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Polish trade union Solidarity rejects climate science consensus Publishedon06/12/2018,11:34am

The communique states that Solidarity’s Katowice representatives were “very satisfied by the new science and policy presentations from Heartland during their COP24 meeting,” adding that “the presentations assured Solidarity that their doubts about current, alarmist climate policy are correct.”

“We, speaking as one, believe in the restoration of the Scientific Method and the dismissal of ideological dogma at the United Nations,” the joint statement said. “That means a healthy skepticism of data interpretation and policy conclusions and an end to the war on science and scientists by powerful state-backed forces.”

The statement declared:

· Global leaders should focus their efforts on energy affordability and availability that raise living standards around the world

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In a joint statement with US denialist think-tank the Heartland Institute, Solidarity expressed scepticism of UN conclusions on the dangers of global warming

Solidarity is a historically important and influential trade union network in Poland (Pic: Flickr/Mariusz Cieszewski)

By Chloé Farand for DeSmog UK

A Polish trade union has issued a joint statement with a notorious American climate science denial group, rejecting the scientific consensus on climate change.

The statement, signed by the Chicago-based Heartland Institute and the trade union Solidarity was released as UN climate talks took place in Katowice, the centre of Poland’s coal heartland region of Silesia.

The talks, known as Cop24, are widely considered to be the most important climate meeting since the 2015 summit in Paris and will aim to finalise the rulebook to implement the Paris Agreement.

In the statement, the trade union Solidarity and the Heartland Institute express “skepticism of the assertions of the United Nations Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) that the world stands at the edge of a climate catastrophe”.

Polish trade Union Solidarity assured by new science and policy from Heartland Institute.

Polish labor union that stood up to the Soviet Bloc and changed the world joins Heartland on front lines of resistance to climate alarmism

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KATOWICE, POLAND (December 6, 2018) – The Heartland Institute and representatives of Solidarity, the historic labor union founded by Nobel Peace Prize winner Lech Walesa that helped bring down the Iron Curtain, signed a joint statement on Wednesday calling on the United Nations at COP24 to ensure the “restoration of the Scientific Method and the dismissal of ideological dogma at the United Nations.”

The joint statement, created at Solidarity’s prompting and written cooperatively between the two organizations on December 5, was submitted to the UN Conference of the Parties climate conference in Katowice today.

“The Silesian Region of Solidarity, the Secretariat of Mining and Energy of Solidarity, and The Heartland Institute express skepticism of the assertions of the United Nations Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change that the world stands at the edge of a climate catastrophe,” said the statement. “Solidarity and The Heartland Institute together stress that there is no scientific consensus on the main causes and consequences of climate change.”

Read the entire joint statement here.

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The joint statement was signed by Jaroslaw Grzesik, Chairman of Secretariat, Mining and Energy of Solidarity; Dominik Kolorz, president of the Silesian Region of Solidarity; and Heartland Institute Senior Fellow for Environment and Energy Policy James Taylor, who represented the organization. The communique also stated that The Heartland Institute – a U.S.-based free-market think tank known globally for its work on scientifically opposing climate alarmism – and Solidarity would begin “working together more closely to advance sound, science-based public policy.” Solidarity took the initiative in 2014 to translate from English to Polish Climate Change Reconsidered II: Physical Science – part of a series of scientific reports by the Nongovernmental Interntional Panel on Climate Change (NIPCC) – and invited Heartland to its office in Katowice on December 5 to give presentations on the latest climate science and the failure of green energy plans in neighboring Germany. The latter presentation was delivered by Wolfgang Müller, general secretary of the European Institute for Climate and Energy (EIKE). The communique states that Solidarity’s Katowice representatives were “very satisfied by the new science and policy presentations from Heartland during their COP24 meeting,” adding that “the presentations assured Solidarity that their doubts about current, alarmist climate policy are correct.”

“We, speaking as one, believe in the restoration of the Scientific Method and the dismissal of ideological dogma at the United Nations,” the joint statement said. “That means a healthy skepticism of data interpretation and policy conclusions and an end to the war on science and scientists by powerful state-backed forces.”

The statement declared:

· Global leaders should focus their efforts on energy affordability and availability that raise living standards around the world.

· The negative impacts of expensive energy on human health and welfare are manifest and devastating.

· Affordable energy is absolutely necessary to lift people out of poverty and secure a brighter future for the people of the world.

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· The most important joint task will be educating the public and policy makers on climate policy, “especially the world’s youth” – who have been indoctrinated by climate alarmist dogma for generations.

“Solidarity has proven time and again that it will stand up the common man against the ruling elites,” Taylor said. “Solidarity, like the Heartland Institute, does not shy away from pointing out flaws in the United Nations’ asserted climate crisis. Sound science is on our side and we are honored to work closely, now and in the future, with Solidarity.”

https://wattsupwiththat.com/2018/12/06/solidarity-heartland-institute-sign-historic-

climate-communique-at-cop24/

France May Be Ahead Of The Curve When It Comes To Global Warming Policy Backlash charles the moderator / 2 hours ago December 6, 2018 From The Daily Caller Michael Bastach 2:26 PM 12/05/2018 | Energy France might be ahead of the curve when it comes to

climate policy backlash. President Emmanuel Macron caved to demands from

“yellow vests” over planned carbon taxes. More backlash like this could be seen as countries try to

phase out gas-powered cars. The French love a good riot, but the political backlash to the French government’s plans to increase carbon taxes on fuel could be a harbinger of what’s to come in countries committed to the global warming crusade.

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Calls from the United Nations and environmentalists for the world to “do more” to stem projected global warming might run up against economic realities. But France could be a taste of what’s to come if more governments try to tax carbon dioxide emissions. “In some senses the French are ahead of the rest of the world on this,” said John Constable, energy editor at the Global Warming Policy Forum, a U.K.-based think tank. (RELATED: The UN Is Trying To Prime The World For More Carbon Tax Revolts) Constable told The Daily Caller News Foundation because of France’s heavy reliance on emissions-free nuclear power, the government has to look beyond power plants to achieve its global warming goals. Macron raised fuel taxes already in 2018 to cut down on oil demand, but it’s hard for working-class people to sacrifice their livelihoods for speculative climate benefits in the future. “France is now heading into the zone where the marginal cost of emissions reduction begins to increase sharply,” Constable said. “They’ve done the easy bit, electricity, and are now beginning to coerce the more difficult sectors such as transport, which of course is already heavily taxed.”

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<img src="https://cdn01.dailycaller.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/12/RTS2910D.jpg" alt="Protesters wearing yellow vests, the symbol of a French drivers' protest against higher diesel fuel prices, occupy a roundabout in Cissac-Medoc" width="4494" height="3016" /> Protesters wearing yellow vests, the symbol of a French drivers’ protest against higher diesel fuel prices, occupy a roundabout in Cissac-Medoc, France, December 5, 2018. The slogan reads “Urgent, purchase power, dignity for all”. REUTERS/Regis Duvignau. Carbon taxes on diesel and gasoline were set to take effect in January. French President Emmanuel Macron agreed to delay implementing the taxes for six months in the face of protests, but that might not be enough to satisfy demonstrators. “The extra burden imposed by Mr. Macron has caused something to snap, not demand but the temper of the people,” Constable said. “Broadly speaking, I would judge that French popular anger is the shape of things to come globally, as climate policies begin to move

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into more difficult sectors,” Constable said. France is only the latest country to reject new carbon taxes. Ontario Premier Doug Ford and his conservative coalition were swept into power by Canadian voters in June on a platform that opposed carbon taxes. Washington voters rejected a ballot measure in November to tax carbon dioxide emissions from industrial sources in their state. It’s the second time Washington voters rejected a carbon tax ballot initiative. <img src="https://cdn01.dailycaller.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/12/RTS28FTI.jpg" alt="A view shows a barricade with police forces and protesters wearing yellow vests, a symbol of a French drivers' protest against higher diesel taxes, during clashes as part of a demonstration near the Place de l'Etoile in Paris" width="4217" height="2811" /> A view shows a barricade with police forces and protesters wearing yellow vests, a symbol of a French drivers’ protest against higher diesel taxes, during clashes as part of a demonstration near the Place de l’Etoile in Paris, France, December 1, 2018. REUTERS/Stephane Mahe. Australian lawmakers voted to repeal their country’s carbon tax in 2014. Former Prime Minister Tony Abbott led his conservative party to victory in the previous year’s elections on the promise to repeal the carbon tax. However, France’s violent reaction to new carbon taxes is part of the country’s “romantic” view of political uprisings, according to an expert on French politics and history. “In France the governments understand only violence, and since 1789, people have a romantic approach to ‘Revolution,’” George Chabert, a professor at the Norwegian University of Science and Technology, told TheDCNF. “Apparently, it is working this time as well.” Carbon taxes were the breaking point for the thousands of gilet jaunes, or “yellow vests,” who took to the streets in late November. But the protests, considered the worst to hit Paris in 50 years, were also fueled by years of pent-up resentment against Macron’s policies.

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“Since Macron came to power, he has cut taxes for the rich, ‘simplified’ the Work Laws, cut on pensions, and added billions of euros of new taxes to the working class and middle class,” Chabert said. Firemen extinguish burning cars set afire by protesters wearing yellow vests, a symbol of a French drivers’ protest against higher diesel fuel taxes, during clashes near the Place de l’Etoile in Paris, France, December 1, 2018. REUTERS/Stephane Mahe. “The new ‘ecological’ taxes, most of which was to be used in anything but ecology, are just one more,” Chabert said. “Many new taxes are programmed to come in effect until 2020.” Many protesters also called on Macron to resign. Yellow vests say Macron is out of touch and centralizing power at the expense of working class citizens. “Emmanuel Macron is a little boy who has always been told he’s the best, he’s always been idolised. He’s never been told ‘you shouldn’t do that’. The guy thinks he’s God!” Claudio, a 47-year-old Frenchman, told AFP. “He deserves to have his head chopped off, symbolically,” said Claudio, who refused to give his full name to reporters. Other protesters compared Macron to Napoleon and the pre-revolutionary Ancien Regime. “He’s the king. It’s as if we’re in the Middle Ages!” echoed Philippe, a 74-year-old yellow vest leader. Macron agreed to delay raising fuel taxes in January, but many protesters and political opponents don’t see the issue as settled. One self-proclaimed leader of the yellow vests said “we will not settle for crumbs.” However, Macron is unlikely to abandon his green agenda. An ardent supporter of the Paris climate accord, Macron pledged to decarbonize French energy use by 2050 and was initially unyielding to protesters’ demands.https://wattsupwiththat.com/2018/12/06/france-may-be-ahead-of-the-curve-when-it-comes-to-global-warming-policy-backlash/

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It’s Not About the Climate The Great Progressive Reversal: Part One

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Social justice was once synonymous with equal access to modern amenities — electric lighting so poor children could read at night, refrigerators so milk could be kept on hand, and washing machines to save the hands and backs of women. But today's leading left-wing leaders, such as 350.org's Naomi Klein (above right), advocate a return to energy penury and harmonizing human civilization to Nature. April 29, 2013 | Michael Shellenberger & Ted Nordhaus Over the last few decades, humans achieved one of the most remarkable victories for social justice in the history of the species. The percentage of people who live in extreme poverty — under $1.25 per day — was halved between 1990 and 2010. Average life expectancy globally rose from 56 to 68 years since 1970. And hundreds of millions of desperately poor people went from burning dung and wood for fuel (whose smoke takes two million souls a year) to using electricity, allowing them to enjoy refrigerators, washing machines, and smoke-free stoves. Of course, all of this new development puts big pressures on the environment. While the transition from wood to coal is overwhelmingly positive for forests, coal-burning is now a major contributor to global warming. The challenge for the twenty-first century is thus to triple global energy demand, so that the world's poorest can enjoy modern living standards, while reducing our carbon emissions from energy production to zero.

