Playful Subversion:

Red Sunday’s Nonviolent Activism in Thailand’s Post-2010 Crackdown

Janjira Sombatpoonsiri

Introduction

On November 18, 2012 Bangkok’s busiest monorail station was packed with

participants in the “flash mob.” It was staged to mock a call for a military coup to freeze Thai

democracy. In response to the absurdity of this conservative stance, Sombat

Boonngam-anong, the key organizer and founder of Red Sunday group, together with a few

hundred protesters wore their best “winter” outfit amidst Bangkok heat, taking a monorail

ride in the city loop. Their destination was the ice-cream parlor at a luxurious Bangkok mall.

In addition, many demonstrators held self-styled banners that read “It’s freaking freezing,”

“You’ll be frozen if you want to freeze Thailand,” or “Thailand—the iced country!” To be

sure, they posed for tourists’ photographs with their mouth quivering as if it were truly cold.

Despite the satirical and playful features, protest actions like this one emerged out of a

most depressing and violent history of Thai society. Most participants were “veterans” of the

May 2010 crackdown that took some 90 lives. During the monorail ride, my conversations

with them were somewhat emotionally charged, marked by anger towards the aristocratic

elites supporting the crackdown. Many admitted that activities by the Red Sunday organized

right after the protest suppression allowed them to articulate and express resentment. Untold

was Red Shirts’ alleged involvement in an armed response to the crackdown, and how playful

nonviolent actions were carried out albeit a tendency of militarizing the movement. This

article seeks to examine the impact of Red Sunday’s activism on nonviolent politics in the

aftermath of the 2010 clampdown.

Thai Political Turmoil and the Emergence of Red Shirts’ Struggle

as Background of Red Sunday

Hailed as one of the four “pathologies” currently plaguing Thai society,1 the conflict

over governance—with its central battlefield in Bangkok and resources mobilized from the

provinces—is arguably underpinned with divided legitimacy between the two camps of pro-

aristocratic “democracy” and representative democracy. The division has manifested in the

tit-for-tat overthrow of governments favored by supporters of the opposite camp.

Remarkably, nonviolent mass demonstrations have been instrumental. Spearheaders of these

demonstrations are no longer confined to the circle of seasoned activists. Rather, they were

characterized by odd cooperation between politicians, army and NGOs aspiring to

monopolize executive power (Tejapira 2009, 274). The logic of winning and losing in this

political battle has overshadowed the conflict. Victory always implies partial legitimacy to

the winning party, while the relinquished and his or her popular base find it hard to accept

this outcome. The longer this battle carries on, the more polarized Thai society has become.

Military ousting of the former Prime Minister Thaksin Shinawatra on September 19, 2006,

was a stepping stone for the Thai political turmoil. His Thai Rak Thai Party was considered

as a savior for many Thais affected by the 1997 economic crisis. Thaksin’s policies helped

provide economic infrastructure primarily for the urban and provincial working class which

empowered them to upgrade their social strata. This augmented his popularity and

consequently challenged the status quo of the old elites.2 Nevertheless, his responses to civil

society and security threats—particularly the drug trade and Southern insurgency—were

notoriously “hawkish.”3 These patterns provided ground for the anti-Thaksin campaigns

launched by the People’s Alliance for Democracy (PAD) or “Yellow Shirts” (Pye and

Schaffar 2008, 38-61). Street protests culminated in PAD leaders’ call for Thaksin’s

resignation and “the restoration of the Royal Prerogative and the King’s appointment of a

new prime minister and cabinet in Thaksin’s place” which would allegedly amount to an

unconstitutional coup (Kasian Tejapira 2006, 35).4

The 2006 military coup d’état provided legitimate grounds for the emergence of anti-

coup networks which can be categorized into two groups: the activists-intellectuals and Thai

Rak Thai’s politicians. Right after September 19, various civic groups created a network to

carry out activities that criticized the coup. Prominent were the September 19 Anti-Coup

Group and Saturday People’s Dismissal of Dictatorship. Efforts by these civic groups sparked

critical discussions regarding the future of Thai democracy. In terms of popular mobilization

to undermine legitimacy of the coup, these groups had limited achievement with only a few

thousand attending their activities.5

In comparison, Thai Rak Thai’s politicians were more successful in mobilizing the

critical number of masses for anti-coup movement. The most effective instrument is the

