Post-civil war democratization: promotion of democracy in post-civil war states, 1946–2005

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Post-civil war democratization: promotion of democracy in post-civil warstates, 1946-2005Madhav Joshia

a Kroc Institute for International Peace Studies, University of Notre Dame, Notre Dame, Indiana, USA

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To cite this Article Joshi, Madhav(2010) 'Post-civil war democratization: promotion of democracy in post-civil war states,1946-2005', Democratization, 17: 5, 826 — 855To link to this Article: DOI: 10.1080/13510347.2010.501173URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/13510347.2010.501173

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Post-civil war democratization: promotion of democracyin post-civil war states, 1946–2005

Madhav Joshi∗

Kroc Institute for International Peace Studies, University of Notre Dame,Notre Dame, Indiana, USA

(Received 6 July 2009; final version received 11 December 2009)

Post-civil war democratization is a critical element of building sustainablepeace in post-civil war states. Yet studies of democratic transition andsurvival suggest that the post-civil war environment is not hospitable toeither the transition toward or the survival of democracy. This inhospitalitymay be due to the fact that post-civil war environments are contentious.After a civil war, the former protagonists fear for their security and also wantto protect their political and economic interests. The central argument of thisstudy is that former rivals can agree to a transition toward democracy to theextent that a stable balance of power exists between the government andrebel groups; a balance that eliminates the sort of security dilemma thatwould encourage one or both parties to resume armed conflict. Such abalance should ensure access to political power and economic resources.This study identifies factors that contribute to the establishment of a balanceof power between former protagonists and factors that affect its stability. Thepresence of these factors should affect the decision of former protagonists onwhether or not they can achieve their political and economic interests if theyagree to a transition toward democracy once the civil war ends. Based onthis theoretical argument, I have derived empirically testable hypotheses. Inthe survival analysis performed, I find support for the theoretical arguments.The findings of this study have some policy implications.

Keywords: post-civil war democracy; balance of power; negotiatedsettlement; ethnic conflict; United Nations missions

Introduction

Building democracy in the aftermath of civil war is challenging but not impossible.A survey of post-civil war states since the end of the Second World War reveals aremarkable transformation in the structure of these polities. A substantial steptoward democracy was taken in almost two-thirds of the cases after civil war ter-mination. In almost half of the post-civil war states, multiparty elections took

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DOI: 10.1080/13510347.2010.501173

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DemocratizationVol. 17, No. 5, October 2010, 826–855

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place within the five years following the end of the civil war. Almost one-third ofthose states held a second round of multiparty elections.1 Nevertheless, post-civilwar states show remarkable variation in the promotion of democracy in the after-math of conflict. Some, like Mozambique, South Africa, El Salvador and Cambo-dia, are making greater progress toward democratization, while others, such asBurma and Zimbabwe, have failed to establish democracy, either through arelapse into authoritarianism or the renewal of civil war. Among post-civil warstates, there is considerable variation in terms of their prospects for making thetransition toward democracy and for sustaining that transition. This studyfocuses on the question: what factors predict whether or not a post-civil warstate will make a transition toward democracy?

Why post-civil war democratization?

Post-conflict democratization is an important topic for students of civil war anddemocracy. Theoretically, democracy reinforces domestic peace.2 It allows forthe rule of law, respect for human rights, and stabilizes post-conflict societies bybringing groups that had previously resorted to organized armed conflict witheach other into an institutionalized political process. Democratic institutionsallow mobilized groups to compete for offices through the peaceful means of elec-tions. Promoting democracy helps to accommodate the conflicting interests ofincumbent elites as well as the interests of mobilized opposition groups as thesegroups try to maintain their political and economic interests through the democraticprocesses. To the extent that democratic institutions and processes allow groups topursue their interests through peaceful means, governments have an electoralincentive to refrain from repressing their opponents, and opposition movementshave an incentive to refrain from oppositional violence. Since the outbreak ofcivil conflict is likely to diffuse into the neighbouring states through refugeeflows and the rebel networks,3 promoting democracy in the aftermath of conflictalso helps to enhance regional peace and security.4 Therefore, identifying factorsthat encourage democracy in post-conflict states would help to advance our under-standing of post-civil war peace building. Such an effort should also facilitate theforeign policy goals of external actors, who frequently intervene into civil wars andadvocate democracy promotion in conflict-torn states like Afghanistan, Iraq,Liberia and Democratic Republic of Congo, to name a few recent initiatives.

Previous studies on democratic transition

The existing theories of democratization point to a set of conditions that are con-ducive to the transition to democracy. Many of these conditions are oftennotably absent in post-civil war nations. Theories of democratization postulatethat democracy is likely to emerge in an environment characterized by a certainlevel of economic development, a well-developed civic culture, diffusion ofwealth, and certain degree of elite agreements.5 By contrast, most literature

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surrounding democratization indicates that the post-civil war environment ischaracterized by conditions that are hostile to the emergence of democracy.

Building democracy in post-conflict societies is dramatically different fromdemocratization emerging out of stable authoritarian regimes that have not beentorn by intrastate conflict. At the very least, an authoritarian state does not incurthe costs of civil war and the imminent threat of armed overthrow. Civil warsoccur in nations that are poor to start with, and the conflict results in the furtherdestruction of economic infrastructure,6 productive capacity, and the disruptionof trade and commerce. The outbreak of war in such states reduces an ‘alreadylow level of development and capacity for growth, and scares off potential inves-tors’.7 If economic development is critical for war to take place, as argued by Lipsetas well as others,8 the economic destruction caused by civil war should make thetransition to democracy less likely to occur in post-civil war states. Vanhanensuggests that the diffusion of wealth is important for people to demand politicalrights and liberties.9 Yet, numerous studies show that civil war is accompaniedby repression and violations of human rights.10 The outbreak of civil warrenders the people of the country less economically stable than they were beforethe war, which suggests that people are less able and less likely to demandrights and liberties after civil war. The post-war environment is also marked bygrowing political mistrust between former protagonists11 and a lack of consensusregarding the type of political institutions that should guide the political process.12

After the termination of a conflict, civil war actors constantly engage in accusationand bargaining,13 which might hinder efforts to build the institutional capacity ofthe post-conflict state. All these considerations suggest that the post-conflictenvironment is hostile to a transition toward democracy. Nevertheless, withoutestablishing a democratic government and nurturing it, achieving peace and econ-omic prosperity in a post-civil war state may be a remote goal.

Some scholars are sceptical as to whether democracy is the right strategy topursue immediately after a civil war terminates. These scholars argue that in theimmediate aftermath of conflict, political stability and the establishment of aneffective administration over the territory are more important than promoting pol-itical and economic competition.14 Democratic politics are contentious and in thecontext of a post-war environment and rapid political liberalization, these politicscould exacerbate fears and hatreds among contending rivals. Contentious politicalprocesses, such as elections, could hurt the efforts to achieve political stability andeffective administration over the territory, if former protagonists focus on theirstakes in the election outcome. Since the institutions of the post-war state areweak and not fully institutionalized, the election may work against the goal ofestablishing a stable liberal democracy because former protagonists could under-mine the democracy itself once they capture the state power through the electoralprocess.15 Paris suggests how democracy became a distant goal in post 1997Liberia, where Charles Taylor used his power to suppress his political opponentsand consolidate a monolithic party system, transforming the presidency into anautocracy based on violence, suppression and nepotism.16 Rotberg also supports

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the policy prescription of delaying the post-war elections until the post-war govern-ment has achieved some measure of stability by securing the cities and countrysideand establishing a functioning state.17 It is imperative that the former protagoniststransform themselves into viable political parties, embrace democratic politicalculture and be confident in the democratic political process.

There are instances in which former rebel groups find it difficult to refrain fromviolence when they participate in the democratic process. For instance, the Com-munist Party of Nepal- Maoist (an insurgent party) did not refrain from violencecompletely after signing a peace agreement in November 2006. In the post-agree-ment period, Maoists continuously used violence against supporters of theiropponents, even after that party led a coalition government after constituent assem-bly election of April 2008. Yet the former rebel leader has shown the party’s com-mitment to democracy by repeatedly claiming that a return to conflict is not anoption, and that the party is committed to multiparty democracy.18 Nepal’s peaceprocess is still in a precarious condition. Nevertheless, Nepal has thus far success-fully avoided a full-fledged renewed civil war, and the Maoists are now trying topursue their interests through a democratic process. Had the democratic changenot been materialized and elections not been held, Nepal’s peace process wouldhave been stalled right at the beginning. Sisk’s suggestion of promoting democracyin the process of reconstituting political order after a civil war is therefore sup-ported by this case. Delaying post-conflict elections and democracy can makeformer protagonists more suspicious of each other.19 Democracy and electionsprovide institutional mechanisms and legitimacy, without which peace buildingin a post-war state may not materialize.