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For the last 20 years, most everyone who cared about global warming hoped for a binding international treaty abroad, and some combination of carbon pricing, pollution regulations, and renewable energy mandates at home. That approach is now in ruins. In 2010, UN negotiations failed to create a successor to the failed Kyoto treaty. A few months later cap and trade died in the Senate. And two weeks ago, the slow motion collapse of the European Emissions Trading Scheme reached its nadir, with carbon prices, already at historic lows, collapsing after EU leaders refused to tighten the cap on emissions. What rushed into the vacuum was "climate justice," a movement headed by left-leaning groups like 350.org, the Sierra Club, and Greenpeace. These groups invoke the vulnerability of the poor to climate change, but elide the reality that more energy makes them more resilient. "Huge swaths of the world have been developing over the last three decades at an unprecedented pace and scale," writes political scientist Christopher Foreman in "On Justice Movements," a new article for Breakthrough Journal. "Contemporary demands for climate justice have been, at best, indifferent to these rather remarkable developments and, at worst, openly hostile." For the climate justice movement, global warming is not to be dealt with by switching to cleaner forms of energy, but rather by returning to a pastoral, renewable-powered, and low-energy society. "Real climate solutions," writes Klein, "are ones that steer these interventions to systematically disperse and devolve power and control to the community level, whether through community-controlled renewable energy, local organic agriculture, or transit systems genuinely accountable to their users…" Climate change can only be solved by "fixing everything," says McKibben, from how we eat, travel, produce, reproduce, consume, and live. “It’s not an engineering problem,"

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McKibben argued recently in Rolling Stone. "It's a greed problem." Fixing it will require a "new civilizational paradigm," says Klein, "grounded not in dominance over nature, but in respect for natural cycles of renewal." Climate skeptics are right, Klein cheerily concludes: the Left is using climate change to advance policies they have long wanted. "In short," says Klein, "climate change supercharges the pre-existing case for virtually every progressive demand on the books, binding them into a coherent agenda based on a clear scientific imperative." As such, global warming is our most wicked problem. The end of our world is heralded by ideologues with specific solutions already in mind: de-growth, rural living, low-energy consumption, and renewable energies that will supposedly harmonize us with Nature. The response from the Right was all-too predictable. If climate change "supercharges the pre-existing case for virtually every progressive demand," as conservatives decided long ago, then climate change is either not happening or is not much to worry about. Wicked problems can only be solved if the ideological discourses that give rise to them are disrupted, and that's what political scientist Foreman does brilliantly in "On Justice Movements." If climate justice activists truly cared about poverty and climate change, Foreman notes, they would advocate things like better cook stoves and helping poor nations accelerate the transition from dirtier to cleaner fuels. Instead they make demands that range from the preposterous (eg, de-growth) to the picayune (eg, organic farming). Once upon a time, social justice was synonymous with equal access to modern amenities — electric lighting so poor children could read at night, refrigerators so milk could be kept on hand, and washing machines to save the hands and backs of women. Malthus was rightly denounced by

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generations of socialists as a cruel aristocrat who cloaked his elitism in pseudo-science, and claimed that Nature couldn't possibly feed any more hungry months. Now, at the very moment modern energy arrives for global poor — something a prior generation of socialists would have celebrated and, indeed, demanded — today's leading left-wing leaders advocate a return to energy penury. The loudest advocates of cheap energy for the poor are on the libertarian Right, while The Nation dresses up neo-Malthusianism as revolutionary socialism. Left-wing politics was once about destabilizing power relations between the West and the Rest. Now, under the sign of climate justice, it's about sustaining them. http://thebreakthrough.org/index.php/voices/michael-shellenberger-and-ted-nordhaus/its-not-about-the-climate SUMMARY SESSION ACADEMIA

James Matkin I submit research shows the green polemic is not grounded in reality. The world must depend on the lowest-cost energy at the end of the day. Market forces and investment will follow the economics. Coal power trumps alternatives because it is plentiful, cheaper and is the legacy fuel worldwide. Despite climate alarmists and environmental issues new coal plants will double or triple in the decades following (China opens a new coal plant every week). For the 3.5 billion people living in desperate poverty and in the dark today cheap electricity is a matter of social justice and must override the false hope of a carbon free economy, especially when the science behind the theory of global warming is very much disputed.

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Can Any Tech Stop Asia’s Coal Future?

Solar, CCS, Nuclear, and Natural Gas Not Scaling Fast Enough Coal will dominate China’s power landscape for decades to come and is increasing in Southeast Asia’s energy mix as well. The International Energy Agency reported that coal will replace natural gas as the dominant power-generating fuel in the 10 member states of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations. At the same time, energy consumption in this region is expected to double in the next 20 years, and the Asian Development Bank estimates that coal will account for approximately 83 percent of electricity production in the Asia-Pacific by 2035. Armond Cohen, Cofounder and Executive Director of the Clean Air Task Force, discusses the implications of coal’s growing role in the fuel mix of China and ASEAN countries—as well as India—and assesses the tools and policy options available to reduce the environmental impacts. April 30, 2014 | Jacqueline Koch This April, the National Bureau of Asian Research and the Slade

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Gorton International Policy Center, in collaboration with the Asia Pacific Foundation of Canada, will co-host the 2014 Pacific Energy Forum, focusing on “New Frontiers in Trans-Pacific Energy Trade,” in Seattle, Washington. The forum gathers high-level policy makers, industry leaders, and government representatives from across the Asia-Pacific region to explore shifting dynamics in the trans-Pacific energy trade and the challenge to help Asia meet its energy demand while safeguarding the environment. Coal will dominate China’s power landscape for decades to come and is increasing in Southeast Asia’s energy mix as well. The International Energy Agency (IEA) has reported that coal will replace natural gas as the dominant power-generating fuel in the 10 member states of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN). At the same time, energy consumption in this region is expected to double in the next 20 years, and the Asian Development Bank (ADB) estimates that coal will account for approximately 83 percent of electricity production in the Asia-Pacific by 2035. In advance of the 2014 Pacific Energy Forum, NBR spoke with Armond Cohen, Cofounder and Executive Director of the Clean Air Task Force, to explore the implications of coal’s growing role in the fuel mix of China and ASEAN countries—as well as India—and assess the tools and policy options available to reduce the environmental impacts. Why is coal growing rapidly in South and Southeast Asian countries? First and foremost, coal consumption is accelerating because of sheer power demand growth, combined with coal’s rapid scalability. China offers a key example. It is already the world’s largest coal consumer and has a coal power fleet that is two and half times the size of the United States’ fleet. China also expects to move another 100 million people from the countryside to the city in the next 12 years and grow its middle class by 200 million by 2035. Given these projections, China estimates electric demand to roughly double by 2030. Let’s also consider India, a nation of 1.2 billion people—four times the US population—where the rapid growth of the middle class is also underway. It has only 211 gigawatts of installed electrical generating capacity, equivalent to approximately one-fifth of the capacity of the United States, and India is expected to triple its electric demand by 2030. When power demand is growing that rapidly, you build what you can,

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and this very well may include taking all measures to improve efficiency, scale up renewable resources, and diversify the energy mix to include natural gas and nuclear. However, coal is readily available and transportable (no pipelines required), and coal plants can be built quickly—typically in 18 months. While figures have fallen from a much higher peak a few years ago, China still built approximately one large plant every week in 2013. There is still considerable discussion about the wind, solar, and even nuclear boom in Asia (China is building 28 nuclear plants), yet these other power sources are slow to develop to scale, so coal is still the winner. This has played a big role in the projections for the coming years: 75 percent of the annual new generating capacity being added in Southeast Asia is expected to be coal-fired. It’s also important to remember that only about half of China’s coal is used for producing power, while slightly over 40 percent of its coal is used directly for industry—for example, cement and steel. The second greatest contributor to the rapid rise in coal use is cost. Mining coal in China currently costs as little as $2–$4 per million British thermal units (mmbtu). Imported liquefied natural gas (LNG) costs $15–$20 per mmbtu in Asia, and limited domestic gas production—while in the $10 or more per mmbtu range—is husbanded for industry, not electricity. Ironically, global coal prices have dropped somewhat in recent years due to decreased electric demand from member countries of the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD). This trend has been bolstered by the shale gas revolution in the United States, which has freed up U.S. coal for export, helping further depress global coal prices. Even nuclear plants in China are two to three times more expensive to build than coal plants. Coal plants are cheap in China not only because of lower labor costs, but due to lower intellectual property and licensing costs as well as the high level of China’s construction management capability. According to the International Energy Agency (IEA), despite recent price drops, wind and solar power in Asia remains three to five times more expensive per kilowatt hour to develop than new coal power plants, ignoring the costs of the generating capacity needed to back up these renewable resources when the sun doesn’t shine and wind doesn’t blow. The third factor pushing greater coal use in Asia is availability. China has the world’s third largest coal reserves, after the United States and Russia. Australia and India are fourth and fifth. Globally, world

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proven reserves of coal are sufficient for over 100 years of consumption at current rates. True, India and China have substantial natural gas reserves as well, including shale gas, but they have been slow to scale up conventional production infrastructure, and lifting costs for gas are still much higher than for coal. As reported by the IEA, coal will replace natural gas as the dominant power-generating fuel in the ten member states of ASEAN. What does this transition represent in terms of the use of cleaner and more efficient coal-burning technology? What are obstacles to more widespread use of this technology, and how could they be overcome? To date, China’s primary strategy has been to introduce more efficient power plants such as supercritical (high temperature), ultra-supercritical, and circulating fluidized bed plants, all of which have higher efficiency factors than the sub-critical plants dominant in OECD countries. Indeed, because of the relative youth of China’s coal plants (most have been built since 2000), these plants operate at higher average efficiency than those in the United States! Needless to say, they will not be scrapped any time soon. China is the world’s largest market for scrubbers—pollution control devices—and most new plants are equipped with them, although how often and how well they operate is a matter of dispute. A second trend is towards gasification and polygeneration—the production of electricity as well as gas, chemicals, and transportation fuels through coal gasification. While this method can provide more economic output per unit of coal, the resultant combustion of the synthetic liquid fuels and synthetic natural gas results in a net addition of carbon dioxide (CO2) to the atmosphere compared with use of oil for transportation or the use of natural gas. Ultimately, to reconcile China’s large and growing coal fleet with any reasonable climate goals will require the application of carbon capture and storage (CCS), paired with either gasification or post-combustion capture. In addition, CCS or conversion to natural gas will be required for non-process industrial coal use. Where will the ASEAN countries be sourcing their coal? What are their options? China, India, and Australia are the world’s first-, third-, and fourth-largest coal producers, respectively. China and India supply most of their own coal, but imports from Australia and Indonesia are growing as domestic demand outstrips current mining capabilities. Japan has

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dramatically increased its coal use and imports since the Fukushima nuclear accident in 2011—25 percent alone in the last year—with a resultant increase in CO2 emissions, and is diversifying its supply source away from Australia and toward the United States and Canada in order to increase its market leverage. Over the long run, there are many options for coal sourcing to the region. Indonesia, Australia, Russia, and the United States are the largest exporters in the world, while China, Japan, India, South Korea, and Taiwan are the top five importers. Partly due to slack demand in the United States and Europe—as well as gas’s displacement of coal there—and excess capacity in Australia, world coal prices have been on a steady downward trend for several years. Anyone counting on “peak coal” to reduce Asian coal demand will be sorely disappointed in the coming decades. What are the projected consequences of this surge of coal consumption? What are the other tools or policies available to mitigate it? The chief consequences of the region’s coal surge are environmental and primarily related to climate. Relatively inexpensive scrubbing technologies can reduce emissions of particulates, smog precursors, emissions, and mercury to very low levels. Nevertheless, CO2 is much tougher to address. Due to their enormous coal dependence, China and India are the world’s first- and fourth-largest emitters of CO2, respectively, with Indonesia ranked fifteenth; Malaysia and Thailand are also in the top 30. By 2035, the IEA estimates that non-OECD Asia plus Japan will account for 56 percent of global energy-related CO2 emissions. In principle, there are only three ways to reduce CO2 from coal-based electricity production. First, you can replace coal use with other fuels or increased energy efficiency. Second, you can increase the efficiency of coal combustion itself. The third strategy is CCS. China and India are beginning to deploy the first two strategies, but not fast enough to change the story dramatically in the next few decades. Japan, as noted, with its nuclear plant closures, is going backwards on reducing CO2 emissions by deploying more coal and gas. That elevates the importance of CCS. And, as noted before, CCS is really the only strategy available for coal use for certain processes in heavy industry. Energy efficiency is important—but, given the surge in first-time demand resulting from urbanization and increased wealth, improvements in efficiency are not expected to significantly dent

