Master Thesis in Holocaust and Genocide Studies

Presenting, describing and solving

Myanmar’s Rohingya crisis A human rights organisation’s perspective

Student: Henna Kröger Term and year: Autumn 2021 Credits: 45 Supervisor: Tomislav Dulić Word count: 28700

The Hugo Valentin Centre

Table of contents

Abstract .................................................................................................................... 2

Acknowledgments .................................................................................................... 4

Introduction .................................................................................................. 5

Research overview ....................................................................................... 6

Research design ......................................................................................... 10

Theoretical framework – agenda-setting theory and framing

theory ............................................................................................. 10

Specification of research questions ................................................ 15

Methodology – inductive qualitative content analysis ................... 17

Empirical analysis ...................................................................................... 27

Discussing the illegality, continuity and comprehensive violence

of ethnic cleansing ......................................................................... 30

Descriptions of illegalities, failure and concern ............................ 43

Solving the ethnic conflict by international cooperation ............... 59

Conclusions ................................................................................................ 69

Which aspects of the ethnic cleansing of the Rohingya in 2017

have been discussed by Amnesty International, and what explains

Amnesty International’s decision to discuss these particular

aspects? .......................................................................................... 69

How are these aspects of the ethnic cleansing being discussed by

Amnesty International, and what explains Amnesty

International’s decision to discuss the aspects in their particular

ways? ............................................................................................. 71

Which solutions have been promoted by Amnesty International,

and what explains Amnesty International’s decision to promote

these particular solutions? .............................................................. 74

Final words .................................................................................... 76

Bibliography .......................................................................................................... 77

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Abstract This study had three aims of research. The first aim was to look at the different aspects

of the 2017 campaign of ethnic cleansing of the Rohingya minority, as discussed by

Amnesty International, and the reasons why Amnesty International has decided to

discuss these particular aspects. The second aim was to look at Amnesty International’s

descriptions of these aspects, and the reasons why Amnesty International has decided

to use these particular descriptions. The last aim was to look at the possible solutions

of the ethnic conflict, as promoted by Amnesty International, and the reasons why

Amnesty International has decided to promote these particular solutions. To reach the

aims of research, three research questions were formed. The research questions were:

1) Which aspects of the ethnic cleansing of the Rohingya in 2017 have been discussed

by Amnesty International, and what explains Amnesty International’s decision to

discuss these particular aspects?

2) How are these aspects of the ethnic cleansing being discussed by Amnesty

International, and what explains Amnesty International’s decision to discuss the aspects

in their particular ways?

3) Which solutions have been promoted by Amnesty International, and what explains

Amnesty International’s decision to promote these particular solutions?

The process of analysis was guided by two theories, agenda-setting theory and framing

theory. The method of research was inductive qualitative content analysis, for which

the software programme MAXQDA was used.

The analysis first revealed that the different aspects discussed create the frame of

illegality, the frame of continuity and the frame of comprehensiveness. The reason for

discussing these aspects can be seen to stem from Amnesty International’s own

interests, as the aspects discussed mirror the interests mentioned on the organisation’s

webpage amnesty.org. It was also revealed that these aspects are described through the

frame of illegality, the frame of targeted, indiscriminate, widespread and systematic

violence, the frame of concern and the frame of failure. The conclusion was made that

the emphasis on illegality mirrors Amnesty International’s interest on international

justice and that the emphasis on failure, concern and the nature of violence serves the

purposes of making moral judgements, mobilising governments and others and

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advocating for change. Last, the solutions promoted create and can be seen through the

frame of disappointment, the frame of failure and the frame of international

cooperation. The solutions promoted are also similar to the organisation’s listed

interests, as legal solutions, arms control and donations were suggested. In terms of

future research, more focus is needed on the effects of armed conflict on the elderly, as

well as more research on the living conditions of the Rohingya in Myanmar and in

refugee camps and how the latest military coup has affected them and how the Muslim

minority sees the situation.

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Acknowledgments

I wish to thank my thesis supervisor, Senior Lecturer and Associate Professor

Tomislav Dulić, and Senior Lecturer and Associate Professor Roland Kostić for their

guidance, advice, support and never-ending patience throughout the research process.

I also wish to thank my colleagues and fellow thesis-writers for the much-needed peer

support and assistance in the technicalities of the research process. Lastly, I wish to

thank my family for their patience and assistance in what appeared to be never-ending

technical difficulties throughtout the research process.

5

Presenting, discussing and solving Myanmar’s Rohingya crisis – a human

rights organisation’s perspective

Introduction The long-lasting ethnic conflict of Myanmar, as a topic of academic research, is still

quite new and untouched. The perhaps worst outburst of mass violence only occurred

some four years ago, in August 2017, when the Myanmar army unleashed a campaign

of ethnic cleansing on the Rohingya minority as a response to insurgency attacks by the

Arakan Rohingya Salvation Army (ARSA). Consequently, thousands of Rohingya

Muslims lost their lives and over 700,000 people were driven out of the country into

neighbouring Bangladesh to live as refugees and asylum seekers (Amnesty

International 2018h). Since then, the number of refugees has increased to nearly a

million.

Some four years later the conflict continues, and there are very few encouraging

signs suggesting that the conflict would come to an end anytime soon. On 3 December

2020 Human Rights Watch and Amnesty International reported that the Bangladesh

authorities seek to relocate Rohingya refugees to the remote island of Bhashan Char,

away from their families that remain in mainland Bangladesh (Amnesty International

2020m; Human Rights Watch 2020). Moreover, the refugees remaining in Cox’s Bazar,

the largest refugee camp in mainland Bangladesh, are living in appalling conditions. It

has been reported that they suffer from starvation, thirst, environmental hazards,

unsafety, poor or non-existent medical care and lack of provided education – just to

mention a few issues (Amnesty International 2019g). Also, we must not forget the

Rohingya and other ethnic minorities remaining in Myanmar as their persecutions and

plight continue to this day (Amnesty International 2020k), or the fact that the country’s

military only recently seized power in a military coup (Amnesty International 2021)

which poses a threat to all citizens.

The retaliatory attacks of the Myanmar army, alongside the passive and defensive

attitude of Myanmar’s State Counsellor Aung San Suu Kyi, have caused international

outrage and have been widely condemned. It can easily be argued that the State

Counsellor, and her country, lost the large amount of goodwill once shown by the

international community towards the Nobel Peace Prize winner and her small country

that has been ruled by the authoritarian military for decades before the most recent turns

of events. The attacks, constituting crimes against humanity and ethnic cleansing, have

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been discussed by, for instance, the ICJ, the ICC and the UN (Amnesty International

2018k; 2018n; 2020a). It is perhaps the large media attention of the case that has

diverted the attention of the academic community to these events as well.

Unfortunately, there are many undiscussed and unexplored aspects to the conflict.

There are two reasons why I have chosen to discuss the conflict in my master’s thesis.

Firstly, the limitations of previous research, and the obvious need for future research,

are the reasons why I have chosen to discuss this topic. It is essential that the topic is

further expanded on, as the situation cannot be resolved without a thorough

understanding of the ethnic conflict’s background and the present situation. In other

words, in previous research intervention, for instance, is too scarcely discussed and

points of view are too limited (previous research will be further discussed in the next

section). Secondly, without the attention and the pressure of the international

community the Myanmar army might feel inclined to whitewash the atrocities and

continue their actions.

This study will focus on 1) the different aspects of the ethnic cleansing discussed by

Amnesty International, and why has Amnesty International decided to discuss these

aspects, 2) Amnesty International’s descriptions of these aspects, and why has Amnesty

International decided to use these particular descriptions and 3) possible solutions as

promoted by Amnesty International, and why has Amnesty International decided to

promote these particular solutions. The data used for conducting the study consists of

21 reports and 107 news articles published by the organisation between 25 August 2017

and 4 December 2020 on their website (www.amnesty.org). The lengths of the reports

are between 2 and 186 pages, and the total amount of pages analysed is 699 pages. The

process of analysis is guided by agenda-setting theory and framing theory. The research

questions will be presented in section “Specification of research questions”. The

method of analysis is inductive qualitative content analysis, and the software

programme MAXQDA was used for the coding. In the next section previous research

is discussed, and several lacunas in the previous research are identified.

Research overview As written in the previous section, the research on Myanmar’s ethnic conflict is quite

limited in many aspects. There are numerous lacunas in the previous research that need

to be addressed. Firstly, the perspective of a human rights organisation has not been

addressed in previous research and the theory used in this study has also been largely

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neglected (only two studies using framing theory or looking at frames created about the

conflict were found. These studies were Ubayasiri 2019 and Vu and Lynn 2020. The

results revealed that the Rohingya were framed as threats to national security in certain

local newspapers, but many Western newspapers were concerned about bringing peace

to the region). Brooten, Ashraf and Akinro (2015) and Downman and Ubayasiri (2017)

have also looked at how news agencies, such as The New York Times and Inter Press

Service, have reported the ethnic conflict and how these reports were created. In

summary, the results found that in the reports the helplessness of the Rohingya and the

need for external intervention were reinforced, the structural causes behind the conflict

were paid attention to (Brooten, Ashraf and Akinro 2015) and that it is far too common

to present the Rohingya as a problem from across the border or as a regional burden,

the reports tend to focus on events as opposed to issues and even some victim-shaming

has appeared, due to some reports’ confusion of the terms “smuggling” and “human

trafficking” that are many times associated with the Rohingya, but that are critically

different (Downman and Ubayasiri 2017). However, as they do not discuss the

reporting of human rights organisations, comparing the results of these studies to my

results does not help me fulfil the research aim of this study, and a few studies that

focus on the reports of the ethnic conflict are obviously not enough. This study will

hence bring a new point of view to the conflict, remind us of the fact that news agencies

are not the only operators that report events and operate on unsafe conflict zones, in

addition to reminding us that every organisation and agency that discusses certain

events in a certain way has their own agenda and reasons for doing so.

Another of these lacunas concerns the methods used in the studies. The methods of

data collection and analysis used in previous research have been relatively numerous.

The methods have included interviews (Parnini 2013; Haque 2017; Haar et al 2019;

Messner et al 2019), literature surveys and reviews (Md Jobair Alam 2018; Parashar

and Alam 2019, which also included a legal review), comparative analysis (Sahana,

Jahangir and Anisujjaman 2019), opinion analysis (Rochmawati and Wibawa 2018),

thematic analysis (Mithun 2018), quantitative methods (Hutchinson 2018), textual

analysis (Brooten 2015) and questionnaires/surveys (Jerin and Mozumder 2019).

However, qualitative content analysis, not to mention inductive qualitative content

analysis, has not been used in the previous research at all. Hence, this study will

contribute to the methods used to address and discuss the long-lasting ethnic conflict.

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Because the majority of previous research is descriptive, there is large inconsistency

in terminology. Nearly every author uses a different term to discuss the events of August

2017 and the pre-conflict period. They have been labelled and discussed as a genocide,

ethnic cleansing (Hutchinson 2018), resettling (Akins 2018), refugee crisis (Lewis

2019) and ethno-demographic conflict (Qadir, Rehman and Gardezi 2019). Different

combinations of terms have also been put forward. For example, Mithun (2018) used

the combination of exodus and ethnic conflict, Southwick (2015) crimes against

humanity and genocide and Pantea (2019) saw the events as an ethnic conflict with

religious aspects. However, the most popular combinations are refugee crisis and mass

exodus (Bepler 2018; Ty 2019 and Kipgen 2019), forced migration and displacement

(Sahana, Jahangir and Anisujjaman 2019 and Lee 2019) and ethnic cleansing and

genocide – interchangeably (Kingston 2015; Khin 2017). In my opinion, this is a

serious problem. The authors do not debate about the terminology per se, but because

they use different terms so inconsistently, in some articles the events are perceived as

less serious. When discussing international intervention, for instance, it is a completely

different thing to discuss genocide intervention than refugee crisis intervention. This is

important to keep in mind.

Which aspects have been discussed and addressed then? It could be said that three

specific themes have been most addressed in previous research. I have categorised these

themes as statelessness and justice, intervention and responsibility to protect and

historical, ethnic and religious background of the conflict.

The discussion regarding the statelessness of the Rohingya has particularly focused

on the Citizenship Law of 1982, which deprived the members of the minority of their

legal status as citizens of Myanmar or made it nearly impossible to gain. The law and

its effects have been discussed by e.g. Ahsan Ullah (2016), Hague (2017), Md Jobair

Alam (2018), and Parashar and Alam (2019). In summary, the results of these studies

reveal that the law strips the Rohingya of their fundamental citizen rights (Ahsan Ullah

2016), consigns them to statelessness (Md Jobair Alam 2018), is deliberately used to

create statelessness and deprive the Rohingya of nationality (Hague 2017) and is a part

of gradual status change, aimed at depriving the Rohingya of their minority status and

citizenship, thus creating statelessness (Parashar and Alam 2019).

The legal discussion has revolved around the Rome Statute and what it means for

human rights violations in the country. Myanmar is not a member of the Rome Statute,

which has made the unprecedented decision of the ICC to investigate the crimes more

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difficult for the government of Myanmar and their allies to accept. This issue of the

ICC and the Rome Statute has been discussed by e.g. Ahsan Ullah (2016), Higgins

(2018), Colvin and Orchard (2019) and Hale and Rankin (2019).

The articles discussing intervention and the responsibility to protect have mainly

focused on three organisations. These organisations are ASEAN, the ICC and the

United Nations (Security Council). Many academics have, perhaps surprisingly, been

rather focused on criticising these organisations for their inflexibility and lack of

interest.

ASEAN has been seen most favourably out of the three previously mentioned

organisations. Parnini (2013), Southwick (2015) and Mutaqin (2018) have discussed

the possible role of ASEAN and encouraged the organisation to continue its actions.

The ICC, on the other hand, is seen as a quite inflexible organisation (Pedersen 2019,

5), and the fact that Myanmar is not a member of the Rome Statute further complicates

the issue. Lastly, The United Nations Security Council has been seen as a failure in the

situation, since not a single resolution was passed to prevent the atrocities and hold the

perpetrators accountable (Adams 2019).

The historical background of the conflict has been traced back to British colonialism

by e.g. Akins (2018), Alam (2019) and Mukherjee (2019a; 2019b). The ethnic

background of the conflict can also be traced back to colonialism, and it has been done

so by Hein (2018) and Mithun (2018). Lastly, the religious background of the conflict

has been discussed by Lee (2014), Weber and Stanford (2017) and Zarni and Brinham

(2017). In the articles the silence of Aung San Suu Kyi, and the deliberation with which

the government of Myanmar changed the religious character of the Rakhine state, were

discussed.

As we can see, a human rights perspective to the ethnic conflict and possible

solutions to the ethnic conflict have not been adequately discussed and addressed. This

study aims to fulfil these gaps in previous research. In the following sections the

theoretical framework, the research questions and the methodology of the study will be

introduced.

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Research design

Theoretical framework – agenda-setting theory and framing theory In academic research the theoretical framework of a study helps the researcher explain

the phenomenon or phenomena that is/are being studied, as well as interpret and make

sense of the results. The most suitable theoretical framework is essential when

answering the research questions and fulfilling the research aim. In this study two

theories are combined and used to answer the research questions and form the

foundation of analysis. The theories in question are agenda-setting theory and framing

theory.

Agenda-setting theory has been described as "the creation of public awareness and

concern of salient issues by the news media". As a theory, it has two main assumptions.

Firstly, the press and the media do not reflect reality, but instead they filter and shape

it. Secondly, when the media is focused on a particular issue, the general public starts

to consider this issue more important than another issue which has not received so much

media attention (University of Twente 2003/2004, 104). Therefore, it could be claimed

that media outlets actively seek to enforce and advance their own agendas, knowing

that by ignoring and downplaying certain events they are also affecting their readers'

way of thinking to a great extent.

It was already discovered in the 1970s that the consumers of mass media not only

learn about specific issues through media, but they also learn how to attach varying

amounts of importance to these issues, based on much coverage they have received in

the media (McCombs and Shaw 1972). In other words, if particular events or issues are

not discussed in the media, the general public would not consider these events or issues

that relevant or important. This phenomenon or connection was first proven in the

context of political campaigns (by McCombs and Shaw 1972), but it surely applies to

other phenomena as well.

It is important to remember that media is not our "only source of orientation to public

affairs" (McCombs and Valenzuela 2007, 46). Various organisations and agencies are

very much engaged with public affairs and politics as well. Keeping in mind the statute

of Amnesty International (Amnesty International 2019h), not only do they wish to

affect the thinking of their supporters and politicians, but they also wish to advocate for

change and encourage different operators to act. This is the core idea and basis of this

study. Amnesty International has an agenda and particular interests, and this is why they

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talk about certain events in a certain way. There is a reason why certain aspects of the

conflict are brought up and emphasised, when discussing the ethnic conflict and the

ethnic cleansing that started in August 2017. For instance, it would not make sense,

from a human rights perspective, to discuss the effects of the conflict on Myanmar's

foreign affairs or international investments.

It has been written that agenda-setting works through repetition. When same

messages are repeated time and a time again, day after day, they evidently influence

our thinking and quickly move from the media's agenda to our personal agenda

(McCombs and Valenzuela 2007). Consequently, the messages and the information in

these messages become more accessible to us. The more accessible the information is

to us, the easier it is to retrieve from our memories (Freeland 2012).

It goes without saying that every individual is different and is affected by the media

in a unique way. In particular, our need for orientation affects us in an individual way.

The more relevant an issue is to us, and the more uncertain we are about the issue, the

greater is our need for orientation. If the need for orientation is low, an individual is

unlikely to follow or read news reports (McCombs and Valenzuela 2007, 46; McCombs

and Guo, 2014).

Freeland (2012) has pointed out that the audience's predispositions to certain beliefs,

the correlation between the media agenda and the public agenda and whether the issue

is obtrusive or unobtrusive have an effect our thinking as well. When an audience is

already sensitive to an issue, they are likely to be more affected by the increased media

coverage, than an audience that is not perhaps familiar with the topic. As stated, the

obtrusiveness of the issue also affects our thinking. Obtrusive issues, such as increased

food prices, are seen to affect the majority of the population. Unobtrusive issues, on the

other hand, are more distant to the general public. The obtrusiveness of an issue depends

on the audience's personal experience with the issue. In other words, news articles about

the ethnic cleansing of the Rohingya have a larger effect on people who are already

familiar with the topic and/or are directly affected by the events.

This is also important to keep in mind, when moving forward with the analysis. The

target audience of Amnesty International's reports, according to their website

amnesty.org, are not for instance teenagers in upper secondary school, but donors,

politicians and organisations that have a say in or control over e.g. arms control,

international justice, death penalties and climate change.

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It has been written that three types of agenda-setting exist. These types are public,

media and policy agenda-setting. Public agenda-setting is focused on the audience's

agenda, media agenda-setting is focused on the influence of mass media on the audience

and policy agenda-setting is focused on how media and public agendas affect elite

policy makers. There has, obviously, been criticism towards these types of agenda-

setting, especially towards the media agenda-setting. When discussing social problems,

like violence for instance, it has been criticised for blaming the media instead of

examining the actual perpetrator of violence (Freeland 2012). There is no need to go

into more detail at this point, but it is once again important to remember that agenda-

setting goes beyond traditional media.

