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The Cynicism of “African Solutions for African Problems”Belachew Gebrewolda

a Helmut Schmidt University of the Federal Armed Forces, Hamburg, Germany

Online publication date: 25 May 2010

To cite this Article Gebrewold, Belachew(2010) 'The Cynicism of “African Solutions for African Problems”', AfricanSecurity, 3: 2, 80 — 103To link to this Article: DOI: 10.1080/19392206.2010.485509URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/19392206.2010.485509

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UAFS1939-22061939-2214African Security, Vol. 3, No. 2, Sep 2010: pp. 0–0African SecurityThe Cynicism of “African Solutions for African Problems”The Cynicism of “African Solutions for African Problems”Belachew Gebrewold

Belachew Gebrewold

Helmut Schmidt University of the Federal Armed Forces, Hamburg, Germany

ABSTRACT. It is suggested that the emergence of a more peaceful and prosperousAfrica depends on the implementation of “African solutions for African problems” andthat this be done through the creation of regional security communities. This maysound right, but because of internal and external factors, as a policy it is cynical, hypo-critical, and misleading. There is a fundamental contradiction between the concept intheory and in practice. This paper shows that the complex problems in Africa are partof the global systemic interaction that often hinders the potential of the African Unionand its regional economic communities’ ability to become security communities. I arguethat since Africa’s problems are not only African but also global problems, solutions forAfrica can only be global-systemic.

KEYWORDS. African Union, security community, China, France, UK, USA, Russia,cynicism, African solutions.

INTRODUCTION

Currently, “African solutions for African problems” has become the leadingprinciple driving security and in economic cooperation within Africa andbetween the continent and outside actors. The concept can be traced to theearly 1960s when intra-African integration and mutual support in anticolo-nial struggles had intensified. The Organization for African Unity (OAU) wasestablished in 1963 and the Abuja Treaty, promoting economic integrationamong African states, was signed in 1991. The African Mechanism for ConflictPrevention, Management and Resolution was followed in 1993 and the sum-mits of Sirte (1999), Lomé (2000), and Lusaka (2001) led to the formation ofthe African Union (AU) in 2002. The regional economic communities (RECs),such as SADC (Southern African Development Community), IGAD (Intergov-ernmental Authority for Development), and ECOWAS (Economic Community

Address correspondence to Dr. Belachew Gebrewold, Helmut Schmidt University,University of the Federal Armed Forces Hamburg, Department of International Relations,Postfach 700822, 22008 Hamburg, Germany. E-mail: [email protected]

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The Cynicism of “African Solutions for African Problems” 81

of West African States), and their security arms, are considered essential ifthe AU is to establish political and economic ownership of its future.

What are the determining factors for the successful implementation of“African solutions for African problems”? This article argues that the keyproblems of “African solutions for African problems” are not primarily techni-cal, financial, or logistical problems. Rather they are multilevel systemic con-tradictions imbedded in Africa’s place in the international system. If one seesAfrica’s conflicts only from intrastate (and regional) points of views, it seemsobvious that outsiders cannot solve African conflicts and that some Africanstates must change their direction. If the problems are purely internal, inter-national initiatives will have only limited impact on the continent.1

Not all of African problems are externally imposed, nor are Africans merevictims of the global system. However, the successes as well as setbacks of theAfrican Union and of Africa’s regional economic and concomitant securitycommunities must be seen in the global context.

The objective of this paper is not to analyze whether or not the AU and RECsare security communities but to examine the impact of the global system on theirability to evolve into security communities. In other words, my argument is notthat Africa’s problems emerge and continue because of the lack of security com-munities, it is that the impact of the global system on the nascent African secu-rity communities affect their ability to perform as security communities.

I understand system as a number of actors and factors and their relationsamong and mutual impact on one another. In the context of this analysis, thesystem consists of the interactions of actors and factors at the intrastate, inter-state, and global levels. “African solutions for African problems” translates asintrastate or interstate challenges to be met. I focus on the neglected global level.

First, this paper discusses what constitutes a security community andwhat is the potential for the AU and its RECs to become one. Second, it exam-ines what “African solutions for African problems” means for African institu-tions. Third, it briefly illustrates the commitment of central global actors tothis idea in theory. Fourth, it discusses the actual behavior of the globalactors, pointing out the gulf between theory and practice. It concludes with asummary and suggestions.

SECURITY COMMUNITY AS A MECHANISM OF EFFECTIVE OWNERSHIP

Before exploring whether Africa can find solutions to its problems andwhether the AU and RSMs are security communities or not, it is helpful todefine a security community. According to Deutsch et al., a security communityimplies the integration of a group of people where the members of that commu-nity abolish war based on “we-ness,” and the “dependable expectations” of


82 Belachew Gebrewold

“peaceful change.”2 There is an agreement that common social problems mustand can be resolved by processes of “peaceful change, sense of community,institutionalized procedures, and without resort to large-scale physical force.”3

The increasing unattractiveness of war, mutual sympathy, loyalties, “we-feeling,”trust, and identification of mutual interests lead to the emergence of a plural-istic security community.4 As a consequence, transnational communities inDeutsch et al.’s argument often constructed by political elites are character-ized by shared identities, values, meanings, direct interactions, and reciprocallong-term interests.5

Security communities or nascent security communities already exist,including the European Union (EU), Association of Southeast Asian Nations(ASEAN), and the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA). The AUand its RECs have similar ambitions. What are the challenges facing the AUand its RECs? For a better understanding of this issue, we can compare theEU to the AU. Due to its high degree of economic integration and peacefulinterstate relations, the EU has become the AU’s model.

The EU is the most advanced and successful regional security community.Although it is the model for the AU, the differences between them are sub-stantial. The improbability of war among the EU states and their capabilitiesto respond to their mutual needs without resort to violence is a distinguishingtrait. The EU’s member states’ economies are highly integrated (they trademore among themselves than with non-EU states). Africa’s economies are nothighly integrated (they trade more with external countries) and neither are itsregional subsystems. In Europe, unlike Africa (with the possible exception ofIreland and Spain), there is no intrastate conflict. Finally, the EU’s place inthe international system is very different than Africa’s.

The aftermath of World War II led the EU states to cultivate sharedidentities, values, and to emphasize constructive interactions and reciprocallong-term interests. In contrast, African states, despite their common historyof slavery, colonialism, and neocolonialism, have not been able to harnesstheir common identities. As Tusicisny suggests, the EU is a mature, tightlycoupled, comprehensive security community capable of addressing politicalconflicts in a peaceful way. Its institutions are characterized by politicalliberalism, democracy, the rule of law, and the respect of human rights andfundamental freedoms.6

Nonetheless, the objectives and principles outlined in the AU’s Constitu-tive Act and the various declarations and strategies of its constituent RECscontain the core components of a security community, including achievinggreater unity and solidarity among African counties and peoples; defendingthe sovereignty, territorial integrity, and independence of its member states;accelerating the political and socioeconomic integration of the continent;promoting peace, security, stability, democratic principles and institutions,popular participation, and good governance; and protecting human rights.



However, with the notable exception of some countries such as Ghana, SouthAfrica, Mauritius, Botswana, most African states have a democracy deficit, andmany still suffer from high levels of corruption.

In most of Africa, individual state security cannot be considered separatefrom its neighbor’s security. The spillover of domestic dynamics like refugeeflows, expulsion of foreigners, and civil wars, generate regional insecurity.Regional interdependence, which drives the evolution of security communitieselsewhere, is often destructive rather than constructive; the externalities ofinterdependence are negative. This is evident in the conflicts surrounding theDemocratic Republic of Congo (DRC), Rwanda, Uganda, Angola, Sudan, Chad,the Central African Republic (CAR), Somalia, Ethiopia, Eritrea, Sierra Leone,Liberia, the Ivory Coast, and Burkina Faso. Thus, while the EU is a maturesecurity community, the regionalization of Africa’s conflicts point to a differ-ent regional configuration even as there is greater need for regional securitycommunities.

