA GAMBOA YBANEZ, FABIO G2 ASISTENTE SERV GRALES,. -

5TA HARO VILlANUEVA, JESUS G2 CHOFER

5TA HARO VILlANUEVA, JORGE HEUO G2 ASISTENTE SERV GRALES.

5TA JO CHANG, ELSA VICTORIA G8 GERENTE ADMINISTRA TlVO FINANC,

5TA LUNA GUTIERREZ, MARCO ANTONIO GO AUXIUAR ADMINISTRA TlVO

5TA MARINI CARRENO, GUST AVO MARTIN G5 ASISTENTEA

5TA MENDIETA ROMANI, MARIO G6 EJECUTIVO DE DEPARTAMENTO

5TA MOREYRA PELOSI, ENRIOUE ALFREDO MAURO GB CONTRALOR

5TA MOSOUEIRA MEDINA, EDGARDO Gl0 INVESTIGADOR ESPECIAUST A

5TA ROBLES ESPIL, JAVIER SALVADOR G8 PROGRAMADOR

5TA ROMAYNA MONTEIRO. TONI G2 ASISTENTE SERV GRALES,

5TA SILVA HURTADO, JACKEUNE G7 INVESTIGADOR B

5TA SILVA SALAS, EUANA G5 ASISTENTE CONT ABIUDAD

5TA TRENEMAN YOUNG, GONZALO JAVIER G5 PROGRAMADOR

5TA TRONCO CRIOLLO, ROBERTO Gl0 INVESTIGADOR ESPECIAUSTA

5TA VALER CHACON, m.40TEO HEBERT GO AUXIUAR SERVo GENERALES

5TA VILLAMARIN GUTIERREZ, CARLOS FRANCISCO GB JEFE DE SEGURIDAD

5TA VIVAR MORALES, ELENA MARIA GB ABOGAOO Total 5ta Cate,

4TA M Y M ASESORES Gll GERENCIA GENERAL

4TA MESSICK, RICHARD G12 COORDINADOR EN WASHINGTON

4TA HER EN CIA OUISPE, DANIEL Gl0 INVESTIGADOR ESPECIAUSTA

4TA CASTILLO MALLOUI, DAVID G5 PROGRAMADOR

4TA MACKENZIE LEON, IRIS GO EJECUTIVO DE DEPARTAMENTO Total 4ta Cate

Total 4ta y 5ta Cate

ATTACHMENT II 2

SUGGESTED STAFFING

G. GENERAL: 1 INVESTIGAe. : 1 ADMINIST./PERSONAL: 1

CONTRALOR.lPRESUP. : 1 DD.PP.: 7

CONTABIUDAD: 2 ,

INF. Y COMe.: 1 TESORERIA: 1

S. GRALES.: 2

SEGURIDAD: 5

SUB-TOT ALES: 9 5 12

TOTAL: 27

HIPOTECAS INSCRJTAS EN EL REGISTRO PREDIAL

Hula 0121 do .otiombro do 1995

PERIODO URBANO RURAL URBANO-RURAL · N' USS N' USS N'

1990 10 89,882.45 10 1991 116 207,438.33 116

1992 38 308,929.58 38 1993 416 682,611.12 I 3,718.83 417 1994 437 2,273,049.64 lOS 772,745.58 542

1995 922 4,631,598.06 232 1,710,033 .57 1,154

TOTAL 1,939 8,193,509.18 338 2.091,856.51 2.),77

DET ALLE DE LAS PRJNCIP ALES FUENTES DE CREDITO DE LAS HIPOTECAS REGISTRADAS

N' MONTO ENTIDAD HIJ'O. USS ENTIDAD

TE-CAS

Ori6n Corporacion de Credito 739 3,695,000.00 Banco Industrial del Peru I I

Banco Wiese Ltdo. 140 1,408,618.55 Coop. Ahorro y Credo San Ricardo KARPA 150 745,600.00 Asociaci6n Promoviendo Banco de Comercio 16 620,020.00 Fondo de Empleados Banco de la

Naci6n Municipalidad de Villa EI Salvador 506 590,363.69 Coop. de Ahorro y CrCdito San

Isidro Korea Motors Inc. S.A. 11 338,560.00 Gloria Sociedad An6nima Banco:c!i: 1a Vivienda del Peru 262 303,321.80 Banco de Credito del Peru Central Cailete S.A. 132 270,457.55 Caja Municipal Banco Financiero del Peru 26 206,800.00 Mutual Metropolitana Consorcio Vip S.A. 8 271,072.00 Almacenes Agrop. del Sur SRL

"Almagros" Volvo Peril S.A. 2 .. 152,279.82 Banco Nacional Coop. del Peru Promocion y Gestion de Neg. S.A. 4 144,812.76 Coop. Credo San Ricardo Ltda. 206

Comercial Agricola del Peru S.A. 6 261,164.54 Lima Caucho S.A. Fondo de Vivienda de la Marina 26 123,772.00 Banco de Lima (Fovimar) Banco Continental 12 115,882.45 Banco Intemacional del Peni

Instituto Desar. del Sector Informal 19 145,416.25 Caja Rural de Ahorro y Cridito Callete Banco Popular del Peru I 85,567.39 OTROS

Promotora Intemacional Santa Rosa 1 77,005.44 TOTAL

. PROSA-

USS

89,882.45

207,438.33

308,929.58

686,329.95

3,045,795.22

6,341 ,631.63

10.680.007.16

N' MONTO H!Po- USS

TE· CAS

17 51 .511.99 . 2 50,683.90

20 48,832.45

2 40,000.00

2 35,749.11

2 34,000.00

1 32,040.00

32 31,651.33

2 28,050.83

1 28,000.00

5 18,029.56

1 17,380.00

I 14,000.00

1 7,421.91

4 40,000.00

7 24,900.00

116 622,041.84

2.,277 10,680.007.16

estad95b.doc· l2Iocll95

Fecha de Entreaa: Ai 22 De Set1embre de 1995 .

, NUMERO DE CODIGOS DE PREDIO GENERAI::XJS _

URBANO = . ._-c-.

A/O ZONAL SUR ZONAL NORTE ZONAL ESTE

1990 40.100 7.297 10.458 - --

1991 14.842 ----- -----

1992 7.761 3.386 506

1993 19.010 27.343 16.368

1994 8.241 10.945 8.121

1995 33. 543 16.893 19.486

SUB TOTAL: 123.497 65.864 54.939

RURAL =

SUR 2.708

NORTE 7.367

SUB-TOTAL 10.075

TOTAL PREDIOS URBANOS Y RURALES = 254,375

,f

TOTAL

57.855

14.842

11.653

62.721

27.307

69.922

244.300

--

.

ATTACHMENT 115

VAAlACIOH AHUAL Dr Loa AEQIITAOI IIIIFteADOI AUTOAIZAD08 A NIVEL NACIONAL

TOTAL NACIOHA1.

