Perfect Friendship in the Political RealmAn exploration of the relationships between the

Nicomachean Ethics and the Politics

Elena IrreraBologna University

Email: elena.irrera2@unibo.it

Introduction

Over the last five decades, contemporary scholarship has witnessedan increasing concern for the relation of Aristotle’s ethicalwritings (i.e. the Nicomachean Ethics, the Eudemian Ethics and the MagnaMoralia1) to the Politics. As a way to start taking issue with theproblem and its characteristic complexity, we might unfold it intoat least three main operative questions. In the first place, givenAristotle’s explicit admission that his inquiry into matters ofcharacter is part of a comprehensive reflection which heunquestionably qualifies as “political” (MM I, 1181a23-26, wherethe point is most explicitly stated; cf. NE I, 1094b10-11), wemight wonder whether he leaves room for an autonomous ethicalscience in the corpus of his writings. In the second place, in linewith the alleged political orientation of Aristotle’s practicalthought, doubts may arise as to whether his teachings in mattersof the good life, virtue, voluntariness, justice and friendshipare specifically targeted for the needs of would-be politicians,rather than being addressed to a broader range of persons (forinstance, people interested in actively ameliorating themselvesand their fellows without necessarily undertaking politicalactivity at high levels, or students possibly inspired by a sheer

1 In this paper I shall assume that the Magna Moralia, although having possiblybeen written by a peripathetic author, conveys authentically Aristotelian views.On the thorny issue of the supposed Aristotelian faterhood of the Magna Moralia(and the relevant secondary literature) see for instance C. Bobonich, Aristotle’sEthical Treatises, in R. Kraut (ed. by), The Blackwell Guide to Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics,Oxford, Blackwell, 2006, pp. 12-36; cf. A. Fermani (ed. by), Aristotele. Le tre Etiche,Milano, Bompiani, 2008, pp. XCVIII-CV.

theoretical interest in his reflection on political life).Finally, a third question might be raised with regard to theclosing lines of the Nicomachean Ethics, in which Aristotle expressesthe urgency of taking issue with problems referring to the fieldof legislation and the political community as a way to bring intocompletion what he calls “the human philosophy” (τὰ ἀνθρώπειαφιλοσοφία; NE X, 1181b14-15). In fact, we may wonder whether aconceptual and methodological continuity subsists between theNicomachean Ethics and the Politics and, in case it does, in whatrespects the Politics is supposed to complement the argumentativepaths outlined in the Ethics.

In this paper I shall try to deal (although only tangentially)with the issues above by adopting Aristotle’s view of friendship(as expounded in Books VIII and IX of the Nicomachean Ethics) as avantage point from which, as I believe, an investigation of therelationships between Aristotle’s reflections on the politicallife and those on matters of character and ethical interpersonalrelationships can be better explored.

In the first section of the essay, by drawing on some of therelevant secondary literature, I shall briefly outline some of themost notable views expressed by Aristotelian scholars on thesupposed political nature of Aristotle’s enquiry on the humangood, with peculiar reference to the view (expounded by RichardBodéüs in Le Philosophe et la Cité) according to which Aristotle’sethical teachings are exclusively meant for would-be politiciansand lawgivers. Although agreeing with Bodéüs’ main contentions ofthe book – for instance, the view that a proper “ethical science”is absent in Aristotle’s thought, and also the idea that politicalscience (ἡ πολιτική ἐπιστήμη2) is the expertise which plays themost prominent role in his his project of a philosophy of humanaffairs – I will criticize him on two grounds. First, I shallcritically engage with his idea that Aristotle is exclusively

and not simply primarily – addressing persons with politicalambitions; secondly, I shall question his belief that the Politicswould present an “applied ethics” (understood in terms of a numberof reflections on matters of character) in the realm of the polis.

2 See for instance Pol. I, 1252a15-16; II, 1268b34-37.

Against Bodéüs’ line of interpretation, I will propose thatboth the Nicomachean Ethics and the Politics preserve the nature oftheoretical investigations, although the object they treat, thatis, the human good (τἀνθρώπινον ἀγαθόν), has unquestionablypractical implications for human life. In fact, I will suggestthat, although the two works at issue complement each other in avariety of ways and offer reciprocal philosophical buttressing,the Politics seems to offer a suitable terrain for a more fluid anddynamic interaction of ethical concepts which in the NicomacheanEthics often appear to be divided into watertight compartments.