The AU as well as RSMs, as aspiring security communities, haveattempted to address the chronic problems of Africa’s various regions, but thecontinent and its various regions still lack the prerequisites for a securitycommunity, most important being viable economic integration. Moreover,donor dependency handicaps Africa’s attempt at collective self-sufficiency.

However, Africa problems are not only internal. The success of securitycommunities depends not only on their capability to organize themselvesinternally but also on their articulation within the international system. Real-ists argue that states are attentive to their interest and their power. Theiractions are constrained by the global structure, of which they are a constitu-ent part. For realists, international politics is about “power relationships thatexist in a community lacking an overriding authority”7—the internationalsystem is formally anarchical. Neorealists (or what are called structural real-ists) see the international system as determining the behavior of the states.However, such a perspective neglects the constitutive effect of ideas and the dis-tribution of knowledge among states that influence the international system.8

Consequently, while the international system has substantial influence on thedevelopment of security communities, in the same way the developmentswithin security communities impact the international system.

The extent to which individual states (and security communities) havesystemic effects depends on their position in the system. Whereas major pow-ers directly influence the system, weak states influence the system onlyindirectly. Major powers influence the global system through military inter-ventions, arms transfers, trade agreements, the exploitation of naturalresources, and in promoting their ideologies and values. Weak states influencethe global system through state failure, conflicts, and refugee flows. Most Afri-can states are positioned as the weaker partners in this asymmetric system.As a consequence of this asymmetric global system, the weak African states



will remain too weak to regulate interactions between various actors andfactors, will remain too weak to resist pressure (economic, political) from theoutside, and will be open to global systemic involvements and interferences.

Hence, the system and state mutually influence each other. Unfortu-nately, in this process the weakest units remain weak or become even weaker.Because the state and the international system are mutually constituted,peace initiatives, military interventions, development aid, and peacekeepingthat address only the intrastate level fail. There is an essential global dimen-sion. Therefore, it is important to not only focus on the institutional weak-nesses of the AU, IGAD, ECOWAS, or SADC, but also on Africa’s position inthe global system. Even as regional nascent security communities as institu-tions can enjoy certain autonomy, the weaker its component parts, the lessautonomous it will be. It will be open to more external penetration.

Africa’s internal weakness and relative weakness (and mutual interactionof both) inhibit the evolution of mature security communities. The concept“African solutions for African problems” predicated on the formation of suchcommunities is, therefore, problematic. Indeed Africa and its regions could bedesignated “nascent security communities”9 in that they are attempting to findtheir own solutions for their own problems at the regional level. However, in thenear future, African states cannot become “amalgamated security communi-ties.”10 Part of the reason rests in their position in the international system.

Africa’s many conflicts inhibit the development of pluralistic securitycommunities where independent states respond to one another’s needs andare endowed with compatible values relevant to political decision making.11

Without downplaying the importance of the AU and its RECs, currentlyAfrican security communities are neither comprehensive security communi-ties of “peaceful change” nor interstate security communities wherein inter-state wars become unthinkable. From a constructivist approach we can saythat AU and its RSMs may have “shared identities, values, and meanings.”12

Nonetheless, their internal weaknesses and external challenges mean they donot constitute security communities capable of creating “African solutions forAfrican problems.” This is despite the objectives and principles stated in thevarious African institutions. As argued in detail later, the global factor is asubstantial factor in this problem.

AFRICAN INSTITUTIONS AND “AFRICAN SOLUTIONS FOR AFRICAN PROBLEMS”

The AU’s objectives include strengthening solidarity and cooperation amongAfrican peoples; promoting peace, security, stability, and democratic princi-ples and institutions; and promoting popular participation, good governance,and human rights. But Africa cannot do it alone.



To this end, the New Economic Partnership for Development (NEPAD)was created in 2001 to forge a new international partnership that was meantto change the unequal relationship between Africa and the developed worldby, in part, accelerating regional and continental integration. The APRM(African Peer Review Mechanism), as an African self-monitoring mechanism,was established as a centerpiece of the NEPAD process. It is meant to acceler-ate the process of intra-African cooperation and integration by ensuringdemocracy, economic development, and good governance. It includes the Panelof the Wise as an instrument to foster “African solutions for African problems”via mediation as well as preventive and shuttle diplomacy. Africa’s RECs,such as IGAD, ECOWAS, SADC, are expected to enhance Africa’s ability toaddress its own problems by creating regional and continental conflict man-agement mechanisms and early warning systems and by fostering securitycooperation among the RECs, AU, and UN. This shared division of labor ismost evolved in the Mano River Basin.

In 1990, ECOMOG (ECOWAS Monitoring Group) intervened in theLiberian civil war with 12,000 troops backed by Guinea, Sierra Leone, andNigeria. However, ECOMOG found the Liberian warlord Charles Taylor aformidable battlefield adversary. Rather than defeating Taylor and his insur-gent forces, a tentative peace was negotiated in the Abuja Agreements of 1995and 1996. But Taylor’s Liberian insurgency had spillover effects. The RUF(Revolutionary United Front), which was supported by Taylor, was able totopple President Kabbah of Sierra Leone on May 25, 1997. ECOMOG thendeployed a large-scale force to Sierra Leone, and by February 1998 it droveback the RUF and reinstated Kabbah as president. In 1999, ECOMOGdeployed peacekeepers to Guinea-Bissau in response to a conflict betweenPresident Viera and a military junta. In 1999 after a RUF offensive, it recap-tured the Sierra Leone capital of Freetown. ECOWAS imposed an armsembargo on Liberia in October 1992 and economic sanctions on Sierra Leonein August 1997 and on Togo in February 2005. In 2001 it stationed troops onGuinea-Liberia border to stop guerrilla infiltration. It has been monitoring acease-fire in the Ivory Coast.

The conflict vortex in central/east Africa has also elicited a regionalresponse. Eastern and central African states imposed economic sanctions onBurundi in July 1996 after a coup through which President Buyoya came topower. The AU Mission in Burundi (AMIB) was deployed between 2003 and2004, the first fully fledged AU peace operation on the continent to verify andfacilitate the quartering of some 25,000 FDD (Forces pour la defense de lademocratie) fighters and the assignment to barracks of some 45,000 Burundianarmed forces.

In southern Africa, SADC threatened Lesotho with economic sanctions inSeptember 1998 following an attempted coup. In that same year, South Africaand Botswana intervened military in Lesotho under the auspices of SADC.



The AU has also taken on increasing responsibility. It sanctioned Togofrom February to April 2005 after a constitutional coup. It suspendedMauritania after the army overthrew the elected president in August 2008. InDecember 2008, it imposed sanctions on Guinea after the military took overfollowing the death of President Conte. In March 2009, it suspended Madagascarfrom the AU after the opposition took power with the support of the army. InMay 2009, the AU called on the UN Security Council to impose sanctions onEritrea because of its alleged support of radical and anti-TFG (TransitionalFederal Government) Islamist in Somalia. The enhanced engagement ofAfrica’s regional institutions and of the AU seemingly point to Africa solvingAfrica’s problems. But are they successful?

