Political Islam and Modernity

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‘Political Islam is the product of modernity, not a rejection of it.’ Discuss.

Political Islam is one of the widely debated topics of the twenty first century; often associated with the

rise of Islamism, fundamentalism and extremism. The rise of Islamist movements—often adapting

radical strategies—have led some scholars to suggest that the rise of political Islam, or Islamic

fundamentalism, presents a clear danger with its monotheistic doctrine that needs to be countered.

Whereas, others imply political Islam to be a diverse phenomenon that requires thorough understanding

of the political circumstances within which it flourishes; thus, emphasizing on the need of investigation

of different factors which might help in understanding the rise of political Islam. The aim of this paper,

thus, is to discuss all these factors; that is, political, social and economic, which may explain the rise of

Islamist movements. The central thesis of this essay can be summarized as follows: Although there was

an elaborate body of jurists in the earlier phase of Islam that provided legitimacy to the rulers on different

matters, credibility of the jurists was never undermined. In the modern era, however, one finds the

fragmentation of authority and undermining of traditional institutions. Taking Egypt as a case study, it is

argued that state policies based on modernity have lessened the effectiveness of al-Azhar University, and

certain economic policies have resulted in mass un-employment, thus, complementing the rise of

Islamists. Similarly, commonalities will be drawn between Egypt and Iran; however, the last part of this

research will show how post-Khomeini period has seen greater political participation and the

improvement of parliamentary institutions, thus, demonstrating the compatibility of political Islam with

modernity. But first the idea of ‘Islamic state’ is dispelled, and the role of jurists is highlighted in

comparison to the ulema (religious scholars) in the modern world.

Theoretical debate and the idea of Islamic State

To begin with, it is important to define what is meant by modernity and how it is articulated by

Orientalists to present its clash with political Islam. The term modernity, according to Michel Foucault,

refers to a rejection of old traditions; that is, where people move away from traditional to more secular

and rational society. In this sense, a society is formed where individuals are prioritized, minority rights

are protected, democracy is accepted as the best form of government and capitalism becomes the main

economic system (Foucault, 1995: 176-177). Those who propagate the idea of a ‘clash of civilizations’

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often refer to these ideas of modernity and highlight its incompatibility with the Islamic doctrine. For

intellectuals such as Samuel Huntington and Bernard Lewis, it is religion that is the main source of

motivation for Islamists to justify their actions (based on violence), and both agree that religion drives

Islamic culture and politics (Mamdani, 2005: 148). It is also suggested that contemporary Islamists—

influenced by the Islamic doctrine—have an agenda of creating an Islamic State based on Sharia

(religious law). In this sense, it is argued that Islamist movements are attempting to reinstall a type of

Islamic/religious state that had existed at some point in history (Ayubi, 1991: 2). As this view has

dominated the field of Middle Eastern studies, Islamist social movements are projected as a destabilizing

force—a tool of demagogues who will resort to violence to gain power and implement such agenda

(Esposito, 1997: 3). Similarly, the opposition of secular views and the assassination of government

officials re-enforces such impression, thus, strengthening the picture of clash between political Islam and

modernity.

Although there seems to be an agreement between the Orientalists—such as Huntington—and Islamists

that religion breeds violence and that a unique Islamic state existed at some point in history, much of the

research contradicts such view. Before this paper moves on to examine those factors (state policies) in

Egypt, it is important to refute the idea of Islamic state often highlighted by fundamentalists and

Orientalists. According to Ayubi, political Islam does not represent a ‘going back’ to any theory that was

formulated in the past (Ayubi, 1991: 3). The view that the original Islamic sources- i.e. the Quran and the

Hadith (sayings of the Prophet Muhammad) have a theory on how to form states and how to run a

government is a new invention.

Indeed, Ayubi is right to note that religion was monopolized by rulers in the past to ensure ideological

hegemony. In the earlier phase, Muslim rulers had used religion, or the body of jurists, to justify and

legitimize various types of tax on Muslims (Ayubi, 1991: 5). In this sense, certain actions which were

unpopular amongst the population were given religious legitimacy; that is, legitimacy on financial and

security matters. But, as Hallaq notes, the ruler (Caliph) was not an authority superior to that of the

jurists, even the judges or scholars appointed by the ruler (Hallaq, 2009: 132). More importantly, the

Caliph did not challenge jurists in their own domain of competence. Indeed, as we shall see later, this

process has reversed in the modern era, especially in Egypt, where the ulema were subordinated to the

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state. However, as the ‘State’ itself is a Western concept, one finds it difficult to trace any theory of the

Islamic state, with the exception of sources that specifically addressed the problems of the government.

The point that is illustrated here is that there had been an elaborate body of jurists that provided religious

legitimacy to the rulers (Caliph) in moments of political and financial crisis as they (jurists) preferred

order than chaos. It is this juristic theory—not Islamic state—that is often employed to serve as a tool

against the national secular states. Therefore, it can be concluded from the above discussion that the idea

of ‘Islamic state’ is a myth, or a new invention, which is often used as a means to justify actions. The

second point is that there had been an elegant body of jurists; although they were appointed by the ruler,

they were not challenged; meaning that the Caliph did not think of himself an authority superior to the

jurists, especially in the legal domain (Hallaq, 2009: 132).

