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Transcript of Power, Totalitarianism and the Fairy Tale Ideal Jeremy E ...
The Horror Of "Happily Ever After":
Power, Totalitarianism and the Fairy Tale Ideal
Jeremy E. DeVito
B.A., Mount Allison University, 1999
Thesis submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for
the Degree of Master of Arts (English)
Acadia Universiiy Fall Convocation 200 1
Q by Jeremy E. DeVito, 200 1
I, Jeremy E. DeVito, grant permission to the University Librarian at Acadia University toreproduce, loan, or distrubute copies of my thesis in microform, paper or electronic
formats on a non-profit basis. I, however, retain the copyright in my thesis.
Signature of Author
Date
Contents
Abstract
Key To Citations
Acknowledgernents
Introduction
A Note on Michel Foucault and the Fairy Tale Ideal
Chapter 1 - Fairy Tale Crisis: Stepmothers, Spiinters and Peas (Oh My!)
Flaws and imperfections (and the sleeping patterns of Princess's)
Contlicting visions and fairy taie rivalry: a struggle for dominance
Deviant invasion (or what happens when the wolves are not kept at bay)
Food intentions and the failure to devour
Chapter II - Fairy Tale Resolution: Destruction, Conformity, and Isolation
"Little Red Riding Hood" and the fairy tale ideal
AnnihiIating deviance: to devour and destroy
Conforming deviance: the production of docile bodies
Keeping deviance out: brick tvalls and locked doors . . '-Honibly Ever Afier"
Chapter III - Fairy Tale Alternatives: Revisioning "Happily Ever After"
(Re)visions of the tàiry tale ideal
Equal time for differing points of view
Anne Sexton's Transformations: an interrogation
A different approach: resisting closure, finding fault with perfection
The anti-fairy-tale
Concl usion
Works Cited
Works Consulted
Appendix: Famous Last Words
Abstract
While many various approaches have been taken to the study of fairy tales this
thesis aims at introducing to the field an approach that has not been put to extensive use.
In recent years, with the rïse of what is referred to under the umbrelia of "literary theory,"
fairy tales have been analyse& in depth, according to such theories as structuralism,
psychoanalytic theory, Marxisrn and, most pervasively, feminism. What has not been
attempted, on a large scale, is a post-stnichiralist approach to the genre. This thesis, in
applying to fairy tales the theones and methodologies of Michel Foucault, takes just such
an approach. In accordance with Foucault's particular brand of post-structuralism, the
study at hand is concerned with the workings of power within the mica1 fairy tale and
especially within the typical fairy tale "happily ever aftery' ending. When examined
through such a template the utopian vision towards which the conventional fairy taie
sîrives bccornzs one built [lot upon a foundation of absolute happiness or absolute çood,
but upon onc of absolutc powcr. "Happily cvcr after" is, for al1 intcnts and purposcs, a
totalitanan statr. It is achieved through total dominance and through the elimination of
dissent so that, in the end, a single, total, order of things remain. In efTect, the fairy tale
fantasy of perfect happiness is a reflection of the same "wdl to power" that (according to
the theories of Foucault) forms our reality.
Kev To Citations:
A = cbAshputtle" (Brothers Grimm)
BR = "Brier Rose" (Brothers Grimm)
C = "Cinderella7' (Perrault)
H&G = "Hansel and Gretel" (Brothers Grimm)
J&B = "Jack and the Beanstalk" (Jacobs)
LRC = "Little Red Cap" (Brothers Grimm)
LRRH = "Little Red &ding Hood" (Perrault)
P&P = "The Princess and the Pea" (Andersen)
R = "Rurnpelstiltskin" (Brothers Grimm)
SB = "The Sleeping Beauty in the Wood" (Perrault)
SLT = "Sole, Lune, E Talia" (Basile)
SW = "Snow White" (Brothers Grimm)
TLP = T h e Story of the Three Little Pigs" (Jacobs)
Acknowledmnents
First of al1 I would like to thank Dr. Andrea Schwenke Wyile for her supervision,
her assistance, the use of her personal library and, most of all, for her continued
encouragement. 1 must also express my gratitude to the entire English Department at
Acadia, including the Graduate class (Hamid, Mike, fistina), as well as the English
Department at Mount Allison, where 1 completed my undergraduate degree, and in
particular to Dr. Deborah Wills for providing me with the background that made this
project possible. 1 would also like to Say thank you to Martin Hallett for his book on Folk
& Fuiry Tales and for his input in the final stages of this project, both of which have
proved valuable. Finally, thank you to my family and fn'ends and, most importantly, to
my wife, Natasha, for having lived through the experience of the past year with me and
my obsession with other women (Little Red, Cinderella, Snow White, Bnar Rose and, as
always, Alice, to name just a few).
Introduction
"...and they al1 lived happily ever after." Could we ask for a less problematic
ending to a tale? 1 would suggest that we could - that, indeed, we should. In fact, wïthin
the pages of this Masters Thesis 1 will argue that the "happily ever after7' conclusion so
common to fairy and folk tales is, in many ways, the most problematic ending of all. This
vision of a total happiness, it will be argued, cames with it the same troubles and terrors
as do al1 totalitarian visions- As evidenced in such tales as "Snow White" or even "The
Three Little Pigs," etemal happiness for one must usually be bought at high cost to
another. Although such evidence rnay be dismissed (and has been for ages) as a simple
example of justice in which the good are rewarded with good, the evil with evil, I believe
it deserves a closer look. Hence, the main questions with which my thesis will be
concerned are: "At what cost (fieedom? difference? pleasure? life?) is "happily ever
after" to be achieved, and at what cost is it to be maintained?"
Lying beneath my study are the powerhowledge theories of Michel Foucault.
Therefore my focus is aimed at an attempt to locate the suppressed stoty within the story
and to investigate the reasons for and methods of this suppression. In this I make no
apologies for my biased assertion that fairy tales, like histories of war, are written from
the perspective of the winners. Nevertheless, 1 have endeavoured to leave Foucault in the
background of the body of the thesis. Rather than to relegate the primary texts that 1 am
dealing with to the status of a being a starting point for a Foucauldian exercise, in the
mode of many theory-oriented critics, I have attempted to put the f a i r tales up front. In
an effort to make this possible, 1 begin my study with a bnef note achowledging
Foucault and how his theories pertain to the study at hand, thereby Ieaving myself free to
discuss the "happily ever afterYy ideaI in Iight of the tales themselves.
Said tales include various versions of "The Princess and the Pea,"
"Rurnplestiltskin," "Hansel and Gretel," "Sleeping Beauty." "Cinderella," "Snow White,"
"Little Red Riding Hood" "The Three Little Pigs" and, of course, "Jack and the
Beanstalk." This selection of fairy tales is intentionally eclectic; the orïgins, styles, plots
and settings of these narratives are various. What remains is their undying optimism -
their focused drive towardç an ending that iç "happily ever afier," and al1 that this entails.
Because these stories have been told, and retold, written and rewritten, in countless
contexts, times, places and languages, much of the challenge in studying them has been in
deciding upon authoritative versions of each. My solution to this problem is to focus,
primarily, on those variants most comrnonly recognised by the general pubIic and viewed
as being the "originals" (in written form) such as those of the Brothers Grimm and
Charles Perrault. 1 operate under the assurnption that regardiess of which version of a
story is used (with the exception of those which are intentionally parodic or subversive, as
are the tales 1 deal with in my final chapter), the same basic themes, and thus the same
basic problems, hold.
The thesis itself consists of three chôpters. Within rny first chapter 1 explore the
origin of crisis within fairytaies. In doing so 1 suggest that the basic crisis within al1 of
these stories is more or Iess the same and arises out of a drive towards the standard fairy
tale vision of a perfect existence. Although some tales begin with an idyllic setting which
is later lost and others begin in an already imperfect world, the complication in either case
arises not so much out of an impending danger but rather out of a perceived imperfection
(or, more accurately, a deviation), be it large or tediously srnall, that stands in the way of
the establishment or re-establishment of a perfectly unified and thus, "happy," non-
deviant realm. For example, while it would be difftcult to argue that having a stepmother
bent on one's death is not an impending danger, 1 would propose that the real problem
with the stepmother, and the reason she is a recurrïng character within folktaledom, is that
she can never achieve the perfection of mother. A stepmother has no more business in the
perfect life of a pnncess than does a pea in her twenty-feather-rnattressed bed. Likewise
the case against the Big Bad Wolf is that his interests are contrary to those of o w
protagonists, be they The Three Little Pigs or Little Red Riding Hood, and therefore
threaten their idyllic lives. On the other han4 as 1 will demonstrate, oftentimes it is the
hero/ine of a given tale who fills the role of deviant and, therefore, is responsible for the
conflict that arises. Fairy tale crisis, thus, does not a i se out of a conflict between good
and evil but out of the mere existence of anything mnning counter to a single, absolute
order, anything representing a break in a prevailing image of total perfection and
happiness. In any case, a solution to the existence of such deviant bodies, such different
points of view, must be found.
This solution is the focus of my second chapter. It is in working towards the
"happily ever after" and maintaining it that the totalitarian aspect of the fairy tale vision is
made most evident. In keeping with Foucault's theones of deviance and control, the
antagonist in the story must be not only defeated, but also annihilated. The dissenting
voice, and any threat that accompanies it, is obliterated once and for all. Such action must
usually corne about through the protagonist's newfound a l i v e n t with power (often
achieved in a marriage to royalty). Even in kinder, fiendlier versions of such tales the
antagonist must be transformed (Le. Cinderella's wicked stepsisters recognize her beauty
and have a change of heart), thus doing away with the dissenting voice, if not its vesse!.
Another way of achieving the fairy tale ideal can be seen in the gamson mentality of the
third little pig in his attempt to put up walls, thereby locking deviance out. Of course, the
main problem with the perfect fairy tale existence is not in achieving it, but in
maintaining it. Hence, the storyteller's habit of maliing a quick exit as soon as total
happiness is reached. Therefore, some reading "beyond the ending" will be required in
order to interrogate the more lasting effects and implications of the "happily ever after"
ending.
Finally, my third chapter focuses on those who have read beyond the ending and
have decided that, perhaps, the static, uncompromising world of the "happily ever after"
is not so happy after all. There has been a long tradition of cynicism towards the
traditional vision of the fairytaie, which has resulted in both a new type of tale (as told by
Lewis Carroll among others) and the satirïcal rewritings of older fairytales (as told by
such writers as The Merseyside Fairy Story Collective, Angela Carter, and Anne Seston,
to name a few). In contemplating such texts, I have made a distinction between those that
offer a cynical critique, and those that offer an alternative mode, a solution to the problem
of the typical fairy tale resolution. After aI1, if "happily ever afier" is no way to end a
story, what is?
A Note on Michel Foucault and the Fairv Tale Ideal
It wouid seem that for many fairy tales the striving towards an uItimate and total
happiness, is the main force driving and directing the narrative. Nevertheless, many
critics of the genre have questioned the legitirnacy of the vision of perfect existence as it
is presented wlthin fairy tales. These critics suggest that, if w e dig a little deeper, we will
discover that the ideals presented within many fairy tales are not so ideal, the "happily
ever afier" not so happy. As a case in point, such critics as Jack Zipes and Mana Tatar
have passed judgment on the Grimms' "Cinderella" suggesting that, because the heroine
of the story %ke so many of the Grimm heroi~es" is a passive figure who "gets her man
through a combination of hard domestic labor and supematurally enhanced beauty," the
story, far frorn being a woman's fantasy, "is an insuIt to women" (de Vos & Altmann
50,51). Implied in this critique, and those like it, is the suggestion that the problematic
within fairy tales anses out of a wong-minded vision of what constitutes ideal and
perfect happiness. This study aims to take a different approach in proposing that the
problematic within the fairy tale arises out of the very fact that it /?as a vision cf
perfection. In short, the problematic within the fairy tale is to be found in its veiy striving
towards the non-problematic. In taking such an approach the theories and methodology of
Michel Foucault must be acknowledged as providing a foundation for this study. 1 would
stiggest that the will to happiness is - as Foucault suggests is the case wïth the will to
mith - directly related to a will to power. Thus, the striving towards a vision of [oral
happiness, within the fairy tale or within the society it informs and out of which it
originates is, according to a Foucauldian analysis, a striving towards rural power.
While Foucault's research and analyses have touched upon a variety of topics
(sexuality, madness, and institutions such as prisons and hospitals, to name a few) and has
spamed several disciplines, his primary focus has remained consistent. He is interested in
the workings of power. For Foucault, though, power is not simply that which is exercised
by powerful individuals and institutions; rather, it is what pervades, orders and defines
every facet of society. The actions, words, and even the thouçhts and beliefs of the
individual (as well as the collective) are governed by a "will to power." Thus, as Foucault
puts it, we must "base Our analysis of power on the study of the techniques and tactics of
domination" (Power Kmwletige 102).
It must be granted, at this point, that such an analysis of the fairy tale might seem
to be sornewhat out of touch wïth the spirit of the genre. Foucault's interest is in historical
figures and events, in political systerns and institutions; his concern is with human
realities- The fairy tale world, on the other hand, is decidedly unreal. It is the realm of
fantasy. There is a h a certain utopian aspect to the standard fairy tale "happily ever
after" vision, although this vision is typically one concerning the achievernent of a perfect
persona1 existence, rather than that of a pcrfect society. Moreover, this fairy tale vision is
utopian both in the sense of the word "utopia" meaning an ideal or "nice place" (fiorn the
Latin, "eutopia") and that meaning another or "no place" (fiom the Greek, "outopia")
(Strode's "Utopianism / Utopian Socialism"). Fairy taIes are typically told and received
with the realization that what is being shared is a dream, never to be realized in everyday
existence. Hence, it might be argued that, so far as the fairy tale is concerned, the
"techniques and tactics of domination" in which Foucault is interested do not come into
play. The fairy tale realm is ideal precisely because it is the realm of fantasy.
If fairy tales are fantasies, however, they are our fantasies. They originate out of
the hopes and drearns of real people. Although they do not describe reality as we h o w it,
they do paint a portrait of reality as many would most desire it to be. It is for this reason
that the theones of such social critics as Foucault are relevant even to the most
consciously fictional realrn of the fairy tale. Just as such methodology works to suggest
that the physical human world is stnicturzd by power and power relations, so too does it
work to suçgest that even our dreams of a better life have much to do 14th the innate
(according to Foucault) human desire for power and dominance.
This, then, changes the focus somewhat with regard to how we read fairy tales and
especially the "happily ever after" ending common to so many fairy tales. Essentially,
what takes place cannot be viewed simply as the protagonist's fortunate escape frorn
tyrannical power. Instead, the personal utopia reached in the conclusion to the traditional
fairy taIe is the end result of the protagonist's having achieved or become aligned with a
dominant power. Thus, in the case of such a heroine as Snow White it is significant that
not only does she escape the power and royal authority of her stepmother, the Queen, who
wouId put her to death, but she also achieves this self same power and royal authority in
marrying the Prince. Moreover, it must be noted that, read in this light, the motives of the
conventional fairy tale hero/ine and those of the conventional fairy tale villain becorne
one and the same. Each is stnrggIing to achieve or to maintain a dominant position. In
such an analysis of the fairy tale, and in keeping with the methodology of Foucault, what
becomes important is not who succeeds, but how and to what extent this success takes
place.
Key to this methodoIogy is Foucault's emphasis on the relationship between
power and knowledge. For Foucault power and knowledge are built upon one another;
that is to Say, power is created and sustained through knowledge, wkch is, likewise,
created and sustained through power. Simply put, howledge (or tnith) is a construct; it is
not something that is discovered; it is produced. More importantly, it is a tactic of
domination. The will to power m u t also contain within it the wi11 to truth in that "[wle
are subjected to the production of truth tfirough power and we cannot exercise power
except through the production of tmth" (Power Knowledge 93). Hence, such concepts as
good and evil, in so much as they are related to (byproducts of) this "truth," become
problematic. It is power that detennines, and estabiishes for its own purposes, what is
"good." Within this context it becomes quite inadequate to examine fairy tales in relation
to a standard dualistic mode1 of good versus evil in which good eventually wins out,
gaining power over evil. In like manner, it is inadequate to debate the n'ghtness of the
ideals (the perspective of what is good) being presented. Rather, what becomes
significant is the examination of how concepts of what is good and tnie corne to be
established. Further, it may be noted that the very idea of what constitutes happiness is
also a product of power/knowledge. Just as 'the question 'what is power?' is, for
[Foucault], secondary to the question 'how is power exercised?"' (Cousins 227), the
standard question in relation to fairy tale critique, "what constitutes ideal happiness?"
must, in like manner, become secondary to the question, "how is ideal happiness
constituted?"
In effect, it is the establishment of what is right and true (a proper order of things)
that constitutes the fairy tale happy ending. In light of the theories of Foucault, however,
right and true are conditions of discourse or, more specifically, are defined for most by an
existing dominant discourse. Therefore, the study that is important to Foucault, and to this
examination of the fairy tale, is one of discourse; its focus concerns the location and
identification of different discourses and an analysis of the mechanisrm that bring a
particular discourse to dominance. It must be noted that the term "discourse" here does
not refer simply to spoken or written foms of communication. Rather, it refers to
discourse as the articulation of power in word as well as act, and also in more subtle
foms such as surveillance and the threat of surveillance or even the implied disapproval
or ridicule expressed through a simple facial gesture. Foucault makes it clear within the
pages of his influential work, Discipime und Ymislz: The Birlh of' fhe Prison, that
individual human beings and bodies are not simply the subjects of power, but are also the
agents, whether willingly or not, of its articulation. As Foucault presents it, acts of
punishment, such as torture or execution, consist of something more than the simple
exercise of power upon the body of the condemned; they also work to establish and
articulate power [and tnith) thouglz the body of the condernned- Hence, the torture and
execution of a condemned man, within a traditional monarchy and according to the
demands of the Crown, works to articulate at once the "surplus power" of the king, as
well as "the 'Iack of power' with which those subjected to punishment are rnarked
(Foucault Discipline und Punislz 29). In short, the individual body, even (or especially) in
its most passive or seemingly powerless mode, becomes an intinsic aspect of the
dominant power discome that exists. What is right and true, then, actually cornes to be
established and articulated by power as it is exercised upon even the involuntary
individual - the individual who would prefer not to participate in the dominant discourse
at hand.
Of course, such an analysis of crime and punishment has profow.0 ramifications
when applied to our reading of fairy tales. Indeed, Discipline and Punish begins in much
the same manner as many fairy tales end. The villain, in this case being "Damiens the
regicide," is condemned, among other things, to having the flesh tom fiom his body "with
red-hot pincers [. . . ] and then his body drawn and quartered" and finally "consurned by
fire, reduced to ashes and his ashes thrown to the wind" (Foucault Discipline and Punish
3). Several well recognized fairy tale villains (the Wolf of "Little Red Riding Hood"
Snow White's stepmothedqueen, or Rurnpelstiltskin, to name a few) suffer similar fates
as the impiied consequence of their evil behavior. However, in conducting a discursive
analysis of such events it becomes imperative to recognize the fact that such punishments
work not simply to correct or eliminate villainy; they also work to define villainy as such.
Thus, the ideal situation, the "happily ever afieryy ending we are left with, is defined and
articulated as such in its very being established. The dominant discourse, in becorning
dominant, also becomes the ideal.
This said it must be recognized that, within the theories of Foucault, the
dominant discourse is not the only discourse to exist. There a h exist alternative
discourses of deviance, which are suggested and represented by deviant bodies (those
which do not conform to or act in accordance with the dominant discourse). Moreover,
these alternative discourses are also born of pocver and therefore pose a threat to the
power, or discourse, which dominates. In fact, there is always the possibility of upset, the
possibility that deviance and dissent will win out and overthrow (and even replace) this
dominant discourse. By and large, it is this possibility that drives the action (fiom both
sides) of most fairy tales. A most illustrative example of this is to be found in the story of
"Snow White." The motives of the villain stepmother in her attempts on Snow White's
life are clearly laid out; she is making an effort to secure her position of dominance as the
"fairest in the land." Further, Snow White's dominant position onIy cornes to be secured
in the eventual death of the Queen- Therefore, the conflict that exists within such fairy
tales need not be analyzed as being one between good and evil as it is, firs: and foremost,
one between conflicting discourses as each strives towards dominance of the other.
With this in mind it must be acknowledged that, throughout the main body of
most fairy tales, total domination does not take place. (A powerful wolf may blow down a
house and eat a pig, but a dever pig may build a house that cannot be blown down, in
spite of extensive huffing and puffiing.) Nevertheless, it is toward this end of total
domination that the typical fairy tale is implicitly working in its striving toward a
"happily ever afier" conclusion. Some factors help to blur this fact somewhat. There is,
for instance, much shifting of places within fairy tales; as situations change, characters
change position in relation to the several dominant discourses that anse. Thus, the
position of Snow White's stepmother shifts within the course of the tale from one of
power and dominance, as Queen, to one of deviance, as an enemy to the neiv Prince's
Bride, Snow White. In this she is transforrned from one who seeks to suppress and
destroy the threat to her dominant power into one who must be destroyed as a threat to the
newly established dominance of her stepdaughter. Fairy tales also tend to invite sympathy
for the particular character that conforms to the dominant discourse of the society out of
which the tale was written (hence the patriarchal overtones). It is through this sympathy
that the ~roublesonze prospect of total dominance, for which the fairy tale villain strives,
comes to be seen as being an ideal conclusion when finally achieved by the hero/ine at
the er,d of the tale.
Contrarily, in applying the theories of Foucault, the ''happily ever afier" ending
may be viewed as being far more troublesome, more horrïfic even, than is any striving
towards domination on the part of the villain of the fairy tale. It is, after all, only in the
fairy tale ending that totality is ultimately achieved. In this it rnust be noted that the fairy
tale differs quite significantly fiom the vision of society presented by Foucault. Tndeed,
Foucault's methodology operates under the assumption that the dominant discourse is
never totally and completely dominant, that totality is never attained; dissenting
discourses and deviant bodies always exist (although they are often suppressed) to pose a
chaIlenge to, and create cracks in, the dominant discourse at hand. In fact, much of
Foucault's study is focused upon the location and articulation of such suppressed
alternative discourses. Eowever, the fantasy of the fziry tale allows for, or more precisely
demands, what even the most totalitarian forces of reality can only dream of - the
successful and total eradication of al1 dissent.
