Priming against your will: How accessible alternatives affect goal pursuit

Priming against your will: How accessible alternatives affectgoal pursuit

James Y. Shaha,* and Arie W. Kruglanskib

a Department of Psychology, University of Wisconsin–Madison, 1202 West Johnson Street, Madison, WI 53706, USAb University of Maryland, College Park, MD, USA

Received 16 October 2000; revised 26 March 2001

Abstract

Four studies examined how diverse aspects of goal pursuit are influenced by the accessibility of alternative goals. It was con-

sistently found that such an accessibility often affects the resources allocated to a focal goal, influencing commitment, progress, and

the development of effective means, as well as one’s emotional reponses to positive and negative feedback about one’s striving

efforts. Moreover, the direction of these influences was found to depend on how the alternative goals relate to the focal pursuit.

Alternatives unrelated to the focal goal pull resources away from it, whereas alternatives facilitatively related to a focal goal draw

resources toward it. � 2002 Elsevier Science (USA). All rights reserved.

When Mary enters her school library, her voice dropsto a whisper and her thoughts turn to a paper due in herpsychology class at the end of the semester. John’scurrent concerns always become quite social when hereturns to his fraternity house after dinner. Such ex-amples illustrate recent findings by Bargh and his col-leagues, suggesting that goals may often be primed bythe environmental context in which they are pursued(Bargh, 1990; Bargh & Gollwitzer, 1994; Bargh &Barndollar, 1996). Chartrand and Bargh (1996), forexample, have demonstrated that goals can be uncon-sciously activated by semantically similar terms. Thus,words like ‘‘evaluate’’ may unconsciously prime im-pression-formation goals and the books in a library maybring to mind one’s goal to engage in studious con-templation. But goals are rarely primed in a motiva-tional vacuum and may often be activated when one isconsciously pursuing something else. Thus, while John’sfraternity house may often prime in him social inten-tions, the implications of such priming may depend onits relation to John’s presently chosen pursuit. How,then, might such social goal priming affect John when hehas the explicit intention of doing something quite dif-

ferent, such as studying? Perhaps such a conscious in-tention would simply shield John from any unconsciouspriming effects, making him impervious to the socialtemptations embodied by his fraternity house. On theother hand, given the extent to which goal priming hasbeen shown to prompt goal pursuit and magnify itsemotional significance (see Higgins, Shah, & Friedman,1997), it is also possible that such priming may come tointerfere with the conscious pursuit of a focal goal. Thepresent work seeks to address these possibilities by ex-amining whether goal priming affects one’s consciousfocus on a current pursuit and, if so, to explore thenature of this effect as well as its implications for be-havior and emotional experience.In various forms, the general notion that a goal

pursuit may be affected by an alternative has long beenentertained in lay and scientific notions of motivation.The 14th-Century French philosopher Jean Buridan, forinstance, asserted that awareness of two equally desir-able pursuits prevents progress on either. The extremityof his position was satirized by the parable of ‘‘Buri-dan’s Ass’’: a hungry ass stands between two equallyappetizing bales of hay; although obviously motivated,the ass is unable to choose between them and eventuallydies (see Turner, 1903).Yet classic research on motivation has offered at least

a modicum of support for Buridan’s general perspective

Journal of Experimental Social Psychology 38 (2002) 368–383

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Journal ofExperimentalSocial Psychology

*Corresponding author.

E-mail address: [email protected] (J.Y. Shah).

0022-1031/02/$ - see front matter � 2002 Elsevier Science (USA). All rights reserved.PII: S0022 -1031 (02 )00005-7

in acknowledging that the psychological presence of al-ternative goals may create an ‘‘approach–approach’’conflict (Lewin, 1935, 1951; Miller, 1944; Zeigarnik,1938). Such work illustrates the difficulty one may face infocusing on a given goal when appealing alternative goalsexercise their ‘‘pull’’ on motivational resources. Therecognition of such detrimental effects led Shallice (1972)to assume that individuals typically inhibit competing‘‘action systems’’ whose simultaneous activation woulddrain the available resources. Similarly, Kuhl (1984) hasargued that progress toward goal attainment involvesboth the active pursuit of a chosen focal goal and theinhibition of alternative goals that might come to mind.Consistent with the above analyses, research on self-control has shown that our ability to ignore some goalshas significant implications for our ability to attain oth-ers. Thus, Kuhl and Weiss (1985) found that for indi-viduals focused on their internal states, failure to reachone goal may result in subsequent performance deficits inthe pursuit of unrelated goals because of an inability tocognitively disengage from the initial failure (see also,Brunstein & Olbrich, 1985; Kuhl & Kazen-Saad, 1988).Moreover, when Kuhl and Helle (1986) interrupted de-pressed patients before they could complete a goal ofcleaning up a messy desk, this interfered with a subse-quent test of short-termmemory, suggesting that patientssuffered from an inability to cognitively ‘‘put aside’’ in-terrupted goal pursuits (see also Kuhl & Beckman, 1994).Mischel’s delay of gratification work (Mischel &

Ebbeson, 1970; Mischel, Ebbeson, & Zeiss, 1972; Mi-schel, Shoda, & Rodriguez, 1989) similarly found thatchildren are much better at keeping to their goal ofwaiting for the experimenter and ignoring the tempta-tion to fulfill another goal instead (e.g., eating a cookie)when the competing goal-object (the cookie) is hiddenfrom view than when it is clearly visible. Correspond-ingly, children who refrained from looking at thetempting object were better able to stick to their goal ofwaiting than children who chose not to look away.Though the foregoing findings are suggestive and

consistent with the notion that the presence of alterna-tive goals may interfere with current pursuits, the un-derlying process that governs these phenomena and itsprecise consequences for self-regulation have not beenfully understood, leaving a number of fundamentalquestions unexplored. What exactly defines, for in-stance, the ‘‘presence’’ of an alternative goal and howconsciously aware of such an alternative must one be forit to undermine one’s present pursuit? Moreover, what isthe precise mechanism whereby alternative goals mayundermine each other? Is this undermining effect simplydue to the mental distraction posed by the accessibilityof any other cognitive stimulus, or is it restricted to thespecific motivational pull that only goals may exercise?Finally, what specific aspects of goal pursuit may beaffected by the accessibility of alternative goals and what

are some of the possible boundary conditions on such aneffect? While the notion of pull has traditionally sug-gested a ‘‘pulling away’’ of resources, thus underminingattainment, might there be occasions in which thepresence of goal-alternatives draws resources toward amore concerted goal pursuit? That is, could there becircumstances wherein an accessible alternative actuallyserves as a reminder of one’s current pursuit, augment-ing goal focus and the intensity of goal pursuit?The present research attempts to provide some pre-

liminary answers to such questions by adopting a per-spective on goal-directed strivings that emphasizes thecognitive aspects of motivational phenomena.