To summarise, agenda-setting theory helps us understand why certain issues are

being brought up and discussed by the media, different organisations and different

agencies. In other words, agenda-setting tells us what to think about. However, we still

need understand how to think about a particular issue. We need to understand how

Amnesty International wants us to think about or see the ethnic cleansing of the

Rohingya. This is where framing theory can help us reach the research aim and answer

the research questions.

Framing theory was first put forth by Erving Goffman in 1974, and he is considered

to be the pioneer of the sociological tradition of framing theory. His fundamental idea

was that humans make sense of the world around them through their primary

frameworks. He also argued that every human has a social framework and a natural

framework, the difference of which is functional (for a more detailed discussion, see

Goffman 1974). Framing theory also has a psychological tradition, which is typically

credited to Kahneman and Tversky (1983) and a political tradition.

So, what exactly is a frame? According to Gitlin (1980, 7), media frames organise

the world for journalists and for us, the audience of their reports. For journalists, frames

make it possible to process large amounts of information quickly, efficiently and

routinely. On the other hand, it has been argued that frames highlight certain pieces of

information about a subject of communication. Frames draw attention to certain aspects

of reality, whilst other aspects remain concealed. It could be said that frames in pieces

of news capture the essence of actors or interests that compete “to dominate the text”

(Entman 1993, 52–55).

This is the defining difference between agenda-setting and framing. In framing

theory, it is the information about the issue in itself that carries the effect and the

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influence. In agenda-setting theory, on the other hand, the fact that an issue has received

attention in the first place is seen as carrying the effect (Scheufele and Tewksbury

2007). As written before, framing tells us how to think and agenda-setting what to think

about. Framing is based "on the assumption that subtle changes in the wording of the

description of a situation might affect how audience members interpret this situation".

Agenda-setting, however, relies "on the notion of attitude accessibility" (Scheufele

2000, 309).

As certain aspects of reality are highlighted, the salience of these aspects is elevated.

In this context, the elevation of salience means making the piece of information more

noticeable, meaningful or memorable to the audience. Increasing salience ensures that

the receivers will perceive, process and store the information in their memories. De

Vreese and Lecheler (2015, paragraph 17) have clarified that frames do not make

specific frame-related beliefs more salient, but rather increase the weight that is being

assigned to these beliefs. Cappella and Jamieson (1997, 45) have also elaborated that

salience and selection emphasise that framing does not only include that which is made

noticeable, but also that which has been left out or is treated as secondary, or less.

It could be said that frames diagnose, evaluate and prescribe. They define problems,

by determining what a causal agent is doing and what are the consequential costs and

benefits (usually in terms of common cultural values), diagnose causes, by identifying

the forces that initially create the problem, make moral judgements, by evaluating the

causal agents and their effects, and suggest remedies, by offering and justifying

treatments for the problems and by predicting their possible effects. It is worth

remembering that one sentence might perform two or more of these framing functions,

but it is not always the case. Many sentences might not perform any of these four

functions, and a frame in a particular text might not include all of them either (Entman

1993, 52).

Cappella and Jamieson (1997, 47; 89) have argued that frames should meet four

different criteria. Firstly, frames should have identifiable conceptual and linguistic

characteristics. Secondly, they should be commonly observed in journalistic practice.

Thirdly, the audience and the author should be able to reliably distinguish a frame from

another frame. Lastly, a frame should have representational validity. The reader and the

author should attribute the same characteristics to issues and strategy messages. If this

does not happen, meaningful distinctions might not be produced for the audience, and

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the researcher might have to explain the results “in terms they assume to be true of the

message types, but which readers do not perceive to be the case”.

It is suggested that frames in a communication process have at least four locations.

Communicators make conscious and/or unconscious framing judgements when

deciding what they want to say. They are guided by frames that organise their belief

systems. Texts contain frames that manifest in the presence or absence of e.g. certain

keywords, habitual or frequent phrases, stereotyped images, information sources and

sentences that “provide thematically reinforcing clusters of facts or judgments”. The

receiver might not necessarily agree with the frames of the text and the communicator.

Instead, her/his thinking might be guided by different frames entirely. The culture is the

standard of the most commonly turned to frames. It could even be seen as the

“empirically demonstrable set of common frames” that are found in the discourse and

thinking of most people in a particular social group. Framing in all these four locations

includes selecting and highlighting particular elements, which are then used to construct

arguments about specific problems and their causation, evaluation and solution(s)

(Entman 1993, p. 52–53).

Gamson and Modigliani (1989, 3–4) have suggested that media discourse could be

conceived as a set of interpretative packages that give a particular issue meaning. These

packages are internally structured, and at their core lies a central organising idea, or

frame, which makes sense of relevant events. Furthermore, they offer a number of

condensing symbols, suggesting the core frame and positions in shorthand, which

enables displaying the entire package with a metaphor, a catchphrase, or some other

symbolic device, for instance. The authors have identified five framing devices that

suggest how to think about a particular issue. These are 1) metaphors, 2) exemplars –

in other words, historical examples from which we learn, 3) catchphrases, 4) depictions

and 5) visual images – in other words, icons.

Tankard (2001, 100) has also presented a list of framing mechanisms used to identify

framing. It consists of 11 focal points that should looked at. They are:

1. Headlines and “kickers” (smaller headlines above the main headlines) 2. Subheadings 3. Photos 4. Photo captions 5. Leads, or beginnings of new stories 6. Sources and affiliations

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7. Quotes 8. Pull quotes (quotes that are made larger in order to emphasise certain issues or

comments, for instance) 9. Logos (identification of the series to which an article belongs) 10. Statistics, charts, graphs 11. Concluding statements or paragraphs of articles

Regardless of how one defines a frame, selection and salience are essential to framing.

By framing, certain aspects of perceived reality are selected and made more salient in

a communicating text. This is done in order to promote e.g. certain problem definitions,

causal interpretations, moral evaluations and/or treatment recommendations for

whichever item is being described. Texts, for instance, use placement and repetition for

making pieces of information more salient. Pieces of information can also be associated

with culturally familiar symbols in order to increase their salience. As mentioned

before, even a single word, or a simple illustrated appearance of a notion, somewhere

in the text can be highly salient, provided it is accordance with the receiver’s beliefs

and frameworks that already exist. For the same reason, the receiver might not easily

notice, interpret, or remember certain ideas emphasised in a text (Entman 1993, 52–

53).

In my opinion, framing and frame-creation is best summarised by Cappella and

Jamieson (1997, 57). According to the authors, framing comes down to slant, emphasis,

selection, word choices and context. These five factors need to be kept in mind when

identifying or building frames, alongside identifying and keeping in mind the hidden

and unhidden agendas of the text’s author.

As we can see, the research aim could not be reached with just one theory. Agenda-

setting is needed in order to find out the most defining issues faced by the Rohingya,

from a human rights perspective. Framing theory is also needed, as it is essential to

understand the essence of these issues and to come up with solutions. In the next

section the research questions will be specified, after which the method of analysis is

presented and discussed.

Specification of research questions As mentioned in the introduction, the topics of the study are 1) the different aspects of

the ethnic cleansing as discussed by Amnesty International, and why has Amnesty

International decided to discuss these particular aspects, 2) Amnesty International’s

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descriptions of these aspects, and why has Amnesty International decided to use these

particular descriptions and 3) possible solutions as promoted by Amnesty International,

and why has Amnesty International decided to promote these particular solutions.

There are four reasons for why Amnesty International was chosen as the topic of this

study. Firstly, it is a politically independent organisation. Secondly, it is also

economically independent. However, even though they are politically and economically

independent, they are by no means biased or without an agenda. Their statute states that

“members, supporters and staff mobilize public pressure on governments and others to

stop the abuse” and that it “carries out a wide range of human rights educational

activities; and it encourages intergovernmental organizations, individuals and all organs

of society to support and respect human rights" (Amnesty International 2019h). Thirdly,

as a human rights organisation, its work is victim-based and survivor-based. The

victims and survivors, in my opinion, should always be the top priority when discussing

mass violence. Lastly, their publications are based on interviews with the actual

eyewitnesses of mass violence. This undeniably increases the trustworthiness and the

credibility of their work.

The reason why an organisation working with human rights was chosen as the topic

of the study, as opposed to the UN for instance, was that there is no previous research

that discusses both human rights organisations and the Rohingya. Also, most likely due

to the recentness of the events discussed, their aftermath and possible solutions are also

widely undiscussed. Hence, my research questions are:

1) Which aspects of the ethnic cleansing of the Rohingya in 2017 have been discussed

by Amnesty International, and what explains Amnesty International’s decision to

discuss these particular aspects?

2) How are these aspects of the ethnic cleansing being discussed by Amnesty

International, and what explains Amnesty International’s decision to discuss the aspects

in their particular ways?

3) Which solutions have been promoted by Amnesty International, and what explains

Amnesty International’s decision to promote these particular solutions?

Hopefully, by creating a condense package of information about the events and the

present situation, it will be easier for future researchers to further expand on the topic.

17

Furthermore, the thesis will hopefully be a good source of information for those who

are not yet familiar with the topic but wish to be in the future. Lastly, as mentioned

previously, by continuing the discussion on the topic and making sure that the events

are not forgotten, we are helping the Rohingya and advocating for change. In the next

section the method of analysis is presented, after which we will move on to the analysis

and its results.

Methodology – inductive qualitative content analysis

The history and objective of (qualitative) content analysis

The basic content analysis, by Weber (1990), is the most common form used in social

work literature. It is also commonly used in the multidisciplinary literature. Its results

are often used to empirically document perceived social problems and advocate for

change (Drisko and Maschi 2015, 21). Weber (1990) has argued that the method can be

used to empirically identify and describe themes, or other aspects of communication

content. Thus, content analysis can address language, meanings of content,

communication techniques, specific events or all of the above simultaneously. It has

also been argued that content analysis can address content that is missing in a situation,

where it should not be missing (Drisko and Maschi 2015, 21–26). Neuendorf (2002, 1)

has defined content analysis as a systematic, objective and quantitative analysis of

message characteristics.

Content analysis began to be used more commonly after World War II, and it was

first embraced by psychologists, anthropologists, historians, social scientists and

literary scholars. Content analysis offered many of them a more systematic way of

processing large quantities of data (Krippendorff 2004, 12). These days, the main

audiences of content analysis are different advocacy groups, marketers, programme and

policy planners, businesspeople, legislators and policy makers and other professionals

or academics. In that case, the goal of the analysis is to persuade and to inform the

audience about socials issues, products, services or policy positions. However, the

general public might also be the target audience. If so, the main goal of the analysis is

to raise awareness and consciousness and to inform and educate (Drisko and Maschi

2015, 27–28).

Mayring (2000, paragraph 5) has defined qualitative content analysis as “an

approach of empirical, methodological controlled analysis of texts within their context

18

of communication, following content analytical rules and step by step models, without

rash quantification”. Therefore, not only is manifest content addressed in this method,

but also the core ideas and themes found in the texts as primary content are of interest.

In addition, no statistical analytic methods are employed (Drisko and Maschi 2015, 82).

There are other qualitative methods that are quite similar to, although distinct from,

qualitative content analysis. For instance, discourse analysis, critical theory, grounded

theory and thematic analysis have certain similarities with the method. However,

discourse analysis focuses on the forms and elements of speech and text, whereas

content analysis focuses on the content of text. For example, in discourse analysis the

grammar and the speaker's tone of voice might be looked at. These are of no interest to

us in this study, and therefore discourse analysis would not help us answer my research

questions in the best possible way. Critical theory tends to be quite interpretative,

whereas content analysis is more descriptive. Thematic analysis, on the other hand,

could be seen as an underdeveloped variant of what is considered as contemporary

qualitative content analysis (Drisko and Maschi 2015, 82– 83). Grounded theory was

not chosen as the method of sampling and analysis for two reasons. As it has been

pointed out, in comparison to qualitative content analysis, the research goal of grounded

theory is a substantive theory and the data collection occurs simultaneously with the

analysis. In other words, the analysable data guides the subsequent data collection. The

researcher needs to constantly compare and contrast incidents to other incidents, to

advance the conceptualisation and generalisability of a fact (Cho and Lee, 2014. The

authors have discussed other differences between the methods in extent, as well). The

goal of this study is neither to create a theory, nor are there any studies that this study

could be compared to. Therefore, grounded theory would not help us reach the research

goal and would be an unsuitable method of analysis.

The qualitative approach to content analysis has been discussed for decades.

Kracauer (1952) already at the time argued that by neglecting the qualitative approach,

and only focusing on quantitative counts, the accuracy of the analysis is reduced. This,

according to the author, is a result of the fact that latent content cannot be interpreted

by using quantitative methods. In other words, the essence of such data as interviews

cannot be captured without qualitative methods.

Schreier (2012, 5–7), on the other hand, has found the strengths of qualitative content

analysis to be its systematic approach, flexibility and its tendency to reduce data. The

steps taken in the research process are always the same, which makes conducting

19

research much simpler and more systematic. The flexibility of the method is a result of

the coding frame, which is different in every study. The coding frame needs to be

tailored according to each study, because this ensures the reliability and the validity of

the research. Lastly, other qualitative methods tend to open up the data, reveal new

aspects of it and bring it together in novel ways. However, this particular method reveals

what is most relevant and specific about the selected data.

Conducting inductive content analysis

In qualitative content analysis the process can be either inductive or deductive. The

inductive approach is preferable when there is not enough previous knowledge about

the phenomenon. In this approach the categories are derived from the data. The

deductive approach can be used when the point of the study is theory testing and the

previous knowledge can be operationalised (Elo and Kyngäs 2007). As mentioned

previously, this study is conducted inductively.

In the preparation phase the unit of analysis is chosen. The unit of analysis can be

anything between a single word and pages of text. The unit should not, however, be too

narrow. Additionally, the decision whether only manifest content is analysed, or is latent

content also included, needs to be made (Elo and Kyngäs, 2007., 109).

The next step is to make sense of the data, and it is done by asking the data questions,

such as “Who? What? When? Where? Why?” (Dey 1993, 87). The material should be

read through multiple times, in order to gain insights, overcome possible issues of

comprehension and become familiar with the material (Polit and Beck 2004, 102–103).

In this study, the material was read through twice before the coding and creation of

categories.

The next step is to organise the chosen data. This includes open coding, creation of

categories and abstraction (Elo and Kyngäs 2007, 109). Open coding means that

relevant categories are identified and labelled descriptively. The coding should, at this

point, be over-inclusive, because the meanings of the text are only learned and refined.

One applicable technique could be to use in vivo codes, which use a word, or a sentence,

taken from the original data. In this way, the essence of the content is fully reflected

(Drisko and Maschi 2015, 104–105). This technique was applied in this study, as some

of the codes are titled according to articles (see section "Codes used in the study").

After the categories have been decided on, their number should be reduced by

combining categories that are too similar and by grouping them into higher-order

20

headings (Burnard 1991, 462). Maynard (2000, paragraph 11, Figure 1) has argued that

once 10–50 per cent of the text has been coded, a revision of categories should be

undertaken. This is done in order to assure the reliability or the trustworthiness of the

categories (Drisko 2013a; 2013b. Quoted in Drisko and Maschi 2015, 105).

Unfortunately, in this study the entire data had to be coded before the trustworthiness

of the categories was able to be determined. This is a result of the fact that the analysable

data consisted of news reports and reports from a period of three and a half years

(August 2017–December 2020). Obviously, the events and the overall situation in

Myanmar unfolded and changed as time went on, so the themes and events discussed

in late 2017 are entirely different compared to early 2020.

The studies of qualitative content analysis are most often presented in a narrative

form. In this form of analysis, the section headings of the report are the core categories

and themes identified by the researcher. The core themes are interpreted in a summary

manner and quotations are used to illustrate the portrayal of the participants’ or texts’

original ideas or views. This way, the development of categories is clarified and the

categories which address the overall research question are highlighted. The level of

provided interpretation may be anything from minimal to significant, depending on the

researcher(s). This means that categories or themes can be simply summarised, in order

to highlight the content, or the creation of more contextualised interpretations based on

latent content may also be an option (Drisko and Maschi 2015, 109–110).

The narrative forms of presentation and data analysis used in qualitative content

analysis can be persuasive to a high extent. However, they can be used in a way that is

not obvious to the reader. Great care must be taken, in order to demonstrate to the reader

the typicality of such language in the entire data set. Narrative presentations do not

necessarily reveal the impact of selective, or limited, sampling (Drisko and Maschi

2015, 110).

Trustworthiness and validity

The most important values of content analysis are reliability, validity and objectivity

(Weber 1990; Krippendorff 2004; Drisko and Maschi 2015). The cultural and personal

histories of the researcher, the social context of the research and the purpose of the

research should not, or rather do not, shape the analysis of data in important ways

(Drisko and Maschi 2015, 28). This particular straightforwardness and “exclusion” of

the researcher’s background is what makes content analysis quite unproblematic, in this

21

sense. However, were there any biases to be found, they would most likely be detected

and addressed by later researchers (Ibid., 29).

Interestingly, reliability and validity are measured differently in qualitative content

analysis. Actually, many scholars, such as Anastas (1999), Elo and Kyngäs (2007), Elo

et al (2014) and Drisko and Maschi (2015), even use the term trustworthiness instead

of, or alongside, the term reliability. In order to achieve trustworthiness, special

attention must be paid to the reliability or reproducibility of observations and results

and to the validity or defensible assignment of meaning to what was observed (Anastas

1999, 415).

One of the most important aspects of producing reliable and valid information in

qualitative content analysis is maintaining and making full records of the different

aspects of the entire research process, including the investigation, the data and the

coding process (Anastas 1999, 423; Elo et al 2014, 2). Furthermore, when reporting the

data, the analysis process should be described in so much detail that the reader gains

full understanding of how the analysis was conducted. In other words, the process of

analysis and the results must be dissected and presented in categories that reliably

reflect the subject of the study. Additionally, a link between data and results must be

presented. This may be done by, for instance, using authentic citations, appendices, and

tables (Elo and Kyngäs 2007, 112). In this study this has been ensured by including

authentic citations that summarise the point I wish to make in the text, and by ensuring

that the headlines/titles of different sections and chapters accurately describe the subject

of that particular section or chapter.

There are two reasons why I have chosen to use the terms trustworthiness and

validity, instead of reliability and validity. Firstly, the typical methods for ensuring

reliability in qualitative research, such as comparisons across points in time or

comparisons across persons through percentages of agreement (for instance), would not

work in my thesis. This research is conducted once, by one person. Therefore, focusing

on aspects of trustworthiness and validity that can be ensured by a single researcher,

when analysing specific material only once, makes more sense in this context.

Secondly, the terms reliability and validity are considered to be terms of positivist

epistemology. The terms credibility and trustworthiness, on the other hand, are

considered constructivist. I do not believe in the positivist idea that different peoples’

experienced reality or different occurrences, such as mass violence, could be measured

or understood objectively. However, I do not also fully support the constructivist idea

22

that all knowledge is “situated and relative” (Drisko and Maschi 2015, 91). My

epistemological “conviction” is something in between, where many universal laws

apply and affect us, and they can be objectively measured, but most of our everyday

experiences are interpreted through our socio-economic positions, for instance. This is

why I combine terms from both epistemologies in my thesis.