Of course, it must also be noted that such eradication of dissent is often
accomplished in ways other than the destruction or annihilation of deviant bodies. Rather,
in keeping with the observations of Foucault, dissent is often dealt with through the
production of docile bodies. Ln other words, the deviant individual, through the
mechanisms of powerhowledge, is not destroyed by the dominant discourse but is made
to conform to it. Read in this light, kinder, gentler versions of fairy tales, in which villains
reform and participate in the ideal world that comes to be established, are not essentially
much different from those in which the villain is made to sufFer a horrible death. In effect,
Charles Perrault's "Little Red Riding Hood," in concluding with Riding Hood's being
devoured by the wolf as an implied consequence of her having deviated from her path "to
talk to strangers" (Perrault "Little Red Riding Hood" 27), contains rnuch the same result
as does the Grimm version of the tale, "Little Red Cap," which ends with the
protagonist's vow never again to "leave the path and mn off into the wood when rny
mother telis me not tom (Grimm "Little Red Cap" 30). While the latter may seem less
troublesome (and more typical of the fairy tale "happily ever after" ending) than the
former, both tales reach conclusion in the elimination of dissent, one through the
annihilation of the deviant body, the other through its reform. In fact, Foucault would
seem to suggest, within the pages of Discipline & Punislz, that the latter method of
dealing with deviance through discipline and reform is sornehow more troublesome, more
sinister even, than the former method of punishment and execution. Whereas physical
punishrnent and execution display the exercise of power upon the body, the mechanisms
of discipline and reform work ~ 4 t h the intention of exercising power on "the sou17'
(Foucault Discipline Q Punish 16). Needless to Say, this does not make tomre and death,
within fairy tales any more than within Me, more desirable or more readily accepted than
discipline and reform. As Mark Cousins points out, "we would prefer to go to prison than
to be tom limb from limb" (4). Nevertheless, in either case the finai goal is totality, the
complete elimination and annihilation of dissenting discourses - a goal which, when
achieved within the fairy tale, results in a "happily ever after" ending.
Further, it is this goal that brings about the conflict and complication at the
begiming of most fairy tales. Many fairy tales begin within a realm of near totality, in
which a dominant discourse seems to prevail until something or someone enters into the
picture to threaten this totality. However, from one tale to the next such totality takes on
very different foms so that it may not always be viewed as carrying the fairy tale vision
of perfect existence. While many readers may be inclined to view the peaceable kingdom
witnessed at the beginning of the Grimms' "Brier Rose" as being an ideal setting and
situation, few would be inclined to view the Ogre's kingdom in the clouds, at the
beçiming of Joseph Jacobs' "Jack and the Beanstalk," in the same way. Yet, the two are
quite similar in that each presents a world in cvhich one vision prevails and dominates al1
others. Moreover, each of these worlds comes to be threatened by an intruder wïth
conflicting interests to those of this dominant vision. Simply put, Jack's roIe is much the
sarne as that of the thirteenth fairy; both are deviant bodies and, as such, both threaten the
order of things as they exist. These and other fairy tales, however, develop and conclude
quite differently. Whereas some end, as does "Brier Rose," with the total restoration of
the original dominant power, others, such as "Jack and the Beanstalk," end tvith the total
overthrow and replacement of the original with a new dominant power. Yet, in either
instance, the action of the tale is brought about through an attempt at the elhination of a
perceived threat to the dominant order of things.
Further, since the "happily ever after" vision is one of total happiness, it requires
not just dominance, but fotal dominance. Therefore, aï- imperfection or inconsistency in
the vision, no rnatter how small, comes to be perceived as a threat that must be
eliminated. All that is required to shatter the perfect world being sought within the fairy
tale is for a princess to prick her finger on a spinning wheel or for a Queen to be only the
second "fairest in the land." Hence, al1 spinning wheels must be bumed, al! "budding
beauties" assassinated in an ettort to sustain total pert'ection and happiness. Through
such incidents we are given a vision of what the eventual "happily ever afiery' of the fairy
tale implies and are Ieft to consider an issue concerning the "will to power" not directly
addressed by the theones of Foucault. To cl&&, the ultimate total success of this "\vil1 to
power," the establishment of perfect and absolute dominance (a mere hypothetical goal
within the case studies of Foucault, but an achieved "reality" within the fairy tale),
presents a horrific situation for al1 involved. M i l e those existing outside the dominant
discourse sufTer annihilation, those who are aligned with the dominant discourse must
exisé in a constant state of fear, always on the lookout for even the smallest hint of a
threat to the perfect world that has been established. Simply put, "happily ever after"
exists always on the brink of disaster in that it is shattered by what would be, under less
total circumstances, even the slightest flaw or difference, even the most insignificant sign
of dissent or deviance.
In the final analysis, then, the significant dualistic battle that takes place within the
fairy tale is not one pitting good a~a ins t evil so much as it is one pitting totality açainst
difference, or dominant power discourses against deviant power discourses. Hence, the
theones of Foucault become intrinsicalIy irnportmt in informing the study at hand. In
effect, the following exploration attempts to follow the methodology of Foucault in
making a case study of the fictional world of the fairy tale that is somewhat akin to those
conducted by Foucault upon historical periods and institutions. The aim is not to moralize
the standard vision of the fairy tale, but to analyze it. The analysis is not one concemed
with good and evil, but with the workings of power and with tactics of dominance. It
inust be granted that any such analysis (includinç those conducted by Foucault) will
contain an implied critique. Nevertheless, this critique is different than most in that it is
not directed towards the vision of "happily ever after" that is presented, but towards the
totality of that vision and the very implications of such a striving toward totality. At issue
is the fairy tale ideal of a perfect existence which, in its will to rotal happiness, seeks total
dominance - the complete and absolute eradication of dissent through the annihilation of
deviant bodies and/or the praduction of conforming, docile bodies.
While the focus of this thesis is upon the implications of totality within the typical
fairy tale "happilgr ever afier7' resolution, the best place to begin such an analysis is,
perhaps, in starting out by taking a look ai what constitutes fairy tale conflict and cnsis.
In defining just what it is that fairy tales strive toward, it would be helpful to work first
toward a definition of what, exactly, it is that fairy tales strive against. On the surface this
would seem a daunting task. From one fairy tale to another, fairy tale crisis onanates out
of a wide variety of sources. Villains include wolves, witches, giants, ogres, and wicked
stepmothers, to name but a few. Heroes and heroines are subjected to various penls and
hardships, from the threat of pncking one's finger to the threat of being killed and even
eaten, from the dire conditions of extreme poverty to those of unjust oppression and
forced servitude. In short, fairy tale worlds offer their characters a wide range of
seemingly different complications to be overcome in the pursuit of security and
happiness. These complications, though, have more in common than rnay be apparent
through a casual reading. Within the typical fairy tale, al1 complications, be they large or
small, represent not simply a threat to the happiness of the protagonist but also, and more
imporiantly, a threat to totality. Crisis finds its root in any factor (human, animal, object
or discourse) that deviates from or does not coincide with a single, total order of things.
Fairy tale crisis speaks of imperfection and dissent, a lack of totality. What is being
fought against is nothing so tangible as a wolf or a witch, nothing so immediate as the
threat of death or the conditions of poverty; what is being fought against is any factor or
discourse that may be regarded as running counter to a total prevailing vision. The
resulting struggle is not one of good and evil, but one for absolute power - the power to
define, control and prescribe a specific vision of a perfect world.
Many critics, and especially those with feminist or Manrist leanings have taken up
the issue of power relations within fairy tales. Ln doing so, however, they often base their
critique on the assurnption that the traditional tale perpetuates and promotes a decidedly
right wing, conservative, ideology that is based upon patriarchal, colonial and even
capitalistic values. Where many feminists argue that "[tlhe passive and pretty heroines
who dominate popular fairy tales offer narrow and damaging role models for young
readers" (Stone 229), many Marxist critics have worked to "demonstrate how the
transformation of the tales and their employment have been ideologically detemined to
legitimate the interests of capitalist societies" (Zipes Marxists ... 239). Indeed, such
conservative ideology may be detected, to various degrees, within most popular fais.
tales. Nevertheless, a wide survey would seem to suggest that the fairy tale also carries an
even more pervasive ideology of its very own. Fairy tale ideology is one based upon the
valuing of perfection and the implied desirability of persona1 utopia. Although it often is,
the "happily ever after" vision of the fairy tale need not necessarily be built upon
conservative and patiarchal ideals; what is important to faiiy tale ideology is the ideal of
the absolute. Fairy tales in general tend to promote not so much a specific brand of
perfection, as perfection itself
Flaws and imperfections (and the sleeping patterns of Princesses)
It might be said that the fairy tale genre is one obsessed with perfection. While
fairy tale characters are ofien seen to combat extreme danger and hardship in pursuit of
securie and happiness, they are equally as ofien seen to do battle against any flaw in
existence, regardless of how seemingly insignificant it may be. Within the world of the
fairy tale, relative peace is not an option and neither is relative pleasure. Resolution may
only be achieved through perfection. Hence, even the slightest imperfection amounts to a
cnsis (sometimes large, sometimes srnal!, but always significant) that can be resolved
only through the elimination of the flaw. In no other narrative genre "does the tiny
imperfection stand in such clear contrast to perfection as in the fairytale, for in no place
else is perfection pushed so far, made so clearly visible, striven for with such various
means as in the fairytale" (Luthi Fairylale As Art Fo m... 59). In accordance with fairy
tale ideology, so long as imperfection exists, life remains unsatisfactory. Although this
actuahy is more readily observable in some than it is in others, it is true of most
traditional fairy tales.
Hans Christian Anderson's short tale of "The Pnncess And The Pea" serves as a
bratant - and perhaps even self-cor~scious - illustration of the fairy tale concern with
perfection. In the real world, or in practically any other genre of fiction, for that matter,
''twenîy mattresses" topped with "twenty eider-down beds" (P&P 26), would more than
compensate for the presence of a single pea beneath the heap, be the slumbering subject a
Princess or no. Only in the world of the fairy taie would this most insignificant flaw be
enough to cancel out ail else so that the Pnncess, having spent the night on the bed,
claims not only that she has been unable to sleep, but even goes so far as to declare "1 was
lying on something hard, so that I am black and blue al1 over my body. It's horrible!"
(P&P 26). As outlandish as her reaction rnay seem, it is through her response to
imperfkction that the Pnncess passes the test, for "nobody but a real princess could be as
sensitive as that" (P&P 26). What we see here is, surely, an example of what Martin
Hallett describes as Andersen's ambivalent attitude concerning royalty: "he is tom
between mockery and admiration, dismissiveness and envy - a conflict of feeling that
emerges unmistakably in many of his tales'' ( 150).
At the sarne time, the sheer outlandishness of the test itself, as weI1 as its udikely
result, would seem to suggest that Andersen is also making a self-conscious comment on
fairy tale idedogy (which is, in many ways, not far removed from that of monarchical
society). "The Princess and the Pea" could even be read as a meta-fairy tale of sorts in
that, through the use of blatant exagseration, it exposes and reflects upon the totality of
the fairy tale demand for perfection. Andersen's tale would seem to go out of its way to
awaken its readers to the fact that, within the realm of the fairy tale, as within the realm of
royalty, anything less than total perfection is unsatisfactow, regardless of how
ovenvhelmingly the positives outweigh the negatives.
Although it is generally presented in a somewhat subtler and less self-conscious
manner, this implied dissatisfaction with anything Iess than total perfection is evident
within most popular fairy tales. The several versions of the "Sleeping Beauty" tale, for
example, display the perfection motif to a point of near obsession. Both Charles Perrault
and the Brothers Grimm open their versions of the tale (respectively, "The Sleeping
Beauty In The Wood" & "Brier Rose") with what would seem to be the culmination of a
perfect fairy tale kingdom in the much sought after birth of a princess. Having "visited al1
the clinics, al1 the specialists, made holy vows, gone on pilgrimages and said their prayers
regularly," Perrault's royal couple is described as being "wild with jofY at their eventual
success in having a daughter (SB 40). Pnor to this development they had been "bitterly
unhappy because they did not have any children'' (SB 40). Despite their royal positions
and regardless of their having already achieved the ultimate fairy tale goal of mamage,
the existence of the King and Queen remains imperfect, and therefore unsatisfactory in
fairy tale terrns, until the birth of their chiId. Likewise, the royal couple of the Brothers
Grimm seem to regard their initial inability to procreate as the only thing separating them
from perfect bliss as they declare "day after day: 'Ah, if only we had a child!"' (BR 48).
Also like Perrault, the Brothers Grimm make short work of bringing this about so that, for
a short time at least, a utopian vision is established in the successful completion of a
perfect royal famiiy.
In each case, however, this vision is threatened and shattered by the introduction
of a senes of flaws into the perfect world that exists. The pattern of disrupted perfection
begins at the feast or christening that takes place in celebration of the child's birth.
Although Perrau1t7s King invites "seven suitabIe fairies" (SB 40) to the event, an eighth
attends unexpectedly. Likewise, in the Gnmms7 tale a thirteenth Wise Woman attends the
feast to which the King has invited only twelve (BR 48). These nurnbers are significant in
that both the number seven and the number twelve, within the JudeoIChristian culture out
of which these tales originate, imply perfection and completion (seven being the number
of days referred to in the creation myth, twelve being the number of the tribes of Israel
and of the apostles of Christ). Before these additional guests have done or said anything,
they already represent imperfection an4 therefore, fairy tale crisis; in her very presence
each undermines the totality that has been established by transforming the symbolically
perfect and total seven into an imperfect eight, the perfect and total hvelve into an
irnperfect thirteen.
Yet, the nature of the imperfection introduced through these characters is not
merely symbolic. They also dismpt the vision of perfection at hand through the vengeful
"gifs" which they give to the Princess. Their counterparts (the invited seven and twelve),
as agents of perfection, bestow upon the princess mystical gifts of perfection. In doing so,
Perrault's faines, by offering unmatchec! beauty, "the disposition of an angel," the grace
of "a gazelle," and the abilities to dance, sing and play "any kind of musical instrument
that she wanted to" (SB 41), seek to make of the child a perfect Princess. The Wise
Women of the Brothers Grimm, in offering "virtue," "beauty," "wealth," and "everflhing
a person could wish for in this world" (BR 48)' seek to make for the child a perfect,
"happily ever after," existence. Once again, however, the imperfect eighth or thirteenth
guest manages to shatter this vision, not by taking away from it, but simply by adding to
it a fiaw in the form of a curse upon the Princess so that in adolescence she will "prick her
finger" on a spindle and die (SB 41 & BR 48). Although the curse is softened sornewhat,
in both instances, by another fairy or Wise Woman, the death being replaced by a one
hundred years' sleep, it still serves to introduce imperfection into the Princess's perfect
world, thus bringing about a collapse of her fairy tale existence.
Regardless, an effort is made on the part of the dominant power, the King, to
maintain a utopian existence for his daughter as he attempts to rïd the kingdom of
spindles, the object of the curse. It is in this that the implications of the fairy tale goal of
perfection become most evident. Of the greatest significance, perhaps, is the seeming
insignificance of the perceived threat. In order for utopia to be maintained for his
daughter, the King must somehow ensure that she does not suffer what would othenvise
be considered the smallest of possible hams, a prick on the finger. Through this we are
presented, as we are in Andersen's tale of "The Princess and the Pea," with a glimpse of
the totality required in sustaining perfect happiness. Most disturbing, though, are the
King's methods of ensuring this totality. While in the Grimm version of the tale the King
sen& "out an order that every spindle in the whole kingdom should be destroyed (BR
49), Perrault's King goes one step fùrther in forbidding "the use of a spindle, or even the
possession of one, on pain of deatlr" (SB 4 1 [italics mine]). Simply put, in his efforts to
preserve fairy tale vision the King becomes n tyrant. As the King attempts to remove
from the kingdom al1 threats to the total and perfect, yet fragile, happiness of his
daughter, the kingdorn becomes a totalitarian realm where the most extreme of measures
corne to be the prescribed remedy in the elimination of what would seem even the most
insignificant of flaws-
An earlier version of the tale, as told by Giambattista Basile, entitled "Sole, Lune,
E Tale" (or "Sun, Moon and Talia"), sheds further light on the fais. tale ideoiogy of
perfection. In this version the Princess7s fate cornes to be known not through a curse but
through a prophesy as the wise men and seers of the kingdorn, in foretelling the
Princess's future, come "to the conclusion that she would be exposed to a great danger
from a small splinter in some flax" (SLT 36). Imperfection, in this instance, has no root in
the evil intentions of an eighth or thirteenth guest- Rather, the only threat to happinrss,
the only flaw in the existing totality as it were, is the splinter itself. Once again, the King
attempts to eliminate this threat by forbidding that "flax or hemp or any other similar
material should ever come into his house" (SLT 36). Nevertheless, as is the case in the
tale as told by Perrault and by the Grimms, this attempt proves futile; the Princess
eventually cornes in contact with some hernp and, a splinter having been lodged under her
fingernail, "immediately fell dead upon the ground (SLT 36).
It might even be suggested that, within Basile's version of the taIe, Talia (or the
Sleeping Beauty) herseif becomes a personification of the fairy tale ideal. Like the perfect
world of fairy tale ideology, Talia's body, having been invaded by the slightest of flaws,
sufTers collapse. Further, it must be noted that, within this tale, the Princess is revived, the
ideal body restored to life, when one of the two children to whom she has given birth in
her sleep mistakes her finger for her breast and sucks "so hard that it drew out the
splinter" (SLT 37). Thus, it is made clear that where the introduction of a slight fiaw
results in the total coilapse of perfection, the removal of this same flaw results in the total
restoration of this perfection. While this motif may take on different forms, it is common
to most fairy tales in that what takes place is not a simple case of conflict between good
and evil but goes much deeper than this. What is being sought is the accomplishment of a
perfect existence through the elimination of any flaw, regardless of how trivial it may
seem, which disrupts the totcility of this vision; the struggle is one for absolute
flawlessness.
In relation to this struggle the Grimms' tale of "Snow White" shares much in
common with the "Sleeping Beauty" tradition. As do the several "Sleeping Beauty" tales,
"Snow White" begins with the fuifilment of a Queen's wish for a child. Significantly, the
chiId wished for, and the child born, is described in terms of perfection. She is "as white
as snow [perfect whiteness] and as red as blood (perfect redness], and her hair was as
black as ebony [perfect blackness]" (SW 65). As is the case in the "Sleeping Beauty"
tales of Perrault and the Brothers Grimm the Princess's security is later threatened by the
amval of an uninvited guest in the person of Snow White's disguised stepmother who
offers Snow White a series of life thrzatening "gifts." Finally, just as Basile's Talia,
having gotten a splinter lodged "under her fingernail, [. . . ] irnmediately fell dead upon the
ground (SLT 36), Snow White, having taken a bite of her stepmother's gift of a
poisonous apple, likewise, "fell to the floor d e a d (SW 71), and just as Talia is restored to
life once the splinter has been removed so, too, is Snow White restored to life when a
"jolt shook the poisoned core, which Snow White had bitten off, out of her throat" (SW
72). Simply put, the tale of "Snow White" is, as is the tale of "Sleeping Beauty," one in
which the ultirnate goal is perfection and totality. Within these fairy tale realms, as within
the fairy tale realrn in general, any flaw c r imperfection brings about crisis and the
coilapse of an ideal fairy tale existence.
Certainly, one of the most familiar examples of a flaw (especially within the tales
of the Brothers Grimm) is the stepmother/villain figure, herself, encountered not only in
the tale of "Snow White" but a h in a countless number of others, including Perrault's
"Cinderella" and the Grimrns' tale "Ashputtle" (a version of the "CindereIla" stcry).
m i l e such characters do corne to act in such a way as to bring about hardship, and even
the threat of death, for the protagonistheroines of these tales, it is implied in their very
identity as stepmother rather than birthmother that, like the eighth fairy or the thirteenth
Wise Woman, they do not belong. The very presence of the stepmother, it would seem,
implies a shattered perfection, a threat to total happiness. In "Cinderella," Perrault is
careful to juxtapose his description of Cinderella's "natural mother, who had been a kind
and çentle woman" with that of her new stepmother who, shortly followinç her wvedding
"showed her tnie colours" in heaping hardships upon her new stepdaughter (C 53)- The
Grimm version begins in much the same manner, ultimately suggesting, in each case, that
the tale itself, or more specifically the conflict and complication which drive the plot of
the tale, could not have corne about without the introduction of the stepmother figure.
Simply put, where the natural rnother fits the "happily ever after" vision of ideal family
Iife (the vision realised at the beginning of the "Sleeping Beauty" narratives). the very
concept of the stepmother destroys this vision. Quite apart from her villainous and ofien
murderous behaviour, the presence of the stepmother constitutes fairy tale crisis in that it
signifies the absence, and death, of the natural rnother who would make the perfect fairy
tale family cornpiete. Within the world of the fairy tale, a stepmother in one's family is
the equivalent of a pea in one's bed or a splinter in one's finger; al1 imply a flawed
totality, imperfection causing cnsis.
That the Grimms felt this to be the case is evidenced in their significant revision
of the "Snow White" taIe, which is transfomed somewhat in the second edition of
Nursery and Houseltold Tufes tiorn the original version found in the first edition. The
villain within the first edition is Snow White's natiiral mother. "Only in the second
edition of the Grirnms' collection does the reaI mother die and is replaced by a wicked
stepmother" (Tatar Hard Facts ... 143). (Incidentally, the Grirnms made essentially the
same revision, in later editions, to such tales as 'Wansel and Gretel" [de Vos 1 161 and the
lesser-known "Mother Holle" [Tatar Hard Facts ... 1431.) As Maria Tatar points out, this
revision is significant in that it enables the tale to "preserve the sanctity of mothers" in
transforming the villain from an evil natural mother into "an alien interloper whose goal
is to disturb the harmony of family life" (Hard Fucts ... 143). For the Grimms, at least, the
idea of the natural mother being the source of C ~ S ~ S would seem to have becn somewhat
unthinkable. Their introduction of the stepmother figure into the tales alIows for the
destabilization of the fairy tale ideal without undermining the concept of ideal family life
so important to their own vision of a fairy tale existence. Total happiness comes to be
something which, rather than suffering internal breakdown through the unnatural actions
of a natural mother, is threatened by the introduction of an alien body representing, in its
very presence, deviance as a flaw or an imperfection, a fissure in the totality of an ideal
world. It would seem, in later editions at least, that the Grirnm tales suggest that a threat
to total happiness may be anticipated with the amval of any such deviant or alien body.