In the second section I shall begin an inquiry intoAristotle’s ideal of friendship as a notion that, at least in myopinion, lends itself well to the interpretive framework expoundedabove. After laying down the main features and kinds offriendship, I will stress some differences between friendships byutility and friendships between virtuous people. Special attentionwill be devoted to a distinction that Aristotle makes both in theNicomachean and in the Eudemian ethics between friendships by“legal” and “moral utility” (NE VIII, 1162b21-25; EE VII, 1242b31ff.). Such a distinction will allow me to argue that politicalfriendship can be a form of utility friendship which, in its mostaccomplished actualization, aims to the promotion of virtue amongits citizens. Finally, I shall briefly consider how the paradigmof virtue-based friendship can offer an interpretive framework foran understanding of some imperfect constitutions and their (weakeror stronger) ties with virtue.

The Nicomachean Ethics and the Politics: a unitary path ofinvestigation

Any attempt to address the issue of the possible relationshipsbetween the Nicomachean Ethics and the Politics must come to terms witha plethora of uncertainties surrounding the nature, the innercomposition and the ultimate intentions of each work. Due to theimpossibility of covering the overall complexity of the problem inthis paper, I shall confine myself to outlining a sketchy accountof a few issues raised by Aristotelian scholars on the subject, inthe hope that they help to provide a suitable framework for my

discussion on friendship. To begin with, it is worth noting thatboth the Nicomachean Ethics and the Politics belong to the category ofAristotle’s so-called ἐσωτερικοὶ λόγοι, that is, writings reservedto his students and not designed for circulation among a wideaudience3. Such writings were also called “acroamatic” (from theGreek ἀκροαματικός, meaning either “oral” or, “intended forlisteners”/for the initiated), being treated as distinct fromthose Aristotelian works intended for a more general audience (theso-called ἐξωτερικοὶ λόγοι)4. As scholars generally believe,neither work (in the way in which each has been handed down to us)is a direct outcome of its author, nor was it originally destinedfor publication. Rather, each appears to be an edited collectionof logoi, i.e. discourses that, in this case, seemed to reproducethe key concepts expressed in the lectures delivered by Aristotleto his students in the Lyceum5. What remains unclear is, in thefirst place, whether Aristotle himself had written such notes,using them as a basis for his orally delivered lectures6, or if the

3 For a detailed treatment of the issue see C. Lord, “The Character andComposition of Aristotle's Politics” Political Theory, 9, No. 4 (1981), pp. 459-478,pp. 460-462. Cf. G. Reale, Storia della filosofia antica, 5 vols, Milano, Vita epensiero, 1991 (first published 1975-1980), vol II, p. 381; A. Fermani (ed.),Aristotele. Le tre etiche, Milano, Bompiani, 2008, introductory essay, p. LXXXIX. 4 As C. Lord (1981, cit.) says at p. 461, of all the works mentioned in thecatalogues of Aristotle's writings, the Politics and (in some catalogues) thePhysics are described as a "course of lectures”. See R. Bodéüs, The Political Dimensionsof Aristotle’s Ethics (tr. By J.E. Garrett), Albany, State University of New Yorkpress, 1993, p. 85 and 179, footnote 2, who translates the very early titlegiven to the Politics in the first catalogs, i.e. “πολιτικὴ ἀκρόασις” “oralpresentation on political questions” (No 75 Diogenes Laërtius and No. 70Hesychius in I. Düring, Aristotle in the Ancient Biographical Tradition, Göteborg, Stockholm:Almqvist & Wiksell in Komm, 1957, pp. 45 and 85). On the distinction betweenesoteric and exoteric logoi in Aristotle cf. Cicero, Ad Atticum 13, 19; Strabo,Geographica, I.13; Ammonius Hermiae, In Aristotelis Categorias commentarius, who maintainthat the esoterikoi logoi were written transcripts of oral discourses, whereas theexoterikoi works were written dialogues. An alternative criterion of differentiationbetween esoteric and exoteric logoi are supplied by Plutarch (Life of Alexander, 7.3-4) and Aulus Gellius (Attic Nights I. XX, ch. 4), who maintain that the acroamaticworks were those on natural philosophy and logic, unlike the exoteric ones, thatwould have dealt with issues of rhetoric, ethics, and politics.5 See for instance C. Natali (ed.), Aristotele. Etica Nicomachea, Roma-Bari,Laterza, 2001, second edition (first published 1999), introduction, p. III. 6 See T.H. Irwin, Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, Indianapolis, Hackett, 1985, p.xxi; cf. I. Düring, Aristoteles: Darstellung und Interpretation seines Denkens, Heidelberg,Winter, 1966, pp. 32-36. Also, as C. Lord (1981, cit.) suggests at p. 461, «Inany case, it makes sense to suppose that the treatises served also, or even

works are simply edited transcripts of Aristotle’s lectures takenby one of (or more than one among) his students7. Secondly, doubtsarise as to the specific target of such lectures. Were theydestined to highly specialized students of the Lyceum or to awider circle of attendants?8 What is more relevant to our purposes,what kind of teaching were such writings designed to supply? Werethey supposed to address different thematic issues and adoptcorrespondingly different methodological approaches ofinvestigation, such as a distinctively ethical one in theNicomachean Ethics and a political one in the Politics? Alternatively,do the above mentioned writings appear to mark different aspectsof a unitarian project? If so, what kind of project is that, andwhat its ultimate nature? Possibly a political one?