Trustworthiness

As written above, the inductive content analysis involves three phases. Each of these

phases has its own challenges when it comes to ensuring the trustworthiness of the

study. This is why Elo et al (2014) have addressed the issue and come up with particular

questions to keep in mind, while conducting the research.

The preparation phase consists of three smaller “units”. These units are data

collection method, sampling strategy and selecting the unit of analysis. When it comes

to the data collection method, the researcher should pay attention to how to collect the

data that best suits the content analysis. In other words, it is important to consider

whether the particular method answers the research questions in the best way. This also

applies to the sampling strategy. Lastly, selecting the units of analysis is extremely

tricky. The researcher needs to decide on units that are not too narrow, or too broad.

Additionally, describing the units sufficiently is of importance (Elo et al 2014). In this

study, this was ensured by, for instance, explaining why discourse analysis or grounded

theory was not applied (see section "The history and objective of (qualitative) content

analysis").

In phase two, the organisation phase, three “units” are also considered. These are

categorisation and abstraction, interpretation and representativeness. In terms of

categorisation and abstraction, questions regarding the number of concepts, overlaps

between categories and how the concepts and categories are created should be asked.

When it comes to representativeness, the researcher should contemplate on how (s)he

can ensure the trustworthiness of the analysis. Furthermore, the representativeness of

the data as a whole should be contemplated on (Elo et al 2014.). In this study this was

ensured by, for instance, explaining how the assigned categories overlap (see section

"Codes used in the study").

The last phase, the reporting phase, has two smaller “units”. These are reporting

results and reporting analysis process. The questions that should be asked at this stage

23

were already discussed a bit earlier. The posed questions should concern the logic and

consistency of reporting, whether the categories cover the entire data, how well the

research process is described and whether the concepts are adequately described. In

summary, attention should be paid to the transferability of the results. In this study this

was ensured by, for instance, describing the concepts and by making sure that the data

was entirely covered by suitable categories by readjusting the categories/codes by

reading the data through twice before the actual analysis.

Validity

Schreier (2012) and Neuendorf (2002) have discussed four types of validity. These are

face validity, criterion validity, content validity and construct validity. In my thesis I

will focus on face validity, which is why I will not further discuss the other three types.

Face validity is extremely useful if one wants to develop the categories from the data.

By doing this, an exact description of material is provided, and this is the key point of

face value. The face validity of the data-driven coding frame can be assessed by using

the results of the pilot coding. The process starts by evaluating the residual category or

categories. It is typically a bad sign if there are too many segments in the residual

categories. Also, if a considerable part of the material cannot be described in terms of

the substantive categories, but through residual categories, it means that the meaning

of the segments was not captured by the substantive categories. Thus, frequent use of

residual categories indicates low face validity (Schreier 2012, 186).

In addition, when assessing the face validity of the data-driven coding frame, each

main category should also be looked at. In particular, how the segments are distributed

across subcategories is of interest. It is usually a sign of insufficient differentiation of

the coding frame if the majority of segments have been assigned to one subcategory.

The mostly used subcategory would summarise several considerations at a fairly

abstract level and, therefore, the material would not be described in sufficient detail.

The issue can be addressed by dividing the subcategory into further subcategories

(Schreier 2012, 186–187). In this study this was ensured by reading through the data

twice, so that new categories were created when necessary and some categories were

combined if they were too broad.

Finally, the validity of the data-driven coding frame could be considered in terms of

its level of abstraction. Qualitative content analysis summarises and reduces the

material, and by categorising it some individual information will invariably be lost.

24

However, if too much information is lost, the categories are too abstract, and the coding

frame does not have sufficient face validity. Therefore, the importance of creating the

most suitable categories cannot be emphasised enough (Schreier 2012, 187).

Codes used in the study1

As mentioned previously, when inductive qualitative content analysis is applied, the

analysable data must be read through before the categories, or codes, are decided on.

After having gone through the data twice, the following codes were decided on:

1) Terms for Events

2) Covid-19

- Situation in the camps

- Stranded at sea2

3) International Organisations

- ASEAN

- ICC and ICJ

- The UN

- The Security Council

- The Human Rights Council

- The Fact-Finding Mission

4) Arrested Journalists and Freedom of Speech

5) Repatriation

- Physical obstacles

- Destroyed homes

- Further violence

- Systematic discrimination and segregation

- Mental obstacles

- Willingness to return

- Fear of returning

- Dignity

1 The decision to present the codes in this form was made, as exported code systems from

MAXQDA did not look as visually pleasing and easily readable as this form of presentation. 2 The title comes from a news article by the same name (Amnesty International 2020d).

25

- Supervising the repatriation

6) Foreign Countries

- China

- Japan

- The US

- Thailand

- Malaysia

- Bangladesh

- Refugee camps and humanitarian response

- Medical problems and lack of healthcare

- Starvation and lack of drinking water

- Unsafety

- Environmental hazards

- Lack of education

- Restricting movement

- Inaccessible or inadequate sanitation

- Internet blackout

- Administration of the camps

- Gender-based violence

- Relocation of the Rohingya

- Other countries

7) Ethnic Armed Groups

- ARSA

- AA

- Other groups

8) Military and Business Relations

9) Impunity

10) Other Forms of Oppression

- Denying international and humanitarian aid

- Denying access to education

- Denying access to medical care

- Forced starvation and restricting access to drinking water

26

- Forced mass deportations and displacement

- Systematic discrimination and segregation

- Corruption

- Restraining access to the internet

- Restricted freedom of movement

11) Physical violence

- Shootings and other unlawful killings

- Sexual violence

- Beatings

- Abductions and enforced disappearances

- Forced labour

- Arbitrary arrests

- Torture and other ill-treatment

12) Damage Done to the Physical Environment

- Scorched earth tactics

- Landmines

- Looting and destruction of properties and homes

- Bulldozing and rebuilding infrastructure

13) Pre-Conflict Period

- Torture, physical violence and killings

- Impunity of soldiers and BGP officers

- The elections of 2015

- Segregation and discrimination

- Corruption

- Arrests and arbitrary detention

14) Rohingya and Other Ethnic Minorities Remaining in Rakhine State

15) Kachin and Shan States

16) Who Is Responsible

- State Counsellor Aung San Suu Kyi

- Myanmar Army and security forces

- Command structure

- BGP / Border Guard Police

27

- Senior General Min Aung Hlaing

17) What Needs to Be Done?

- Donations

- Stopping arms trade / arms embargo

- Increasing international attention and pressure

- Allowing access to outsider observers and humanitarian workers

- Addressing impunity

- Financial sanctions

It should be pointed out at this time that many of the codes are found in same sentences,

paragraphs and articles. In other words, they tend to intertwine and overlap quite a lot.

For example, a typical description of an attack by the Myanmar army would be a

description of shootings, beatings and mass rape. Many times, the raped women would

be left wounded at the location of the rape (typically their home or a school), where

they would be burned to death (see e.g. Amnesty International 2018i).

In addition, on some occasions large quantities of data would have to be put under

the larger main category, instead of a subcategory, or under one code, because the

information provided is a bit too scattered and specific for a single code (which would

then have a very unspecific, undescriptive title). For instance, solutions to the problem

would be addressed to multiple actors and they would on occasion contain one or a

couple of very specific solutions per actor (see e.g. Amnesty International 2019d, 76).

Lastly, it is important to point out that some of the codes do not help answer my

research questions or achieve my research aim, since I am only focusing on certain,

specific issues. Therefore, they will not be addressed or focused on in the analysis. We

will next move on to the analysis and the results.

Empirical analysis Before moving on to the results of the analysis it is important to briefly address and

explain the different reasons and forces that lead to the ethnic cleansing of August 2017,

as well as to explain why the situation in Myanmar has been quite explosive for

decades, if not centuries. The prejudice and resentment that is felt towards the Rohingya

by the majority of Myanmar's population could be explained by historical, ethnic and

religious reasons. The role of the Myanmar army, or Tatmadaw as it is called in

28

Burmese, also needs to be understood. Obviously, we cannot go into too much detail

here, but some basic outlines should be explained.

Myanmar was previously occupied by the United Kingdom, against whom they

fought three Anglo-Burmese Wars in 1824–1826, 1852 and 1885. The country initially

became a part of British India, remaining a part of it until 1937. During this time, the

country was seen as "the backwaters of Bengal Residency", and its citizens were

considered barbaric and uncivilized (Mukherjee 2019b, 27). The British were

temporarily driven out of the country by the Japanese in 1942, which caused great

division amongst the country's numerous ethnic groups, since some ethnic minorities

remained loyal to the British throughout the occupation and some groups sided with the

Japanese (Akins 2018, 234). This colonial experience and division would eventually

lead to nationalism, minority-majority debates, feelings of resentment and fear and total

exclusion of the Rohingya from public life (Alam 2019). The same sentiments and

tensions are still very much present in Myanmar's society, where they have led to the

ethnic cleansing of 2017 and driven hundreds of thousands of Rohingya out of the

country.

Rakhine State, the state in which the Rohingya primarily live and reside in Myanmar,

is located between Muslim Bangladesh and Buddhist Myanmar. Rakhine State is

considered the second least developed state of Myanmar, which means that the

Rohingya have had to, for instance, compete over jobs with the ethnic Rakhine, the

Buddhist part of Rakhine State, who felt that their jobs and livelihoods were being taken

away. Because Rakhine State has had a long history of foreign invasions and

occupations, ethnic Rakhine felt that the existence of their ethnicity was being

threatened by the Rohingya, who were becoming the largest ethnic group in the state a

few years ago. Consequently, the Rohingya are still labelled as illegal Bengali migrants,

a sentiment which is reinforced by the fact that the Rohingya speak a distinguishable

dialect with connections to the Chittagong region of Bangladesh and are in Islamic faith

(Mithun 2018, 651–652).

British colonialism also had an effect on the issue of ethnicity, since under the

colonial rule people were categorised based on their race and religion. There was an

initial idea that the "indigenous races", in other words monolithic races with imagined

majority, should lead and build the nation. Moreover, the Muslim groups of Arakan (the

name by which Rakhine State used to be known) were either assimilated into the

Burmese majority or seen as a part of the Indian race in British census practice (Hein

29

2018, 366–367). Therefore, it could easily seem as if these groups never existed, or that

they have always been seen as "others" or significantly inferior in comparison to the

majority.

In terms of religion, it has been pointed out that Arab Muslim traders already arrived

in the state of Arakan, or Rakhine, in the seventh century. This means that, even if the

term "Rohingya" did not appear until the 1990s, Muslims have inhabited the area for

centuries. The relationship between the Muslim population and Buddhists has always

been tense, and it significantly deteriorated during the British occupation and after the

Tatmadaw's coup d'état in 1962. The British occupation can be seen to have contributed

to the situation, because during this period significant amounts of Muslims migrated to

the area from Bengal (Bangladesh), which made the religious and ethnic basis of the

region more diverse (Weber and Stanford 2017). In other words, the Islamic religion of

the Rohingya, very much like their race and ethnicity, would make the great majority

of Rakhine State's and Myanmar's population see them as the "other", as something that

threatens the very existence of the majority.

The military would go on to initiate a campaign called Nagamin ("Dragon King") in

February 1978, which drove hundreds of thousands of Rohingya out of the country.

And now, in 2021, the same thing is happening again. The military has once again

seized the power (Amnesty International 2021) and the entire country is on the verge

of a civil war. Unfortunately, this does not come as a surprise. The Tatmadaw is known

for its authoritarianism and its top members' influence in politics, since it is written in

the constitution that the military retains 25 per cent of seats in the parliament, or

Hluttaw (Armao 2015). It could even be said that the state of Myanmar does not have

an army. Rather, the Myanmar army has its own state, which it holds as its playground.

These complexities, ethno-religious tensions and completely distorted political

forces need to be kept in mind and understood, if we ever wish to discuss reconciliation,

democratisation or whichever solution that is brought up. Furthermore, they offer an

explanation to the heinous atrocities, or rather crimes against humanity (Amnesty

International 2017k) and ethnic cleansing (Amnesty International 2018k), which have

been perpetrated against the Rohingya. We will next move on to the empirical analysis

and results. The chapter is divided into three subsections, each of which discusses one

of the research questions.

30

Discussing the illegality, continuity and comprehensive violence of ethnic

cleansing

It perhaps goes without saying that there are many aspects to discuss and bring up when

it comes to the 2017 campaign of ethnic cleansing of the Rohingya. Amnesty

International has also brought up multiple sides to the story in their discussions. This

section will focus on research question 1: “Which aspects of the ethnic cleansing of the

Rohingya in 2017 have been discussed by Amnesty International, and what explains

Amnesty International’s decision to discuss these particular aspects?”. I have divided

these discussions into six categories. The categories are 1) physical violence, 2) damage

done to the physical environment, 3) other forms of oppression, 4) “threats to

democracy”, 5) issues relating to refugee camps and 6) denial of permanent residency.

After having gone through these categories, agenda-setting theory and framing theory

will be used to explain why the decision was made to bring up and discuss these

particular aspects.

Physical violence has, in my opinion unsurprisingly, been discussed and brought up

regularly and in great volume in the articles and reports. In particular, six aspects to

physical violence have been most often discussed. Firstly, torture appears to be a

frequent occurrence. According to Amnesty International’s articles and reports, the

torture is used as a way to extract information about ethnic armed groups, such as the

AA (Amnesty International 2019b, 8).

Secondly, shootings and other unlawful killings are an essential and an obvious part

of the violence used by the Myanmar army to attack the Rohingya. The victims are

overwhelmingly of the civilian population, and the methods used to execute these

civilians range from being burned alive to being beaten to death (Amnesty International

2018h).

Thirdly, sexual violence against men and women has been brought up by Amnesty

International. Sexual violence in this context includes rape, mutilation of and other

forms of violence on the genitalia and touching a woman's body in a humiliating and

an intrusive way without their consent. Although the situation is gradually improving,

understanding sexual violence against boys and men is far too often overlooked or

miscategorised (Sivakumaran 2010). In other words, it is far too rarely discussed. It is

very commendable that Amnesty International has brought up the topic, but for some

reason sexual violence against men is only discussed in the pre-conflict context

31

(Amnesty International 2018h). Based on the reports and articles, sexual violence

against men did not take place during or after the events of 2017. Based on the

knowledge of how the Tatmadaw and the Border Guard Police operate, I find it hard to

believe that sexual violence against men would also not have taken place later. During

the events of 2017 women were frequently gang raped and subjected to humiliating

body searches by the Border Guard Police, but worryingly gender-based violence

against women has also become more frequent in the refugee camps, because due to

the COVID-19 pandemic men are spending more time at home, unemployed, which

has led them to become more physically abusive. Sexual harassment and discrimination

also take place on a regular basis (Amnesty International 2020i).

Fourthly, arbitrary arrests of boys and men in fighting age appear to happen on a

regular basis. According to Amnesty International, the boys and men were arrested and

then tortured in order to extract information about the ethnic armed group AA (2019b,

23). Arbitrary arrests also took place before the events of August 2017, as the security

forces detained boys and men to gather information about the ethnic armed group

ARSA (Amnesty International 2018h). It appears that the arrests were not limited to

boys and men, but elderly people have also been detained. They are, due to their limited

mobility, unable to flee once the military attacks begin, and are therefore left behind as

the soldiers enter the villages. They are then detained, tortured and sometimes killed

(Amnesty International 2019e).

Fifthly, according to Amnesty International, women and girls, at times as young as

fifteen years old, are being abducted. This raises serious concerns of potential rapes and

sexual slavery (Amnesty International 2018b). Men and boys are also subjected to

abductions and enforced disappearances by the military (Amnesty International 2019b).

Forced mass deportation has also been a way to unroot the Rohingya from their

homeland. Relating to forced mass deportation, Amnesty International has voiced

special concern over the situation of and the impact for the elderly people. Many elderly

Rohingya are subjected, or rather have been subjected, to decades of being displaced,

time and time again. This has a particular effect on their healthcare and livelihoods

(Amnesty International 2019d).

Lastly, the organisation has documented and brought up the fact that the Myanmar

army uses forced labour. In one documented case of forced labour an 18-year-old man

and a 14-year-old boy were forced to, for instance, dig trenches (Amnesty International

32

2019i). Another report reveals that the Tatmadaw has forced civilians to transport

military equipment, soldiers and food (Amnesty International 2019b).

Before moving on to the second category, damage done to the physical violence, it

has to pointed out that according to Amnesty International’s articles and reports ethnic

armed groups are also perpetrating physical violence in multiple different forms. For

instance, ethnic armed groups have also used forced labour before and during combat

(Amnesty International 2019b), ARSA has carried out massacres of Hindu children,

women and men, the total death toll being up to at least 99 (Amnesty International

2018f) and ethnic armed groups are strongly involved in drug and arms trade business,

which raises serious concerns over the safety of the refugee camps, as the drug cartels,

run by ethnic armed groups, fight over the control of the camps and civilians are caught

in the middle (Amnesty International 2020j). Next section will discuss e.g. the legal

terminology and the descriptions and the aims of these aspects, as seen by Amnesty

International, in more length. We will next move on to the different aspects of damage

done to the physical environment that have been discussed by the organisation.

When it comes to the different ways in which the physical environment has been

damaged by the conflict and political instability in Rakhine State, throughout the years,

Amnesty International has decided to specifically bring up and discuss four aspects.

These are 1) the scorched earth tactic used by the Myanmar army and security forces,

2) landmines, 3) looting and destruction of property and 4) bulldozing and rebuilding

infrastructure. In this case, a difference between "scorched earth tactics" and "looting

and destruction of properties and homes" was distinguished, even though the latter

would on occasion include the burning of a home. When the burning, looting or

destruction of an individual home, school or a shop was discussed, the latter code was

used. Also, when the looting and destruction (not by burning) of multiple properties

was discussed, it would be coded this way. However, when the deliberate burning of an

entire village or multiple fields, for instance, was discussed, it would be put under

scorched earth tactics.

According to the articles and reports the topic of burned homes and scorched earth

tactics is deemed important, as it is very frequently brought up. Within the discussion

around the scorched earth tactics, special attention was paid to the elderly people who

suffer disproportionately due to their limited mobility, as they are unable to move and

flee (see e.g. Amnesty International 2019e). Also, it was specifically mentioned and

33

discussed that many women are also left to burn to death after being (gang) raped by

the military and security forces (see e.g. Amnesty International 2018h).

Another aspect of environmental damage that has been chosen as a topic of

discussion are the anti-personnel landmines and MM2 type landmines planted by the

military in a civilian area and along the Myanmar-Bangladesh border, where numerous

fleeing Rohingya are trying to cross the border (see e.g. Amnesty International 2017e).

It has also been pointed out that not only is the Tatmadaw using landmines, but ethnic

armed groups are also using landmines in Rakhine State, the home state of the Rohingya

population. In this case, the AA has been reportedly using landmines. However, due to

restricted access to Rakhine State, establishing the provenance of the landmines is not

always possible (Amnesty International 2020k).