The imperative of post-conflict democratization, however, is not adequatelyaddressed in the post-conflict peace-building literature. Post-conflict peace-build-ing literature looks at the way a conflict is terminated, the structure of power-sharing institutional arrangements, and how international missions influencepeace duration in post-conflict states.20 The power-sharing argument presentedby Hartzell and Hoddie is particularly disposed to explain determinants ofpower-sharing agreements and how those power-sharing agreements are relatedto peace duration. They explain power-sharing arrangements as institutions thatensure the future security of former rivals and thereby reduce the incentives forthem to revert to armed conflict in the future.21 Power-sharing arrangements canbring peace even under an authoritarian post-conflict regime, as in Chad after1979, and Liberia after 1996. Perhaps a failure to translate the power-sharingarrangements of a peace agreement into a fully institutionalized democracyexplains why peace failed in both of these nations. Similarly, Walter and Fortnasuggest the importance of third-party guarantees (in the form of UN peacekeepingmissions) to create a favourable environment for the negotiated settlement of a civilwar and for the durability of peace after civil war.22 But peace has failed repeatedlyin countries like Angola, Somalia and the Democratic Republic of Congo. Perhapsbuilding a durable peace in the aftermath of civil war is related to building a

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democracy that ensures politically mobilized groups institutional mechanisms tocontest for political power and resources.

Some scholars have very recently tried to explain post-civil war democratiza-tion.23 These studies look at how the convergence of the political interests of thegroups in conflict and the citizenry could lead to democratization outright fromcivil war. They depict democratization as a way out of a stalemated armed conflict.The rivals agree to democracy not because of any deep commitment to its prin-ciples, but because it is a convenient way to cut their losses from a stalematedarmed conflict. In her explanation of the transition to democracy in South Africaand El Salvador, Wood suggests that a stalemated insurgency reshaped the interestsand opportunities of the economic elites (and perhaps some of the state elites) insuch a way that they judged the foreseeable returns to continued war as less thanthe returns to compromise with the insurgents.24 Similarly, Wantchekon arguesthat the anarchy of armed conflict may be highly profitable for the warringfaction in the short run, but their long-term prospects for expropriating revenuedepend on citizens’ investment.25 Citizens’ productive investment depends oneliminating illegal expropriation and securing their investments. As such,Wantchekon depicts post-civil war democratization as the convergence of politicalinterests between the citizens and the warring factions.26

But these studies are limited in their explanation of post-civil war democratiza-tion. They depict democracy established out of civil war as a change in the balanceof power within the governing elite, such that the more moderate elements of therebels would negotiate a democratic compromise with the democratic oppositionwithin the governing coalition.27 These studies do not fully address the structuralchange caused by the civil war and the balance of power between the governingelites and the rebel groups as a function of civil war. These studies look at onlya limited number of cases where civil wars ended in a negotiated settlement.They also tend to equate a negotiated settlement with democracy, when clearlythe two are not the same. In fact, most studies depict post-civil war democracyas a product of negotiated settlement. There are instances where efforts to establishdemocracy have failed after a negotiated settlement, as in Angola in 1992.Similarly, current studies on post-civil war democratization do not help us under-stand the prospects for democracy following a decisive military victory either bythe government or rebels, as in Burundi after 1988 (government victory) and inMoldova after 1992. Therefore, current studies on post-conflict democracy havelimited our ability to generalize across cases where civil wars ended not just in anegotiated settlement but also in a decisive military victory by either side (govern-ment vs. rebels). This study will expand understanding of post-civil war democra-tization by considering factors related to the role of third-party actors and ethnicconflict.

In the section below, I present a theory of post-civil war democratization by dis-cussing factors that affect the establishment of a balance of power between civilwar protagonists, and the stability of that balance. The hypotheses derived fromtheoretical discussion are tested with data for all post-civil war countries

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between 1946 and 2005. After reporting my empirical findings from survivalanalysis, I summarize the findings and suggest the policy implications of thisstudy and future research agenda.

A theory of democratic transition after civil wars

The answer to the puzzle of post-civil war transition toward democracy, I argue, isthe establishment of a balance of power between former protagonists and the stab-ility of that balance of power. These two factors are important preconditions for asuccessful transition toward democracy.28 The balance of power is affected by,first, whether the conflict ended in a government victory, a rebel victory or a nego-tiated settlement and, secondly, whether the conflict was ethnically based or not.The stability of the balance of power is affected by whether there are third partyguarantees, such as peacekeeping missions or third party interveners.

I define the balance of power in terms of the capability of former protagonists topursue their political and economic interests unilaterally. In a post-war state, anactor can act unilaterally when the previous civil war terminated in a decisive mili-tary victory for that actor and that actor has little or no fear of renewed conflict.When the war ends in a decisive military victory, the balance of power favoursone side over the other. However, the fear of a resumption of a civil war might con-strain the victor’s preference in the post-war institutional design. Such a fear ismore likely among victorious governments than victorious rebels because therebels can more easily blend into the population and resume the conflict. Theinability of either side to prevail militarily in the civil war indicates the balanceof power between former protagonists. Therefore, balance of power betweencivil war protagonists does vary, and the prospects for democracy vary with thevariations in the balance of power. In this regard, the manner in which the civilwar terminates is a major determinant of the balance of power between former pro-tagonists because the termination of the war brings about a substantial change inthe distribution of power among former rivals. Civil war terminates either in a gov-ernment victory, a rebel victory or in a negotiated settlement.29 How the conflictterminates is a function of several factors, including the relative military strengthof the government versus the strength of the rebels, the duration of the conflict,the costs of war, whether the war was ethnically based or not, whether it was asecessionist war or a revolution, and whether a third-party intervention occurred.30

A civil war that terminates in a negotiated settlement tends to close the gap in theasymmetrical power relations between government and rebels, at least in compari-son to a conflict that ends in one-sided military victory.

Independent of how the conflict terminates, whether or not the conflict was eth-nically based can affect the post-war balance of power. Because ethnic identitiesare more immutable than class-based identities, the sense of threat that former pro-tagonists feel towards each other is less likely to diminish following ethnically-based conflicts than class-based conflicts. I define the stability of the post-warbalance of power in terms of institutional assurances provided by external

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actors, such as United Nations (UN) missions. Each of these determinants, andtheir stability, produces a different post-war environment, which affects theprospects for a post-civil war transition toward democracy. In the section below,I develop a causal explanation of how factors that establish the balance ofpower, and their stability, lead to transition toward democracy in post-civil warstates.

Negotiated settlement

Transition toward democracy in the aftermath of civil war becomes possible whena balance of power is achieved between former protagonists. A negotiated settle-ment to a civil war indicates that a balance of power exists between formerrivals, at least in comparison to a decisive victory by one side or the other. A nego-tiated settlement results from a military stalemate.31 A stalemate indicates abalance of military power between the rebels and the government. A stalematedarmed conflict often terminates in a negotiated settlement32 from which a transitiontoward democracy can emerge.33 The stalemate that produces a negotiated settle-ment preserves the balance of power between the protagonists, but as suggested byWood and Wantchekon,34 a negotiated settlement does not automatically produce ademocratic transition. Previous studies suggest that actors emerging out of violentconflict are particularly sensitive to issues related to the use of coercion by theiropponents.35 In other words, former protagonists are fearful about their futuresafety. More specifically, these protagonists have reasons to fear that their rivalwill defect from the settlement agreement and make a surprise attack. This fearimpedes the achievement of a peace agreement to end the war, even when bothsides would prefer a negotiated settlement over continued fighting. Civil warrivals are more likely to reach a negotiated settlement when there are third-partysecurity guarantees against such defections and institutional mechanisms (that is,power-sharing institutions) to resolve the credible commitment problems thatotherwise would make them reluctant to agree to a settlement.36 When this crediblecommitment problem is addressed, former protagonists are more likely to agree tonegotiate a transition toward democracy: they would prefer democracy over arenewed civil war. The balance of power established through a negotiated settle-ment often includes provisions for political, military, economic and territorialpower-sharing and power dividing arrangements.37 These institutions provideformer protagonists with access to political power and resources and essentiallygive each rival group a veto power over the discretionary (unilateral) use ofpower by another rival group. Power-sharing institutions make it difficult for arival to monopolize state power for its own benefit at the expense of its rivals.As such, power-sharing institutions provide security guarantees to some extentand help to reduce the fear of future war. In some instances, a negotiated settlementalso involves provisions for unbiased third-party actors such as the UN mission toprotect and implement the agreements between the former rivals.38

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The works of Hartzell and Hoddie suggest that the adoption of power-sharingarrangements as well as security guarantees provided by UN missions depends onconflict duration and the conflict intensity.39 Not all negotiated settlements involvepower-sharing arrangements and security guarantees from a UN mission.Nevertheless, a negotiated settlement to a civil war involves some degree of abalance of power between former rivals. When the balance of power is supportedby the provision of power-sharing arrangements and the involvement of a UNmission, civil war protagonists can be more certain about their future. Thiscertainty creates incentives for them to negotiate a transition toward democracy.