In encountering one such tale after another we as readers begin to recognise the
stepmother figure and to anticipate the threat she brings to the fairy tale world. Indeed,
descriptions of Snow White's stepmother as being "proud and overbearingT7 (SW 66)
seem almost redundant in that, for the typical fairy tale reader, the very term
icstepmother" tends to be description enough.
conflict in^ visions and faiw taIe rivalry: a struggle for dominance
On the other hand, it must be recognised that there is another aspect to the identity
of Snow White's stepmother: in becoming such, she also becomes Queen. Indeed, the
second paragraph of "Snow White" begins as many fairy tales close, with a royal
wedding. Moreover, as the proclaimed "fairest in the land" (SW 66), it could be argued
that, were it not for her alter identity as stepmother, the Queen would be representative of
the typical fairy tale heroine. Hence, the threat that the Queen's presence brings to the
existence of Snow White is not simply the result of her identity as a flaw in what would
be Snow White's perfect life. It is also a direct consequence of the establishment of what
is, in essence, the an alternative perfect existence - that of the Queen. Of course, as
readers we are not encouraged to recognise the situation as such in that the Grimms
describe the Queen in less than flattering tones; while she is declared to be "beautiful,"
this compliment is undermined by the revelation that "she couidn't bear the thought that
anyone might be more beautiful than she" (SW 66). Nevertheless, it may be that a certain
amount of unintended irony is to be detected in this revelation. The fairy tale ideal, afier
all, requires not only beauty, but also unmatched beauty (as evidenced in the first fairy's
bestowing on Sleeping Beauty the gift of growing "up to be the loveliest woman in the
world" [SB 411). Thus, the Queen's inability to bear the possibility of anyone surpassing
her in beauty is, in effect, nothing more than the standard fairy taie fear of a threat to her
own fairy tale existence. Read from the Queen's point of view (the dissenting
perspective), it is Snow White who poses a threat to the personal utopian vision that
exists. In growing, at age seven, to be "more beautiful than the Queen herself'(SW 66),
she effectively cornes to represent a flaw in what has been, untiI this point, the "happily
ever after" existence of the Queen. Therefore, the Queen's attempts on Snow White's life
are akin to the attempts of Sleeping Beauty's father to destroy al1 of the spindles in his
kingdom. Each is attempting to protect her own persona1 utopia.
Such an analysis of the "Snow White" tale serves to illustrate the fact that specific
fairy tale visions of ideal happiness, like dominant discourses (us dominant discourses),
are mutually exclusive. That is to Say, isvo cannot exist in one place at one time; either
Snow White's vision wiI1 dominate at the expense of that of her stepmother, or the
stepmother's vision uill dominate at the expense of Snow White. Thus, the tale of "Snow
White," like many other faity tales, is concemed not simply with the elimination of
imperfections that hinder a specific vision of fairy tale happiness, but also wïth the
elimination of conflicting visions; it is a power struggle for dominance. While it is
tempting to read this struggle as being the one sided victimization of a seven year old
child by a powerfül Queen, it is important to recognize that, as Datlow and Windling have
pointed out, the world presented in this tale is "a world where beauty is the basis of
power7' (de Vos 325). Therefore, it is Snow White who, as the more beautifid of the two
rivals, is also the most powerful and has the upper hand throughout this struggle,
regardless of the hardships she encounters at the han& of the seemingly more powerful
Queen.
A close look at the story reveals this to be so. It would be reasonable to assume
that, in accordance with fairy tale ideals, the Queen has gained her position through her
beauty (it need not be regarded as coincidence that the most powerful man in the land, the
King, has taken the most beautiful woman in the land for his wife). By extension, then, it
is through the power gained by her beauty that the Queen has achieved the authority to
order a huntsman to take her +al, Snow White, "into the forest and kill her" (SW 66).
However, it is specified that Snow White is ultimately saved "&Jecause of her beauty"
(SW 66) which convinces the huntsman to take pity on the child. Simply put, Snow
White, though passive, occupies a position of dominance in that her superior beauty gives
her power over the actions of others and even over the direct orders of the Queen. Having
Iost the upper hand in relation to the power gained by passive beauty, the Queen becomes
active in attemptinç to eliminate Snow White and even seems to succeed in killing her
with a poisoned apple (SW 71). Nevertheless, because her world is one in which beauty,
not action, dictates control, it is Snow White who wins out once again as the dwarves see
her as being too beautifûl, even in death, to lower "into the black earth" (SW 71). Instead,
they put her into a g l a s cotfin and leave her on a hilltop whereby she is evenîually
revived by a wandering Prince who, being struck by her beaury, orders that she be camed
off to be kept in his castle, resulting in the jolt which shakes the poisoned piece of apple
"out of her throat" (SW 72). Within the story of "Snow White," then, beauty power and
she who has dominant beauty has dominant power. In effect, the Queen's dread of the
possibility of someone being more beautiful becomes far less trivial. For her, a rival
beauty also represents a rival power and, with it, the threat of a dominant discourse and
f a i ~ tale vision which conflicts with and threatens to destroy her own.
A similar rivalry is evident in the "Cinderella" story as told by Perrault and the
Brothers Grimm. In each case Cinderella (or Ashputtle, as she is called in the Grimm
version), Ends herself in conflict not only with a stepmother but with two stepsisters as
well. Althouçh much is made of Cinderella's poor treatrnent at the hands of these
characters as she is gwen "al1 the rough work about the house to do" (C 53) and even
forced (in the Grimm version) to sleep "in the ashes by the hearth" (A 60), the true cmx
of the story has to do with the conflicting aspirations of Cinderella and her stepsisters. To
be chosen by the Prince as his bride would be, for any one of the three, to achieve perfect
happiness, but since there is only one Prince, the success of one also depends upon the
failure of the others. As is the rivalry between Snow White and her steprnother, the
rivalry between Cinderella and her stepsisters is one for a personal "happily ever afier"
existence for one at the expense of the similar desires of the others.
Elisabeth Panttaja has suggested that the Grimms' version of the tale features
mother rivalry in the confiict between Cinderelta's natural mother and her stepmother.
Panttaja points out that, although she dies, Cinderella's mother is never tmly absent from
the story. Prior to her death she has advised her daughrer, "be good and Say your prayers
[... 1 and I wi1I look d o m on you from heaven and always be with you" (A 59). We see
this promise realised in the fonn of the tree that Cinderella plants on her mother's grave,
as well as the birds that nest in its branches. Through these the mother takes care of her
daughter and, in doing so, does battle against the stepmother on Cinderella's behalf
However, this is not simply a matter of the "good" ambitions of the natural mother in
protecting her daughter fion; the "evil" ambitions of the stepmother. Rather, "[tlhese two
women share the same devotion to their daughters and the same long term goaIs: each
rnother wants to ensure a future of power and prestige for her daughter, and each is
willing to resort to extreme measures to achieve her aim" (Panttaja 90). The conflict is
not one of good and evit; it is that of one vision of personai utopia pitted against another.
Such conflicts, however, are not lirnited to the tales of Perrault and the Brothers
Grimm. A most interesting example of conflict between mutually exclusive discourses
and utopian visions can be found in Joseph Jacobs' English fairy tale, 'Yack and the
Beanstalk." This tale differs from most in that its begiming seems far frorn containing a
utopian vision of any sort. Jack and his mother start out in dire circumstances only to
have their situation worsened by the fact that their cow "Milky-white" stops giving milk,
cutting off their only source of incorne (J&B 59). Nevertheless, having exchanged the
cow for rnzgic beans, which result in the growth of a giant beanstalk from Jack's
backyard into the clouds, Jack soon climbs the beanstalk only to discover that, even in
this tale, a vision of perfect existence does exist - although it is controlled by an ogre.
Indeed, it would seem that the ogre occupies an ideal space. His power is unchallenged,
he has unlimited wealth, the source of which is a hen that "laid a golden egg every time
he said 'Lay"' (J&B 65), and even has culture and entertainment in a magic golden harp
which "sang most beautifûlly" (J&B 66). SeMng as a good indication that this is an fairy
tale existence is the fact that, having seen it, Jack is quick in his attempt to achieve it for
himself. In this, it is Jack who takes on the role of the alien body who threatens the
"happily ever afier" that exists. Once again, we are presented with a power struggle
between rivals for total happiness and once again both visions cannot exist at once as both
Jack and the ogre desire the same things. Thus, the perfect happiness sought by each can
only be realised in keeping the other from that sarne vision of happiness (or, as Jack
proves, in robbing the other of that vision). Ultimately, in the attempt of each to achieve
or maintain the goal of persona1 utopia, each must work towards the goal of the
elimination of the other. It must be recognised that, in so much as the ogre stands in the
way of Jack achievinç a "happily ever after" existence, Jack is a very real threat to the
ogre's own ideal life.
In fact, it is the failure to recognize Jack as such - on the part of the ogre's wife -
that drives the action of the tale. Although she perceives the threat that her husband poses
to Jack's life, the ogre's wife fails to recognise Jack as posing any threat to the life of her
husband and herself. That this is so is evidenced in the fact that she warns Jack "My man
is an ogre and there's nothing he likes better than boys broiled on toast. You'd better be
moving on or he'll soon be coming" (J&B 62), and then, upon his having refüsed to heed
the warning, allows hini into the house. With this, Jack gains entrance in the role of an
uninvited guest. Much like the eighth fairy or the thirteenth Wise Woman at the
christening of Sleeping Beauty, Jack does not belong to the totality that exists; already,
before his having done anything, Jack represents deviance in that he is a [ive boy in the
ogre's castle (or, what is even more out of place, a live boy hiding in the ogre's oven).
For this reason, Jack is as much of a threat to the ogre as the ogre is to him, regardless of
the obviouç difference in the physicaf size and prowess of the two. Such are the rules of
fairy tale happiness and totality; any fissure in the totality that exists, will (like the
splinter in Sleeping Beauty's finger) cause the coIIapse of the prevailing vision.
It must also be recognised that Jack is not content, as are the eighth fairy and the
thirteenth Wise Woman, with being a dismpting force, creating a break in the prevailing
totality. Rather, he is like Cinderella or Snow White in that he is involved in a stmggle to
achieve a "happily ever afterl' existence for himself and at the expense of a rival. Yet, the
rivalry that exists between Jack and the ogre differs from that between Cinderella and her
sisters; whereas Cinderella and her sisters stmggle to achieve the same fairy tale goal (a
royal wedding), Jack makes a conscious effort to displace the ogre from a fairy tale
existence already achieved. In this, Jack also differs from Snow White. While Snow
White does, indeed, displace her stepmother as the "fairest in the land," it may at least be
said of her that she does so quite unwittingly. Jack, on the other hand, actively and
consciously pursues his own vision of a utopian existence. Of al1 the hero/ine figures
within the taIes addressed by this srudy, it would seem that it is Jack who best
understands the dynamics of the fairy tale goal of an ideal existence; it is Jack who
realises (as do such fairy tale villnins as Snow White's stepmother) that in achievinç a
utopia lité for himself he must destroy or take away from the power and happiness of his
rival.
Further, what Jack seeks is not sirnply a relief from hardship, or a relative
happiness; his conscious desire is for a fairy tale ending of total happiness. In no place is
this made more clear than in the narrator's statement that, even afier his having
successfülly stolen fiom the ogre the hen that lays golden eggs, "Jack \vas not content"
(J&B 65) . "You would think that a child who owns a hen capable of producing an endless
supply of golden eggs would be satisfied with what he has. But not Jack" (Cashdan 180).
Just as Snow White's steprnother is not content with being a Queen who is only the
second fairest in the land, and is therefore bent upon te-establishing herself as the fairest,
Jack is not satisfied with his endless suppIy of gold and so is "detennined to have another
try at his luck up there at the top of the beanstalk" (J&B 65). If there is more to be had,
Jack must have it, despite al1 risk and at any cost (whether to himself, to the ogre, or to
anyone else). Simpty put, the action o f "Jack and the Beanstalk" is driven not by Jack's
attempts to escape a position of poverty. Nor is it driven by his attempts to escape the
threat of the ogre. Rather, it originates out of Jack's desire to achieve totally the fairy tale
ideal, and out of the conflicting interests of the ogre in rnaintaining his own position of
dominance.
An equaIIy intereçting case of 2 power stniggle beltween parties of conflicting
interests is to be found in another of Joseph Jacobs' fairy tales, "The Story of the Three
Little Pigs." Indeed, the identities of the characters in this story as animals, rather than
humans or monsters, would make it difficult for even the most moralistic of readers to
view the conflict of the tale as being a simple case of dualism, a batile behveen good and
evil. That the three IittIe pigs and the carnivorous wolf would be enernies seems quite
natural. Nevertheless, the conflict between the two is every bit as serious as that between
Jack and the ogre or between Snow White and her stepmother. This taIe rnay be seen to
differ somewhat from the others in this study, though, in that it suggests a certain self-
awareness of the nature of fairy tale conflict. Simply put, this tale is far more open than
most in its portrayal of the nvalry that exists within it as being one amongt differing
perspectives that are not so much right or wrong, as they are mutually exclusive.
AS a case in point, one may notice a distinct difference in the way in which the
wolf is introduced into the tale from the way certain figures such as the stepmothers of
Snow White and Cinderella are introduced into their respective narratives. Perrault
actually begins his CNlderelia tale by stating, within the first sentence, that Cinderella's
stepmother 'kas the haughtiest and most stuck-up wornan in the wor ld (C 53)- Likewise,
the brothers Grimm introduce Snow White's stepmother as being "proud and
overbearinç" and unable to "bear the thouçht that anyone might be more beautiful than
she" (SW 66). Thus, these narratives attempt to convince the reader that such characters
are evil or wrong and that the threat to the protagonist, and the conflict which aises out
of this threat, is a result of this evil. Contrarily, the wolf in The Story of the Tizree Little
Pzgs is introduced with the simple statement, "Presently came along a wolf, and knocked
at the door, and said: 'Little pig, little pig, let me corne in"' (TLP 69). Because most
readers v d l be conscious of the threat the wolf poses to the pigs in his very presencz and
identity as a wolf, no further comment is necessary. Because, as a carnivore, the woff s
interests are in direct conflict with those of the pigs, his very presence shatters their more
or less idyllic existence. In this, the wolf is not so very different from the stepmothers. He
is a flaw in the fairy tale perfection of another4s life and a threat in that his own interests
are counter to those of the protagonist. Yet, the story diRers frorn most fairy tales; no
attempt is made to provide the "villain" with a motive; his motives are assurned. In
essence, the interests and motives of the wolf go unsaid because they go without saying-
The wolf, like the pigs, is interested in survival. Unfortunately, as is the case within most
fairy tales, the interests of the one can be fulfilled only at the expense of the other.
Ultimately, the conflict within al1 of the fairy tales outlined above arises out of this same
incompatibility of interests. "The Story of the Three Little Pigs" differs only in its
allowing this cause of crises to rerilain in the forefront. Through the absence of narrative
comment upon the nature of the wolf, the reader is left to recognise of the wolf that which
is equalIy hue, if not so easily recognised, of ogres and stepmothers: he does not pose a
threat because he is evil; the threat he poses to the pigs is due to his conflicting
perspectives and interests. It is because they are pigs and he is a wolf.
Deviant invasion (or what happens when the wolves are not kept at bav)
It must be noted that true cnsis, within "The Story of the Three Little Pigs,"
cornes about only once the deviant wolf has succeeded in invading the dwellings of the
pigs. If Jacobs' tale is about anything, it is about gaining access. In a sense, the wolf fills
a role sirnilar to that of Jack. Just as Jack's entry, as a living boy, into the castle of the
ogre is foltowed by Jack's active pursuit of his own goals which in turn leads to the
ogre's domfaIl, the successful entry of the wolf into the house of the first hvo littfe pigs
leads to their being eaten. Further, the wolf bears a similarity to Jack in that, having eaten
the first two pigs and having achieved a deal of success, he is not content. Such is the
nature of fairy tale ideology that if there is another pi@ to be had, the wolf must have it.
Success, for the wolf, as for most fairy tale characters, m u t be total. It is in this sense that
the wolf s vision is - like that of Jack who must have al1 that the ogre's castle has to
offer, like that of Snow White's stepmother who must be the fairest (as opposed to the
second fairest) in the land - one of "happily ever after." Similarly, the success of the pigs
in maintaining or achievinç happiness is equally dependent upon total success. It is in the
interests of the pigs to rnaintain a space totaZ?y and completely free of the wolf, a goal
attempted by each (with varying degrees of success) through his refusal to open the door
to the wolf "No, no, by the hair of rny chiny chin chin" (TLP 69).
Of course, in discussing the character of the wolf \vitAin the fairy tale, it is
difficult to ignore one of the most well-known fairy tales of alI, "Little Red Riding
Hood." Although this tale has taken on many different forms, the conflict in each remains
virtually the same. As in "The Story of the Three Little Pigs," the protagonist's interests
are threatened by the conflicting interests of the predatory wolf In fact, the wolves from
the several "Red Riding Hood" tales bear a striking resemblance to the wolf in the tale of
"The Three Little f igs." Perrault's version of "Little Red Riding Hood" clearly States
that, having met Little Red on her walk through the wood, the wolf "wanted to eat her"
(LRRH 25). Likewise, the wolf from the Grimm version of the tale, "Little Red Cap,"
thinks of the child in terms of being "young and tender" and "even tastier" than her
grandmother (LRC 28). However, it is not just in his carnivorous interests that the Little
Red's enerny is similar to that of the Three Little Pigs; he is also similar in his rnethods.
In order to achieve his goal, the wolf works to gain access into the house of Little Red's
sandmother. In gaining access, the wolf becomes a deviant body, disrupting the securiy -
of the home; he does not belong. Interestingiy, however, this wolf does not enter the
house by force, but by posing as Little Red, who &es belong, so that the grandmother
actually invites him i ~ - (LRRH 26 & LRC 28). What is, perhaps, most interesting about
this tale, though, is the suddemess and completeness with which the wolfs successful
entry into the house collapses one persona1 utopia and replaces it with another (that is, of
course, if we are willing to see things from the wolf s perspective). As a space free from
the presence of the wolf, grandmother's house represents an ideal space for LittIe Red, a
protection frarn the dangers of the forest. Once the wolf has entered, however, the house
becomes not only a place of extreme danger to Little Red but, at the same time, an ideal
space for the wolf who can now lie back and wait for his prey to corne to him.
While it is the wolf s position as a deviant body within the grandmother's house
that threatens and destroys what wodd seem an ideal space for Little Red, though, this is
not the only cause of crisis within the tale. A perfect fairy tale existence, from the
perspective of Little Red, is also threatened by her own presence within a space where
she does not belong. Despite her mother's warning, in the Grimm version of the tale, not
to "Ieave the path" (LRC 27), the chiId, acting on the suggestion of the wolf? "lefi the
path to go into the wood to pick flowers" (LRC 28). In doing so, Little Red becomes a
deviant body in several senses. First, she deviates, fiteraIly, from her course. Second, she
becomes a deviant child in her disobedience to her mother. Last, she is deviant in that,
just as the wolf does not belong in the grandmother's house, it is implied that a Little girl
does not belong in the woods. In exiting her own ideal space and entering into that of the
wolf, Little Red becomes a flaw in the existing totality of the forest. Essentially, in the
sarne sense that the only type of boy to have a place within the castle of Jack's ogre is the
boy who is to be consumed, the only type of Iittle girl to have a place in the forest of the
wolf, and in grandmother's house once it has been taken over by the wolf, is the little gr1
who is to be consunied.
Food intentions and the failure to devour
At this point it would be helpful to focus in on the particular motif of consumption
as it shows up, in one form or another, in so many fairy tales. In fact, the m a j o r i ~ of the
taIes addressed within this study contain the act of one party either devouring or
attempting to devour another. What is important to note, with regards to this motif, is that
because most fairy tales are told from the point of view of the party who is in danger of
being devoured, readers are tikely to view the potential of the act being carried out as
being a threat to happiness, a barrier standing in the path toward a "happily ever after"
ending. However, in reading the fairy tales as being power struggles between opposing
visions of total happiness it becomes necessary to read any 'tillainous" attempts at
devouring the protagonist as being precisely the opposite of a threat or bamer to the
establishment of a persona! utopia. These predatory attempts are often made with the
intended purpose of protecting or establishing a persona1 utopia by eliminating the factors
that destroy or threaten it. Moreover, the failure of so many fairy tale villains in their
attempts to devour their enemies is part and parce1 with their failure to achieve or
maintain a fairy tale existence in which they occupy a position of power.
Certainly, it is with the motive of maintaining her position of power that Snow
White's stepmother attempts murder and cannibalism. In ordering the huntsrnan to kill
Snow White "and bring me her lungs and liver" (SW 66), the Queen is demanding total
assurance that her position of dominance is secure. It is not enough for Snow White to be
gone; if the Queen's "happily ever after7' vision is to be total, gone as well must be the
possibility of Snow White's very existence and of her potential return. Furthemore, as it
is Snow White's body that represents deviance within this vision, in its posing a threat to
the Queen's position of dominant beauîy and power, her body must also cease to exist. Of
course, a most effective method in bringing such elimination about is through the act of
devouring in that the body being devoured is not simply broken doun. It is, more
importantly, transformed into and added to the power of the body that devours it.
Such is the desired effect of c a ~ i b a i i s m within the versions of the "Sleeping
Beauty" tale as given by Basile and Perrault, both of whom extend the story beyond the
point at which the Brothers Grimm Ieave off with the waking of the Princess. The
continuation of Basile's version of the tale, once the sleeping curse has been broken, is
largely because Talia7s lover in the narrative is not a Prince, as he is in the Grimm tale,
but is a King who already has a Queen. Thus, the joining of the two results not only in the
establishment of a new royal union, but also in the collapse of the royal union that already
exists. In this, the Queen, whose position of power is sustained through her alignment
with the King, is displaced and her power threatened. Further, the union produces
children who, in their position as heirs to the throne as offspnng of the King, become part
of a power discourse that runs counter to that which includes the Queen. Therefore, the
Queen's atternpt at remedying the situation and re-establishing her position within the
power structure of the kingdorn, through a plot to have the children cooked and devoured
by the King, is especially fitting. Unlike Snow White's stepmother - whose source of
power is her dominant beauty and who, therefore, seeks to add to her power in the
consumption of her more beautifül rival - the Queen's source of power, within Basile's
tale, is her husband the King. Hence, she endeavours to have him devour his own
offspring, by which he w i l l re-appropriate and reabsorb, through consumption, the power
he has released and redistributed through his coupling with Talia. Equally fitting, then, is
the phrase the Queen repeats to the King as he eats the meal that she believes to be his
children: "Eat away, you are eating what is your own" (SLT 38). In her attempt to restore
to the King what is his own, the Queen seeks both to restore power to its source, the King,
and to realign herself with this source of power, through the elimination of counter
alignments. In essence, the Queen's plot to have the King eat his own children is a plot to
re-establish the fairy tale existence of which she had been a part pnor to the union of the
King and Talia.