The third way in which the physical environment has been damaged by the ethnic

conflict is through looting and destruction of properties and homes. Amnesty

International has reported that during and after the events of August 2017 the Myanmar

army has looted and destroyed cultural and historical properties, such as temples

(Amnesty International 2019c), shrines, mosques and other religious buildings

(Amnesty International 2018e) and have confiscated and stolen Rohingya families’

livestock, firewood, gold, mobile phones, solar electricity panels and food (see e.g.

Amnesty International 2019b). When confiscating Rohingya property, the military has

reportedly been using these properties as temporary bases in Rakhine State and Shan

State (Amnesty International 2020e). It has also been brought up that on occasion

soldiers and security forces personnel would loot and destroy Rohingya owned shops

in order to pressure the individual to accept an NVC card – National Verification Card

– that practically deprives the Rohingya of the right to possess property, cattle, land,

move around freely or do business without prior permission (Amnesty International

2018h). Very concerningly, it is not only the officials that loot and destroy Rohingya

property. It also appears that ethnic Rakhine residents and non-Rohingya villagers are

also actively participating in the looting and destruction of property (Amnesty

International 2018e).

The fourth, and last, aspect of environmental damage chosen as a topic of discussion

is the bulldozing and rebuilding of infrastructure that is taking place in Rakhine State.

The reports reveal that rapid and large-scaled bulldozing of deserted, burned downed

or other ways destroyed Rohingya villages is taking place in Northern Rakhine State.

According to Amnesty International (2018h), the cleared-out spaces are being used to

34

settle non-Rohingya residents to the area, to build so called “model villages”, also

known as NaTaLa villages, and mines, to increase the amount of security presence in

the area and to perhaps destroy evidence of the ethnic cleansing that took place in the

state in 2017. However, the aim of the bulldozing, according to Myanmar officials, is

in fact to accommodate the returning or repatriated Rohingya population and to address

the decade-long under-development and under-investment of the state. We will next

move on the third category, which is “other forms of oppression” faced by the

Rohingya.

When it comes to other forms of oppression, six aspects have been chosen as topics

of discussion. First, the civilian and military authorities of Myanmar are imposing

serious restrictions on humanitarian aid in Rakhine State, Kachin State and Shan State.

This means that the Rohingya, and many other ethnic minorities remaining in these

states, have very limited amounts of food and water, not to mention insufficient

healthcare. According to Amnesty International’s articles and reports, humanitarian

agencies’ operations, especially their travel authorisations, were already tightened prior

to August 2017 (Amnesty International 2017k). and have been heavily limited or non-

existent after the events of August 2017. The situation is not limited to Myanmar, but

the refugee camps in Bangladesh are also struggling to provide adequate amounts of

most basic supplies. In fact, the organisation has repeatedly mentioned that Bangladesh

cannot support the refugee community all by themselves, but rather need the help of

the international community (see e.g. Amnesty International 2017h).

Second, Rohingya children are denied education both in Myanmar and Bangladesh.

In Myanmar, Rohingya children are denied education at basically all possible levels –

primary, secondary and higher education, such as universities. One reason for this,

pointed out by Amnesty International, is that it is forbidden for Muslim children to

attend schools with other ethnicities. Also, due to the heavy restrictions on movement,

it is physically impossible for a Rohingya child to go to school if the schools are located

in another township, as they are not allowed to cross borders of any kind without

documents that can be difficult to obtain. Furthermore, many teachers refuse to teach

in Muslims schools, often referring to security concerns (Amnesty International

2019g). The situation is not better in Bangladesh. The Rohingya children are not

allowed to study in local schools, according to a decision by the Bangladesh

government, the small amount of education available is only suitable for the youngest

children, there is a lack of teachers in the camps, restrictions on movement make it

35

impossible at times to organise lessons and the schools or learning centres do not have

enough or adequate teaching material. Perhaps unsurprisingly, the COVID-19 has had

an effect on the camps’ education system as well. According to Amnesty International,

the pandemic has led to the closing of already existing learning facilities and has

delayed the implementation of the Myanmar curriculum, previously promised for the

refugees (Amnesty International 2020i).

Third, healthcare, or rather the lack of it, is often brought up and discussed. Similarly,

to the lack of education discussed in the previous paragraph, healthcare is also an issue

both in Myanmar and Bangladesh. For the Rohingya in Myanmar, more specifically in

northern Rakhine State, any medical care that goes beyond treating the simplest cases

requires travelling and seeking treatment in Sittwe hospital. However, due to the

restrictions on movement, any Rohingya travelling there requires special permission to

leave their township. This permission is not necessarily granted. Furthermore,

travelling is very expensive, meaning that many Rohingya do not seek treatment due to

limited finances. And, even if they do make it to hospital, they are kept in segregated

Muslim wards, are forced to pay additional and unofficial fees and are not treated

equally to other patients (Amnesty International 2017m). The situation in the refugee

camps of Bangladesh is not better. In the camps the Rohingya are facing difficulties

seeking and finding treatment outside the camps, the camps’ medical centres are

seriously under-equipped when it comes to treating “non-basic conditions” and

supplying medication (not to mention that the medication is very expensive, so many

refugees have to resort to the black market to get their medication), they are difficult to

reach with limited mobility, the waiting times are long and there are far too few of them.

When it comes to healthcare, Amnesty International has paid special attention to how

the problematic situation effects the elderly, as they many times depend on others due

to their limited mobility and often have less money to use on healthcare than younger,

working refugees (Amnesty International 2019d).

Fourth, the decision to discuss hunger and forced starvation is often made, when it

comes to the reports and articles. Hunger and forced starvation, just as the lack of

education and health care, are also taking place both in Myanmar and in Bangladesh.

In Myanmar, the Myanmar army uses forced starvation as a tactic of war, and it is

implemented through e.g. withholding food supplies such as rice, denying access to or

expropriating farmland, burning of or denying access to markets and looting of

livestock (Amnesty International 2018h). The situation is similarly bad in the refugee

36

camps. Reportedly, the refugees are surviving on rations of rice, oil and lentils.

However, they do not have access to fresh meat or fish, for instance. Certain vegetables

and spices are also excluded from the rations or unavailable in general, which means

that the refugees are unable to prepare traditional dishes. This, in consequence, means

that they are being estranged from their culture, which can cause serious damage to the

refugees' physical and mental well-being. Regarding the food distributions, problems

have also been reported in adding new people to the official food rationing systems.

According to the reports, this has serious effects on people with disabilities and the

elderly, because they are very much dependent on others to collect their daily or weekly

food rations due to their limited mobility. Moreover, these groups tend to have less

finances at their disposal, which means that they might have to choose between

medication and food (Amnesty International 2019g).

Fifth, according to Amnesty International the Rohingya population is suffering from

segregation and discrimination. Before moving on to the segregation and discrimination

of the Rohingya taking place in Myanmar and in Bangladesh, these terms need to be

defined. In this context, I understand segregation as something that physically prevents

the Rohingya from being an active part of society. For example, by placing and

confining them to certain areas, where they are physically kept apart from the rest of

the population by barbed wire and security checkpoints, they are being segregated.

Discrimination, on the other hand, is understood as preventing the Rohingya from

enjoying "the full rights of a human being", such as access to healthcare, freedom of

religion or not being more susceptible to corruption than another group.

It is extremely clear that the Rohingya population is being segregated from the rest

of the population. The government of Myanmar has completely isolated two entire

communities in the aftermath of violent clashes between the Buddhist and Muslim

communities of Rakhine State in 2012, where access to and from the area was entirely

controlled by military checkpoints. Five years later, over 100 000 Rohingyas were still

living in displacement camp areas in Rakhine State, where they are segregated from the

rest of the country with barbed wire fences (Amnesty International 2017m). Another

example of segregation are the previously mentioned hospitals’ isolated or segregated

Muslim wards, into which the Rohingya are placed when receiving medical treatment.

Amnesty International has also been very active in reminding us of the

discrimination faced by the Rohingya. Very much like e.g. Hague (2017), Pantea

(2019), Parashar and Alam (2019) and Sahana, Jahangir and Anisujjaman (2019),

37

Amnesty International has also discussed how devastating the effects of the 1982

Citizenship Law are, how the Rohingyas’ Muslim religion is used to discriminate them

in nearly all aspects of life and how the elderly and women face discrimination when it

comes to refugee camp administration. Regarding camp administration, it is revealed

that in community meetings women's representation is highly discriminatory and

disproportionate, with only one or two women participating in the meetings (the

number of invited men was 50) (Amnesty International 2020i). We will look at the

discussion surrounding the law, the religious discrimination and discrimination

surrounding camp administration more closely when answering research question 2 in

the next section.

Last, Amnesty International has decided to mention the restrictions on movement

and the restricted access to the internet. As previously written, the restrictions on

movement are in place both in Myanmar and in Bangladesh. They affect the Rohingya

population’s ability to seek employment, to educate themselves, to seek healthcare and

all in all enjoy their full citizen rights. More precise descriptions by Amnesty

International will be provided in the next sections. The restricted access to the internet

in Myanmar and Bangladesh is also a great concern to the organisation. According to

the articles and reports, such as Amnesty International 2019f and 2020h, this is causing

the Rohingya to miss out on life-saving information about the COVID-19 pandemic,

makes it more difficult for human rights organisations to monitor the situation in

Myanmar, means that the refugees’ freedom of expression is compromised and that

studying and getting in touch with family in case of emergency is more difficult. We

will also come back to this topic in the next section.

I have named the fourth category as “threats to democracy”. It goes without saying

that physical violence and segregation do not have a part in democracy or democratic

societies, but there are many aspects to the conflict, discussed by Amnesty

International, that do not physically affect the Rohingya but prevent them from

enjoying certain democratic rights. In the case of the Rohingya and the ethnic conflict

of Myanmar, Amnesty International has chosen to discuss four aspects that threaten the

democratic rights of the Muslim minority. These are 1) corruption, 2) impunity of the

Myanmar army, security forces and the Border Guard Police, 3) press freedom and the

freedom of speech and 4) business and military connections. Here, I must further

explain my decision to include business and military connections in this category. The

decision to categorise these connections as threats to democracy was made, as I

38

consider it a profound part of democracy that political power and influence be divided

and shared. No party, whether a company or a government, should have exceedingly

high amounts of influence on all aspects of life. Furthermore, certain companies have

been proven to have funded the Myanmar army (see e.g. Amnesty International 2020l),

in other words, perpetrators of crimes against humanity. Business and military

connections that enable such atrocities to continue are a threat to democracy.

It appears that the Rohingya population faces corruption and is forced to pay

unofficial fees almost everywhere they go, no matter what they do. For instance, in

hospital they are subjected to unofficial fees (allegedly for protection), on township

borders Border Guard Police officers demand bribes and if the Rohingya are caught

praying together they are forced to pay unofficial fines, unless they want to get detained

(Amnesty International 2017m).

Impunity also appears to be a serious enough problem in Myanmar, as Amnesty

International has decided to discuss it on a regular basis. It is common knowledge that

the military controls its own judicial processes, which easily explains the impunity that

extends all the way to the top ranks of the military and security forces (see e.g. Amnesty

International 2018h).

The third aspect of this category is press freedom and freedom of speech, which in

Myanmar is practically non-existent. We will also come back to this topic in a later

chapter, but at this point it could be mentioned that arresting and detaining independent

journalists has happened on more than one occasion (see e.g. Amnesty International

2017d).

Finally, before moving on to the next category, business and military connections

should be mentioned. It was revealed and brought to attention by Amnesty International

that Myanmar Economic Holdings Limited (MEHL), from which many members of the

Tatmadaw receive huge revenues, is actively doing business with multiple international

companies. These companies range from the Japanese beer company Kirin Holdings to

the South Korean steelmaker POSCO and Wanbao Mining, which is a Chinese metal

mining company. It is important to point out that these companies are only a few

examples discussed by the human rights organisation (see e.g. Amnesty International

2020g).

The second to last category which will be discussed is “issues relating to the refugee

camps”. In this category we find some aspects to the conflict that are very much related

to and limited to the refugee camps. Specifically, Amnesty International has decided to

39

bring up the poor sanitary conditions of the camps, the unsafety of the camps and the

environmental hazards that threaten the camps.

All these aspects will be returned to in the next section, but in summary, the issues

in sanitation are numerous. First, the number of facilities is too low and they are not

properly maintained. Second, the facilities are located in places that are difficult to

reach, especially with limited mobility. Third, the lighting on the pathways to the

facilities is insufficient, which can lead to accidents, such as broken wrists. Fourth,

especially older women had revealed to Amnesty International that they cannot use the

facilities due to lack of privacy. Last, due to the poor condition of sanitation facilities,

the drinking water in the camps is not safe, but contaminated with bacteria such as E-

Coli (see e.g. Amnesty International 2020c; 2020j).

According to the articles and reports, the unsafety of the camps is a consequence of

violent clashes between armed criminal gangs, fighting over the control of illicit trade

of contraband drugs inside the camps. Rather worryingly, there are also reports of

extrajudicial killings of the Rohingya, the number of victims being over a hundred, by

members of law enforcement agencies between August 2017 and July 2020 (Amnesty

International 2020i).

The last aspect of this category, discussed by organisation, was the environmental

hazards that threaten the camps. In summary, the weather conditions in the camps are

hazardous and challenging. The camps are vulnerable to flooding, severe winds and

extreme heat, to mention a few examples. Also, the shelters of the Rohingya are deemed

flimsy, which means that they cannot withstand heavy rain and severe wind.

Furthermore, the camps suffer from overcrowding. The decision to include

overcrowding in this category was done based on two arguments: firstly, when

overcrowding occurs, the housing needs to be expanded on terrain that is perhaps not

that safe for shelters or buildings in general, such as too close to water or on hilly terrain.

Moreover, when shelters are needed to build within small spaces, quickly, the materials

and techniques used are once again perhaps not the safest options. Secondly,

overcrowding, I would argue, has an effect on the sanitary conditions. The more people

are crammed into small areas, the easier it is for infectious diseases to spread. And

unfortunately, according to the reports, the camps are severely overcrowded (Amnesty

International 2018i).

Before looking at the possible reasons behind Amnesty International’s decision to

bring up these particular aspects of the conflict by going back to agenda-setting theory

40

and framing theory discussed in the section “Theoretical framework – agenda-setting

theory and framing theory” we will look at the final category. I have titled this category

as “denial of permanent residency”. This title was chosen as a result of the fact that,

due to various reasons, the Rohingya are facing difficulties being able to settle down

and set up permanent residences both in Myanmar and in other countries.

Unfortunately, the COVID-19 pandemic has forced many Rohingya out of their

homes and into exile. The pandemic has given the general public and the governments

of Myanmar and Bangladesh a reason to try to force the Rohingya out of their countries

and to seek asylum elsewhere in Southeast Asia, as they are deemed dirty, dangerous

and infectious. Forced to leave by using waterways, multiple countries like Malaysia,

Thailand and Bangladesh are using the pandemic as an excuse to stop the Rohingya

from seeking asylum in their countries by not allowing the boats transporting the

refugees to embark on their shores. Moreover, some of the boats have also been actively

pushed back at sea (see e.g. Amnesty International 2020c). Consequently, hundreds and

hundreds of Rohingya have been left stranded at sea for months, in addition to tens of

people having lost their lives at sea. Needless to say, the refugees who have been

rescued from their journey have been severely malnourished and dehydrated.

Another aspect that makes settling down and setting up permanent residence difficult

for the Rohingya are the possible repatriations to Myanmar and relocations in

Bangladesh. In particular, it is frequently mentioned and reminded in the reports and

articles of Amnesty International that any possible repatriations need to meet three

criteria: they need to be voluntary, safe and dignified. Because human rights violations

are still taking place in Myanmar, no Rohingya refugee should be forced to go back or

have to return to living conditions that are systematically discriminative and

segregative, according to the organisation.

The living conditions for the repatriated refugees in Myanmar could mean that they

face continuing violence, do not literally have a home or a house to live in (a

consequence of the bulldozing and scorched earth tactics used during the 2017

campaign of ethnic cleansing) and might have to live in an area with an increased

security forces presence (e.g. Amnesty International 2018e).

The possible relocation of the Rohingya has also been met with caution.

Demonstrably, the relocation of the refugees to an uninhabitable island of Bhashan Char

was well underway in 2020 (Amnesty International 2020m; Human Rights Watch

2020). However, the plans were already drafted in 2017 and the island has been known

41

to be vulnerable to flooding from the very beginning. It goes without saying that forcing

refugees to live in such hazardous conditions far away from the mainland carries a lot

of risks, and could mean that humanitarian assistance does not reach the refugees in

need (Amnesty International 2017n). We will also come back to this category in the

next section.

Now, before moving on to the more precise descriptions of these previously

discussed aspects, we must go back to agenda-setting theory in order to understand why

Amnesty International has decided to discuss these particular aspects. In the theoretical

section it was written that agenda-setting is "the creation of public awareness and

concern of salient issues by the news media". Theoretically speaking it has two main

assumptions. First, the press and the media rather filter and shape reality than reflect it

(University of Twente 2003/2004, 104). In other words, certain aspects of events are

deliberately left out, whereas others are deliberately brought up. Second, when the

media focuses on particular issues, the general public begins to consider these issues as

more important (University of Twente 2003/2004, 104). This is the core idea and basis

of this study. Amnesty International has an agenda and certain interests which they want

to “push forward” and advocate for. This is why decisions are made to discuss e.g. child

rights, torture and the legal aspects of the conflict. It needs to be kept in mind that

agenda-setting theory sees that the attention received by an issue in itself carries the

effect, rather than how this issue is portrayed.

Armed conflict, child rights, corporate responsibility, detention, disappearances,

discrimination, freedom of speech, international justice, living in dignity, refugees,

asylum seekers and migrants, sexual rights, torture, United Nations, The Universal

Declaration of Human Rights. These are all aspects to the 2017 campaign of ethnic

cleansing mentioned and discussed in the news articles and reports. They are also all

listed as Amnesty International’s interests under “what we do” on their website

amnesty.org. Children’s rights are discussed, in particular when education is discussed.

Corporate responsibility was brought up in the context of business and military

connections. Detention and disappearances were discussed and mentioned as parts of

the physical violence and other forms of oppression perpetrated and continued prior to

and throughout the ethnic cleansing of 2017. The discrimination of the Rohingya

population as a whole is emphasised and proven in nearly every article and report. In

addition, special attention was paid to the discrimination faced by women, older people

and people with disabilities. It is made very clear that the freedom of speech in

42

Myanmar is practically non-existent, and that has been the case for a long period of

time. International justice could be described as one of the cornerstones of Amnesty

International’s work, as the illegality of the atrocities and the living conditions is

emphasised on a regular basis in the articles and reports (we will look at the legal

definitions in length in the next section). The undignified living conditions in Myanmar

and Bangladesh are also emphasised in many ways, as it could be argued that being

forced to starve, being denied permission to leave home and to work and not being able

to use safe and functioning sanitation facilities takes away the foundations of a dignified

life. The sexual rights of Rohingya women are blatantly disrespected and ignored, as

the Myanmar army and the security forces perpetrated widespread sexual violence in

the forms of gang rapes and intrusive body searches. As will be revealed in a later

section, the UN is frequently referred to, in particular when it comes to solving the

conflict. Lastly, The Universal Declaration of Human Rights is the declaration that the

right to education for instance, which is strongly advocated for by Amnesty

International, is based on.