People’s Television (PTV) which broadcasted anti-coup TV programs nationwide. Later on,

live talk shows were held, serving to summon Thai Rak Thai supporters in different

provinces. This tactic became essential when the Constitutional Court dissolved the Thai Rak

Thai party during the 2007 constitutional referendum. According to Uchane Chiangsaen, the

figure of demonstrators at some stage rose to 30,000. The constitutional referendum, in

particular, was a turning point where many anti-coup activists and intellectuals decided to

merge their struggle with that of former Thai Rak Thai’s politicians. As a result, the United

Front Against Dictatorship (or Nor Por Kor) and subsequently the United Front of

Democracy Against Dictatorship (UDD or Nor Por Chor) came into existence (Uchane 2010,

146).

It was the parliamentary power shuffle followed by the rule of Democrat Party that

constituted the point of mass mobilization by the UDD. Palang Prachachon Party—Thai Rak

Thai’s proxy—won the December 2008 election. Shortly after, the Constitutional Court

banned the People’s Power Party and stripped a number of party executives of their political

rights for a period of five years. Meanwhile, a former key ally of Thaksin was brought to

defect, enabling the formation of a new parliamentary majority led by the Democratic Party.

Its party leader, Abhisit Vejajiva, was then appointed as the new PM. However, the UDD

found this process illegitimate as the DP came to power without an election. The movement

staged a nationwide protest that accused aristocratic elites of engineering this government

change, and called for the renewed election.6 Its protest tactics were at times disruptive. The

storming in the venue of 2009 ASEAN summit led to the harsh repression of protesters on

April 13 (Uchane 2010, 145-146; The Truth for Reconciliation Commission for Thailand

2010-2011, 63-64).7

When the UUD resumed its demonstrations in early 2010, movement militarization

was observed. For instance, in January, Major General Khattiya Sawasdipol, during his

speech, proposed that the UDD’s struggle consist of three pillars: political party, the masses

and the force. Other proposals included General Panlop Pinmanee’s suggestion to establish

the National Army for Democracy—though this proposal was later on dismissed as being

merely a rumor (The Truth for Reconciliation Commission 2010-2011, 67).

From March until the crackdown in May 2010, the movement’s oscillation between

nonviolent protests and vandalism—at least in part—accounted for spiraling street violence.

By mid-February 2010, the UDD’s leaders called for mass protests so as to press for the

government’s dissolution. After the first round of crackdown on April 10, the UDD’s

leadership was convinced that the government was unwilling to negotiate. The security

dilemma persisted and reached its zenith when some of the UDD leaders dismissed the PM’s

roadmap for “reconciliation” which included the election date scheduled in November.

Several attempts were made by some of the UDD’s leading activists and other Thai

NGOs to maintain the nonviolent nature of the conflict.8 According to the think tank Strategic

Nonviolence, 60 per cent of Red Shirts’ protest repertoires were featured by nonviolent

rallies, symbolic demonstrations (e.g. blood pouring) and non-cooperation (Thai Research

Fund 2011, 8). Nevertheless, these attempts were eventually overshadowed by the overuse of

disruptive actions and vandalism in response to military suppression. Occupying buildings,

main roads and business intersections made up for 10 per cent of total protest actions (Ibid.,

12). Although this could be classified as a form of “nonviolent intervention,” in the context of

the Thai protracted conflict, such an activity was perceived as highly provocative, exposing

protesters to the increased risk of military crackdown. In addition, there were incidents where

protesters responded to the authorities with stone and bottle throwing, arson, and the use of

explosive devices allegedly by a clandestine agent. Three months of nonviolent struggle that

escalated into episodes of clashes caused some ninety deaths of UDD protesters, 10 deaths of

officers and nearly two thousand injuries (Ibid., 10).9

The crackdown substantially

undermined the Abhisit government’s popularity, especially among Red Shirt supporters in

the provinces, which translated into the landslide victory of Pheu Thai Party—another

Thaksin’s proxy—in late 2011 (Uchane 2010, 12-23).

Red Sunday’s Playful Nonviolent Actions

Many feared that the May crackdown could prompt Red Shirts to form an armed

guerrilla movement (Sombutpoonsiri 2012).10

This tendency was, however, reversed. Among

other factors such as the UDD leaders’ electoral victory in 2011, Red Sunday’s playful

nonviolent protests contributed to precluding Red Shirts’ possible armed insurgency. And this

potentially allowed conflict parties to express resentment and defiance while creating room

for nonviolent possibilities for the ongoing conflict.