Africa’s peacekeeping missions are handicapped by being undermanned,underequipped, and underfunded. AMISOM (AU Mission in Somalia), forinstance, currently has slightly more than 5,000 troops, whereas it expects8,000 troops. AMIS (AU Mission in Sudan), which failed and was laterreplaced by UNAMID (UN–AU Mission in Darfur) lacked the troops, equip-ment, and mandate to provide adequate civilian protection or enforce theceasefire agreements of April 2004 and May 2006 that were violated by allsides. It was unable to control a conflict with just 7,000 troops and civilianpolice. Due to a lack of funds, it took more than six months for AMIB to com-plete the deployment of its 2,800 troops. In all of these cases, Africa’s externaldependence belies African solutions for African problems. Africa is dependenton the financial, logistical, planning, and transportation support of the EU,United States, NATO, and Canada.

How serious are Africans themselves about pursuing “African solutionsfor African problems”? The AU Constitutive Act (Article 4h) envisages thatthe AU will have the right to intervene in a Member State in response tograve circumstances, namely war crimes, genocide, and crimes againsthumanity. However, the AU Commission rejected the International CriminalCourt’s (ICC) arrest warrant of March 4, 2009, on President al-Bashir ofSudan. Many African states have called for the ICC proceedings to besuspended, arguing they will hamper efforts to bring peace to Darfur, thatit violates the sovereignty of the Sudanese state, and that it violates Article2(4) and (7) of the UN Charter. Only thirty African states are parties tothe ICC.

The case of Zimbabwe challenges the commitment of the AU to its statedvalues. The fact that most African states support Robert Mugabe shows thatAPRM faces serious challenges. Zambia and Botswana are the only SADCmembers not supporting Mugabe, either by inference or directly. Regionalstates (DRC, Kenya, Tanzania, Rwanda, Uganda, and Zambia) did impose anembargo on Burundi following its 1996 coup, but arms continued to flow intoBurundi from different sources through Angola, Kenya, Rwanda, Tanzania,and the DRC. “African solutions for African problems” has had a mixed result.



GLOBAL ACTORS AND “AFRICAN SOLUTIONS FOR AFRICAN PROBLEMS” IN THEORY

The idea of “African solutions for African problems” is in vogue. As aconsequence, global players like the UN, EU, United States, UK, France, andChina treat the AU and its RSMs as security communities rather than as thechallenged nascent security communities they are.

Although the UN recognizes the need for support from the internationalcommunity for Africa, it stresses that the responsibility for peace and securityand the capacity to address the root causes of conflict and to resolveconflicts in a peaceful manner lie primarily with Africa. Based on ChapterVIII of the UN Charter, the AU shares responsibility for finding African solu-tions for African problems. Various UN resolutions have underlined thispoint, such as A/RES/53/92 of December 7, 1998, A/RES/54/234 of December22, 1999, A/RES/55/217 of December 21, 2000, A/RES/56/37 of December 4,2001, A/RES/57/296 of December 20, 2002, A/RES/57/337 of July 3, 2003, 58/235of December 23, 2003, A/RES/59/213 of December 20, 2004, A/RES/59/255 ofDecember 23, 2004, A/RES/60/223 of December 23, 2005, A/RES/61/230of December 22, 2006, A/RES/62/179 of December 19, 2007, and A/RES/62/275of October 7, 2008. But how does it gain ownership of its own security if thatsecurity has an international dimension?

For the EU, ownership is a basic principle in its ties with Africa, alongwith equality and partnership, for achieving MDG (Millennium DevelopmentGoals). Ownership is stated, for example, in Articles 2, 11, 19, 56, and 73 ofthe Cotonou Agreement of 2000. As both the EU and Africa stated in theirStrategic Partnership agreement of 2007, the EU Commission underlines thatownership is “condition for success” for conflict prevention. The AU–EU JointStrategy of 2007 underlines that policies and strategies cannot be imposedfrom outside, that based on the principle of equality, partnership, and owner-ship the EU and Africa are equal partners in promoting peace, security, goodgovernance, human rights, and trade.13 The EU Political and SecurityCommittee on May 7, 2007 recommended that ownership should be a keyprinciple of the EU African relations. The council’s joint action 2005/557/CFSPof July 18, 2005, on the EU civilian-military supporting action to the AMISreiterated that the EU shall respect and support the principle of African own-ership. The EU’s November 15, 2008, Regional Strategy Paper for the regionof Southern and Eastern Africa and Indian Ocean as well as the RegionalStrategy Paper of EU for Southern African Region and Regional IndicativeProgramme (2008-2013) of September 18, 2008, underline ownership andAfrican responsibility as guiding principles for development strategies.14

The Commission for Africa initiated by Tony Blair stresses that responsi-bility for peace, security, conflict prevention, and resolution lies primarilywith African governments. In order to support African capacities, the UK



created the Africa Conflict Prevention Pool in 2001. The UK sub-Saharanstrategy and objectives for conflict prevention includes support of African conflictmanagement capacity, effective Peace and Security Architecture, AU regionaleconomic communities (like ECOWAS, IGAD, SADC), nongovernmental orga-nizations and universities, development of effective tools for conflict analysis,security sector reform, small arms control, and work on the economic andfinancial causes of conflict.

Michele Alliot-Marie, France’s current Justice Minister, said “Africa’s illsmust be dealt with by Africans.”15 The French military instrument, RECAMP(Renforcement des Capacités Africaines de Maintien de la Paix) was createdin 1998 to increase the military capacity of African countries and subregionalorganizations to engage in peacekeeping operations and to enable Africancountries to find African solutions for their problems. During his visit to SouthAfrica in February 2008, French President Sarkozy underlined that for thesake of everything that unites France with Africa it is unthinkable for Franceto be drawn into Africa’s domestic conflicts,16 a change of pace for France.

The principles of U.S.–African cooperation include supporting African lead-ership in overcoming conflict and encouraging Africa to address the challengesof debt, poverty, infrastructure development, and HIV/AIDS. The United Statesestablished the ACRI (African Crisis Response Initiative) in 1997 to enhancethe capacity of selected African countries to respond quickly and effectively topeacekeeping and humanitarian relief contingencies. The PSI (Pansahel Initia-tive of 2002) and the TSCTI (Trans-Saharan counterterrorism initiative of2004) were created to enhance the capacity of each participating African state tocontrol the full expanse of its own territory and to preclude terrorists and ter-rorist organizations from seeking or establishing sanctuaries in the Sahel.

The AGOA (Africa Growth and Opportunity Act) eligibility criteria includeestablishing the rule of law and combating corruption and human rights. TheU.S. National Security Strategy of 2002, as it relates to Africa, states that itsobjectives are to help it strengthen Africa’s fragile states, to help build indige-nous capability to secure porous borders, and to help strengthen law enforce-ment while using Africa’s reforming states and subregional organizations asthe primary means for addressing transnational threats. During his visit toGhana on July 11, 2009, U.S. President Obama said, “Africa’s future is up toAfricans,” and that Africa must take charge of its own destiny in the world.17

According to former Russian President Vladimir Putin, Russia willexpand its interaction with African states and assist with the earliest possiblesettlement of regional conflicts in Africa. The Foreign Policy Concept of theRussian Federation of July 2008 states that Russia will enhance its multi-pronged interaction with African States at the multilateral and bilateral lev-els, including through the dialogue and cooperation within the G8, contributeto the prompt resolution of regional conflicts and crisis situations in Africa,and develop political dialogue with the AU and subregional organizations.18