The cognitive side of motivation

In social psychology, motivational and cognitiveperspectives have often been viewed as rival interpreta-tions of the same findings (cf. Bem, 1967; Bem, 1972;Kunda, 1990; Miller & Ross, 1975). Parallel to this re-search tradition, however, is one that has implicitly ac-knowledged the cognitive aspect of motivation. Theearly research on intrinsic motivation, for instance (cf.Deci, 1971; Kruglanski, 1975; Kruglanski, Friedman, &Zeevi, 1971; Lepper, Greene, & Nisbett, 1973) assumedthat motivation may be inferred from one’s performanceof an activity and the circumstances in which it hasoccurred. More recently, discrepancies from desiredstates have been viewed as cognitive structures whosedegree of activation may vary chronically and as afunction of the situation (Higgins, 1989, 1997) and, asdiscussed earlier, a similar perspective has been fruitfullyapplied to goals (Bargh & Gollwitzer, 1994; Kruglanski,1996a, 1996b; Trzebinski, 1989). The present researchshares the cognitive approach to motivation exemplifiedby the above work and applies it toward gaining adeeper understanding of the impact that the presence ofalternative goals may exert on ongoing strivings.Specifically, we interpret this impact in terms of al-

ternatives’ cognitive accessibility while pursuing a givenfocal goal: to the extent that alternative goals are ac-cessible and unrelated to the focal goal, they may inter-fere with the pursuit of that goal by pulling away from itslimited regulatory resources. Thus, we are assuming thatincreased accessibility of alternative goals, effected, say,by environmental priming (Bargh, 1990), may automat-ically pull away the attentional and motivational re-sources allocated to a focal goal when these alternativesare unrelated to the focal pursuit. In turn, the loweredresources devoted to the focal goal should also dampenone’s emotional reactivity to perceived progress or a lackof progress vis-�aa-vis that goal. If the presence of com-peting alternatives causes the focal goal to be pursuedless ardently, then actors should be less anxious or de-jected by feedback about a lack of progress but also be

J.Y. Shah, A.W. Kruglanski / Journal of Experimental Social Psychology 38 (2002) 368–383 369

less satisfied or relieved by feedback about progress. Inaddition, the pulling away of resources from the focalgoal by its rival alternatives might reduce the individual’sability to develop efficient means to goal attainment. As aconsequence, one’s progress toward goal attainmentmight be hampered. In short, we are assuming that themere cognitive activation of alternative goals unrelatedto a current pursuit will foster a whole range of cognitiveand motivational effects that will detrimentally affectattainment of the focal objective.

Facilitative inter-goal relations and the direction of ‘‘goal

pull’’ effects

Though an alternative goal may often pull attentionaland motivational resources away from a focal pursuit,there are occasions wherein the attainment of one goalfacilitates an attainment of the other. For instance,‘‘becoming a successful professional’’ and ‘‘being likedand respected by others’’ may be seen as mutually fa-cilitative objectives in that successful professionals areoften liked; conversely, being liked and respected byothers may be of help in attaining one’s professionalobjectives. The presence of such facilitative relationsmay reduce or reverse the effects posed by the accessi-bility of an alternative by drawing resources toward thefocal goal. That is, while an unrelated alternative goalmay pull resources away from a focal pursuit, a facili-tatively related alternative may instead draw attentiontoward focal goal attainment because a facilitativelyrelated goal may be regarded as a ‘‘means’’ for the focalgoal’s attainment. A means, in turn, may prime itscorrespondent goal, which may bring to mind its in-herent value or desirability and mobilize resources to-ward its pursuit. Shah and Kruglanski (2000) haverecently obtained evidence that goals may be primed bytheir attainment means, defined as those activities thatfacilitate goal attainment. This priming, in turn, wasfound to increase goal focus and to intensify goal pur-suit, even when the specific priming means was notutilized. This work suggests therefore that a focal goalmay be primed by a facilitatively related alternative andthat its increased accessibility due to such priming maybenefit goal pursuit and attainment.To summarize then, we have assumed that (a) goals

function as cognitive entities that may be made moreaccessible through environmental priming (Bargh &Barndollar, 1996); (b) the accessibility of alternativegoals may automatically affect commitment to the focalgoal which, in turn, may influence the formulation ofeffective means, the likelihood of goal attainment, andthe emotional significance of goal pursuit. Finally, (c)the direction of these effects is determined by the extentto which the focal and alternative goals are perceived tohave a facilitating relation to each other.

We performed four studies to explore these notions.These manipulated (through environmental priming) thesimultaneous accessibility of an alternative goal with afocal task goal that participants were currently pursuing.We assumed that accessibility of unrelated alternativegoals exerts a ‘‘goal pull’’ that automatically lessenscommitment to a focal goal and reduces the develop-ment and selection of effective attainment means. Suchan accessibility should also hinder attainment of thefocal goal and dampen emotional responses to successand failure-feedback en route to its pursuit. Finally, weassumed that the undermining effects of such ‘‘goal pull’’would be reversed when the alternative goals were seenas facilitatively related to the focal goal.

Study 1

Our first study sought to manipulate the accessibilityof an alternative goal and examine the consequences thiswould have for attainment of a current task goal. Theaccessibility manipulation was accomplished through asubliminal priming procedure that repeatedly displayedthe name of an alternative task goal, as participantswere pursuing their primary or focal goal. We predictedthat the increased accessibility of this alternative(through priming) would affect participants’ commit-ment to the focal goal, as reflected by their performanceand persistence at the task, and that the nature of thiseffect would depend on the relation of the alternativegoal to the focal pursuit.

Method

ParticipantsFifty-five students of the University of Wisconsin-

Madison participated in the study in exchange for extracredit toward a course requirement. The sex of partici-pants was not recorded in this particular study, thoughit was recorded in all our remaining experiments.