While some scholars have (more or less explicitly) claimedthat Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics offers the groundlines of adistinctively ethical science9, others have stressed the absence ofprimarily, as reference works which were treated to some extent as the commonproperty of the school and were available for the use of students». A similarcontention is made by F. Susemihl, (Review of J. Burnet, The Ethics of Aristotle, inBerliner Philologische Wochenschrift 20(1900), pp. 1505-1513: 1508-9, whomaintains that Aristotle’s texts were not mere oral lessons but ratherexpsndions of such lessons into books for the school. 7 As C. Lord (1981, cit.), p. 461 points out, this possibility is regarded bymost scholars most unlikely, given the high quality and uniformity of style ofthe treatises. Also, as he explains at p. 475, footnote 2, by mentioning A.Kenny (The Aristotelian Ethics: A Study of the Relationship Between the "Eudemian" and "NicomacheanEthics" of Aristotle, Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1978, pp. 215-220) and W.D. Ross,Aristotle's Metaphysics, Oxford,1924, pp. xxv-xxvii), works like the Magna Moraliaand the Metaphysics are regarded as transcripts made by Aristotle’s students. Cf.A. Fermani (2008, cit.), p. CLI.8 See Aulus Gellius, Attic Nights, XX.5, who explains that Aristotle regularlylectured to advanced students of the Lyceum in the morning, while in theafternoon he would give lectures to a wider audience. Cf. C. Lord (1981, cit.,p. 462).9 See R.A. Gauthier and J.Y. Jolif, Aristote. L’ethique a Nicomaque, Louvain,Publications universitaires de Louvain; Paris, 1970 (second edition); F.Dirlmeier, Aristoteles, Nikomachische Ethik, Berlin, Akademie, p. 189. Such authorsspeak of an ἠθικὴ ἐπιστήμη. A slightly different opinion is held by Bien (G.Bien, La filosofia politica di Aristotele, Bologna, il Mulino, 20 [tr. It. M.L. Violante],p. 189), who at p. 219 claims that ethics and politics represent two distinctspheres of inquiry in Aristotle, although he specifies that the disciplinarydistinction at stake is neither fundamental nor absolute (given that ethics haspolitical implications and political issues contains ethical underpinnings). Fora more detailed treatment see S. Cashdollar (cit., 1973, p. 146, footnote2). Thescholar mentions A. Grant and W. Jaeger as authors who, although avoiding toexplicitly recognise an ethical science, usually assume without evidence that

an ethikē epistemē in Aristotle’s practical philosophy10, suggestingthat his real focus of investigation is political competence(which he explicitly addresses in terms of a ἡ πολιτική, ἡπολιτική ἐπιστήμη and ἡ πολιτική τέχνη). In this respect, thePolitics would bring into completion an inquiry that in theNicomachean Ethics itself Aristotle qualifies as “political”. As weread for instance at NE I, 1094 b 10-11, the research (μέθοδος) thatAristotle sets out to undertake is “somewhat political”(πολιτική τις).

In agreement with the second group of scholars mentionedabove, if we are allowed to speak of a “moral philosophy” inAristotle, that is, of a reflection about matters concerningcharacter (τὰ ἤθη), we can hypothesize that such philosophy formspart of a comprehensive political science11. Such an insight findsconfirmation in the opening lines of the Magna Moralia, where theauthor, while stressing the need to ask to what form of expertisedoes character (τὸ ἦθος) refer, declares without reticence that itbelongs to ἡ πολιτική (MM I, 1181a23-26). Significant evidence ofthe intimate relationship between matters concerning character andpolitical expertise is also offered in the Nicomachean Ethics on theoccasion of a discussion of ἡ πολιτική in terms of an expertisethat employs subordinate practical expertises. At NE I, 1094 b 4-9explains that such an art/science legislates about what one mustdo and what things one must abstain from doing, and that its endis the human good. Such a good is said to be the same for a singleperson and for a city, although the good of the city

is a greater and more complete thing both to achieve and to preserve: for whileto do so for one person on his own is satisfactory enough, to do it for a nationor for cities is finer and more godlike12.