According to the declaration of the Beijing Summit of the Forum onChina–Africa Cooperation on November 16, 2006, China assured Africa that itwill support regional and subregional organizations in their efforts to promoteeconomic integration; resolve African problems; implement the NEPAD pro-grams; enhance prevention, management, and resolution of regional conflicts;combat transnational organized crimes and corruption; combat terrorism; andstop small arms smuggling. In its African Policy of January 2006, Chinaemphasized that it would continue to appeal to the international communityto give more attention to questions concerning peace and development inAfrica. It would support human rights, increase assistance to African nationswith no political strings attached, help train African military personnel andsupport their militaries ability to provide for their own security, and pursuemilitary-related technological exchanges and cooperation. According to theForum on China–Africa Cooperation Addis Ababa Action Plan (2004–2006),China would consider support for Africa’s peacekeeping operations logistics.Through the China–Africa Cooperation Beijing Action Plan (2007–2009) ofNovember 16, 2006, China promised the AU to build a convention center inAddis Ababa with US$150 million.19

The theoretical principles of cooperation between Africa and the globalplayers seem quite promising. Most external actors lean heavily on the AUand its various regional institutions. Ironically, even as the major externalplayers—from the UN to the major powers—call for Africa to find solutions forAfrican problems, they have crafted an intricate partnership with the AU andits regional institutions. Have they struck the right balance between benignneglect and malign involvement? How is external involvement squared withthe idea of “African solutions for African problems?” Is there even a unitedexternal voice, or does intra – major power competition better explain Africa’srelations with the outside world?

GLOBAL ACTORS AND “AFRICAN SOLUTIONS FOR AFRICAN PROBLEMS” IN PRACTICE

As Olsen convincingly argued, there are major contradictions among theinterests of the major external actors in Africa.20 Is the EU military conflictmanagement in Africa for the good of Africa or for themselves? The samequestion can be asked of other external actors. A brief sampling of how majorpowers interact with Africa is revealing.

France and AfricaBernard Debré, French Minster of Cooperation (from November 1994 to

May 1995) suggested that France should play an active role in Africa’s democ-ratization, because if Africans are left by themselves and not encouraged and



assisted, successful democratization is unlikely.21 However, France has beenattempting to secure power and influence through Africa on the wider inter-national stage and to use European foreign policy to achieve its own prioritiesand to establish national grandeur.22 France was the prime mover behindEurope’s trade and aid agreements with Africa (such as Yaoundé I of 1963,Yaoundé II of 1969, Lomé I-IV between 1975 and 2000, and the CotonouAgreements of 2000).23 The Lomé and Cotonou Agreements were createdbetween the African, Caribbean, and Pacific (ACP) states on the one hand andthe European Economic Community (later European Union) on the otherhand to promote sustainable development and poverty reduction in ACPmember states and integrate the ACP countries into the world economy.

France has relied on Africa as a source of strategic raw materials, as amarket for manufactured goods, and as an outlet for capital investment.24 Itsmilitary bases in Africa (Chad/N’Djamena, Central African Republic/Bangui,Senegal/Dakar, Ivory Coast/Abidjan, Gabon/Libreville, Djibouti/Djibouti, andCameroon) have been valuable in the projection of its commercial, military,and strategic interests.25 The Accord de Cooperation includes arms transfers,technological transfers, and military-industrial cooperation, which often go tonondemocratic regimes.

The sentimental bonds linking Paris to francophone Africa include dis-semination of French culture, the projection of French identity and valuesoverseas, the desire to maintain its status and influence in international poli-tics, the fear of Anglophone encroachment in Francophone Africa, economicinterests and involvement, links existing between France and the nationalruling elites, and the protection of its citizens in Africa (currently about240,000 French nationals live in Africa).26 France has protected friendlyregimes in Africa from internal and external threats through interventions,such as in Mauritania, Senegal, Congo-Brazzaville, Gabon, Cameroon, andChad in the 1960s; Chad again, as well as Djibouti, Western Sahara, CentralAfrican Republic, and Zaire in the 1970s; Chad twice more in the 1980s;Rwanda in the 1990s; and Chad again early 2008. After the Rwandan genocide,France established safe havens for radical Hutus and protected the perpetra-tors of the genocide from public scrutiny and accountability.27

France is still an unconditional supporter of the Chadian President IdrisDéby, whose regime ranked as one of the most corrupt in the world in 2007(ranked 172 out of 179 surveyed countries). In 2005, it was the most corruptafter Bangladesh. The French military support allowed the Chadian govern-ment to survive rebel attacks in 2006, 2007, and 2008. President Déby vio-lated the Chad Constitution in June 2005 when he stood for a third term aspresidential candidate. In protest, rebels fought government troops in 2006on the outskirts of N’Djamena. In May 2006, President Déby won an electionboycotted by the opposition. The Zaghawa minority, less than 3 percent ofthe total population, continues to dominate Chadian politics. For France,



nonetheless, Chad is a legitimate government deserving protection fromexternal aggression.

Various African officials and their families within nondemocratic regimesenjoy special treatments, including higher education in France’s best schoolsfor the children of the elite and extravagant shopping trips for African firstladies. Francophone African states continue to be treated as France’s cher-ished ones. The idea of the “grandeur de la France” often has been moreimportant than human rights or good governance in Africa.28 Nonetheless, anew era in French–African relations is beginning, marked by a French judgein June 2009 investigating alleged embezzlement by former Gabon PresidentOmar Bongo (who had led the country for more than forty years).

Finally, France also competes with both the UK and the United States inAfrica. When the United States and some European countries embraced theadvancement of Laurent Kabila in 1996, France was increasingly isolated inits support of Mobutu Sese Seko. When Washington signaled stronger tieswith Africa through various high-ranking visits—Secretary of State WarrenChristopher in October 1996, followed by Hillary Clinton in March 1997,Madeleine Albright in December 1997, and Bill Clinton in 1998—France inlate 1997 reacted by pushing for multilateralism in Africa. France startedsupporting the OAU’s conflict prevention program and the ECOWAS Morato-rium on Small Arms and to financially and logistically support the ECOWASpeacekeeping mission in Guinea-Bissau and the ECOFORCE (ECOWASForce) in the Ivory Coast. It did so by training African officers in Africathrough regional training schools rather than the traditional training done inFrance.29

In 2002, the EU and especially the UK imposed sanctions on Zimbabwe.France, however, took advantage of the hostility between Zimbabwe and theUK to advance its own interests. In 2003, France invited Mugabe to theFranco-African summit of Paris 2003, in the face of EU and British sanctions.Similarly, the EU condemned the 2003 election campaign in Togo and refusedto send election observers because of irregularities, whereas Paris sent elec-tion observers.

There has been, nonetheless, a modicum of cooperation among the Euro-pean powers. In November 1994, John Major and Francois Mitterrand agreedat the Franco-African summit that 1,000–1,500 African troops should betrained, equipped, and financed for peacekeeping duties by France, otherEuropean powers, and the EU. Accordingly, British Military Advisory Train-ing Team (BMATT) would provide support and training to the Armed Forcesin Africa, enhance African capacity to conduct peace support operations, andsupport the national Armed Forces Command and Staff, including infrastruc-ture projects such as accommodation facilities. At St. Malo in December 1998,UK and France expressed their intent to coordinate their Africa policies withits allies.