ProcedureParticipants completed a majority of the procedure

on IBM-compatible computers. Instructions to allparticipants stated that they would be completing twoseparate tasks, the first of which would involve thesolving of anagrams. This initial task was described asa measure of ‘‘verbal recall,’’ portrayed as a valuableskill for writing. Each anagram consisted of a string ofletters participants attempted to ‘‘unscramble’’ to findas many different words as possible using all of theletters. Participants were also told that individuals withgood verbal recall could find 80% of the possiblewords in the set of anagrams. To introduce the alter-native goal with which the participants would besubsequently primed, participants were informed that

370 J.Y. Shah, A.W. Kruglanski / Journal of Experimental Social Psychology 38 (2002) 368–383

after completing the anagram task they would beperforming a different task to assess their skill at‘‘functional thinking.’’ This task, referred to as the‘‘box-use’’ task, would involve the naming of as manydifferent functions for a box as they could think of in aset (and undisclosed) time period. Participants weretold that they would be completing this second taskimmediately after they had completed the first one. Nodirect information about the interrelation of the twotasks was provided, although we assumed that partic-ipants might find reason to assume some relation fromthe fact that both involved the generation of as manydifferent solutions as possible on each trial. But be-cause this only hinted at a possible relation, we as-sumed that participants in our sample would naturallyvary in the extent to which they perceived the twotasks as interrelated.Participants were then asked, ‘‘how difficult does the

anagram task seem?’’ and ‘‘how related is verbal recall tofunctional thinking?’’ and provided answers on a 10-point scale ranging from 1 (not at all) to 10 (extremely).The latter question intended to tap participants’ per-ception of a facilitative relation between the two taskgoals, assuming that if they seemed related, attaining onewould indicate that one is likely to attain the other aswell. As we had assumed, participants’ ratings of thetasks’ relatedness naturally varied across the entire rangeof the scale from 1 to 10, with a median score of 6. Priorto embarking on the actual anagram task and ostensiblyto familiarize them with the procedure, participantsperformed five sample anagrams. It is at that time thatthe priming of the alternative task goal took place: spe-cifically, before each sample anagram was presented,participants were subliminally primed with a wordphrase. In the control condition, they were presentedwith the phrase ‘‘view it’’ for 50ms that was backwardmasked with a non-word letter string (‘‘xxxxxxxxxx-xxxx’’). In the experimental, ‘‘high accessibility’’ condi-tion, they were presented with the phrase ‘‘box use’’ for50ms backward masked in the same manner.Participants then completed a set of 5 anagrams,

comprising the actual anagram task. The computerrecorded the answers they provided for each anagram.After completing the anagrams, participants indicatedhow important it was for them to do well on the box-use task, how much they had enjoyed the anagramtask, and how difficult they found it. Each responsewas given on the same 10-point scale described earlier.Finally, a funneled debriefing procedure was used toassess whether participants had guessed the true natureof the study and had seen the presented primes. Eachparticipant was asked a series of questions concerninghis or her experiences while completing the program.Participants were debriefed about the nature of theexperiment and the fact that they had been presentedwith prime words. At this point, participants were

asked whether they had seen these primes and, if so,whether they could identify them. No participant re-ported any suspicion about the study before the de-briefing nor did any report seeing the word primes afterhaving been told that they had been presented on thescreen.

Anagram performance and persistenceParticipants’ performance on the anagram task was

calculated by simply summing all the correct solutionsthat they found across the trials.Participants’ persistence on the anagram trials was

calculated by summing their persistence on all the actualtask trials after employing a natural logarithmic trans-formation on each individual trial time to lessen theimpact of outliers and to correct for skewness in thedistribution of persistence times (Judd & McClelland,1989).

Results

Relation among variablesAn initial correlational analysis found that partici-

pants’ rating of the facilitative relation between the twotasks was not significantly related to how difficult orenjoyable they found the anagram task, r ¼ :09, p > :50,r ¼ .11, p > :40, respectively, but was marginally sig-nificantly related to how committed they were to thebox-use task, r ¼ . 24, p > :10. This correlational anal-ysis also found participants’ persistence on the anagramsto be significantly positively correlated with their per-formance, r ¼ :53, p < :001.Participants’ rating of the facilitative relation between

the two tasks was then subjected to a median split toform separate high and low relation groups. An initialset of analyses examined whether the accessibility ma-nipulation affected how difficult they found the anagramtask, how enjoyable they found it, and how importantthey perceived the box-use task to be. Consistent withour expectations, accessibility had no significant effecton these ratings, F s < 1.Separate ANOVAs were then performed to examine

the effect of accessibility manipulation on participants’anagram performance and persistence for individualswho perceived the goals to be facilitatively related andfor those who perceived them to be unrelated, control-ling for their other ratings of the task. With all of thesevariables included in the analyses, the accessibility ma-nipulation as such was not found to significantly affecthow well participants performed and how long theypersisted at the task F ð1; 48Þ ¼ 2:05, p > :15; F ð1; 48Þ ¼1:26, p > :25, respectively. Additionally, perceived goalinterrelation as such did not have a significant effect onanagram performance or persistence, F s < 1, but itsignificantly interacted with accessibility to affect bothdependent measures, F ð1; 48Þ ¼ 4:14, p < :05;


F ð1; 48Þ ¼ 7:44, p < :01, respectively. According to thisinteraction, the detrimental effect of alternatives’ ac-cessibility on anagram performance and persistence wassignificantly greater when the perceived facilitative re-lation between the goals was low than when it was high.Participants’ total anagram performance and untrans-formed persistence time (in seconds) as functions of thetype of prime and perceived inter-goal relation arepresented in Fig. 1.The results of Study 1 confirm our predictions. Ac-

cessibility of the alternative goal interacted in the pre-dicted manner with its perceived relation to the focal goalin its impact on commitment to the focal goal, as as-sessed by participants’ task persistence and performance:accessibility undermined persistence and performance toa greater extent when the two task goals were perceivedas unrelated than when they were perceived as facilita-tively related. Note that these results cannot be explainedby the effects of our accessibility manipulation on per-ceptions of the alternative goal in terms of its difficultyand importance ratings, which did not differ significantlyacross the two accessibility conditions. Nor can theseresults be explained by the mere effects of distraction dueto a priming manipulation per se, in so far as such amanipulation occurred in our control condition as well.A more compelling explanation of these findings is that itwas the accessibility of alternative goals that affected theresources allocated to the focal goal, depending on itsperceived relation to the alternative. Our subsequentexperiments attempted to conceptually replicate thesefindings while also testing additional aspects of our the-ory. Specifically, we investigated whether accessibility ofan alternative goal and the perception of facilitative re-lations between it and the focal goal have the predictedjoint effects on the development of effective attainmentmeans with respect to the focal goal as well as on par-ticipants’ emotional reactivity to progress (or the lack ofprogress) toward that goal.