Aristotle was headed in that direction. 10 See R. Bodéüs (1993, cit.); P.A. Vander Waerdt, “The Political intention ofAristotle’s Moral Philosophy”, Ancient Philosophy 5, 1(1985), pp. 77-89; S.Cashdollar, “Aristotle’s Politics of Morals”, Journal of the History of Philosophy 11 (2)(1973), pp. 145-160. D. Frede, “The Political character of Aristotle’s Ethics”,in M. Deslauriers and Pierre Destrée (eds.), The Cambridge Companion to Aristotle’sPolitics, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2014, pp. 14-37.11 See for instance P.A. Vander Waerdt (cit., 1985), p. 77. 12 εἰ γὰρ καὶ ταὐτόν ἐστιν ἑνὶ καὶ πόλει , μεῖζόν γε καὶ τελειότερον τὸ τῆς πόλεως φαίνεται καὶ λαβεῖν καὶ σῴζειν : ἀγαπητὸν μὲν γὰρ καὶ ἑνὶ μόνῳ, κάλλιον δὲ καὶ θειότερον ἔθνει καὶ  πόλεσιν. 

It is worth noting that, although establishing a correspondencebetween the two forms of good, Aristotle is inviting his audienceand/or readers to search for the more perfect good, that is, theone able to bring persons to their fullfledged realization: thegood of the political community. This is the good that not simplyvirtuous individuals, but, most crucially, true politicians try topursue for the city. Remarkably, as we read at NE I, 1102a7-9,

[I]n fact it seems that the true political expert(ὁ κατ᾽ ἀλήθειαν πολιτικὸς) will have worked at excellence more thananything; for what he wants is to make the members of the citizen-body good, andobedient to the laws13.

For, as he has made it clear in the previous lines, the good ofeach citizen is εὐδαιμονία, that is, the good life, which consistsin the perfect actualization of the rational faculties of thehuman soul according to perfect virtue(ψυχῆς ἐνέργειά τις κατ᾽ ἀρετὴν τελείαν, NE I, 1102a5-6)14. This iswhy, at it can be evinced from the end of the Nicomachean Ethics,Aristotle encourages his readers/listeners to become legislatorsand take care of all the members of their city at the publiclevel. The main object of discussion in the context at issue isthe educational (and not simply the coercitive) power that lawsposses over the citizens. As he explains, sometimes care for their

All the passages of the Nicomachean Ethics quoted in this paper are taken (unlessdifferently specified) by S. Broadie and C.J. Rowe, Aristotle. Nicomachean Ethics.Translation, Introduction and Commentary, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2002.13 δοκεῖ δὲ καὶ ὁ κατ᾽ ἀλήθειαν πολιτικὸς περὶ ταύτην  μάλιστα πεπονῆσθαι: βούλεται γὰρ τοὺς πολίτας ἀγαθοὺς ποιεῖν  καὶ τῶν νόμων ὑπηκόους. Cf. Book I of the Eudemian Ethics (1216a23-27), in whichAristotle speaks of the one who is “truly politician” (ἀληθῶς πολιτικὸς). Such apolitician, unlike those who are not really so and embrace political life forthe sake of money and gain, is one who chooses on purpose fine actions for theirown sake (τῶν καλῶν ἐστι πράξεων προαιρετικὸς αὐτῶν χάριν). 14 On Aristotle’s specification of εὐδαιμονία as “the human good”(τὸ ἀνθρώπινον ἀγαθὸν) see in particular NE I, 1098 a 16-18, where such a goodis described as “activity of soul in accordance with excellence (and if thereare more excellences than one, in accordance with the best and the mostcomplete). (ψυχῆς ἐνέργεια κατ᾽ ἀρετήν, εἰ δὲ πλείους  αἱ ἀρεταί, κατὰ τὴν ἀρίστην καὶ τελειοτάτην). 

education is neglected on the communal level, in which case itwould seem appropriate for each to contribute towards his ownchildren’s and friends’ acquisition of excellence, and for him tohave the capacity to do so. On the other hand, concern forvirtuous legislative activity should also be kept in high esteemand fostered:

from what has been said he [presumably the potentially good man] would seem tobe likely to have a greater capacity for doing it if he first acquired theexpertise of the lawgiver. For clearly, where the supervision is on a communalbasis, it is achieved through laws, and where it is of a decent kind, throughgood laws…(NE X, 1180a30-34).

At this stage of the discussion, we may wonder who is the realaddressee of Aristotle’s message. Scholars have expressed variousopinions on the issue. Bodéüs suggests that the Nicomachean Ethicsprovides a teaching reserved to would-be politicians15, and it isfor such a reason that the work at issue would lay the ground fora properly political investigation. In other words, reflection onethical themes would be introduced only insofar as such themeshelp virtuous lawgivers to accomplish their aim: the promotion ofthe authentic human good for the citizens of their polis16. Adifferent opinion is advanced by Smith Pangle, who, althoughrecognising that Bodéüs “makes a major contribution in correctlyidentifying the primary audience of the Nicomachean Ehics and indescribing much of what Aristotle hopes to accomplish in it”17,maintains that “Aristotle’s project is both more complex and moreambitious than Bodéüs allows”. For even students of philosophymight have been interested in the ideas expounded in theNicomachean Ethics (as well as in the Eudemian Ethics), withoutnecessarily studying in view of a prospective political career.