VAAlACIOH "

COMER;IO

III[)USTFQ

TURISMO ARTESAIIaA

TRANSPORTES

SALUO

401,608

54,800

34,3S18

4,104

4,114

4,923

ff1,_

4e,340

S,e33

3,272

334 458

472

FUENTE : PROYECTO ESPECIAl. DE REGISTRO UNlFICAOO

FECHA : 10/04/1 Q115

1154,870 112,488 I

1.,1 4,'

124,154 130,11711

1 S,4111 11,332

10,008 11,617

1,523 I ,S31

888 I ,see 1,820 1,4as

12',003

·20,'"

lOO,03C! 13,817

11,613

1,210

1,202

1,18S

SECTOR

INDUSTRIA

ARTESANIA

COMERCIO

TURISMO ,SALUO

I TRANSPORTE

iTO TAL

ATTACHMENT /I 6

REGISTROS UNlFICAOOS AUTORIZAOOS POR LOCAL Y RAN30 DE PERSONAL OCUPAOO

AL 5/4/1995

RANGO DE TRABAJAOORES T. EMP. o ·4 II 5·19 II 20·49 I 50· g9 I 100· lQQ I 200· MAS

35,153 30,oee 4,049 609 206 123 96 . 2,067 2,007 57 2 0 0 1

248,693 237,297 9,342 1,328 382 180 164

19077 17474 1 455 104 23 e 13 3,204 3,052 106 27 6 6 7

906 753 108 28 11 2 4

II 309,100 II 290,651 /I 15,117 II 2.096 I 630 I 319 i 265 I

--- I -- I -... -... -v ... -

ATTACHMENT 7

-Grafico NR 9

CONTRIBUYENTES QUE DECLARAN 11 (JuI1993- Ago 1995)

A ./ --

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Gr8fico NR 10 CONTRIBUYENTES QUE PAGAN 11

(JuI1993- Ago 1995)

---

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----• • • • • , • • • " '" • • • • • • I • .. •

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I I i 1 , , ,

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11 Incluye a los contribuyentes Que presentaron dectaraciones par regularizad6n anual dat Impuesto a Ia renta.

ATTACHMENT II 8 (I /J)

RELAC ION DE CON VEN IDS APROBADOS

MONTO DURACION FUNDACION DONA DO NOMBRE DEL PROYECTO DEL

US $ PROYECTO

JOHN M. OLIN FOUNDATION 25,000 INCREASING ACCESS TO CREDIT 1-89/11-89

400,000 HIPOTECA POPULAR Y REFORMA DEL CREDITO 12-&9/12-SL

FUNDACION PARA EL DESA- 62,77Y GASTOS GENERALES MAYO 1991 RROLLO ECONOMICO Y 5,509/ GASTOS DE VIAJE SOCIAl. (FUNDES) 6,40:¥ GA STOS DE VIAJE DIC IE 1953

53,000 DERECHOS PATRIMONIALES ENERO 1994 511,907 " .. 04-94/01-95 257,077 " " JULIO 1995

2,00CV GASTOS GENERALES r1AYO 1989 FRANCISCO MARROQUIN 500' " " r1ARZO 1990

2,00er " " ABRIL 1992 1,00(1, " " I MARZO 1991 I

240,00~ INFORMAL SECTOR ADVOCACY 5-89/4-90 CIPE 8,77 GASTOS DE VIAJE

115,000 DEMOCRATIC DECISION MAKING 4-93/4-94

SMITH RICHARDSON FOUNDA 176,895 CREDIT REFORM IN PERU 10-89/12-90 128,030 IMPACT OF PROPERTY FORMALIZ 07-94/02-95

CINDE 9,672 II GASTOS DE VIAJE Y CONFERENC ABRIL 1989

SECRET. NAC. GBNO PERUA 37,007 PUBLICACIONES (S.A. E H.P.) 6-89/1-92

EARHART FOUNDATION 10,000 DEMOCRATIZAC. ACCESO CREDIT NOVIEM 1989

LABAT · ANDERSON 7,442"" TRAVEL EXPENSES ABRIL 1989

VALLEY FOUNDATION 2,456V TRAVEL EXPENSES JUNIO 1989

CHASE MANHATTAN BANK 3,196 V TRAVEL EXPENSES DIC. 1989

PNUD (UNDP) 459,000 DEMOCRATIZAC ACCESO CREDITO 2-90/2-91 402,000 SIMPLIFICACION ADMINISTRAT . 2-90/2/91

ARGID~US FOUNDATION 50,00er GASTOS GENERALES 9-90/3-91 50,000 I- " " 4-91/3-92

/

PERUBAR 50, 000 II GASTOS GENERALES 4-90/3-91

ECHOING GREEN FOUNDATIO 15C,000 FUNDRAISING 4-91/3-92

ATTACHMENT 1/ 8 ( 2 /3)

MONTO DURACION FUNDACION DONADO NOMBRE DEL PROYECTO DEL

US $ PROYECTO

IRIS FOUNDATION ' 20,000"'" GASTOS CONFERENC. WASHINGT ENERO 1991 5,0001 GASTOS DE CONFERENCIA 11AYO 1994

17,679 DEMOCRATIC DECISION MAKING 1-91/9-91 THE TINKER FOU NDATION 7,667 " " " 1-92/12- 9

50,000 " " " 10- 93/5-9

USAID EL SALVA DOR 250,211 PROi"ERTY REGISTRING SYSTEM 1-91/9-91 253,000 " " " 1-92/ 12-9

CHARLES H. BRUNIE 1,000v GASTOS GENERALES SET 1 EM 199

ATLAS FOUNDATION 10 ,000' CONFERENCE AT WASHINGTON 9-92/ 12-9 10,000" CONFERENCE PROPERTY FOR POO ABRIL 199

PADF 1,600" GASTOS VIAJE, CON FERENCIA OCTUB. 199

COHEP HONDURAS 111,271 SIMPLIFICACI6N ADMINI~TRAT . 1-92/9-92

BANCO MUNDIAL 550,000 PROPERTY T I Tll NG REGISTRAT. 11-92/8-93

LYNDE & BRADLEY 50,000" GASTOS GENERALES 2-92/2-93

FUNDAC ION YAKARTA 575,j GASTOS DE VIAJE ABRIL 1992

ROY GODSON 1,399" GASTOS DE VIAJE FEBRE. 199

BORLAND 6,215 SOFTWARE ENERO 1993

INTERCENA 16,500 v PSJES . CONFERENC. ATENCIONE FEBRER 199

CANTRILL GROUP 10,000 v CONSULTORIA EN SEGURIDAD FEBRER 199

ENCICLOPEDIA BRITANNICA 1,000v GASTOS GEN ERALES MARZO 1993

INTER PRESS SERVICE IPS 200 v GASTOS GENERALES OCTUBRE 93

PATH TO PROPERTY 50,000 DEMOCRATIC DECISION MAKING ENl;"(O 1994

WESTMINSTER FOUNDATION 65,JOO DEMOCRATIC DECISION MAKING MARZO 1994

DR. KENNETH MACKNET 200'" DIVULGACION EOS DICIEM 199

BDVI GASCHAEFTSSTELLE 6,559'" GASTOS DE VIAJE JUNIO 1994

FREIE UNIV BERLIN 59511' GASTOS DE VIAJE ABRIL 1994

DIVERSOS ING . CONFEREN 520* CONFERENCIA EN WASHINGTON ABRIL 1994

ATTACHMENT /I 8 (3/3)

FUNDACION

C Y A MODAS LTDA SAO PA

FOUND FOR DEMOC EDUCAT

EMBAJADA DE HOLANDA

FRIEDERICH NAUMANN STr

EMBAJADA DEL CANADA

SALLY BOWEN Y OTROS

DONANTES VARIOS

DONANTES VARIOS

ADRIAN REVILLA

TOTAL GENERAL

US $ 15,593

* US $ 630

, US $ 8,596

MONTO DONADO US $

110*

975 At

402 A1

6,662 AL

400"

5,100 II

2,796 ,.