Study 2

Our analysis suggests that the accessibility of an al-ternative goal may affect the extent to which resourcesare pulled away from, versus being mobilized toward,pursuit of the focal goal. Among other things, this mayaffect the degree to which an individual would possesssufficient resources to invest in the independent devel-opment of appropriate attainment means with respect tothat goal. When resources are pulled away, participantsmay often rely on ‘‘conventional’’ attainment strategies,or uncritically use means proposed by an external agent,instead of developing new means. Participants may bemore likely to develop new means, however, when thealternative re-directs their attention back to the focalgoal. Thus, the effect of an accessible alternative on theuse of means to pursue a focal goal should also bemoderated by the degree to which the alternative andthe focal goals are perceived as facilitatively interrelated.Our present study examined the foregoing implicationsof our analysis and attempted to replicate the perfor-mance and persistence findings of Study 1.In most relevant respects, the experimental paradigm

of Study 2 resembled that of Study 1. The focal goalagain involved the solving of anagrams. Also, we againused a subliminal priming procedure to manipulate theaccessibility of an alternative goal. Unlike Study 1,however, participants in the present study were alsopresented with a possible attainment means for pursuingthe task goal. Pre-testing had suggested that the use ofthis particular means did not significantly increase theanagram performance. Nevertheless, because accessi-bility of an unrelated alternative goal was hypothesizedto impair one’s ability to generate effective attainmentstrategies, participants primed with an alternative goalmay more readily depend on the presented task meanswhen solving the anagrams. Under these conditions,then, individuals should report a greater use of the

Fig. 1. Anagram performance and persistence as a function of alternative priming and perceived relation (Study 1).


presented means when solving the anagrams; andwhereas in Study 1, the priming manipulation occurredprior to the actual anagram task while the participantswere working their way through the anagram samples,in the present study, it took place concomitantly withthe anagram task.

Method

ParticipantsForty students of the University of Wisconsin-Mad-

ison participated in the study in exchange for extracredit toward a course requirement. Of these, 6 weremale and 34 female. Participants’ sex had no significanteffects on any of the present dependent variables andwill not be discussed further.


on IBM-compatible computers. As in Study 1, they weretold they would be completing two separate tasks, thefirst of which would involve the solution of anagrams.Participants were told that following the anagram taskthat assesses ‘‘verbal recall’’ they would be completingthe box-use task assessing ‘‘functional thinking.’’ Par-ticipants were also presented with an alleged strategy forsolving anagrams. It was referred to as the ‘‘pair-letter’’strategy and it involved searching for common letterpairings in each anagram (e.g., the ‘‘ch’’ in ‘‘cpunh’’).Pre-testing had indicated that use of this strategy actu-ally had no effect on the anagram performance for thepresented set of anagrams. As in Study 1, participantswere also told that individuals with good verbal recallcould find 80% of the possible words in the set of ana-grams and were first given some sample anagrams be-fore completing the actual anagram task.After completing the sample anagrams, participants

rated how difficult and enjoyable they found the ana-gram task, the importance of the box-use task, and theperceived effectiveness of the ‘‘pair-letter’’ strategy.Participants were also asked to rate how related theythought verbal recall was to functional thinking. Al-though these two tasks again differed in terms of theircontents, it was assumed that their close placement to-gether in the same study might cause some participantsto infer that these tasks were related to each other. Wehad therefore again assumed a natural variability in oursample on the tasks’ perceived relatedness. This expec-tation was confirmed. On a 10-point scale ranging from1 (not at all) to 10 (extremely), participants’ relatednessratings varied from 3 to 10, with a median score of 6.Participants then completed a set of 8 anagrams,

comprising the anagram task. Before presenting eachanagram trial, we subliminally primed the participantswith a word phrase. In the two low-accessibility condi-

tions, participants were presented with the controlphrase ‘‘view it’’ for 50ms backward masked in the samemanner described previously. In the two high-accessi-bility conditions, participants were presented with thephrase ‘‘box-use’’ for 50ms backward masked in thesame manner as in Study 1. No participants reportedseeing the presented word phrases.The computer recorded the answers that participants

provided for each anagram. After completing the entireanagram series, participants were asked to indicate howfrequently they had used the ‘‘pair-letter’’ strategy whilecompleting the anagram task and how often they hadthought about the box-use task while completing theanagram task. The latter question was included as acheck on whether our priming manipulation affectedaccessibility of the alternative goal in the manner thatwe had intended. Participants’ responses were recordedon the same 10-point scale described earlier. Finally, afunneled debriefing was used to assess whether partici-pants had guessed the true nature of the study. Thisdebriefing was identical in format to the one described inStudy 1. Again, no participants reported any suspicionsabout the study before the debriefing nor did any reportseeing the word primes after being told that they oc-curred during the task. Finally, participants were thor-oughly debriefed about the true nature of the studyand invited to ask any remaining questions about itspurpose.

Results


pants’ rating of the facilitative relation between the twotasks was not related to how enjoyable they found thetask, r ¼ �:09, p > :50, but was marginally related tohow difficult they found it, r ¼ :29, p < :10, and to theeffectiveness of the presented attainment means,r ¼ :28, p < :10 as well as significantly related to howcommitted participants were to the box-use task,r ¼ :32, p < :05. This correlational analysis also foundparticipants’ persistence on the anagrams to be signif-icantly positively correlated with their performance,r ¼ :49, p < :001.As in Study 1, participants’ ratings of the facilitative

interrelation of the two task goals they were expecting topursue were subjected to a median split to form separatehigh relation and low relation groups. As in Study 1, wealso examined whether the accessibility manipulationaffected the perceived difficulty of the anagram task andthe importance of the box-use task and found that it hadno significant effect on either rating, F s < 1.

Check on the accessibility manipulationWe then proceeded to examine whether our accessi-

bility manipulation affected the degree to which partic-


ipants reported thinking about the box-use task whilecompleting the anagram task. Because the accessibilitymanipulation also affected anagram persistence andbecause the time participants spent thinking about thebox-use task would be expected to relate to the totaltime they spent on the anagram task, we controlled inthis ANOVA for overall differences in time spent on theanagram task as well as participants’ other task ratings.As predicted, participants reported that they thoughtabout the box-use task significantly more in the highaccessibility condition than in the low-accessibilitycondition, F ð1; 31Þ ¼ 4:85, p < :05. The perceived in-terrelation of the two tasks exerted no main or interac-tive effects on this rating, F s < 1. Thus, it appears thatour subliminal priming manipulation was successful.Even though it was consciously undetected by our par-ticipants, it significantly impacted the degree to whichthey reported thinking about the primed alternative taskgoal.