UK and AfricaGreat Britain’s Africa policy has been, at least partially, subsumed by the

global war on terror. British weapons have flowed to variety of African states,including regimes that openly flouted democratic principles and human rightsstandards. In 1999, for instance, the UK granted 970 small arms exportlicences to, among others, Eritrea, Kenya, and Zimbabwe.30 Since 2000,licences for military exports were granted to Eritrea, Ethiopia, Algeria,Sudan, Zambia, Uganda, Namibia, and Somalia. Fifty-three million poundsworth arms went to Nigeria.31 The Campaign against the Arms Trade esti-mated the British arms to Africa to have exceeded US$200 million in 2003.UK’s Sandline International brought thirty tons of arms and ammunition intoSierra Leone in 1998, in contravention of the UN arms embargo of 1997.Similarly, Avient, a company run by British businessmen, supplied militaryassistance to the DRC air force during its civil war. Between 2000 and 2004,the British arms sold to Africa reached a record level of £1 billion while theBritish government was emphasizing that it was putting political capital intorelieving poverty in Africa. More than £30 million of military equipment wassold to Angola, and export licences were granted by the Department of Tradeand Industry in 2004 to sell £3.6m of military equipment to Malawi, one of theleast developed nations in the world. In 2005, the UK arms export licences toAfrica had risen to record levels when ten African countries involved in con-flict purchased UK arms.32 An average of 18 billion dollars per year is lost byAfrica due to armed conflict.33 Besides France, Russia, Germany, and theUnited States, the UK is a leading producer and exporter of those arms.34

The Conflict Prevention Pool of the UK envisages improving conditions forAfrican Peacekeeping Training Support Programme through an integratedinstitutional structure and via resources of three government departments,the Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO), the Ministry of Defence (MOD),and the Department for International Development (DFID). Fighting poverty,promoting sustainable development and good governance, curbing the flows ofsmall arms and light weapons, and preventing the trade of conflict goods areunderlined as essential strategies to prevent conflict. But despite the Commis-sion for Africa’s stated intent, issues such as good governance and humanrights in Africa have been sidelined by the counterterrorism agenda. As aresult, a blind eye has been turned to the democracy deficit in such places asEthiopia and to corruption in Kenya.35

United States and AfricaWhen President Clinton took office he attempted to help African countries

manage their resources to effectively address their challenges and to buildstability and peace within their borders and in their subregions. Various U.S.policies for Africa were initiated: the U.S.–Africa Economic Cooperation



Forum; the Overseas Private Investment Cooperation, Trade and Develop-ment Act (2000); ACRI (1997); African Centre for Security Studies (ACSS)(1998); Military Medical Exercises in Africa (MED-FLAG); FLINTLOCK(promoting regional cooperation); Joint Combined Exchange Training (JCET);Foreign Military Financing (FMF); Foreign Military Sales Training (FMS-T);Direct Commercial Sales (DCS); International Military Education Training(IMET); Excess Defence Articles (EDA); and Humanitarian AssistanceProgrammes-Excess Property (HAP-EP). The United States attempted toprofessionalize military education in Africa. It established the African “demo-cratic university” (building expertise in areas of defense, law enforcement,economics, and political organization), supported regional peacekeeping coop-eration programs, and enhanced U.S. rapid response efforts to humanitariandisasters.

Contrary to President George W. Bush’s original assessment, Africabecame an important area of the U.S. strategic interests. In 2005, the Bushadministration pledged to give $15 billion over five years to treat HIV/AIDSsin Africa. In addition, the terrorist organization GSPC (Groupe Salafiste pourla Prédication et le Combat)—now AQIM (Al-Qaeda in Islamic Maghreb)—isoperating in the Sahara, drawing Washington’s attention. Twenty-five per-cent of those accused by the United States of being “unlawful combatants” andheld in Guantanamo Bay are from East Africa.

The eleven-day tour of U.S. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton to Kenya,South Africa, Nigeria, Angola, Liberia, the DRC, and Cape Verde in August2009 shows that Africa remains a key foreign policy priority. States such asKenya, Ethiopia, and Nigeria are frontline states in the global war on terror.However, this creates tension within Washington’s stated Africa policy. WhileU.S. allies may be getting militarily stronger as partners in the global war onterror, they are not necessarily becoming democratically stronger. Accordingto Freedom House Report 2007, the democratic record of U.S. ally Ethiopiahas become comparable to that of Chad, Eritrea, or Zimbabwe. The EthiopianCharities and Societies Proclamation (Draft Law) of June 2008 imposed finesand prison sentences of up to fifteen years for a range of new offenses, includ-ing participation in any meeting held by unregistered civil society organiza-tion or those declared by the government as unlawful organizations. TheUnited States, despite the principles embedded in AGOA, according to whicha country’s eligibility depends on the respect of human rights, and the UK,despite the principles of the Commission for Africa of 2005, collectively pro-vide Ethiopia with more than 600 million dollars in foreign assistance eachyear.36 Kenya received $486,000 in 2002 and requested $600,000 more in 2003and 2004. Furthermore, it is a major beneficiary of the $100 Million EACTI(East African Counter Terrorism Initiative) established in 2003 in order tostrengthen the counterterror capacities of the eastern African states,37 evenas U.S. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton during her visit in August 2009



described Kenya’s failure to seek justice following 2007–2008 postelection vio-lence as disappointing. But Kenya’s place in the global war against terrormeans that more than $2 billion flows from the United States to Kenya eachyear from official and private sources, including military support.38

Military and antiterror training in Africa supports the status quo, becauseonly those who are already in political and military power get the training.And the status quo does not favor democracy. The United States, for instance,has supplied Somali pro-government forces with over forty tons of weaponsand ammunition between January and July 2009 to fight Al-Shabab andHisbul Islam (which have extended their terrorist activities as far as Sydney).The overall conflict system in the Horn of Africa is left to simmer, and democ-racy still suffers.

Pragmatic imperatives seemingly trump the ideals recounted by theUnited States. In Angola, for instance, Secretary of State Hilary Clinton reit-erated the need for good governance, strong democratic institutions, and anti-corruption efforts. However, Angola supplies the United States with 7 percentof its oil demands. In Equatorial Guinea, the U.S. investment is over elevenbillion dollars. U.S. oil companies are involved in oil production in Chad, andit supported the four billion dollar Chad-Cameroon pipeline project.39 HilaryClinton has called on Nigeria to press ahead with democratic reform and thefight against corruption. However, Nigeria supplies 10 to 12 percent of U.S. oilimports, and the Gulf of Guinea will supply 20 to 25 percent of total U.S. oilimports by 2010.

According to the Transparency International Annual Report of 2007, outof 179 countries rankings by the TI, Nigeria (147), Angola (147), EquatorialGuinea (168), and Chad (172) belong to the most corrupt states in Africa. TheUnited States was one of the strongest supporters of the notorious UNITArebels in Angola. It is now providing undemocratic Angola with ships, radar,and intelligence to prevent it from becoming a target for seaborne crime as itgradually becomes Africa’s biggest oil producer.40

Finally, the United States is increasingly caught in a geopolitical competi-tion for Africa’s energy resources. Chinese oil interests and interventions inAfrica are closely watched by Washington. China gets 28 percent of its oilimports from Africa and it owns 40 percent of the oil industry in Sudan,41 akey U.S. partner in the global war against terrorism. Energy security is,therefore, contributing to the great power friction between the United Statesand China, particular over Sudan.

China and AfricaAs of 2007, there were about eight hundred Chinese firms working in

forty-nine African countries. China claims that through its investment inAfrica, it is raising standards of living. It recognizes that “soft power” can be



used to enhance its role as a rising power in the regional and world affairs.42

Nonetheless, it pursues its business interests Africa without regard for goodgovernance, democracy, and human rights. It grants loans to its client Africanstates without any conditionality.43 Yet, it is sensitive to how its Africanpartners treat Taiwan.