700 '"

100 L

4' 740,071

PARA GASTOS ADMINISTRATIVOS

NOMBRE DEL PROYECTO

CONFERENCIA EN WASHINGTON

GASTOS DE VIAJE

GASTOS DE VIAJE

V~STOS DE VIAJE

GASTOS DE VIAJE

GASTOS ADMINISTRATIVOS



GASTOS ADMINISTRATIVOS ,

us $ 607,334

PARA HIPOTECA POPULAR - ACCESO AL CREDITO

PARA SIMPLIFICACION ADMINISTRATIVA

3'074,120

513,271

305,346

240,000

PARA DEMOCRATIZACION DECISIONES DEL GBNO,

PARA ESTUDIOS SECTOR INFORMAL

4' 740, 071

DURACION I DEL

PROYECTO I JUNIO 1994

FEBRt::RO 94

FEBRERO 94 i ,

NOViEMB 94 I

NOVIEMB 94 i ENERO 1993 1

MAYO 1992

JUNIO 1992

JUNIO 1993

=============

FILE I

FILE II

ATTACHMENT II 9 (1/2)

"ARCHIVO GOLPE"

01. CORRESPONDENCIA

1.1 FUJIMORI, A. (PRESIDENTE) 1.~ ARONSON, BERNARD 1.3 BEERS, RANDY 1.4 PEREZ DE CUELLAR, JAVIER 1 • 5 SAN ROMAN, MAXIMO 1.6 SALINAS, ABEL 1.10 VARIOS

02. DOCUHENTOS INTERNOS ILD

2.1 LA IMPOSIBILIDAD DEL REGRESO A LA SITUACION ANTERIOR

2.2 PROGRAMA PARA LA DEMOCRATIZACION 2.3 COMUNICADO DE PRENSA (NO PUBLICADO) 2.4 DISCURSO DEL PRESIDENTE AFF

(VERSIONES PRELIMINARES) 2.5 DISCURSO DEL PRESIDENTE AFF

(VERSION FINAL) 2.6 DISCURSO DEL PRESIDENTE AFF

(VERSION FINAL EN INGLES) 2.7 POSIBLES REFORMAS AL REGIMEN DE LOS

PARTIDOS POLITICOS 2.8 CONGRESO CONSTITUYENTE DEMOCRATICO (CCD)

,

03. DECLARACION ILD 9/ABRIL/92

3.1 VERSION CASTELLANO 3.2 VERSION INGLES 3.3 BACKGROUND 3.4 DECLARACION PUBLICAOA 3.5 DISTRIBUCION 3.6 REACCION A NOTA DE PRENSA 3.7 PRENSA EXTRANJERA EN LIMA (6-4-92) 3.8 "EL MERCURIO", CHILE (BRITO, JUAN IGNACIO)

04. ARTICULOS PRENSA INTERNACIONAL

4.1 ORSINI, D. - MEMOS ON COUP

FILE III 14. ARTICULOS VARIOS PRENSA NACIOHAL (ABK-HAY, 92)

FILII IV

FILII V

FILII VI

ATTA CHMENT n 9 ( 2 /2)

14. ARTICULOS VARIOS PRENSA HACIOHAL (CONT ••• ) (JUN-JUL-AGO, 92)

14.1 DISCURSOS - VERSIONES TEXTUALES 14 . 2 ENCUESTAS 14.3 PRONUNCIAMIENTOS 14.4 DIALOGO NACIONAL 14.5 REACCION A NOTA DE PRENSA ILD 14.6 ENTREVISTAS A AFF 14.7 ENTREVISTAS A CB

15. API' - O.E.A. 15 . 1 CORRESPONDENCIA HECTOR GROS ESPIELL 15.2 RESOLUCIONES OEA 15 . 3 DISCURSO OEA 18.04.92

- DOCUMENTO ILD - VERSION TEXTUAL

15.4 OTROS DISCURSOS OEA ABR/92 15.5 MEMOS INTERNOS REFERENTE OEA 15.6 RECORTES DE PRENSA

FILB VII 16. NOTA DE PRENSA 01/JUNIO/92 INICIO Y TERMINO DE COLABORACIOH PARA NASSAU 16.1 VERSION CASTELLANO 16.2 VERSION INGLES 16.3 REACCION A NOTA DE PRENSA

17. C.C.D. 17.1 PROPUESTA ILD (TEXTO) 17.2 AVISO ~ESTAREMOS REPRESENTADOS? 17.3 DISTRIBUCION INTERNACIONAL 17 . 4 INVITACIONES 17.5 RECORTES DE PRENSA

VOTO DE MILITARES Y DISTRITO ELECTORAL MULTIPLE

FILII VIII 18. C.C.D. (Cont • •• )

19.

18 . 1 PROPUESTA AL PRESIDENTE AFF 18.2 AVISO "HE TENIDO UNA PESADILLA"

VERSION ESPANOL e INGLES 18 . 3 DISTRIBUCION NOTA DE PRENSA NACIONAL 18.4 RECORTES DE PRENSA 18.5 COMENTARIOS PROF. BECKER

REF. AVISO " PESADILLA"

SELECCION DE ARTICULOS CCD BECBO 19.1 FASE I: PRE-COUP 19.2 FASE II: APRIL 5 - MAY 18, 19.3 FASE III: MA Y 18, 1992 19.4 FASE IV: ceD EDITORIALES 19.5 FASE V: BOMBA

POR HDS

1992

ATTACHMENT II 10

BUDGET SUMMARY (US Dollars)

DIRECT LABOR - TRAINING PROGRAMS

- INFORMATION CENTER - ADMINISTRATION

BENEFITS

- TRAINING PROGRAMS

-INFORMATION CENTER

- ADMINISTRATION

III. TRAVEL AND PER DIEM

- TRAINING PROGRAMS

- INFORMATION CENTER

- ADMINISTRATION

OTHER DIRECT COSTS

- TRAINING PROGRAMS

- INFORMATION CENTER

- ADMINISTRATION

EXTERNAL AUDITS

1,0<41,300 189,951 318,456

407 219,303

37,012 151,578

154,800 12,000

o

179,500 96,200

225,900

Attachment d ' I I QUESTIONNAIRE

Location: Date:

1. Have you ever heard about the Institute for Liberty and Democracy? YES NO

2. How did you find out about it? a . In the newspaper. Which? b. On the radio. Which station'! c . On TV. Which channel? d. On a posterl street banner. Where? e. In a pamphlet. f. Through a frjend g. By other means. Which?