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absolute demand growth. Indeed, substantial efficiency improvements are already “baked in” to the high-growth scenarios for Asia; growth would be even higher if efficiency lagged. Improving the efficiency of coal plants is useful, but will only reduce CO2 emissions at the margin. Then there are renewables. Each year brings news and discussions regarding the dramatic percent increase in additions of wind and solar power in China, but this is from a very small base. In 2011, China derived 78 percent of its power from coal, and less than 2 percent from wind and solar. In 2013, China added in excess of three times more new coal electricity in kilowatt hours (kWh) than wind and solar combined. While China is building 28 new nuclear plants and aims to have up to 150 on line within two decades, this would still only produce a fraction of the power produced from coal. A recent Bloomberg study predicted that China coal use might peak as percentage of total power supply in the coming decades, but until then (and even after, according to the U.S. Department of Energy) would continue to grow in absolute amounts and still provide well over half of China’s electricity in 2030, even in the best-case scenario. Moreover, this scenario will not be significantly affected by the recent coal plant construction ban in parts of coastal China; substantial development is proposed in the western and northern provinces. Due to the long life of coal plants—lasting 50 years or more—and given that China’s plants are mostly less than a decade old, the current and soon-to-be-built plants will continue to retard climate progress for another half-century if nothing is done to address their CO2 emissions. However, there are potential game-changers. They include modular, less expensive nuclear plants that could step in to replace coal boilers on an economical retrofit basis, or the “reforming” of natural gas, which removes the carbon and produces hydrogen to make price-competitive carbon-free liquid fuels like ammonia. My organization is working hard with developers to commercialize this technology. But CCS on coal-fired power plants seems like the most likely and necessary option in the near term. If CCS is a viable option, why has it not gained greater traction? CCS is a real option for China coal plants both new and existing. But there are two primary barriers for deploying CCS in China, and for that matter, anywhere in the world. The first is the high cost of

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capturing and compressing the CO2 emitted by a coal plant. Current CCS technology in the United States and China adds roughly 50 percent to the cost of operating a new coal plant, and as much as 70 percent to the cost of operating an existing plant. The second barrier comes in the task of disposing of the CO2 once it has been captured. CO2 disposal requires a dedicated network of pipelines and underground storage sites that can inject it miles underground. With the exception of certain regions in North America, this disposal network does not yet exist. These two problems—high capture cost and the lack of pipeline and storage site availability—are interconnected. With the right strategy, they can be solved in China and the rest of the world. A strategic approach to establish widespread CCS in China begins with using recovered CO2 for enhanced oil recovery (EOR) on a transitional basis. In this process, carbon is injected into a new or depleted oil field, where its properties free up the oil that would otherwise not be extractable. The revenue from EOR can pay for the cost of injection, pipelines, and a substantial portion of the cost of capturing CO2. After the oil from the fields is extracted, the second step is to inject the captured CO2 for permanent storage in the field itself, or in saline aquifers underneath. Shenhua Coal is already undertaking the second step and is currently injecting 100,000 tons of CO2 per year underground on a pilot basis. Japan also is starting up a pilot project to inject carbon into the seabed floor. My organization is bringing U.S. expertise to China to accelerate EOR using CO2. To build this pipeline and EOR network, China needs to start with cheaper sources of CO2 than what comes from coal-fired power plants. Approximately 7 percent of the industrial CO2 that is vented worldwide comes from high-purity sources such as ammonia and methanol production. This industrial subset is economical for EOR without the need for subsidies. Conservative estimates show that more than 130 million tons of CO2 are vented from these sources each year in China alone. In Shaanxi Province, just nine methanol and ammonia plants together vent nearly 24 million tons of pure CO2. Once this pipeline and storage site network is built with industrial sources, it will be cheaper and easier to add CCS to China’s vast coal power plant fleet. That’s because the network can act as a nucleus or hub for capture-cost innovation. This is another area where my

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organization is pairing companies in China and the United States to work together to develop and demonstrate novel CCS technologies that are more efficient and lower-cost. For example, China’s largest power producer, Huaneng, has partnered with U.S. technology start-up Powerspan to develop a lower-cost amine-capture system. With China’s manufacturing costs advantages, these partnerships have the potential to drive CCS deployment far faster than a “West only” approach. A key point to keep in mind is that innovation isn’t limited to the back end of capture. In India and China, the use of underground coal gasification—where coal is gasified in the coal seam itself—could reduce CCS costs substantially; this process is being demonstrated at commercial scale and is highly suitable for China and India’s coal supply. Chinese universities and industries have substantial scientific and engineering innovation capacity, and we need to increase and pick up the pace of collaboration between East and West to accelerate our CCS options. You have suggested that we look beyond China when evaluating the implications of increased regional coal consumption. Are there lessons China has to offer in the effort to address the environmental impacts for ASEAN countries or India? What would you highlight as the most promising examples of China’s efforts? The principal lesson from China is that there are no easy or quick answers to the problem of rapidly accelerating energy consumption and the need to curb CO2. To tame this massive problem, we will need an unprecedented technological push on multiple fronts. Here, China has pointed the way and offers both lessons and concrete value. China has shown the unprecedented ability to manage down the costs of all forms of energy, including clean energy. China builds highly efficient coal plants at roughly half the cost of those in the United States and Europe, and has also driven down the price of wind and solar installations to below OECD levels. This is not solely due to labor cost differences; it also has to do with technical innovation and proficiency in the management of large engineering projects. If this capability can be harnessed to CCS and nuclear power, the world will benefit. On the nuclear front, we are seeing the beginnings of this innovation path. China has begun a substantial nuclear-power development program, with 28 power plants under construction, and is building

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reactors at much lower costs than in the West, in part due to using several standard designs and typically building several units at each nuclear site. China is constructing advanced Western reactor designs—such as the Westinghouse AP1000 (four units) and Areva EPR (one unit)—and doing so at approximately half the cost of current Western projects building these reactors. China’s AP1000 partnership with Westinghouse provides for China’s evolution of this technology and associated IP ownership—which has led to design of the larger CAP1400—the first unit of which recently began construction. In addition, China is ahead of the United States and Europe in developing and demonstrating a new generation of reactors that are potentially safer, lower-cost, and, in some cases, produce less high-level nuclear waste, including those using high-temperature gas coolant technology, as well as molten salt reactors that could use thorium (or uranium) fuel. India also has undertaken a thorium demonstration program—primarily focused on using thorium to fuel conventional light-water reactors. Combined with a strengthening of nuclear safety governance and practices through China-Western cooperation, nuclear could be a competitive and highly scalable replacement for new coal plant construction in Asia by 2025 and beyond. China and India also offer the potential to scale up CCS rapidly, utilizing EOR as a near-term accelerant, and thereby drive costs down through learning. China and India also may have the ability to innovate new CCS technologies with their growing scientific and engineering innovation capabilities. Similar innovations could occur to decarbonize the region’s substantial natural gas reserves. For example, natural gas can be processed—sequestering carbon—to produce hydrogen that combines with nitrogen to create ammonia liquid fuel. Produced this way, ammonia is a “zero-carbon” fuel that can be burned in a power plant or car or truck engine. Another way to create zero-carbon ammonia is to use carbon-free electricity (such as nuclear power or renewables) to split water to produce hydrogen, which is then combined with nitrogen to produce liquid ammonia. The ultimate hope that China, and perhaps all of Asia, offers to solve the global warming and energy problem is this: energy innovation historically tends to occur more rapidly where there is economic growth and the underlying need for more power. Asia’s energy demand will grow rapidly in the coming decades, generating the markets in which experimentation can take place. By contrast,

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shrinking OECD energy markets are largely saturated with existing supply, so producing clean energy involves the costly replacement of functioning equipment. The incremental cost of building something that is new and clean is generally lower than the total cost of replacing something old and dirty. If Asian nations put their strategic minds to finding solutions and collaborate with global companies and nations, the steep Asia energy growth curve could move from being a major global warming liability into a powerful asset. Jacqueline Koch is the Pacific Energy Forum Communications Advisor. This interview first appeared on the National Bureau of Asian Research website, and is reprinted with permission.

James Grant Matkin · NO. Renewables are not even in the running. Pretending solar and wind as intermittent sources will fill the gap is a fairytale. Fossil fuels provide 86% of world energy resources and at best this will only fall to 80% by 2035. Coal has the lion’s share of fossil fuel energy and will triple over the next two decades largely from India and China expansions. Notwithstanding President Obama's political push against coal and for a green technology revolution, "we remain deeply entrenched in a world dominated by fossil fuels, with the only true revolution now underway involving the shift from one class of such fuels to another." Michael T. Klare - Salon. America's green energy future is a pipe dream. Coal is at the top of the heap because it is cheap and plentiful where it is most needed at developing nations for economic growth and to alleviate energy poverty. "If you could pick one thing to reduce poverty, by far you would pick energy, business magnage and philanthropist Bill Gates has said." Economic research shows only coal can provide the large amount of affordable, reliable energy the world needs. As the article explains - "When power demand is growing that rapidly, you build what you can, and this very well may include taking all measures to improve efficiency, scale up renewable resources, and

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diversify the energy mix to include natural gas and nuclear. However, coal is readily available and transportable (no pipelines required), and coal plants can be built quickly—typically in 18 months. While figures have fallen from a much higher peak a few years ago, China still built approximately one large plant every week in 2013." Power demand is growing rapidly in China and India the most populated developing countries in the world. Cost is the imperative for energy and there "really is no free energy lunch." Evolutionary renewable technology may make a contribution to energy supply, but overall it will not make a difference. The coal hard truth is China's new coal investment is 6 times higher than wind and 27 times higher than solar in 2013. India will be even more than China by 2030. http://thebreakthrough.org/.../energy.../the-coal-hard-truth. Fortunately climate alarmists have much exaggerated the impact of increased C02. Global tempertures are not increasing as predicted, glaciers are not melting that much and some are expanding as are the Pacific Islands. Over the last 100 years oceans only rose 5" and polar bears are thriving. The only imperative is to be sensible and not weaken the economy for an unproved theory. http://thebreakthrough.org/index.php/programs/energy-and-climate/can-any-tech-stop-asias-coal-future

Dr. Richard C Willson Astrophysics Expert Re: "...climate alarmists have much exaggerated the impact of CO2." The CO2 anthropogenic global warming (CAGW) hypothesis has proved to be false. The predictions of the global circulation models on which CAGW is based have failed to match observational data both during the 'Industrial Era' and previous history. The thrust of recent research has demonstrated that climate changes continually and is determined by natural forces that humans have no significant control over.