Cappella and Jamieson (1997, 45) have written that salience and selection emphasise

that framing does not only include that which is made noticeable, but also that which

has been left out or is treated as secondary, or less. If we look at the the interests of

Amnesty International and the aspects of the ethnic cleansing brought up by the

organisation, what is largely missing is police violence, indigenous peoples, the death

penalty, climate change and arms control. Although, it has to be pointed out that the

death penalty is mentioned when it comes to the rights of the Rohingya men, who are

being suspected of murder in a Bangladesh refugee camps (this case will be further

discussed in the next section) and arms control is a part of the solutions suggested,

which will be discussed in an upcoming section. The fact that these aspects are missing,

however, does not necessarily mean that the issues of climate change or indigenous

peoples would be less important than international justice or sexual rights, for instance.

It could just mean that these missing aspects are not a part of the ethnic conflict.

To summarise, in this case the presumption of agenda-setting theory that the interests

of an operator and the attention given to these interests are in correlation can be

confirmed. As far as framing theory goes, the decision to bring up these particular

aspects of the ethnic cleansing paints a picture of a conflict that is defined by illegality,

comprehensiveness and continuity. Therefore, the frames that can be identified from

43

the articles and reports are the frame of illegality, the frame of comprehensiveness and

the frame of continuity.

Descriptions of illegalities, failure and concern In this section we will discuss and focus on research question 2: “How are these

aspects of the ethnic cleansing being discussed by Amnesty International, and what

explains Amnesty International’s decision to discuss the aspects in their particular

ways?”. We will first go through the six categories identified in the previous section,

in the same order as they were discussed in the previous section, after which we will

go back to framing theory and agenda-setting theory to answer the question why

Amnesty International has made the decision to use these particular descriptions in

their articles and reports.

The first category identified in analysis section 1 was “physical violence”. When it

came to physical violence, Amnesty International has decided to discuss and bring up

the following forms of physical violence: 1) torture, 2) shootings and other unlawful

killings, 3) sexual violence towards men and women, 4) arbitrary arrests, 5) abductions,

enforced disappearances, forced mass deportations, 6) forced labour and 7) physical

violence perpetrated by ethnic armed groups.

When discussing torture, Amnesty International has pointed out that the actions of

the Myanmar army, security forces and the Border Guard Police in fact amount to the

war crime of torture. According to the organisation, the infliction of severe physical

pain, mental pain or suffering when it is aimed at “obtaining information or a

confession, punishment intimidation or coercion or for any reason based on

discrimination of any kind”, when in connection with an armed conflict, amounts to

this crime under international law (Amnesty International 2019b, 24). In many cases,

the torture would go on for days and weeks, the methods of torture were constantly

changing and the torture was deliberate, as its aim was to specifically extract

information about the ethnic armed groups ARSA and the AA (see e.g. Amnesty

International 2018h). Furthermore, the organisation has pointed out that caning, to

which Rohingya refuges have been subjected to in Malaysia, violates international

human rights laws. Accordingly, the organisation states that all corporate punishments

are prohibited, as they violate the absolute prohibition of torture and other forms of

44

cruel, inhumane, or degrading punishments that often amount to torture (Amnesty

International 2020f).

When it comes to shootings and other forms of unlawful killings, Amnesty

International has described the actions and killings of the Tatmadaw and the security

forces as wide-ranging, widespread, systematic, indiscriminate and extrajudicial. All in

all, they amount to war crimes and the crime against humanity of “murder”. The

organisation points out that “the right not to be arbitrarily deprived of life is a

peremptory norm of international law”, and no derogation is permissible, under any

circumstances. Furthermore, international human rights standards state that when a

person dies in custody, impartial, prompt and independent investigations must be

conducted. However, this has not happened in Myanmar (Amnesty International 2019b,

27), which makes the situation all the more illegal.

Regarding sexual violence, the systematic, widespread and pervasive nature of the

sexual violence was pointed out by Amnesty International. According to the

organisation, sexual violence was an integral part of the campaign of ethnic cleansing,

aimed at driving the Rohingya population into exile. Once again, the illegality of the

actions was also emphasised. The organisation states that rape is a form of gender-based

violence and as such constitutes to discrimination, which is forbidden under

international law, and in this case the crimes of the crime against humanity of torture,

war crimes and the crime against humanity of rape and other forms of sexual violence

were also perpetrated (Amnesty International 2018h, 90).

According to Amnesty International, the arbitrary arrests and detentions that took

place before and during the ethnic cleansing may amount to enforced disappearances

under international law. Enforced disappearances, when committed as a part of a

systematic and widespread attack on civilian population, also constitute crimes against

humanity. To further back up the suitability of the term arbitrary arrest, Amnesty

International quotes The UN Working Group on Arbitrary Attention when defining the

moment when detention becomes arbitrary (Amnesty International 2018h, 27). In my

opinion, this demonstrates that when it comes to discussing events, and defining these

events that are under discussion, Amnesty International wishes to link themselves, their

work and their interests to the international community, from governments to criminal

courts and other human rights organisations, to increase the credibility of their work

and make their work more visible to these organisations. This makes sense, as agenda-

setting suggests that the visibility of the issue in itself, rather than how it is discussed,

45

carries out the effect. We will come back to this theme at the end of this section.

Abductions and forced mass deportations also constitute to crimes against humanity

under international law, according to the organisation. It is stated that in armed conflict

all parties must take measures to account for persons who are reported missing, as a

result of conflict, and information on missing persons must be provided to family

members (Amnesty International 2019b, 26). Due to the pervasive nature of the sexual

violence perpetrated before and during the ethnic cleansing, the abductions of young

girls and women raise serious concerns of rape and sexual slavery (Amnesty

International 2018b).

Forced labour, according to Amnesty International, is a practice that dates back

decades in the case of Myanmar (Amnesty International 2019b). This emphasises the

fact that the ethnic tensions have been boiling in the region for decades, and the conflict

can only be described as a pro-longed ethnic conflict. To go back to legal terminology,

forced labour whether paid or unpaid, is a contravention of humanitarian law and a

violation of customary international law (Amnesty International 2019b).

Before moving on to the next category, we must discuss the violence perpetrated by

ethnic armed groups. The organisation has stated that ethnic armed groups, such as

ARSA, have also committed murders, large scale massacres and severe violations of

human rights. The violations by these groups are just as condemnable as the atrocities

perpetrated by the Myanmar army (see e.g. Amnesty International 2018g). In my

opinion, this is an important part of the approach of Amnesty International and very

descriptive of their work, in a sense. Human rights apply to all humans, and they need

to be respected by all humans. Being a target persecution and violence does not, under

international law at least, justify similar actions and “returning the favour”. Amnesty

International makes this very clear by choosing to discuss the violations perpetrated by

the Rohingya population as well. However, it is extremely important to remember that

ARSA, or any other ethnic armed group for that matter, is not representative of the

Rohingya community or the wider community. The members of these armed groups are

exceptions and are in no way comparable to non-members.

The second category identified in the previous section was “damage done to the

physical environment”. In this category the scorched earth tactics, landmines, looting

and destruction of properties and homes and bulldozing and rebuilding infrastructure

were discussed.

46

The first aspect of environmental damage was the scorched earth tactic, used by the

Myanmar military and the security forces throughout the campaign of ethnic cleansing.

When it comes to the descriptions of this tactic, they have included 1) systematic, 2)

widespread, 3) consistent in methods, 4) carried out with persistent determination and

level of planning and oversight, 5) targeted, 6) deliberate and 7) organised. The

systematic, thoroughly planned, targeted and deliberate nature of this violence is

obvious to Amnesty International, as reportedly the military would on occasion issue

warnings to certain villages, before arriving and setting the villages ablaze.

Furthermore, how could the events be described as anything else because the damage

was always limited to Rohingya villages, and it is easy to see that the fires were always

started with similar methods? (Amnesty International 2018h). According to the

organisation, by uprooting people by deliberately destroying homes and belongings, in

addition to forcing them into exile, the authorities are committing a wide range of

human rights violations. These include “violations of the rights to adequate housing;

to an adequate standard of living more generally; to education, particularly for

children; and to work—all provided within the International Covenant on Economic,

Social and Cultural Rights, which Myanmar ratified in early October, even as its

soldiers continued to burn Rohingya homes”. (Amnesty International 2018h, 37). The

point is well summarised by a pull quote, found in a news article, which says:

”The evidence is irrefutable – the Myanmar security forces are setting northern

Rakhine State ablaze in a targeted campaign to push the Rohingya people out of

Myanmar. Make no mistake: this is ethnic cleansing. “ (Amnesty International 2017g).

Similarly, to the scorched earth tactics discussed in the previous paragraph, the use of

landmines has also been deemed and described as targeted, systematic and

widespread. It is also callous, as the following pull quotes suggest:

“This is another low in what is already a horrific situation in Rakhine State. The

Myanmar military’s callous use of inherently indiscriminate and deadly weapons at

highly trafficked paths around the border is putting the lives of ordinary people at

enormous risk.” (Amnesty International 2017e).

“All indications point to the Myanmar security forces deliberately targeting locations

that Rohingya refugees use as crossing points. This a cruel and callous way of adding

47

to the misery of people fleeing a systematic campaign of persecution.” (Amnesty

International 2017f).

Once again emphasising the illegality of the technique of warfare, it is stated that due

to the deliberate manner in which the landmines have been placed along the border

area that is used by the fleeing Rohingya, as a part of a widespread and systematic

attack on the entire Rohingya population, the deaths that have occurred as a

consequence of these landmines qualify as the crime against humanity of murder.

Moreover, the causing of severe injuries by these landmines also falls under the

crimes against humanity of “other inhumane acts of a similar character intentionally

causing great suffering, or serious injury to body or to mental or physical health”

(Amnesty International 2018h, 100).

When it comes to the looting and destruction of properties and homes, the action has

been described by Amnesty International as regularly occurring, indiscriminate and

reckless, in addition to illegal in many ways. The regularity of these actions is based on

the fact that the military regularly confiscate and destroy civilian property, afterwards

using the properties as temporary bases. These actions can also be deemed

indiscriminate and reckless in the sense that by indiscriminately and recklessly firing

at civilians, many properties and homes end up being destroyed. However, at the same

time these actions can be seen as targeted violence, as the buildings that are targeted for

destruction tend to be mosques and other religious monuments (see e.g. Amnesty

International 2018e). In other words, the looting and destruction of homes and

properties can in a way be seen as a measure that aims at restricting and suppressing

the religious identity of the Rohingya, which is an obvious violation of human rights,

as it violates the freedom of religion. When it comes to destruction of cultural property,

Amnesty International has written as follows: “while the organization has not been able

to determine who was responsible for the attacks, by basing themselves close to the

monuments, the Myanmar army exposed historical and cultural property to destruction

and damage, which violates international humanitarian law” (Amnesty International

2019c).

In addition, because the looting and destruction of properties and homes that took

place in the context of an ongoing attack against the Muslim minority, it may also

constitute the crime against humanity of apartheid. In particular, the actions taken by

the government of Myanmar could be seen as part of policies “designed and

48

implemented to further entrench the institutionalised regime of systematic oppression

and domination” of the minority group (Amnesty International 2018e, 23).

Lastly, it is stated by the organisation that pillage is forbidden under international

law, and it is in this case seen by the organisation as a war crime. Accordingly,

intentionally targeting historic monuments, provided they are not military objectives,

is also a war crime under international law (Amnesty International 2019b).

Before moving on to the next category, we have yet to discuss the bulldozing and

rebuilding of infrastructure in northern Rakhine State. Amnesty International has

described this change in the state by using three terms: frenetic, dramatic and alarming.

The pace in which the change has taken place was described as frenetic and dramatic,

but the change has also been dramatic in scale and in the increase of security presence.

There are four reasons, why this change is also seen as alarming. First, there is a

possibility that the government is trying to destroy evidence of military crimes. Second,

it is possible that the government is also trying to accommodate even further security

presence to the region. Third, the eradication of Rohingya homes and possible

relocation of other ethnicities to the region might make the repatriations of the

Rohingya population virtually impossible, as they will not have homes to come back

to. Fourth, due to the increased security presence and the construction of “transit

centres” the organisation has voiced concerns over potentially continuing restrictions

on movement (Amnesty International 2018e). Legally speaking, the organisation has

pointed out that as these actions are being perpetrated knowingly, as a part of the

systematic and widespread attack on the Rohingya population, they constitute the crime

against humanity of deportation or forcible transfer of population (Ibid., 113) as well

as the crime against humanity of apartheid.

The third category identified in the previous section was “other forms of oppression”.

The first aspect of this category was denying humanitarian aid. Humanitarian workers

have faced significant impediments to their ability to continue their work, and

humanitarian aid is unfortunately not only restricted in Rakhine State, but also in

Kachin State and Shan State. According to Amnesty International, these restrictions are

a part of the Myanmar army’s “four cuts” strategy, which is designed to deprive ethnic

armed groups of food, funds, intelligence and new recruits. This is done by imposing

measures that punish the wider population. As the Tatmadaw is willfully impeding the

delivery of relief supplies, in other words using starvation of civilians as a method of

warfare, the denial of humanitarian aid in this case constitutes a war crime (Amnesty

49

International 2019b, 32). In the words of the organisation, “these restrictions show a

callous disregard for human life and must end immediately” (Amnesty International

2017j).

The second aspect brought up in this category was the extensive and systematic

denial of education (Amnesty International 2019g), which is taking place both in

Myanmar and Bangladesh. Rohingya children are deprived of education on all levels,

which clearly violates humanitarian laws, such as the right to education and the rights

of children in general. According to the reports, the military is in the habit of

confiscating schools and using them as military objectives. Therefore, these actions

violate international humanitarian laws, as “the protection of schools under general

provisions on the protection of civilian objects and the specific provision on cultural

property including buildings dedicated to education” is recognised under international

law (Amnesty International 2019b, 30). In other words, schools should not, under any

circumstances, be used to support military efforts.

Additionally, all parties to a conflict must take into consideration the special

protections accorded to children under international humanitarian law. As the Myanmar

military uses education facilities for military purposes, putting the life and physical

safety of children at risk, in addition to restricting their access to education, Myanmar

is violating its obligations under the Convention on the Rights of the Child and the

International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (Amnesty

International 2019b, 30). All in all, it is our responsibility to ensure that Rohingya

children receive education. Otherwise, they will be facing a hopeless future, in which

they are at risk of drugs, smuggling and a lifetime of poverty, just to mention a few

examples.

Denying access to healthcare was also brought up by Amnesty International. It

appears that the Rohingya population is lacking adequate healthcare, once again, both

in Myanmar and Bangladesh. The organisation states that in Myanmar the lack of

healthcare is largely due to the discriminatory restrictions on movement, which means

that the Rohingya are not necessarily allowed to, for instance, cross township borders

to reach medical facilities or clinics. The ongoing policies of segregation mean that

once in hospital, the Rohingya are put in segregated Muslim wards (Amnesty

International 2017m, 60), where they face poor treatment and are subjected to unofficial

fees (these issues were mentioned in the previous section).

50

In Bangladesh, due to the COVID-19 pandemic, the conditions of the Rohingya have

exacerbated. The situation was bad even before the pandemic, as it was pointed out in

the previous section, but now the refugees struggle to access healthcare due to e.g.

language barriers, ill-treatment from medical staff and lack of access to information

about the available healthcare services. Not only do these issues need to be fixed, but

improving the referral system, the inaccessibility of medical facilities and the

conditions of these facilities in general is essential (Amnesty International 2019g). In

particular, the treatment and the viewpoint of older people should be taken into

consideration (Amnesty International 2019d).

It is reminded by the organisation that there are international laws on the right to

health, which require that “health care facilities, goods, and services be available in

sufficient quantity; be accessible to everyone without discrimination, which includes

affordability, information accessibility, and physical accessibility, such as for older

people and people with disabilities; be accessible to all persons, that is, respectful of

medical ethics and culturally appropriate; and be of good quality” (Amnesty

International 2019d, 45). It is obvious that at the moment these international laws are

not being respected and met, neither in Myanmar nor in Bangladesh.

When it comes to the forced starvation in Myanmar and to the inadequate and

insufficient food and water in Bangladesh, the situation is described as unjustifiable and

deliberate. According to the organisation, the Tatmadaw is deliberately causing acute

food insecurity, hence making forced starvation a part of the campaign of ethnic

cleansing, forcing the Rohingya population to flee (Amnesty International 2018b;

2018c). Legally speaking, the government of Bangladesh on the other hand is falling

short of its obligation to ensure the right to food and to sufficient and safe water, which

is guaranteed under the ICESCR for the refugees within the camps (Amnesty

International 2019g, 32).

The organisation has also pointed out that especially the rights of older refugees,

with respect to adequate food and water, as well as to physical and mental health, have

been undermined. Their unequal access to food and water, not to mention the lack of

effective actions to address it, falls short of humanitarian principles of inclusivity and

non-discrimination (Amnesty International 2019d, 51). As written in the previous

section, older people and people with disabilities are seen to have unequal access to

food due to their limited mobility, which means that they must often rely on other

people to collect their food rations. Moreover, because these groups tend to have less

51

money at their disposal, they might on occasion have to choose between medication

and food.

All in all, depriving people of food and other life-sustaining provisions is an obvious

violation of the human right to adequate food, “provided inter alia in Article 11 of the

International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR), whilst also

having a potentially serious negative impact on the right to health, guaranteed by Article

12 of the ICESCR, which Myanmar ratified in 2017”. As this forced starvation is being

inflicted knowingly, as a part of the widespread and systematic attack on the Muslim

minority, it constitutes the crimes against humanity of persecution on racial or ethnic

grounds and of “other inhumane acts of a similar character intentionally causing great

suffering, or serious injury to body or to mental or physical health”. As the actions are

designed to force the Rohingya population out of their homes, they also constitute the

crime against humanity of deportation or forcible transfer of population (Amnesty

International 2018h, 102–103).

When the segregation and discrimination are discussed, the message is quite

unambiguous. According to Amnesty International, the Rohingya are living in a

dehumanising system of institutionalised discrimination, oppression and segregation

that amounts to the crime against humanity of apartheid. The Rohingya population has

faced consistent, repetitious and pro-longed applications of policies of racial

segregation, which are prohibited under international humanitarian law. These include

the before mentioned restrictions on movement, forced starvation, denial of education

and healthcare, as well as attacks on the freedom of religion (as discussed previously,

if the Rohingya worship together they risk being arrested, and have already had

mosques and religious buildings destroyed on a large scale). It is reminded by the

organisation that the freedom of thought, conscience and religion is written in

international humanitarian law (Amnesty International 2017m).

The Muslim minority also faces discrimination in Bangladesh. In Bangladesh

women and older women in particular are excluded from decision-making. Their

representation is highly disproportionate and discriminatory in community meetings,

which are highly dominated by men. Additionally, as mentioned before, the Covid-19

pandemic has increased the amount of domestic violence faced by women, which has

widened the gap of inequality between women and men even further (Amnesty

International 2019d; 2020e).