Although the Queen in Perrault's version of the tale has a different relationship to
the Sleeping Beauty's King (as his mother rather than wife), her cannibalistic tendencies
are quite similar. M i l e we are given an explanation for the Queen's taste for human flesh
in the revelation that "she came from a family of ogres" and "still had ogriçh tastes" (SB
4 9 , her plot to eat her grandchildren and daughter-in-Iaw is, nevertheless, one which has
ramifications conceming the distribution of power. Her husband having died, the ogress
is, like the Queen in Basile's narrative, displaced as the spouse of the King by Sleeping
Beauty. Although the young King leaves "the governing of the kingdom in his mother's
hands" (SB 46) when he goes off to war, her position is not the only one aligned with
royal power. The very presence of Sleeping Beauty and her two children makes the
utopian life of the ogress less than total. Were the Queen to be successful in carrying out
her plans, she would become the sole representative of royal power and authorïty within
the kingdom. As it stands, her failure to be so is both the cause and the result of the
existence of other, dissenting, powers. More simply put, it is because her power is not
total that the commands of the ogress to her butIer - to have Sleeping Beauty slaughtered
and served to her - are not carried out. At the same time, she fails to have her power
made total due because her cornmands are not camed out. In essence, the act of
devouring is both an act of dominant power and a method of achieving dominant power;
the failure of most fairy tale viliains in carrying out this act signals the collapse of their
respective "happiIy ever afler" visions and, at the same time, resuIts in their failure to re-
establish these visions.
Furthemore, the act of devouring, within the fairy tale, is not just an act of power
or a method of achieving power; it is also the articulation of a specific discourse of
power. In the tale of "Jack and the Beanstalk," the ogre's taste for a breakfast of "boys
broiled on toast" (62) works to suggest not only the ogre's evil nature but also, and more
importantly, his position of dominant power. Just as the bodies of the devoured boys are
appropriated and added to the body of the ogre, thereby adding to his physical strength
and sustenance, the dissenting discourses that these boys represent are also appropriated
and added to the dominant discourse of the ogre, thereby adding to and sustaining his
position of dominance. Hence, it is Jack who, in his successful avoidance of being
consumed, remains as the source of a dissent to the ogre's control and dominance. As
such, Jack represents a fissure in the totality that has existed in the land at the top of the
beansialk up until this point. The ogre's Failure to devour Jack, like the Queen's failure to
devour Snow White, actually puts off a possible resolution to the tale (albeit, a resolution
most readers will not desire). Much the same cm be said for the woIf s failed atternpts at
devouring the thirc! httle pig. Conflict and action, within the tde, originates out of this
failure, on the part of the wolf, to establish, through total consurnption, the totality of his
own vision of happiness. It is not the threat of being devoured that hrings about conflict
and puts off the resolution of the typical fairy tale but, to the contrary, it is the failure of
one p a q and discourse to devour successfully and totally the other which brings about
and sustains conflict. As we shall see in the following chapkr, ~ u c c e ~ ~ f i d consumphm,
when it occurs, actually brings about the ideal fairy tale ending by eliminaîing the source
of crisis.
In examining what occurs in fairy tales pnor to their "happily ever after"
resolutions, 1 have proposed that the source of crisis within the typical fairy tale is any
factor that prevents the establishment of, or results in the collapse of: totality. Conflict
arises when counter discourses appear - in forms ranging From a seemingly trivial flaw,
to an alien interloper, to the introduction of a contrasting vision of "happily ever afier" -
and challenge the dominant discourse that exists. Thus, it may be surmised that resolution
to such conflict will take place oniy when counter discourses are destrooyed or gain their
own dominance. In either case, the "happily ever after" ending can be achieved only
through the elirnination of deviant bodies and counter discourses and through the
establishment or restoration of totality. This is to be the focus of my next chapter.
Having outlined, in the previous chapter, the source of cnsis within the trpical
fairy tale, it will now be possible to address the issue with which this thesis is most
concerne4 the resolution of crisis in the form of a "happily ever after" ending. Because
crisis within the fairy tale is brought about through a break in or a challenge to an existing
dominant order of things, resolution mmt corne about through the restoration of a
dominant order and the elimination of any challenge or threat counter to this dominant
order. Furthemore, the very phrase, "happily ever after," in suggesting complete and
everlasting happiness, also suggests a resolution that is the result not only of an order that
is dominant, but aIso of an order that is total. However, this simple phrase is not the only
thing to suggest totality within the fairy tale vision. Totality is also implied in the specific
ways in which the typical fairy tale resolution cornes about. Time and again, and in fairy
tales originating out of different cultures, places and time periods, the typical fairy tale
resolution is brought about through either the total annihiiation of parties opposed to a
prevailing order, or the total conformity of opposing parties to a prevailing order. In
either case, ail counter discourses are utterly destroyed or swallowed up by the dominant
discourse, the victonous "happily ever after" vision. In other words, fairy tale endings are
without compromise and without tolerance for anything not fitting into that vision. What
is most troublesome, however, is that they are successfùlly so. Hence, the basic premise
of this thesis is that, while fairy taie conflict certainly tends to bring about some homfic
circumstances, none are so horrific as the totalitarian realm suggested in the final
resolution of such conflict. Ultimately, the major problem with fairy tales is to be found
in their very success in eliminating the problematic.
"Little Red Riding7' Hood and the faim tale ideal
Ironically, the most effective mode1 for illustrating the problematic implications of
the "happily ever after" ending is, perhaps, a tale that does not end happily at al1
according to conventional standards. Charles Perrault's "Little Red Riding Hood"
concludes with the devious wolf, having already eaten the child's grandmot her,
"[throwing] himself upon Little Red Riding Hood and gobbi[ing] her up, too" (27). On
the surCace, this ending may seem a far cry h m the ideal vision encountered in the
resohtion of rnost fairy tales. Not only does Little Red Riding Hood meet with a vioIent
and tragic end, but her assailant goes unpunished and, furthemore, is heartily rewarded
for his treachery. Indeed, one possible way of reading this concIusion as being a more or
less typical fairy tale happy ending woulci be to suggest that it does end happily, not for
Little Red Riding Huod and her grandmother, but for the wolf. However, the moral
following the story seems to suggest that there is something more than this going on in
the narrative. Here the narrator declares the lesson to be learned from the tale is that
"Children, especially pretty, niceiy brought-up young ladies, ought never to taIk to
strangers; if they are foolish enough to do so, they should not be surprised if some greedy
wolf consumes them" (LRRH 27). Through this, it is Little Red Riding Hood, and not the
wolf, who is specified as being the deviant body within the tale. Hence, the fact that the
tale ends with her being consumed should corne no more as a surprise to the reader than,
as Perrault's narrator suggests, it should corne as a surprise to her.
Further, it must be noted that while the moral refers to the wolf as being "greedy,"
and goes on to implicate the "smooth-tongued, smooth-pelted variety as being "the rnost
dangerous beasts of all" (LRRH 27), it is not directed towards the wolf The wolf serves
neither as a mode1 of exemplary behaviour, nor as an exarnple of how not to behave.
Within the realm of Perrault's narrative it would seem that the wolf is a force of nature;
his actions are not deviant but, to the contrary, they represent the naturai consequences of
Little Red Riding Hood's behaviour. Whether he is read as being a literal wolf or, as the
moral seems to imply, as being a metaphor for the type of seeminçly "charming, sweet-
natured and obliging" (LRRH 27) young man who preys on naive young women, he is
what he is. Thus, it is implied that the tragic fate of Little Red Riding Hood is the
consequence of her own deviance. Simply put, whereas the wolf has his place in the
totality of the forest, just as the deceitful young man fits into the power structure of the
world that the forest represents, Little Red Riding Hood, in doing what "pretty, nicely
brought up young ladies, ought never to" do (LRRH 27), goes against this prevailing
order. It is for this that she is destroyed. Of course, it would be quite legitimate to object
to the blatantly sexist ideology of this tale, but it is the totality of this ideology that is
most objectionable. Perrault's fair). tale does more than to put forth a specific perspective
(nght or w-rong depending upon one's own); it imagines a realm in which this perspective
is made total through the elimination of anything or anyone representing dissent. Through
the wolf s consurnption of Little Red Riding Hood, dissent is destroyed and the dominant
discourse or perspective becomes the only one that is Ieft. It is in this sense that the
resolution to Little Red Riding Hood is, for al1 intents and purposes, the same as most
fairy tale, "happily ever afier7' endings.
This point may be clarified through a close look at the ways in which the ending
of the Grimm version of the same taie, entitled "Little Red Cap," relates to that of
Perrault. Certainly, the Grimm ending to this narrative is far closer to what might be
expected of a "happily ever after" fairy tale ending. Although the woif in the Grimm tale
does succeed in eating Little Red Cap and her grandmother, the couple is promptly
rescued by a hunier who "took a pair of scissors and [. . .] cut the wolf s belly open" (LRC
29) allowing them to escape unharmed. Moreover, the woIf is punished for his act, by
having his belly filled with Stones so that, when he awakes and tries to run away, "he fell
d o m dead" ( L W 29). Of the hunter, the child and her grandmother, the final paragraph
tells us, "Al1 three were happy" (LRC 29). However, it is the last line of this paragraph
that is most telling in its revelation of Little Red Cap's final thought on the event: "Never
again will I leave the path and run off into the wood when my mother tells me not tom
(LRC 30). Through this it is made clear that, ultimately, the happy realm that has been
established at the end of this variant of the tale is very much the same as that established
at the end of Perrault's. That is to Say, it is a realrn free of deviant Iittle girls. Although
Little Red Cap remains, dissent does not. Totality is achieved not through her annihilation
by the dominant power structure, but throuçh her conformity to it. Through Little Red
Cap's vow ''Never again" to deviate fiom her path, the Grimrns consmict a "happily evsr
afier" realm that is, Iike that consmicted by Perrault, free fiom deviance.
Interestinçly, just as Perrault seems compelled to ensure the reader's
cornprehension of his tale, as indicated by the moral he attaches to its conclusion, the
Brothers Grimm seem equally wary of the possibility of arnbiguity. It would seem that the
Grimm felt it necessary to show, unequivocaIly, that although Little Red Cap has
survived her ordeal wïth the wolf, the incident has resulted in real and lasting change.
Thus, they have attached an epilogue as a means of re-enforcing the message of their own
wrk . In essence, this epilogue gives us a glimpse of the newly established "happily ever
afier" realm in offering a later incident concerning Little Red Cap's dealings with a wolf.
This time, however, the child remains tnie to her word and does not deviate fiom her path
but "kept on going" (LRC 30) along the open road, thereby reaching her grandmother's
house before the wolf gets there and in time to Iock herself safely inside. Hence, the
totality of the Grimms' vision is re-enforced as evidence is provided to illustrate the
absence of Little Red Cap's deviance within the newly established order. Of course, there
may be objections to viewing this realm as being truly and totally utopian as far as Little
Red is concerned in that the wolf figure is yet present. While the figure of the wolf does
remain, however, the threat of the woIf does not.
Nevertheless, it must be noted that, within the Grimm tale, the wolf seems to fil1 a
somewhat different role than that filled by the wolf in Perrault's tale. Wherezs Perrault's
wolf takes on the role of a sot; of scourge, punishing and destroying deviance, the wolf of
the Grimms seems to fil1 a dual role of both scourge and deviant body in that, although he
is the agent of the punishrnent for and destruction of Little Red Cap's deviant behaviour,
he, too, is punished and desîroyed. Furthemore, while Perrault's wolf is said to be
"greedy" and his allegorical counterpart (the male charmer) is said to be a "dangerous
beast" (LRC 27), the hunter in the Grimm tale refers to the wolf using the term "You otd
sinner" (LRC 29). Although in either case the charactenzation is, indeed, Iess than
flattering, it is important to note that the former is more or less descriptive; the latter is
blatantly judgemental. What is dangerous must be avoided (hence the moral of Perrault's
tale). What is sinful, on the other hand, must be punished and destroyed. As Gerhard
O.W. Mueller observes, the Grirnms' portraya1 of the wolf may have something to do
with Jacob Grimm's interest and expertise in law. "In his work on German legal
antiquities ( 1828), Jacob Grimm wrote: 'Wargus, however, signifies wolf and robber
because the banished criminal becomes a resident of the forest, just like a predatory
animal, and he may be hunted, just like a wolf" (Mueller 224). Simply put, the wolf does
not belong in the vision of an ideal fairy tale realm as outlined by the Grimms and it is for
this reason, and towards the end of establishing a totality of perfection, that the "happily
ever after" resolution must entai1 more than fortunate escape of Little Red Cap and her
grandmother from the wolf s belly; it must also include the death of the wolf. As such,
the very fact that "the hunter skinned the wolf and wcnt home with the skin" (LRC 29) is
given as the reason for his happiness. The only type of wolf fitting the vision at hand is a
dead wolf and, thus, in order for "happily ever after" to be achieved, the deviant Liîtle
Red Cap must be conformed and the deviant (sinfùl) wolf must be killed. Moreover, as is
s h o w through the events outlined in the epilogue, in order for the "happily ever af?er7'
vision to be maintained, Little Red Cap must continue, totally, in her conformity and
newly introduced wolves must be continually kept out and/or destroyed. Such is the
condition of al1 fairy tale "happily ever after" endings; they are achieved and rnaintained
through the elimination of dissent either in the annihilation, the conformitv, or the
keeping out of deviant bodies and discourses.
Annihilating deviance: to devour and destroy
As the tale of "Little Red Riding H o o d may serve to illustrate, one of the most
effective means of accomplishing the total annihilation of deviance that is necessary in
establishing "happily ever after7' is through the physical consumption of the offending
body. In the first chapter of this thesis it has been s h o w that the failure to devour works
to brkg C ~ S ~ S about and to put resolution off. This point can be made most clearly,
however, through an examination of those tales in which total consumption is
successfully achieved - with the invariable result of total resolution. The first, and
perhaps bat , example of this takes place in the tale focused on above. In both Perrault's
"Little Red Riding Hood" and in the Gx-imms' "Little Red Cap" resolution, and totality, is
reached through the wolf s act of devouring Little Red. In the earlier tale this fact is
obvious as the taie promptly ends following the wolf s success. Once the deviant body
has been consurned and added to the dominating power, totality is successfully achieved.
The later tale, however, does not end directly following the wolf s consurnption of Little
Red. Nevertheless, it is this experience that brings about her conformity. Although the
child escapes alive from the belly of the wolf, deviance does not. Sirnply put, in both
vsrsions of the tale a dominant perspective is made total through the swallowing up of
counter perspectives.
Further, it is also the case within fairy tales that not only does the dominant
perspective simply swallow up the counter perspective - the body representing total
power devouring the body representing dissent - but it is through the very act of
devouring or being devoured that each perspective or body cornes to be defined. To eat is
to represent totality. To be eaten is to represent dissent. Indeed? the faiiy tale world is one
govemed by the rule "eat or be eaten." As a case in point Jacobs' EngIish fairy tale, "The
Story of the Three Little Pigs," serves well. Although the wolf in this tale - as a carnivore
bent on the consumption of the protagonist of th- narrative - bears a stiking resemblance
to the wolf in the "Little Red Riding Hood" tales, he differs in that he is never totally
successful in his attempts. Whereas he establishes himself as a powefil figure through
his quick and easy consumption of the first hvo little pigs, because the wolf is
unsuccessful in devouring the third Iitile pig, and in achieving total consumption, he
never achieves total dominance. In turn, the wolf s personal utopia is never established.
Resolution does come about, however, in the establishment of another personal utopian
rision - that of the third little pig. What is most telling about this "happily ever after"
ending, though, is that it is achieved not simply through the wolf s failure to devour the
third little pig, but also (and more importantly) through the third M e pig's success in
devouring the wolf. Until the wolf is boiled and consumed the world of the three little
pigs is one of ongoing conflict and, thus, one in which differing perspectives, discourses
and counter discourses, and individuals with conflicting interests, survive with neither
wiming out. Within this tale, as within most fairy tales, the resolution can come about
crdy once one side ltas won out, unequivocally, in this case by devouring the other.
Final resolution comes about in much the same way in Perrault's tale, "The
Sleeping Beauty in the Wood." Like the wolf in "The Story of the Three Little Pigs," the
ogress mother-in-law of Sleeping Beauty never achieves totality, as she does not succeed
in her plot to eat Sleeping Beauty and her children. Instead, her intended victims are
rescued and hidden away in the cellar by the King's butler who fools the queen mother by
replacing them with "a little lamb" a "tender young kid" and "a young doe" (SB 46-7).
rescue. However, ii: is important to note that the tale does not end ~ 4 t h the success of th'-
True success, in the fairy tale "happily ever afier" sense, must be nothing less than total.
As long as counter discourses survive, a threat yet remains. This point is made clear by
the queen mother who, having been made aware of her initial failure, sets out once again
to have her daughter-in-law and grandchildren devoured, along with "the butler, his wife
and his maid" (SB 47), this time not by herself but by having them thrown into a "vat
Rlled with toads, vipers, snakes and serpents" (SB 47). In short, the initial failure of the
Queen does not amount to success on the part of Sleeping Beauty and her allies, but is
also a failure on their part because it is not complete in that it does not include the total
dimination of the ogress. The result is a continuation and expansion (as the butler, his
wife and his maid are now included in the struggle) of conflict. A "happily ever after"
resolution to the tale is brought about only once the King returns, just in tirne, to foi1 his
mother's plans once again, but this time with more conclusive results as his mother
becomes "so angry to see her plans go awiy that she jumped head first into the vat and the
vile beasts inside devoured her in an instant" (SB 47). Thus, the "happily ever after"
ending of the tale cornes about not through the escape of Sleeping Beauty and the other
ifitended victims of the queen mother (this has already been achieved once without
result), but through the Queen-mother, herself, being devoured. Ironically, resolution
cornes about only through the type of homific death that has been so fearfully avoided
(albeit, with a twist in the relation of victor and victim).
CertainIy, though, one of the most shocking things about the ending of this tale is
not to be found in the way in which resolution is reached, but in the King's reaction to
that resolution. Although a certain totality is immediate following the death of the ogress,
happiness is not so total as ive are told that "[tlhe king codd not help grieving a M e ;
after all, she was his mother" (SB 47). Above al1 else, such a revelation alerts us to the
role point of view plays in the "happily ever after" convention of the fairy tale. For
readers to view fairy tale endings as being happy resolutions, rather than the
establishment of totality through cruel and often homfic acts, it is important that the
reader is aligned with the victorious totalitarïan vision. Because the king in "The Sleeping
Beauty in the Wood" is aligned not only with his wife, but also with his mother, his
opinion of the total resolution differs fiom that of most readers who are uilling to accept
the totality that has been achieved, even if they were not so iviIIing to accept the
alternative totality that the ogress sought Similarly, within the tale of "The Story of the
Three Little Pigs" it is the mere possibility of a particular totality being achieved - that of
the wolf - that strikes most readers as being disconcerting. Nevertheless, because the
reader is encouraged to view the story fiom the point of view of the pig, the totality
reached in the "happily ever after" ending is intended to bring about a certain sense of
relief. In syrnpathizing with the pig, rnost readers will syrnpathize with his utapian vision.
The totality achieved in the typical fairy tale "happily ever afiei' ending, then,
extends beyond the tale itself. In order for the vision to be a truly utopian one it is
necessary for it to be shared, and participated in, by al1 involved - the story's characters,
narrator, and readers aIike. In fact, close observation reveals that, in the end, even fairy
tale "villains" usually corne to be participants in the persona1 utopian vision of the victor
(against which they have waged battle throughout the body of the narrative). More often
than not, villains are not simply and paçsively punished for their deviance by the newly
established powers that be; they tend to take an active role in their own punishment. It
must be granted that the ways in which this active participation is brought about Vary
geatly; some villains participate in their own destruction quite voluntarily while others
do so unwittingly and still others are forced. Nevertheless, it is significant to note that
fuir;. iz!e ~.ri!!uics lsaa!!y scffrr ut k i r m , r r c.il!irn Lb cr unwilling, witting or unt.s?ttinm 3
hm&.
ln Perrault's "Sleeping Beauty" tale, for example, it is the ogresdQueen-mother
who, being '30 angry to see her plans go awry," throws herself into the vat of "vile
beasts" by which she is devoured (SB 47). Likewise, the wolf Corn "The Three Little
Pigs" climbs down the third little pig's chimney and (unwittingly) into the pot of boiling
water of his own volition and aIthough Snow White's stepmother is "forced to step into
the red hot shoes," her death is brought about through Rer ovm dancing (SW 73). The list
goes on: Rumpelstiltskin tears himself in two (R 117); the witch in "Hanse1 and Gretel"
puts her head into her own oven (H&G 105); Ashputtle's stepsisters cut off their owt toe
and heet (A 63-4). Even the wolf from the Grimms' "Little Red Cap" is not simply
executed at the hands of the hunter who cuts him open but, instead, kas his beIly filled
with Stones so that upon his having awakened he dies in his own attempts to run away
(LRC 29). In short, it may easily be seen that while many villains voluntarily choose
destruction itself (such as Sleeping Beauty's stepmother or Rumpelstiltskin) others are
given little choice in the matter (such as the wolf in "Little Red Cap" or Snow White's
stepmother). In either case, though, whether brought about through voluntary action or
through tnckery and/or coercion, the final act of the typical fairy tale villain is one that
corresponds with the totality of the vision at hand - the elimination of dissent through
self-destruction.
Thus, the typical fairy tale resolution is made absolute in that even the heretofore
figure of dissent and deviance - the representative of a counter discourse or an alternative
point of view - becomes, willingly or not, a participant in the (somewhat more than)
dominant order. "Happily ever after" is achieved because, in the end, al1 characters
betong to and act as agents of the sanie absolute power structure whereby they articulate
(through actions more than words) a single point of view. That most readers corne to
share this perspective and read the typical fairy tale resolution as a happy one should
corne as no surprise; the tale strives to leave us no other choice by ensuring that
alternative points of view no longer exist.
1: is this, the fairy tale's stnving towards the elirnination of counter discourses in
its quest for an absolute and ideal resolution, that accounts for the severely cruel and
unusual methods by which villains are punished. ln his analyses of the standard fate of a
farniliar fairy tale villain, the witch figure, Lutz Rohrich observes, "[tlhe punishments for
witches aim at the total destniction of their bodies: buming, scattering the ashes in the
wind, ripping apart, and drowning" (1 30). Moreover, such destruction of the witch's body
is not motivated, primarily, by cruelty or a thirst for vengeance but by the fact that
"according to folk belief, only total destruction guarantees reversal of the witch7s magic"
(Rohrich 130). In other words, the witch (both of fairy tale and of histoiy) is destroyed
not so much with the intention of having her pay for past crimes as with the intention of
destroying her power as a future threat. Within the realm of the fairy taie, however, any
deviant body - be it wolf, spindle or stepmother - represents a threat to the fairy tale
drearn. Hence, most such threats within the fairy tale are subjected to a fate similar to that
of the witch. From Snow White's stepmother to the woif in "Little Red Cap," villains
suffer death for much the same reason that Bner Rose's father orders "that every spiodle
in the kingdom should be destroyed" (BR 49). Al1 are threats to the idealistic vision of a
"happily ever aftei7 resolution and al1 must be annihilated, cornpletely and absoiutely, in
order that this vision may be achieved and maintained.