“Red Sunday” was a loose network of Red Shirt veterans whose mission was to carry

on nonviolent protests despite the Emergency Decree imposed after the 2010 clampdown.

The protest repertoires were symbolic, playful—if not absurd at times—and theatrical. Three

elements gave rise to these unusual features: evolution of Red Shirts as a social movement,

the post-crackdown context and Sombat’s leadership.

Years of struggle enabled the Red Shirts to develop themselves from being

“politically indifferent” mobs to becoming active participants in the 2010 uprising. Somsak

Jiamthirasakul, a prominent Thai historian, argues that prior to the violent suppression in

2009, Red Shirts joined the demonstrations, and yet they “failed to actually participate in

them” (Uchane YEAR, 148). The crackdown to a large extent altered this pattern. By early

2010, based on connections with local politicians, many organized themselves as community-

oriented learning groups conducive to successful mass mobilization during the April-May

2010 demonstrations in Bangkok (Thabchumpon and McCargo 2011, 1009-1014). The

widespread feeling of being oppressed consolidated Red Shirts’ solidarity, collectively urging

them to demand justice. This atmosphere of despair convinced many to speculate Red Shirts’

adoption of armed rebellion. However, there remained a belief that the majority of Red Shirts

were prone to the use of nonviolence. Red Sunday emerged to amplify this tendency toward

nonviolent struggle, as Sombat pointed out, and to show the UDD supporters that options for

an “unarmed fight” against oppression remained (Sombutpoonsiri 2012b).

Constrained rights to freedom of expression and self-censorship clouded Thailand’s

post-2010 clampdown. Under the imposed Emergency Decree and the draconian Lèse

majesté law, hundreds of UDD activists were detained while many went into hiding. Public

gatherings were closely scrutinized (Human Rights Watch 2011).11

The authorities

anticipated that this policy could set the scene for emasculating the UDD. In other words,

whereas the course for Red Shirts’ resurgence of street struggle was visible, the draconian

laws could work to undermine mass mobilization. This atmosphere shaped the protest actions

by Red Sunday to overcome the challenge of reclaiming political space for the Red Shirts—

thereby bringing the movement back to life—while protecting them from possible

suppression (Sombutpoonsiri 2012b).12

Sombat’s leadership and his unique knowledge in the art of theatre performance,

marketing techniques, and information technology influenced Red Sunday’s playful approach

to street protests. Sombat has engaged in anti-coup activities that were later on merged with

the UDD’s demonstrations. As a practitioner of nonviolent resistance, Sombat believes that

nonviolence could constitute a more effective tool for the UDD than the employment of

armed tactics (Ibid.). However, he views that the existing conception of protest activism lacks

creativity, and this accounts for limited nonviolent alternatives. A perception is that

nonviolent options are exhausted. Thus shifting to armed struggle is justified. His knowledge

in arts and brief experience as theatre performer allowed him to incorporate elements of

absurd theatre, satire and carnivals into renewed activities of the Red Shirts. Protest actions

with these elements should be fun for participants, and simultaneously attractive enough to

get media coverage. In this light, Sombat relied on marketing texts he has drawn upon over

the years. They gave him ideas about how to make serious social campaigns more interesting

and relevant to the urban middle class and the younger generation. In addition, social media

such as Facebook, Twitter and YouTube became instrumental for publicizing his campaigns

and mobilizing advocates (Ibid.).13

Staged virtually every Sunday between late May 2010 and June 2011, Red Sunday

activities were characteristically playful with an absurd and satirical undertone. Networks of

Red Sunday such as Prakaifai, Tonkla Institute, We Change and Iskra Drama also improvised

their own skits corresponding with Red Sunday’s. The ludic protests can be classified as

resistance through everyday life practice or “protest without protesting,” commemoration and

satirical performance, and festivals.

Resistance through Everyday Life Practice/ “Protest without Protesting”

The post-crackdown atmosphere prompted the onset of the Red Sunday actions to

fuse with everyday life activities (such as dining, donning certain outfits, shopping and

exercising) with political protests. According to Sombat, the reason was to protest without

protesting. That is, the protest did not occur on the street, but rather in everyday life space.