The establishment of both a balance of power between former civil war actorsand the institutional mechanisms to address their security concerns creates anenvironment that is optimal for cooperation between former rivals. It alsocreates an environment where former protagonists can establish themselves aslegitimate political actors in the post-war regime. As such, an armed conflictbecomes less attractive as an option for former rivals when their security concernshave been addressed and they have a fair chance to compete for power andresources through elections. Hence, when a balance of power is establishedthrough a negotiated settlement, and when the fear of renewed war is reduced bypower-sharing institutions and third party guarantees, the former protagonistscan negotiate a democratic transition. When the protagonists are confident thattheir security dilemma is now manageable because of power-sharing institutionsand the presence of a UN mission, the former protagonists can see the benefit ofa transition toward democracy. Through free and fair elections, elites of the incum-bent regime and the rebels can compete for control over the government or a shareof the government power without having to defeat their rival militarily. Democracyempowers civilian masses with voting rights and at the same time secures civil waractors access to political power and economic resources through the electoralprocess. Losing control of the government in an election does not lead to the per-manent exclusion of the group from the political process because they always havethe opportunity to compete again in the next election cycle. A transition towarddemocracy changes the perceptions of civil war actors so that they perceive that‘the cost of accepting the defeat plus the expected gains from the next electionexceed the expected gains from subverting the regime’.40 In democratic elections,former rebels and government officials can expect to win some seats in the legis-lature, even if they lose control of executive power. As long as they have somereasonable hope of winning the executive or enough seats in the legislature toclaim cabinet posts and influence the legislative process, the parties have incentivesto accept a transition toward democracy rather than resume fighting. The discus-sion of a negotiated settlement and the measures involved in a negotiated settle-ment to address the security concerns of former rivals leads to the first transitionhypothesis:

H1: Transition toward democracy is more likely in the post-civil war states followinga negotiated settlement.

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One-sided military victory

A one-sided military victory, either by the government or the rebels, creates abalance of power that obviously favours the victor. A decisive military victorycreates a post-civil war environment in which the victorious side has little incentiveto agree to power-sharing deals or to invite in a UN mission to protect the peaceprocess. Licklider suggests that the outright military victory by one side or theother would make renewed conflict less likely because the new government thatcomes into power in the aftermath of a military victory is strong enough toensure that their former enemies are unable to resume violent conflict.41 Thedefeated group’s military power has been subdued, and the victor can ‘punish itsenemies by genocide rather than war’.42 Therefore, a decisive military victorycreates a post-civil war environment where the victorious side is more likely toadopt exclusionary policies backed up by its military dominance rather thanseek cooperation with the defeated side in the form of democratization. Thisdoes not create a favourable environment for a democratic transition to takeplace. The victor has little to no incentive to put its claim to power, won on the bat-tlefield, at risk through elections.

However, all military victories are not alike. Differences in the post-civil warenvironment that could affect the victor’s perception of their ability to protecttheir interests in the aftermath of conflict can be identified. These differencescould affect the prospects for post-civil war democratization. A rebel victorybrings new elites into the political system by replacing the elites of the defeatedgovernment. A rebel victory usually eliminates the old elites from contention forpower more thoroughly than a government victory. Also, a rebel victory usuallyresults in changes in economic elites because victorious rebels often confiscatethe assets of those elites and redistribute some portion of them to their own suppor-ters. Gurses and Mason suggest that victorious rebels have little incentive to grantthe defeated government any concessions.43 When a rebel group secures a decisivemilitary victory, the defeated government elites are either killed or sent into exile,along with their allies among the economic elite.44 Civilians quickly change theirloyalty to the rebel groups because the old elites lack access to economic resourcesnecessary to reward the loyalty of their former supporters. Therefore, victoriousrebels have little incentive to democratize, at least to the extent of allowingmembers of the defeated government to contend for office.

With respect to the government victory, the same political and economic elitesremain in power, though considerably weakened as a consequence of the economicdamage sustained during the war. Transition toward democracy in the aftermath ofa decisive government victory depends on the extent to which the governmentvictory tips the balance in the government’s favour. Establishing a balance ofpower in its own favour is possible only when the victorious government addressesthe grievances of conflicting groups, eradicates the rebel movement, and eliminatesthe fear of renewed conflict. If the government achieves decisive victory over therebels, the resulting balance of power favours the government so that it has no

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incentive to democratize. Gurses and Mason suggest, however, that under these cir-cumstances, the previous regime type does matter because democratic govern-ments are more likely than non-democratic regimes to open up the politicalsystem to incorporate the now-defeated opposition. By contrast, autocratic govern-ments are expected to use repression to subdue the remnants of the opposition as away to preempt the possibility of renewed rebellion.45 Studies by Henderson andSinger show that democracies are less likely to experience civil war in the firstplace.46

In most instances, government victory by itself does not resolve the grievancesthat led to civil war in first place. Indeed, those grievances may be exacerbated as aconsequence of the destruction of the war itself. Furthermore, a decisive govern-ment victory does not necessarily lead to the eradication of the rebel movement.Defeated rebels can avoid annihilation by blending into the population, rebuildingtheir military strength, and awaiting a change in the political opportunity structurethat would make renewed combat feasible.47 For example, Janatha Vimukti Pera-muna (JVP) in Sri Lanka suffered military defeat in 1977 and 1987 respectively butpopular support for the movement survived. After each defeat, the JVP leadershipblended into the population in order to avoid annihilation and in both instances themovement was later able to revive its capacity to mount an organized opposition tothe government. Rather than risk a third conflict, the government of Sri Lankagradually allowed the JVP to participate in the political process as a legal party.The JVP succeeded in winning seats in the legislature and since 1994, the JVPhas been a member of the governing coalitions. This and similar examplessuggest that it is difficult for a victorious government to completely eliminatethe last remnants of a rebel organization and its civilian support base. As such,the fear of a recurrence of civil war remains higher in the aftermath of a decisivegovernment victory than a rebel victory. This fear seems well founded given thatthere is empirical evidence that civil war is more likely to recur following a gov-ernment victory than a rebel victory.48

The major concern of the victorious government is avoiding the recurrence ofcivil war. Since victorious governments are less able than victorious rebels to elim-inate their rival’s capacity to resume conflict at a later date, victorious governmentshave more incentive than victorious rebels to consider democratic reform as a wayto win over some of the rebel’s civilian supporters and thereby reduce the risk ofrenewed conflict at a later date. Civil war is destructive and costly to the govern-ment. The elites of a victorious government can protect their access to powerand resources by establishing institutional mechanisms to reduce the risk of arenewed war. Alternatively, the incumbent elites can also use repression in orderto maintain the status quo of no democratic change. The preference of the victor-ious government for repression versus democratic change depends on the balanceof power between it and its rivals, and in the case of a victorious government, thatbalance is calibrated in terms of the government’s estimate of the defeated rebels’ability to regroup and resume conflict at a later date. The balance of power is lessfavourable to the victorious government if the rebel movement revives. Under such

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circumstances, the government’s use of repression might not reduce their fear offuture conflict. If the rebels were able to resume the conflict and defeat the govern-ment, the incumbent elites of the government would lose everything. The morelikely that prospect appears to the government, the more attractive a democratictransition becomes for the government. By incorporating enough of the rebels’ sup-porters into the polity, the victorious government would make it more difficult forrebels to rebuild viable rebel organization later.49 The fear of future war, therefore,should push the elites of the incumbent government to open up the political systemand allow politically mobilized groups to participate in the democratic process.This leads to the following hypothesis:

H2: Transition toward democracy is less likely following a rebel victory compared togovernment victory in a civil war.

Ethnic civil wars

The outcome of civil war is the basic determinant of the balance of power, butwhether the war is ideological or ethnic affects the degree of the balance ofpower between contenders in the post-conflict environment. Ethnic civil warsare ‘particularly difficult to negotiate, largely because ethnic enmities tend to beso deep and the stakes so high’.50 Licklider suggests that ethnic civil wars aremore difficult to resolve through a negotiated settlement, and that settlements tosuch wars are less durable.51 The rebel groups in ethnic conflicts build their civiliansupport base around shared identity, which is less changeable than, say, sharedeconomic interests. Moreover, the war itself tends to harden ethnic hostilities.52

Therefore, a negotiated settlement is less likely in ethnic civil wars than in ideologi-cal civil wars.53 Previous studies also suggest that ethnic civil wars are harder forrebels to win.54 As such, government victory is the most likely outcome of anethnic civil war. But a security dilemma persists even after a government winsan ethnic civil war. This dilemma is that hardened ethnic identities make it difficultfor a victorious government to win over the former supporters of the now-defeated(ethnic) rebels. As such, a government victory in an ethnic civil war does not estab-lish a balance of power that favours the victorious government to the same extent asthe balance established by a government victory in an ideological war.