15 R. Bodéüs (1993, cit.). 16 Cf. S. Cashdollar (1973, cit.), p. 148: “Politics investigates humanexcellence and happiness (EN 1102 a 5-15), which studies the human soul in sofar as it is necessary in order to understand excellence (EN 1102 a 16-24).17 L. Smith Pangle, Aristotle and the Philosophy of Friendship, Cambridge, CambridgeUniversity Press, 2003, pp. 10-11.

On my understanding of the issue, Bodéüs and Cashdollar arecertainly right in pointing to the political nature of the ethicalinvestigations expounded in the Nicomachean Ethics, especially in thelight of the evidence from the latter work provided above.However, as Smith Pangle suggests, it should also be noticed thatAristotle means to convey a message to all those individuals thatshow a propensity to reflect on virtue and to instantiate it inconcrete life. The task of a research on ethical and politicalmatters is not that of providing the conditions for a sterilespeculation, but that of turning those who wish to participate init virtuous persons18. Although such a task can be operated at theindividual level, to actualise the human good for the city is amore perfect activity than the promotion of the good life for asingle human being. Provided that the highest good is one which isobtained by the citizens of a polis under the coordinating activityof political science/competence, what is required to promote thegood of the city will be a kind of practical wisdom thedistinctive deliberative capacity of which cannot be restricted tomatters concerning one’s own life. This is why Aristotle – as NEX, 1180a30-34 clearly indicates – seems to be inviting peopleinterested in virtue to become lawgivers. Such people might notsimply be persons who already entertain political ambitions, forthey might be also and, perhaps especially, others who, whileprofitably attending Aristotle’s lectures in matters of character,may not have yet developed political ambitions. This point isfurther remarked at NE X, 1180b23-28, where we read that

[A]nd perhaps if someone wishes to make people better – whether in large numbersor in small – by exercising supervision over them, he too should attempt tobecome an expert in legislation, if it’s through laws that we’d become good. Forthe production of a good disposition in any given person, whoever he may be, isnot a task for just anybody, but if anyone can do it, it is the person withknowledge, as in the case of medicine or any sphere where there is room for wisesupervision19.

18 See NE II, 1103b27-29, where Aristotle claims that the undertaking is not forthe sake of theory, but for the sake of becoming good. Cf. NE X, 1179a34-b3. 19τάχα δὲ καὶ τῷ βουλομένῳ δι᾽ ἐπιμελείας  βελτίους ποιεῖν, εἴτε πολλοὺς εἴτ᾽ ὀλίγους, νομοθετικῷ πειρατέον  γενέσθαι, εἰ διὰ νόμων ἀγαθοὶ γενοίμεθ᾽ ἄν. ὅντινα γὰρ οὖν καὶ  τὸν προτεθέντα διαθεῖναι καλῶς οὐκ ἔστι τοῦ τυχόντος, ἀλλ᾽ εἴπερ τινός , τοῦ εἰδότος, ὥσπερ ἐπ᾽ ἰατρικῆς καὶ τῶν λοιπῶν ὧν ἔστιν ἐπιμέλειά  τις καὶ φρόνησις.

What such people need to understand and achieve is a φρόνησις, i.e.an intellectual virtue employable in deliberative activity20, oflegislative nature. As Aristotle explains at NE VI 1141b25-27political expertise itself is regarded as the same disposition asφρόνησις, although their being is not the same. For

[O]f the disposition as it relates to the city, the architectonic form of wisdomis legislative expertise, while the form of wisdom at the level of particularsis given the generic name ‘political expertise’, and this is concerned withaction and deliberation, since a decree is something to be acted upon, as whatcomes last in the process21.

The idea the human good cannot be fully realized at the individuallevel suggests that a reflection on a well-functioning polis islogically prior to one on the individual good and the virtuousmeans to attain it. In this respect, it might be suggested thatAristotle’s investigations on matters of happiness, justice,individual virtues and friendship contribute to the adequateintellectual and ethical education of well-inclined human beingsto excellent statemanship. This is a concept that needs to beunderstood even by those who, attending Aristotle’s lectures, arenot immediately prone to commit themselves to architectonicpolitical activity. I therefore propose that, however we mayinterpret the issue of the supposed addressees of Aristotle’steachings, what really matters for an understanding of therelationships between the Nicomachean Ethics and the Politics is not thenature of the addressees, but the concrete possibility thatAristotle, rather than trying to impart the fundamentals of aproper and autonomous ethical science, displays various aspects ofa unitary political project for the successful realisation ofwhich the lawgiver is accorded the primary responsibility22 (this20 See for instance NE VI, 1140a25-27, where it is said that the characteristicof a practically wise person is to be able to deliberate well about the thingsthat are good and advantageous to himself. 21  ἔστι δὲ καὶ ἡ πολιτικὴ καὶ ἡ φρόνησις ἡ  αὐτὴ μὲν ἕξις, τὸ μέντοι εἶναι οὐ ταὐτὸν αὐταῖς. τῆς δὲ περὶ πόλιν ἣ μὲν  ὡς ἀρχιτεκτονικὴ φρόνησις νομοθετική, ἣ δὲ ὡς τὰ καθ᾽ ἕκαστα τὸ κοινὸν  ἔχει ὄνομα, πολιτική: αὕτη δὲ πρακτικὴ καὶ βουλευτική: τὸ γὰρ ψήφισμα  πρακτὸν ὡς τὸ ἔσχατον.22 This aspect is stressed by D. Frede (2014, cit.), especially at p. 16. Fredestates that the dispensability of statesmanship and the responsibility of the