China has been warning various African states against any diplomaticrelations with Taiwan. On January 29, 1998, the Central African Republic(with which China broke off relations in 1999 when it established diplomaticrelations with Taiwan) bowed to such threats and broke formal ties withTaiwan. China and Guinea-Bissau resumed their diplomatic ties in April1998, which China had suspended for the same reasons on May 31, 1990.China’s ambassador to Lusaka warned that Beijing might cut off diplomaticrelations with Zambia if its voters elected a Taipei-leaning opposition candi-date in the presidential elections of 2006. Chad had to cut its ties with Taiwanin 2006 in order to secure loans from China, especially after the World Bankdropped the oil project there when it did not respect the terms of the agree-ment. In 2000, it was agreed with the World Bank that Chad would spend atleast 85 percent of oil incomes in social sector, including health and education.Instead the Chadian government spent more money on the military sectorthan on the social sector.44

Sixty-two percent of total African exports to China consist of oil, increas-ing at an annual compounded rate of 30 percent. Angola supplies 47 percent ofAfrica’s oil exports to China, followed by Sudan’s 25 percent, the DRC’s 13 per-cent, Equatorial Guinea’s 9 percent, and Nigeria’s 3 percent.45

The bilateral trade volume between China and Africa had reached$106.8 in 2008, up from $10 in 2000.46 Reminiscent of neocolonialism, theterms of trade strongly favor China: 87 percent of all imports from China toAfrica comprise textile, apparel, electric machinery, equipment, medicine,cosmetic products, and batteries.47 Chinese foreign direct investment inAfrica reached $1.3 billion in 2005, mainly in mineral rich countries likeNigeria, Sudan, and Zambia.48 The Chinese Minister of Construction WangGuangtao agreed in February 2008 to develop Ethiopia’s rich hydroelectricresources with the potential of more than 45,000 megawatts of energy.Similarly, in July 2008 China agreed to build up the elecricity supply inMali. A five billion dollar oil deal between China and Niger was signed inJune 2008, ignoring serious concerns and calls by the Network of Organisa-tions for Transparency and Budgetary Analysis for a parliamentary inquiryto ensure that people of Niger will benefit from the country’s oil wealth. Thiswas to avoid cases like in Angola where more than $1 billion in oil revenueshas been misappropriated in similar deals. China wants up to 40 percentof its oil and gas imports to come from Africa in the next five to ten years.It has already invested some thirty billion dollars in Africa’s oil and gasindustries.



The Chinese economic strategy includes turning the country’s armsindustry into a top global player by 2020, resulting in arms delivery to suchwar-torn countries as Sudan, Ethiopia, Eritrea, the DRC, and Sierra Leone.China has provided 90 percent of all of the African nation’s small arms acqui-sitions between 2004 and 2006, totaling more than fifty million dollars.49 Itscorporations transferred a substantial share of one billion dollars in weaponsto Ethiopia and Eritrea during their 1998–2000 war. Various covert ship-ments of weapons in violation of regional or international arms embargoes,with final destination mislabeled and the weapons disguised as agriculturalequipment, made their way there.

Nowhere are China’s inroads into Africa more evident that in Sudan.China is Sudan’s largest investor, with total stake estimated at four billion dol-lars, mainly in the oil sector and arms industry. Sudan imported eighty-threemillion dollars worth of military hardware from Beijing, despite of the SecurityCouncil Resolution 1591. Human Rights Watch says that China ramped up itssmall-arms supply to Sudan almost fivefold in 2004, even as other countriescut back in order to comply with the UN arms embargo. It has been the largestsupplier of arms to Sudan since 2004 and has sent over fifty-five million dollarsworth of small arms to the Sudanese government between 2004 and 2006.50 Ithas enabled Sudan to double its defense spending and purchase modern weap-ons systems, including Hind helicopter gunships, Antonov medium bombers,MiG 23 fighter aircraft, mobile artillery pieces, light assault weapons,51 onehundred million dollars worth of Shenyang fighter planes, and a dozen super-sonic F-7 jets.52 China sold Sudan six K-8 training aircraft along with spareparts worth thirty million pounds, which could have been used to keep militaryaircraft airborne, and arms and ammunition worth twelve million pounds.53

The BBC in July 2008 discovered that China has been helping Sudan’s govern-ment militarily in Darfur by training fighter pilots and supplying ChineseDong Feng army lorry, anti-aircraft guns, and Chinese Fantan jets.54

China condemned the International Criminal Court’s (ICC) warrant forthe arrest of Sudanese President al-Bashir of March 4, 2009. Jia Qinglin,chairman of the National Committee of the Chinese People’s Political Consul-tative Conference (CPPCC), visited Zimbabwe on April 24, 2007, and prom-ised to deepen bilateral cooperation in trade and other fields. From December31, 2006, to January 7, 2007, Chinese Foreign Minister Li Zhaoxing paid offi-cial visits to, among others, Equatorial Guinea, Guinea Bissau, Chad, theCentral African Republic, and Eritrea.

Russia and AfricaThe end of the Cold War led to a dramatic reduction of the Soviet military

and nonmilitary support for sub-Saharan African countries, from 12.5 billionrubles (US$420 million) in 1989 to 400 million rubles (about US$14 Million) in



1991.55 Russian assistance to Africa and other developing countries wasreduced because it was seen as a major cause of the Russian economic prob-lems, a “black hole” that swallowed Soviet resources.56 But Russia may bepoised to join the great power completion in Africa.

In his “Foreign Policy Concept of the Russian Federation” of June 28,2000, President Putin stressed that Russia would prioritize Africa’s securityand preserve and strengthen Africa’s sovereignty and territorial integrity.Russia seeks to achieve a prestigious position as a great power in the worldcommunity.

Russia supports an alternative world order (to U.S. perceived hegemony)based on the United Nations, consisting of, among others, strengtheninginternational security; limiting and reducing armaments; promoting humanrights, international peacemaking, participation in peacekeeping operations,and humanitarian aid to the suffering countries.

Russian foreign policy, much like the other great powers, is increasinglydriven by economic demands, the drive for power, and for markets for itsweapons.57 Since the end of the Cold War, Russia has pursued a less ideologi-cal or strategic approach in Africa for a more practical and pragmatic one thatfocuses on economic and trade interests, especially in those countries thatsupply oil and minerals (manganese, chrome, nickel, zinc, lead, etc).58 Accord-ing to the Ethiopian Trade and Industry Minister Girma Birru’s statement ofFebruary 14, 2008, Russian oil major Lukoil is planning to develop deposits inEthiopia. From 1982 to 1993, the Soviet Petroleum Exploration Expedition(SPEE) drilled nine deep gas wells in the Ethiopian region of Calub. TheCalub gas reserves are estimated at 2.7 trillion cubic feet (TCF), while theHilala gas reserves are estimated at 1.3 TCF. The Gambella basin is one of thefive sedimentary basins found in Ethiopia that are expected to produce oil.