52

The final forms of oppression, brought up and discussed by Amnesty International,

were the restrictions on movement, of which we have already discussed before, and the

internet blackouts taking place in Rakhine State and in the refugee camps. There is a

high amount of Rohingya refugees living in Myanmar’s displacement camps, from

which it is difficult to leave, with some individuals being confined for years. The

organisation states that confining members of the Muslim minority to these camps,

without any legal basis or legitimate justification, amounts to arbitrary deprivation of

the right to liberty, which is a violation of international human rights law and standards

(Amnesty International 2017m). This is all a part of a larger formalised system of

abusive control established and enforced by the state that has led to the Rohingya

population living in a ghetto-like existence, whilst also being at risk of ongoing and

deepening poverty and deprivation, and that has robbed the minority members of their

dignity (Ibid., 13; 42; 94).

The ongoing restrictions on access to the internet and telecommunications, on the

other hand, severely limit “their right to seek urgent protection for sexual and gender-

based violence, receive prompt and reliable information about COVID-19 and

communicate with family members on phone”. Moreover, it clearly violates their

freedom of expression (Amnesty International 2020h, 9), in addition to making it more

difficult for human rights organisations and other actors to monitor their situation and

living conditions. We will next move on to the fourth category “threats to democracy”.

When it comes to corruption, the viewpoint of Amnesty International is summarised

in a sub-heading found in Amnesty International 2018b: “Systematic theft from fleeing

Rohingya”. According to the organisation, this systematic theft is depriving the fleeing

population of the little wealth they can carry, adding insult to injury. To make the

situation even worse, some refugees described having their photographs taken and, in

a few cases, having been recorded on video saying that the military had not mistreated

them (Amnesty International 2018b). When discussing the inevitable, unofficial fees at

town borders, the organisation even goes as far as to say that their research reveals that

the checkpoints’ only function appears to be demanding and receiving bribes from

fleeing and travelling Rohingya (Amnesty International 2017m, 47). This tactic of

routinely occurring extortion also has a more serious effect on an individual Rohingya

in the long term, not just as in individual loss of money, because they are many times

unable to pay the extremely high amounts of money required, which than puts the

Rohingya at risk of arbitrary arrests and detention (Amnesty International 2018h, 30),

53

which we previously identified as a crime against humanity that can continue for days

and weeks.

As far as ensuring the accountability of army soldiers, BGP officers and the security

forces goes, the vast majority of violations have been committed with total, far

extending and ongoing impunity. In the words of Amnesty International, the previous

investigations into the atrocities and crimes committed have completely lacked

independence, impartiality and competence (Amnesty International 2018m).

Furthermore, when it comes to future investigations, there is real and justified concern

that the bulldozing and rebuilding of the infrastructure discusses earlier will destroy the

evidence of these atrocities and crimes (Amnesty International 2018e).

The organisation states that the civilian-led government at the time showed its

unwillingness and inability to stand up to the Tatmadaw when it came to ensuring

accountability for human rights violations in Rakhine State and elsewhere in the

country (Amnesty International 2018h, 24). It goes without saying that in the current

situation, where the country is at brink of civil war, the situation is very unlikely to have

changed. All in all, the authorities in Myanmar cannot be trusted to investigate these

crimes, violations and atrocities (Amnesty International 2018m). This could be

interpreted as a call for outsider investigations, but countries like China that are for

instance using their veto power in The United Nations Security Council and are voting

down The United Nations Human Rights Council’s resolutions are not helping the

situation and are only preserving this impunity (Amnesty International 20170o).

Before moving on to the last threat to democracy, business and military connections,

we have yet to discuss the freedom of speech, freedom of press and freedom of

expression that has for years been in decline. And in this case, Amnesty International

has had a lot to say. According to the articles and reports the situation is extremely

alarming, and there have been disturbing surges in number of people being arrested for

critising the government and the military. The laws that are used to to justify these

arrests are incompatible with international human rights laws and standards (Amnesty

International 2019a), in addition to being described as draconian, colonial-era laws that

are deliberately misused to halt investigations into appalling atrocities. One case was

described by the organisations in the following way: “From start to finish, the case was

nothing more than a brazen attack on freedom of expression and independent

journalism in Myanmar” (Amnesty International 2018l). Another article discussing a

different case of suppressed freedom of press was titled as “tragic denial of justice”

54

(Amnesty International 2019a). The following pull quotes also, in my opinion, describe

Amnesty International’s viewpoint of this topic extremely well:

“These arrests are yet another alarming assault on press freedom in Myanmar, and

demonstrates that authorities in the country are growing more thin-skinned by the day.

They should be released immediately and without conditions.” (Amnesty International

2018o) .

“This appalling but wholly unsurprising decision is entirely in keeping with

Myanmar’s continued regression on freedom of expression and human rights in

general.” (Amnesty International 2018d).

Lastly, the military and business connections were discussed. In this case, the

organisation clearly states that any company partnering with MEHL, Myanmar

Economic Holdings Limited, of which significant profits go to members of the military

as written in the previous section, risk complicity in and contributing to these crimes.

According to the organisation, MEHL and the military are inextricably linked, which

means that the perpetrators of atrocities are the ones collecting the profits. It is

emphasised that suspending payments is not enough, but all business ties must be cut

(Amnesty International 2020l).

We will next discuss category number five, which was “issues relating to refugee

camps”. In this category issues mostly limited to the refugee camps were discussed,

and they included 1) inadequate or insufficient sanitation, 2) unsafety of the camps and

3) environmental hazards. When it comes to sanitation, special attention has been paid

to how the situation affects older people, people with disabilities and women. It has to

be said that the refugee camps are extremely congested, and it is fair to say that

overcrowding is a major problem for any person forced to live in such conditions.

However, it is written that inadequate and insufficient sanitation actually represents a

major loss of dignity particularly for older people, because they cannot use the

restrooms and other “sanitation facilities” that are available for healthier and younger

refugees, as they cannot cross the difficult terrain leading to the facilities safely due to

lack of light and the physical shapes of the terrain. Consequently, they are forced to

build some sort of arrangements in the corner of their sheds, where they have “had to

become like cows or goats, as cows urinate where they sleep” (Amnesty International

2019e, 8).

55

Not only are there not enough sanitation facilities, but they are also most often

broken. Perhaps it is this that has caused the drinking water in the camps to also be

contaminated and even dangerous to health. Amnesty International has pointed out that

“the right to water has been recognised as derived from the right to an adequate standard

of living and, therefore, implicitly contained in the ICESCR and other human rights

instruments”. This right includes the availability of sufficient water for personal and

domestic purposes, such as for drinking and food preparation, personal sanitation and

clothes washing. Additionally, the CESCR General Comment No. 15 states that water

and related facilities and services must be within physical reach for all people, within

or in the immediate vicinity of each household, educational institution and workplace.

The water they provide must be affordable and safe, and the facilities and services must

“be sensitive to gender, life-cycle, and privacy requirements” (Amnesty International

2019g, 36).

There is also a universal right to sanitation, contained in ICESCR. This right requires

sufficient amounts of sanitation facilities available within, or in the vicinity of, every

household, health or educational institution, workplace, public institution and public

place. The facilities must be of good quality, meaning that they need to be hygienically

safe to use. They must be affordable, physically available in a safe place, ensure privacy

and dignity, be culturally and socially acceptable and pay special attention to the needs

of children, older people and disabled people. (Amnesty International 2019g, 36).

As far as the unsafety of the of the camps go, only two words can be used to explain

the view of Amnesty International: deep concern. The extrajudicial executions of

alleged Rohingya murderers, by the Bangladeshi security forces, taking place in the

refugee camps, in the organisation’s words, violate the right to life as well as the

principals of “innocent until proven guilty” and the right to a fair trial. The organisation

emphasises that even suspected criminals are protected by basic human rights under

international human rights treaties, including the before mentioned fair trials, policy of

innocence until proven guilty and the right to not be sentenced to death penalty

(Amnesty International 2019j). It goes without saying that the armed ethnic groups also

have a responsibility to respect the life of others, and they must not continue the

violence that is also leaving unarmed civilians in the middle.

The environmental hazards, in the eyes of Amnesty International, are just as

concerning. The environmental hazards threatening the camps are numerous, yet there

is virtually no protection against the raging winds, extreme rain and pressing heat in the

56

shelters of the Rohingya. It is written that the humanitarian community has been filled

with dread (Amnesty International 2017l) when it comes to the environmental

conditions of the camps. All in all, the conditions do not live up to international

humanitarian standards (Amnesty International 2019g, 8).

The UN Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (CESCR) has clarified

the obligations that must be fulfilled to ensure the right to adequate housing. It is written

in an Amnesty International report that “this right applies without discrimination to all

those in a state’s territory or under its jurisdiction. Governments must prioritize the

realization of minimum essential levels of housing for everyone while prioritizing the

most disadvantaged groups in all programmes when allocating resources. The CESCR

also calls on state parties to guarantee the right of people to participate in and be

consulted over decisions that will affect them and to provide an effective remedy if any

of these rights are violated” (Amnesty International 2019g, 26). The decision to include

this piece of text in a report proves that in Amnesty International’s opinion the right to

adequate housing is not being respected and/or fulfilled in Bangladesh’s refugee camps.

We will now move on to the final category, “denial of permanent residency”. In this

category the hundreds of Rohingya stranded at sea, possible repatriations and

relocations were brought up and discussed. It is revealed in the reports and articles that

Malaysia, Thailand and Indonesia are organising and implementing highly militarised

operations to push back the boats carrying Rohingya refugees and Asylum seekers. The

situation is undoubtedly very complex, concerning and illegal. Whatever happens to

the Rohingya, they seem to be in a very disadvantaged situation. One news article

reveals that if the Rohingya are allowed into countries like Malaysia, they risk being

subjected to for instance caning, an obvious violation of human rights. However, if they

are returned to Bangladesh, they risk being subjected to living conditions that amount

to arbitrary detention (Amnesty International 2020f). Needless to say, if these boats are

sent back to Myanmar, the Rohingyas will just end up living in the same conditions,

under constant threat of violence, segregation and limited opportunities for a happy

future.

In this case, Amnesty International has made appeals for the urgent need of rescue

missions. As it is stated, pushing the boats back at sea and leaving the Rohingya to die

violates multiple international agreements and will only serve to “turn seas into

graveyards” (Amnesty International 2020d).

57

When it comes to the possible repatriations, the plans have been met with widespread

fear. The Rohingya population has not yet forgotten the murders, sexual violence and

torched villages, which they left behind. Not only have the memories of the events not

disappeared, but the conditions in Myanmar have also not changed. A pull quote in

Amnesty International 2019f summarises the opinion of Amnesty International very

well: “With Myanmar’s military as powerful and remorseless as ever, it remains unsafe

for anyone to return to Rakhine”. In another article it is explained that the plans of

repatriation are woefully premature (Amnesty International 2018b), as the conditions

in Myanmar do not meet the requirements for safe, dignified and voluntary returns

(2020h, 6). The living conditions in Myanmar still amount to apartheid, including the

previously mentioned restricted freedom of movement, lack of adequate food, poor

quality and inaccessible healthcare and education, continuing threat of violence and

increased presence of security forces, Border Guard Police and military in Rakhine

State, Kachin State and Shan State. We must also not forget that many Rohingya do not

quite literally have homes to go back to, as they were burned and destroyed during the

2017 campaign of ethnic cleansing and have now reportedly been given to members of

other ethnic nationalities or been bulldozed to accommodate other buildings, such as

BGP bases.

Before we go back to agenda-setting theory and framing theory to better understand

Amnesty International’s decision to use these particular descriptions of these particular

topics, we must still discuss the relocations taking place in Bangladesh. For the

organisation, the relocations to the uninhabitable island of Bhashan Char have raised

serious questions and grave concern for multiple reasons (Amnesty International

2020j).

First, the island is extremely isolated, meaning that the refugees living there would

also be potentially isolated from their families and friends. Second, due to the isolated

location of the island, it would be more difficult for the humanitarian aid and

humanitarian workers to reach the refugees. Third, the island has not been deemed safe

for human habitation by the UN, which is a clear red flag. Similarly, to the arbitrary

arrests being defined by the UN, here Amnesty International has also decided to use the

UN as their “measure” and to quote them, which is interesting. It is interesting, because

one might think that such a respected and large human rights organisation would like

to define and determine the living conditions for themselves, or rely on other human

rights organisations for this, instead of the UN, the main purpose and focus of which

58

are not human rights. However, as the UN is listed as one of Amnesty International’s

points of focus on their webpage, this is understandable. To summarise the

organisation’s message by two quotes:

“Relocating the refugees to Bhashan Char will neither end their current insecurity nor

bring about a durable solution to the refugee crisis.” (Amnesty International 2020j).

“No relocation plan, either to Bhashan Char or to another location, can be undertaken

without the full and informed consent of the individuals involved.“ (Amnesty

International 2020m).

Now, we must go back to framing theory and agenda-setting theory to see, why the

situation has been described in these particular ways and which frames have been used

to describe the situation. The frames that can be identified in this case are the frame of

illegality, the frame of targeted, indiscriminate, widespread and systematic violence,

the frame of concern and the frame of failure.

It is written that framing is based "on the assumption that subtle changes in the

wording of the description of a situation might affect how audience members interpret

this situation" (Scheufele 2000, 309). In other words, certain words are used to make a

greater impact on the target audience. Words like apartheid, war crimes and crimes

against humanity surely make a greater impact on Amnesty International’s target

audience, which includes politicians and organisations that have control over

international humanitarian laws.

It is also written that frames diagnose, evaluate and prescribe. They define problems,

diagnose causes, make moral judgements and suggest remedies (see e.g. Entman 1993,

52). I suggest that the frame of failure was chosen by Amnesty International for the

purpose of making moral judgements at the governments of Myanmar and Bangladesh

and the international community (in this case meaning organisations such as the UN

and ASEAN, other governments and politicians in high levels of power) that have failed

at doing enough for the Rohingya population. As we can remember, there is a desperate

need for e.g. justice and addressing impunity, food, education and healthcare, and in the

eyes of Amnesty International not enough has been done to ensure that these problems

are taken care of.

I also suggest that by emphasising how alarming and concerning the situation is, in

other words by using the frame of concern, Amnesty International wishes to advocate

59

for change, encourage immediate action and mobilise governments and others to stop

these abuses. After all, according to the statute of the organisation (Amnesty

International 2019h) mobilising governments and others is one of the methods of action

used and chosen by the organisation. We will next on to the third section of analysis, in

which research question 3 will be discussed.

Solving the ethnic conflict by international cooperation

Coding the suggested solutions was the trickiest and most difficult part of the study.

Certain themes, such as donations, stopping arms trade/arms embargo, increasing

international attention and pressure, allowing outsider observers and humanitarian

workers to enter the country, addressing impunity and financial sanctions were easy to

code, because they were frequently mentioned and discussed. However, some solutions

were only mentioned once or a couple of times, which means that it would not make

sense to create an individual code or subcategory for each of them. Because of this,

such solutions were coded using the main category "What needs to be done?".

In these cases, different organisations and operators would be presented with

specific, personalised solutions and responsibilities. For instance, in Amnesty

International 2020h solutions were presented to and required of the government of

Bangladesh (eleven bullet points), the international community, including the EU, OIC

and UN agencies (six bullet points), local and international humanitarian agencies in

Bangladesh (three bullet points) and ASEAN (two bullet points). In Amnesty

International 2018h The UN Security Council, The UN Human Rights Council, The

UN General Assembly, The UN Secretary General and country team in Myanmar, EU

and ASEAN, the international community and Myanmar's partners as a whole, the

authorities in Myanmar, ARSA, the government of Bangladesh and humanitarian

organisations and donors working with the Rohingya in Bangladesh were addressed.

Altogether, over fifty individual measures and solutions were suggested.

Some of these solutions are definitely more often suggested, or worthy of mentioning

for some other reason. Hence, three of these solutions will be mentioned before moving

on to the solutions that have been coded in their own subcategories. For instance, the

authorities of Myanmar have accused humanitarian workers of supporting ethnic armed

groups, after certain food items were found in an alleged militant camp. Unsurprisingly,

it was pointed out that these types of allegations are false, reckless and irresponsible.

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The spreading and dissemination of such misinformation has to be stopped (Amnesty

International 2017b).

Secondly, very much like Adams (2019) and Ahsan Ullah (2016), Amnesty

International has also strongly and repeatedly suggested that The United Nations

Security Council should refer the entire situation to the ICC (see e.g. Amnesty

International 2018i; 2018j; 2019b). One of the reasons why the Security Council, at the

time, was so slow to respond to the events and was seen as a disappointment was the

fact that any member state of the Council can use its veto power to halt and hinder

certain decisions and measures. For instance, China is a well-known partner of

Myanmar, and was very reluctant to take any measures against the Myanmar

government (Adams 2019). It appears that the demands of various organisations and

academics were heard, since the ICC authorised an investigation into the crimes

committed in the country in November 2019. The decision was met with joy, as it meant

that "the wheels of justice are turning" (Amnesty International 2019k).

Thirdly, it is frequently mentioned and reminded that any possible repatriations need

to meet three criteria: they need to be voluntary, safe and dignified. Because human

rights violations are still taking place in Myanmar, no Rohingya refugee should be

forced to go back or have to return to living conditions that are systematically

discriminative and segregative. This aspect of repatriation is emphasised with a quote:

“While it is positive that Myanmar and Bangladesh are discussing options for the safe

return of Rohingya to their homes, this must be a voluntary process and not lead to a

hasty and reckless effort to push people back against their will. No one should be forced

back to a situation where they will continue to face serious human rights violations and

systemic discrimination and segregation.” (Amnesty International 2017j).

As mentioned in the previous sections, the living conditions for the repatriated refugees

in Myanmar could mean that they face continuing violence, do not literally have a home

or a house to live in (a consequence of the bulldozing and scorched earth tactics used

during the 2017 campaign of ethnic cleansing) and might have to live in an area with

an increased security forces presence (see e.g. Amnesty International 2018e).

The possible relocation of the Rohingya has also been met with caution.

Demonstrably, the relocation of the refugees to an uninhabitable island of Bhashan Char

was well underway in 2020 (Amnesty International 2020m; Human Rights Watch

2020). However, the plans were already drafted in 2017, and the island has been known

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to be vulnerable to flooding from the very beginning. Needless to say, forcing refugees

to live in such hazardous conditions far away from the mainland carries a lot of risks,

and could mean that humanitarian assistance does not reach the refugees in need

(Amnesty International 2017n).

But now, let us move on to the most often suggested and discussed solutions and

measures that need to be taken. For each of the following six measures and solutions

an individual subcategory and code were created. They will be discussed in a specific

order from the most often suggested to the least suggested.

The first measure that needs to be taken, according to the reports, is to address

impunity. It is a well-known fact that the military is entirely in control of its own judicial

processes (Amnesty International 2017d), holds considerable independence from the

civilian government and is not accountable to civilian courts (Amnesty International

2017c). This autonomous position has been decades in the making, so to speak. Already

in 1948, and the years following the independence, the military was an integral part of

the state-building process in Myanmar. Later on, the military got involved in drug

business and politics (Armao 2015), just to mention a couple of examples, which does

reveal that the Tatmadaw has gradually penetrated every aspect of the Myanmarese

society and developed questionable ways to operate, amongst others through

corruption, violence and impunity.