Ideal happiness, though, is not the mere result of the forces of good having
gained power over the evil villain; ideal happiness is also articulated and defined tlzrouglz
the villain's destruction. In fact, it could even be argued that it is his or her very
destruction that defines the villain as such. Who or what is to be defined as good and who
or what is to be defined as evil depends, ultimateiy, upon who wields the power. To be
powerless, m l y and absolutely powerless that is, not only results in the loss of one's
ability to articulate one's own perspective, but also in one's being used to articulate the
perspective of power.
Any judgement of good and evil within fairy tales depends more upon who wins
and who loses than it does upon the actions or motives of the characters. Indeed, hero/ines
and villains alike tend to act in strikingly similar manners and according to similar
motives. Whereas the wolf attempts to eat the third little pig, it is the pig that ends up
eating the wolf (TLP 72). Snow White's stepmother makes several attempts on the Iife of
her stepdaughter only to be executed at Snow White's wedding, if not by the hands of the
Princess, at least in her name (SW 72). The witch plots to cook Gretel in her oven, but in
the end it is Gretel who turns the tables by pushing the witch in "to be bumed miserably
to death" (H&G 105). As Maria Tatar observes, "These victims of vioience have no
trouble turning into agents of revenge, and it is astonishing to see how vigorously and
adeptly fairy-tale protagonists punish their oppressors (who usually take on the mask of
stepsister, witch, or ogre) and derive pleasure [or, at least, arrive at happiness] from their
agony" (Of Widz Their Heads ... 169). In short, if there is a qualitative difference between
fairy tale herohnes and fairy tale viIlains it has little to do with the ways in which they
choose to exercise power, once attained, in the direction of their enemies. The main
difference between the herohne and the villain in such cases would seem to be the
difference betwem success and failure.
Of course, such an observation might well be met with the standard schoolyard
defence, "well they started it." Nevertheless, a closer examination and cornparison of two
other tales, Jacobs7 "Jack and the Beanstalk and Perrault's variant of "Little Red Riding
Hood," suggests that this defence will not suitilce. The sad truth is, in the tale of "Jack and
the Beanstalk," it is the hero, Jack, who "starts it." It is Jack who climbs the beanstalk,
takes advantage of the hospitality of the ogre's wife (who not only aliows him in and
gives him something to eat but even helps him to hide from and to escape from her
husband) and then runs off with "one of the [ogre's] bags of gold under his am" (J&B
63). Furthemore, Jack retums a second time, is once again greeted, fed and hidden by the
ogre's wife, only to commit a second act of thievery in stealing "the hen that lays the
golden eggs" (J&B 65). In fact, it is not until Jack's third and final t i p up the beanstalk,
and his ensuing attempt at stealing the ogre's singing harp, that the ogre finally takes
retaliatory measures in running off in angry pursuit of Jack. By no ineans cm Jack's
killing of the ogre be seen as an act of repayment for crimes committed against himself;
to the contrary, it is Jack who has committed crimes against the ogre. Considering the fact
that this is Jack's rhird trip up the beanstalk and his third act of theft, despite his being no
longer poor and desperate (having already stolen the hen that lays the golden eggs), it is
difficuh, even, to view the case in terms of self-defence. Certainly the ogre is out to kill
hirn, but then, one might argue that Jack had no business being up there in the first place
(or at least in the third place). Yet, there can be little doubt that Jack is the hero of the
tale, the ogre the unmistakable villain. Through his destruction of the ogre, Jack, in effect,
destroys the ogre3 point of view. Just what constitutes happiness, and good or evil for
that matter, is lefi up to Jack. The ogre's o\ÿn happiness or opinions concerning good and
evil, his alternative personal vision of utopia as it were, is no longer relevant as the ogre
no longer exists. Jack does not win because he is right; he is right because he wins.
Adrnittedly, it would be difficult for most to view such a figure as the boy-eating
ogre as being a hero, regardless of the outcome of his battle with Jack. Yet, as we rnay
observe in Perrault's "Little Red Riding Hood," a tale's conclusion does have an
unrnistakeable effect on Our judgement of its characters. In many ways, Little Red is very
much like Jack. Each ventures into the unknown and each risks being eaten because of it.
However, it is only Little Red who is ultimately devoured and, while the reader may
remain somewhat sympathetic to the child, her fate (as 1 have noted earlier) is intended to
send a clear message. Folklorists have classified "Little Red Riding H o o d as belonging
to a sub-genre of "[w]arning or scare tales" (Rohrich 48). Such "cautionary tales," as
Maria Tatar describes them, "demonstrate how children with undesirable traits -
deceitfulness, curiosity, insolence - corne to a bad end" ("Beauties vs. Beasts.. ." 141 ).
Little Red's fate puts on display the consequences of ciisobedience. She may be the
protagonist within the narrative, but Little Red is no heroine; she is eaten because she is a
- .. --oad iittie girl." From this it may be gathered that, given a similar ending, Jack's stow
would carry a similar message. Death to Jack would irnply a warning not only against
going into the unknown, but also against greed and theft. More importantly, it would
serve to define Jack as deviant rather than as hero. Such speculation, it must be confessed,
is merely subjunctive; as the tale stands, Jack is no/ devoured; Jack is the hero.
Nevertheless, the juxtaposition of Jack's tale with that of "Little Red Riding Hood" helps
to shed some Iight on the nature of punishment and death so common in fairy taIe
resolution. Executions are not simply acts of power; they are aiso discourses of power.
The destruction of deviant bodies does serve to eliminate a specific source of dissent - 2.
threat to the dominant power stnicture - but it also serves to communicate the
consequences of dissent in general and even to define what is to be considered acceptable
or unacceptable behaviour. Therefore, the fact that so many tales ending "happily ever
after" also end with homfic death and destruction should corne as no shock. The two go
hand in hand. Absolute good is rooted in absolute power and both are part and parce1 of
the vision of perfection achieved, maintained and defineci through the total destruction of
deviance.
Punishrnent and revenge are not the primary motives behind the cruel treatment of
fair). tale villains; totality is. Close examination reveals this to be the case even in
seemingly anomalous examples, such as Gnmms' "Ashputtle," in which villains are not
thoroughly destroyed or killed. Indeed, Cinderella7s (Ashputtle's) stepsisters are not
destroyed at the end of the Grimm variant of the tale but, instead, both have their eyes
"pecked out" by doves at Cinderella's wedding (A 65 j. This would seem a clear instance
of the punishment for, rather than the annihilation of, deviance; the tale even tells us that
"both sisters were punished with blindness to the end of their days for being so wicked
and false" (A 65 [italics mine]). However, it would be a rnistake to dismiss this
punishment as being a random act of cruelty. In fairy tales, in accordance with pre-
modem concepts ofjustice, the maxim "the punishment must fit the crime" is taken quite
literally. In history and fairy tale endings alike it is often the case that "[s]pecific parts of
the body involved in the crime are punished (Etohrich 132). This is essentially what takes
place in "Ashpuîtle." The steprnother and her daughters tell Cinderella that she cannot go
to the ball because of her appearance: "We'd only be ashamed of you" (A 61). Further,
when she does appear at the ball it is stated that "[hler sisters and stepmother didn7t
recognize her" (A 62). The general implication houglzout the tale is that the problem
with the stepsisters, the reason that they treat Cinderella so badly, has much to do with
their failure to recognize and appreciate her for the beautiful young girl that she is. Their
vision is flawed and, thus, it is their faulty vision that is, quite literally, destroyed. The
destruction of deviant bodies is no less total in "Ashputtle" than in other tales; it is simply
more specific. Here, as in other fairy tales, "happily ever after" is achieved through thc
annihilation of dissenting viewpoints, the total destruction of al1 things deviant.
Conforminp deviance: the production of docile bodies
The total destruction of deviant bodies, while being perhaps the most outwardy
blatant method through which the typical fairy tale reaches totality in its resolution, is not
the only way in which "happily ever after" endings are brought about. As has already
been pointed out through an examination of the Grirnms' version of the "Little Red
Riding Hood" tale in relation to that of Perrault, the confonnity of the deviant body is
equally effective in achieving fairy tale totality. Conversely, an examination of Perrault's
version of the "Cinderella77 tale, as it relates to that of the brothers Grimm, illustrates
much the same point. Perrault's tale ends with the stepsisters finally recognizing
Cinderella as "the beautihl lady they had seen at the bail" and then throwing "themselves
to fier feet to beg iier to tôrgive them for aii the bad treatment she had received frorn
ihem," which CindereiIa does "with al1 her heart" (C 58). Hence, the "villains" of the tale
are neither punished nor destroyed. Rather than their vision being violently removed (as
is that of their Grimm comterparts), the stepsisters' vision is eEectively altered.
Nevertheless, whereas Perrault's fairy tale resolution is far less violent than that of the
brothers Grimm (which probably has much to do with the reason that it is Perrault's tale
that serves as the basis for most popular storybook and movie adaptations), it is no less
total. In either case the "happily ever after" realm envisioned is one fiee, totally and
absolutely, h m dissent. Resolution cornes about oniy when Cinderella's persona1
utopian vision goes thoroughly unçhallenged. In the end, the point of view that wins out
does not merely become dominant; it also becomes absolute in that it cornes to be shared
by al1 parties involved. The stepsisters of Perrault's Cinderella, like the Gnmms' Little
Red, are not destroyed by the totality of fairy tale resolution precisely because they
conform to said totality and become a part of it. Although they remain, dissent does not.
Far fiom posing a threat to Cinderella's "happily ever after" existence, her stepsisters (in
accepting the newly ordered power structure in which CindereIla7s position is higher than
their own) corne to re-enforce it.
It must be noted that in the typical fairy tale, as in Life, conformity need not
always imply a loss of security or a decline in statu. To the contrary, conformity often
means increased security and comfort through an alliance with power. Cinderella's
stepsisters, for example, ackieve an elevated status through their conformity. By aligninç
themselves ~ 4 t h Cinderella's power, rather than opposing it, the stepsisters succeed in
participating in, and becoming beneficiaries of, the "happily ever after" resolution. The
story concludes by informing us, "Cinderella, who was as good as she was beautifûl, took
her sisters to live in the palace and arranyd for hnth nf-thcm to be marrieci, on the sarne
&y [the &y of Cinderella's own royal wedding], to great lords" (C 58). Certainly, this
conclusion would seem to contrast greatly with that of the tale as told by the brothers
Grimm: "both sisters were punished with blindness to the end of their days for being so
wicked and false" (A 65). Further examination, however, reveals that the two endings
have much more in common than one might suppose. First it must be noted that, while
the conclusion to the "Cinderella" story is in many ways a representative mode1 of the
typical fairy tale ending, both Perrault and the Brothers Grimm avoid closing the tale with
the familiar phrase, "happily ever after." Nevertheless, in each instance Cindere l la '~
"happily ever after" existence is implied through the fate of her stepsisters. Perpetual
happiness, in the case of the Grimm variant, is implied in the fact that the stepsisters,
having been disabled by their blindness, no longer pose a threat to Cinderella or to her
perfect fairy tale life; they have been rendered powerless. Perpetual happiness, in the case
of the Perrault variant, is implied in the fact that the stepsisters, having been permitted a
srnall share in Cinderella's good fortune, have been stnpped of their motivation to pose a
threat; they have been made docile. Totality is achieved not in the guarantee that the
stepsisters cannot threaten the power structure, but in the guarantee that, as its
beneficiaries, they wiil nof threaten the power structure. Resolution is achieved through
Cinderella's success in bringing about the conformation and transformation of her
stepsisters fiom deviant into docile bodies.
Within the absolute realm of the typical fairy tale resolution the existence and
creation of docile bodies is often as prevalent, and as important, as the annihilation and
destruction of deviant ones. Many fairy tale herohnes, in fact, achieve "happily ever
aftei' in conforming to an existing power structure rather than by achieving an absolute
dominance of their own. As rnany feminist theonsts have suggested, this is especially true
of female characters. Karen Rowe declares, "fairy tales perpetuate the patnarchal status
quo by making female subordination seem a romantically desirable, indeed an
inescapable fate" (325). One need not look very far to discover that, for many fairy tale
heroines, the prospect of living "happily ever after" involves subordination to the
invariably male mler of a totalitarïan realm. Snow White, for example, achieves
happiness and security only once she has agreed to marry a Prince. Of course, marnage in
and of itself does not necessarily suggest female subordination. Yet, in reading the tale
one might be tempted to observe the conditions Ieading up to the mam'age with a degree
of cynicism. After all, wlien the Prince first encounters Snow White, and decides to take
her off to his castle, she is lying in a coffin in a death sleep. Although she is reanimated
before any wedding plans are made, there remains, in her easily won acceptance of the
Prince's rnam-age proposal, a sense that Snow White's control of the situation is hardly
more legitimate than had she remained asleep. Incidentally, the proposa1 itself is phrased
not as a question but as a demand: "come with me to my father's castle and be my wife"
(SW 72). Simply put, the implications of the tale's happy resolution are somewhat
disconcerting. In it, perfect happiness is achieved not only in the totaIity that resutts out of
the destruction of the stepmother, but also that which results out of Snow White's own
submission to dominant power.
Unfortunately, not al1 instances of female submission to dominant male p o w r are
equally disconcerting. Many, such as Basile's "Sole, Luna, E Talia" or the Grimms'
"Rurnpelstiltskin" are far more troubling, indeed. As does Snow White's Prince, Talia's
King cornes upon her when she is under a sleeping spell. However, whereas the Prince's
infatuation with the sleeping Snow White prompts him to have her carried off to his
castle, the King's infatuation with TaIia results in his "carr[iing] her to a couch" where
he "gathered the fniits of love" (SLT 37)' as Basile so euphemistically puts it. Rape,
though, is rape, regardless of how poetically it is described. Simply put, Talia is the
epitome of the passive female, not to mention the docile body, while the King who takes
advantage of her is the ultimate representative of absolute power (and tyranny, for that
matter). The most troubling aspect of this tale may not be the rape itself, but in the fact
that the tale's "happily ever after" ending includes Talia's mamage to the man who has
raped her. It is only through her total passivity, her non-resistance to the totalitarian
authonty of the King, that Talia achieves the fairy tale ideal.
In the Grimms' classic tale, "Rumpelstiltskin," the miIler7s daughter, who filIs the
role of heroine in the narrative, achievesisuffers a similar utopian fate. Although the King
of this tale is no rapist, he is no less a tyrant for that. In fact, it is the King, not
Rurnpelstiltskin, who represents the most immediate danger to the miller's daughter.
Twice he Iocks her in a room fuIl of straw and Ieaves her with the threat that if she has
not spun a room full of "straw into gold by tornorrow moming, [she] will die" (R 1 15).
Twice she succeeds in her task and escapes death (with assistance fkom Rumpelstiltskin).
Finally, the King locks the miller's daughter in a third room full of straw, but this time he
leaves her with a promise rather than a threat: "You'll have to spin this into gold tonight,
but if you succeed, you shall be my wife" (R 1 15). Of course she does succeed and, thus,
"the beautifid miller's daughter became a queen" (R 116). Like Talia, the miller's
daughter passively submits herself to totalitarian authority. In short, she achieves the fairy
tale ideal of security and happiness through her rnarriage to the very tyrant who
threatened her in the first place. "RurnpeIstiltskin" serves as an effective illustration of the
choice so many fairy tale figures (blllains and herohes alike) are faced wïth: one may
oppose, or fail to satisQ, the dominant power and be destroyed by it, or one may submit
to the dominant authority thereby achieving a place within the "happily ever after"
totality through an altiance with power.
In their striving towards a cornmon goal of a perFect existence, fairy tales would
seem to promote conformity in general. Most "happily ever after" endings entai1 a
submission to or an alliance with the dominant power structure and those who occupy a
position of authonty within that power structure. The Grimms' "Little Red Cap," for
instance, ends happily with Little Red's decision that, from this point fonvard, she will
obey the rules of her mother (LRC 301, the representative of adult (and even patriarchal)
authority. Likewise, the stepsisters in Perrault's "Cinderella" win a place in the "happily
ever after7' by subordinating themselves to Cinderella, who has become the representative
of royal authority as the Prince's Bride, and "[throwing] themselves at her feet" (C 58).
Moreover, although Cinderella herself may be seen as an active heroine - she attends the
bal1 of her own volition and reveals her identity as "the beautiful lady [. . .] at the ball" of
her own free will in requesting an opportunity to try on the gIass slipper to "see if it might
not fit" (C 58) - her happiness, too, is the end result of the fact that she confonns (with
the help of her fairy godrnother) to the Prince's ideal of feminine beauty, whereby she is
aligne4 through marriage, to royal rule. Joseph Jacob's tale, "Jack and the Beanstalk,"
concludes similarly in telling us that the male protagonist, Jack, "married a great princess,
and they lived happy ever after" (J&B 67). Regardless of his success in having acquired
great riches through his adventures at the top of the beanstalk and his having effectively
dispatched the ogre, Jack's "happily ever after7' life is not complete until he has attained a
position within the ruling power structure. Further, the implication would seem to be that
just as Snow White and Cinderella obtain their royal position because they conform, as
extremely beautiful young ladies, to the standard image of royal Princesses, Jack obtains
his royal position because he confoms, as an extrernely wealthy young man, to the
standard image of royal Prince.
Within the realm of the typical fairy tale those who are permitted to participate in
the "happily ever after" that is established at the end of the narrative, be they villain or
hero, are not destroyed precisely because they fit neatly into the niling power structure at
hand. Overall, it would seern that resolution is rooted as much in the creation of docile
bodies as in the destruction of deviance. Totality is the aim. If Little Red is to live happily
and avoid being devoured she must first become an obedient little girl. If Cinderella's
stepsisters are to avoid having their eyes pecked out, they must agree "always to love ber"
(C 58). If Snow White and Sleeping Beauty are to acquire perpetual happiness they must
passively accept the advances of a lovesick Prince or King. Even Jack cannot live "happy
ever afief' (J&B 67) until he has become, through his marriage to a Princess, a part of the
dominant power. In short, fairy tale resolution of perfect happiness cornes about only
when totality has been achieved, when deviant bodies have been destroyed and only those
who conform to the prevailing order remain.
Keepine deviance out: brick walls and locked doors
The "happily ever after" fairy tale resolution implies not onIy perfect happiness
achieved, but also perfect happiness maintained. As the "Sleeping Beauty" taIes indicate,
however, the task of maintaining perfection is a dificult one to say the least. As has been
suggested in the first chapter of this thesis, the fairy tale vision is a fragile one; even the
slightest flaw, a pea in a Princess's bed, a prick in her finger, represents a deviant body
and a threat to the perfect order. It is for this reason that Brier Rose's father orders "that
every spindle in the whole kingdom should be destroyed" (BR 49)' and that Sleeping
Beauty's father "forbade the use of a spindle, or even the possession of one, on pain of
death" (SB 4 1 ). Each attempts to rnaintain their daughter's perfect happiness, one through
the destruction of the threat, the other through the forced conformity of his subjects. The
King in Basile's version of the tale deals with the situation in another manner; through his
command "that no flax or hemp or any other similar material should ever corne into his
house" (SLT 36), Talia's father attempts to keep the threat out. This is a third method
commonly employed in the typical fairy tale's stnving towards a "happily ever after"
ending.
The Grimms' epilogue to the tale, "Little Red Cap," serves to illustrate this point.
Here we discover that despite the destruction of the wolf and the confomity of Little Red
within the stoq proper the child and her grandrnother are yet susceptible ro the threat of
wolves. Nevertheless, although Little Red encounters a second wolf on the way to visit
her grandmother, the ideal fairy tale realrn of grandmother's house is successfully
defended fkom the threat of the wolf by grandmotherys simple plan to "just lock the door
[sol he won't be able to get in" (LRC 30)- Although Little Red's safety is dependent upon
her conformity to parental authori~j in resisting the wolf s attempts "to make her Ieave
her path" (LRC 30) as weI1 as the eventual drowning of the wolf so that she c m safely
return home, it is equally dependent upon the locked door that keeps deviance, in the
f o m of the wolf, from gaining access into the house. The "happily ever after" realrn
envisioned in "Little Red Cap" is a garrison of sorts. Perfect happiness is maintained for
"ever after" through the act of locking representatives of dissent out and, incidentally, by
locking representatives of the prevailing totality in. Litîle Red's personal utopia is a
spatial one consisting of grandrnother's house, her own house and the path in between. To
leave the path, or to unlock the door, is to bnng about one's own destruction. In short, in
order for Little Red to live "happily ever after'' she must avoid difference and dissent; she
must keep out of the unkno~m and keep the unknown out. Hence, the fairy tale vision
encountered here and in the resolution of many other fairy tales is, even for those who
control it (including the tierohne), somewhat stifling. "Happily ever after," as most fairy
tales would have it7 has little to do with freedom from the threat of danger or dissent and
much more to do with a perpetual vigilance directed towards the goal of maintaining an
impenetrable bamer between a fairy tale existence and anything that poses a threat.
Such is, arguably, the prïmary theme of Joseph Jacobs' tale, "The Story of the
Three Little Pigs." What sets the third little pig apart from the other tsvo - what results in
his achieving a "happily ever after" existence as opposed to being devoured by the wolf
as are his siblings - is precisely his success in having encased himself within an
impenetrable fortress. The dwelling of the third little pig is a space no more ideal than
that of the first and second little pig except in its effectiveness in keeping the \volves at
bay, as it were. It might also be noted that, while the house of "furze" (TLP 69) built by
the second little pig is çignificantly stronger than the house of straw built by the first, both
share the same fate. A doubled effort of huffing and puffing is required of the wolf in his
task of blowing the furze house down as compared with the straw house (TLP 69).
Nevertheless, both houses are Iess than perfect in the protection they offer and, therefore,
both houses suffer colIapse and both pigs are ultimately devoured. In accordance with the
fairy tale ideology of perfection and flawlessness only the third Iittle pig, locked inside
the perfect security of his brick house, survives the woIf who is not free to enter. His
sumival, though, depends not only upon his success in lirniting the wolf s freedom to go
where he would; it is also dependent upon the Iimiting of the pig's own fieedorn to corne
and go as he wishes. If the pig is to go anywhere, be it to dig turnips, to pick apples, or to
attend the fair, he must leave the security of his home when the wolf is not there and he
must r e t w and lock himself inside before the wolf has amved. Total safety and
happiness - for the third.little pig, as for Little Red Riding Hood - requires that limits be
put on the free mobility of al1 parties involved ("hero/inel' and "villain" alike). Such
boundaries are not to be taken lightly. To overstep them is to bring about either the
collapse of the secure r e a h of the ideal fairy tale existence or the destruction of the
individual who has placed/found him or herself on the wrong side of the boundary. This,
of course, is what takes place in the resolution of "The Story of the Three Little Pigs."