Secessionist vs. revolutionary ethnic war

Not all ethnic civil wars are alike, and the prospect for a transition toward democ-racy following an ethnic civil war also depends on whether the goals of the rebelswere revolutionary and secessionist.55 In an ethnic revolutionary war, ethnic rebelswage armed conflict against the hegemony of a rival ethnic group in order toreplace the old regime with one controlled by their own ethnic group. In secessio-nist civil wars, regionally concentrated ethnic groups wage armed conflict to gain

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territorial autonomy from the existing regime in order to protect their culturalautonomy and sometimes the resources located in their homeland as well.56 Thestakes of revolutionary ethnic wars are fundamentally different from those of seces-sionist ethnic civil wars. This distinction is also relevant to the balance of powerbetween ethnic groups after the war ends, and to the prospect of a post-conflict tran-sition toward democracy.

Ethnic secessionists and ethnic revolutionaries pursue distinct military strat-egies depending on their size and geographical concentration. The variation inthe use of military strategy is instrumental to understanding how the protagonistsperceive the fear of renewed conflict once the conflict ends. Buhaug suggests that aguerrilla operation may be an effective way to defend a claim over territory againstthe government.57 With this strategy, ethnic groups in conflict do challenge the coreinterests of the ruling ethnic group at the centre because a rebel victory in a seces-sionist war would still leave that dominant group in power in the government of therump state. The dominant ethnic group can still hold its control over economicresources and political power at the centre even after granting territorial autonomyto the ethnic secessionist rebels. This indicates a balance of power in favour of thegovernment and therefore the dominant ruling coalition has little incentive todemocratize. The dominant coalition that now controls the government canaccede to secessionist demands, rather than concede power to the rebels. This isnot the case with ethnic revolutions. In ethnic revolutions, decisive militaryvictory (by the rebels or the government) does not dismantle the support base ofthe respective ethnic groups, unless there is genocide. Therefore, in an ethnic revo-lution, fear of the recurrence of conflict persists even after a decisive militaryvictory by one side or the other. Even if the insurgents are able to overthrow thegovernment (thus a rebel victory), such as in Rwanda and Burundi, the defeatedgovernment can more easily recuperate its strength than a defeated governmentin a non-ethnic (revolutionary) civil war because the elites of the defeated govern-ment can mobilize their own network of ethnic supporters. In the latter case, thedefeat does not lead to the defection of the loser’s civilian support base. The per-sistence of the defeated government’s support base poses a threat to the economicand political interests of the new regime. Elites in the new regime may not be ableto maintain their political power and their control over economic resources if theyare confronted with an armed uprising by the very elites they just overthrew. Theycannot easily triumph over the ethnic supporters of the defeated government. If anethnic revolution were to successfully overthrow the government dominated byanother ethnic group, the new incumbents might fear renewed conflict thatwould threaten their hold on political power. The recurrence of ethnic revolutionis likely unless a democratic transition occurs after the conflict ends. The goalsof ethnic rebels (i.e., secessionist or revolutionary) influence the prospect of a tran-sition toward democracy in the aftermath of a civil war to the extent that the fear ofrenewed conflict persists. This is because the support base of the defeated ethnicgroup cannot be easily won over by the post-conflict regime. This leads to thefollowing hypothesis:

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H3: Ethnic conflicts with government incompatibility are more likely to be followedby a transition toward democracy than are ethnic conflicts with territorialincompatibility.

So far, I have discussed how the balance of power between former protagonistsinfluences the prospect of a transition toward democracy in post-civil war states.But civil war protagonists may find it difficult to negotiate a democratic changewhen the established balance of power is not stable enough to eliminate the fearof future uncertainty. In this regard, two factors can influence the stability of thebalance of power established with the termination of the conflict. These twofactors are third-party interveners and the UN mission.

Third-party intervention during a conflict

The balance of power between former rivals is influenced by third-party states thatintervene militarily during the civil war. Biased third-party intervention (asopposed to unbiased intervention in the form of peacekeeping) enhances the warfighting capability of the favoured protagonist, (i.e., government or rebels), andshifts the balance of power in favour of the protagonist that receives the interve-ner’s assistance. Previous studies suggest that biased third-party intervention incivil war affects the outcome of the civil war and increases the duration of the con-flict.58 A protracted civil war is more likely to end in a negotiated settlement than ina military victory by either the government or the rebels.59 Since protracted civilwars are more likely to end in a negotiated settlement, third party interventionshould make negotiated settlements more likely thereby making post-civil wartransitions to democracy more likely. However for a democratic transition totake place, the third-party induced balance of power between former rivals musthold. This is likely to happen when the intervener maintains its military presencein the post-civil war state.

Maintaining their military presence after the conflict ends might not be possiblefor many third-party interveners, especially for democratic interveners, because ofdomestic audience costs.60 In a democracy, elected leaders are sensitive to voterpreferences and, therefore, are inclined to focus more on domestic issues inorder to increase their chances of getting reelected. Politicians want to avoidforeign military interventions that drain resources from investment in domesticpolicy areas. Committing the nation to a prolonged military presence in aforeign country poses a risk to the domestic policy areas, especially as the pro-spects of that intervention producing a decisive military victory diminish.61 Forthese reasons, third-party interveners (especially democratic ones) have strongincentives to withdraw from the civil war nation once the conflict ends. Undersuch circumstances, the third-party induced balance of power that made a nego-tiated settlement more likely might not hold once the intervener withdraws. Thewithdrawal of the third party’s military forces may increase the former protago-nists’ fear of renewed conflict. However, this does not mean that a third-party

838 M. Joshi


state will not again intervene in the future. For example, at the request of PresidentTombalbaye, France intervened in Chad on 28 August 1968 to repress Front for theNational Liberation of Chad (FROLINAT). The Chadian government signed apeace agreement with FROLINAT on 16 March 1979 and France pulled itstroops out of Chad on 20 March 1979.62 On 9 August 1983 France intervenedagain on the side of government and withdrew its troops on 16 September1984.63 But Chad did not make the transition toward democracy in either instance.

The withdrawal of a third party alters the balance of power between govern-ment and rebels in ways that can create incentives for at least one side to preferwar over a transition toward democracy. Therefore, it can be expected that athird party intervention would make the transition toward democracy morelikely as long as that party remains in the post-civil war state. But the withdrawalof the intervener before transition occurs should reduce the odds of transition. Thedeparture of the third-party intervener creates a power vacuum between formerprotagonists; the stronger side has an incentive to annihilate the weaker side.Therefore, the transition toward democracy is less likely to follow after a third-party intervention if the intervener withdraws as soon as the conflict ends. Sincea third-party induced balance of power is not endogenous to the capabilities ofthe civil war actors themselves, at least one of the civil war protagonists mightprefer to return to war to settle their differences once the third party withdraws.The withdrawal disrupts the balance of power that led to the conflict’s termination.As such, the transition toward democracy becomes less likely following biasedthird-party intervention.

H4: Biased third-party intervention decreases the likelihood of transition towarddemocratic after civil-war.

UN mission

A negotiated settlement establishes a balance of power between former enemies,but peace scholars suggest that the former rivals are fearful about their futurebecause negotiated settlements also create incentives to cheat on peace agreements,which can lead to renewed conflict.64 Previous studies suggest that unbiased third-party interventions, such as UN peacekeeping missions, enforce the terms of thenegotiated settlement and solve the credible commitment problem inherent in allnegotiated settlements. Such third-party interventions help to alleviate eachparty’s fear of aggression by their rivals.65 UN missions cannot stop a determinedaggressor from defecting from the peace process and resuming armed conflict.Nevertheless, undermining the balance of power preserved by the UN missionsand thus re-engaging in conflict would be costly for former rivals because itcould lead to the withdrawal of international recognition and/or trade sanctionsas well as to the elimination of international aid for the faction that defects fromthe agreement.66 As such, UN peacekeeping missions help to stabilize thebalance of power between the insurgents and the government.