3. Do you Icnow what the Institute for Liberty and Democracy does?

••• •••. •••• .. .• .••.•.... •...•• •••• .••• ••• •. .... .. .•.. ... .•. •. ••. ... ..•.• .• .. •.• . f .•

4. Have you heard of other institutions similar to the YES NO Institute for Liberty and Democracy? If so, please mention their names.

5. Do you think ILD is any better than the other institutions?

6. Would you be willing to make a contribution for ILD services ?

7. Have you ever seen ILD street banners or posters? A bulletin or a pamphlet?

8. . Do you think ILD has contributed to social and economic improvements in Peru?

9. Do you have any information to confirm ILD success?

10. Do you recall having seen any ILD notice or other materials in the newspapers or elsewhere?

a. Did you read them?

b. Would you say they were :

Excellent Good Fair Bad

11. What would you say is the main role for ILD?

a. Research b. Administrative Simplification c . Property Rights d . Arbitration

ANNEXES

1. Evaluation Scope of Work 2. Evaluation Methodology 3. Evaluation Work Plan 4. The Composition of the Team and the Qualifications of the Team

Members. 5. List of Documents Reviewed 6. List of Persons Contacted/Interviewed 7. The Project Evaluation Summary Report - Pages 2 through 4 of

USAID Form No. 1330-5 (5-92) 8. A Draft Project Completion Report - USAID Handbooks

AN NEX I

The specific rellpon~lbiliticlI of the cvylu.stion teall will include the following:

A. Administratiye/Pinancial;

Based on the review ILD's record. and written procedure. and pertorm lnt:erv1ews with melDllca'lf .0£1'.1 .. uvl .. uL .. /cQullultants to the organization, the Contractor will conduct administrative and financial. assessments ot ILD'. organization and openll . .I.ulI, including the following:

a)

b)

0)

d)

Assess the ~dequacy and appropriatenellll of the current organizational structures, atatting and compensat1on, ~ administrative and personnel procedures, accounting procedures, inventory and financial management controls, and monitoring information systema to carry out its workload and to reapond to the need. of the institute. AMaels the reasonablenese of ILD'. plan to reduce staff in the near future and the strategy they have adopted to reach financial self sustainabilitv. In aaaessing lLD's staffing, the Contractor shall consider th. proximity of the Project Assistance Completion Date (July 31, 1995) and the likelihood that USAID will no longer aalist 'ILD aa it h .. ", nonl! in the past by covering lDOat of its administrative costs. Aacertllin the macrninlt-l .. of r"''''()UrCf!8, in cash and/or in kind, ~hat ILD has obtained from other donors dur..i.ng the life of the PSIR Project (March '-, , ~Aq- .T1I1y :n, 1995) . The Contractor must also distinguish between those resource. that third donors h~ve allocated fOT prngr~mA from those that have asaioted ILD to cover its adm1niatrytive coats. ABsess whether ILD is collecting properly ~ll the adminiatrwtive coots inc\lrrad \lnder each one of the grants, coneracta, and/or donations they have received, and whether these hAve boon properly allotted to each contribution, as a first step in becoming .elf~ :sustainable.

Contract No . . 527-598- 0772 .16-C- 00 -5368 -00 l2

e)

f)

g)

B .

Ascertain whether ILD's management of the project baa been adequate . Identify strengths and weaknesses and make appropri~t. "'Al"nmmf'!ndations for improving and/or streamlining l'IIanagement and procedures to meet stated objectives after the Proj ... ('t . .

Assess whether USAID management of the Project haa been adequate, if ILD/USAID rp.1"t.innllhip was effective·, and whether USAID' a inputs were delivered in a timely l'!I.:lnner.

Tachnical/rregrgmpt

The Contractor will examine lLO'c ~etivitiea in the implementation of the Project in the areas of its USAID programs: 1) the AUIlI.l.u.l.I:ILLdl.lvc SimplifiCAtion Program, 2) the Oemoor~ti.ation of Government Decision-MakJ.ng Prog-r&I'II, 3) Property Rights, and ') International A~L~v.l.Ll~s. The Contractor will includo the following aspects:

al

b)

c)

d)

e)

fl

g)

h)

i)

j I

Identity and diDcusa major ch~ge. in project setting, including socia-economic con<1itions and GOP 90v~,",lInl;l,,"1. priorities , which have an impact on the PSIR Project. A3eess the extent to which the ~$IR project through lLO has achieved t.he intended objectives mentioned in i t s original Democratic Initiatives Proposal to U~AlU dated 9/13/~, and detailed in the Cooperative and in the Grant Agreements signed with USAID, as well as in the Project Implementation Letters and/or Letters of Involvement. The asseesment should show evidence of the achievements in terms of qualitative and quantitative indicatora. Describe any unexpected accomplishments that have resulted, and the factors that deterl'llined them. Identify major failures and the hctors lhat have ; n f 1 \l~nc:ed theUl. Identify the direct and indirect beneticiaries of the Project in t~rmA of the nature of the benefits and the identity and number of those benefitting. A8.e.. the rel.vanc~ of thA 9~TR Project in the achievement of the USAID/Peru democracy objective • . lI.e.e.8 the oo.t-effectivQne,;a of the af.'t.ivit.;"'111 n.D hae carried out. Were the reeul ts obtained reasonable in rol~tion to the ooaea incurrQd? Identify the internal f.:lctorD that facilitated or reetrictcd implementation of the Project . Assess whether reco\1llllendations tnade in the Threshold evaluation, performed in 199~, were impleU\8Ated . If not, why? Determine if ILD'. current progr~mc ~re cti11 a part of Peru's economic agenda, and if not, analyze the causes CuL' their Q1Ilieeion, and propoee the correotive action ••

ContrAct No. S27-598-0772.16-C-OO-S368-00 1,3

Ie)

1)

Asae.. the existence and adequacy at lLO'1i overall IItrateqiea to influence opinion leaderll and increase public awarene.s and knowledge relative to tne modernization and privatization of the State anel the development of democracy in general. Dnr.lIment the lessons that can be Project. It will include design, m&nacre~nt f~r.~ors.

learned from the implementation and

In regard to ILD'. pr~ramA ... hl'! p.valuation ahould allaiwer the following questions:

I.

II.

Democratization of Ggyernment Decision-MAking program

HOW effective have ILD prO<Jrama been in IItrengthen1ng democracy throughout tha country? In particular, what haa been the impact of ILD activities related to anti<.;u<:ruption, democratization of decioion l!I4llcing and parallel systems of justice? What impact has ILD had on prol1lOt.l.ull LL .... ''''p4J:ency and accountcability of publiCI administration? Has the impact of this program been spread to the whole P~Luv14ll pOp1.llation and to other. Latin American countries?