Anagram performance and persistenceIn separate ANOVAs, we then examined the effect of

accessibility manipulation on participants’ anagramperformance and persistence for individuals who per-ceived the goals to be related and for those who per-ceived them to be unrelated, controlling for their othertask ratings. Participants in the high-accessibility con-dition did not perform significantly worse overall (al-though the effect approached significance, F ð1; 32Þ ¼2:43, p > :10), but they did quit marginally sooner thanparticipants in the low-accessibility condition, F ð1;32Þ ¼ 2:78, p ¼ :10. These analyses also revealed thatperceived goal interrelation, as such, did not have asignificant effect on the anagram performance or per-sistence, F ð1; 32Þ ¼ 1:72, p > :15; F < 1, but it did sig-nificantly interact with accessibility, (F ð1; 32Þ ¼ 5:61,

p < :05; F ð1; 32Þ ¼ 5:46, p < :05, respectively), indicat-ing that the effect of the alternative goal’s accessibilityon anagram performance and persistence was signifi-cantly greater when the perceived interrelation betweenthe goals was low than when it was high. Participants’total anagram performance and untransformed persis-tence (in seconds) as a function of type of prime andperceived inter-goal relation are presented in Fig. 2.These results replicate the findings of Study 1, attestingto their robustness.

Provided means useIn a final ANOVA, we analyzed the effect of an al-

ternative goal’s accessibility and its perceived relation tothe focal goal on the degree to which participants re-ported using the means we had provided them forworking on the anagrams. Again, there was a significantinteraction between the accessibility and interrelationvariables, suggesting that participants were significantlymore likely to rely on the presented means (rather thangenerating independent means) when the alternativegoal was accessible and unrelated to the focal goal,F ð1; 32Þ ¼ 9:56, p < :01. This interaction is illustrated inFig. 3.As can be seen, the self-reported use of the pro-

vided means is by far greater when the primed termrepresents an unrelated alternative versus a controlword. However, the self-reported use of the providedmeans is not appreciably different when the primerepresents a facilitatively related goal versus a controlword.In summary, the results of Study 2 replicate those of

Study 1, demonstrating the robustness of our initialfindings across several modifications in procedure andextend them by considering how accessibility effects mayinfluence the use of attainment means. Once again the

r



accessibility of alternative goals was found to negativelyimpact goal pursuit (as measured by anagram perfor-mance and persistence), this effect being particularlypronounced when the alternative goal was perceived asfacilitatively unrelated (vs. related) to the anagram task.Study 2 also validated our accessibility manipulation bydemonstrating that it affected the degree to which par-ticipants thought about the alternative goal (the box-usetask) while completing the anagrams. Finally, and mostimportantly, Study 2 confirmed our prediction about theeffects of accessible alternative goals on reported reli-ance on externally provided means of goal attainment.As hypothesized, reported reliance was greatest whenthe primed alternative goal was facilitatively unrelated(vs. related) to the focal goal. But can one be sure thatthis self-reported reliance reflected actual means use?Study 3 was specifically designed to investigate thisissue.

Study 3

Method

ParticipantsThirty-five students of the University of Wisconsin-

Madison participated in the study in exchange for extracredit toward a course requirement. Of these, 17 weremale and 18 female. Participants’ sex had no significanteffects on any of the present dependent variables andwill not be discussed further.


on IBM-compatible computers. The general experi-mental paradigm was similar in most respects to that ofStudies 1 and 2. Participants were informed that theywould be completing two separate tasks. The first of

these tasks would involve the solving of anagrams andwas characterized as a measure of ‘‘verbal fluency.’’Participants were again told that after completing theanagram task they would be completing the box-usetask assessing their ‘‘functional thinking.’’ As in Study 2,participants in the present study were also presentedwith a strategy for solving the anagrams. However, thisstrategy was different from that presented in Study 2.Whereas in Study 2, participants were provided with the‘‘pair-letter’’ strategy, and in Study 3, participants wereprovided the ‘‘first–last’’ strategy, which involved de-termining whether any of the possible solutions startedwith the first or last letter of the anagram. Each of theanagrams had at least one solution that could be foundthrough the use of this particular strategy and one so-lution that could not be found through its use. Thisdesign feature was implemented to allow us to determinethe actual use of the supplied strategy, as evident in the‘‘mean-related’’ solutions that participants found andtheir use of other strategies, as evident in the solutionsthey found that required the use of different means thanthe one provided. All participants were then told thatindividuals with good verbal fluency could find 80% ofthe possible words in the set of anagrams and were firstgiven a sample of anagrams before attempting the actualanagram task.After completing the sample anagrams, participants

rated how difficult and enjoyable they found the ana-gram task, the importance of the box-use task, theperceived effectiveness of the ‘‘first–last’’ strategy, andthe perceived facililitative relation between functionalthinking and verbal fluency. Each rating was performedon a 10-point scale ranging from 1 (not at all) to 10(extremely). Again, participants’ perceptions of thetasks’ facilitative relatedness exhibited a natural vari-ability across the entire range of the scale. Specifically,they varied between the scores of 1 and 10, with a me-dian score of 6. Participants then performed a set of 8

Fig. 3. Use of provided means as a function of alternative priming and perceived relation (Study 2).


anagrams, comprising the anagram task. Before eachanagram was presented, participants were subliminallyprimed with a word phrase. In the low-accessibilitycondition, they were presented with the control phrase‘‘see this’’ for 50ms backward masked using the samemask as described in Study 1 (‘‘xxxxxxxxxxxxxx’’). Inthe high-accessibility condition, they were presented withthe phrase ‘‘box use’’ for 50ms backward masked in thesame manner. No participants reported noticing thepresented word phrases.The computer recorded the answers participants

provided for each anagram. After participants com-pleted the entire anagram series, a funneled debrief-ing identical to that of Study 1 was implemented toassess whether participants had guessed the true na-ture of the present experiment. No participants re-ported any suspicions about the study before thedebriefing nor did any report having seen the wordprimes after being told that they had been presentedon the screen.