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The CAGW hoax to curtail use of fossil fuels is perpetuated by (1) some cynical scientists that want to protect their CAGW careers and government grants; (2) cynical crony capitalists that make money related to carbon cap and trade fees, government subsidies or the related service industries; (3) Hyper-environmental activists who want to make feel-good gestures at public expense; (4) and political ideologues that want to redistribute wealth or impose population limits. Alternative renewable technologies will not be commercially viable in the foreseeable future. Renewable energy sources like solar and wind supply only 3 % of our energy use and that only works when the sun shines and the wind blows. Significant expansion of renewables will require massive investments in research and infrastructure, potentially distorting other more important social and economic priorities. Bottom line: Anti-fossil fuel policies based on CAGW are fools errands. There is no reason to sabotage world economies by failing to use fossil fuels, the most cost-effective form of energy, to the maximum extent possible. RICHARD C. WILLSON RESUME Education: B.S., Engineering Physics, University of Colorado (1960) M.S., Physics and Astrophysics, University of Colorado (1963) Ph.C. Atmospheric Physics, University of California at Los Angeles (1971) Ph.D. Atmospheric Physics, University of California at Los Angeles (1975) HONORS: NASA MEDAL FOR EXCEPTIONAL SCIENTIFIC ACHIEVEMENT (1981) HONORARY GRADUATE SCHOLASTIC FRATERNITY UCLA Member of the Working Group on Solar Influences on Global Change, Committee on Global Change, NRC (1990-94) Presenter to the NOAA Panel on Strategies for Climate ( Nov., 2000) Employer: Columbia University, Center for Climate Systems Research Position: Senior Research Scientist Principal Investigator for NASA ACRIM experiments

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Principal author of 56 climate research peer reviewed articles including advanced research on sun spots and solar irradiance. See Willson, R.C., Three Decades of Total Solar Irradiance Monitoring, (Poster GC23A),Co-convener of special session GC23A 2008 AGU Fall Meeting. ADVANCED ENERGY FOR LIFE

Coal is Essential for World Economic Growth and to Alleviate Energy Poverty - See more at: https://www.advancedenergyforlife.com/article/coal-essential-world-economic-growth-and-alleviate-energy-poverty#sthash.KTUY8JGR.dpuf Dr. Roger H. Bezdek Energy Economist and President of MISI If you could pick just one thing to reduce poverty, by far you would pick energy, business magnate and philanthropist Bill Gates has said. And few could find reason to disagree. I submit only coal can provide the large amount of affordable, reliable energy the world needs for economic growth to reduce energy poverty and to achieve the U.N. development goals. A recent report by the Australia Institute takes issue with this simple concept and that’s why the report is seriously flawed. First, coal is vitally required to facilitate economic growth over the coming decades, especially in the developing nations. All major forecasts indicate that world energy consumption will increase significantly over the next three decades, that almost all of this increased energy will be required in the developing nations, that fossil fuels will continue to provide 80% of world energy, and that

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coal will continue to be the world’s most rapidly growing fuel. As prominent energy analyst Vaclav Smil notes: “The most fundamental attribute of modern society is simply this: Ours is a high energy civilization based largely on combustion of fossil fuels.” In short, fossil fuels – especially coal – will continue to be the driving force behind economic growth for the foreseeable future. In fact, within five years coal will surpass oil as the world’s major energy source. Second, coal is critically required to reduce energy poverty and to help achieve the U.N. development goals. Nearly 3.5 billion people globally lack sufficient energy for basic needs and 4 million die annually from the effects of indoor air pollution as a result of energy poverty. All forms of energy are needed to address this challenge – especially advanced coal. A recent study by Robert Bryce emphasized coal’s role in alleviating energy poverty, concluding that, between 1990 and 2010, for every person who gained access to electricity from sources such as wind and solar, 13 gained access from coal. Coal offers the unique attributes of large scale, low cost and lower emissions through advanced clean coal technology such as current supercritical plants. Affordable, reliable electricity is key to reducing energy poverty and to achieving the U.N. development goals, and within 25 years electricity use will double. Coal is currently world’s predominant fuel for electricity generation and will remain so. Finally, coal power generation has been getting cleaner for decades and this improvement continues. For example, in the United States, since 1970 industry has invested over $100 billion in clean coal technologies, coal power generation has increased 170%, and the key emissions rate for SO2, NOx, and particulates has declined 90%. This represents an incredible environmental success story according to any measure. Further, high-efficiency coal plant technologies are even cleaner: When equipped with advanced controls, these plants can have an emissions rate that is two-thirds lower than the existing fleet and a CO2 emissions rate that is up to 25% lower than the oldest plants, driving major environmental improvement. As the head of the International Energy Agency notes, “A single, large coal plant, if built with the best-available technology, can reduce emissions by the annual equivalent of taking a million cars off the road.” In conclusion, and Dr. Amartya Sen, a Nobel Laureate in Economics,

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said “Energy use is essential for conquering poverty, and there is a need for increased power in poorer countries.” Only coal can provide the large amount of affordable, reliable energy the world needs for economic growth, to reduce energy poverty and to achieve the U.N. development goals. Dr. Roger H. Bezdek Dr. Bezdek is an internationally recognized energy economist and President of MISI, in Washington D.C. He has 30 years’ experience in research and management in the energy, utility, environmental, and regulatory areas, serving in private industry, academia, and the federal government. He has served as Senior Adviser in the U.S. Treasury Department, as U.S. energy delegate to the EU and NATO, and as a consultant to the White House, federal and state government agencies, and numerous corporations and research organizations. His most recent book is The Impending World Energy Mess.

- https://www.advancedenergyforlife.com/article/coal-essential-world-economic-growth-and-alleviate-energy-poverty

COMMENTARY fossil fuels

What Electric-Car Lovers Get Wrong About Fossil Fuels Jim Mahoney Updated: Mar 07, 2016 7:40 AM PST http://fortune.com/2016/03/07/fossil-fuels-electric-cars-clean-energy/ Green-energy proponents often claim that petroleum businesses are hostile to new and innovative energy

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sources and technologies. As a large company with business and financial interests in petroleum, Koch Industries is no stranger to such criticism. The truth is, however, that Koch Industries does not oppose electric vehicles, nor is it trying to prevent new energy businesses or technologies from succeeding. There is value in all forms of energy, including wind, solar, oil, gas, and everything in between. (That’s why Koch invests in quite a number of them already, including renewable fuels like ethanol and biodiesel.) Any product or service that helps people improve their lives through voluntary and cooperative transactions is a win-win and benefits everyone involved. What Koch Industries opposes is the government subsidizing or mandating one form of energy over another. This includes oil and other fossil fuels—as well as ethanol—because they distort markets and harm Americans by increasing energy costs. (Koch opposes all market-distorting policies, including subsidies and mandates—even if they may benefit the company.) These subsidies and mandates often prop up companies and industries that would otherwise fail, and this is precisely the type of corporate welfare that has become all too common in today’s political system. /react-text Related react-text: 262 Remember the Solyndra scandal? The U.S. government chose to enrich the solar panel company with hundreds of millions in subsidies, and the American taxpayer saw firsthand what happens when the government intervenes to pick winners. It distorted market prices, resulting in the loss of taxpayer dollars when the company ultimately failed. /react-text

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react-text: 264 Another sobering example is the /react-text react-text: 266 $7,500 federal tax credit /react-text react-text: 267 for all-electric and plug-in hybrid vehicles. (Similar credits exist in a few states, /react-text react-text: 269 such as California /react-text . react-text: 271 ) This is a clear example of welfare for the wealthy. According to a /react-text react-text: 273 2015 study /react-text react-text: 274 by researchers at the University of California, Berkeley, about 90% of credit beneficiaries are people in the top income bracket. Why are taxpayers being forced to subsidize the lifestyle choices of the wealthiest 20%? /react-text react-text: 276 To be fair, the fossil fuel industry (like many others) has benefitted from market-distorting policies. The problem is that continuing these politically driven provisions only rigs the system further. Consumers should be free to choose for themselves the best source of energy to meet their needs, but at its market price and without the influence of subsidies or mandates. /react-text COLLAPSE fIFQFETZHKXUM

Play Video What you need to know about investing in clean energy Nancy Pfund, founder and managing partner of DBL Partners, explains what makes a clean tech company successful. react-text: 284 A company’s success or failure shouldn’t

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be determined by politicians putting their thumb on the scale or by lobbyists securing special-interest carve-outs. Success should be determined by whether a company provides a product or service consumers value more than their alternatives. When the government prevents this type of voluntary exchange, it dulls competitiveness, distorts markets, wastes valuable resources, disrespects consumer choice, and erodes Americans’ confidence in the fairness of both government and business. /react-text react-text: 286 Instead of favoring one energy solution over another, America should embrace as many choices as possible, including fossil fuels. Affordable, reliable, and abundant, fossil fuels provide 87% of our domestic energy supply and are a critical part of any comprehensive energy strategy. Bill Gates t is right when he says, “Without access to

energy, the poor are stuck in the dark, denied all of the economic, social, and health benefits that come with power. So if we really want to help the world’s poorest families, we need to find a way to get them access to energy they can afford.” But anyone who says (Gates included) that fossil fuels shouldn’t play a major role in our energy future is wrong. For most people in the world, particularly the least advantaged, fossil fuels are the very best option for creating a better life.

Fossil fuels cannot be the enemy if companies truly want to help people in the United States and around the world improve their lives. That’s why Koch Industries will continue to openly and vigorously advocate for affordable and abundant energy chosen by consumers—and not

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government bureaucrats. Others should do the same. Jim Mahoney is a board member of Koch Industries, where he previously served as executive vice president for operations and compliance.

The Coal, Hard Truth China's New Coal 6 Times Higher than Wind, 27 Times Higher than Solar in 2013 Recent reports claim that China is the “new global powerhouse for renewable energy.” Unfortunately, the numbers do not square with this rosy picture. Once again, in 2013, coal was the big winner. As the detailed below, it’s clear that new fossil energy output in China, most of it coal, exceeded new wind energy by six times and solar by 27 times. Much as one might wish that wind and solar (and for some, nuclear) were sending Chinese coal into the sunset, the cold, hard facts suggest otherwise. Until we scale up carbon capture and storage, these ongoing China coal trends will continue to be an unmitigated climate disaster. January 23, 2014 | Armond Cohen The new year brought some deserved celebration of the advance of renewable energy in China, as the government announced nearly 8 gigawatts of wind power additions and 3.6 gigawatts of new solar installed during 2013. But as I’ve previously pointed out, it is important to keep this laudable progress in perspective compared to the still staggeringly large annual increase in new China coal power capacity. Not everyone did so. In a January 4 article entitled “China Roars Ahead with Renewables,” for example, The Ecologist magazine claimed: “Reports of China opening a huge new coal fired power station every week belie the reality – China is the new global powerhouse for renewable energy…It

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means that the growth of its electric power system – that underpins the entire modernization and industrialization of the country – is now being powered more by renewables than by fossil fuels.” The report concluded, “These results reveal just how strongly China is swinging behind renewables as its primary energy resource…” Unfortunately, this rosy picture is not justified by the numbers. Once again, in 2013, coal was the big winner. As the graph below shows, when adjusted for capacity factor (the amount of energy each gigawatt of capacity puts out in a year), it’s clear that new fossil energy output in China, most of it coal, exceeded new wind energy by six times and solar by 27 times: New Electric Production Capability Added in China During 2013 (Terawatt Hours)

Source: CATF from China National Energy Administration website for GW, accessed January 2014. Assumed capacity factors: fossil (58% per IEA WEO 2013); hydro (34% per IEA WEO 2013); wind (33%); solar (15%). Similarly exaggerated is the article’s claim that this trend “will have a dramatic impact on China’s carbon emissions, slowing their growth and hastening the year when they will

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actually start falling.” Given the relative youth of China’s coal plants – the vast majority of them have been built since 1990 – they are unlikely to be bulldozed anytime soon. If their carbon is not abated, they will be emitting for another half century, with a carbon overhang of centuries. In case you’re in any doubt about the longevity of this trend, Reuters carried a story three days later entitled “China Approves Massive New Coal Capacity Despite Pollution Fears” that delivered some sobering facts (emphasis added): China approved the construction of more than 100 million tonnes of new coal production capacity in 2013 – six times more than a year earlier and equal to 10 percent of U.S. annual usage . . . The scale of the increase, which only includes major mines, reflects Beijing’s aim to put 860 million tonnes of new coal production capacity into operation over the five years to 2015, more than the entire annual output of India. As we showed in a previous post, even under the most aggressive renewable development scenarios, roughly two thirds of China’s power in 2030 will come from fossil energy, the vast majority of it coal. Much as one might wish that wind and solar (and for some, nuclear) were sending Chinese coal into the sunset, the facts suggest otherwise. Until we scale up carbon capture and storage, these ongoing China coal trends will continue to be an unmitigated climate disaster. http://thebreakthrough.org/index.php/programs/energy-and-climate/the-coal-hard-truth

A Skeptic Looks at Alternative Energy It takes several lifetimes to put a new

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energy system into place, and wishful thinking can’t speed things along By Vaclav Smil Posted 28 Jun 2012 | 13:46 GMT

In June 2004 the editor of an energy journal called to ask me to comment on a just-announced plan to build the world’s largest photovoltaic electric generating plant. Where would it be, I asked—Arizona? Spain? North Africa? No, it was to be spread among three locations in rural Bavaria, southeast of Nuremberg. I said there must be some mistake. I grew up not far from that place, just across the border with the Czech Republic, and I will never forget those seemingly endless days of summer spent inside while it rained incessantly. Bavaria is like Seattle in the United States or Sichuan province in China. You don’t want to put a solar plant in Bavaria, but that is exactly where the Germans put it. The plant, with a peak output of 10 megawatts, went into operation in June 2005. It happened for the best reason there is in politics: money. Welcome to the world of new renewable energies, where the subsidies rule—and consumers pay. Without these subsidies, renewable energy plants other than hydroelectric and geothermal ones can’t yet compete with conventional generators. There are several reasons, starting with relatively low capacity factors—the most electricity a plant can actually produce divided by what it would produce if it could be run full time. The capacity factor of a typical nuclear power plant is more

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than 90 percent; for a coal-fired generating plant it’s about 65 to 70 percent. A photovoltaic installation can get close to 20 percent—in sunny Spain—and a wind turbine, well placed on dry land, from 25 to 30 percent. Put it offshore and it may even reach 40 percent. To convert to either of the latter two technologies, you must also figure in the need to string entirely new transmission lines to places where sun and wind abound, as well as the need to manage a more variable system load, due to the intermittent nature of the power. All of these complications are well known, and all of them have been too lightly dismissed by alternative energy backers and the media. Most egregious of all is the boosters’ failure to recognize the time it takes to convert to any new source of energy, no matter how compelling the arguments for it may be. An example is the 2008 plan promoted by former vice president Al Gore, which called for replacing all fossil-fueled generation in the United States in just a decade. Another is Google’s plan, announced in 2008 and abandoned in 2011, which envisaged cutting out coal generation by 2030. Trumping them all was a 2009 article in Scientific American by Mark Jacobson, a professor of civil engineering at Stanford University, and Mark Delucchi, a researcher in transportation studies at the University of California, Davis. They proposed converting the energy economy of the entire world to renewable sources by 2030. History and a consideration of the technical requirements show that the problem is much greater than these advocates have supposed.