This untypical repertoire would help participants avoid arrest. In late May 2010, the group

named Little Red Riding Hood gathered at a mall and ate “red [brown] rice” together. This

was a symbolic subversion of the Decree. It also confused the authorities who were not sure

if this kind of action would be deemed unlawful (Prachatai 2010a). A few days after, Sombat

encouraged the UDD veterans to collectively wear red T-shirts, which marked the launching

of the “Red Sunday” campaign (Prachatai 2010b). He viewed that although the Decree could

curb people’s freedom of expression, the right to select an outfit always remains. Wearing red

shirts—amidst the fear of being associated with Red Shirts—symbolized a form of resistance

against the draconian law (Sombutpoonsiri 2012b).

A breakthrough of Red

Sunday was an aerobic dance at

the biggest public park of

Bangkok. Around 400

participants wore their red sport

outfit together with ghost

makeup (to remind the public of

the tragic deaths of their fellow

Red Shirts). As with other park

visitors, they gathered at the

public park for a popular dance

sport. But theirs was unusual.

Photos courtesy of Prachatai News

Online:

http://www.prachatai3.info/journal/20

10/07/30446

The instructor led them to dance to Red Shirt songs and in different silly steps, which at some

point captured passers-by’s attention. The gig ended with Sombat’s pantomime. He

concluded his show by holding the self-styled banner reading “If you want to forbid me to

speak, you need stop me from breathing” (Prachatai 2010c).

Similar actions included Red Shirt’s jogging at the Santipab public park in early

August. The message conveyed to the public was to promote healthy Red Shirts both in the

literal and political sense. Sombat announced that the exercise was necessary because this

struggle would be prolonged. Hence, Red Shirts as individuals and as a movement should be

fit for “combat” in their demand for justice (Prachatai 2010d).

The logic of protest without protesting, moreover, manifested in actions such as “The

Picnic of Red [brown] Rice,” “Shopping for the Nation,” “Dining at McDonald’s,” and

“Cycling on Sunday.” While participants in the first action reached around 1,000 at its peak,

the second action conveyed a strong symbolic message. Red Shirts gathered at the Imperial

World Department Store where their TV station was once located. Instead of staging rallies

or occupying the building as one could expect, these protesters turned themselves into

shoppers. Through the process of walking and shopping, Red Shirts re-appropriated the

political space once belonging to them (Prachatai 2010e).

Commemoration and Satirical Performance

Street performance was an integral method Red Shirts employed to remind the public

of the crackdown atrocities they experienced. It was an anti-public amnesia tactic. Various

student groups performed the scenes allusive to the power that had masterminded the May

clampdown (Prachatai 2010f). They had actually coined the phrase “there were dead people

here” or “I saw dead people here” that later on inspired several street performances some of

which emphasized the absurdity of military intervention in politics. Prominent was the prank

in which Sombat led around 500 UDD supporters to paint their bodies and faces in red. They

lied down in the area of Ratchprasong intersection (where the crackdown took place) as if

they were murdered. The protesters held the banner that read “there were dead people here.”

This form of action became popular and was repeated by numerous anti-government groups

(Prachatai 2010g). Afterwards, Sombat tied a piece of red cloth around the holder of the

Ratchprasong street sign. He recalled that the security forces nervously surrounded him,

getting ready to respond to the act breaching the Decree. However, by doing that, the

Courtesy of Prachatai News Online

(http://www.prachatai3.info/journal/2010/08/30888)

authorities appeared absurd as onlookers could see these stern-looking forces were

surrounding a piece of red cloth they perceived as a threat to national security

(Sombutpoonsiri 2012b).

The commemorative action of “there were dead

people here” lifted its level of absurdity when the

Prakaifai group together with other student

networks brilliantly staged the skit “Ghost dress

up that would haunt the army.” Approximately

ten students got dressed in different styles of

ghost costumes gathering at the monorail stations

close to the sites of the 2010 crackdown. They

took a ride, mingled with passengers and even

greeted the soldiers stationed at checkpoints.

Rather than uttering a word, these students

showed the placard “Cursed 19th

[September

2009].” Their aim was to demonstrate the role of

the army in delaying Thai democratization

(thereby pointing out the coup date), relating

this to the April-May crackdown in order to

prevent forced amnesia of the atrocities (Prachatai 2010h).