Results

Relation among variablesAn initial correlational analysis found that par-

ticipants’ rating of the facilitative relation betweenthe two tasks was not related to how difficult or en-joyable they found the anagram task or how im-portant they viewed the box-use task (r ¼ �:12,p > :45, r ¼ :03, p > :80; r ¼ :12, p > :50, respectively)but significantly related to the perceived effectivenessof the presented attainment means, r ¼ :37, p > :05.This correlational analysis also found participants’persistence on the anagrams to be significantly posi-tively correlated with their performance, r ¼ :45,p < :005.As in our prior studies, participants’ ratings of the

interrelation of the task goals were subjected to a

median split to form separate high relation and lowrelation groups. Also consistent with our previous twoexperiments, the present accessibility manipulation didnot appear to affect the perceived difficulty of theanagram task or the importance of the box-use task,F s < 1.

Anagram performance and persistenceAs in Studies 1 and 2, we then performed separate

ANOVAs to examine the effect of the accessibilitymanipulation and perceived inter-goal relation on par-ticipants’ anagram performance and persistence for in-dividuals who perceived the goals to be facilitativelyrelated and those who perceived them to be unrelated,controlling for participants’ remaining ratings of thetask.Neither the accessibility manipulation nor the

measure of perceived goal interrelation exerted maineffects on anagram performance (F s < 1) and persis-tence (F < 1, and F ð1; 27Þ ¼ 1:90, p > :15, respec-tively). However, they did so interactively such thatthe detrimental effects of an alternative goal’s acces-sibility on performance and persistence were signifi-cantly reversed when perceived goal interrelation washigh versus being low, F ð1; 27Þ ¼ 5:34, p < :05;F ð1; 27Þ ¼ 4:62, p < :05, respectively. Participants’ to-tal anagram performance and untransformed persis-tence time (in seconds) as a function of type of primeand perceived inter-goal relation are presented in Fig.4. These results replicate the findings of the first twostudies.

Actual means useOf greater interest in the present experiment were the

possible effects of our variables on the actual use of theprovided means for anagram solution.Participants could have found a number of the pos-

sible solutions to the anagrams by using the provided

r



means ( the ‘‘first–last’’ strategy). A comparable numberof possible solutions to these anagrams, however, re-quired participants to use different means than the oneprovided. To determine the degree to which participantsrelied on the given means and the degree to which theygenerated their own means, we calculated the totalnumber of solutions found by participants that involvedusing the provided means and the total number of so-lutions that they found using different means. Each totalwas examined as a function of the accessibility of thealternative and perceived goal interrelations, as sum-marized in Fig. 5.As can be seen, when the alternative goal was acces-

sible (through priming) and seen as facilitatively unre-lated to the focal goal, participants found more of thesolutions that involved using the provided means thanthe solutions that involved using different means. Whenthe alternative was accessible and seen as facilitativelyrelated, however, participants found more solutions thatinvolved using different means than solutions involvingthe use of the provided means. Performing a MA-NOVA, we found that the overall interaction of theaccessibility manipulation, perceived goal interrelation,and type of solutions found (provided means vs. differ-ent means) was significant (F ð1; 27Þ ¼ 5:20, p < :05).This suggests that when the alternative was made moreaccessible through priming and was seen as unrelated tothe focal goal, participants did not generate effectiveanagram solution strategies on their own and insteadtended to rely on the provided means, even though notall solutions to the anagrams could be found by usingthis strategy. In contrast, when the alternative goal was

made more accessible and seen as facilitatively related tothe focal goal, participants found more solutions fromthe use of different means than from the use of theprovided means, presumably because they more readilygenerated their own strategies for finding solutions tothe anagrams. Thus, the pulling of resources away fromthe focal goal—when the accessible alternative goal wasfacilitatively unrelated to it—may have lowered partici-pants’ quest for effective means of goal attainment,which, in turn, may have contributed to the observeddeterioration of anagram performance in the accessible-unrelated condition. Likewise, the mobilization of re-sources in service of the focal goal when the alternativewas facilitatively related thereto may have increasedparticipants’ quest for effective means for goal attain-ment, contributing, in turn, to the observed increase inanagram performance in the accessible-related condi-tion.Our final study sought to replicate the general pat-

tern of performance and persistence found in the firstthree studies using a different alternative goal and toextend the findings of these studies by consideringparticipants’ emotional reactions to feedback aboutprogress or the lack of progress on the focal task. Ourtheoretical analysis suggests that commitment to thefocal goal should be affected by the accessibility of analternative goal and its relation to the focal pursuit.These variables should therefore exert a parallel influ-ence on participants’ positive or negative affective re-actions to success or failure-feedback regarding thisfocal pursuit. Participants whose goal commitment isundermined by the presence of alternative goals should

Fig. 5. Anagram performance as a function of alternative priming, perceived relation, and whether attainment means was provided (Study 3).


care less and hence be less emotionally reactive to suchfeedback.

Study 4

Method

ParticipantsNinety students of the University of Wisconsin-

Madison participated in the study in exchange for extracredit toward a course requirement. Of these, 38 weremale and 52 female. Participants’ sex did not signifi-cantly affect any of the present dependent variables andwill not be discussed further.

ProcedureAs in our previous studies, participants completed a

majority of the procedure on IBM-compatible comput-ers. They were told that they would be completing twoseparate tasks, the first of which would involve the so-lution of anagrams. This initial task was described as ameasure of ‘‘verbal reasoning,’’ a valuable skill forwriting. Unlike the alleged ‘‘functional thinking’’ taskused in our prior studies, a different second task wasintroduced and described as a measure of ‘‘analyticreasoning.’’ We again assumed that some participants,at least, would view the two tasks as facilitatively re-lated, as they both pertained to ‘‘reasoning’’ and bothrequired participants to generate as many different so-lutions as possible. Participants were told that this sec-ond task would require them to combine a set of fournumbers to form a fifth number by adding, subtracting,multiplying, and dividing the set of numbers as well asusing parentheses. For instance, ‘‘ð4� 3Þ þ 2� 1’’would be one way to get the number set ‘‘4 3 2 1’’ toequal ‘‘13.’’ After the two tasks were described to par-ticipants, they completed three practice anagrams andthree practice trials of the ‘‘analytic reasoning’’ task.They then proceeded with the anagram task. As with allour previous studies, this task was the only one de-scribed that participants actually attempted.Prior to embarking on the anagram task, participants

were informed that individuals with good verbal rea-soning skills could find 80% of the possible words in theset of anagrams. They were then asked, ‘‘how difficultdoes the anagram task seem?’’ and ‘‘how enjoyable doesthe anagram task seem?’’ and were also asked to ratehow satisfied, calm, dejected, and anxious they werefeeling at that moment. Answers to each of these ques-tions were provided on a 7-point scale ranging from 1(not at all) to 7 (extremely). Participants then completedthe anagram task, which consisted of 10 trials in thisstudy. The computer recorded the answers participantsprovided for each anagram and the amount of time theyspent on each trial.