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The UN presence in a post-war state helps to create an environment that is con-ducive to the transition toward democracy. The UN mission helps to resolve thecredible commitment problem between protagonists by ensuring that cheatingon the peace agreement will have costs. The mission creates incentives forformer protagonists to respect the peace process. The assurance that their rivalwill abide by the terms of the peace agreement helps to eliminate an actor’s fearof future uncertainty. On the one hand, the cost of war reduces the expected netbenefits an aggressor can gain from capturing the state. On the other hand,former protagonists can receive much higher net benefits if they reciprocatecooperation and agree to a transition. Cooperation would also bring internationalassistance for reconstruction and development projects. Furthermore, a UNmission has some degree of legitimacy in comparison to a biased third-party inter-vener. This legitimacy gives the UN mission a space to engage local political actorsand use local capacity to mobilize parties that have a stake in the post-conflictstate,67 which is critical to the process of building the institutions of the post-war state. UN missions also play very important roles in protecting human rightsand resettling internally displaced persons and refugees. They can supervise thedisarmament, demobilization, and reintegration of rebel armed forces.68 The pres-ence of the UN mission protects the balance of power between former rivals, elim-inates security dilemmas, and creates incentives for cooperation. Unlike biasedthird-party interventions during civil wars, UN missions are neutral and thisgives them a degree of political legitimacy, rendering them mutually acceptableto former adversaries. All of these factors influence the protagonists’ decisionwith regards to a transition toward democracy. Once peace is established formerprotagonists can be confident that they can secure their political and economicinterests through democratic processes if they agree to a democratic change. UNmissions influence the democratic transition process in the post-conflict states byresolving the credible commitment problem, which helps to preserve the balanceof power and creates incentives for the civil war actors to negotiate a democratictransition. From this discussion, I derive the following hypothesis:

H5: UN peace-building missions increase the prospect of the transition towarddemocracy in post-conflict states.

The theoretical argument presented here suggests that transition toward democ-racy in the aftermath of civil war is more likely when the balance of power is estab-lished between former enemies and stabilized to alleviate their fear of futureuncertainty or renewed conflict. In the next section I will present a researchdesign to test these hypotheses.

Research design

I use an updated version of Sambanis’ dataset to identify post-civil war cases.69

The dataset covers 125 post-civil war cases in 71 countries from 1946–2005.

840 M. Joshi


The unit of analysis is a post-conflict year, which is observed in the dataset immedi-ately after the termination of a civil war. The count of a post-conflict year beginsfrom the same year if conflict terminates in the first half of the year (fromJanuary to June). Otherwise a post-conflict year is counted as beginning with thefollowing year.

The dependent variable in this analysis is transition toward democracy (TTD)in the post-conflict states. I use the ‘CHANGE’ variable in the Polity IV dataset toidentify TTD in post-conflict states, which is coded ‘1’ if ‘CHANGE’ in the Politydataset is at least a positive 3-point, otherwise ‘0’.70 This variable indicates achange in the institutionalized democracy score (210 to +10) in which a positivechange indicates a movement from non-democracy toward democracy, and a nega-tive change indicates a regression toward authoritarianism. Smith and Gurses alsoused the same measure.71

One could argue that operationalizing TTD with a 3-point change in the Polityscore is arbitrary. It does lump changes greater than 3-points into the same categoryand the 3-point change does not necessarily mean that the nation has passed theconventional ‘threshold’ for democracy of +5 on Polity democracy–autocracyscale. The Polity IV Project explains ‘democratic transition’ in terms of changefrom autocracy (210 to 0) to partial democracy (1–6), and partial democracy tofull democracy (7–10).72 This operationalization in the Polity dataset ignores con-siderable changes that occur without passing one of the two (arbitrary) thresholdsof regime change. For instance, the Polity score for Jordan moved up to a -4 from a-9 in 1989 (an increase of 5-points) without a shift in regime type. Similarly,Uganda’s Polity score moved up to -1 from -4 in 2005 (an increase of 3-points).Even though these countries did not make a transition to partial democracy asspecified in the Polity dataset, substantial political reforms took place. In Jordan,the first general elections since 1967 were held, and the Muslim Brotherhoodwon 37 out of 80 seats.73 Similarly, Uganda moved to multi-party democracy in2005 from a ‘no party’ system. These countries do meet the Gates et al.74 definitionof polity change. They operationalize polity change in terms of at least one of thefollowing: (a) a movement from one category to another in the executive con-straint, (b) a change of at least two units in the executive constraints, or (c) a100% increase or 50% decrease in participation. Therefore, a positive 3-pointchange in the Polity score meets a minimal operational definition of transitiontowards democracy in post-conflict states. This operationalization still leaves outcases like El Salvador, India, Bangladesh and Sri Lanka, where rebels were inte-grated into the democratic process but change was not recorded in the Polityscore. Perhaps these are the cases where democracy was functioning to someextent during the civil war, and rebels did not gain enough electoral support toreplace the incumbent regime. To not include these cases in the dataset would indi-cate a bias toward cases that demonstrate a change in the Polity score. To resolvethis issue, I coded TTD if a post-conflict state is at least a semi-democracy as speci-fied in the Polity dataset even if the Polity change is less than 3-points. Neverthe-less, these post-conflict states must hold post-conflict elections to integrate rebels

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into the democratic process. In the dataset, I coded 92 (72.44%) spells of TTD outof 125 spells of civil war terminations. The spells of TTD will be coded ‘failure’ insurvival models.

To test hypotheses 1 and 2, I used variables related to civil war terminations.Government victory is coded ‘1’ if the civil war ended in a government victoryand the government is still in power with no negotiated settlement, otherwise itis coded ‘0’. Rebel victory is also coded ‘1’ if the insurgents defeated the govern-ment militarily or the central government collapses and the rebels assume power;otherwise it is coded ‘0’. If a military stalemate exists and the government and theinsurgents negotiate a settlement, I code ‘negotiated settlement’ as ‘1’; otherwise Icode ‘0’. I do not code ‘truce’ as a separate category. Sambanis coded some caseslike Papua New Guinea (1988–1991) and Sri Lanka (1987–1989) as terminatingin ‘truce’, which later were terminated in negotiated settlement and governmentvictory respectively.75 After identifying relevant cases for this study, the datasetincludes 55 cases (44%) that terminated in government victory, 28 cases(22.4%) ending in rebel victory, and 41 cases (32.8%) that were resolved by a nego-tiated settlement. More than half of the post-civil war cases (63 cases) are recordedas terminated between 1990 and 2005, and more than 50% of those civil wars (32cases) were terminated in a negotiated settlement. The data for coding all threetypes of conflict termination are taken from Sambanis and his detailed case narra-tives, and National Science Foundation funded Third Party Interventions in Intras-tate Disputes Project (TPI Project) case narratives.76

In order to test hypothesis 3, I make a distinction between ethnic and non-ethnicconflicts. Following Doyle and Sambanis and Sambanis, I code ‘1’ for ethnic civilwar if the pattern of rebel recruitment and alliance follows ethnic lines, otherwiseI code ‘0’. In the dataset, I identified 81 cases (63.78%) that are coded as ethniccivil wars.77 To identify the issue underlying the incompatibility of the conflict,I use Buhaug’s dataset and code ‘1’ for ‘governmental conflict’ (that is, revolution)if the rebels sought to overthrow the central government or bring change in thecomposition of the government, otherwise ‘0’.78 I coded 86 cases (68.80%) as gov-ernment incompatibility and the rest of the conflicts as territorial incompatibility(that is, secession).79 The interaction between the ethnic conflict variable and thegovernment incompatibility variable denotes a variable called ‘ethnic governmen-tal incompatibility’. I coded 45 cases (36%) that had both ethnicity and govern-mental incompatibility issues. Because of the use of the interaction variable inthe dataset, I used all these three variables to test hypothesis 3.

To test hypothesis 4, I used a dummy variable, ‘external intervention’. Theexternal intervention variable is coded ‘1’ if any third party (parties) intervenedmilitarily on behalf of the government or the insurgents during the civil war.80

Out of 125 spells of conflict, I coded 61 cases (48.8%) as having third party inter-ventions. I used Sambanis’ data and TPI Project case narratives to code third partyinterventions.81

Finally, to test the effect of the UN missions on transition toward democracy(hypothesis 5), I used ‘UN Missions’ variable. This variable proposes that UN

842 M. Joshi


missions increase the chances of post-conflict transition toward democracy. Thisvariable is coded ‘1’ if UN missions were deployed (irrespective of mandates) inthe post-conflict states, otherwise it is coded ‘0’. I coded ‘UN missions’ only foryears when such missions were present in the post-conflict state. Out of 125civil wars observed in the dataset, UN missions were deployed in 34 cases(27.20%).82

To obtain non-spurious and robust results for the hypotheses tested, I usedseveral control variables. While negotiating a democratic transition with aformer rebel group, the government might also be fighting another civil war withanother rebel group. This could pose an obstacle to the democratic transitionprocess because the government and the former rebels have to find a commonground to deal with the group that is still fighting. Therefore, I control forongoing civil war. This variable is coded ‘1’ for ongoing civil war, otherwise itis coded ‘0’. This variable is coded using lists of civil wars provided by Sambanis.83

Previous studies suggest that ethnically homogenous or highly fractionalizedsocieties are less likely to experience civil war.84 Therefore, I control for ethnicfractionalization using the Ethnic and Linguistic Fractionalization Index (ELFI)coded by Doyle and Sambanis, which ranges from 0 (minimum) to 1(maximum).85 Transition toward democracy may be less likely in relatively hom-ogenous and highly fragmented societies. Therefore, I also used the square ofELFI, which helps to explain any quadratic or non-linear relationship.