In a similar vein, on September 19, the Red Sunday group organized a

commemoration which comprised the action “Writing Letters to the Sky.” Hundreds of Red

Shirts assembled at the Ratchaprasong intersection on the memorial of the coup and fourth

month anniversary of the latest crackdown. There were no rallies or public speeches being

carried out. Instead, Sombat invited these participants to “write a letter to the sky.” This was

a symbolic defiance the implication of which can be traced back to a UDD leader’s speech

associating Red Shirts with common people analogical to the “soil.” In comparison, the

ruling elites symbolized the “sky.”14

The letters were attached to balloons that were released

to the sky (Prachatai 2010i).15

Reportedly, the messages contained a number of provocative

statements criticizing the ruling class. Stationed at the site of this activity, authorities

nervously asked Sombat to review the content of the letters before their release. He

recollected, “I told them the message was complete since we announced the title of the action

‘Writing Letters to the Sky’ basically because it implied our awareness of the power that is

destabilizing democracy” (Sombutpoonsiri 2012b).

Courtesy of Prachatai News Online

(http://www.prachatai3.info/journal/2010/07/30289)

Courtesy of Prachatai News Online

(http://www.prachatai3.info/journal/2010/09/31066)

Satire was at times incorporated in street performance as a response to the authorities’

repression and the ruling elites’ rhetoric of reconciliation. An example was Sombat’s reaction

to local police in Chiang Rai province who had accused a high school student holding the

sign “There were dead people here” of breaching the Emergency Decree. During his Red

Sunday tour there, Sombat donned a student uniform imitating the act of the accused student.

But instead of simply showing the placard, he tied a piece of red cloth in the area of city

center, announcing that the student had the right to freedom of expression and should not

have been detained because of his exercise of this right. Later on, Sombat and his crew staged

the street performance “There were dead people here” by lying down on a main road as if

they were shot dead. Other Red Shirts pointed at them, yelling “These are dead people

indeed!” (Prachatai 2010j).

16

Red Sunday-style protests inspired various student and activist groups to infuse their

activism with satire. One of them was “Prongdong [reconciliation] Rangers,” a pseudonym of

pro-democracy student networks that juxtaposed a Thai term for reconciliation with a

Japanese manga. When Ban Ki-moon, the Secretary-General to the United Nations, visited

Thailand, five activists staged a dance show in front of the UN headquarters. They wore

masks representing the PM, Interior Minister, other leading commissioners of reforms and

reconciliation commission, and Ban Ki-moon himself. Apart from the silly, cheeky dance to

the Japanese superhero soundtrack, these activists held a basket of “kanom chine,” the Thai

term for rice noodle. But they looked sad because there was no “nam ya” or the noodle sauce

typically taken with this particular rice noodle. The skit contained a pun referring to a Thai

idiom “Mai mee nam ya” which literally means the noodle sauce (nam ya) is missing (mai

mee), but implies “incompetence” of a person or an institution. The performance conveyed

this implication to the ruling elites, the appointed commissioners and the UN secretariat,

perceived to have failed in protecting human rights (Prachatai 2010k).17

Courtesy of Prachatai News Online

(http://www.prachatai3.info/journal/2010/08/30616)

Festivals

Organizing festivals—mostly in the period of 2010’s final months through September

2011 (briefly after the electoral victory of Pheu Thai Party)—marked the increase in the

audience of the Red Sunday campaigns, and in turn their enhanced confidence in returning to

protest activism. Themes of these festivals were usually based on existing festivals on the

Thai calendar. But in symbolically subverting the official rhetoric, organizers tended to twist

the actual titles to correspond with their political agenda. For instance, the Chiang Mai Red

Shirts arranged a Loi Krathong (Floating Decoration) festival in mid-November 2010. But

theirs was an extraordinary one, entitled “Floating Decoration to Oust Dictatorship.” The

main activity was to collect donations of winter clothes for the northernmost villagers who

had encountered the piercing cold. The organizers pointed out that donations would go to

those who were still alive (in reference to the deaths of the May incident), but were about to

die (mob ai oun hai kab kon tee young mai tai tae kamlung cha nhao tai) (Prachatai 2011a).