What was the German government thinking in 2004, when it offered a subsidy, known as a feed-in tariff, that guaranteed investors as much as €0.57 per kilowatt-hour for the next two decades of photovoltaic generation? At the time, the average price for electricity from other sources was about €0.20/kWh; by comparison, the

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average U.S. electricity price in 2004 was 7.6 cents, or about €0.06/kWh. With subsidies like that, it was no wonder that Bavaria Solarpark was just the beginning of a rush to build photovoltaic plants in Germany. By the end of 2011, Germany’s PV installations had a capacity of nearly 25 gigawatts, which was more than a third of the global total. If you subsidize something enough, at first it can seem almost reasonable; only later does reality intervene. This past March, stung by the news that Germans were paying the second highest electricity rates in Europe, the German parliament voted to cut the various solar subsidies by up to 29 percent.

Such generous subsidies are by no means a German peculiarity. They have been the norm in the new world of renewable energies; only their targets differ. Spain also subsidized wind and PV generation before cutting its feed-in tariff for large installations by nearly 50 percent in 2010. China’s bene­fits to its wind-turbine makers were so generous that the United States complained about them to the World Trade Organization in December 2010. In the United States the greatest beneficiary so far has been neither solar nor wind but biomass—specifically, corn used to produce ethanol. According to the U.S. Government Accountability Office, the excise tax credit for ethanol production cost taxpayers US $6.1 billion in 2011. On top of that direct cost are three indirect ones: those related to soil erosion, the runoff of excess nitrate from fertilizers (which ends up in the Gulf of Mexico, where it creates dead zones in coastal waters), and the increased food costs that accrue when the world’s largest exporter of grain diverts 40 percent of its corn to make ethanol. And topping all those off, the resulting fuel is used mostly in energy-inefficient vehicles. You might argue that [PDF] subsidies aren’t bad in themselves; indeed, there is a long history of using them to encourage new energy

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sources. The oil and gas industries have benefited from decades of tax relief designed to stimulate exploration. The nuclear industry has grown on the back of direct and enormous R&D support. In the United States it received almost 54 percent of all federal research funds between 1948 and 2007. In France it got the all-out support of the state electricity- generating company. Without that subsidy, the industry would never have managed to get its recent share of more than 75 percent of the French electricity market. We must therefore ask whether the subsidies for alternative energy can deliver what their promoters promise.

Image: Source Nuclear Energy: an Energy Technology That’s Been Pushed Nuclear power was the first major energy technology to owe its development largely to government investment and subsidies, as can be seen from its very different fortunes in these three countries. Click on the image to enlarge. Make no mistake—they promise much. The most ardent supporters of solar, wind, and biomass argue that these sources can replace fossil fuels and create highly reliable, nonpolluting, carbon-free systems priced no higher than today’s cheapest coal-fired electricity generation, all in just a few decades. That would be soon enough to prevent the rise of atmospheric carbon dioxide from its current level of 394 parts per million to more than 450 ppm—at which point, climatologists estimate, the average global temperature will rise by 2 °C. I wish all these promises would come true, but I think instead I’ll put my faith in clear-eyed technical assessments. The matter of affordable costs is the hardest promise to assess, given the many assorted subsidies and the creative accounting techniques that have for years propped up alternative and renewable generation

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technologies. Both the European Wind Energy Association and the American Wind Energy Association claim that wind turbines already produce cheaper electricity than coal-fired power plants do, while the solar enthusiasts love to take the history of impressively declining prices for photovoltaic cells and project them forward to imply that we’ll soon see installed costs that are amazingly low. But other analyses refute the claims of cheap wind electricity, and still others take into account the fact that photo­voltaic installations require not just cells but also frames, inverters, batteries, and labor. These associated expenses are not plummeting at all, and that is why the cost of electricity generated by residential solar systems in the United States has not changed dramatically since 2000. At that time the national mean was close to 40 U.S. cents per kilowatt­-hour, while the latest Solarbuzz data for 2012 show 28.91 cents per kilowatt-hour in sunny climates and 63.60 cents per kilowatt-­hour in cloudy ones. That’s still far more expensive than using fossil fuels, which in the United States cost between 11 and 12 cents per kilowatt-hour in 2011. The age of mass-scale, decentralized photovoltaic generation is not here yet. Then consider the question of scale. Wind power is more advanced commercially than solar power, but with about 47 gigawatts in the United States at the end of 2011 it still accounted for less than 4 percent of the net installed summer generating capacity in that country. And because the capacity factors of U.S. wind turbines are so low, wind supplied less than 3 percent of all the electricity generated there in 2011.

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Infographic: Bryan Christie Design; Data Source: Vaclav Smil Two rising powers, China and India, together outweigh the United States in carbon emissions. Click on image for enlargement. ways. For example, combined-cycle gas plants exploit It took 30 years—since the launch of small, modern wind turbines in 1980—to reach even that modest percentage. By comparison, nuclear power had accounted for 20 percent of all U.S. generation within 30 years of its launch in 1957, and gas turbines achieved 10 percent three decades after they went into operation in the early 1960s. Projections of wind-power generation into the future have been misleadingly optimistic, because they are all based on initial increases from a minuscule base. So what if total global wind turbine capacity rose sixfold between 2001 and 2011? Such high growth rates are typical of systems in early stages of development, particularly when—as in this case—the growth has been driven primarily by subsidies. And a new factor has been changing the prospects for wind and solar: the arrival of abundant supplies of natural gas extracted by hydraulic

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fracturing, or fracking, from shales. Fracking is uncommon outside the United States and Canada at the moment, but it could be used in many countries in Europe, Asia, and Latin America, which also have large shale deposits. Some countries, such as France and Germany, have banned the technology for fear of possible environmental effects, but such concerns accompany all new energy technologies, even those touted for their environmental virtues. And natural gas can be used to generate electricity in particularly efficient the heat leaving the gas turbine to produce steam and generate additional electricity using a steam turbine. What’s more, gas turbine modules with up to 60 megawatts of capacity can be up and running within a month of delivery, and they can be conveniently sited so as to feed their output into existing transmission lines. The siting of massive wind farms is also becoming increasingly contentious—many people don’t like their look, object to their noise, or worry about their effect on migrating birds and bats [see “Fixing Wind Power’s Bat Problem,” in this issue]. This has become a problem even for some offshore projects. For example, a vast project off Martha’s Vineyard island, in Massachusetts, which was supposed to be the first offshore wind farm in the United States, has been stalled for years because of local opposition. The intermittence of the wind makes it hard to estimate how much electricity can be generated in a few days’ time, and the shortage of operating experience with large turbines introduces even greater uncertainty over the long term. We’ll just have to wait to see how reliable they’ll be over their supposed lifetimes of 20 to 30 years and how much repair and maintenance they will require. And, of course, you can’t use wind turbines unless you’re prepared to hook them to the grid by building lots of additional high-voltage transmission lines, an expensive and typically legally challenging undertaking. Assuming that any major wind farms in the United States would be built on the Great Plains, where there is sufficient wind and land, developers would need to construct many thousands of kilometers of transmission lines to connect those farms to the main markets for electricity on the coasts. Of course, the connection challenge is easier for small countries (particularly if they can rely on their neighbors), which is one reason why Denmark became a leader in wind power. In the United States, the problem goes beyond building new lines; it is also necessary to add them to an existing grid that is already

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stressed and inadequate. The most recent Report Card for American Infrastructure, prepared with 2009 data by the American Society of Civil Engineers, gives the country’s energy system a D+, largely because the grid is relatively old and its operations are repeatedly challenged by spikes of high summer demand. Raising that grade is more than a technical challenge, because improvements in infrastructure often face entrenched political opposition—the not-in-my-backyard syndrome. As for Europe, there may be better interconnections, but it faces other problems in converting to wind and solar power. Its economic prospects are bleak, and that will limit its ability to invest massively in new technologies. Even Germany, the strongest European Union economy and a great proponent of new energies, has a difficult road ahead; it must find a replacement for its nuclear plants after having decided, following Japan’s nuclear disaster in Fukushima, to phase them out. This is no small challenge at a time when Germany is cutting its subsidies for wind and solar power and its economy is close to recession. Government intervention is needed because the odds are poor that any private program will be massive enough to speed the conversion to new sources of energy. But even governments in the rich countries are having trouble shoring up essential infrastructure, mainly because of mounting debts. Their causes include uncontained health-care costs, trade deficits, uncompetitive manufacturing, and tax-­revenue shortfalls. At the same time, government subsidies to new energy technologies haven’t delivered on an often-made promise: They haven’t created many new, permanent, well-paid jobs either in the EU or the United States.

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Infographic: Bryan Christie Design; Data Source: Vaclav Smil Wind power in the United States has grown quickly, but from a very low base, and as the history of such technologies shows, the real challenge comes later. Click on image for enlargement. The ultimate justification for alternative energy centers on its mitigation of global warming: Using wind, solar, and biomass sources of energy adds less greenhouse gas to the atmosphere. But because greenhouse gases have global effects, the efficacy of this substitution must be judged on a global scale. And then we have to face the fact that the Western world’s wind and solar contributions to the reduction of carbon-dioxide emissions are being utterly swamped by the increased burning of coal in China and India. The numbers are sobering. Between 2004 and 2009 the United States added about 28 GW of wind turbines. That’s the equivalent of fewer than 10 GW of coal-fired capacity, given the very different load factors. During the same period China installed more than 30 times [PDF] as much new coal-fired capacity in large central plants, facilities that have an expected life of at least 30 years. In 2010 alone China’s carbon-dioxide emissions increased by nearly 800 million metric tons, an equivalent of close to 15 percent of the U.S. total. In

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the same year the United States generated almost 95 terawatt-hours of electricity from wind, thus theoretically preventing the emission of only some 65 million tons of carbon dioxide. Furthermore, China is adding 200 GW of coal-fired plants by 2015, during which time the United States will add only about 30 GW of new wind capacity, equivalent to less than 15 GW of coal-fired generation. Of course, the rapid increase in the burning of Asian coal will eventually moderate, but even so, the concentration of carbon dioxide in the atmosphere cannot possibly stay below 450 ppm. Perhaps the most misunderstood aspect of energy transitions is their speed. Substituting one form of energy for another takes a long time. U.S. nuclear generation began to deliver 10 percent of all electricity after 23 years of operation, and it took 38 years to reach a 20 percent share, which occurred in 1995. It has stayed around that mark ever since. Electricity generation by natural gas turbines took 45 years to reach 20 percent. In 2025 modern wind turbines will have been around for some 30 years, and if by then they supply just 15 percent of the electricity in the United States, it will be a stunning success. And even the most optimistic projects for solar generation don’t promise half that much. The quest for non­carbon sources of electricity is highly desirable, and eventually such sources will predominate. But this can happen only if planners have realistic expectations. The comparison to a giant oil tanker, uncomfortable as it is, fits perfectly: Turning it around takes lots of time. And turning around the world’s fossil-fuel-based energy system is a truly gargantuan task. That system now has an annual throughput of more than 7 billion metric tons of hard coal and lignite, about 4 billion metric tons of crude oil, and more than 3 trillion cubic meters of natural gas. This adds up to 14 trillion watts of power. And its infrastructure—coal mines, oil and gas fields, refineries, pipelines, trains, trucks, tankers, filling stations, power plants, transformers, transmission and distribution lines, and hundreds of millions of gasoline, kerosene, diesel, and fuel oil engines—constitutes the costliest and most extensive set of installations, networks, and machines that the world has ever built, one that has taken generations and tens of trillions of dollars to put in place. It is impossible to displace this supersystem in a decade or two—or five, for that matter. Replacing it with an equally extensive and reliable alternative based on renewable energy flows is a task that will