Russia has joined oilmen from countries such as the United States, China,Japan, and India in places like Equatorial Guinea, Cameroon, Chad, and theDRC. Economists calculate that the Gulf of Guinea will earn $1 trillion fromoil by 2020.59 Russian Ambassador to Ethiopia Mikhail Afanasiev indicatedthat Moscow is chasing Beijing in Africa when he announced a five hundredmillion dollar development aid package to Africa not only to fight hunger, pov-erty, infectious diseases including HIV/AIDS, and other development-relatedproblems, but also to strengthen its role in a multipolar world where competi-tion for Africa’s resources with Europe, the United States, India, China,Japan, and South Korea is taking place.60

Between 2004 and 2008, Russia was the leading arms supplier to Central,North, and West Arica, with 74 percent of all major arms.61 Russia hadaccounted for 87 percent of Sudan’s major conventional weapons purchases inthe period 2003–2007, while China was responsible for only 8 percent.62

Sudan imported $34.7 million in military equipment from Moscow in 2005. In2005, Russia sold helicopter gunships worth about seven million pounds to the



Khartoum regime, and Belarus, a close ally of Russia, exported thirty-twoheavy artillery guns and nine armored fighting vehicles.63 In 2006, Russia andAlgeria signed $7.5 billion in arms sales contracts. In 2008 Russia not onlywrote off $4.6 billion of Libya’s debt but it also concluded two billion dollarmilitary-technical cooperation.64

The global powers discussed are the Permanent Members of the UNSecurity Council. The primary responsibility of the UN is to maintain interna-tional peace and security, to investigate any dispute or situation that mightlead to international friction, to recommend methods of adjusting such dis-putes or the terms of settlement, to formulate plans for establishing a systemto regulate armaments, to determine the existence of a threat to the peace oracts of aggression and to recommend what actions should be taken,; to call onUN members to apply economic sanctions to prevent or stop aggression, andto take military action against an aggressor. Moreover, according to the UNCharter Chapter VIII the UN Security Council encourages regional arrange-ments like the AU to find its own solutions for regional problems. The UN’shistory shows that this has not been always the case.

Wallensteen and Johansson designate the end of the Cold War as a forma-tive experience if one counts the number of all council resolutions and thosetaken under Chapter VII providing for enforcement measures as well as thosetabled resolutions that were blocked through vetoes by permanent Councilmembers.65 For the period 1946–1989, the annual average number of passedresolutions was fifteen; since then the average has dramatically changed tomore than sixty.

Since the paradigm change in the global system at the end of the ColdWar, human rights became a more important international concern, and theactive monitoring of the human rights situation and the investigation ofhuman rights violation started to become a sensitive issue.66 However, asshown, the contradicting behaviors of the UN Security Council members inpursuit of their own parochial interests has often handicapped the UN and ithas limited the UN’s ability to partner with Africa.

Somalia is a perfect example. It has been destabilized by arms flows fromIran to General Mohamed Farah Aideed in October 1993; United States to theSomali police force in March 1994; Libya to Hussein Mohamed Aideed mid-October 1997; Ethiopia to Mohamed Said Hirsi Morgan and Ahmed HashiMohammed in October 1997, in April 1998 to Abdullahi Yusuf Ahmed, andApril and June 2002 to Mohamed Sudi Yalahow and Mohamed Dhere;Bangladesh and Kuwait to Al Ittihad militia in August 1998; Eritrea toHussein Mohamed Aideed throughout 1999 and 2001; and Saudi Arabia toMusa Sudi Yalahow in January 2000. Qatar, Libya, and Saudi Arabia finan-cially and materially supported the Somali transitional government.67 Poland,Eritrea, Ethiopia, Yemen, Djibouti, Bulgaria, Egypt, Libya, and United ArabEmirates were involved in delivering weapons and ammunitions to Somalia.68



Ethiopia accuses Qatar of supporting terrorism in Somalia and Ethiopia, andas a consequence in April 2008 Ethiopia severed diplomatic ties with Qatar,which has strong ties with Eritrea. Eritrea continues to deliver arms to itsallies in Somalia; Ethiopian troops and AMISOM were allegedly selling weap-ons and ammunition in Somalia. Various weapons and ammunitions could betraced to Russia, France, Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Slovakia, Poland, Roma-nia and the former Yugoslavia, Yemen, United Arab Emirates, and the UnitedStates.69

Similarly, the conflict dynamic in Chad and Sudan cannot be limited tointernal or regional dimensions alone. In March 2009, Arab leaders under-lined their support for Sudanese President Omar al-Bashir by defying the ICCdecision. African states oppose the ICC arrest warrant for al-Bashir, whovisited Eritrea, Egypt, Libya, and Ethiopia in order to demonstrate that hehas supporters not only in the Arab world but also in Africa. Arms fromFrance, UK, Belarus, Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, Chad, Eritrea, Libya, Turkey,Russia, Iran, and China have been flowing into Sudan, despite Sudan’s crimesagainst humanity.70 Sudan signed agreements on military cooperation in2006, which includes agreements to supply arms and training with Belarus,China, Russia, and Turkey. The UN has so far been unable to stop this.

CONCLUSION

Although Africans are not mere victims of the global system but rather are itsco-maker, the slogan “African solutions for African problems” papers over thecomplexity of its challenges. Africa’s problems are too multifaceted to besolved by Africans alone. For instance, Africa lacks the capacity and resourcesto implement UN arms embargoes. It lacks the political will and a broaderdiplomatic strategy to tackle the continent’s issues. But, more important, evenif it had the capacity and will, because it is a highly penetrated subsystem, itsproblems are not purely generated from within.

If the external community, the great powers and the UN in particular,overestimate African ability to address its own problems, on the African sidethere is a huge self-overestimation or false expectations as well. Africa doesnot have the material power to prevent or address atrocities like genocide, warcrimes, and crimes against humanity. Africans do not even have a unifiedposition in many cases. Africa’s stand on Darfur’s atrocities and its position onthe arrest warrant of President Al Bashir of Sudan is a case in point.

Nonetheless, Africa’s states remain unequal and vulnerable partners inthe global system. The chaos in Somalia, as related previously, is, therefore,not only the product of internal factors. Crises in Africa will continue as longas global actors pursue contradicting interests, interests often driven byinter–great power competition.



Finally, the UN and the individual great power have a renewed focus ontaking a regional approach to Africa. Ideally, Africa’s subregions wouldbecome security communities, mimicking the evolution of the EU. But Africalacks the antecedent conditions that promoted regionalism in Europe. Itsregions’ destiny are not its own, because even as the major external actors pro-mote African self-sufficiency, they continue to pursue their own interests onthe continent because of the asymmetric nature of the international system.

NOTES

1. Rita Abrahamsen and Paul Williams, “Ethics and Foreign Policy: the Antinomies ofNew Labour’s ‘Third Way’ in Sub-Saharan Africa,” Political Studies 49 (2001): 262.

2. Karl W. Deutsch et al., Political Community and the North Atlantic Area: Interna-tional Organization in the Light of Historical Experience (Princeton, NJ: PrincetonUniversity Press, 1957), 3; Emanuel Adler and Michael Barnett, eds., SecurityCommunities (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998), 6.

3. Deutsch et al., Political Community and the North Atlantic Area, 5.

4. Ibid., 36.

5. Andrej Tusicisny, “Security Communities and Their Values: Taking MassesSeriously,” International Political Science Review 28, no. 4 (2007): 429.

6. Ibid., 432.

7. Dunn, Frederick S., “The Scope of International Relations,” in Contemporary TheoryIn International Relations, ed. Stanley Hoffmann (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press,1977), 14.

8. Alexander Wendt, Social Theory of International Politics (Cambridge: UniversityPress, 1999).

9. Adler and Barnett, Security Communities, 17.

10. Deutsch, Political Community and the North Atlantic Area.

11. Ibid., 66.

12. Tusicisny, “Security Communities and Their Values,” 427.

13. The Africa–EU Strategic Partnership, A Joint Africa–EU Strategy (Lisbon: EU, 2007).

14. “EU–Southern African Region: Regional Strategy Paper and Regional IndicativeProgram 2008–2013,” http://ec.europa.eu/development/icenter/repository/scanned_r7_rsp-2007-2013_en.pdf, accessed 29 March 2010.

15. Michele Alliot-Marie (2007), Africa’s Ills Must Be Dealt with By Africans, http://www.consilium.europa.eu/ueDocs/cms_Data/docs/pressData/en/esdp/95218.pdf, accessed21 July 2009.