Before each anagram’s appearance in the low-acces-sibility condition, participants were presented with theword ‘‘dedication’’ for 50ms backward masked in thesame manner described in Study 1. In the high-accessi-bility conditions, they were presented with the word‘‘analytic’’ in the same fashion. No participant in eithercondition reported having seen the presented word.Participants were randomly assigned to one of the

two feedback conditions. After completing the ana-grams, those in the success-feedback condition wereinformed that they had, in fact, found 80% of all thepossible solutions. Participants in the failure-feedbackcondition were told that they had not found 80% of allthe possible solutions. After receiving the feedback,participants again rated how satisfied, calm, dejected,and anxious they were feeling at that moment. Finally,participants were asked to rate how related verbalreasoning was to analytic reasoning and how importantit was for them to do well on the upcoming analyticreasoning task. Each of these ratings was given on thesame 7-point scale described earlier. As expected, par-ticipants’ actual facilitation ratings naturally variedover a considerable range, namely from 1 to 7, with amedian score of 4. A funneled debriefing identical informat to that of Study 1 was then used to assesswhether participants had guessed the true nature of theexperiment. Again, no participants reported any sus-picions before the debriefing nor did any report notic-ing the word primes after having been told that theywere flashed on the screen.

Affective reactivityAfter reverse scoring all the negative mood items,

participants’ change in mood was calculated by sum-ming their mood scores after receiving feedback andsubtracting from it the sum of their initial mood scores.This score represented the magnitude of their emotionalreaction to success or failure-feedback.

Results


pants’ rating of the facilitative relation between the twotasks was not related to how enjoyable they found theanagram task, r ¼ :08, p > :45, and how important theyfound the analytic reasoning task, r ¼ �:08, p > :45, butwas marginally negatively related to how difficult theyfound the anagram task, r ¼ �:19, p < :10. This corre-lational analysis also found participants’ persistence onthe anagrams to be significantly positively correlatedwith their performance, r ¼ :40, p < :001.Because, in this study, alternative accessibility and

feedback were manipulated before participants ratedthe facilitative relation between the two tasks, weconducted a separate ANOVA to examine the possi-


bility that these manipulations affected participants’facilitative relation rating. No evidence was found forthis possibility, as the ANOVA revealed that partici-pants’ facilitative relation rating was not significantlyaffected by the alternative accessibility manipulation,the feedback manipulation, or the interaction of thesemanipulations (all F s < 1).As in the previous studies, participants’ rating of the

two tasks’ interrelation was subjected to a median splitto form separate high interrelation and low interrelationgroups. Conceptually replicating our previous results,separate ANOVAs found that the present accessibilitymanipulation did not affect the perceived difficulty of theanagram task or the importance of the analytic rea-soning task, F s < 1.

Effects on anagram performance and persistenceReplicating the results of our previous studies and

controlling for participants’ task difficulty, task enjoy-ment, and importance ratings, separate ANOVAs foundthat the accessibility manipulation and the perceivedinterrelation of the goals did not significantly affectanagram performance and persistence (all F s < 1) butthey did so in interaction with each other (F ð1; 83Þ ¼4:33, p < :05; F ð1; 83Þ ¼ 4:32, p < :05, for performanceand persistence, respectively). Once again, the detri-mental effect of alternative goal accessibility on anagramperformance and persistence was significantly greaterwhen perceived task interrelation was low than when itwas high. Participants’ total anagram performance anduntransformed persistence time (in seconds) as a func-tion of prime-type and perceived inter-goal relation arepresented in Fig. 6. These results replicate the findings ofour previous studies in this series.

Affective reactivityA separate ANOVA examined participants’ emo-

tional response to feedback as a function of alternativegoal accessibility and perceived inter-goal relation,

controlling for participants’ task ratings. The analysisrevealed that feedback had a strongly significant effecton change in mood, F ð1; 79Þ ¼ 42:95, p < :001. Notvery surprisingly, positive feedback led to a morepositive change in mood than did negative feedback.Neither the accessibility of the alternative nor theperceived interrelation of the goals exerted significantmain effects on mood change, F s < 1. Nor did thesetwo variables interact with each other (F < 1) or withfeedback to affect the change in mood, F < 1;F ð1; 79Þ ¼ 1:48, p > :20, respectively. However, thethree-way interaction of the accessibility of the alter-native, the perceived interrelation of the goals andfeedback was significant, F ð1; 79Þ ¼ 5:63, p < :05, in-dicating that the effect of feedback was moderated bythe interaction of alternative accessibility and perceivedinterrelation of the goals. These results are portrayed inFig. 7.As can be seen, when the alternative goal is facilita-

tively unrelated to the focal goal, its priming dampens,by and large, participants’ affective reactivity to feed-back with regard to progress toward the focal goal. Incontrast, when the alternative goal is perceived as re-lated to the focal goal, its priming enhances the affectivereactivity to feedback about progress.

General discussion

The present research

In his analysis of goal conflict, Lewin (1935, 1951)likened goals to physical bodies occupying specific po-sitions within an individual’s ‘‘life space.’’ Each entity inthis field either attracts or repels one’s focus and thestrength of these attractive and repellent forces varies asa function of the goal’s psychological distance from theindividual’s self. The present research emphasizes howthe force exerted on an individual by any one goal



cannot be considered in isolation and instead dependson the salience and interrelation of other goals presentin one’s life space at a given moment.Four studies consistently suggest that priming alter-

native goals can affect one’s commitment to a currentlypursued objective, which, in turn, has implications forgoal-directed behavior and emotion. Moreover, suchpriming effects are consistently moderated by the degreeto which the goal facilitatively relates to its alternative.These conclusions are supported by a convergence offindings pertaining to different accompanying aspects ofgoal pursuit.Given the relative novelty of our approach to goals

and their interrelations, it is encouraging to have rep-licated, time and time again, the manner by whichcommitment and progress toward a focal goal is af-fected by the accessibility of an alternative goal. Wefind that the extent to which an alternative goal isrendered accessible affects participants’ performanceand persistence in striving for the focal goal and weinterpret these effects as reflecting the waxing andwaning of goal focus that results from the subliminalpresentation of a facilitating or unrelated alternativegoal. This presentation either pulls attention and re-sources away from the focal goal (and toward the al-ternative), or draws attention and resources toward thefocal goal by increasing its accessibility. Consistentwith such an interpretation, we find that emotionalresponses to goal pursuit are amplified or dulled by thesalience of an alternative goal and its facilitative rela-tion to the focal pursuit. Presumably, these effects re-flect the pulling of resources away or the drawing ofthem toward the consciously pursued goal. We findthat the development of efficient means to the focalgoal, an obvious resource-intensive activity, is also af-

fected when alternative goals are activated. It is par-ticularly noteworthy that our effects obtain, eventhough our priming manipulations were subliminal andour participants reported no conscious awareness oftheir occurrence. This attests to the relatively automa-tized, non-deliberative nature of the ‘‘goal pull’’ effects.