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require decades of expensive commitment. It is the work of generations of engineers. About the Author Vaclav Smil, a distinguished professor in the department of environment and geography at the University of Manitoba, in Canada, dates the interests that inform his article “A Skeptic Looks at Alternative Energy” to his student days at Prague’s Carolinum University more than 50 years ago. “Contrary to the currently popular assertion of accelerating innovation,” he says, “most technical improvements are evolutionary and take time to make a real difference. Consequently, I think little of claims of near‑instant transformations of any complex system.” http://spectrum.ieee.org/energy/renewables/a-skeptic-looks-at-alternative-energy/0 Commodities | Tue Jan 7, 2014 9:01pm GMT China approves massive new coal capacity despite pollution fears * Beijing approves 15 new large coal mining projects over year * Total new capacity, including small mines, likely to be higher * Capacity to increase by 860 mln T over 2011-2015 period By David Stanway BEIJING, Jan 8 (Reuters) - China approved the construction of more than 100 million tonnes of new coal production capacity in 2013 - six times more than a year earlier and equal to 10 percent of U.S. annual usage - flying in the face of plans to tackle choking air pollution. The scale of the increase, which only includes major mines, reflects Beijing's aim to put 860 million tonnes of new coal production capacity into operation over the five years to 2015, more than the

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entire annual output of India. While efforts to curb pollution mean coal's share of the country's energy mix is set to dip, the total amount of the cheap and plentiful fuel burned will still rise. According to data compiled by Reuters, the National Development and Reform Commission (NDRC), China's top planning authority, approved the construction of 15 new large-scale coal mines with 101.3 million tonnes of annual capacity in 2013. "Given that China's total energy consumption is still growing along with the economy, then coal production will continue to grow," said Helen Lau, senior commodities analyst with UOB Kay Hian in Hong Kong. "While China is trying to foster consumption from other sources like hydro and nuclear, we expect actual coal production to grow 2-3 percent a year in the next five years." Chinese coal production of 3.66 billion tonnes at the end of 2012 already accounts for nearly half the global total, according to official data. The figure dwarves production rates of just over 1 billion tonnes each in Europe and the United States. Much of China's new capacity is in regions like Inner Mongolia and Shaanxi, reflecting a strategy to close small mines in marginal locations like Beijing and consolidate output in a series of huge "coal industry bases" that will deliver thermal power to markets via the grid. While expanding output at such bases, China has shut more than 300 million tonnes of old capacity in the last decade, but critics say new mines are rapidly outpacing closures and the policy merely shifts China's environmental problems elsewhere. "Despite the climate change pressure, water resource scarcity and other environmental problems, the coal industry is still expanding fast in northwest China," said Deng Ping, a campaigner with environmental group Greenpeace in Beijing. "The scale of these coal bases has been rarely seen in other places in the world, with open-cast coal mines, coal power plants, and coal chemical plants all combined together." The new projects involved a total investment of 54.1 billion yuan ($8.9 billion). In 2012, the administration approved just four coal projects with 16.6 million tonnes of annual capacity and a total investment of 7.8 billion yuan. The list of approvals does not cover all mines launched in 2013, with many smaller projects under the purview of local authorities and not

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the central government. According to rules issued in December, coal mines producing more than 1.2 million tonnes per year need Beijing's go-ahead, while local governments can approve the rest. It takes the NDRC months to announce new mine approvals, so other projects may have been passed in the fourth quarter. One 46 million-tonne mine was approved in December but the NDRC has yet to publish details. An NDRC spokesman was not available to comment. TACKLING SMOG With major cities hit by smog last year, the government has promised to ease its dependence on coal, a major source of air, soil and water pollution as well as climate-warming emissions. It has issued guidelines to restrict mining in residential areas, improve quality and reduce overcapacity. But coal is cheaper than all the alternatives and China is the world's biggest producer as well consumer. It is also far more reliable than intermittant energy sources like hydropower or wind. The 2011-2015 plan said around 860 million tonnes of new coal production capacity will be brought into operation, as well as 300 more gigawatts of coal-fired power, twice the total generation capacity of Germany. While Beijing said in September that it would cut the share of coal in its primary energy mix to "less than 65 percent" by 2017, down from 66.8 percent in 2012, consumption will still rise in absolute terms, with total energy demand set to grow 4.3 percent a year over the 2011-2015 period. "The replacement of coal hasn't been as fast as expected, and other sources of energy are not only expensive but also face a lot of technical and environmental problems," said UOB's Lau. The government's 2011-2015 energy plan put coal production capacity at 4.1 billion tonnes by 2015, but Lau said it may be much higher. "We estimate China's total coal production capacity will be 4.7 billion tonnes by 2015 - I think the government figure is a big underestimation." ($1 = 6.0506 Chinese yuan) (Reporting by David Stanway; Editing by Richard Pullin) http://uk.reuters.com/article/2014/01/07/china-coal-idUKL3N0K90H720140107

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THURSDAY, AUG 8, 2013 12:04 PM PDT

America’s green energy future is a pipe dream Ignore Obama's bold talk. The energy industry is still pouring its historic profits into fossil fuel projects MICHAEL T. KLARE, TOMDISPATCH.COM http://www.salon.com/2013/08/08/in_the_third_carbon_era_america_is_still_hooked_on_fossil_fuels_partner/

When it comes to energy and economics in the climate-change era, nothing is what it seems. Most of us believe (or want to believe) that the second carbon era, the Age of Oil, will soon be superseded by the Age of Renewables, just as oil had long since superseded the Age of Coal. President Obama offered exactly this vision in a much-praised June address on climate change. True, fossil fuels

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will be needed a little bit longer, he indicated, but soon enough they will be overtaken by renewable forms of energy. Many other experts share this view, assuring us that increased reliance on “clean” natural gas combined with expanded investments in wind and solar power will permit a smooth transition to a green energy future in which humanity will no longer be pouring carbon dioxide and other greenhouse gases into the atmosphere. All this sounds promising indeed. There is only one fly in the ointment: it is not, in fact, the path we are presently headed down. The energy industry is not investing in any significant way in renewables. Instead, it is pouring its historic profits into new fossil-fuel projects, mainly involving the exploitation of what are called “unconventional” oil and gas reserves. The result is indisputable: humanity is not entering a period that will be dominated by renewables. Instead, it is pioneering the third great carbon era, the Age of Unconventional Oil and Gas. That we are embarking on a new carbon era is increasingly evident and should unnerve us all. Hydro-fracking — the use of high-pressure water columns to shatter underground shale formations and liberate the oil and natural gas supplies trapped within them — is being undertaken in ever more regions of the United States and in a growing number of foreign countries. In the meantime, the exploitation of carbon-dirty heavy oil and tar sands formations is accelerating in Canada, Venezuela, and elsewhere. It’s true that ever more wind farms and solar arrays are being built, but here’s the kicker: investment in unconventional fossil-fuel extraction and distribution is now expected to outpace spending on renewables by a ratio of at least three-to-one in the decades ahead. According to the International Energy Agency (IEA), an inter-governmental research organization based in Paris, cumulative worldwide investment in new fossil-fuel extraction and processing will total an estimated $22.87 trillion between 2012 and 2035,

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while investment in renewables, hydropower, and nuclear energy will amount to only $7.32 trillion. In these years, investment in oil alone, at an estimated $10.32 trillion, is expected to exceed spending on wind, solar, geothermal, biofuels, hydro, nuclear, and every other form of renewable energy combined. In addition, as the IEA explains, an ever-increasing share of that staggering investment in fossil fuels will be devoted to unconventional forms of oil and gas: Canadian tar sands, Venezuelan extra-heavy crude, shale oil and gas, Arctic and deep-offshore energy deposits, and other hydrocarbons derived from previously inaccessible reserves of energy. The explanation for this is simple enough. The world’s supply of conventional oil and gas — fuels derived from easily accessible reservoirs and requiring a minimum of processing — is rapidly disappearing. With global demand for fossil fuels expected to rise by 26% between now and 2035, more and more of the world’s energy supply will have to be provided by unconventional fuels. In such a world, one thing is guaranteed: global carbon emissions will soar far beyond our current worst-case assumptions, meaning intense heat waves will become commonplace and our few remaining wilderness areas will be eviscerated. Planet Earth will be a far — possibly unimaginably — harsher and more blistering place. In that light, it’s worth exploring in greater depth just how we ended up in such a predicament, one carbon age at a time. The First Carbon Era The first carbon era began in the late 1800s, with the introduction of coal-powered steam engines and their widespread application to all manner of industrial enterprises. Initially used to power textile mills and industrial plants, coal was also employed in transportation (steam-powered ships and railroads), mining, and the large-scale production of iron. Indeed, what we now call the Industrial Revolution was largely comprised of the widening application of coal and steam power to productive activities. Eventually, coal would also be used to generate electricity, a field in which it remains dominant today.

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This was the era in which vast armies of hard-pressed workers built continent-spanning railroads and mammoth textile mills as factory towns proliferated and cities grew. It was the era, above all, of the expansion of the British Empire. For a time, Great Britain was the biggest producer and consumer of coal, the world’s leading manufacturer, its top industrial innovator, and its dominant power — and all of these attributes were inextricably connected. By mastering the technology of coal, a small island off the coast of Europe was able to accumulate vast wealth, develop the world’s most advanced weaponry, and control the global sea-lanes. The same coal technology that gave Britain such global advantages also brought great misery in its wake. As noted by energy analyst Paul Roberts in The End of Oil, the coal then being consumed in England was of the brown lignite variety, “chock full of sulfur and other impurities.” When burned, “it produced an acrid, choking smoke that stung the eyes and lungs and blackened walls and clothes.” By the end of the nineteenth century, the air in London and other coal-powered cities was so polluted that “trees died, marble facades dissolved, and respiratory ailments became epidemic.” For Great Britain and other early industrial powers, the substitution of oil and gas for coal was a godsend, allowing improved air quality, the restoration of cities, and a reduction in respiratory ailments. In many parts of the world, of course, the Age of Coal is not over. In China and India, among other places, coal remains the principal source of energy, condemning their cities and populations to a twenty-first-century version of nineteenth-century London and Manchester. The Second Carbon Era The Age of Oil got its start in 1859 when commercial production began in western Pennsylvania, but only truly took off after World War II, with the explosive growth of automobile ownership. Before 1940, oil played an important role in illumination and lubrication, among other applications, but remained subordinate to coal; after the war, oil became the world’s principal source of

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energy. From 10 million barrels per day in 1950, global consumption soared to 77 million in 2000, a half-century bacchanalia of fossil fuel burning. Driving the global ascendancy of petroleum was its close association with the internal combustion engine (ICE). Due to oil’s superior portability and energy intensity (that is, the amount of energy it releases per unit of volume), it makes the ideal fuel for mobile, versatile ICEs. Just as coal rose to prominence by fueling steam engines, so oil came to prominence by fueling the world’s growing fleets of cars, trucks, planes, trains, and ships. Today, petroleum supplies about 97% of all energy used in transportation worldwide. Oil’s prominence was also assured by its growing utilization in agriculture and warfare. In a relatively short period of time, oil-powered tractors and other agricultural machines replaced animals as the primary source of power on farms around the world. A similar transition occurred on the modern battlefield, with oil-powered tanks and planes replacing the cavalry as the main source of offensive power. These were the years of mass automobile ownership, continent-spanning highways, endless suburbs, giant malls, cheap flights, mechanized agriculture, artificial fibers, and — above all else — the global expansion of American power. Because the United States possessed mammoth reserves of oil, was the first to master the technology of oil extraction and refining, and the most successful at utilizing petroleum in transportation, manufacturing, agriculture, and war, it emerged as the richest and most powerful country of the twenty-first century, a saga told with great relish by energy historian Daniel Yergin in The Prize. Thanks to the technology of oil, the U.S. was able to accumulate staggering levels of wealth, deploy armies and military bases to every continent, and control the global air and sea-lanes — extending its power to every corner of the planet. However, just as Britain experienced negative consequences from its excessive reliance on coal, so the United States — and the rest