How have ILD studies been used and have they had practicaJ. applications l.n establishing government:. pol.l.<.;y?

Can this be documented?

How is the Oel1lOCratization of Government Deciwiona (DOG) activity being applied within the Legislative Branch, the Electoral System, etc.?

Mminis.trative Simplification Program

What was the lLO'a role 1n establishing the Administrative Simplification Law and the Unified BusinlllJIIA Reqistry? How effective were the Administrative Simplification and Unified Business Regiatry law8 and wera they fully impll'!mented?

What did the Adlll!" i Rt r;ll~. 1 VP. Simplification Tribunal accomplish and doe. it still exist?

One important objective of the Administrative Silllplif ie.tion progr.m w&Ill to i "r.r"~AI'! formal sector businelses, formal sector employment opportunities and government tax ravenuest W1u.t was its t"'l'l~r.t'. on the economy and can it ba quantified?

Contract No. S47-S9a-077?.16-C-OO-S368-00

III. Prgperty Right'

IV

Are the ·PROFORM" and "Path to Property Mlociation" still in existence?

r.Rn the ~moun~ be quantified?

Has a rF.'iI 1 jIIAr.Rte market developed as a relul t of ·these informal titles? Do owners sell their land and move to urban areas. instF.'ad nf rp.-investing in their property?

Are land titl.s (urban and rural) T'-"9i Rt ... rjllt! throuqh the PROFORM activity accepted by formal financial institutiona against which loans can be secured? "~A infor~l titling led to bank loans? If not, why? Can the amcunt be quAntified7

What .,jIGI the reo.ction of Oxceutive BrOUloh institutions to lLD's proposal on Property Registration?

International Actiyities

Have ILD's international activities helped lead to financial selt-suttlciency?

In addition, the evaluation should answer the following questions:

a) USAID has supported ILD programs since lse" far exceeding the shorter, five to eight year relationships that USAID normally sustains .... ith an organization. What are some of the lessons learned from such a long term relationship, particularly with regard to program impact and the institutions's long-term viability?

~) What lLD activities can and should be continl.led and m~Tkp.~ed internationally in the absence of future USAID or other donor support? Are these activitie. profitable and "nul ci they qenerate sufficient inc9IIIe to cover a portion of ILD'. operational coat.?

0) What is the future of the ILD in Peru? Will it continue eo h;;ive a rolF.' l" RI"TlIrt.lITltl reform in Peru? Will it continue as a thinktank? Assess major setbacks of ILD as an in&titution: relationship wil"h ~p.rnmP.nt, HGOa.

d) Financial .. ustainability ha .. ~en a "'''jnr R .. I". h~r.1c in the rLD o.dministration. What atratogies have been plann.d to deal with thia import.nt i .... u.?

Contract No . S~7-S98-077~.16-C-OO-53'8-00 15

e) How were the interests and role of women (compared eo' m ... n) taken into account in the design and i1llJ)1cllentatiOD .. tages of ILD programs?

f) Has lLD been successful in creating awareness among the intorlllal ".Cl:or ot i t.1!I "c1vnr.llr:y role on econolllic and political development?

Annex 2

DESCRIPTION OF METHODOLOGY

In this evaluation for USAIDjPeru the team was guided by the requirements and guidance of the SOW and information gathered interviews, site visits, document reviews, and an examination of ILD administrative and operational records, financial systems, and reports of activities since the original cooperative agreement was signed in March, 1989. A particular point o.f reference was the Threshold Evaluation Report performed by the Development Economics Group in March 1992.

The evaluation team concentrated on ILD activities in the implementation of the project in the areas of USAID programs: 1) the Administrative Simplification Program, 2) the Democratization of Government Decision-Making Program, 3) Property Rights (including the Unified Business Registry, and 4) International Activities. We placed an emphasis on determining the status of ILD as an institution as it pertains to sustainability after more than eleven years of USAIDjPeru support (nearly seven under this project). since ILD has drawn international attention because of its efforts in Peru to eliminate governmental impediments to entrepreneurial activity, the reports pays particular attention to lessons learned. This exercise serves at least two positive purposes for similar efforts elsewhere: 1) Articulating what has worked and what has not will help to avoid design errors in administrative simplification and democratization throughout the world, and 2) Providing a model for other nations to simplify the process of establishing small businesses, clarifying property rights, and increasing popular participation in government decision-making, particularly as it applies to economic activity and the regulation of individual and corporate behavior.

Because much of ILD's activities have been concentrated on the so-called informal sector and governmental decision-making we conducted extensive interviews with research institutions, members of the government, think tanks, and "new towns" residents and one selected rural community north of Lima. We also conducted an informal series of intercept interviews to get a rough measure of ILD name-recognition and respondent's willingness to support ILD from four areas of Lima with high a concentration of informal traders and service providers, i.e., mechanics, itinerant handymen, money-changers, etc. While the team has not been able to make exact measures of ILD's effect on this sector, we have been able to determine how well known and used the simplification and democratization reforms are. We can also estimate how willing the formQlized small businesses and property owners are to pay taxes, licensing fees, loan interest, and the costs of doing business.

At the other end of the spectrum, we investigated how influential ILD's ideas and recommendations for simplification

and democratization have been on government decision makers and bureaucratic rule makers and implementors. One of the major thrusts of the ILD program over the years has been to break the strangle hold that petty officials have on the every day conduct of business in Peru. Now that the Peruvian economy is improving, and foreign investment is on the rise, heavy handed rule application could smother the nascent boom. Of particular interest will be the restrictions on importing seeds, manufacturing equipment, agricultural machinery, tools, and other materials needed to modernize Peruvian industry and agriculture.

The evaluation was carried out in metropolitan Lima in 48 work days, over a period of four weeks. We gathered information from documents, briefings, interviews, a review of financial systems and reports and on-site visits to villa El Salvador, Huaycan, and Huando. Intermediate deliverables included a detailed work plan presented on the second day after our arrival in Peru, and a draft final report presented eighteen days after approval of the work plan. The report was revised based on comments and recommendations of the mission management team, and we'll debrief this team prior to departure from Peru. Another three work days are required for the Team Leader to complete the English version of the Final Report, which will be presented within three weeks of the team's departure. The spanish version of the Final Report requires another two work days and will be submitted within two weeks after presenting the English version of the Final Report .

During the initial meeting with USAID management team we reviewed and obtained approval for our work plan. We set up a base of operations in the American Chamber of Commerce of Peru and hired a local assistant to assist the team in setting up interviews and served as a point of contact for schedule modifications and changes.

Tasks for each team member were set after the initial orientation meeting with briefings by USAID and ILD representatives. Normally we prefer that all team members participate in each interview. But of the scope and breadth of the evaluation in a short space of time required separate interviews. The exceptions were meetings with ILD staff (including the President), with USAID, with Grupo Orion, and interviews with the Superintendents of SUNAT, SUNAD, and SUNARP. To compensate for the separate paths taken, the team members met at the end of each day to review accomplishments and share the information obtained in the course of the day. A joint brief summary was then prepared to document notes, memory, and comments . This daily summary and discussion provided the basis for a continuous analysis of the evaluation and worked to direct the team away from unproductive areas.