On the National Children’s Day in January 2011, Red Shirts in many parts of

Thailand prepared festivals for kids, hoping to cultivate anti-dictatorial culture for the

youngsters. At the Bangkok 14th

October Memorial, the event entitled “Our kids endorse

democracy, and shall not ‘play’ with soldiers” was organized. The idea was to change the

usual ritual of National Children’s Day in which the army would turn their bases into a

museum for a special visit of children. By turning around this ritual, the event was aimed to

challenge the “heroization” of the military which largely legitimizes military intervention in

democracy (Prachatai 2011b). In a similar vein, the Chiang Mai branch of Red Sunday put

together a Children’s Day festival. Instead of taking children to visit an army base out of

military admiration, activities that would educate them about the idea of human rights and

democracy were put in place. The organizers announced that in 2011, children would stay

away from soldiers or any war-mongering policies (Prachatai 2011c).

On the part of the Bangkok Red Sunday group, participations in festivals reflected its

increased popularity. On December 6, Sombat went ahead with his own talk show entitled

“Asking for being behind bars” (Won non khuk). Around 1,500 tickets were sold out. Sombat

aimed for this talk show to constitute “a site for a constructive engagement in politics, with

humor and laughter, so as to tone down tensions and lessen possibilities of violent

confrontation on the street” (Voice TV 2010). Despite mockery in light of criticizing the army

and the government, Sombat’s jokes were considered as quite humanizing and at times self-

deprecatory. For instance, he told his audience the rumor in which “Red Shirts were believed

to dislike Hollywood films. Guess why? Because people thought we don’t like Phanthamit”

Courtesy of Prachatai News Online (http://prachatai.com/journal/2010/10/31660)

(the Thai title of People’s Alliance for Democracy. It is also the name of a popular company

for foreign language movie dubbing). In another gag, he mimicked the statement by coup

generals, changing their original coup title from “The revolutionary commission for

democracy under constitutional monarchy” (khanapatiwat peu karn pokkrong nai rabob

prachatippatai un mee pramahakasat song pen pramuk) to “The commission to refuse any

form of democratic rule” (khanapatiseth kan pokkrong rabob prachatipatai) (Prachatai

2010l).

“Horizontal Leadership Expo” was a final festival that saw the conclusion of Red

Sunday’s protest campaigns. On September 17, 2011 several anti-coup groups such as Red

Sunday, Student Social Networks for Democracy, Tonkla Institute, Prakaifai group and Turn

Left Organization organized an exposition that would serve as a platform for growing

collaboration among civic groups and concerned citizens. This festival in many ways denoted

a changing strategy of Red Sunday, from being a protest-based group to being a horizontally

structured and community-learning network (gaen non). Sombat encouraged civic groups

across different provinces to move beyond simply opposing the person in power. He viewed

active participation in democracy as more crucial. The task of gaen non is to create networks

of education for grassroots for their active engagement in politics (Matichon 2011).

Subversion, Ambivalence and Playfulness

Red Sunday’s satirical and playful nonviolent actions marked an emerging possibility

that enables the oppressed’s engagement in a struggle for justice, while leaving room for

future collaboration with their antagonists. The creative protests contain three characteristics

conclusive to this possibility: subversiveness, ambiguity and playfulness.

The satirical and parodic undertones of Red Sunday’s protests constituted a channel

for participants to defy the authorities openly. These actions were open fundamentally

because they were carried out in the public space—not to mention the site where clashes took

place before—and under the Emergency Decree, doing so could induce penalty. More

importantly, that Red Sunday campaigns were launched only a week after the crackdown

reflected the will to overcome fear inflicted by the authorities’ witch-hunts. The content of

these actions also contained symbolic subversion of authoritarianism embedded in Thai

political culture (e.g. “Writing a letter to the sky” or the “Asking for being behind bars” talk

show which was initially scheduled to be held precisely on the King’s birthday).

Conceptually, these can constitute a stepping stone towards undermining discursive

domination which has shaped popular perceptions and practices, helping to consolidate the

power of aristocratic elites (Foucault 1984, 32-50; Routledge 2000, 1-42; Bleiker 2000, 200-

214; Vinthagen 2006, 1-21).18

Red Sunday’s satires provoked the Thai public to start to

question moral claims of the powers-that-be. Although actions were limited in number, they

epitomized the people’s courage to subvert aristocratic institutions publicly.