16. “Sarkozy Speech to Parliament of South Africa,” 2008, http://www.polity.org.za/article/france-sarkozy-speech-to-parliament-of-south-africa-28022008-2008-02-28, accessed 30March 2010.

17. “Obama Ghana Speech,” 2009, http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2009/07/11/obama-ghana-speech-full-t_n_230009.html, accessed 1 April 2010.

18. “The Foreign Policy Concept of the Russian Federation,” 2008, http://eng.kremlin.ru/text/docs/2008/07/204750.shtml, accessed 19 March 2010.



19. “Full Text of President Hu’s Speech at China-Africa Summit,” 2006, http://www.dawodu.com/china1.htm, accessed 1 April 2010.

20. Gorm Rye Olsen, “The EU and Military Conflict Management in Africa: For theGood of Africa or Europe?” International Peacekeeping 16, no. 2 (2009): 245–260.

21. Guyl Martin, “Continuity and Change in Franco-African Relations,” Journal ofModern African Studies 33, no. 1 (1995):1–20, S17–S18.

22. A. Guyomarch et al, France in the European Union (Basingstoke: PalgraveMacMillan, 2002): 106–107; Daniela Kroslak, “France’s Policy Towards Africa:Continuity Or Change?” in Africa in International Politics: External Involvement on theContinent, eds. Ian Taylor and Paul Williams (London: Routledge, 2004): 61–82, 64; R.Utley, “Not to Do Less but to Do Better. French Military Policy in Africa,”International Affairs 78, no. 1 (2002): 134.

23. Guyomarch et al., France in the European Union, 110–111.

24. Martin, “Continuity and Change in Franco-African Relations,” 9.

25. Utley, “Not to Do Less but to Do Better,” 130; A. Hansen, “The French Military inAfrica, Council on Foreign Relations,” 2007, http://www.cfr.org/publication/12578/#8,accessed 22 March, 2007.

26. Hansen, “The French Military in Africa,; Kroslak, Daniela, (2004), 74; Martin(1995), 14.

27. Utley, “Not to Do Less but to Do Better,” 130–132.

28. Kroslak,“France’s Policy Towards Africa, 61–68.

29. Ibid., 76.

30. Paul Williams, “Britain and Africa after the Cold War: Beyond Damage Limitation?”in Africa in International Politics: External Involvement on the Continent, eds. I. Taylorand P. Williams (London: Routledge, 2004), 49.

31. A. Barnett, “UK Arms Sales to Africa Reach £1 Billion Mark,” 2005, http://www.guardian.co.uk/politics/2005/jun/12/uk.hearafrica05.

32. Saferworld, “The Good, the Bad and the Ugly: A Decade of Labour’s Arms Exports,”2007, http://www.saferworld.org.uk/images/pubdocs/The%20Good%2C%20the%20Bad%20and%20the%20Ugly%20rev.pdf, accessed 10 January 2008.

33. IANSA et al., 2007, “Africa’s Missing Billions,” http://www.oxfam.org.uk/resources/policy/conflict_disasters/downloads/bp107_africa_missing_billions.pdf, accessed 12May 2009.

34. SIPRI, Armaments, Disarmament and International Security (Oxford: UniversityPress, 2007), 422.

35. Chatham House, “Britain in Africa—Book Launch,” 2008, http://www.chatham-house.org.uk/files/11932_120508porteous.pdf, accessed 17 August 2009.

36. Amnesty International, “Ethiopia: Government Prepares Assault on Civil Society,”1 July 2008, http://www.amnesty.org/en/library/asset/AFR25/006/2008/en/30310ac1-477c-11dd-858d-299ca9428acd/afr250062008eng.pdf, accessed 21 March 2009, 2.

37. Muhula, Raymond, “Kenya and the Global War on Terrorism: Searching for aNew Role in a New Era,” in Africa and the War on Terrorism, ed. J. Davis (Aldershot:Ashgate, 2007): 48–55.

38. Department of State, “Ambassador Ranneberger Discusses U.S.–Kenya Relations,”2008, http://www.america.gov/st/washfile-english/2008/March/20080312120845xjsnommis0.7968866.html#ixzz0NJe9aGyZ, accessed 12 July 2009.



39. Department of Energy, “Corporate Council on Africa Oil & Gas Forum,” 2006, http://www.doe.gov/news/4498.htm, accessed 22 January 2007.

40. “Africa-Russia: Moscow chasing Beijing,” Africa Research Bulletin 45, no. 6 (2008): 17586.

41. CSIS, “Africa, China, the United States, and Oil,” 2008, http://forums.csis.org/africa/?p=34, accessed 6 August 2008.

42. S. Guo and S. Hua, “New Dimensions of Chinese Foreign Policy,” in New Dimensionsof Chinese Foreign Policy, eds. Sujian Guo and Shiping Hua (Lanham, MD: LexingtonBooks, 2007), 2.

43. Alex Perry, “Africa’s Oil Dreams,” Time (31 May 2007), http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,1626751-1,00.html.

44. Eduard Guell, “Poverty Alleviation versus Public Governance Conundrum in WorldBank’s International Development Policy Mechanism: The Chad-Cameroon OilPipeline,” 2010, http://wphr.org/2010/eduard_guell/poverty-alleviation-versus-public-governance-conundrum-in-world-bank%E2%80%99s-international-development-policy-mechanism-the-chad-cameroon-oil-pipeline/, accessed 12 February 2010.

45. H. G. Broadman, “China and India Go to Africa: New Deals in the DevelopingWorld,” Foreign Affairs (March/April 2008): 82–83, 95–109.

46. K. Brown and Z. Chun, “China in Africa—Preparing for the Next Forum for ChinaAfrica Cooperation,” 2009, http://www.chathamhouse.org.uk/files/14269_0609ch_af.pdf, accessed 12 July 2009.

47. Broadman, “China and India Go to Africa,” 95–109, 82–83.

48. Ibid., 95–97.

49. Gunpolicy.org, “Guns in North Africa,” 2008, http://www.gunpolicy.org/Topics/Guns_In_North_Africa.html, accessed 12 March 2009.

50. S. Klein-Ahlbrant and A. Small, “China’s New Dictatorship Diplomacy,” ForeignAffairs 87, no. 1 (2008): 52.

51. U.S. Department of State, “Background Note: Sudan,” 2008, http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/5424.htm, accessed 21 March 2010.

52. I. Taylor, “Sino-African Relations and the Problem of Human Rights,” AfricanAffairs 107/426 (2008): 79.

53. David Blair, “China and Russia Defy Sudan Arms Embargo,” 8 May 2007, http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/1550936/China-and-Russia-defy-Sudan-arms-embargo.html, accessed 23 March 2009.

54. Hillary Andersson, “China ‘Is Fuelling War in Darfur,’” 13 July 2008, http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/africa/7503428.stm, accessed 15 July 2008.

55. R. H. Donaldson and J. L. Nogee, The Foreign Policy of Russia: Changing Systems,Enduring Interests (Armonk: Sharpe, 2005), 345.

56. V. Shubin, “Russia and Africa: Moving in the Right Direction?” in Africa in Interna-tional Politics: External Involvement in the Continent, eds. Ian Taylor and Paul Williams(London: Routledge, 2004), 103.

57. C. A. Wallander, “Global Challenges and Russian Foreign Policy,” in RussianForeign Policy In the Twenty-first Century and the Shadow of the Past, ed. R. Legvold(New York: Columbia University Press, 2007), 458–59.

58. Shubin, “Russia and Africa,” 107.

59. Perry, “Africa’s Oil Dreams,” 24–27.



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