This final analysis is a result of the team's consideration of the data gathered during the course of the assignment, from the directions suggested through the day-to-day analysis, and from the wide experience and skills of the team members. The final analysis is expressed in the findings of the team, the

c onclusions are based on these findings, and the recomrnendat'ions are based on the conclusions. Development Associates' evaluation procedures emphasizes a logical progression of ideas in the c onceptualization and preparation of the analysis for the evaluation report. This analytic rigor helps eliminate conclusions and recommendations that: 1) Do not reflect the collected data, and 2) are essentially extraneous.

ANNEX 3

To:

From :

Subject :

Date:

M E M 0 RAN DUM

Alfred? Larr~DI, USAID/Peru

Russell Sto~evelopment Associates, Inc .

Draft ~ork Plan for PSIR Final Evaluation

4 October 1995

1. Attached is a draft work plan for your review and consideration. We are prepared to discuss this, if required, at the meeting tomorrow morning.

! 2. We have included the tasks outlined in the SOW, plus the agreed-upon s i te l vis,its that were discussed in the meeting with ILD representat ives yesterday.

i

3 . Once we have a list of key persons to contact from USAID and from ILD we will start scheduling interviews. In addition, we shall be speaking with other contacts here in Lima : to widen the net of potential interviewees. .

4 . The next few days will be primarily devoted to document review, except for the ILD visit, and the site visits, of course .

-------~ -

DATE TIME DAY ACTIVITY LOCALE RESP. STATUS # PERSON

Mon. 2 I Arrive i

Tue. 3 A.M. 2 Sec. Briefing USAID/P RS/GG

A.M. Setup Office Office RS/GG/CC

A.M . Meet AID Staff USAID/P RS/GG Stan

P.M. ILD Briefing ILD RS/GG Stan

P.M. Setup Office RS/GG i

P.M. Workplan Office RS/GG Stan

DAILY SUMMARY

Wed. 4 A.M. 3 Workplan Office RS/GG Finish

A.M. Review Docs . Office CC IP .

A.M. Interview Setup Office RS/GG I lP ,

P.M. Present Workplan USAID/P RS/GG , IP

DAILY SUMMARY

11IU. 5 A.M. 4 ILD Briefing ILD

A.M. Int. Setup Office CC IP

A.M. Project Committee USAID/P RS/GG

P.M. ILD lLD

DAILY SUMMARY

Fri. 6 DAY 5 Interview Setup Office CC IP

DAY Field Visit RS/GG IP

Sat. 7 DAY 6 Field Visit RS/GG lP

DAILYIWEEKLY SUMMARY

DATE TIME DAY ACTIVITY LOCALE RESPONS. STATUS # PERSON

Sun. 8 7

Mon. 9 A.M. 8 Setup Interviews Office CC IP

A.M. Interviews Lima RS/GG IP

P.M. Review Docs. Office RS/GG IP

DAILY SUMMARY

Tue. 10 A.M. 9 Interviews Lima + RS/GG IP


DAILY SUMMARY

Wed. II A.M. 10 Interviews Lima + RS/GG IP

P.M. Review Docs. Office RS/GG IP"

DAILY SUMMARY

Thu. 12 A.M. II Interviews Lima + RS/GG IP


DAILY SUMMARY

Fri. I3 A.M. 12 Interviews Lima + RS/GG IP


Sat. i4 A.M. 13 Interviews Lima + RS/GG IP :

A.M. Stan Draft Report Office RS Stan



DATE TIME DAY ACTIVITY LOCALE RESPONS. STATUS # PERSON

Sun. 15 14

MOD. 16 A.M. 15 Interviews Lima + RS/GG IP

A.M. Review Docs. Office RS/GG IP

P.M. Draft Report Office RS/GG IP

DAILY SUMMARY

Tue. 17 A.M. 16 Interviews Lima + RS/GG IP

A.M. Review Docs. Office RS/GG IP


DAILY SUMMARY

Wed. 18 A.M. 17 Review Docs. Office. RS/GG IP-

A.M. Review Int. Data Office RS/GG IP


DAILY SUMMARY

Thu. 19 A.M. 18 Turn in Report USAID/P RS IP

P.M. Field Visits Lima + RS/GG IP

DAILY SUMMARY

Fri. 20 DAY 19 Revise Report Office RS/GG IP

DAILY SUMMARY

Sat. 21 DAY 20 Revise Report Office RS/GG IP


3

DATE TIME DAY ACTIVITY LOCALE RESPONS STATUS If

PERSON

Sun. 22 21

Mon. 23 A.M. 22 Revise Report Office RS/GG IP

P.M. Revisit as Required Lima -l RS/GG II'

DAILY SUMMARY

Tue.24 A.M. 23 USAID/P Office RS --Returns Report

P.M . Revise Report Office RS

DAIL Y SUMMARY

Wed. 25 DAY 24 Revise Report Office RS/GG IP

DAIL Y SUMMARY . Thu. 26 DAY 25 Revise Report Office RS/GG IP

DAIL Y SUMMARY

Fri . 27 A.M . 26 Present Report USAID/P RS/GG Draft Done

P.M. Debrief USAID USAID/P RS/GG Done

DAlLY SUMMARY

Sat. 28 DAY 27 Start Report Review Office RS/GG IP

DAILY SUMMARY

Sun. 29 . 28 TEAM DEPARTS LIMA

Mon.lTue Final Revision 30131 + 3 weeks -English

+ 5 weeks Spanish (25 copies)

Nov. Final Revision and 1,2,3 Translation

Suhmit to USAID/ P

4

Annex 4

DESCRIPTION OF TEAM QUALIFICATIONS

TEAM LEADER/SENIOR ORGANIZATION AND MANAGEMENT SPECIALIST: RUSSELL STOUT. Dr. Stout, a Senior Associate with Development Associates, Inc., has over twenty years experience in the fields of administrative simplification, project management, NGO support, and community mobilization in the United States and abroad, as teacher, researcher, consultant, and practicing manager. Most recently, he has just returned from over f6ur years as Chief of Party for a Drug Awareness and Prevention Project in Bolivia. Prior to that (1986-1987) as part of the Iowa State University long-term technical assistance team in Peru, he was Resident Advisor for Management and Planning in the Ministry of Agriculture, as part of the USAID/Peru, Institutional Development and Management Improvement Project for the ministry. His assigned role int he ministry was administrative simplification and rule reduction in the agricultural sector. During those years, Dr. Stout also actively participated in the "desburocratization -descentralizacion" effort of the GOP. As part of the Iowa State team in Peru, Dr. stout also served, on occasion, as administrative adviser to the Rector of the National Agrarian University. Prior to joining Development Associates, Dr. sto~t was Associate Director of the USAID 211(d) grant activity "Program of Advanced Studies in Institution Building and Technical Assistance Methodology" (PASITAM) at Indiana University, Bloomington, (1976-1980), and later, a tenured Professor of public policy and management in the School of Public Affairs, The American University, Washington, D.C. (1980-1991). Dr. Stout has a Ph.D. in Political Science from the University of California, Berkeley, with a specialty in organization and management theory and practice.