Modernity and the rise of Political Islam

If the idea of Islamic state is a myth, then how do we interpret the rise of political Islam and their resort

to violence? While some Islamist movements—such as Al Qaeda—openly reject modernity, one should

be careful not to equate ‘fundamentalism’ with terrorism. John Voll rightly notes that by concentrating

only on gunners and murderers one might miss the really important factors that are transforming the

Islamic world (Voll, 1997: 232). There are indeed certain policies of the state that have a backlash, which

is then complemented by the circumstances within which they arise. In Egypt, for instance, the

introduction of modernity during the 1960s had unintended consequences, resulting in a dislocation of

old ways and undermining the role of traditional institutions such as al-Azhar university. The forces of

modernity not only marked the fragmentation of authority as the ulema (religious scholars) had no longer

monopoly on sacred authority, but also undermined their credibility (Zeghal, 1999: 372). The ulema lost

resources and influence in many places as they were simply taken away by the state (Kamrava, 2006:

12). As secularization weakens the traditional institutions, the Nasserist regime—with its secular

policies—excluded the ulema from the judicial courts in 1955, and further reformed the al-Azhar

institution in 1961. Nasser—under the banner of modernity—imposed a strong control on the religious

institution, used the ulema to legitimize his socialist ideals, and introduced reforms by criticizing them

for not being able to keep up with the modern world (Mershed, 2010: 115). The 1961 reform, thus,

subordinated the ulema to the state as they were bureaucratized, and modern subjects were introduced to

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bring the Azharite students closer to the status of modern students (Zeghal, 1999: 376). In the earlier

phase, however, although jurists did provide legitimacy to the rulers, their credibility had never been

compromised. Thus, the introduction of modern subjects, crack down on religious organizations such as

Muslim Brotherhood, and several state campaigns against the ulema denied them any social status as men

of religion (Zeghal, 1999: 375). On the other side, militant Islamists criticized the scholars from al-Azhar

University, as students with religious knowledge gained over a long period of time were preferred

compared to Azharites with a mix of both.

Further credibility of the ulema was undermined during the liberal regime of Sadat who, unlike his

predecessor, provided a public space for Islamist organizations to re-organize. Following the footsteps of

his predecessor, Sadat used the ulema once again but this time it was to get rid of the leftist ideology.

Indeed, as the ulema tried to shift their discourse from the veneer of socialism to what Zeghal describes a

‘return’ to religion, they were publicly criticized by the new interpreters of Islam, educated in modern

institutions, for not being able to innovate (Zeghal, 1999 : 372). Just like the Nasser regime had criticized

the official interpreters (ulema) for not being modern, the radicals criticized them for acting as a rubber

stamp for the needs of the rulers in power. For them, the rulers were pre-Islamic in their character; that is,

belonging to the Jahiliyya, the period of ignorance, thus, justifying violence not only against the state, but

also targeting religious scholars such as Shaykh Dhahabi who, according to the new interpreters, had

submitted to the state (Zeghal, 1999, 383). To put simply, the policy of modernity under Nasser damaged

the credibility and monopoly of the ulema, which resulted in a vacuum filled by radical Islamists—

encouraged by the liberal policies of Sadat.

Additionally, political freedom under Sadat’s regime came along with the free market capitalism, which

is probably an important factor behind the rise of political Islam. With the “open door policy”, Egyptians

witnessed a high level of inflation no less than 80 percent (Youssef, 1985: 133). Scarcity of food,

dislocation of the middle class, and hike in the food prices affected majority of the population as

Egyptians experienced what Youssef calls a severe stress that destabilized the society’s equilibrium. Such

economic policy in the 1970s had pushed the middle class into an intolerable economic condition, which

unsurprisingly resulted in mass demonstrations and protests against the government. With all these

protests and movements that reflected anger of the population, Tibi notes that Islamists took advantage of

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the situation by presenting their Islam as a solution to the social and economic crisis in Egypt (Tibi,

2009: 276). Similarly, Anderson argues that the Islamist movements were specifically the product of

government policies as the Islamists provided services that government had failed to deliver (Anderson,

1997: 24). The Muslim Brotherhood, for instance, not only criticized the government’s policies, but

provided school equipment, free medicine and all other administrative and legal advice that government

had abdicated (Anderson, 1997: 23). In other words, the Islamist movements were better organized and

less corrupt, which indeed presented the Islamists as a viable alternative to the government. The failed

development and the assistance of funds from the Saudis explain how Egyptians were searching for

solutions in Islam. It explains the rise of private mosques from 14000 in 1964 to 46000 in 1981, which

served as a home for political activities and as a recruiting ground for militants (Tibi, 2009: 275). The

remarks of an Algerian young man can be used here as it sums up our whole argument, “You have only

four choices: you can remain unemployed because there are no jobs; you can work in the black market

and risk being arrested; you can emigrate to France and sweep the streets; or you can join the FIS and

vote for Islam” (Tessler, 1991: 17).