Having gained entrante, through the chimney, into the house the wolf is instantly
eliminated by the third little pig who "boiled him up, ate him for supper, and lived
happily ever aftenvards" (TLP 72), thereby maintaining totality and, fiom the pig's
perspective at least, a utopian reaim.
Jacobs' tale, "Jack and the Beanstalk" contains a similar resolution as the ogre,
like the wolf, is destroyed in his very attempt to enter Jack's newly established persona1
utopia at the bottom of the beanstalk. Moreover, in fis act of cutting down the beanstaIk
Jack not only destroys the immediate intnider who threatens his happineçs; he also
eliminates the potential of any future threat from the clouds, such as the ogre's wife.
Although Jack's solution to the problem of the unknown does not include the constniction
of a brick wall or gmison, it is equally effective in that it maintains totality by isolating
it, by cutting it off, literally, from contact with those who might destroy it. What makes
Jack's own perfect existence different fiom that of the Little Red or the third Little pig,
however, is the fact that Jack has stolen it fiom the very entity, the ogre, who threatens to
take it away. In chopping down the beanstalk. Jack is, in effect, taking a step in
preventing intruders fiom the land at the top of the beanstalk h m doing to him what he
has done to the ogre (of course, Jack still has his fellow humans to worry about, but his
eventual alignment with power through money and his maniage to a Princess go a long
way in guarding against this threat). Interestingly, such measures are not necessary prior
to Jack's having successfully achieved a totally happy existence. For as long as Jack's life
remains less than totally perfect, even once he has escaped poverty through his theft of
the gold laying hen but is still "determined to have another try at his luck up there at the
top of the beanstalk" (J&B 65)- the beanstalk remains a source of opportunity for Jack by
which he may improve his life. It is only once his vision of a perfect existence has been
made complete, once there is nothing left for him to gain, that the beanstalk becomes a
threat. Such is the price of perfection: once one has achieved it, one must put up walls and
create bamers in an effort to protect it fiom those who would take it for themselves. The
result is a loss of freedom and mobility for al1 involved. Just as the woif must be kept out
of the house, Little Red and the third little pig must remain inside (or, at least, on the right
path). Just as the inhabitants of the land in the clouds must be kept from entenng Jack's
world, Jack may never again experience an adventure in the clouds. Hence, the ideal
realrn envisioned in these fairy tales is not rnerely a reaIm fiee from the hazards of the
Iess than perfect space existing outside; it is also a realm cut off and isoIated from ail
others.
"Homblv Ever After"
In the final analyses, the world of absolute perfection envisioned in so many fairy
tale resolutions is not so ideal as it may first appear. It has been the argument of this
thesis that the "happily ever after" resolution so common to the typicai fairy taIe is one
based on totality and absolute power. It is brought about through the cornpiete
annihilation, whether by means of conformity or the often-violent destruction, of dissent
and difference. In short, the absolute perfection so rigorously sought after throughout the
body and so successfully achieved at the concIusion of such tales is, in fact, a totaIitarian
realrn; the very prospect of perfection, thus envisioned, is problematic at best and in many
instances quite horrifie. Nevertheless, the typical fairy taIe is quite effective in glossing
over the more problematic and homfic implications of the standard fairy tale vision.
Upon closer observation, however, one might be tempted to describe the standard
"happily ever after" fairy tale resolution in much the same terms used by Hans Christian
Andersen's Princess, in "The Princess and the Pea," as she describes a night spent
sleeping on "twenty mattresses and twenty eiderdowvn quilts" and a single pea: "It's
homble!" (P&P 2 1). Indeed, any state in which a single pea could hinder one's sleep, not
to mention making one "black and blue al1 over" (P&P 21), truly is homble. Ultimately,
the "happily ever after" realm of the typical fairy tale resolution is such a state. Totality of
any sort, even total happiness, rneans horror for al1 involved. Those who do not "fit" must
conform or be brutally, unmercifùlly and absolutely destroyed andior even devoured.
Because "happily ever after" is a fragile state, because perfection rnay suffer collapse due
even to the slightest of flaws, it may be achieved and maintained only through the
establishment of absolute power. Dissent or anything ninning counter to the prevailing
order, anything different as it were, must be reduced to powerlessness. Stepmothers and
wolves, giant ogres and tiny mystetious men without names, spindles and peas alike - al1
must be elirninated absolutely and completely at the hands of those in control of the
prevailing vision of absolute happiness.
Even for those in control, perfection has its price. In order to maintain it they must
lock others out and lock thernselves in; they must remain perpetually wary of those who
would take away or destroy their perfect state. Although fairy tale heroes and herohnes
suffer many hardships and are threatened by various fn'ghtening dangers throughout the
body of their tales, I would suggest that nothing could be more frightening than the
totality with which these hardships and dangers are ultimately eliminated. Yet, the
question remains: If "happily ever after" is no way to end a faiiy tale, what is? Over the
yeae others have attempted to answer this question and these attempts will be the focus
of my third and final chapter.
However common, the conventional "happily ever after" mode of the traditional
fairy tale has not gone totally unchallenged over the years. Much criticism has been
focused upon calling into question standard fais. tale ideals. Some of the most thought
provoking challenges that have been posed to the conventional fairy tale, though, have
been posed not through critical texts, but through narrative texts written in not so
conventional fairy tale form. While the tales with which Ive are most familiar tend to
subscribe to the "happily ever afier" formula, there has long existed, as well, a counter
tradition - a dissenting voice as it were - that remains wary of the prospect of fairy tale
perfection. The fairy tale canon includes a virtually countless number of what may be
described as "counter-narratives" - originating out of a variet. of different cultures, eras
and locations - that express varying degrees of cynicism towards the conventional
"happily ever after" ideal. Such tales include variants of farniliar narratives told in a not
so familiar manner, from an unfamiliar point of view or provided with an alternative
ending. Also, there exist what may be described as "anti-fairy-tales" in the fom of
or@naI narratives wîth reverse fâiry tale ideals such as the celebration of
differenceldissent, a negative view of perfection and a conscious avoidance of absolute
closure. In any case, these tales pose a direct challenge to the status quo. Far from
glossinp over the more negative implications of the dominant fairy tale ideal of total and
perfect happiness, counter-narratives and anti-fairy-tales work to forepround the
problematic and horrifie. Most importantly, perhaps, many revise the standard fairy tale
vision by offenng an alternative to the totality involved in ending "happily ever after."
In discussing the issue of fairy tale revision it must be granted that ''[alny tnie
fairy tale, like al1 folklore is characterized by the criteria of 'multiple existence' and
'variation"' (Dundes 261). As has been made clear in the previous chapters of this study,
even such "authoritative" texts as those written by Perrault and the Brothers Grimm offer
similar tales in variant forms. Nevertheless, such narratives, while differing corn one
another, cannot legitimately be viewed as nrnning counter to one another as they tend to
cany similar messages and to be based upon shared ideals. Although Perrault's Little Red
Riding Hood is devoured never to be heard fiom again, in contrast with her Grimm
counterpart, Little Red Cap, who is rescued from the belly of the wolf, the message in
each case remains the same: little girls should obey their mothers, avoid strangers, and
generally keep to the right path. Likewise, even though the "CinderellaY7 story told by
Perrault differs, in many regards, from that related by the Brothers Grimm in their tale of
"Ashputtle" (for example, CindereIla receives assistance from a fairy godmother whife
Ashputtle is assisted by a hazel tree and the birds nesting therein), both tales suggest that
ideal happiness is to be found in the heroine7s becoming a Princess through her mamage
to the Prince. In such instances different vanants of fairy tales do not truly suggest
alternative visions. Our interest here is with those tales that do.
Another distinction to be made between tale variants and counter-narratives
concerns the spirit in which they are told. Most traditional fairy tales and tale variants
reflect a distinct sense of escapism. They are set in an ideal realm of the unreal, a world
removed from everyday existence. They speak of unattainable drearns of a beîter life
while staying away, for the most part, from blatant political and social commentary. Most
counter-narratives, on the other hand, operate in precisely the opposite manner. The
writers of such stories use their tales, quite often, to comment not only upon what they
see as being the problems with traditional fair). tales but also upon what they see as being
social and political problems. It might even be said that, where conventional fairy tales
are told with the intention of escaping everyday existence, counter-narratives are told
wlth the intention of changing it. Thus, it shodd corne as no surprise that such tales ofien
resist the very notion of a perfect existence towards which the more standard fairy tale
strives. As history, and especially recent history, has shown, this dream of an ideal and
total state is, when applied to realiv, an unrealistic and often dangerous notion. It must
also be noted that such an outlook is very much a modem one and has much to do wïth
what many have perceived as the failure of the promises of "progress" (most evident in
such historical realities as two World Wars). It is for this reason, perhaps, that the
rnajority of counter-narratives are modem retellings. They are written by those who, in
transforming the fairy tale from an escapist dream into a social critique, would pose a
challenge to the ideals and ideologies presented by the traditional fairy tale.
(Re)Msions of the fairy tale ideal
Many wrïters who have posed a challenge to the ideals evident within popular
fairy taIes have done so in attempting to recover the tales by providinç them, through
extensive revision, with more "acceptable" ideals. Many "present-day writers have
rearranged familiar motifs and characters and reversed plot lines to provoke readers to
rethink conservative views of gender and power" (Zipes Don 't Ber ... 13). Although
feminist w-riters must, most certainly, be credited with producinç a large nurnber of this
type of revisionist fairy tale, such tales ofien suggest a valuing of other non-consemative
views besides feminism, such as anti-racism or socialist ideals.
In examining such narratives we might begin by looking at the popular tale of
"Snow White" as re-envisioned by The Merseyside Fairy Story Collective. \ h i l e still
somewhat recognizable, the tale as told by the Collective deviates significantly fiom the
standard version of the Brothers Grimm. In keeping with the Grimm tale, the villain is a
"cruel and powerfùl Queen" who owns a "magic mirror7' (Merseyside 21 1 ) . Of this
mirror, though, she does not enquire as to who is the fairest in the land but, raiher, "[wlho
is the happiest in the land" (Merseyside 2 12). The answver, of course, is the Queen herself,
and it is little wonder that she is so happy as "al1 the usehl and beautifid things that had
been made in the kingdom" are daily brought to the Queen's castle at the top of the
mountain (Merseyside 2 12). The action of the story begins when, "[olne day, among the
procession climbing the steep path to the castle were a pale little girl called Snow White
and seven little men, dwarfs, even srnaller than she" (Merseyside 2 12) who present to the
Queen a chest filled with diamonds on top of which lies a necklace made by Snow White.
The Queen, being impressed by the girl's skills, declares that Snow White is "to stay in
the castle as a jewellery maker7' (Merseyside 2 13) and, held against her will, Snow White
does just that. Whenever the Queen is pleased by Snow White's handiwork she tells the
girl she "may choose a reward (Merseyside 2 13). Although she is told that "she could be
a princess" (Merseyside 2 14), Snow White rejects this reward and, instead, asks one time
to be allowed to "go home" (Merseyside 2133, another time that the Queen be less selfish
so that the people of the kingdom "will no longer be cold and hungry and miserable"
(Merseyside 214) and, finally, having been denied her fint two requests, asks for
"[n]othing7' (Merseyside 2 15). The tale finally ends when Snow White, having escaped
the castle, incites an uprising against the Queen and her soldiers, and the Queen, in her
attempt to throw down the rnagic rnirror that has infomed her of the coming revolution,
falIs from the castle wall and is "shattered to fragments on the rocks below" (Merseyside
2 18).
While the differences between this "Snow White" tale and the one with which we
are familiar are many, indeed, for the purposes of this study one difference is of particuIar
interest - that is the difference in the implied "happily ever after" vision of each. Whereas
the Gnmms' version of the tale reaches its "happily ever after" resolution in Snow
White's marriage to the Prince whereby she is restored to her rightful position as
Princess, the Merseyside tale soundly and adarnantly resists a like resolution. Even in the
face of the Queen's threat that "unless you choose to be a pnncess you will never leave
the tower again" (Merseyside 215) Snow White refuses. In doing so, however, Snow
White is not simply rejecting the reward offered by the Queen; she is also rejecting, in
favor of a more collective utopian vision, the vision of perfect happiness as laid out by the
Brothers Grimm. So long as her "fiends will still be toiling in the mines" (Merseyside
213), Snow White's own potential situation, however ideal, can by no means be
envisioned by her as being a happy one. In the end, "happily ever afier" is brought about
not through the heroine's having been elevated in status to a position atop a poLver
hierarchy (as a royal Princess), but through the effective collapse of the hierarchal system.
Hence, the Merseyside "Snow White" is not a mere variation of the conventional tale, but
works, rather, as a counter-narrative. In offering an alternative vision of ideat happiness it
calls into question the very desirrbility of the more familiar "happily ever after"
resolution to the "Snow White" tale.
This having been said, it must be noted that, although the Merseyside "Snow
White" does work to challenge and critique the more conventional fairy tale vision of the
Brothers Grimm in offering an alternative vision, this alternative vision may be
legitimately viewed as being an equally totalitarian one. The tale ends, after all, with the
destruction of the wicked Queen as she plunges to her de&. It would seem that even The
Merseyside Fairy Story Collective is loath to permit that deviance, in any form, should
remain to threaten the socialist utopia that has been established. While the tale does pose
a challenge to the Grimms' pariicular (hierarchical) brcrnd of "happily ever afier" totality,
it prescribes its own (egalitarian) brand of "happily ever afier" totality in the process.
Nevertheless, for the vast majority of readers, the Merseyside "Snow White" wi11 not be
read as a stand alone story but, rather, as being irrevocabiy Iinked to the tale in its
conventional form. Thus, the very concept of fairy tale perfection, of an ideal realrn,
breaks down as the mere juxtaposition of alternative visions of "happily ever after7' forces
one to recognizz the fact that what is considered as being ideal depends largely upon
one's o m set of ideals or ideologicaI stance.
This point becornes increasingly evident as one reads Jack Zipes' exhaustive case
study of the Red Riding Hood tradition, Tlze Trrals B Tribuhtions of Little Red Rfding
Hood: Versions of the Tale in Socioculturai Context. Beginning with Perrault's "Little
Red Riding H o o d and ending with Chiang Mi's "Goldflower and the Bear," Zipes draws
on the creativity of three separate continents and almost three hundred years of history in
gathering together thirty-one separate variants of the popular tale. While a great many of
these variants end with a little girl being devoured, or almost devoured, as a result of her
atm naivety or disobedience, alternatives to this resolution are also represented. James
Thurber, for example, in his (extremely) short storv, "The Little Girl and the Wolf," has
the "Iittle girl" Save herself by taking "an automatic out of her basket and [shooting] the
wolf dead" (Thurber 2 10). ("Moral: It is not so easy to fool Iittle girls nowadays as it used
to be" [Thurber SlO].) In her version of the tale, "Little Red Cap '65," Anneliese Meinert
Ieaves even "old Mr. Wolf7 unmdested as he stands "on the side of the road [signaling]
to hitch a ride" while Little Red Cap passes by in her "sp~rtscar~~ at "a hundred miles an
hour" (Meinert 224). In direct contrast to the typical cautionary theme implied by more
conventional variants of the tale, alternative tales such as these wouId seem to suggest
throwing caution to the wind. Little Red, far fiom being presented as a spoiled and
disobedient child who must either conform to the prevailing order or be destroyed by it, is
transformed "into a fearless, independent girl" (Zipes Trials and Tribulations 42), in
control of her OWTI destiny.
Arguably the most effective, and certainly the most anthologized, challenge to the
standard resolution of the "Little Red Riding Hood" narrative cornes in the form of
Angela Carter's feminist version of the tale, "The Company of Wolves." Carter plays on
a popular interpretation of the tale, most commonly associated with the Perrault variant,
as being one conceming the dangers of seduction and sexual impropriety. In the moral
that closes his narrative, Perrault warns that the "most dangerous beasts of all" are those
"wolves who seem perfectly charrning sweet-natured and obliging, who pursue young
girls in the street and pay them the most flattering attentions'' (LRRH 27). It is precisely
this type of wolf that Carter's nameless heroine ("the girl") encounters on her way to visit
her grandrnother: "he laughed with a flash of white teeth when he saw her and made a
comic yet flattering ~ O W " (Carter 276). In keeping with the basic plot of the standard tale
the "handsome gentleman" (Carter 276), who tums out to be a werewolf, parts with the
girl and races off to grandmother's where he amves before her, makes short work of
granny and awaits the child's arrival while sitting "patiently, deceitfûlly beside the bed in
granny's nightcap" (Carter 278).
It is only once the girl reappears on the scene that Carter's tale deviates
significantly from the conventional version. Trapped alone in the house with the wolf the
girl, realizing "her fear did her no good, [...] ceased to be afraid" (Carter 279) and takes
control of the situation: "she ripped off his shirt for hirn and flung it into the fire, in the
fiexy wake of her own discarded clothing" (Carter 280). Simply put, this heroine is not the
helpless victim of seduction of old but has been transformed into a seductress in her own
nght. Thus, the tale ends quite unconventionally with her sleeping soundly "in granny's
bed, between the paws of the tender wolf' (Carter 280). In effect, Carter reverses the
standard "Red Riding H o o d resolution of Perrault and the Grimms - which sees the
protagonist's disobedience (her implied unrestrained sexuality) conquered or conformed -
so that it is rh-ough her unrestrained sexuality that the "girl", ultimately, succeeds in
taminç the beast. As does the Merseyside "Snow White," Carter's version of the "Little
Red Riding Hood" story, in supplying a familiar tale with an alternative (more
appealing?) resolution, invites an interrogation of the conventional tale, its resolution and
the ideals that such a resolution suggests. Even the "happily ever afier" ending of the
Grimms' "Little Red Cap" seems hollow and somewhat less than satisfactory in light of
the alternative viewpoint irnplied by such adaptations as "The Company of Wolves."
EquaI time for differinn tmints of view
Some of the most interesting fairy tale adaptations are those in which an
alternative viewpoint is not rnerely implied but clearly represented. PIaying on the belief
that there are two (or more) sides to eveq story, many fairy tale revisionists have posed
challenges to some of the most popular "happily ever after'' resolutions by giving voice to
the side of the story that would usuaily remain untold. One such revisionist is Prisciila
Galloway. In her story, C L B I ~ ~ d and Bone," Galloway retefls the story of "Jack and the
Beanstalk" fiom the perspective of the GiantIOgre or, more precisely, from that of his
wife. Adrnittedly, other aspects of the tale have been altered: Galloway has transformed
the Ogre and his wife into humans and Jack into a pygrny (the relative size differsnce
being, thereby, creatively maintained); the beanstalk has k e n replaced by a "sheer cliff'
(Galloway 16); in the place of a bag of gold and a gold Iaying hen, Jack makes off with a
"Ruman" (22) and a "gold terminal" (29), respectively (the harp remains a harp).
Nevertheless, the plot of the story, for al1 intents and purposes, is much the sarne as that
of Jacobs' tale. Three times Jack climbs the cliff, is invited in by the narrator, hides in her
oven, is srnelled by her husband, Sard, who would eat him if only he could find him, and
robs the man of his most valued possessions. As he leaves for the third tirne Jack makes
the mistake of playing his harp before he has gotten home and "a crashing sound," heard
by Sard's wife, would seem to suggest that the tale has ended in much the same manner
as Jacobs' tale as Sard, in his pursuit of Jack, falls "over the cliff' (Galloway 35) to his
death.
What is not the same about the ending of Galloway's variant of the tale is its
irnplied tone; "happily ever after," from this new point of view, is not so happy. By
s hifting the tale's perspective, GaiIoway invites the reader to shi fi herhis sympathies.
Through first person narration of Sard's wife ive are given a fiesh outlook on the
characters involved. Sard is not simply a bloodthirsty Ogre out to eat Iittle boys; rather, he
is a man with a terminal "bone disease, Sarrow's deficiency as they cal1 it nowadays,"
and his only "means of keeping death at bay" is a medication (or his own special bread)
made from the bones of pygmies like Jack, which are becoming increasingly scarce
(Galloway 19). Furthemore, the money spouting gold terminal that Jack makes off with
during his second visit is, in fact, the source of Sard's disability income. The cumulative
result of such revelations is that, as it is told from the perspective of those existing at the
top of the criff, rather than that of those existing at the bottom of the beanstalk, the
"happily ever after" ending becomes a tragic conclusion. Adding to the tragic effect is the
fact that as the story ends the narrator herself is dying. Having discovered that she is half
pygmy, she takes an overdose of "Sard7s painkillers" in the hope that her husband might
use her own bones to prolong his life (Calloway 33). His death means that her sacrifice
has been made in vain. Of course, one might object to the melodrama. Regardless of this,
Calloway's tale is quite effective in its undermining of the typical fairy tale ending. Of
significant interest is the narrator's futile wish for "them both to be al1 right. Sard and
Jack" (Galloway 35). In accordance with the typical fairy tale ending, this cannot be so.
The mutual exclusivity of the fairy tale vision, and its demand for a resolution that is
total, dictates that what amounts to absolute happiness from the heroiine's point of view
amounts to absolute horror when considered from the point of view of the supposed
villain.
The villain's perspective, though, is not the only one from which the typical
"happily ever after" fairy tale resolution may seem less than satisfactory. In his story,
"The Seventh Dwarf," Franz Hessel offers a critique of the "Snow White" tale by
irnagïning the reaction of one of the dwarves to Snow White's adventures with her
stepmother and her mam-age to the Prince. The seventh dwarf tells us that it was he "wvho
pdled the wicked queen7s poison comb from Snow White's hair" (Hessel 613), it was he
"who loosened the corset that would have strangled her and it was he, in an attempt '30
get one last look at the glass coffin," who "fnghtened one of the bearen" and caused him
to stumble, thereby jamng the apple from Snow White's throat and reviving her (Hessel
614). However, as the dwarf Iaments, it is the Prince's arrns that Snow White sinks into
upon having awakened and it is the Prince who "lifted her onto his horse" and takes her
away white the dwarf "stood still and had to witness al1 this" (Hessel 614). Simply put,
the joy shared by Snow White and her pince is not shared by all. Snow White's fairy tale
dream having been realized, the dwafls own fairy tale dream is lefi unfulfilled. Such is
the nature of the typical fairy tale vision of ideal happiness; il is often an exclusive club.
Hence, Cinderella marries Prince Channing whihile ull the other girls at the ball, not just
the evil stepsisters, go home disappointed. Likewise, the third little pig, seeming to have
forgotten al1 about the tragic end of his brothers, builds his fortress, does away with the
wvolf, and lives "happily ever after," just as Snow White goes off to live "happily ever
aftery' with her Prince in his castle, having "long since forgotten" the dwarf who "loved
her7' (Hesse1 6 14).