The power of the military is unquestionable, which means that addressing this issue

is crucial for the future of the country. Moreover, the international community, which

in this case would mean the UN, the EU, the ICC and powerful states like the United

States, need to take part in making the situation right and making sure that these

perpetrators of crimes against humanity are held accountable. The need for international

cooperation was emphasised in a pull quote:

"The international community should not be fooled by this latest attempt to shield

perpetrators from accountability. Instead, it must finally put an end to the years of

impunity and ensure that this dark chapter in Myanmar’s recent history is never

repeated." (Amnesty International 2018i).

The same document includes another quote, which reveals that in Amnesty

International's eyes no violation should go unpunished, no matter how high-ranking an

individual is, and how the perpetrators of violence have blood on their hands:

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"Those with blood on their hands – right up the chain of command to Senior General

Min Aung Hlaing – must be held to account for their role in overseeing or carrying out

crimes against humanity and other serious human rights violations under international

law." (Amnesty International 2018i).

To speed things up, perhaps, the organisation has provided a long list of names,

containing members of the military and the Border Guard Police, who should be

prosecuted for e.g. crimes against humanity and other inhumane acts, such as forced

disappearances. The list includes very familiar names such as the above-mentioned Min

Aung Hlaing, Commander-in-Chief of the Defence Services (CINCDS), and BGP

Corporal Kyaw Chau, who is frequently mentioned in quotes about sexualised torture,

for example (Amnesty International 2018h, 154–165). Hence, unfortunately, the

evidence reveals that the impunity and unaccountability for human rights violations

goes all the way to the top of the Myanmarese society, which makes the task of

addressing and fixing the issue all the more difficult.

The second most suggested measure, or demand in this case, is to make sure that

outsider observers, human rights monitors, independent journalists and humanitarian

workers are allowed access to the country. It is well known that the Rohingya greatly

rely on humanitarian aid when it comes to food and medicine, for instance, so the fact

that humanitarian aid is being denied and robbed of the Rohingya by the government is

having serious effects on the Muslim population.

Allowing outsiders in the country is also strongly connected to the previous topic of

impunity. Since the government long refused to cooperate with The Independent

International Fact-Finding Mission on Myanmar and allow the organisation in the

country (Amnesty International 2018a), gathering evidence of their crimes and human

rights violations has proven to be very difficult. It goes without saying that if there is

no evidence of crimes against humanity, war crimes or genocide, for example, the

individuals who are actually committing these violations cannot be put on trial,

prosecuted and convicted.

Fortunately, a fact-finding mission did eventually take place, the report of which was

published in September 2019. In a statement, made to the 42nd session of the Human

Rights Council, the chair of the fact-finding mission summarised and presented the

results by saying that the clearance operations were carried out with genocidal intent,

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it is unsafe for the Rohingya to return and that the discriminatory conditions still remain

very much unchanged (OHCHR 2019).

Also, the ICC authorised an investigation into the crimes committed in November

2019 (Amnesty International 2019k) and The Gambia filed a so-called "genocide case"

against Myanmar in November 2019 (Amnesty International 2019l). The genocide

case's first hearings took place in the International Court of Justice (ICJ) in Hague in

the beginning of December 2019. The Myanmar delegation was led by State Counsellor

Aung San Suu Kyi herself. At the time of conducting this study, neither have charges

been pressed against members of the Tatmadaw, nor have any verdicts been handed out

in the ICC. The ICJ, however, ruled that the state of Myanmar must take emergency

measures to protect the Rohingya from genocide. The decision was met with joy around

the world and was even reported in major newspapers like Al Jazeera (2020) and The

Washington Post (2020).

It does have to be pointed out at this point, before moving on to the next solution,

that by allowing access to journalists, outsider observers and human rights monitors

valuable information is also gathered about the ethnic armed groups, such as ARSA,

that have also committed heinous crimes. After all, the members of this group have

been branded as terrorists by the government, so objective investigations would also

provide evidence of crimes committed, or allegedly committed, against the Buddhist

majority and other ethnic minorities, such as Hindus. As it has been pointed out, the

Tatmadaw cannot accuse the international community of being one-sided, whilst

hindering and objecting independent and objective investigations at the same time

(Amnesty International 2018f).

The third solution to the conflict, according to the reports and news articles, is

increasing international attention and pressure. By international attention and pressure

Amnesty International refers to organisations, such as the UN, and individual countries,

like Japan. All in all, like the organisation declared in 2019, "international community

is failing – ICC referral needed" and it is "time to step up international pressure". The

same article that includes these quotes states that The United Nations Security Council

is not taking its responsibility seriously (Amnesty International 2019c). The two quotes

are "kickers" and subheadings in the previously mentioned article, and they make it

quite clear that, according to the organisation, the entire situation is not under control

and it should be seen through the frame of disappointment and the frame of failure.

Clearly, the disappointment is not expressed in actual words, but when considering the

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latent content and reading between the lines, the disappointment becomes crystal clear.

As framing theory suggests, framing does not only include that which is noticeable, but

also that which is absent (Cappella and Jamieson 1997, 45). In other words, the

unspoken, or unwritten, also needs to be taken into consideration, when identifying

frames. Therefore, it can be interpreted that by choosing to include the word "failure"

in the subheading, disappointment is also being indirectly expressed.

Individual countries, like Japan, are also being called out, if they decide to continue

to their relationship with Myanmar. A meeting between a Myanmarese delegation of

senior military officials, led by Senior General Min Aung Hlaing, and their Japanese

counterparts was discussed in an article titled "Japan is on the wrong side of history

over Myanmar's atrocities against the Rohingya". A pull quote stated that "Unless it

ends its silence about the appalling crimes in Myanmar’s northern Rakhine State, Japan

will be left on the wrong side of history" (Amnesty International 2018m). Another

country that has been discussed like this is Australia, but its relationship to Myanmar

will be discussed a bit later.

At this point it is important to mention Bangladesh. Not all direct references to

individual countries have such a strong, judgemental tone. For instance, in Amnesty

International 2017j the organisation makes a direct appeal to other countries to assist

and support Bangladesh, or rather the government in Dhaka, to deal with the immediate

crisis and its aftermath.

Going back to framing theory, moral judgements are an essential part in building

frames (Entman 1993, 52). Such direct references, strong language and unambiguous

messages are exactly what one might expect from a human rights organisation.

Appealing to other countries to provide help for Bangladesh emphasises the idea that

the situation should be, or rather needs to be, solved by cooperation. Making such a

statement against Japan, on the other hand, makes it clear that all countries supporting

a potentially genocidal regime, or rather not being actively against the regime, are

considered to be morally questionable.

The case against Japan does make sense, since Japan for instance abstained from

voting when The United Nations Human Rights Council adopted a resolution to

condemn the atrocities taking place in Myanmar (Amnesty International 2017j) and it

is quite public knowledge that a Japanese beer company has been linked to Myanmar

businesses in which Tatmadaw's military officials own stocks (e.g. Amnesty

International 2020b). However, does not being actively against something mean that

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this something is condoned? Does only being active in resistance and condemnation

count for something? I suppose this is the age-old question that would have to answered

in another study.

When it comes to authoritarian regimes, it would seem obvious that the trading of

arms and other equipment of a similar kind with them would be stopped. After all, is it

not extremely questionable, most of all ethically, to support such regimes? When it

comes to trading arms with a country like Myanmar, one knows exactly what the arms

are used for. And that is for killing ethnic minorities and activists, who think differently.

Consequently, stopping arms trade and/or imposing a comprehensive arms embargo has

quite frequently been called for.

China, for example, is known for supplying weapons to its neighbour. Russia and

Israel are, or have been, reportedly supplying Myanmar with weapons (Amnesty

International 2017e). Perhaps surprisingly, it was reported in 2017 that the Commander-

in-Chief of Defence Services, Min Aung Hlaing, visited Austria and Germany to

discuss the provision of training. During these visits he also toured and visited an

aircraft manufacture's facilities. Moreover, the draft version of the US Senate National

Defense Authorization Act (NDAA), which at the time was to be debated on, called for

expanding military-to-military engagement through training and workshops (Amnesty

International 2017d). Australia has also been providing training for the Myanmar army

(Amnesty International 2017e). Disapproval and concern regarding the decision of

some European countries to continue relations with Myanmar was expressed by quotes,

such as

"Although the European Union renewed in April its "arms embargo and the embargo

on equipment which might be used for internal repression" in Myanmar, several EU

countries appear to be testing the waters about increasing their military engagement."

(Amnesty International 2017d).

Ibrahim (2016, 134) has also expressed that both the US and the EU have previously

been relatively tolerant of the regime. According to the author, both actors, at the time,

were waiting for a smooth, automatic shift to democracy. Moreover, it has been

considered much easier to discuss financial sanctions, or rather relieving them, and to

consider them as a way to reward progress. Whether or not this tactic is morally

acceptable, or effective in trying to stop the Tatmadaw from committing crimes against

humanity and shifting the country towards democracy, is another question entirely. Yet

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again keeping in mind the fact that the military recently went through with a military

coup, during which State Counsellor Aung San Suu Kyi was once again put under house

arrest, it could be argued that this tactic, or any tactic for that matter, has not been

successful.

Another solution or measure, often suggested together with a comprehensive arms

embargo, are financial sanctions. According to the reports, these sanctions should be

posed by the UN Security Council, and organisations such as the EU and ASEAN.

According to the organisation, this would send a clear message that the Tatmadaw's

human rights violations and breaches of humanitarian law committed during the

numerous conflicts in Rakhine State, Kachin State and Shan State are not tolerated

(Amnesty International 2017k). Fortunately, sanctions have been imposed, and they

were further stepped up after the coup of February 2021 (Reuters 2021).

Interestingly, the study of David and Holliday (2012) came to the conclusion that the

best option for facilitating Myanmar's social and political change would actually be to

lift international sanctions and to guarantee non-prosecution. The results suggested that

international sanctions alone, as well as international justice alone, would in fact have

negative effects on the country's political and social change. It should naturally be kept

in mind that the study was conducted before the most recent campaign of ethnic

conflict. However, it does provide an interesting angle to solving the conflict, because

its results differ greatly from the suggestions of Amnesty International. Moreover, it is

not surprising that Amnesty International uses such direct appeals and strong,

persuasive language. Their methods, according to their statute (Amnesty International

2019h), entail mobilising public pressure on governments and others to stop the abuses.

In order to achieve this, certain amount of perhaps provocative language is needed.

One can obviously have endless debates about which option is, or which options are,

the best when it comes to solving such a long-lasting ethnic conflict. However, what

these two almost entirely different opinions do have in common is the idea that solving

the conflict requires cooperation between different actors and a combination of

measures. As written multiple times before, the conflict can under no circumstances be

solved by a single measure, implemented by a single actor. In other words, the frame of

international cooperation is very much a part of this solution as well.

The final suggested solution is donations. On many occasions, donations were

recommended in order to help Bangladesh, a poor county that has accepted and housed

the majority of refugees fleeing the persecutions and ethnic cleansing in Myanmar. As

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written before, donations are very much needed to improve the poor level of sanitation,

acquire medicine, improve the medical care offered in the refugee camps and improve

the infrastructure in the camps. And these are just a few examples of the most urgent

problems that could be solved by additional funding. Keeping in mind the fact that

Amnesty International is mostly funded by donations, it is reasonable that the topic of

donations would also be on the agenda, when it comes to discussing possible solutions

for the conflict. Going back to agenda-setting theory, it is suggested that each actor, an

organisation in this case, brings up certain topics, or rather makes them more salient,

when they wish to see them on the public agenda.

Although donations are undoubtedly an important and an effective way to help those

in need, the donor has a great responsibility to ensure that the funds are given to

organisations or other actors that do not misuse the funds, or that the funds are not given

to an actor that in anyway supports questionable solutions. Amnesty International has

reminded their donors of this in a following quote:

“The international community must send a clear message that it will not allow a repeat

of 2012. Donors must establish red lines and make clear that they will not fund any

proposed ‘solutions’ leading to forced returns from Bangladesh, or the displacement

and continued segregation of the Rohingya. Failure to do so would not only support

the continuation of human rights violations, it would make the international community

complicit in them.” (Amnesty International 2017a).

To summarise, six solutions have been most often suggested to resolve the conflict.

Firstly, the impunity of army soldiers, BGP officers and security forces needs to be

addressed. Even though impunity has been the norm for nearly decades, it does not have

to be so. Secondly, outsider observers, humanitarian workers and independent journalist

need to be allowed to enter the country. The Rohingya greatly depend on humanitarian

aid and outsiders in reporting their living conditions, which means that stopping

humanitarian workers and reporters from doing their work deteriorates their situation

even further. Thirdly, international attention and pressure against the regime need to be

increased. The fourth solution is to impose an arms embargo and stop all arms trade

with Myanmar. Many countries have quite recently been supplying the country with

weapons or cooperating with the military in the form of training and workshops, and

clearly this needs to stop. The fifth solution is to impose financial sanctions against

individuals who are guilty of human rights violations. Sanctions should be imposed by

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e.g. the Security Council, the EU, ASEAN and individual countries like the United

States. The sixth solution is to make donations, in order to ensure that the Rohingya are

provided with adequate food, sanitation and medical care, amongst other basic needs,

in the refugee camps.

Following framing theory, it is obvious that solutions are suggested and expected.

As Entman (1993, 52) has written, frames suggest remedies by offering and justifying

treatments to problems. They also make moral judgements, which has been quite

obvious in the case of Amnesty International. The frames used by the organisation

mainly focus on and highlight the comprehensiveness of solutions and international

cooperation needed to solve the conflict. Following agenda-setting theory, on the other

hand, it becomes clear why these particular solutions have been suggested. The theory

has the basic assumption that certain aspects of issues or problems are brought up, or

rather made more salient, in order to make them a part of the public agenda. Arms

control, accountability and international justice, to mention a few examples, are on

Amnesty International's agenda, which means that they would be frequently mentioned

and discussed, because the organisation wants them to be a part of the public agenda.

No solution or decision will solve the ethnic conflict on its own, but rather a

combination of solutions needs to be decided on and implemented in cooperation with

multiple organisations, such as ASEAN and the UN. Moreover, high-ranking

individuals in the government and the army need to be persuaded or forced to act and

"change the ways of the country", as well. Impunity and continuing violence cannot be

tolerated anymore.

Financial sanctions and international pressure have also received support from

academics. It is proven that it is possible to gain leverage over Myanmar's authorities,

but putting pressure on the government and forcing them to care is extremely difficult

(Ibrahim 2016). Judging by the fact that almost on a daily basis mass violence erupts

somewhere in Myanmar, especially after the most recent coup by the Tatmadaw, we are

still not clearly doing enough. It is time to stop making political statements. What is

needed is action, concrete measures and decisions effectively implemented and carried

out. The country is on the verge of a civil war, and in the case that a civil war breaks

out, it is not only the Rohingya who will be affected. Every member of an ethnic

minority, as well as the members of the Buddhist majority, will face the consequences

of severe mass violence perpetrated by the military, security forces and the Border

Guard Police.

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Conclusions As mentioned in the introduction and section “Specification of research questions”, the

research aim of the study was to see which aspects of the 2017 campaign of the ethnic

cleansing of the Rohingya have been brought up and discussed by a human rights

organisation, Amnesty International in this case, and what explains the organisation’s

decision to discuss these aspects. Another aim of the study was to see how these aspects

have been described and discussed, and what explains Amnesty International’s decision

to present the aspects in their particular ways. The solutions suggested to solve the

conflict were also under observation. In order to answer these questions, agenda-setting

theory and framing theory were used to guide the process of analysis and to explain the

results. This final section consists of three subsections, each of which answers one

research question.

Which aspects of the ethnic cleansing of the Rohingya in 2017 have been

discussed by Amnesty International, and what explains Amnesty International’s

decision to discuss these particular aspects?

The analysis reveals that the aspects discussed and brought up can be divided into six

categories. These categories are 1) physical violence, 2) damage done to the physical

environment, 3) other forms of oppression, 4) threats to democracy, 5) issues relating

to refugee camps and 6) denial of permanent residency.

According to the organisation, the physical violence used in the campaign of ethnic

cleansing included 1) torture, 2) shootings and other unlawful killings, 3) sexual

violence towards women and men, 4) arbitrary arrests, 5) abductions, enforced

disappearances and forced mass deportations and 6) forced labour. It was also brought

to attention that ethnic armed groups, such as ARSA, or the Arakan Rohingya Salvation

Army, and AA, or the Arakan Army, have also perpetrated physical violence, even

implementing massacres of the Hindu population.

The damage done to the physical violence has consisted of four tactics used by the

Myanmar army, the security forces and the Border Guard Police. These tactics include

1) scorched earth tactics, 2) the use of landmines, 3) looting and destroying properties

and homes and 4) bulldozing and rebuilding infrastructure.

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Other forms of oppression, according to Amnesty International, include six different

forms of oppression. These are 1) denying or restricting humanitarian aid, 2) denying

or restricting education in Myanmar and Bangladesh, 3) denying or restricting health

care in Myanmar and Bangladesh, 4) forced starvation in Myanmar and lack of food in

Bangladesh, 5) segregation and discrimination and 6) restricting the freedom of

movement and access to the internet. When discussing these forms of oppression,

special attention was paid to the effects on older people, people with disabilities and

women.

The category titled as “threats to democracy” consisted of four threats, which were

1) corruption, 2) impunity of soldiers, security forces, and the Border Guard Police, 3)

press freedom and the freedom of speech and 4) business and military connections. The

category was named in this way, because not every threat to democracy is of violent

nature. Even though physical violence, quite obviously, threatens democracy, the lack

of press freedom and large-scaled corruption, for example, also contribute to the

deterioration of democracy in Myanmar.

The fifth category, issues relating to refugee camps, saw discussions on 1) the camps’

poor conditions of sanitation, 2) the unsafety of the camps and 3) the environmental

hazards threatening the camps. When the (un)sanitary conditions of the camps were

discussed, special attention was paid to people with disabilities and older people. This

is a result of the fact that the sanitation facilities are not easily accessible with limited

mobility.

The last category discussed was titled as “denial of permanent residency”, because

as a result of multiple reasons the Rohingya are facing difficulties settling down and

establishing permanent residencies. This is a result of three factors: 1) the COVID-19

pandemic in particular has left many Rohingya refugees stranded at sea, because after

seeking refuge by sea they are many times not given the permission to embark in

countries like Malaysia and Thailand, but face having their boats pushed back at sea,

2) they are under the threat of repatriation, for which the conditions in Myanmar are

not suitable and 3) they are also at risk of relocation in Bangladesh. The planned

location of these relocations has not been deemed suitable for human habitation.

The analysis revealed that the aspects discussed and brought up by Amnesty

International very much reflect their interests and “points of focus” listed on the

organisation’s webpage amnesty.org. Children’s rights, corporate responsibility,

detention, disappearances, discrimination, freedom of speech, international justice,

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living in dignity, refugees, asylum seekers and migrants, sexual rights, torture, United

Nations and The Universal Declaration of Human Rights were all discussed in the

material analysed, and they are all listed as the organisation’s interests. Thus, the

presumption of agenda-setting theory that media and other operators wish to make

certain issues, in other words their agendas and their interests, more salient by paying

more attention to them appears to be true in this case and explains why Amnesty

International has made to discuss these particular aspects.