SENIOR FINANCIAL MANAGEMENT SPECIALIST: GUSTAVO A. GUERRERO. Mr. Guerrero, a Senior Program Officer with Development Associates, has more than ten years experience as an accountant, budget and financial analyst, project manager, and production manager. His skill areas include financial management, contract management, computerized data base systems, training program logistics, USAID-funded participants' tax liability, and project statistical and financial reports. He has substantial experience in designing program fiscal controls and managing all financial analysis reporting and accounting for several large USAID-funded contracts. His program management experience includes serving as Project Office on the USAID-funded Cochabamba (Bolivia) Regional Development Project (CORDEP); Project Manager for the Niger Policy Analysis and Monitoring Project; and Home Office Coordinator on the Nicaragua PVO Co-financing Project. He also acts as financial officer on the USAID-funded Botswana Private Enterprise Development Project (BPED), Oman Fisheries Training Project (OFTP), Bolivia Peace Scholarship Project (BPSP), and the Andean Peace Scholarship Project (APSP). In this capacity, Mr. Guerrero monitors project spending, disburses all approved

program funds, prepares Training costs Analyses, project program expenditure, and maintains dBaseIII files. Mr. Guerrero has field experience in Bolivia and Peru because of his financial management role in the APSP and BPSP. In 1994, Mr. Guerrero was Senior Financial Analyst in the evaluation of CEDRO-Peru, the leading drug prevention agency in the country. Because of his extensive home office ad field financial management experience, Mr. Guerrero is heavily involved in the preparation of firm proposal budgets, a major responsibility.

ANNEX 15

DOCUMENTS REVIEWED

• ADEC - A TC Derechos de la Mujer (Women's Ril:hts) by Ana Marfa Yaiiez & Lisl>eth Guillen.

• ADEC - ATC En oue Trabajan las Mujeres (Where Women Work) Statistical Report on women's employment by Werner Garate & Rosa Ana Ferrer.

• ADEC - ATC Institutional Protile

• ADEC - ATC, Lallor Statistical Summary , No. 107 & III (Deceml>er 1994 & Jul -Aug. 1995)

• Agenda: Peru, "Democracy and Good Government" (July 1995)

• APOYO, Annual Report 1994, Institutional Profile

• APOYO, Annual Report 1994.

• APOYO, results of surveys conducted on: Opinion on commercial activity in Peru (April 1989), Administrative Simplification (July 1989), Opinion on laws published by the Congress 85-90 (May 1990), Opinions on democratization (March 1991), Attitudes towards market economy (March 1994),

• Banco Continental, "Peru in Figures - 95"

• CADE 94 "Productive Employment: Everyone's responsibility" by Pablo Bustamante Pardo (Dec. 1994)

• CARE PERU, Projects in Implementation (January 1995)

• CARETAS, dossier entitled "To Govern in Democracy, AGENDA and Challenge" (Aug. 11, 1994).

• CEDRO, Results of an intercept survey in tour small business concentrations in Lima, Peru. (140ctol>er, 1995).

• Flores Galindo, All>erto - "Los Caballos de los Conquistadores, otra vez" (The Conquerors Horses, Again) in A Time of Pla~ues, Caballo Rojo, 1988.

• GAMARRA, Small Business Magazine (Octol>er, 1995)

• GRADE (Group of Analysis tor Development), 1992 Annual Report

• GRADE (Group of Analysis tor Development), 1993 Annual Report

• ILD (Institute for Lil>erty and Democracy) -- Social and Economic Impact of Property Formalization in Peru , Final Report (Augu~i , 1995)

• ILl) Workplan, Year 6, Period (April 1994 - February 1995)

• ILD Revised Workplan (April 1994 - February 1995)

• ILD Workplan and Budgets, Year (March 1993)

• ILD Workplan, Years 4, 5,6

• ILD, Economic Impact of the Unitied Business Registry, 2 vols . (August 1995)

• ILD Final Report to the World Bank (December 1993)

• ILD , I folder containing: a list of Grassroot Organizations affiliated to lniciativa Popular, copies of newspaper publications, laws, and letters of invitation to conferences .

• ILD Institutional Protile

• ILD, "Are Democracies and Markets Failing'!"

• ILD, Administrative Simplification Laws published between qctober 1989 and September 1994.

• I LD, Local Newspaper Articles, 2 vols .

• ILD, International Newspaper Articles, 1 vol.

• ILD bulletin, "Peru is Becoming a Country of Property Owners"

• ILD Personnel Manual

• ILD Financial and Administrative Procedures Manual

• ILD Financial Statements - Through Septemher 30, 1995.

• ILD External Audits 1989 - 1994

• Instituto de Economfa de Libre Mercado, Pensamiento y Acci6n (Ihou~ht and Act jon) by Carlos BoloRa Behr. Series of artides on politics and democracy published in various local new~'Papers.

• Instituto de Economfa de Libre Mercado, Annual Report (June 1993 - June 1994)

• Instituto de Economfa de Libre Mercado, Cambio de Rumbo (Chan~e of Direction) hy Carlos BoloRa Behr.

• Instituto de Economfa de Libre Mercado, EI A~ro Una Reforma Pendiente (A.:riculture · The Pendin~ Refurm) hy Alherto Bustamante.

• I nstituto de Economfa de Libre Mercado, La Prjyatjzacj6n de la Salud rumbo a la Modernjdad (Privatization' Modernizjn.: the Health Sector) .

• Instituto de Economia de Lihre Mercado, Del Aislamiento a la ReinserciOn (From holation to Participation) hy Raymundo Morales.

• Ministry of Industry - lJnitied Business Registry, Numher of Small Businesses and People Employed in Peru (1991 - 1995)

• PEMTEC, "Small Enterprise, Technology and Society"

• Outline sent to Mr. Adrian Fajardo, "A System for the Formalization of Urhan Property" and" A Proposal for the Promotion of Popular Entrepreneurs and Access to Formal Enterprise" (Proposals presented to World Bank by Jaime Yoshiyama, Oct. 1995).

• SlJNAD, User Orientation pamphlets

• SlJNAD, Statistics on Imports (Years 1993, 1994 & 1995)

• SUNARP (National Property Registry) "A Registry for Everybody".

• SUNARP,. Chart of Instructions, Acts and Contracts Required to be Registered

• SlJNARP, Registration Services in Informal Settlements (Septemher 1995)

• SUNARP, Statistics on mortages registered in the Property Registry as of September 21, 1995,

• SlJNARP, Statistics of the main sources of credit for registered mortages,.