Gurses and Mason suggest that the war costs (measured in terms of humancosts and the duration of the war) are likely to affect the former protagonists’ esti-mate of the net benefit that they can achieve from agreeing to power-sharing asopposed to fighting a costlier war they are unlikely to win.86 I control for warcosts by using the log of battle-related deaths and the duration of the previouscivil war. In a separate model, I also use battle-related deaths as a proportion ofthe total population. Both variables come from Doyle and Sambanis and areupdated using TPI Project case narratives.87 I also control for size of the nation’spopulation, using the natural log of this variable. This variable is coded from theWorld Bank World Development Indicator (WDI) and updated using Penn WorldTable Version 6.2.88

Given the finding that the level of GDP per-capita affects the prospects for boththe transition toward democracy as well as the onset of civil war,89 I control forGDP per-capita. To avoid endogeneity problems, this variable is lagged by oneyear. I take the natural log of this variable to avoid a possible heterogeneityproblem, which is likely because different countries have different levels of econ-omic development.

One of the consistent findings on the effect of natural resources on democracyand civil war is that greater dependence on natural resource exports (like oil orgemstones) tends to strengthen authoritarian institutions and make such countriesmore susceptible to civil war outbreaks.90 Therefore, I control for oil dependence.If a country’s oil exports make up more than 33% of total exports I code ‘1’, other-wise it is coded ‘0’. This variable is taken from Doyle and Sambanis.91

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The regional standard of democracy has gained currency in the study of demo-cratic transition and democratic survival.92 To control the regional influences onthe transition toward democracy in the post-civil war state, I control for the regionalstandard of democracy. To derive this variable I first count the number of contig-uous countries (less than 150 nautical miles in distance) and take an average of theirinstitutionalized democracy score (Polity IV) for each year under observation. Ifthe average Polity IV score is equal to or more than 6 in the Polity scale, Icoded the nation-year ‘1’, otherwise I coded ‘0’. The numbers of contiguouscountries are derived using EuGene.93

Finally, previous studies have consistently found a positive relationshipbetween past democratic experience and the transition toward democracy.94 I oper-ationalize past democratic experience as a dummy variable and code it ‘1’ if thepost-conflict state had at least +4 score on the Polity scale at any time after theend of the Second World War but before the onset of the civil war, otherwise itis coded ‘0’. I also control for the Cold War’s effect on the transition toward democ-racy after civil wars. As such, conflicts terminated in 1990 and thereafter are coded‘1’, otherwise ‘0’.

Analysis and findings

The transition toward democracy is a crucial political event in the history of a stateemerging out of violent conflict. In this study, the event (failure) is defined as atleast a 3-point positive change in the Polity score. To explain an incident ofTTD, I will use survival analysis. Survival analysis is time to event analysis,where the dependent variable measures the time that a unit spends before experi-encing an event or a failure.95 This method allows researchers to analyse thetime until an event occurs.96

The theoretical argument developed in this article suggests that the probabilityof a transition toward democracy (event failure) monotonically increases over theearly years following civil war termination. Given the complexity of the post-con-flict environment and the political process, it may take some time for civil waractors to agree to a democratic change. Therefore, in the early post-conflictperiod, the rate of events (failure) or hazard will be low, then high, and then willbecome stable after some time. Note that the primary interest in this research isthe effect of covariates on the dependent variable, not the shape of the hazard func-tion. When interest is on the covariates, not the baseline hazard, the use of a semi-parametric or parametric model is more appropriate.97 I estimated four modelsusing different distributional parametrization and estimated Akaike InformationCriterion (AIC) and/or Bayesian Information Criterion (BIC) in order to choosethe best fitting models. Statistically, the model that produces the lowest AIC andBIC scores is the best for analysing the data. By these information criteria,I should use Log Normal parametrization (see Table 1). But the Weibull modelbest describes the theoretical expectations because the failure rate is expected toincrease over time. The estimated parameter (p) in the Weibull model is greater

844 M. Joshi


than 1 and statistically significant. This suggests that the hazard is rising monoto-nically over time, which is consistent with the theoretical expectations. Therefore, Iuse a Weibull model to test the hypotheses related to the theories of post-civil wardemocratization. I also employ the Log normal model for a robustness check.

To test the proposed hypotheses, I estimated a series of survival models inaccelerated failure time (AFT) metric form. AFT estimates the failure time, notthe hazard ratio. An estimate of failure time is preferred in order to explain howquickly a transition toward democracy occurs after the termination of a civilwar. Since this study seeks to explain factors that influence the transition towarddemocracy, a negative sign for the estimated coefficients in the Weibull modelsindicates that the variable accelerates the process toward democratic transition.A positive sign indicates that the variable impedes or slows the transition towarddemocracy.98 The first three models in Table 2 are Weibull models and Model 4is a log normal model that replicates the first Weibull model. The log normalmodel is reported as a robustness check. In the models, the reference categoryfor civil war termination variables is government victory.

Hypothesis 1 suggests that the transition toward democracy is more likely tofollow a negotiated settlement than a military victory. The estimated coefficientfor the negotiated settlement variable is negative and significant at least at the0.05 level of confidence, which lends support to the theoretical argument. The esti-mated coefficient for a negotiated settlement is 20.838 (Model 3). As such, theeffect is equal to 2.670 {[exp(−p̂b̂)] = exp(−1.172∗ − 0.838)} in terms of thehazard ratio. It suggests that a negotiated settlement is likely to increase the prob-ability of transition toward democracy by decreasing the survival time by 167%[100 × (1 − exp(−p̂b̂))] compared to those cases terminated in the governmentvictory (p , 0.01).

Hypothesis 2 stipulates that the transition toward democracy should be lesslikely following a rebel victory than a government victory. In all the models, theestimated coefficient for rebel victory was negative. This suggests that, contraryto theoretical expectations, rebel victories accelerate the time to transitiontoward democracy, compared to government victories. However, the coefficientfor rebel victory does not reach statistical significance in any of the models. Assuch, the absence of a statistically significant difference between rebel victoriesand government victories does not support the theoretical claim that greater fearof renewed war should make victorious governments more likely than victorious

Table 1. Comparison of AIC and BIC values for parametric models.

Model 1 Model 2 Model 3

Parametric models AIC BIC AIC BIC AIC BIC

Weibull 216.90 282.95 230.42 302.92 229.00 290.33Log normal 210.75 281.52 225.66 302.99 223.67 285.00Log logistic 211.27 277.32 225.85 303.18 224.29 285.62

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Table 2. Transition toward democracy after civil wars, 1944–2005.

Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4

Negotiated settlement (1, 0) 20.993∗∗ 20.514∗ 20.838∗∗ 20.749∗

(0.366) (0.239) (0.310) 0.335Rebel victories (1, 0) 20.456 20.190 20.267 20.261

(0.454) (0.373) (0.457) 0.439United Nations missions (1, 0) 21.365∗∗∗ 21.085∗∗∗ 21.370∗∗∗ 21.479∗∗∗

(0.348) (0.314) (0.332) 0.303External intervention (1, 0) 20.390 20.226 20.226 20.078

(0.263) (0.212) (0.269) 0.272Govt incompatibility (1, 0) 211.598∗∗∗ 210.54∗∗∗ 212.50∗∗∗ 25.259∗∗∗

(1.272) (1.041) (1.322) 0.581Ethnic conflict (1, 0) 211.800∗∗∗ 210.60∗∗∗ 212.65∗∗∗ 25.308∗∗∗

(1.228) (1.070) (1.299) 0.594Ethnic conflict x govt

incompatibility11.573∗∗∗

(1.306)10.24∗∗∗

(1.057)12.55∗∗∗

(1.353)5.067∗∗∗

0.669Civil war duration 20.001 0.000 – 0.000

(0.002) (0.002) 0.002Battle death (log) 0.140∗∗ – – 0.117∗∗

(0.069) 0.063Population (log) 0.151 – – 0.097

(0.098) 0.125Battle death proportion of

population– 2.992

(4.367)2.887

(3.368)Past democratic experience (1, 0) – 21.045∗∗∗ –

(0.230)Cold War (1, 0) – 20.169 –

(0.304)Oil (1, 0) 1.323∗∗ – – 1.484∗∗∗

(0.504) 0.396Neighbouring democracy – 20.052∗ –

(0.023)Ethnic fractionalization – 20.128 21.551

(1.841) (2.483)Ethnic fractionalization squared – 0.860 1.958

(1.577) (2.180)Ongoing civil war (1, 0) 20.339 20.373

(0.286) 0.241GDP (log)t21 20.439∗∗ – 20.136 20.369∗∗

(0.147) (0.109) 0.128Constant 15.09∗∗∗ 13.99∗∗∗ 19.09∗∗∗ 13.700∗∗∗

(2.139) (1.100) (3.046) 3.223

Scale parameters 1.198 1.356 1.172 0.961Wald x2 209.80 248.92 212.68 327.12Probability of x2 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000Observations 827 928 827 827Number of subjects at risk 97 110 97 97Failures 51 56 51 51

Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses. ∗ p , 0.05, ∗∗ p , 0.01, ∗∗∗ p , 0.001. Log Normalmodel reports sigma in scale parameters. Model 1–3 Weibull, Model 4 Log Normal.