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of the world — has suffered in various ways from its reliance on oil. To ensure the safety of its overseas sources of supply, Washington has established tortuous relationships with foreign oil suppliers and has fought several costly, debilitating wars in the Persian Gulf region, a sordid history I recount in Blood and Oil. Overreliance on motor vehicles for personal and commercial transportation has left the country ill-equipped to deal with periodic supply disruptions and price spikes. Most of all, the vast increase in oil consumption — here and elsewhere — has produced a corresponding increase in carbon dioxide emissions, accelerating planetary warming (a process begun during the first carbon era) and exposing the country to the ever more devastating effects of climate change. The Age of Unconventional Oil and Gas The explosive growth of automotive and aviation travel, the suburbanization of significant parts of the planet, the mechanization of agriculture and warfare, the global supremacy of the United States, and the onset of climate change: these were the hallmarks of the exploitation of conventional petroleum. At present, most of the world’s oil is still obtained from a few hundred giant onshore fields in Iran, Iraq, Kuwait, Russia, Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, the United States, and Venezuela, among other countries; some additional oil is acquired from offshore fields in the North Sea, the Gulf of Guinea, and the Gulf of Mexico. This oil comes out of the ground in liquid form and requires relatively little processing before being refined into commercial fuels. But such conventional oil is disappearing. According to the IEA, the major fields that currently provide the lion’s share of global petroleum will lose two-thirds of their production over the next 25 years, with their net output plunging from 68 million barrels per day in 2009 to a mere 26 million barrels in 2035. The IEA assures us that new oil will be found to replace those lost supplies, but most of this will be of an unconventional nature. In the coming decades, unconventional oils will account for a growing share of

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the global petroleum inventory, eventually becoming our main source of supply. The same is true for natural gas, the second most important source of world energy. The global supply of conventional gas, like conventional oil, is shrinking, and we are becoming increasingly dependent on unconventional sources of supply — especially from the Arctic, the deep oceans, and shale rock via hydraulic fracturing. In certain ways, unconventional hydrocarbons are akin to conventional fuels. Both are largely composed of hydrogen and carbon, and can be burned to produce heat and energy. But in time the differences between them will make an ever-greater difference to us. Unconventional fuels — especially heavy oils and tar sands — tend to possess a higher proportion of carbon to hydrogen than conventional oil, and so release more carbon dioxide when burned. Arctic and deep-offshore oil require more energy to extract, and so produce higher carbon emissions in their very production. “Many new breeds of petroleum fuels are nothing like conventional oil,” Deborah Gordon, a specialist on the topic at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, wrote in 2012. “Unconventional oils tend to be heavy, complex, carbon laden, and locked up deep in the earth, tightly trapped between or bound to sand, tar, and rock.” By far the most worrisome consequence of the distinctive nature of unconventional fuels is their extreme impact on the environment. Because they are often characterized by higher ratios of carbon to hydrogen, and generally require more energy to extract and be converted into usable materials, they produce more carbon dioxide emissions per unit of energy released. In addition, the process that produces shale gas, hailed as a “clean” fossil fuel, is believed by many scientists to cause widespread releases of methane, a particularly potent greenhouse gas.

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All of this means that, as the consumption of fossil fuels grows, increasing, not decreasing, amounts of CO2 and methane will be released into the atmosphere and, instead of slowing, global warming will speed up. And here’s another problem associated with the third carbon age: the production of unconventional oil and gas turns out to require vast amounts of water — for fracking operations, to extract tar sands and extra-heavy oil, and to facilitate the transport and refining of such fuels. This is producing a growing threat of water contamination, especially in areas of intense fracking and tar sands production, along with competition over access to water supplies among drillers, farmers, municipal water authorities, and others. As climate change intensifies, drought will become the norm in many areas and so this competition will only grow fiercer. Along with these and other environmental impacts, the transition from conventional to unconventional fuels will have economic and geopolitical consequences hard to fully assess at this moment. As a start, the exploitation of unconventional oil and gas reserves from previously inaccessible regions involves the introduction of novel production technologies, including deep-sea and Arctic drilling, hydro-fracking, and tar-sands upgrading. One result has been a shakeup in the global energy industry, with the emergence of innovative companies possessing the skills and determination to exploit the new unconventional resources — much as occurred during the early years of the petroleum era when new firms arose to exploit the world’s oil reserves. This has been especially evident in the development of shale oil and gas. In many cases, the breakthrough technologies in this field were devised and deployed by smaller, risk-taking firms like Cabot Oil and Gas, Devon Energy Corporation, Mitchell Energy and Development Corporation, and XTO Energy. These and similar companies pioneered the use of hydro-fracking to extract oil and gas from shale formations in Arkansas, North Dakota, Pennsylvania, and Texas, and later sparked a stampede by larger energy firms to obtain stakes of their own in these areas. To

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augment those stakes, the giant firms are gobbling up many of the smaller and mid-sized ones. Among the most conspicuous takeovers was ExxonMobil’s 2009 purchase of XTO for $41 billion. That deal highlights an especially worrisome feature of this new era: the deployment of massive funds by giant energy firms and their financial backers to acquire stakes in the production of unconventional forms of oil and gas — in amounts far exceeding comparable investments in either conventional hydrocarbons or renewable energy. It’s clear that, for these companies, unconventional energy is the next big thing and, as among the most profitable firms in history, they are prepared to spend astronomical sums to ensure that they continue to be so. If this means investment in renewable energy is shortchanged, so be it. “Without a concerted policymaking effort” to favor the development of renewables, Carnegie’s Gordon warns, future investments in the energy field “will likely continue to flow disproportionately toward unconventional oil.” In other words, there will be an increasingly entrenched institutional bias among energy firms, banks, lending agencies, and governments toward next-generation fossil-fuel production, only increasing the difficulty of establishing national and international curbs on carbon emissions. This is evident, for example, in the Obama administration’s undiminished support for deep-offshore drilling and shale gas development, despite its purported commitment to reduce carbon emissions. It is likewise evident in the growing international interest in the development of shale and heavy-oil reserves, even as fresh investment in green energy is being cut back. As in the environmental and economic fields, the transition from conventional to unconventional oil and gas will have a substantial, if still largely undefined, impact on political and military affairs. U.S. and Canadian companies are playing a decisive role in the

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development of many of the vital new unconventional fossil-fuel technologies; in addition, some of the world’s largest unconventional oil and gas reserves are located in North America. The effect of this is to bolster U.S. global power at the expense of rival energy producers like Russia and Venezuela, which face rising competition from North American companies, and energy-importing states like China and India, which lack the resources and technology to produce unconventional fuels. At the same time, Washington appears more inclined to counter the rise of China by seeking to dominate the global sea lanes and bolster its military ties with regional allies like Australia, India, Japan, the Philippines, and South Korea. Many factors are contributing to this strategic shift, but from their statements it is clear enough that top American officials see it as stemming in significant part from America’s growing self-sufficiency in energy production and its early mastery of the latest production technologies. “America’s new energy posture allows us to engage [the world] from a position of greater strength,” National Security Advisor Tom Donilon asserted in an April speech at Columbia University. “Increasing U.S. energy supplies act as a cushion that helps reduce our vulnerability to global supply disruptions [and] affords us a stronger hand in pursuing and implementing our international security goals.” For the time being, the U.S. leaders can afford to boast of their “stronger hand” in world affairs, as no other country possesses the capabilities to exploit unconventional resources on such a large scale. By seeking to extract geopolitical benefits from a growing world reliance on such fuels, however, Washington inevitably invites countermoves of various sorts. Rival powers, fearful and resentful of its geopolitical assertiveness, will bolster their capacity to resist American power — a trend already evident in China’s accelerating naval and missile buildup. At the same time, other states will seek to develop their own capacity to exploit unconventional resources in what might be

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considered a fossil-fuels version of an arms race. This will require considerable effort, but such resources are widely distributed across the planet and in time other major producers of unconventional fuels are bound to emerge, challenging America’s advantage in this realm (even as they increase the staying power and global destructiveness of the third age of carbon). Sooner or later, much of international relations will revolve around these issues. Surviving the Third Carbon Era Barring unforeseen shifts in global policies and behavior, the world will become increasingly dependent on the exploitation of unconventional energy. This, in turn, means an increase in the buildup of greenhouse gases with little possibility of averting the onset of catastrophic climate effects. Yes, we will also witness progress in the development and installation of renewable forms of energy, but these will play a subordinate role to the development of unconventional oil and gas. Life in the third carbon era will not be without its benefits. Those who rely on fossil fuels for transportation, heating, and the like can perhaps take comfort from the fact that oil and natural gas will not run out soon, as was predicted by many energy analysts in the early years of this century. Banks, the energy corporations, and other economic interests will undoubtedly amass staggering profits from the explosive expansion of the unconventional oil business and global increases in the consumption of these fuels. But most of us won’t be rewarded. Quite the opposite. Instead, we’ll experience the discomfort and suffering accompanying the heating of the planet, the scarcity of contested water supplies in many regions, and the evisceration of the natural landscape. What can be done to cut short the third carbon era and avert the worst of these outcomes? Calling for greater investment in green energy is essential but insufficient at a moment when the powers that be are emphasizing the development of unconventional fuels. Campaigning for curbs on carbon emissions is necessary, but will undoubtedly prove problematic, given an increasingly deeply

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embedded institutional bias toward unconventional energy. Needed, in addition to such efforts, is a drive to expose the distinctiveness and the dangers of unconventional energy and to demonize those who choose to invest in these fuels rather than their green alternatives. Some efforts of this sort are already underway, including student-initiated campaigns to persuade or compel college and university trustees to divest from any investments in fossil-fuel companies. These, however, still fall short of a systemic drive to identify and resist those responsible for our growing reliance on unconventional fuels. For all President Obama’s talk of a green technology revolution, we remain deeply entrenched in a world dominated by fossil fuels, with the only true revolution now underway involving the shift from one class of such fuels to another. Without a doubt, this is a formula for global catastrophe. To survive this era, humanity must become much smarter about this new kind of energy and then take the steps necessary to compress the third carbon era and hasten in the Age of Renewables before we burn ourselves off this planet.

Energy in India

The future is black Power is essential for India’s long-term growth. But electricity is

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unlikely to flow fast enough Jan 21st 2012 | NAGPUR http://www.economist.com/node/21543138/comments#comments

STAB a finger at the middle of a map of India and you will hit Nagpur. Some 20 miles (32 kilometres) north-west of the city is a sloping tunnel bored into the rock. Ride two miles down into the gloom, hanging from a wire, and after a torch-lit hike past underground streams and conveyor belts you arrive at a black wall. Sweating men are rigging it with tubes of explosives and wire detonators. Soon they will blast it apart, and down should tumble tonnes of India's most important commodity: coal. In coal India has something as abundant as people. As more Indians enjoy the trappings of middle-class life and the country industrialises, demand for coal-fired electricity will continue to rise smartly, roughly in line with economic growth. India may not have much oil or gas to call its own but it has the world's fifth-largest coal reserves. And it has successfully raised a mountain of the other raw material needed to turn carbon into sparks: capital. Some $130 billion has been ploughed into the power industry in the past five years. Of that, $60 billion or so has come from the private sector—probably the largest-ever private-sector investment India has seen. Possessing coal and capital is no guarantee that India's energy boiler will work properly, however. It also involves multiple states, government ministries, regulators, mandarins, politicians,

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tycoons, environmentalists, villagers, activists, crooks and bandits. There are the usual gripes of an emerging economy: blackouts (during peak hours the system delivers 10% less electricity than customers want) and an inadequate grid that does not reach some 300m people (although it has improved a lot in recent years). There is also a risk that India cannot deliver the long-term increase in electricity generation that its economy needs to fulfil its potential. On January 18th a group of influential businessmen gathered in Delhi to bend the prime minister's ear on this very matter.