is an assumption that, as we have seen, Bodéüs himselfentertains). Independently of the chronological order in which wemay want to fix the composition of the Politics and the NicomacheanEthics, there is wide room for supposing that the two workscomplement each other under various aspects.

Regarding the possible ways in which the arguments and themethodologies employed in the two works may interact, once againBodéüs seems to offer valuable suggestions, for he argues that thePolitics provides a suitable terrain for “exercises in sciencepratique”; which is to say, it seems to put the theoreticalconcepts enucleated in the Nicomachean Ethics into action and toprovide a sort of “applied ethics” (assuming that “ethics” here istantamount to “reflections on matters of character”, and not to aproper science)23. Along a similar (although not the same) line,Gerson, by stressing the existence of a supposed unitary projectbetween the Nicomachean Ethics and the Politics, hypothesises that thePolitics supplies specific cases in which ethical concepts likevirtue and justice, being treated in their general aspect in theEthics, find concrete and individual instantiations24. I believe thatboth positions contain valid insights, especially with respect tothe idea that many ethical notions which in the Nicomachean Ethics arepresented without a specific historic and/or political context mayfind a rich array of specifications in the Politics. Nevertheless, Ibelieve that Bodéüs’ view is plausible only as long as we do notestablish a dychotomy between a supposed theoretical basis offeredby the Nicomachean Ethics and a practical approach adopted in theNicomachean Ethics. If the two works display a unitary project for aphilosophia humana, as claimed in Book X of the Nicomachean Ethics,there is no need to credit them as writings that respectivelydisplay an abstract-theoretical and a context-related, practical

virtuous lawgiverin ethical questions is clearly mistaken, especially if we readthe Nicomachean Ethics and the Politics as parts of a whole political investigation. 23 This aspect of Bodéüs’ reflection is brought out by P.A. Vander Waerdt, “ThePolitical Intention of Aristotle's Moral Philosophy”, Ancient Philosophy 5(1)(1985),pp: 77-89: 80.24 See L.P. Gerson, “Aristotle’s Polis: A Community of the Virtuous”, Proceedings ofthe Boston Area Colloquium in Ancient Philosophy 3(1987), pp. 203–25, 205:“The good inpolitics is not different from the good in ethics in the way the good for aspecies of animals is different from the good of an individual animal” (meaningthat Politics, unlike the Nicomachean Ethics, investigates individual cases).

argumentative strategy. What is more, I suggest that, although thethematic issues faced in both works undoubtedly direct theaudience and contemporary readers to practical issues, that is,things which are to be desired and pursued in the realm of action,we should not forget that they both constitute theoreticalinvestigations. As it has been suggested by Garver25, the idea thatphilosophical reflection is ultimately designed to activelypromote the human good should not induce us to neglect that theargumentative structure of both works follows a path oftheoretical investigation.

Given these premises, in the present paper I shall advance thesuggestion that political friendship and, more specifically, theways in which this is treated in the Nicomachean Ethics and in thePolitics, offer a privileged perspective from which the two works canbe seen as theoretical treatises dealing with practical matters,i.e. matters that have the power and the task of prompting anactive change in people’s lives. By analysis of some aspects ofAristotle’s view of political friendship as they can be traced inthe two works, I will suggest that they display a substantialargumentative continuity, even though (as it has been stressed byVander Waerdt26) not every expectation declared at the end of theNicomachean Ethics on the political inquiry to undertake seems to befulfilled in the Politics.