It is however not to suggest that Middle East is a unique piece of land that requires special treatment, and

indeed the point is not to blame modernity, but the rate with which modernity has been introduced in the

Middle Eastern countries is unprecedented. As Badeau notes, “the changes that took place in the West

through four centuries of adjustment have been compressed in the East into a scant century and a half”

(Badeau, 1959: 61). Thus, all these factors—economic, political and social—play an important role in the

rise of Islamists as they provide answers, services and solutions to their problems which supposedly

should be the job of the government.

Iran and the development of popular sovereignty

While each case study has to be studied separately to explore the causes of the rise of Islamists

movements, there is one trend common in all these case studies; that is, one finds government enforcing

modernity rather than trying to consult their own people. In both cases i.e. Egypt and Iran, one notices

oppression of political participation—with the exception of Sadat’s regime which provided public space

for the Islamists to operate.

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Like Nasser, Shah began to rule his country autocratically; he banned political participation as those who

opposed his rule were either oppressed or exiled, and turned the Majles (legislature) totally subservient to

approve his policies (Milani, 1997: 80). Faces were different but not the policies as student associations,

Majles and political parties were brought under the state control; and in both states i.e. Egypt and Iran,

economy was reformed but not the political realm. An example of this is mentioned by Milani in his

work when he notes that most of the masses mobilized by the Islamists against Shah’s rule were either

imprisoned or killed. In this sense, the Islamists in Iran were not different to the ones in Egypt as they

manipulated mass politics and were product of the state policies.

However, it is worth stressing that Iran has seen the development of democratic ideals under Islamists

than under the Shah rule. Political institutions, for instance, have acquired more autonomy which they

never enjoyed before (Milani, 1997: 81). But to borrow from Milani, this section of the essay is not an

attempt to argue that post-revolutionary Iran is a democratic country—not at least in a Western sense—

but the point that is illustrated is the development of democratic institutions, which has resulted in

sovereignty, but a limited one (Milani, 1997: 79).

Although Western scientists often rush to equate all Islamists in one category, post-revolutionary Iran has

witnessed more freedom and growth in private foundations than ever before. Elections are part of the

democratic process to allow the masses to elect a new president as well as the Majlis every four years,

and certain private foundations—like lobbies in the US—operate to influence government’s domestic and

foreign policy (Crane, Lal and Martini, 2008: 13). The Majlis, according to Milani, is the most

independent parliamentary body in the Middle East with the exception of Israeli Knesset and Turkish

parliament. It has acquired more role and responsibility as it engages in debates and questions the

government over different economic and foreign policies. In simple words, post-revolutionary Iran has

seen the development of limited popular sovereignty under the Islamists which, as Milani notes, cannot

be suppressed indefinitely as pressure will be on the state from the people demanding popular

sovereignty (Milani, 1997: 90).

As noted earlier, Huntington and many other academics highlight the clash of civilizations; that is, they

portray Islam and West as two main enemies. Whilst emphasizing on the former, Huntington argues that

anti-Western element and the rejection of Western way of life is what which will dominate the next era

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(Mirbagheri, 2008: 47). Indeed, there are hardliners in Iran, but certain policies pursued by the Iranian

state show the adaptation of Western values. For instance, the Iranian state under Rafsanjani started a

campaign to educate people of birth control. In order to cope with economic, health and education

problems, the Iranian president pursued a policy to state that Islam favored families with two children

(Abrahamian, 2008: 184). As a result of this policy, 83 percent of the households in Iran during 2002-03

were made up of nuclear families; whereas the number in rural areas was 80 percent. More importantly,

most of the household heads are suggested to be female-headed and the number is increasing

(Aghajanian, 2008: 266). All these factors discussed above cannot be said to be a rejection of Western

values, rather it would be right to suggest that post-revolutionary Iran has shown flexibility in terms of

adopting modernity and Western values.

To conclude, this paper has contested the idea of Islamic state often employed by political scientists and

Islamists to show contradiction between political Islam and the principles of modernity. In the case of

Egypt, as discussed in this paper, state policies, often based on modernity, had produced undesirable

results for the regimes. This is because although the use of religious scholars for the legitimation of

policies was common; but, unlike the earlier phase, the sudden shift from traditional institutions and the

critique of ulema was unprecedented, which led the new interpreters to present themselves as an

alternative to the government as they had already created a positive image in the eyes of the masses.

Where the government was unable, or had abandoned, to provide any relief to the masses affected by the

economic policies, the Islamists were seen to have delivered more than expected. Where the Islamists

had successfully controlled power, especially in the case of Iran, we have seen policies that completely

contradicted the principles of Islamic doctrine. The government, for instance, took the unprecedented

step to introduce the concept of nuclear family to deal with economic problems in Iran, which shows the

flexibility of Islamists to the changing circumstances. As Milani notes, with the passage of time there is

hope for more flexibility to be shown by the regime as there will be more pressure from the masses

already demanding popular sovereignty. Thus, as this paper has shown, political Islam is the product of

state policies based on modernity, not a rejection of it.

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Political Islam and Modernity

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