The problem is partly one of design. Coal is dug up by a state-monopolist that has failed to boost output significantly in recent years, unlike China (see chart 1), and so cannot keep up with demand. Power is distributed to homes and firms by publicly owned grid companies that are often bankrupt, their tariffs kept too low by local politicians. Trapped in the middle are the firms that run power stations. In desperation they are importing pricier foreign coal, but the grid companies cannot afford the power it produces. With too little coal and wobbly customers, the private firms that have built new power stations are in financial trouble. Another wave of private investment looks unlikely. In India, though, no one expects perfect design. The economy

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sits somewhere between the old command-and-control approach and the new ways of markets and private capital. What is worrying is that India's talent for improvisation—a collective ability to muddle through—has deserted it when it comes to providing electricity. The problem has been clear for ages. A circuitous blame game is taking place. Ministries squabble but no one knocks heads together. If you trawl round the offices of industry bosses the livid letters they brandish trace their incandescent correspondence with each other. Power, so vital for growth, is India's biggest bottleneck. The danger is that it becomes a metaphor for the whole economy: many fear that the muddle-through approach of the past two decades of boom has diminishing returns. One dam thing after another It wasn't always all about coal. Jawaharlal Nehru, the country's first prime minister after independence, was obsessed with hydroelectric dams, calling them the “temples of modern India”. It would have been good for India's environment, and the world's, had many more temples been raised. The fad for hydro trickled away and it now provides only 14% of India's power compared with up to a half in the 1960s. That seems unlikely to change—India is too chaotic and free a place to manage the feats of national machismo that allowed China to build the Three Gorges dam. Although new projects are planned in places such as Kashmir and neighbouring Bhutan, harnessing Himalayan rivers to power all of India is for now a dream, not a policy. The subcontinent has plenty of sun and wind, and states including Gujarat and Tamil Nadu are keen to encourage investments in renewable energy. These are likely to be niche sources of power, thanks to problems getting land and their high cost. As for nuclear power, India's attitude has long been hyperbolic on paper and ambivalent in practice, despite striking a civilian nuclear deal with America in 2005. Foreign companies are put off by the prospect of unlimited liability in the event of an accident. Nuclear plants face opposition from hostile state

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governments and protesters. Events in Japan have not helped. “By the time people forgot Chernobyl, along came Fukushima,” says one industry bigwig.

The result is that, as in China, fossil fuels will dominate the energy mix (see chart 2). Carbon emissions will rise in tandem, by about two-and-a-half times between 2010 and 2030 according to McKinsey, a consultancy. The growth of India's power industry—assuming it is built and largely fired by fossil fuels—would contribute about a tenth of the total global rise in emissions over the period. Most Indians do not feel too guilty, arguing that dirtier rich countries, not poor ones, should show restraint. India's emissions will remain far below those from America and China both in absolute terms and per head. Fossil hunting India has some oil and gas, mainly offshore and in Rajasthan, although production has been faltering. It lags China in developing pipelines from energy-rich Central Asia. Coal, then, is key. India's is not of a high quality—it contains too much ash—but there is lots of it. The British started swinging picks in earnest in the mid-19th century, to meet the demand of a burgeoning railway system, and undertook geological surveys in Bengal.

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Today east India remains coal's heartland and control of the sooty stuff lies with one of the most important companies that most people have never heard of: Coal India. It is a mighty odd beast. Its blood is of the public sector, with modest buildings, 375,000 staff, an empire of largely opencast mines and company towns, and even its own song. Its managers are proud scientists and engineers. And prices are fixed by the state, at far below international levels. Yet its brain has some capitalist cells. After privatisation in 2010, a tenth of its shares are listed (the rest are owned by the state) making it India's third-most-valuable firm, worth $44 billion. It makes a huge return on equity of over 35%, has $11 billion of unused net cash and reinvests only a fifth of its gross cashflow. It even has a financial gnat on its hide in the form of TCI, a London-based activist hedge fund famed for its stagy belligerence.

What is beyond doubt, though, is that Coal India is not digging fast enough (see chart 3). Output has been flat for the past two years—a dire result. India's ratio of production to reserves is middling by global standards and is well below China's. Assuming production picks up and grows in line with the long-

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term average, a vast shortfall in production will still stunt growth in power generation. From his office in Kolkata, outside which street vendors boil vats of soup on coal stoves, the firm's outgoing chairman, N.C. Jha, says that Coal India is being made a scapegoat. The lag in production partly reflects one-off factors, such as bad weather, but is mainly the result of a deliberate clampdown by the central government on new permits for buying and clearing land, and an explosion of red tape. “Give me land, and I will give you coal,” says Mr Jha. This complaint is reasonable. At Gondegaon, a vast opencast mine in the Nagpur field, engineers need more space to dump the earth and rock that is dug up with coal. A map shows the pit hemmed in by villages and scrub land. Acquiring the land, compensating the villagers and making sure they shift poses a challenge harder than geology, says the company. “We do not have a magic wand in our hand to increase production,” says D.C. Garg, boss of the Coal India unit responsible for the area. In east India the firm faces another problem: most reserves are in remote areas where Maoist guerrillas operate. Yet for all the hurdles it faces, many say Coal India is part of the problem. A senior government official says it is riddled with trade unionism and gangs who steal coal—something the private sector would resolve by sending in “the toughest son of a bitch” they could find. The boss of one smallish state-owned electricity generator details how local Coal India employees collude with middlemen to steal his fuel. He says that its local chief is “hugely compromised” by corruption. And no one really knows what Coal India's mission is, thanks to its hybrid status. Should it maximise profits and the dividend it pays to a cash-strapped government, despite the fact it is a near-monopoly and unregulated? Or is its job to deliver cheap fuel for the nation and accept lower returns by investing more on new mines? Let's burn Australia instead Private generating firms are not waiting to find out the answer to this identity crisis. Instead they have assumed that the state will

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not deliver enough and are prepared to import vast amounts of coal to fire their plants, either by acquiring it from wholesalers or by buying foreign coal mines. Some $7 billion has been spent in the past six years on pits in Australia, Indonesia and Africa. Gautam Adani, a Gujarat-based tycoon, is building a private network of mines abroad that feeds ports and power stations in India. Amish Shah of Credit Suisse reckons that by the year to March 2017 domestic coal production will meet only 73% of demand, leaving a gap of some 230m tonnes, almost five times the level of 2012. Include other industries that use coal, such as steel, and some analysts calculate that India's total imports by 2017 could reach some 300m tonnes. That is on a par with the current exports of Australia, or those of Indonesia, South Africa and Canada combined. Even if India could improve its ports and already stretched railways, and adapt its power plants to burn alien coal, can it afford to import so much? Coal prices have soared in recent years (the benchmark price is some 50% above its average in 2009), partly due to Chinese demand. Indonesia has imposed new rules that hamper foreign mine owners from exporting coal at below market rates. So, adjusted for quality, foreign coal is perhaps four times pricier than the local stuff. The cost of shopping abroad could be as much as $20 billion by 2017—or 1% of today's GDP. That would swell India's overall annual energy-import bill. Include coal used for purposes other than power, liquefied natural gas and oil and it could rise by $65 billion or so by 2017, compared with the year to March 2011, according to Sanjeev Prasad of Kotak, a broker. That would put a huge strain on the balance of payments. Even if India can afford to import all this coal, the next question is whether it can persuade its population to fork out for the electricity it produces. Torture boards Electricity meters are installed in unexpected places. Power in Dharavi, a giant Mumbai slum, is now largely tolled, with meters nestling next to curing factories piled with goat skins and people

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melting down used plastic cutlery. But the city, where power is distributed mainly by two private firms, is an exception: almost everywhere else state electricity boards operate the grid, usually badly. They typically lose about a third of the power they buy through theft or inefficient kit, and one executive reckons that up to another third is delivered legally to rural customers who pay subsidised prices or get it free. The result is that a small proportion of customers foot the bills. Although tariffs are notionally set by regulators, local politicians often hold sway and keep them low to win votes. The legislation that governs power is reasonable but unenforced. The electricity boards haemorrhage cash as a result. They lost $11 billion, excluding any subsidies, in the 12 months to March 2010—the last year for which reliable figures are available. The consequences are twofold. First, there is not enough money to upgrade the network: up to $200 billion of capital investment is required. And second, if the cost of the power rises because of the expense of imported coal, these outfits are neither strong enough to absorb the financial hit themselves nor capable of easily passing it through by raising prices to customers. That means it is their suppliers, the generating companies, that get squashed. “I can see if someone is sleeping on the job,” boasts Arup Roy Choudhury, the chairman of NTPC, the country's biggest electricity generator. In the floor above his office in Delhi a CCTV studio allows him to spy on his empire. He can zoom in on a giant construction site in Mouda, near those mines in Nagpur, where in March a new plant will fire up, fuelled by coal produced by Coal India. NTPC is likely to get the coal it needs partly because it is state-owned and big. Another power firm in the same state with a new plant coming on line in March expects to get only half the fuel originally promised by Coal India. Private-sector firms with plants coming on line often assume they will be last in the queue for domestic fuel. If they substitute imported coal for domestic coal they worry that they may not be allowed to pass on the costs and that if they are, the electricity boards won't be able to pay.

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Generation should be a success story. After a false start in the 1990s, during which even Enron was briefly and disastrously tempted in, mainly local firms, including Tata Sons and Reliance Group, have piled in once more. Special rules were created to fast-track “ultra-mega power plants”, among the largest in the world, with their own captive coal supply and exemptions from some red tape. Total capital investment (including NTPC) has been perhaps $60 billion in the past five years. Yet now share prices have slumped and the central bank has been forced to reassure financial markets that a wave of defaults in the sector will not hurt the banks, which have about 7% of their loans to the power industry, mainly to generation firms. The true cost to the country is not a few bad debts but a reduction in long-term investment plans as confidence wanes. Across the industry “projects are taking a hit, due to a lack of fuel among other things,” says J.P. Chalasani, the chief executive of Reliance Power, a generation firm. For the economy to expand at 8-9% it will need to add large amounts of generation, consistently. “We are nowhere near that unless immediate action is taken. At some point all this will hit our GDP growth.” In theory there are two solutions to the looming power problem. One is to privatise the electricity boards, end Coal India's de facto monopoly or break it up, create new regulators and give teeth to existing ones, and then hope that market forces raise standards, tariffs and production. The other is to resort to command-and-control, with a single authority breaking heads. Either of these approaches might be better than today's squabbling and passivity. Unfortunately, neither is likely. Privatisation is too politically sensitive, as is allowing private firms, let alone foreigners, to run riot over India's coal beds. And the mesh of states, law courts, ministries and coalition politics means iron fists come out only in a crisis. Watch while we juggle That leaves an alternative approach of administrative fiat and improvisation. It hasn't worked so far but there are some grounds for hope. A recent court ruling has prodded many electricity boards to raise tariffs. Crafty ways are being cooked up to allow

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private miners to do the digging while Coal India retains its notional title to the coal, and to grant permission for more “captive” mines where a private generator digs up its own fuel.

In need of untangling Banks seem to have been given the nod by the central bank to ease the terms of their loans to power firms without booking losses. Government officials talk of spreading the cost of imported coal across all firms, so it is not borne by a few, and dream of open access where a power station could bypass the state grid operators and plug into customers directly. It is a safe bet that India's skills of improvisation will recover—helped by stern words from the prime minister. The lights will not go out anywhere for long enough to annoy voters unduly, and by historical standards there will be decent improvements in the reach and availability of electricity. Companies which need reliable power supplies, including India's technology giants, will carry on building their own generators just to be sure. Those states that can guarantee power supply, such as Gujarat, will attract the majority of energy-intensive investment, such as car factories. If the test is avoiding a national catastrophe, India's power sector

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will pass it. But if it is delivering the infrastructure that can allow the economy to grow at close to a double-digit pace and industrialise rapidly, India is failing. From the print edition: Briefing