• SUNARP, Number of Urban and Rural Properties Registered (\990 - 1995)

• SU I" A. T, tax statistics (August 1995)

• SUNAT, "Trihutemos", Tax bulletins (July and September 1994 and August 1995)

• The Economist, "PERU, The Dark side of the Boom" (August 5, 1995)

• Truitt Enterprises, Inc., Threshold Evaluation on the Institute for Liberty and Democracy (March 1992)

• USAID Evaluation Handbook (April 1987)

• USAID/PERU FY 94-95 Action Plan (May 1993)

• USAID/PERU FY 95-96 Action Plan.

• USAID/PERU, Private Sector Institutional Reform, Semi-Annual Reports for the periods Oct. 1, 1993 - March 3, 1994; April I, 1994 - Sept. 30, 1994; Oct. I, 1994-March 31. 1995.

• USAID/PERU, Cooperative Agreement between USAID/Peru and ILD for the implementation of the Private Sector Institutional Retilrm (PSIR) Project (March I

Endo, VIctor

Fajardo, Victor

Fonseca Sarmiento, Cesar

Forsyth Solari, Alben

Gomez de la Torre, Eduardo

Grditammer, Bernd

Guzman Barron, Cesar

Gongora, Rafael

Herencia, Daniel

Houston, Edith

Jo, Elsa

Larrabure, Alfredo

Lauer, Mirko

Linares Gallo, Luis

Lombardi, Guido

Lombardo, Joe

LOpez Mas, Marcia

Luna Victoria, Cesar

/

Risk Analysis Manager, KARPA I Former ILD Consultant

Microenterprise Coordinator, CARE Peru.

Former USAID/Peru Project Coordinator for ILD General Manager PERU 2021

Attorney, Former I LD Consultant

General Manager, SUNARP

Marketing Manager. KARPA

Chairman of the Board of Directors, PREDIAL

Executive, PENTEX

Research Specialist, Im.titute for Liberty and Democracy

Chief ODIT, USAlD/Peru

Administrative & Financial Manager, 1ru.1itute for Liberty and Democracy

Deputy Chief & Project Manager of the Democratic Initiatives Division, USAID/PERU

Journalist, "LA REPUBLICA" newspaper

Chief of the IDB-Customs Project, SUNAD (Customs)

Journalist, Radio Programas del Peru (RPP)

Chief of the Projects & Programs Development Office, USAID/PERU

Director, RUE Office of Intormation, Statistics and Rationalization (Ministry of Industry)

Attorney, Former ILD Consultant

• USAID/PERU, Amendment~ to the Cooperative Agreement between USAID/Peru and ILD for the PSIR Project, # I thru 15.

• USAID/PE.RU, Project Involvement Letters # I through 43.

Annex 6

Aguila del, Luis

Aliaga Jihaja , Luis

Althalls de, Jaime

Arevalo, Pedro

Atalaya, Paula

Avendano, Jorge

Bamikel, Catherine

Boloiia Behr, Carlos

Borns, Jeff

Boyd, Donald

Bustamante Belaunde, Alberto

Bustamante Pardo, Pablo

Camaiora, Ana Lucia

Cardenas, Carlos

Carpio Soto, BIas P.

Castro de la Mata, Ramiro

Cordova, Roxana

Delgado, Marfa del Carmen

PERSONS CONTACTED

Coordinator of Microenterprise Project~, Private Agencies Collahorating Together (PACT)

Advisor to the PREDIAL, ILD Consultant

Depllty Director, EXPRESO newspaper

Grassroot~ Leader, Huaycan (Eastern Cone of Lima)

Grassroots Leader, Huaycan (Eastern Cone of Li rna)

Congressman, former President of the Peruvian Bar Association

Director, Micro and Small Enterprise Division -Banco Wiese

Former Minister of Economy of Peru I Former ILD Consultant

Chief, ODIT, USAlD/Peru

Deputy Director, USAlD/Peru

Lawyer, Ex ILD Consultant

General Manager, Grupo ORION

Research Specialist, Institute for Liberty and Democracy

Superintendent, SUNARPI Former ILD Consultant

Executive Director, PREDIAL

President of the Board of Directors, CEDRO

Secretary General, Ministry of Economy

Attorney, ILD & Member of the Board of Directors of the PREDIAL

.Endo, V fetor

Fajardo, Victor

Fonseca Sarmiento, Cesar

Forsyth Solari, Albert

Gomez de la Torre, Eduardo

Grahammer, Bernd

Guzman Barron, Cesar

Gongora, Rafael

Herencia, Daniel

Houston, Edith

Jo , Elsa

Larrabure, Alfredo

Lauer, Mirko

Linares Gallo, Luis

Lomhardi, Guido

Lombardo, Joe

LOpez Mas, Marcia

Luna Victoria, Cesar

Risk Analysis Manager, KARPA I Fonner ILD Consultant

Microenterprise Coordinator, CARE Peru.

Former USAID/Peru Project Coordinator for ILD General Manager PERU 2021

Attorney. Former ILD Consultant

General Manager, SUNARP

Marketing Manager. KARPA

Chairman of the Board of Directors, PREDIAL

Executive, PENTEX


Chief ODIT, USAlD/Peru

Administrative & FinanciaJ Manager, Institute for Liberty and Democracy

Deputy Chief & Project Manager of the Democratic Initiatives Division, USAID/PERU

Journalist , "LA REPU BLiCA' newspaper

Chief uf the IDB-Customs Project, SUNAD (Customs)

Journa list, Radio Programas del Peru (RPP)

Chief of the Projects & Programs Development Oftlce. USAID/PERU

Director, RUE Oftlce of Information, Statistics and Rationalization (Ministry of Industry)

Attorney, Furmer ILD Consultant

Marini, Gustavo

Masfas, Mario

Mateo, Fernando

Mayorga, Manuel

Moreyra, Enrique

Mosqueira Medina, Edgardo

Mendoza, Francisco

Ortiz de Zevallos, Gabriel

Palomino, E.

Revilla, Adrian

Sagasti, Francisco

Silva, Jacqueline

Soto de, Hernando

Tapia, Luis

Tronco, Roherto

Ugarteche, Oscar

Vassilaqui, Alejandro

Vivar Morales, Elena

Wachtenheim, George

Wing, Harry

Yaiiez, Ana Marfa

Research Specialist, ILD

Grassroots Leader, Villa EI Salvador

Auditor, Alonso & Cia. - Hansen Holm Coopers & Lyhrand

General Manager, Institute for Liherty and Democracy

Controller, Institute for Liherty and Democracy


Grassroots leader, Huaycan (East Cone of Lima)

Manager, APOYO S.A.

Grassroots leader, CA U Huando

Superintendent, SUNA T (Tax Office)

Director, GRADE

Coordinator of Grassroot Organizations, ILD

President, Institute for Liberty and Democracy

Research Coordinator, CEDRO


Consultant. World Bank

Executive Director, CEDRO

Anorney, I nstitute for Liherty and Democracy

Director, USAID/Peru

Chief of the Oftice of Rural Development, USAID/Peru

Director, ADEC/ATC

Private Sector Institutional Reform Project Final Evaluation

Documents

Transcript of Private Sector Institutional Reform Project Final Evaluation