25 E. Garver, Confronting Aristotle's Ethics: Ancient and Modern Morality, Chicago, Universityof Chicago Press, 2006. He makes this point with reference to the sphere ofAristotelian ethics as well as to that of rhetoric, whose practical aim,persuasion, is premised on a properly speculative reflection which is valuablein itself. 26 See P.A. Vander Waerdt (cit., 1985), p. 86, who claims that, at it isgenerally agreed, the outline at NE 1181b12-24 does not introduce the extantthemes in the Politics. It rather seems to allude only to books II (b 15-17), V-VII(b17-20; cf. 1289b23-26), 1301a19-25, 1316b31-36) and VII-VIII (b2o-21).Moreover, Vander Waerdt points out that the Politics seems to present morephilosophical connections and continuity with the Eudemian Ethics rather than withthe Nicomachean Ethics. I don’t think, however, that such a view forestalls thepossibility that there is a continuity and even reciprocal complementaritybetween the Nicomachean Ethics and the Politics, especially if we consider, as I do,that the Nicomachean Ethics offers a philosophically refined (and by no meansincompatible) treatment of the issues laid down in the Eudemian Ethics. On theissue of the supposed thematic unity of Aristotle’s ethical works point see A.Fermani (2008, cit.).

Most crucially, I shall claim that Aristotle’s view ofpolitical friendship and, in particular, of perfect friendship, asit can be reconstructed from a joint analysis of the two worksshows how concepts that in the Nicomachean Ethics are treated asridigly separate find a terrain for reciprocal interaction andeven blending in the Politics. I will propose that the Politics offersthe readers the opportunity for an intellectual visualisation ofabstract concepts in a more nuanced way, ranging from the contextof perfect constitution to imperfect forms of politicalorganization.

Preliminary remarks on friendship

In Books VIII and IX of the Nicomachean Ethics Aristotle engages in awide-ranging critical discussion of the notion of friendship(φιλία), showing a glaring example of how a subject of popularappeal may be turned into a philosophically problematic question.Generally speaking, the concept of φιλία he takes issue withcovers an extensive array of human relationships, that is,partnerships that, depending on their nature and purpose, appearto be variously characterised by reciprocal displays of values,obligations, expectations and commitments. By resorting (in linewith his dialectical method)27 to generally held opinions (τὰἔνδοξα) on the topic he investigates, he first presents φιλία as avirtue (ἀρετή τις), or as something that somehow involves virtue(NE VIII, 1155a1-2). This idea seems to pave the way for thecommonly entertained view that friendship can be regarded as anintrinsically valuable good, that is, as something worth choosingin its own right (NE VIII, 1159 a 26-2728). On the other hand,

27 For a detailed illustration of the dialectical method and an illustration ofthe most relevant interpretations of the issue I refer the reader to my E.Irrera, Sulla bellezza della vita buona. Fini e criteri dell'agire umano in Aristotele, Lanciano(Chieti), Carabba, 2012, pp. 107-117.28 Another relevant passage in which ἡ φιλία is regarded as a “fine” and not anecessary or useful good is NE VIII, 1155a28-31, where it is said that “not onlyit is necessary, it is also a fine thing”. However, the moral beauty involved inthe passage does not seem to allude to a supposed intrinsic value of friendship;it rather hints at a virtue able to generate honorable achievements for thosewho possess it and a positive assessment of such persons by external observers.

friendship is most prominently introduced as a requirement thatproves by all means necessary in human life (ἀναγκαιότατον) (NEVIII, 1155a3-5). Notably, the ways in which a friendship might beregarded as “necessary” reflect a set of different concerns ofutilitarian kind. For instance, friendship might represent a sheerinstrument for the attainment and preservation of material goods(NE VIII, 1155a9-10), or an expedient adopted by some persons tohave someone who takes care of them and supplements their failingpowers of action (cf. the case of the elderly at NE VIII, 1155a13-14). On a different side, friendship might be a relationshipwhich, although preserving its expediential nature, frequentlyraises above simple utility and comes to incline towards virtue.For instance, as many believe, friendship allows rich and powerfulindividuals to engage in various forms of welldoing (εὐεργεσία)(NE VIII, 1155a7-9); Even more, it might have a positive effect inthe growth of the individuals involved as good human beings. Forinstance, friends are an aid to the young to guard them fromerror, and those in their peak find in friendship a good conduciveto fine actions (πρὸς τὰς καλὰς πράξεις). For such kinds offriends, when they go together, are better able both to think andto act (NE VIII, 1155a14-16). In compliance with the dialecticalmethod, such commonsensical φαινόμενα29 on friendship not only willnot be rejected by Aristotle, but they will gradually receive anadequate philosophical buttress. On his view, the concept of friendship is designed to cover a widerange of human interactions and shared experiences, that is, ofinterpersonal relationships whose aims and inspiring motives canbe traced back to respectively different ways of understandingboth the nature of the “good life” and the means to attain it.Some kinds of friendship, for instance, seem to arise mainly outof a search for pleasurable moments (cf. NE VIII, 1156 a 31-35; EEVII, 1236 a 39-41), whereas others, being mostly regarded asutility-based friendships, seek to promote the satisfaction ofcontingent desires and needs (cf. NE VIII, 1156 a 10-12; EE VII,1236 a 32-38). Notably, there are also friendships that represent