In many ways Hessel's narrative may be viewed as implying a similar critique of
the conventional "Snow White" resolution as that implied by The Merseyside Fairy Story
CoIIective's adaptation of the tale. Whereas the heroine of thz Merseyside tale rejects the
idea of becoming a Princess as long as she knows that her "friends ~ ~ 1 1 1 still be toiling in
the mine" (Merseyside 213), Hessel's Snow White, in keeping with the Grimm tale, goes
off to be Princess without giving so much as a second thought. Both tale adaptations,
however, work to ensure that the reader will give a second thought to the broader
implications of the "happily ever after" resolution with which s/he is familiar. This, in
effect, is what separates what I have referred to as "counter narratives" from mere tale
variants, such as those produced by Perrault and the Grimms. Whether their alterations
consist of significant changes to the plot of a famiIiar tale, as do the Merseyside "Snow
White" and Angela Carter's "The Company of Wolves," or of the telling of a largely
unchanged plot from a changed perspective, as do Galloway's "Blood and Bone" and
Hsssel's "The Seventh Dwarf," such counter narratives do not simply offer a new version
of a tale in place of the old. Their alterations demand that we return to the stoxy in its
more familiar form, that we examine it more carefully, that we rethink its ideals and
implications.
Anne Sexton's Transformations: an interrogation
Anne Sexton conducts just such an examination in Trunsformutcom, a "book of
odd tales / which transfom the Brothers Grimm" (Sexton 224). Although the work does
convert seventeen of the Grimms most popular tales into poetic form, Sexton avoids
making any significant alterations to the tales; she does not revise the Grimm tales so
rnuch as she presents an interrogation of them. UItimateIy, Sexton's fairy tale collection
aims to uncover the illusory nature of a "happily ever after" ideal or a "right" perspective
in whatever form it may take. Hence, its method is to investigate the tales as they have
been traditionally presented, simply to uncover and examine the problematic, rather than
to offer an alternative vision. Without ever changing the essence or t h s t of these tales,
Sexton effectively and subtly prods the reader into changing herhis vantage point in
order to interrogate the story as it stands. The poems do not bend or reshape the original;
they simply "discover and release elements already implicit in these stories" (Hmschka
4 9 , enlarging and pronouncing that which already exists, holding it up to scrutiny, and
allowing for transformation to take place not in the fairy tale itself, but in how we read it.
As a case in point, Sexton has it that Cinderella's stepmother forbids her going to
the bail not because she is z~nnatrrra/iy cruel but, to the contrary, because "That's the way
with stepmothers" (Sexton 257). Indeed, if we are to take our cue from such Grimm tales
as "Cinderella," 3 n o w White," and "Hansel and Gretel," that is the way ivith
stepmothers. By emphasizinç, rather than adjusting or neutralizing this fairy tale bias
against the stepmother, Sexton effectively puts the challenge to the reader: "This is what
is being said; do you accept?" In articulating the Grimrns' point of view, she forces us to
interrogate this perspective for ourselves, rather than sirnply to accept an alternative
perspective as unthinkingly as we may have accepted the original. In similar fashion
Sexton's narrator effectively de-idealizes the motif of the Prince's ball within
"Cinderella" by referring to it as "a mariage market" (Sexton 256). Once again, not
much has chançed from the original; the Prince's ball always \vas a rnarriage market.
However, Sexton7s having nameci it as such (coupled with the "meat market"
connotations of this narning) is effective in having the reader go back and rethink her/his
feelings towards the event. That is not to Say that the prospect of Cindereila7s going to the
bal1 becornes an aItogether negative one (any more than her stepmother becomes a
positive figure); Cinderella's wish is yet to go, and one would be hard pressed to argue
that she would be better off to stay home and sit in the ashes. In the rejection of Our
idealistic (romantic) view of the ball, Sexton does not allow us the cornfort of simply
rejecting it as wongheaded. Nevertheless, such fiank assessrnent of the true nature of the
ball does provide it with a certain degree of ambivalence, which is precisely what Sexton
would seern to be aiming for.
Sexton achieves a.imbivalence rnost effectiveiy in the happy ending of her
"Cinderella" story. True to form, the narrative calls into question the standard "happily
ever after7' resolution of the tale not by re-writing the resolution but by defining it more
clearly. As Sexton presents it, such eternal bliss as Ci~dereIIa and her Prince achieve
through mariage is comparable to living as "hvo dolls in a museum case" with "srniles
pasted on for eternity" like "Regular Bobbsey Twins" (Sexton 258). It is, as Rise B.
Axelrod puts it, "a deathly stasis" ( 183). In fact, Sexton herself goes so far, in her version
of "The White Snake," as to refer to "living happily ever after" as being "a kind of
coffin" (Sexton 232).
It is in her re/presentation of "Snow White," however, that Sexton's interrogation
of the "happily ever after" ideat is most evident. As has been suggested in previous
chapters of this thesis, the tale of "Snow White7' arguably begirzs in a state akin to
"happily ever after." Snow White's steprnother is both Queen and "the one beauty of the
land (Sexton 225). Such is the ultimate, desirable fate of the typical fairy tale heroine.
Thus, it is Snow White herself who shatters the fairy tale dream as her beauty grows to
surpass that of her stepmother. Until this point she has rernained, like ai1 peripheral
characters within the realm of the fairy tale vision (consider Kessel's seventh dwarf), "no
more important / than a dust mouse under the bed" (Sexton 225). Upon having had her
surpassing beauty revealed, however, Snow White supplants her stepmother as most
beautifid and, in doing so, takes on such significance as :O prompt the Queen to notice
"broum spots on her hand / and four whiskers over her lip" (Se.xton 225). For this, it is
decided by the Queen that her stepdaughter must "be hacked to death-' (Sexton 225). A
conventional reading of the Snow White tale, in sympathizing with Snow White, would
classify the Queen's intentions as being eviI ones. Sexton's reading, however, does not
allow us to make such clear distinctions between the cruel Queen and the innocent Snow
W~te . Rather, paralleIs are drawn between the two. These parallels become most bIatant
in the closing lines of the poem in which Snow White is pictured as "sometimes referring
to her rnirror / as women do" (Sexton 229). Furthemore, Sexton elaborates upon Snow
White's seeming indifference to the Queen's fate in stating that, while her stepmother is
being roasted, "Snow White held court / rolling her china-blue do11 eyes open and shut"
(Sexton 229). Simply put, it is now Snow White who is the vain Queen and the
stepmother who is "no more important / than a dust mouse under the bed." Hence,
although Sexton does not tmly alter the story, as does The Merseyside Fairy story
Collective in their revision of the same tale, our reading of the story is effectively
transformed. It is no longer the story of a wicked stepmother's cruel treatrnent of an
innocent child, culminating in a just, "happily ever after" resolution; rather, it is one of
conflicting interests in which new beauty (power) rises to take the position of old.
Key to Sexton's transformation process, as her "Snow White" poerdnarrative
would seem to suggest, is the ambivalent tone impiied by her narrator in relation to the
characters. Her aim is not to have us shifi Our sympathies, but rather to have us abandon
them, to leave us without an absolute perspective. Ultimately, it is her successful
achievement of ambiguity that creates problems for the readedcritic who would look to
Sexton to revise, to "fix," the Grimm tales and to constmct a better alternative. Indeed, it
is this ambiguity which leads Carol Leventen to cornplain that Sexton's project fails at
points in that she "unwittingly perpetuates many of the gender arrangements of the
ongïnals" and, rnoreover, that "manÿ of her keenest insights and sympathies are reserved
for the emotional cornplexities she attributes to her male characters" (145). One such
"sympathetic" male character to which Leventen objects, is actually the very
personification of ambivalence himself, Sexton's prodairned "Doppelganger" (Sexton
333), Rurnpelstiltskin. To read Sexton's "Rumpelstiltskin" in such a way, however, is to
oversimplifL the character, and the tale. Yes, Sexton brings to the fore the Dwa$s
pathetic position as an outsider, a "freak" of sorts who "has been exhibited on Bond
Street," who has "no private life" and is yet lonely enough to lament, "no child d l ever
cal1 me papa," but she also presents h m as being the self sarne trickster of the brothers
Grimm - the self-proclaimed "evil eye" (Sexton 234). Such characterization, it m u t be
noted, is far removed fiom the conventional fairy tale mode according to which "[a]
person is either good or bad, nothing in between" (Bettleheirn 3 12). In other words,
Sexton's re-writings alIow for what the typical fairy tale and most revisionist tales wi l l
not; they alIow for a character that is
one part sofi as a woman,
one part a barbed hook,
one part papa,
one part Doppelganger. (Sexton 237)
Ultimately, the transformation process initiated by Sexton is an ongoing one.
Absolute, unambiguous forrn and interpretation, for Sexton, is a troribling construct and,
thus, she avoids any attempt at replacing that of the Grimms wïth one of her own. In
essence Tranrformalions works as a critique not only of the fairy tales of the brothers
Grimm, but also of the standard revisionist fairy tale. To revise the plot of a story or to
shift Our sympathies from one character to another Is to faIl into the same old trap of
defining the tales and their implied ideals in terrns of perfection and the absolute. As she
does in her treatment of the traditionzlly heroic characters within the tales, Sexton's
avoids sentirnentalizing the Doppelganger - the "evil" other - as welI. Rather, her tone
remains equally dismissive and flippant whether in reference to the misfortunes of such
"heroines" as Snow White, "the dumb bunny" (Sexton 228), as she accepts the poison
apple, and Cinderella as she sleeps in soot and walks "around looking like Al Jolson"
(Sexton 256), or in reference to such "villains" as Snow White's stepmother, who dies
with "her tongue flicking in and out / like a gas jet" (Sexton 229), and even
Rumpelstiltskin who tears "himself in half i somewhat Iike a split broiler" (Sexton 237).
Through such unbiased flippancy (a far cry froin the tone taken in Galloway's
presentation of Sard and his wife) Sexton ensures that the reader, too, remains unbiased.
To sympathize w-ith, to becorne invested in, any one character, even for a moment, would
result in taking sides, which ultimotely implies the choice of a "nght" or an absolute
perspective.
In contrast, the traditional mode of the fairy tale presents the point of view given
as being transcendental, and assumes that al1 readers w i I 1 take it as such. Sexton plays on
this assurnption through the use of ofn-iand, matter-of-fact, statements that work to
ampli@ and, thereby, to undercut such narrative arrogance. To this end, it is described as
being "no surprise" that Cinderella, having received the dove's gift of "a golden dress /
and delicate Iittle gold slippers," goes to the Prince's bal1 (Sexton 257). In effect,
Cinderella is viewed as going to the bal1 not because it is her personal desire but because
it is the logical step to take; it is what anyone would do. With such commentary Sexton
rnimics and mocks the traditional fairy tale failure to acknowledge the slightest possibility
of alternative points of view or alternative courses of action to those that are displayed.
This point is made most effectively in the tale of "Hansel and Gretel." Having corne to
the end of the tale, having delivered Hanse1 and Gretel safely home to their father,
Sexton's narrator quickly and efficiently ties up the loose end of the former treachery of
the siblings' home life by declaring "Their mother, / yod11 be glad to hear, was dead
(Sexton 290). Here the narrator goes so far as to put thoughts into our head. While the
Grimms make no such declaration as to our feelings on this development, the implication
here is that they, too, assume that we will be glad to hear of the mother7s passing. Again,
in revealing such presurnptions Sexton's works transfonn our reading of the brothers
Grimm by awakening our suspicions to the universal perspective they assume in telling
their tales.
Ultimately, it must be observed that in her interrogation o f the Gnmms and in her
challenge to the assurned universal perspective they present Sexton is posing a \vider
challenge to the logistics of the fairy tale genre as a whole. In striving towards an ideal
ending of "happily ever afier," a solution in which al1 things culminate in a perfect, non-
problematic, conclusion, the fairy tale mode actually necessitates an assurned universal
perspective. In order to have absolute happiness or ideal perfection, we must first assume
an absolute consensus on what constitutes happiness and perfection. Thus, standard
revisionist work, built on these self same assumptions, does not suffice for Sexton. In
effect, her transformatior? project is one that rages not against a specific ideal but against
the very idea o f perfection itself, against resolution in general and against the totality
implied by the standard fairy tale approach of ending "happily ever afier."
A different approach: resistinp closure, findina fauIt with perfection
M a t none of the counter narratives dealt with up until this point offers is an
alternative to the standard fai- tale resolution. We tum our attention now to a sampling
of tales and tale fragments that do offer such an alternative- A most representative
example of just such a tale is Rosemane Kunzler7s 1976 version of "Rumpelstiltskin."
Kwle r ' s tale follows very closely the plot set down by the Brothers Grimm up until the
point at which the miller's daughter has been locked up for a third night in a third room
filled with straw which she is to have spun into gold by moming. From here the plot
deviates signiticantly from that with which most are familiar. Having been told by the
King that if she succeeds in spinning the straw into gold she will become his wife, the
miller's daughter is approached by the same little man that has saved her on the previous
two occasions. He tells her that if she will promise her "first child" (Kunzler 717) to him,
he will once again perform the task at hand. To this proposition she deIivers the
unexpected response, "You're crazy! [...] 1'11 never rnarry this horrible king. I'd never
give my child away" (Kunzler 717). This, of course, enrages the little man and he reacts
by starnping "with his right foot so ferociously that it went deep into the ground and
jarred the door to the room open. Then the miller's daughter ran into the great wide world
and was saved" (Kunzler 717). Making this ending most interesting is the fact that it àoes
not offer an alternative resolution but, in the conventional fairy tale sense, offers no
resolution at ail. The miller's daughter is simply saved frorn her current situation; she
does not achieve eternal bliss. Furthemore, although his plans have been foiled
Rumpelstiltskin remains alive and, as al1 indications would seem to suggest, unreformed,
as does the "horrible king" (KunzIer 717). Unlike such revisionists as the Merseyside
Fairy Story Collective or Angela Carter, who provide familiar tales with new "happiIy
ever afier" visions (achieved through the collapse of power and the death of a Queen or
the undermining of patriarchy through the taming of a "wolf'), Kunzler resists closure
altogether. The tale is simply stripped of its "happily ever afier" resolution so that it ends
in much the same less than perfect state as that in which it began.
Judith Viorst cames this technique of resisting closure to the extreme in her story,
". . . And Then the Prince Knelt Down and Tried to Put the Glass Slipper on Cinderella's
Foot." In fact, Viorst's re-writing of the Cinderella tale is hardly a story at a11 as it
consists of only four lines witten in rhyming couplet:
1 really didn't notice that he had a funny nose.
And he certainly looked better al1 dressed up in fancy dothes.
He's r~ot nearly as attractive as he seemed the other night.
So 1 think I'll just pretend that this glass slipper feels too tight. (Viorst 73)
In effect, these four simple lines leave al1 but the resolution of the conventional narrative
intact and unaItered. The impIications of these lines are, nevertheIess, quite profound. Not
only do they work to suggest Cinderella's rejection of the Prince, they also suggest a
rejection of any ideal of perfection whatsoever. Far h m providing the conventional tale
with a more appeaIing resolution, Viorst leaves Cinderella sleeping in the ashes or, at the
very least, Ieaves the reader without a sense that al1 has been resolved- This is not to
suggest that the vision implied here is pessimistic. The typical fairy tale vision of
"happily ever after" is simply replaced with a vision in which total perfection remains
unachieved, in which nothing is perfect, not even a Prince.
Gunther Krrnert offers a similar vision of imperfection in his r e t e h g of the
"Sleeping Beauty" tale. As does Viorst, Kunert avoids retelling the tale in full and,
instead, skips right to the ending. This ending, however, is quite different from that wvith
which readers d l be familiar. Kunert's hero, having made his way through the thorn-
bushes, enters the castle only to find the Princess sleeping wïth "her toothless mouth half
opened, slavering, her eyelids sunken, her hairless forehead crimped with blue, wormlike
veins, spotted, dirty, a snoring trollop" (Kunert 701). The tale concludes by making a
comment upon those "p]Iessed ones "who, dreaming of Sleeping Beauty, died in the
hedge and in the beIief that beyond it there was a moment in which time for once and al1
stood still and certain" (Kunert 701). Simply put, Kunert, much like Viorst, replaces the
typical fairy tale vision of "happily ever after" ~ 4 t h a vision in which perfect beauty is
temporay at best and eternal bliss is unattainable. By tuming standard fairy taIe motifs
and conventions (such as perfection and absolute closure) on their heads, such narratives
work to upset the conventional reader7s expectations not only in the fact that the endings
they offer are not the endings we have come to expect from the specific tales represented,
but also in the fact that the endings they offer are not the type of endings we have come to
expect fiom any fairy tale.
When it comes to turning tales on their heads and upsetting fairy tale expectations
Dick King-Smith's picture book, The Topsy-Tuny Story Book, serves as an interesting
study. King-Smith's fairy tale adaptations include, arnong others, "Bear and the Three
Goldilocks," "Thinderella," and "Huge Red Ridinç Hood." As the titles would suggest,
these stories differ greatly from the tales upon which they are based. Perhaps the most
significant of King-Smith's adaptations, as it relates to conventional fairy tale ideals, is
"The Princess And The P (For Pumpkin)." In this rem-ting of Andersen's classic, the
fairy tale ideal of perfection comes to be seen as an undesirable prospect. Much like the
Prince of Andersen's tale, KingSrnithYs Prince, "being a bit of a snob [. .. ] only wanted to
marry a Princess" (King-Smith 35). However, he ako wants "a girl who can take the
rough with the smooth" (King-Smith 35). Thus, when a Princess amves at the palace in
the midst of a rain storm the Queen invites her in to spend the night, not with the intention
of finding out whether she is a Princess or no, but with the intention of finding "out how
sensifive she is" (King-Smith 35). To this end a pea is placed under the mattresses of the
bed on which the Princess will sleep. During the night the Queen retums several times to
the Princess7s room where she changes the pea for a lemon "the lemon for a grapefruit
and the grapemiit for a melon and the melon for a vegetable marrow" and. finally,
-. replaces the vegetable marrow '-with the largest purnpkin she could f i n d (KingSmith
36). In the morning the Princess reports that, in spite of ali this, she siept "fllike a
log,"upon which the Prince proposes mamage and, giving him "a hearty slap on the
back," she accepts (King-Smith 36).
In short, the desire for absolute perfection, as it is seen here, is not only an
unrealistic desire, but also a negative one. The typical fairy tale Pnncess of Andersen's
narrative - the Princess who is so perfect as to require that al1 aspects of her existence be
perfect as well (even to the point where a pea placed under her mattresses is enough to
keep her awake al1 night) - is transformed into a Princess who can deal, quite easily, with
the imperfections of life. Hence, King-Smith presents a vision in which "happily ever
afier" perfection is neither achieved, nor is it required. Even an imperfection as large as a
pumpkin in the bed of a Princess is something that can be Iived with and, therefore, need
not be eliminated.
An equally optimistic view of a less than perfect existence can be found in
Catherine Storr's tale, "Little Polly Riding Hood." Although Storr's version of the Ridinç
Hood taIe is set in a town rather than a forest, the "villain" rernains a wolf When he
encounters the girl on her way to her grandmother's the wolf is reminded of a story he has
"been reading about a girl who went to visit her grandmother" which ends when a wolf
"eats up the grandmother, and Lit t le R e d Ridzng Hood' (Storr 3 18). The wolf, of course,
is inclined to re-enact Perrault's tale but since Polly gets to her grandmother's by train
and by bus (Storr 218), rather than by hiking through the woods, his first attempt to do so
fails as he has no change to pay the fare. On the day of Polly's next trip to her
grandrnother's the wolf cornes prepared with "plen@ of change in his pocket" (Storr 2 19)
only to find that Polly is going, this time, by car with her parents who decline to give the
wolf a ride. Finally the wolf takes a trip to Polly's grandmother's - starting "specially
early" (Storr 220) in a third attempt to arrive before Polly - only to find that she is
already there having corne "to lunch and tea today instead of just tea as 1 generally do"
(Storr 22 1). The main difference between this narrative and more conventional variations
of the Riding Hood tale, though, lies in the fact that it ends neither with Polly being eaten,
nor with the death of the wolf. Hence, the reaIm envisioned at the end of the tale is
neither perfect, nor absolute. Storr's tale avoids total closure of 2ny form. When the wolf
cornplains that he cannot ever get Polly as the wolf from the story he has read "managed
to get his little girl," Polly observantly points out that the reason for this is that "this isn't
a fairy story" (Ston 221). It might even be argued that Polly's statement is somewhat
accurate; in one sense, at Irast, "Little Polly Riding H o o d is nor a fairy tale in that it does
not end "happily ever after" but, rather, without absolute resolution. Both Clever Polly
and the wolf, rather than being destroyed, live to see another day (and to show up in other
"Clever Polly" stories). More importantly, perhaps, Polly learns no lesson in obedience
and/or conformity as does her counterpart, Little Red Riding Hood.
Ultimately, tales such as "Little Polly Riding Hood" or KunzIerYs version of
"Rumpelsti1tskin" go a step M e r than to offer a critique of conventional fairy tales and
their endings. Their vely approach to tale telling is different from the traditional fairy tale
approach of working towards the ideal of a perfect and absolute "happily ever after"
resolution. Rather than simply prescribing a different set of ideals these taies envision a
world in which the only true ideal is a less than perfect, less than total state - a world in
which conflicting interests CO-exist and flaws and imperfections (such as a pumpkin in
one's bed or the natural effects of time and ageing) are facts of life that need not
constitute disaster. By stripping conventional tales of their familiar resolutions such re-
writings serve both to awaken readers to the problems of the typical fairy tale vision of
perfection, such as its fragility or the totality that it implies, and to put on display an
alternative vision. In short, they provide us with an answer to that afl-important nagging
question: "If 'happily ever after' is no way to end a fairy tale, tvhat is?"
The anti-faiw-tale
To re-wite and revise familiar tales is not the only method that has been used to
subvert the fairy tale ideology of perfection and to suggest an alternative approach to
ending "happily ever after." History has also witnessed the creation of new and original
tales that work, through the use of vanous techniques, to subvert the conventional fairy
tale mode. As Jack Zipes has it, "[tjhe best example of the type of subversion attempted
during the latter part of the nineteenth century is Lewis Carroll's Alice in Wonderland
(1 8651, which has had a major influence on the fairy tale genre to this day" (Spell-7 of'
Encltanrrnenr [intro.] xxv). Indeed, the underground world envisioned in Carroll's popular
book is about as far from being a world of totality as one could imagine. Not only are
dissent and deviance present within Wonderland, they are seemingly ever-present. Carroll
presents a world in which there is no prevailing order, only disorder. This makes things
rather uncornfortable for Alice who has been raised, as a typical Victorian child, on 'hice
liale stones about children who got bumt, and eaten up by wild beasts, and other
unpleasant things, al1 because they would not remember the simple rules their m'ends had
taught them" (Carroll 10, 11). Because Wonderiand is, for al1 intents and purposes, a
world vithout rules the only one who does not "fit in" is, ironically, the conforrnist,
Alice.