Alternative explanations of goal pull

Our results also provide evidence that counters twomajor alternative explanations to how a focal pursuitis undermined by an unrelated and cognitively salientalternative goal. One such explanation holds that theundermining occurs due to a mere distraction ratherthan due to the pull on resources by the alternativeunrelated goal. Yet contrary to this general distractionhypothesis, we did not find similar effects whenpriming control constructs. Thus, our findings couldnot be due to the priming of cognitive constructs perse, but rather due to the specific priming of goalconstructs. Moreover, such a hypothesis could notexplain the kinds of moderation of the goal pull ef-fects that depend on how an alternative relates to thepresent pursuit.A second explanation holds that the priming manip-

ulation enhances the perceived importance of the acti-vated alternative goal and/or the perceived difficulty ofthe focal goal. It is such shift in perception rather than achange in commitment to the focal goal that might havecaused our various effects. Again, however, our resultsseem to belie these possibilities in that neither the per-ceived importance of the alternative goal nor the per-ceived difficulty of the focal goal was significantlyaffected by our priming manipulations in any of ourstudies.

Fig. 7. Change in mood as a function of alternative priming, perceived relation, and feedback (Study 4).


Self-regulatory implications

The present cognitive and motivational analysis ofgoal effects has implications for a wide range of signifi-cant intra- and inter-personal phenomena. Two suchimplications are particularly noteworthy. They concern(a) the resolution of goal conflict and (b) the quality ofone’s social relations.

Implications for the resolution of goal conflict

An important question to pose at this point is howone might cope with the conflict occasioned by the ac-tivation of alternative goals rival to one’s current pur-suits. When Buridan was asked to explain how an ass, oranyone else, might overcome the decisional challengeposed by two equally attractive alternatives, he had aready answer: one could consider a particular alternativeclosely and thereby cause any others to fall out of con-scious awareness.Such a solution, with its emphasis on lowering the

accessibliity of alternatives, can readily be applied tothe resolution of goal conflict. It suggests that one’sability to cognitively inhibit, or actively put aside,alternative goals may allow one to focus more re-sources on a focal pursuit. It is precisely such pro-cesses that may underlie the observed individualdifferences in coping with competing or conflictinggoals in social and academic settings. Locke andKristof (1996), for instance, found that individualsdiffer in the degree to which they are able to ignorethe attractiveness of other pursuits and that this dif-ference positively predicts their college grade pointaverage. Similarly, Rabiner and Gordon (1992) foundthat aggressive and rejected children were less able tomanage the simultaneous and often conflicting goalsinherent in many social situations. Dodge and Crick(1984) have suggested that children’s social compe-tence is best understood not by the specific goals theytend to adopt in social situations, but by their abilityto coordinate their goals with the goals of others andto manage the inevitable conflicts that arise. Theysuggest that prioritizing or deferring goals are im-portant tools in this coordination but when attempt-ing it, socially incompetent children are often unableto ignore the attractiveness of their own goals or seetheir relation to the goals of others. The present re-sults offer insights into possible underlying mecha-nisms behind these individual differences. Of particularinterest in this regard is the relatively automatic na-ture of the ‘‘goal pull’’ effects, suggesting that tocounter them one may need to automatize the inhi-bition of alternative goals as well. If automatizationdevelops in the context of practice and experience (cf.Bargh, 1996) it may be necessary to institute just suchan inhibitive experience to improve persons’ ability to

focus on their tasks. These possibilities appear tomerit the investment of further research resources intheir exploration.

Implications for inter-personal relations

A final, though by no means least important, im-plication of our analysis has to do with the quality ofour relationships to significant others. Mention hasbeen made already of the fact that other persons couldoften trigger various alternative goals to one’s currentpursuits. In addition, some persons could themselvesembody a variety of alternative goals, hence, consti-tuting ‘‘hubs’’ wherein significant goals may meet. Forinstance, John’s wife Ann could represent to him atonce the goals of ‘‘romantic love,’’ ‘‘giving and re-ceiving affection,’’ ‘‘camaraderie and social support,’’‘‘securing the children’s education,’’ ‘‘paying the bills,’’‘‘cleaning the house,’’ etc. Obviously, different socialtargets may vary in the number of goals with whichthey are associated and in the strength of those asso-ciations as well. This, in turn, may determine how onecomes to feel about and interact with the person inquestion.Researchers on close relationships have commented

on the decline of romance and passion in marital rela-tions as time goes by (i.e., Berscheid, Synder, & Omoto,1989; Huston & Chorost, 1994). From the present per-spective, one reason for this decline could be a dilutionof the romantic/passionate commitment as the maritalpartners come to represent to each other a bundle ofsimultaneously activatable and unrelated goals com-peting for their mental and physical resources. In short,the accessibility of alternative goals may carry profoundpsychological implications not only for motivationaland cognitive (e.g., attributional) phenomena at the in-tra-individual level but also for inter-personal relationsand social interaction.

Conclusion

Although traditionally, motivational and cognitiveexplanations of psychological phenomena have tendedto run along separate paths (see Bem, 1972; Miller &Ross, 1975), there has been a growing appreciation ofthe cognitive aspects of motivational constructs such asgoals (cf. Bargh & Barndollar, 1996; Kruglanski,1996a,b). The present set of studies strengthens thismerger by illustrating how a cognitive quality of alter-native goals (their accessibility) and a motivationalquality (their perceived relation to a focal pursuit) in-teract to affect the singularity and strength with whichone strives toward a focal goal, as well as one’s emo-tional reaction to its attainment or attainment failure.By considering the cognitive qualities of goals and how


they interact with goals’ strictly motivational aspects,the present research has begun to demonstrate theconsiderable potential of a ‘‘warm look’’ on motivation(see Sorrentino & Higgins, 1986). Such a perspective notonly recognizes the distinct motivational and cognitivefacets of goal pursuit, but also highlights their intricateinter-connections.

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