Due to the curbing of protest activism in the post-crackdown period, a wide range of

Red Sunday’s actions incorporated everyday life practices which obscured the movement’s

subversion. This could help lessen the risk of repression, enabling wider participation in

protests. Instead of blatantly staging a rally, the Red Sunday crew joined the collective sport

dance, for instance. Their association with Red Shirts was obvious. However, the protest

action is a form of lifestyle Bangkok urbanites are typically drawn to. For those experiencing

the month of city chaos in 2010, this kind of protest could appear much less intimidating than

occupying business zones. And for the authorities, infusing street protest with sport dance

created for them a dilemma. Arresting participants would be absurd because they were only

dancing, but turning a blind eye might imply permitting public assembly that violated the

Emergency Decree. Other actions that combined everyday activities such as jogging, dining

and shopping possibly led to a similar awkward situation. Above all, these protests skits

demonstrated a distortion of meanings. Street protests were turned into mundane acts, while

everyday life practices provided a platform for defiance. This deviating from established

connotations gave rise to a space of ambiguity that uprooted codes of conduct which were

once manipulated by agents of violence. It introduced fluidity and uncertainty of meanings

that worked against the system sustained by bureaucratic stiffness and stern legality.19

Despite its subversive undertone, Red Sunday’s activism suggested the potential of

collaboration between antagonists through the incorporation of “play.” Understandably,

various messages underpinning Red Sunday’s protests were antagonistic, criticizing the then

government and its elitist mastermind. Conflicts in the quest of justice were considered as

inevitable. However, this antagonism observably coexisted with the playful characteristic of

many street performances, particularly festivals. An inquiry emerging would be; how does

playfulness influence the process of Red Sunday’s campaigns? Crucial is the conceptual

understanding of “play.”

Scholars from diverse academic disciplines seem to agree that aimlessness, non-

seriousness and flexibility characterize play which contributes to development of socializing

skills among children and adults (Apte 1985, 87). Put differently, the goal of playing is

vague, but players can certainly expect entertainment and pleasure. Whereas an aim of

playing is formulated, it is subject to change in a process of interactions among players (Scott

2012, 63-135). Play is different from games in that competition may be counterproductive to

the non-serious nature of a play, while this is not the case for games. For instance, among

Eskimo children, plays almost always lack competition and opposition; “If competition

occurs at all, it is not taken seriously” (Ager

cited in Apte 1985, 90). In other words, play

connotes the sense of collaborativeness—“playing together.”

The playful undercurrent of Red Sunday’s activism generally downplayed the

importance of goal which was more often than not the raison d’être of protest movements.

Consequently, the process of struggling in itself defines the goal of Red Sunday’s campaigns.

Playful protests connote the balancing out of power between parties engaged in a struggle.

Protest participants may prod the other party so s/he is caught off guard. However, this

prodding should be constrained when it potentially provokes fear from the other party. Fear

unnecessarily provides grounds for justified attacks, which conversely destabilizes the

framework of play in relation to mutual pleasure (Sombutpoonsiri 2012b).20

In addition,

because adaptable goals stand at the core of play, playful protest possess this quality by

allowing negotiations to re-shape the goal and demands of protesters. Tensions may be

diminished when a goal of the players becomes negotiable. For instance, in retrospect, had

the UDD leaders adopted a less rigid stance in proposing a timeframe for the government’s

resignation, things might have turned out less bloody. In contrast, the Red Sunday group

rarely announced their clear goals. The campaigns’ targets changed according to different

contexts and locations of the protests. Leading activists were willing to call off

demonstrations in case of rising tensions although demands were unmet.

Adaptability of playful nonviolent action implies creative processes necessitating

imagination. As with cracking jokes, play involves constructing situations that are based on

reality. But these situations are to be transcended. Imagination serves this function through

the creation of “sub-universes.” Paramount reality reminds us day in and day out that it is the

only world we are living in. However, imagination expressed in dreams, aesthetic experience,

in child’s play and a humorous moment, enables the existence of other worlds within this

reality (Berger 1998, 1-13). Play renews meanings of things that are taken for granted in

mundane life (Climacus 1941). This point is related to ways in which playful nonviolent

actions carve out possibilities to rethink the relationship between conflict parties. When

antagonism is not eternal, we can imagine our present opponents as those we may cooperate

with in the future. The potential to re-imagine ourselves in the eyes of the “Other”—the

despised and dehumanized—and vice versa is always manifest.

Conclusion

The Thai conflict over governance presents paradoxes and above all contradictions.