What makes Carroll's story a true anti-fairy-tale, though, is not the fact that it
imagines a world made up of dissenting and conflicting voices (evsn conventional fairy
tales do this in their beginning stages), but the fact that its tone is one that implies a
celebration, rather than a fear, of difference - that dissent and conflict are keys to
happiness and security, rather than threats. Thus, while A k e rnay be troubled by the
Queen's repeated orders of execution ("'Off with his head!' or 'Off with her head"'
[Carroll 67]), the Gryphon, who has a better grasp of how Wonderland functions,
responds by chuckling and saying "What hn!" safe in the knowledge that ''It's al1 her
fancy that: they never executes nobody" (Carroll 74). Simply put, although Carroll's tale
does have the customary wicked Queen, she is no real threat to anyone as her voice is, in
the end, just another voice in the crowd. In tum, no one in Wonderland poses a threat to
the Queen; as her power is illusory, her destruction is not a necessary step towards
happiness, as is the destniction of wicked Queens within such typical fairy tales as 'Snow
White."
The Wonderland game of the Caucus-race serves as a most effective illustration of
the irnplied desirability of an order based on disorder. In fact, the Caucus-race, as a game
\vithout d e s , may be viewed as being a microcosm of Wonderland itself. Each of the
contestants, like 2ny citizen of Wonderland would do in any given situation, mns the race
in hisher own distinct way; "they began running when they liked, and lefi off when they
liked" (Carroll 23). As in Wonderland in general, there is no absolute goal and, as a result
of this, it is impossible to Iose or to corne up short. Instead, the er.d result is that
"Everybody has won, and all must have prizes" (Carroll 23). It is this aspect of Carroll's
vision that contrasts most blztantly with the conventional fairy tale vision of a "happily
ever after" which is divided up, quite unrnistakably, into wimers (of such prizes as a
royal husband or a gold laying hen) and iosers (who, among other hardships, are forced to
dance to the death, are made so angry as to split themselves in hvo, or have their eyes
pecked out by birds). Sirnply put, Carroll effectively presents the failure to achieve any
ideal whatsoever as being the most desirable prospect of ail. Of course, it must be noted
that Alice in Wonderhd onIy ends once Alice has achieved a more or less typical fairy
tale resolution. With her declaration that the Wonderland creatures are "nothing but a
deck of cards" Alice transforms them into just that and, in the process, brings about
Wondedandys collapse, thereby putting an end to al1 points of view conflicting with her
own (Carroll 97). Nevertheless, the final paragraphs of the book concern the thoughts of
Alice's older sister as she sits on the bank wistfully considering Alice's drcam in
comparison wïth "du11 reaIityn (Carroll 98). In the celebration of the state existing prior to
resolution, rather than after, the book, thus, concludes with the subversion of
conventional fairy tale values.
Many modem tales reflect a philosophy similar to Carroll's in their subversive
approach to the writing of tales. In his story, "'Repent, Harfequin!' Said The Tickock
Man," Hsrrlan Ellison would seem to reveal a distinctively Carrollian influence and at one
point even goes so far as to refer to his hero as "a laughing, irresponsible japer of
jabbenvoclq and jive" (Ellison 798). Although many would classifi this story as a
futuristic narrative or a science fiction, it may also be read as an anti-fairy-tale in that it
plays on the reversa1 of many fairy tale conventions and motifs. Ellison7s narrative begins
in a distant future in which "happily ever after" (or at least someone7s version of "happily
ever after") has been achieved. The world has been ordered so as to keep perfect time; al1
things run on schedule and lateness has become "more than a minor inconvenience;" it is
now "a sin" and "a crime" (Ellison 794). Totality is maintained by the office of the
Ticbrtockman, which has devised "a method of curtailing the amount of life a person
could have- If he was ten minutes late, he lost ten minutes of his iife. An hour was
proportionately worth more revocation" (Ellison 794). Thus, deviame is eliminated and
perfect time is kept.
Al1 live "happily ever afier" in a world of absolute punctuality until the Harlequin,
a certain Everett C. Marrn, amves on the scene and throws the entire schedule into a state
of disarray. Unlike the conventional fairy tale herohne, who is out to achieve a perfect
existence, the Harlequin7s sole purpose is to introduce a flaw into the system, to disrupt
the totality that exists. His one major act of dissent is to dump a load of jellybesns on a
group of factory workers thereby successfully throiving off the master schedule "by seven
minutes" (Ellison 793). As is the finger prick which results in disaster for Sleeping
Beauty, this seven minute time loss is "a tiny matter, one hardly worthy of note, but in a
society where the single driving force was order and unity and equality and promptness
and clocklike precision and attention to the dock [...] it was a disaster of major
importance" (Ellison 793). There can be little doubt that the reaIm described here shares
much in cornmon with the typical fairy tale ideal of absolute happiness. As such fairy
taies as "The Princess and the Pea" serve to illustrate, in accordance with the standard
fairy tale vision, any flaw or imperfection, no matter how seeminçly insignificant,
represents a threat to perfect happiness; almost perfect is not perfect at al!. When the
Harlequin is finaily apprehended, therefore, he is condemned as "a nonconformist"
(Ellison 798) and, as such, is first made to conform and ta admit "that it was a good, a
very good thing indeed, to belong, to be right on time hip-ho and away we go," and
finally he is "destroyed" (Ellison 798). In true fairy tale fashion the deviant body, the
threat to perfection, is annihilated and the utopian vision of the Ticktochan is restored.
Or so it would seem until we are made privy, through a short epilogue, to the fact that
things have changed somewhat, "[tlhe schedule is a little, uh, bit off' and even the
Ticktockman himself is found to be "three minutes late" (Ellison 799). Ultirnately,
Ellison's tale effectively reverses standard fairy tale values in presenting the prospect of
even so seemingly beniçn or even positive an ideal as a world of perfect punctuality as a
homfic prospect indeed. Moreover, although the story ends on a hopeful note, this hope is
derived not from the possibility of a world of absolute perfection, as is the case with the
conventional fairy tale, but fiom the indication that, due to the deviant efforts of the
Harlequin, the prevailin~ utopia has begun to break down.
In her short stoiy "The Ones Who Walk Away Frorn Omelas," Ursula K. LeGuin
offers an equally scathing critique of the utopian ideal. Ornelas is, indeed, a utopian
space. However, unlike the world of the Ticktockman, which for al1 but the obsessively
punctual is a troubling place to imagine, Omelas is an ideal realm fiom any perspective.
LeGuin ensures that this will be so by having her narrator declare "it would be best if you
irnagined it as your own fancy bids, assurning it will rise to the occasion, for certainly I
cannot suit you all" (LeGuin 876). The utopian vision of the story, then, is our own.
Nevertheless, LeGuin succeeds in having us cal1 this vision into question by adding in
one factor. Beneath Omelas, locked in a basement, is a srnall, greatly neglected, chiid
upon whom al1 of the greatness of the city depends. LeGuin does not explain the reasons
for this situation but rnakes it very clear that within this storyT as wïthin the typical fairy
tale, the absolute bliss of one party is dependent upon, or the result of, the absolute
despair of another. If the child "were brought up into the sunlight out of that vile place, if
it were cleaned and fed and cornforted [. . -1, in that day and hour al1 the prosperity and
beauty and delight of Omeias would wither and be destroyed" (LeGuin 879). This is the
homfic reality lying beneath the utopia of Omelas, regardless of the f o m it might take in
one's imagination. LeGuin ends her story by relating "one more thing" that is "quite
incredible" (LeGuin 879). There are those who, having been made aware of the situation
of the child in the basement, "walk away from OmeIas" (LeGuin 880). Just as Ellison's
story, in a reversal of fairy tale and utopian values, ends with the hopeful prospect of a
flawed system, LeGuin ends her tale with an equally Iiopeful reversa1 with the implied
"heroiines" of the tale tumïng their backs on the utopian vision and the horror that lies
beneath.
In the final analysis, this is precisely what al1 counter fairy tale narratives invite us
to do. They work to rnake us aware of the problematic and homfic implications of the
"happily ever afterYy ideal common to so many fairy tales and they often ask us to turn
fiom this vision of perfection and to walk away. Such tales are more than variant foms of
familiar narratives. They also imply a critique of popular tales in their most popular
forms. They require that we go back and interrogate the "happily ever after" ideals that
we have come to accept and that we view them fiom an unfamiliar perspective or in light
of a different set of values. They awaken us to the totality implied in the fairy tale ideal of
a perfect existence. Finally, such taIes often offer an alternative vision, a vision that is
less than total, less than absolute, a vision that celebrates diRerence and finds hope not in
perfect closure but in imperfection, nonconfomity, and in the power of dissent.
It has been the purpose of this paper to introduce a new form of fairy tate critique,
one that is concemed not so much wïth the specific world-view suggested by these tales
as with the totality with which such world views achieve dominance in the typical
"happily ever after" fziry tale ending. The basic premise of my argument has been that,
regardless of the f o m in which it may corne, the fairy tale dream of a perfect existence
itself has homfic implications. "Happily ever after," as it is presented wïthin the
conventional fairy tale, is a totalitarian realm in which no thing/party/perspective remains
that runs counter to a specific vision of absolute perfection. Thus, the mere existence of
different points of view or even the slightest of imperfections results in fairy tale crisis as
it threatens the colIapse of, or blocks the establishment of the fairy tale ideal. "Happily
ever afier" is brought about only through the total elirnination of al1 flaws or the total
destruction of dissent and the resultant establishment of an absolute order. In short, the
conventional fairy taie resolution is problematic in its very attempt at being non
problernatic.
This is a problem shared by al1 tales ending "happily ever afier," regardless of the
world-view or political or ideological perspective from which each may be told. As the
third chapter of this study suggests, there are also a great nurnber of tales that do not
subscribe to the conventional fairy tale approach. Through a survey of some of the most
interesting of such tales 1 have endeavoured to provide an answer to the question that this
study would seem to suggest: If "happily ever afier" is not a satisfactory way to end a
fairy tale, what is? Such counter narratives as the ones examined offer an answer to this
question by taking a new approach altogether in creating a type of tale that resists closure
even in its ending, that celebrates dissent, difference and even conflict over any vision of
absolute happiness. However, one might argue that this study Ieaves us with a larger,
heretofore unanswered question concerning the importance, or even the relevance, of
such a study.
To answer this question it might be helpfid to include, in this thesis conclusion,
some of the factors contributing to the genesis of the study at hand. In doing so I would
suggest that, before any real research has even begun, let alone the process of fonnulating
ideas and witing thern dom, significant meaning is to be found in the very choosing of a
thesis topic. To choose a topic is to make a cornmitment to allot a great deal of time and
energy to a speciflc area of study The choice itself, therefore, becomes an argument; it
cames a message: this issue is important and deserves a closer look. It is wïth this in
mind that 1 chose the fairy tale genre as rny area of study. Althouyh fairy tales have been
ofien dismissed and relegated to the nursery by mature adults or even by "serious"
literary scholarship they, nevertheless, remain an important thread in the fabric of most
societies. Fairy tales, unlike much literature, transcend such boundaries as class
distinctions and generational or educational gaps; they are an integral part of an overall,
colIective, consciousness. One need be neither a child nor a scholar to know what to
expect from "a Cinderella story" or to anticipate the end result of making such
observations as, "what big teeth you have!" Fairy tales are a part of us and of the
language that we speak. Therefore, it would seem reasonable to assume that to learn
something about fairy tales is to learn something about ourseIves. The fact that such
narratives are "mere" fantasy serves only to underline the importance of the fairy tale
genre. Fairy tales do not simply contribute to our collective consciousness, they also
originate out of our coIIective consciousness. They are storïes told by the "folk for the
"folk." If fairy tales are fantasy, they are Our fantasy. This is why 1 chose fairy tales as the
focus of my thesis and this is why they are important. By reading them carefully we can
learn what it is that we fantasize about, what it is that we desire and what it is that
motivates us.
Ultirnately, it is at this point that fairy tale analysis cornes into contact with the
theories of Michel Foucault. According to Foucault Our desires and motivations are
rooted in our "will to knowledge," which is synonymous with our "will to power." A
closer look at fairy tale endings reveals that even our persona1 utopian dreams are
informed by and based upon this will to power. Total dominance, in the guise of
happiness or "goodness," is the tnie key to the fairy tale idea1. Here it must be noted that,
as AIlen Megill points out, Foucault, too, has his owm brand of utopianism. His
utopianisrn, however, is like none we have ever seen, especially in the typical fairy tale
dream. Foucault "speaks of a 'Philosophy of nonpositive afirmation' whose sole aim is
to 'contest' the existing ordef' (Mefjll 197), rather than to overthrow it or replace it with
a new, better, order. "Foucault thus opts for a peculiar brand of permanent revolution -
permanent because it seeks to realizv no image of an ideal society" (Megill 198). In this,
Foucault's utopianism shares very much in common with the anti-fairy-tales discussed in
the final chapter of this thesis. Such tales, like Foucault himself, value dissent over
conformity and find hope in the continued existence of deviant bodies and behaviours.
The typical f a i v tale, on the other hand, envisions a world in which dissent and deviance
are eliminated. Hence, the standard fa iv tale ideal of %appily ever after" becomes
problematic, regardless of ideological stance, in that it dreams of a utopia governed
completely and absolutely by a single ideology, power and point of view.
One might argue that this is of no real concern; fairy tales are fantasies, after ail.
Real utopia, absolute totaiity, is not feasible. Flaws and imperfections, dissent and
different points of view \Nil1 always exist. However, the fact that such a totalitarian realm
as that envisioned in the typical fairy tale "happily ever after7' ending is destined to
remain mere fantasy, does not negate the importance of the issue. Indeed, most of us, as
ive exit the nursery and gather life experience, corne to realise soon enough that
perfection, the "happily ever after" drearn as it were, is not possible. Yet, many of us ako
tend to hold onto the belief that such perfection is desirable. The way that we read and
wite fairy tales says much about the way in which we read and live life. Simply put, fairy
tale ideology extends beyond the realm of the fairy tale. It might even be argued that
many of the most homfic events in history, as in fairy tales, have grown not out of a
given world-view but, rather, out of the uncompromisingly idealistic vision that
accompanies this world-view. As an effective illustration one might consider the unlikely
similarities of such opposing philosophies as McCarthyisrn and Stalinism. These
movements, of course, occupied opposite ends of the political and ideological spectmm.
Nevertheless, both shared in common a somewhat similar methodology in their attempt to
establish, through the elimination of dissent, very different visions of a more ideal, more
perfect, existence.
Such visions, though, are not the sole property of lefi wing dictators and right
wing extremists. We might consider the fact that, even in nations and communities where
crime rates are extrernely low, successful political campaigns are often run on a platform
of "getting tougher on crime." The common desire would seem to be one not for relative
security but for the absolute absence of deviance, regardless of the totalitarian
implications involved in bringing about such an absence. Needless to Say, it would be
unfair, not to mention foolhardy, to suggest that fairy tales are to blame for such a desire.
Yet, the fairy tale dream of "happily ever afterYy does, indubitably, promote and
perpetuate a utopian desire for a resolution in which al1 flaws are eiiminated and al1
threats to a single prevaiiing order - whatever form that order rnight take on - are
annihilated.
Even if we do concede that the "happily ever after" in any form implies a
totalitarian vision, though, does this de-legitimize fairy tale critique that is focused on the
fact that most fairy tales, in their most familiar forms, promote and/or perpetuate a biased
world-view that is often sexist, classist, racist, and oppressively puritanical? The short
answer to this question is both yes and no. First it must be noted that some of the most
convincing critiques, and some of the most interesting re-wrïtings, of traditional fairy
tales have corne fiom feminist-oriented critics and witers, like Karen Rowe or Angela
Carter, who suggest "that the traditional fairy tales are unacceptable today because of
their atavistic notions of sex roles and their ideology of male domination" (Zipes Don 't
Bet ... 11). Likewise, critics and writers inth decidedly Marxist leanings, such as Jack
Zipes and The Merseyside Fairy Story Collective, have added much of value to the field
of study. These offer an important interrogation of traditional tales and their underlying
biases. What they do not offer, however, is a viable alternative. Rather, such critiques and
re-writings tend to impose a whole new set of biases on the narratives at hand.
It should be remernbered that even the Brothers Grimm - and especially Wilhelm
Grimm - were somewhat of fairy tale critics and revisionists. Much Iike modem day
critics the Grimm found many of the tales that they gathered to be unacceptable in form,
content, and especially in ideology. "Even though the tales that the Grimms collected
may, in fact, be traced back hundreds of years, they infised them with their own
psychological needs, utopian dreams, sexual preferences, and sociopolitical views" (Zipes
"Dreams of a Better Bourgeois Life.. ." 206). Further, they often modified the tales so as
to make them consistent not only with their own ideological stance, but also with the
world-view that prevailed in their time and geographical location among mernbers of
their target audience. A more shocking example of such an approach to folklore was
advocated by Ernst Lorenzen who, in a 1938 article witten in the context of Nazi
Germany, "demanded that teachers focus on a unified world view that reflected the old
Germanic peasant culture, in order to guarantee that the discussion would have relevance
to the folk Reich of the present. Ali other approaches should be discarded [... 1, as they
had nothing to offer to enhance the current community under National Socialisrn"
(Kamenetsky 71 ). In effect, it is often those critics and writers that pose the most spirited
challenges to the implied ideological biases of such fairy tale writerlrecorders as the
Brothers Grimm who also fa11 into the trap of repeating the same methodological impulse
of such in critiquing or modiQing the tales according to their own ideoIogical biases. In
either case, the prospect of perkction, of an absolute realm that is consistent with the
specific ideological bias of a given writer or critic or socieîy or reader, is presented as
being the thing most desirable.
Having said this, however, it must be recognized that fairy tales are different from
most fonns of literature in that they originate out of oral tradition an4 thus, "no fairy tale
was ever meant to be written in granite. Like al1 oral narrative forms, the fairy tale has no
'correct,' definitive form. Instead it endlessly adjusts and adapts itself to every new
culture as it takes root (Tatar HardFac~~ ... 191)." Familiar fairy tales have been told and
re-told, witten and re-witten, in different forms and languages, by authors fiorn a variety
of eras, locations and backgrounds. The end result is an underlying dialogism; fairy tales
comment upon one another and communicate with one another across space and time. If a
solution to the problem of totality within the standard fairy tale vision is to be found, it is
to be found in this dialogism. If the tales are read - as they should be - as being voices
within the larger dialogue, as being smaller parts contributing to an organic whole, rather
than as being written works based upon and related to yet isoiated from one another, the
fairy tale dream becomes a less than total prospect. The wolf, the witch, the splinter, the
pea - al1 are destroyed but ternporarily; al1 will return to offer a dissenting voice, to
introduce an imperfection and to bring about fairy tale crisis. In the end, it is not the
resolution but the conflict of the fairy tale, the inevitability of new, less than perfect,
beginnings, that offers hope. Fairy tales end only to be begun anew and, likewise, "the
story of storytelling is a tale that will never be done" (Warner [intro] xxv). The challenge
- for fairy tale critics, writers, and readers alike - is to resist the temptation of being
comforted by the utopian fairy tale dream and to value, instead, the prospect of the
unavoidable failure of "happily ever afier."
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Appendix: Famous Last Words
Although conventional fairy tales do tend to end with a "happily ever after"
resolution, it is interesting to note that relatively few of them put to use the "happily ever
after" phrase. More ofien than not the realisation of the fairy tale drearn is rnerely irnplied
in the icieal circurnstances described in the last few Iines of a tale. When read in isolation
from the tale itself, however, the more totalitarian, and ofien homfic, aspects of the fairy
tale ideal become readily apparent. To illustrate this point, 1 have gatkïered together
below, for convenient cornparison, the closing lines of several popular fairy tales. In
reading these lines it is important to remember that al1 corne fiom tales that have been
widely read as ending happily. As different as each may seem, al1 are saying essentially
the same thing, al1 are painting a picture of fairy tale perfection in resolving fairy tale
conflict and ending "happily ever after."
"The Sleeping Beauty in the Wood" (Perrault): - The ogress was so angry to see her plans go awry that she jumped head first into the vat and the vile beasts inside devoured her in an instant. The king could not help grieving a little; after all, she \vas his mother. But his beautifid wife and children soon made hirn happy again.
"Brier Rose" (The Brothers Grimm): - The prince and Brier Rose were mamed in splendour, and lived happily to the end of their Iives.
"Cinderel la" (Perrault): - Cinderella, who was as good as she was beautiful, took her sisters to live in the palace and arranged for both of them to be mamed, on the sarne day, to great lords.
"Ashputtle" (The Brothers Grimm): - So both sisters were punished with blindness to the end of their days for being so wicked and false.
"Snow White" (The Brothers Grimm): - She [Snow White's stepmother] \yas forced to step into the red-hot shoes and dance till she fell to the floor dead.
"Snow White" (The Merseyside Fairy Story Collective): - The rnirror would not leave her [the wicked Queen's] hand. She fell with it and hurtled screarning d o m and d o m until she was shattered into fragments on the rocks below.
"Little Red Riding Hood" (Perrault): - At that, the wicked wolf threw himself upon Little Red Riding Hood and gobbled her up, too.
"Little Red Cap" (The Brothers Grimm): - ... and as for Little Red Cap, she said to herself "Never again wilI 1 leave the path and nin off into the wood when my mother tells me not to."
"Rumpelstiltskin" (The Brothers Grimm): - ... and in his ~umpelstiltskin's] rage he stamped his right foot so hard that it went into the ground up to his waist. Then in his fuy he took his lefe foot in both hands and tore himself in two.
"Hansel and Gretel" (The Brothers Grimm): - They began to run, and they flew into the house and threw themselves into their father's arms. The poor man hadn't had a happy hour since he had left the children in the forest, and in the meantirne his wife had died. Gretel opened out her little apron, the pearls and precious Stones went bouncing around the room, and Hansel reached into his pockets and tossed out handfùl after handful. ALI their wonies were over, and they lived together in pure happiness.
"Jack and the Beanstalk" (Jacobs): - Then the ogre fell down and broke his c row~, and the beanstallc came toppling after.
Then Jack showed his mother his golden harp, and what with showing that and selling the golden eggs, Jack and his mother became very rich, and he married a great princess, and they lived happy ever afier.
"The Story of the Three Little Pigs" (Jacobs): - When the IittIe pig saw what he was about, he hung on the pot full of water, and made up a blazing fire, and, just as the wolf was coming down, took off the cover again in an instant, boiled him up, and ate hirn for supper, and lived happy ever afienvards.