The analysis also revealed that these aspects portray the situation and the campaign

of ethnic cleansing through three frames: through the frame of illegality, the frame of

comprehensiveness and the frame of continuity. The frame of illegality can be identified

from the discussions on e.g. unlawful killings, impunity and restricted freedom of

speech, which clearly violate international humanitarian laws and rights. The frame of

comprehensiveness is created by discussing multiple aspects to the conflict, including

e.g. business and military connections, restricted internet access and discrimination of

women in camp administration. The discussion on these topics reveals and emphasises

that the conflict is not only about physical violence and losses of lives, but the effects

of the situation and the techniques used go much beyond torture and sexual violence,

just to mention a few examples. The frame of continuity can also be identified simply

because the discussion around the conflict does not stop with the Rohingya population

leaving Myanmar in August 2017. Instead, it is frequently mentioned and reminded that

the conditions in the refugee camps very much mirror the conditions in Myanmar, at

least when it comes to the denied education, lack of health care and hunger, for instance.

How are these aspects of the ethnic cleansing being discussed by Amnesty

International, and what explains Amnesty International’s decision to discuss

the aspects in their particular ways?

When it comes to the definitions and descriptions of the afore mentioned aspects, we

can conclude that Amnesty International defines and describes the aspects through

multiple frames, such as the frame of illegality, the frame of targeted, indiscriminate,

widespread and systematic violence, the frame of concern and the frame of failure.

When the first category, physical violence, was discussed it was stated that the forms

of physical violence have amounted to war crimes, the crime against humanity of

murder, the crime against humanity of torture, the war crime of torture and the crime

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against humanity of rape and other forms of sexual violence. By using these legal terms,

Amnesty International is clearly enforcing the frame of illegality. The physical violence

was also described by using the words targeted, deliberate, wide-ranging, widespread

and systematic, thus creating the frame of targeted, indiscriminate, widespread and

systematic violence.

The second category, damage done to the physical environment, is also discussed

through the frame of illegality and the frame of targeted, indiscriminate, widespread

and systematic violence. In this category, the legal definitions included war crimes, the

crime against humanity of apartheid, the crime against humanity of murder and the

crime against humanity of deportation or forcible transfer of population. The freedom

of religion and the rights to adequate housing, education and work were also violated,

as the consequences of these environmental damages have driven the Rohingya

population to exile, where they are amongst other things lacking education and

possibilities to work. Other words used to describe the tactics used to destroy the

physical environment included systematic, widespread, consistent, targeted, deliberate,

organised, frenetic, dramatic and alarming, which reveals the second frame mentioned.

“Other forms of oppression” was the third category discussed, and unsurprisingly

the illegality and the legal definitions were discussed. These oppressive measures have,

according to the organisation, amounted to or constituted the crime against humanity

of persecution on racial or ethnic grounds, the crime against humanity of deportation

or forcible transfer of population and the crime against humanity of apartheid. In

addition to being described as extensive, systematic, deliberate and unjustifiable, they

also violate children’s’ rights, the right to education, the right to adequate food and

water, the right to health, the freedom of expression and the freedom of though,

conscience and religion.

When it comes to the fourth category, threats to democracy, Amnesty International

has had a lot to say. In summary, the corruption in Myanmar is systematic and routinely

occurring. All the crimes discussed and revealed have been perpetrated and carried out

with total, far-extending and on-going impunity, which extends all the way to the top

of the Myanmarese society. The freedom of speech, the freedom of press and the

freedom of expression are in decline, and they are suppressed by using draconian,

colonial-era laws to carry out alarming assaults on press freedom.

The second to last category was titled as “issues relating to the refugee camps”. In

this category the frame of concern and the frame of failure became more obvious, in

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my opinion. The unsafety of the camps was discussed and described with the actual

words “deep concern” and the environmental hazards that the refugee camps face were

also seen to cause “grave concern”, for instance. The frame of failure could be easily

detected, as the organisation is forced to point out in the news articles and reports all

the rights and treaties that are being violated, disrespected and unmet. We have already

discussed some of these violations (such as the right to health and the right to

education), but in the camps, in particular, we are failing to fulfil and respect the right

to water, the universal right to sanitation, the right to life, the right to fair trial and the

right to adequate housing.

The final category discussed was the denial of permanent residency. The situation

where even hundreds of Rohingya are being left stranded at sea was seen as complex,

illegal and concerning. The situation is particularly concerning, because if they are

allowed in countries like Malaysia they face the threat of caning, for example (Amnesty

International 2020f). However, if they go back to Myanmar, they are just returning to

the same conditions that violate international humanitarian laws. The possible

repatriations were met caution and seen as woefully premature, as the conditions in

Myanmar do not enable safe and dignified returns. According to Amnesty International,

this also goes for the relocations to Bhashan Char. The relocations are considered

gravely concerning, because on the island, which has not been deemed suitable for

human habitation, would leave the Rohingya population even more isolated.

Consequently, this would mean that they would be isolated from their friends, families

and humanitarian aid, which they desperately need.

Going back to agenda-setting theory, framing theory and the interests and the statute

of Amnesty International, it becomes clear why these specific frames have been chosen.

By using the frame of illegality Amnesty International is bringing up and drawing

attention to their interests, such as child rights, sexual rights and international justice.

The frame of failure and the frame of concern, on the other hand, could be quite

effective in mobilising governments and others and advocating for change, which is at

the core of Amnesty International’s methods (Amnesty International 2019h).

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Which solutions have been promoted by Amnesty International, and what

explains Amnesty International’s decision to promote these particular solutions?

The final research aim of the study was to look at solutions to the conflict, as suggested

by Amnesty International. Perhaps unsurprisingly, the solutions suggested were

numerous. The organisation presented very specific, personalised solutions to different

organisations, such as ASEAN, the EU and the UN, as well to individual countries and

their governments. Because the suggested solutions were extremely specific, only six

solutions were coded under an individual code, and the rest were coded under the main

category "What needs to be done?".

Out of the solutions coded under the main category three were mentioned more often

or are worth mentioning for specific reasons. Firstly, the government of Myanmar has

made false accusations and disseminated misinformation about humanitarian workers

and aid workers. According to the officials, they are supporting ethnic armed groups,

which the Tatmadaw is fighting against. Unsurprisingly, Amnesty International has

demanded that such claims are no longer made and that the dissemination of

misinformation is stopped. Secondly, it was demanded that The United Nations

Security Council refers the situation of Myanmar to the ICC. The Security Council has

been very ineffective when it comes to handling the conflict, and luckily the appeals

were heard, since the ICC authorised an investigation into the situation in November

2019. Thirdly, when it comes to the repatriations and relocations of the Rohingya, they

need to be safe, voluntary and dignified. Furthermore, the relocations must not be

implemented, unless the new location is not vulnerable to environmental hazards, for

instance.

The most often suggested and the most important solutions, for which individual

codes and subcategories were created, were 1) addressing impunity, 2) allowing

outsider observers, humanitarian workers, human rights monitors and independent

journalists access to the country, 3) increasing international attention and pressure, 4)

stopping arms trade/arms embargo, 5) financial sanctions and 6) donations.

The first solution, addressing impunity, is not going to be an easy task. The impunity

of soldiers, BGP officers and security forces has a long history. The military is entirely

in charge of its own judicial processes, which means that bringing perpetrators to justice

in Myanmar is highly unlikely. Therefore, the international community must participate

in making sure that the crimes do not go unpunished. The international cooperation was

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frequently emphasised with quotes, as well as the need to punish individuals with

"blood on their hands". In other words, strong language and unapologetic appeals were

made in the news articles and reports. Perhaps to emphasise the need to bring

perpetrators to justice, a long list of names, including military commanders-in-chief and

individual BGP corporals, was presented in Amnesty International 2018h.

The second solution, allowing different operators to enter the country, has taken a

few steps of improvement as time has gone by. In the beginning cooperation was

practically non-existent, but at the time of conducting the study the results of The

Independent International Fact-Finding Mission on Myanmar have been published and

many arbitrarily arrested journalists have been released. Partly relating to addressing

impunity, the ICC has authorised an investigation into the crimes and the State

Counsellor Aung San Suu Kyi appeared in front of the ICJ to respond to genocide

allegations in late 2019.

The third solution, increasing international attention and pressure, appears to be very

important to Amnesty International. Very direct appeals and moral judgements have

been made to individual countries for various reasons, such as Japan and Bangladesh,

and to international organisations, such as the UN and ASEAN. The quotes and

subheadings in the articles and reports reveal that the situation is considered an utter

failure and that the situation is extremely disappointing.

The fourth solution suggested, stopping arms trade and imposing a comprehensive

arms embargo, also raised strong feelings of disapproval and concern, because many

European countries have continued their relationships with Myanmar. Moreover,

China, Russia and Israel were reportedly supplying weapons to Myanmar. The

Commander-in-Chief of Defence Services, Min Aung Hlaing, visited Austria and

Germany in 2017 to discuss the provision of training, whilst also touring an aircraft

manufacturer's facilities. The United States Senate National Defence Authorization Act

(NDAA) also called for expanding military to military engagement, in the forms of

training and workshops. This solution is not surprising, as one of Amnesty

International’s listed interests on their website amnesty.org is arms control.

The fifth solution are financial sanctions. According to Amnesty International, they

should be posed by organisations such as the UN (the Security Council, in particular),

the EU and ASEAN. Luckily, this technique has already been used and enforced at least

in February 2021.

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The last solution that has been suggested are donations. Needless to say, the funds

are desperately needed to buy food and medicine and to improve the sanitation, medical

care and infrastructure in the camps, only to mention a few examples. The responsibility

of the donors has been emphasised, because the donors should and need to make sure

that the money is not being used to support oppressive or in other ways questionable

regimes, companies or organisations. Suggesting donations is not surprising in this

case, because Amnesty International also runs mainly on donations. Thus, it makes

sense that donations would be on their agenda.

Based on the results, we can conclude that the solutions to the conflict are discussed

and presented through four identifiable frames. These are the frame of failure, the frame

of disappointment, the frame of international cooperation and the frame of

comprehensiveness. The long-lasting ethnic conflict cannot be solved by an individual

actor in a single manner. Rather, multiple measures need to be taken and combined by

multiple actors.

Final words In February 2021 the Myanmar military went through with a military coup, amongst

other measures arresting and placing the State Counsellor Aung San Suu Kyi under

house arrest (Amnesty International 2021). Protests and countermeasures have been

taking place on an almost daily basis, leading to multiple losses of lives and

deteriorating the situation in the country even further. It strongly appears that the

country is on the verge of civil war. It is imperative that the situation be monitored and

taken under control immediately.

The academic world has an important part to play in this. There are still numerous

aspects about the conflict and the Rohingya that we know nothing about. For instance,

there is no previous academic research on the Rohingya's living conditions in the

camps, apart from some medical research identifying diseases of which they suffer.

Academic research should also focus on how the latest turns of the ethnic conflict have

affected the Rohingya and how they feel about the current situation in their homeland.

Lastly, on a more general level, more information is needed regarding the effects of

armed conflict on older people. It became painfully obvious during the research process

that there is practically no academic research done on how older people are affected by

armed conflicts. Hopefully this study has shed some light on this, previously quite

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untouched, topic. However, a lot more research needs to be done, if we ever wish to

understand the situation and change things for the better.

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Amnesty International. 2017i. “Myanmar: Rohingya Boat Drowning Shows No Let-Up in Rakhine State Desperation.” Accessed November 25, 2021. https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2017/10/myanmar-rohingya-boat-drowning-shows-no-let-up-in-rakhine-state-desperation-2/

Amnesty International. 2017j. "Myanmar/Bangladesh: Rohingya Refugees Must Not Be Forced Home to Abuse and Discrimination." Accessed April 10, 2021. https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2017/10/myanmar-bangladesh-rohingya-refugees-must-not-be-forced-home-to-abuses-and-discrimination/.

Amnesty International. 2017k. “Myanmar: “My World Is Finished”. Rohingya Targeted in Crimes Against Humanity in Myanmar.” Accessed December 1, 2020. https://www.amnesty.org/en/documents/asa16/7288/2017/en/.

Amnesty International. 2017l. "One of the World's Poorest Countries Confronts Ethnic Cleansing on Its Doorstep." Accessed April 18, 2021. https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2017/11/one-of-the-worlds-poorest-countries-confronts-ethnic-cleansing-on-its-doorstep/.

Amnesty International. 2017m. "Myanmar: "Caged Without A Roof: Apartheid in Myanmar's Rakhine State." Accessed April 2, 2021. https://www.amnesty.org/en/documents/asa16/7484/2017/en/.

Amnesty International. 2017n. "Bangladesh: Rohingya Refugees Must Not Be Relocated to Uninhabitable Island." Accessed April 10, 2021. https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2017/11/bangladesh-rohingya-refugees-must-not-be-relocated-to-uninhabitable-island/.

Amnesty International. 2017o.”UN: China Fails to Scupper Resolution on Myanmar’s Persecution of Rohingya.” Accessed November 25, 2021. https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/press-release/2017/12/un-china-fails-to-scupper-resolution-on-myanmars-persecution-of-rohingya/

Amnesty International. 2018a. "Myanmar: Military's Mass Grave Admission Exposes Extrajudicial Killings of Rohingya." Accessed April 10, 2021. https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2018/01/myanmar-militarys-mass-grave-admission-exposes-extrajudicial-killings-of-rohingya/.

Amnesty International. 2018b. “Myanmar: Fresh Evidence of Ongoing Ethnic Cleansing As Military Starves, Abducts and Robs Rohingya.” Accessed November 25, 2021. https://www.amnesty.org.au/myanmar-fresh-evidence-ongoing-ethnic-cleansing-military-starves-abducts-robs-rohingya/

Amnesty International. 2018c "Myanmar: Forced Starvation of Rohingya Highlights Danger of Premature Returns." Accessed April 3, 2021. https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2018/03/myanmar-forced-starvation-of-rohingya-highlights-danger-of-premature-returns/.

Amnesty International. 2018d. “Myanmar: Case Against Reuters Journalists Upheld As Media Restrictions Intensify.” Accessed November 25, 2021. https://www.amnestyusa.org/press-releases/myanmar-case-against-reuters-journalists-upheld-as-media-restrictions-intensify/

Amnesty International. 2018e. "Myanmar: Remaking Rakhine State." Accessed April 10, 2021. https://www.amnesty.org/en/documents/asa16/8018/2018/en/.

Amnesty International. 2018f. "Myanmar: New Evidence Reveals Rohingya Armed Group Massacred Scores in Rakhine State." Accessed April 10, 2021. https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2018/05/myanmar-new-evidence-reveals-rohingya-armed-group-massacred-scores-in-rakhine-state/.

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Amnesty International. 2018g. “Myanmar: Attacks by the Arakan Rohingya Salvation Army on Hindus in Northern Rakhine State.” Accessed November 25, 2021. https://www.amnesty.org/en/documents/asa16/8454/2018/en/

Amnesty International. 2018h. ""We Will Destroy Everything” – Military Responsibility for Crimes Against Humanity in Rakhine State, Myanmar." Accessed December 1, 2020. https://www.amnesty.org/en/documents/asa16/8630/2018/my/.

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Amnesty International. 2018j. "Myanmar: Shameful Anniversary Highlights Lack of Accountability for Atrocities Against Rohingya." Accessed April 10, 2021. https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2018/08/myanmar-shameful-anniversary-highlights-lack-of-accountability-for-atrocities-against-rohingya/

Amnesty International. 2018k. “Myanmar: ICC Decision Opens A Clear Avenue for Justice for the Rohingya.” Accessed December 1, 2020. https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2018/09/myanmar-icc-decision-opens-avenue-for-justice-rohingya/.

Amnesty International. 2018l. “Myanmar: Aung San Suu Kyi in Shameful Defence of Reuters Journalists’ Conviction.” Accessed November 25, 2021. https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/press-release/2018/09/myanmar-aung-san-suu-kyi-in-shameful-defence-of-reuters-journalists-conviction/

Amnesty International. 2018m. "Japan Is on the Wrong Side of History over Myanmar's Atrocities against the Rohingya." Accessed April 10, 2021. https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2018/09/japan-is-on-the-wrong-side-of-history-over-myanmars-atrocities-against-the-rohingya/.

Amnesty International. 2018n. “UN: Major Step Towards Accountability for Atrocity Crimes in Myanmar.” Accessed December 1, 2020. https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2018/09/un-amnesty-reaction-to-hrc-resolution-on-myanmar/.

Amnesty International. 2018o. “Myanmar: Three Journalists Arrested in Latest Assault on Press Freedom.” Accessed November 25, 2021. https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/press-release/2018/10/myanmar-three-journalists-arrested-latest-assault-press-freedom/

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Amnesty International. 2019d. "Myanmar: "Fleeing My Whole Life": Older People's Experience of Conflict and Displacement in Myanmar." Accessed December 1, 2020. https://www.amnesty.org/en/documents/asa16/0446/2019/en/.

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Amnesty International. 2019g. “Bangladesh: "I Don’t Know What My Future Will Be”: Advocacy Update on Rohingya Refugees in Bangladesh." Accessed December 1, 2020. https://www.amnesty.org/en/documents/asa13/0901/2019/en/.

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Amnesty International. 2019l. "Myanmar: Aung San Suu Kyi Appears Before ICJ in Genocide Case." Accessed April 10, 2021. https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2019/12/myanmar-aung-san-suu-kyi-appears-before-icj-in-genocide-case/.

Amnesty International. 2020a."Myanmar: World Court Orders Myanmar to Protect Rohingya." Accessed December 1, 2020. https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2020/01/myanmar-world-court-orders-myanmar-protect-rohingya/.

Amnesty International. 2020b. "A 'Lost Generation' of Rohingya Children Will Have Nowhere to Go." Accessed April 16, 2021. https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2020/01/a-lost-generation-of-rohingya-children-will-have-nowhere-to-go/.

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Amnesty International. 2020f. “Malaysia: Stop Plans to Cane Rohingya Refugees and Release Those Already Imprisoned.” Accessed November 25, 2021. https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2020/07/malaysia-stop-plans-to-cane-rohingya-refugees-and-release-those-already-imprisoned/

Amnesty International. 2020g. “Myanmar: Leaked Documents Reveal Global Business Ties to Military Crimes.” Accessed November 25, 2021. https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/press-release/2020/09/mehl-military-links-to-global-businesses/

Amnesty International. 2020h. "Bangladesh: Let Us Speak for Our Rights: Human Rights Situation of Rohingya Refugees in Bangladesh." Accessed April 9, 2021. https://www.amnesty.org/en/documents/asa13/2884/2020/en/.

Amnesty International 2020i. "Rohingya Refugees Must Participate in Decisions Affecting Their Lives." Accessed 18, 2021. https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2020/09/bangladesh-rohingya-refugees-must-participate-in-decisions-affecting-their-lives/.

Amnesty International. 2020j. "Bangladesh: Rohingya Refugees' Safety Must Be Ensured amid Violent Clashes in Cox's Bazaar." Accessed April 18, 2021. https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2020/10/bangladesh-rohingya-refugees-safety-must-be-ensured-amid-violent-clashes-in-coxs-bazaar/.

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