These pose challenges to efforts towards nonviolent conflict transformation. Nevertheless,

Red Sunday’s activities exemplified a meaningful attempt to deal with contradictions, paving

the way for both the adjustment of an asymmetric power relationship and mitigation of

division. On the one hand, the conflict contains some quality of asymmetric power between

the Red Shirts and the aristocratic elites. The former believe that struggle is needed in pursuit

of emancipation. The 2010 “uprising” followed by bloody crackdown marked the zenith of

this struggle. On the other hand, the conflict has over the years pit advocates of different

political camps against each other. Labels were created to demonize the adversary which has

led to justifying the use of reciprocal violence. This in effect deepens the scars of Thai

society, threatening it with the chance of deadly conflict. Red Sunday’s playful nonviolent

actions reminded us of the indispensability of the struggle over justice. At the same time, its

imaginative quality provided activists some room for reflecting on an image of the enemy,

seeing the adversary in a different light. Here is the key ingredient for a constructive

nonviolent struggle.

Notes

1. See more in Montesano 2011, 273-297.

2. Examples of prominent projects are micro-loans, farmers’ debt relief, a reduced

charge of 30 baht (around 75 cents) per hospital visit. The Village and Urban

Community Fund allocated roughly $25,000 (1m baht) to each of Thailand’s 70,000-

plus villages and 4,000-plus urban communities. See more in Tejapira 2006, 6-37.

3. As a political tycoon with his police background, Thaksin silenced dissents through

various mechanisms such as intervention in independent check-and-balance

institutions, taking over of media corporations (as with the case of The Nation Multi

Media Group and ITV) and at times utilisation of nationalist sentiment to demean

international condemnation on his heavy-handed security policies (as with the case of

the UN and other INGOs). See more in Phongpaichit and Baker 2004.

4. Kasian also notes that this set in motion the moment’s formation of its royal-

nationalist political identity, by defining Thaksin and his regime as the enemy of the

nation, the Buddhist establishment and the King. “The contrast with the gathering

rebellion in Nepal during these same months could hardly have been starker.” See

more in Connors and Hewison 2008, 1 – 10.

5. See for example, Uchane 2010, 142; Chotikijpiwat and Boonrueng 2012, 112-113.

6. See Charoensin-o-larn 2012, 87-96; Phaka 2009, 40; Streckfuss 2012, 274-286.

7. There were reportedly two injuries in this incident.

8. See for instance: Iewsriwong 2010, 22-27; Satha-Anand 2010; and Satha-Anand,

Sombatpoonsiri, Damrongwithitham and Chaisukkosol 2013, 143-143.

9. For a thorough report of human rights violation during the 2010 crackdown, see The

Center for Information about People Affected by the 2010 Crackdown 2012.

10. The shift of unarmed to armed resistance as a result of experienced repression was

common in other conflict cases such as Southern Thailand, Nepal, Kosovo, and

Palestine.

11. The Center for Resolution of Emergency Situation (CRES) publicized the ‘Anti-

monarchy chart’ pointing out a plot to overthrow the monarchy. The UDD

leadership, the Puea Thai Party, pro-UDD media, university lecturers, activists, and

government critics (living in Thailand and abroad) were accused of conspiring to

overthrow the monarchy.

12. See also Panpong 2010, 146-148.

13. See also Sarakadee 2009, 42-48.

14. For the video clip of Nattawut Saigeu’s speech prior to the crack, refer to

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=GAE-7Y5StcU.

15. When the crowd seemed to be out of control, Sombat called off the demonstration. He

asked the demonstrators to avoid obstructing the traffic as that would further damage

the image of Red Shirts. He also told that helping to facilitate the traffic connotes the

victory of demonstrators. See more in “Red Shirt called off the Ratchaprasong

demonstration. Pickets might be expected. The Police Chief Commander anticipated

the Chiang Mai mob would disperse at 8 p.m. (Matichon 2010).

16. For the video clip, refer to

http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=eY16u_Wohkw&feature=player_embedded.

17. For the video clip, refer to

http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=z75T4lcIjqA&feature=player_embedded.

18. I discussed the advantage of satire in subverting discursive domination at length in my

PhD dissertation. See Sombutpoonsiri 2012a.

19. See more in de Certeau 1984; Fiske 1989; Scott 1990; Bauman 1993); and Bleiker

2000.

20. See also Shepard 2010, 19-22.

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