846 M. Joshi


rebels to make the transition toward democracy. In summary, negotiated settle-ments are more likely to produce a transition toward democracy sooner than mili-tary victories, but there is no difference between victorious governments andvictorious rebels with respect to the time it takes to reach a transition towarddemocracy.

Hypothesis 3 states that a transition toward democracy is more likely followingethnic revolutions compared to secessionist conflicts. In the empirical tests, I foundthat governmental incompatibility and ethnic incompatibility are both negative andsignificant (p , 0.000) and that the interaction between these two variables is posi-tive and significant. Because Hypothesis 3 suggests an interactive relationship,I estimated the marginal effect of ethnic conflict with governmental incompatibility(ethnic revolution), which is calculated by subtracting the coefficient of govern-mental incompatibility from the interaction variable between governmental andethnic incompatibility. The marginal effect is equal to 20.36 (Model 2). Assuch, the probability of a transition toward democracy is 62.9% more likely tofollow after ethnic revolutions in which one ethnic group challenges the ethnichegemony of another ethnic group compared to ethnic conflicts for territorialand cultural autonomy. This finding is consistent with theoretical expectations. Itsuggests that all ethnic conflicts are not the same, and building democracy aftercivil war is not as difficult when one ethnic group challenges the hegemony ofanother ethnic group. By contrast, a demand for territorial autonomy does notpose a credible threat to a central government dominated by one ethnic groupand, therefore, does not create incentives for that government to democratize. Ter-ritorial demands are also costly because successful rebels can achieve a separatestate and thus pose a threat of interstate war. For example, Eretria and Ethiopiafought a war from 1998 to 2000. But, when the ethnic group in conflict seeks a sep-arate statehood, it does not create strong incentives for either side to seek democ-racy. Transition toward democracy does not become an optimal choice for eitherside because a relatively weak ethnic group that is fighting for cultural rights(not a separate state) and a share of state revenue is less likely to build a broadercoalition to challenge the hegemony of the incumbent ethnic group.

Hypothesis 4 suggests that transition toward democracy is less likely followinga third-party intervention during civil war. In the statistical test performed, I findthat the coefficient of biased third-party intervention is negative in all modelsbut statistically insignificant. This finding lends no support to the theoretical argu-ment that third-party intervention does not create a durable balance of power thatwould enhance the prospect of transition toward democracy. Even if a third-partyintervener intends to bring the war to an end and help its favoured side improve itsrelative power, its effect on democratic change is not significant. This finding isconsistent with literature on third-party intervention and democratization.99

Perhaps, when third-parties intervene either on the rebel side or the governmentside, they are more interested in promoting their own national interests than increating the domestic political balance of power that would encourage a democraticchange in the aftermath of civil war.

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The effect of UN missions on the transition toward democracy in post-conflictstates is statistically significant and negative across all models, which supportsHypothesis 5. It suggests that the UN missions do help to promote democracyafter the end of civil wars. The estimated coefficient for UN missions is21.370, which is equal to 2.670 in terms of the hazard ratio (Model 3, p ,

0.001). As such, the presence of UN missions increases the probability of a tran-sition toward democracy by decreasing the survival time by almost 167% com-pared to those cases where the UN does not get involved in terminating theconflict and establishing peace and security. The findings on UN peacekeepingmissions and transition toward democracy in the aftermath of civil war comp-lement the post-conflict peace building literature. One of the consistent argumentsin peace building literature is that the UN peacekeeping missions contribute to amore durable peace after civil war termination.100 The positive relationshipbetween UN peace building missions and democracy in post-conflict statessuggests that UN missions contribute to sustainable peace by promoting democ-racy in post-conflict states.

Among several control variables, I find that the probability of a transitiontoward democracy taking place is higher in post-civil war states that have had apast democratic experience. The coefficient for past democratic experience is21.045 (Model 2), which is equal to 3.274 in terms of the hazard ratio (p ,

0.001). The estimated coefficient for the regional standard of democracy is20.052, which is equal to a hazard ratio of 1.06 and statistically significant (p, 0.01). I extrapolated this empirical evidence to explain the varying effect of aneighbouring democratic standard on the transition toward democracy in the after-math of a civil war. For instance, neighbouring states of Rwanda from 1980 to 1984had an average polity score of -5 on the Polity scale, which suggests that Rwandahad more authoritarian neighbours, which should have decreased the chances of atransition toward democracy in Rwanda by almost 29.71%. The average polityscore of neighbouring states of Moldova from 1994 to 1995 was +5 in thePolity scale. As such, the probability of transition toward democracy inMoldova is likely to increase by almost 42.3%.

Consistent with the current literature regarding the natural resource curse ondemocracy and civil war, I find that the oil export dependence is positive and sig-nificant at least at the 0.05 level of significance. Oil export tends to decrease theprospects for democratic transition by almost 64% (Model 1). I find the effect ofthe log of GDP per capita to be inconsistent across models. It is negative andsignificant at 0.01 levels in Model 1. This suggests that higher levels of economicdevelopment encourage the transition toward democracy in the aftermath ofconflict. Because Models 1 and 4 do not control for the effect of ethnic fractiona-lization, the effect of GDP per capita might be subsumed by ethnic fractionalizationin other models. Civil war duration is negative in Model 1 and positive in othermodels but the findings are not significant. Similarly, the battle deaths variable ispositive in Model 1, which suggests that transition toward democracy is lesslikely following more deadly conflicts. The estimated coefficient for battle

848 M. Joshi


deaths is 0.140 in Model 1, which is statistically significant (p , 0.05). In theanalysis performed, log of population is negative but not significant (Model 2).The estimated coefficient for ongoing civil war is negative but this variable is stat-istically insignificant (Model 1). Similarly, I did not find support for the effects ofCold War and ethnic fractionalization variables.

Conclusion

The statistical tests of the theoretical arguments help us to clarify under what con-ditions a post-civil war transition toward democracy is more or less likely toemerge. I find empirical support for the argument that the balance of powerbetween the insurgents and the government, and the stability of that balance ofpower, influence a post-conflict transition toward democracy. The negotiatedsettlement of a civil war indicates the balance of power between former rivals.In the analysis performed, I find strong support for a democratic transition beingmore likely to follow a negotiated settlement than a military victory. I find strongersupport for the transition toward democracy to be more likely, and occur sooner,when a UN mission has been deployed. Similarly, I find that a transition towarddemocracy is more likely following ethnic revolutions than ethnic secessionistwars. In the analysis performed, I did not find support for the idea that third-party intervention affects the transition toward democracy. This finding is consist-ent with the theoretical argument that a third-party induced balance of power doesnot hold once the civil war ends. The presence, and subsequent removal of the pres-ence, of a third-party does not create strong incentives for former rivals to seekdemocratic change. I also did not find any effect of a rebel victory on post-civilwar transition toward democracy. This is contrary to the theoretical expectationsbut not surprising as rebels win civil wars by destroying the institutional capacityof the incumbent regime.

An outbreak of civil war destroys a state’s economic and institutional capacity.In the post-conflict years, the challenge is to rebuild state institutions and restorethe post-conflict state back to a normal operation. This, however, does not diminishthe chance for transition toward democracy. This study illustrates that democracycan be built after a violent civil war if the war’s outcome establishes a balance ofpower between the insurgents and the government. Building democracy helps toavoid future fears of political marginalization, and relieving those fears createsincentives for former rivals to promote democratic institutions. As such, democ-racy eliminates future uncertainty and assures former rivals access to politicalpower through a democratic process.

The transition toward democracy occurs under conditions where state insti-tutions are weak and the post-conflict environment is inhospitable to democracy.Low levels of economic development and a culture of hatred and violence createa legitimacy crisis for the post-war state, which might contribute to the collapseof a democratic transition achieved after a civil war terminates. Therefore after atransition toward democracy, the important question is how to sustain that

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transition and thus avoid a relapse into authoritarianism or a renewed civil war.Future research on this project should focus on what factors contribute to the dura-bility of democracy achieved out of civil war.

AcknowledgementsA previous version of this article was presented at the 2008 annual meeting of the Inter-national Studies Association, San Francisco. I thank T. David Mason, anonymous reviewers,and the editor for their helpful comments and suggestions.

Notes1. Statistics calculated from the dataset that will be used in this study.2. Henderson and Singer, ‘Civil War in the Post-Colonial World’.3. Salehyan and Gleditsch, ‘Refugees and the Spread of Civil War’.4. Gleditsch and Ward, ‘Diffusion and the International Context of Democratization’.5. Lipset, ‘Some Social Requisites of Democracy; Almond and Verba, The Civic

Culture; Huntington, The Third Wave; Diamond, Developing Democracy; Boix,Democracy and Redistribution; Acemoglu and Robinson, Economic Origins ofDictatorship and Democracy.

6. Murdoch and Sandler, ‘Civil Wars and Economic Growth’, 101.7. Kang and Meernik, ‘Civil War Destruction’.8. Lipset, ‘Some Social Requisite of Democracy’.9. Vanhanen, Prospects of Democracy.

10. Poe and Tate, ‘Repression of Human Rights’.11. Licklider, ‘The Consequences of Negotiated Settlements’.12. Kumar, ‘Post-Conflict Elections’.13. Manning, The Politics of Peace in Mozambique.14. Paris, At War’s End; Diamond, ‘Lessons from Iraq’.15. Paris, At War’s End, 188–9.16. Ibid.17. Rotberg, ‘Creating Robust Institutions’.18. Merikallio, ‘We Are Committed to Multiparty Democracy’.19. Sisk, ‘Pathways of the Political’.20. Hartzell and Hoddie, Crafting Peace; Walter, Committing to Peace.21. Hartzell and Hoddie, Crafting Peace, 39–40.22. Walter, Committing to Peace; Fortna, Peace Time.23. Wood, Forging Democracy From Below; Wantchekon, ‘The Paradox of “Warlord”

Democracy’.24. Wood, Forging Democracy from Below, 14.25. Wantchekon, ‘The Paradox of “Warlord” Democracy’, 19–22.26. Ibid.27. Ibid.; Wood, Forging Democracy From Below.28. The term ‘balance of power’ has a long history in the field of international relations

and the way the term is being conceptualized in this study may be different.29. Mason and Fett, ‘How Civil Wars End’; Mason, Weingarten, and Fett, ‘Win, Lose,

or Draw’; DeRouen and Sobek, ‘The Dynamics of Civil War Duration andOutcome’.

30. Ibid; Regan, ‘Third Party Intervention’.31. Zartman, Ripe for Resolution.32. Mason, Weingarten, and Fett, ‘Win, Lose, or Draw’, 264.

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33. Wood, Forging Democracy from Below; Wantchekon, ‘The Paradox of “Warlord”Democracy’.

34. Ibid.35. Walter, Committing to Peace; Hartzell and Hoddie, Crafting Peace.36. Ibid.37. Hartzell and Hoddie, Crafting Peace.38. Walter, Committing to Peace; Fortna, Peace Time.39. Hartzell and Hoddie, Crafting Peace, 53–63; Walter, Committing to Peace; Doyle

and Sambanis, Making War and Building Peace.40. Gates et al., 895.41. Licklider, ‘The Consequences of Negotiated Settlements’.42. Ibid., 686.43. Gurses and Mason, ‘Democracy Out of Anarchy’.44. Quinn, Mason, and Gurses, ‘Sustaining the Peace’.45. Gurses and Mason, ‘Democracy Out of Anarchy’.46. Henderson and Singer, ‘Civil War in the Post-Colonial World’.47. Quinn, Mason, and Gurses, ‘Sustaining the Peace.’48. Ibid.49. Tilly, From Mobilization to Revolution.50. Lake and Rotchild, ‘Containing Fear’, 71.51. Licklider, ‘The Consequences of Negotiated Settlements’.52. Kaufmann, ‘Possible and Impossible Solutions to Ethnic Civil Wars’.53. Mason and Fett, ‘How Civil Wars End’; Mason, Weingarten, and Fett, ‘Win, Lose, or

Draw’.54. Mason and Fett, ‘How Civil Wars End’, 262; DeRouen and Sobek, ‘The Dynamics of

Civil War’, 314.55. Fearon, ‘Why Do Some Civil Wars Last Much Longer than Others?’.56. Horowitz, Ethnic Groups in Conflict, 23–5; Buhaug, ‘Relative Capability and Rebel

Objective’.57. Buhaug, ‘Relative Capability and Rebel Objective’, 695.58. Blach-Lindsay and Enterline, ‘Killing Time’; Regan, ‘Third Party Intervention’.59. Mason, Weingarten, and Fett, ‘Win, Lose, or Draw’; Mason and Fett, ‘How Civil

Wars End’.60. Mesquita and Downs, ‘Intervention and Democracy’. Bueno de Mesquita and

Downs do not make a distinction on whether the particular intervention took placeduring civil war or not.

61. Ibid.62. Mullenbach and Dixon, Third Party Interventions in Intrastate Disputes (TPI)

Case Narratives, http://faculty.uca.edu/%7Emarkm/tpi_homepage.htm (accessed20 October 2007).

63. Ibid.64. Stedman, ‘Spoiler Problem in Peace Processes’; Walter, Committing to Peace;

Hartzell and Hoddie, Crafting Peace.65. Walter, Committing to Peace; Fortna, Peace Time; Hartzell and Hoddie, Crafting

Peace; Doyle and Sambanis, Making War and Building Peace.66. Walter, Committing to Peace, 42; Fortna, Peace Time, 26.67. Doyle and Sambanis, Making War and Building Peace.68. Ibid.69. Sambanis, ‘What Is A Civil War?’.70. Polity IV, ‘Polity IV Project’.71. Smith, ‘Oil Wealth and Regime Survival’; Gurses, ‘Wealth and Regime Formation’.72. Polity IV, ‘Polity IV Project’.

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73. Stearns, The Encyclopedia of World History, 982.74. Gates et al. ‘Institutional Inconsistency and Political Instability’.75. Sambanis, ‘What Is A Civil War’.76. Ibid., note 54.77. Doyle and Sambanis, Making War and Building Peace; Sambanis, ‘What Is A Civil

War’.78. Buhaug, ‘Relative Capability and Rebel Objective’.79. Governmental incompatibility includes ethnic as well as non-ethnic civil wars.80. The distinction between whether an intervention was on the side of the rebel group or

the government is not relevant in this study as this study is focused on howintervention influences the balance of power between rival groups.

81. Sambanis, ‘What Is A Civil War’, note 54.82. Data used from United Nations Peacekeeping Operations, http://www.un.org/Depts/

dpko/dpko/pastops.shtml (accessed 20 May 2008).83. Sambanis, ‘What Is A Civil War’.84. Ibid.; Horowitz, Ethnic Groups in Conflict; Fearon, ‘ Why Do Some Civil Wars

Last’.85. Doyle and Sambanis, Making War and Building Peace.86. Gurses and Mason, ‘Democracy Out of Anarchy’.87. Doyle and Sambanis, Making War and Building Peace.88. World Bank, World Development Indicators; Heston, Summers, and Aten, Penn

World Table Version 6.2.89. Lipset, ‘Social Requisite of Democracy’; Epstein et al., ‘Democratic Transition’.90. Collier and Hoeffler, ‘Greed and Grievance in Civil War’; Ross, ‘Does Oil Hinder

Democracy?’; Fearon and Laitin, ‘Ethnicity, Insurgency, and Civil War’.91. Doyle and Sambanis, Making War and Building Peace.92. Huntington, The Third Wave, 100–5; Gleditsch and Ward, ‘Diffusion and the

International Context’.93. Bennett and Stam, ‘EUGene’.94. Epstein et al., ‘Democratic Transition’.95. Box-Steffensmeier and Jones, Event History Modeling, 1.96. Cleves, Gould and Gutierrez, An Introduction to Survival Analysis.97. Ibid.; Box-Steffensmeier and Jones, Event History Modeling.98. Here a negative coefficient suggests a fast moving process toward democratic

transition.99. Bueno de Mesquita and Downs, ‘Intervention and Democracy’.

100. Doyle and Sambanis, Making War and Building Peace; Doyle and Sambanis 2000,International Peacebuilding; Fortna, Peace Time; Quinn, Mason, and Gurses, ‘Sus-taining the Peace’.

Notes on ContributorMadhav Joshi is Assistant Research Professor and Associate Director of Peace AccordsMatrix (PAM) in the Kroc Institute for International Peace Studies at the University ofNotre Dame. His research centres on post-civil war democracy, peace building, comparativepeace process and the dynamics of Maoist insurgency in Nepal.

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Post-civil war democratization: promotion of democracy in post-civil war states, 1946–2005

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