29 On this aspect see M.C. Nussbaum, Saving Aristotle’s Appearances, in M. Schofield andM.C. Nussbaum (eds.), Language and Logos: Studies in ancient Greek Philosophy presented to G.E.L.Owen, 1982, pp. 267-293.

an opportunity for reciprocal amelioration in the direction ofvirtue. These are friendships between virtuous persons, that is,partnerships which Aristotle himself conceives in terms of anactualisation of the intellectual and ethical potentialities ofthe subjects involved (cf. NE IX, 1172 a 9-14)30. The latter typeof friendship, which in the Nicomachean Ethics Aristotle names“complete friendship” (ἡ τελεία φιλία; see for instance NE VIII,1156 b 7; 1158 a 11)31 and in the Eudemian Ethics “primary friendship”(ἡ πρώτη φιλία); Cf. EE VII, 1236 a 18, b 12, 24; 1237 a 10, b 8;1238 a 30) is the one that best seems to capture his view of whata truly happy life is and also the way in which the good lifeitself (in which happiness consists) ought to be realised. Loveand trust for one’s friend, a full recognition and appreciation ofthe friends’ qualities and a passionate, stable commitment to thefriends’ good seem to be the most distinctive traits of such akind of friendship. Given the demandingness of its requirements,primary friendship would not seem (at least prima facie) to play anysignificant role in the internal organisation of politicalcommunities. For Aristotle – by subscribing to what seems to be agenerally held view – frequently declares that the distinctivefriendship that arises within political communities – the so-called “political friendship” (ἡ πολιτικὴ φιλία), is based on thesearch for some kind of advantage. As we read for instance at NEVIII, 1160 a 8-12:

[…] the political community (ἡ πολιτικὴ δὲ κοινωνία) [too] seems to have cometogether in the beginning and to remain in place for the sake of advantage(τοῦ συμφέροντος χάριν), since this is what is aimed at by lawgivers too, andpeople say that what is for the common advantage is just.

Notably, the utility pursued by the political community is not atemporary advantage; rather, as Aristotle expressly declares at NEVIII, 1160 a 21-25, the state aims at covering the whole of life,and it is with a view to this that the polis itself embraces and30 «...friendship between decent people (ἐπιεικῶν) is decent, and grows inproportion to their interaction; and they even seem to become better by beingactive and correcting each other; for they take each other’s imprint in thoserespects in which they please one another – hence the saying ‘For from good mengood things come’». 31 Cf. for instance NE VIII, 1156 b 7; 1158 a 11.

coordinates the specific ends of subordinate forms of community,such as military partnerships, religious guilds and dining-clubs.Similar points can be found in the Eudemian Ethics, where Aristotlestates that ἡ πολιτικὴ φιλία is said to be mostly (μάλιστα) found inutility (EE VII, 1242 a 6-7), that it

is constituted in the fullest degree on the principle of utility, for it seemsto be the individual’s lack of self-sufficiency that makes these unionspermanent…,32

and also that

[T]he justice that underlies a friendship of utility is in the highest degreejust, because this is the civic principle of justice” (EE VII, 1242 a 11-12).

On the other hand, we should not lose sight of a crucialaspect of Aristotle’s ethical inquiries: the relevance of virtuein political theory as well as in legislative activity. The ideathat political friendship is “mostly” based on utility might implythat utility is not the only aspect that makes up a well-conductedpolitical friendship. The conceptual link between virtue andpolitical competence33 prominently emerges in the opening lines ofBook VII of the Eudemian Ethics, where Aristotle, in the attempt toillustrate the popular view on friendship, specifies that thefunction of politics is mainly that of producing friendship, and thatvirtue is needed to achieve this important goal (EE VII, 1234 b 22-24). Within such a politically-related context, even moreremarkable appears his insistence on properties of friendship likethe moral goodness of friends, the incapacity to commit injusticeto each other and the nature of friendship itself as a bond thatcan be somehow considered as an habitual state of character (EEVII, 1234 b 24-31; NE VIII, 1155 a 1-2). For such properties,strike deep to the very core of primary friendship.

However, before engaging in a discussion of the latter kind offriendship, it will be appropriate to consider the general32 The translation by of the Eudemian Ethics I adopt in this paper is by here is H.Rackham (Aristotle. Aristotle in 23 Volumes, Vol. 20, Cambridge, MA, HarvardUniversity Press; London, William Heinemann Ltd., 1981).33 With regard to to political competence, Aristotle generally makes use of theexpressions ἡ πολιτική, ἡ πολιτική ἐπιστήμη and ἡ πολιτική τέχνη.

requirements that, on Aristotle’s view, enable a relationship tobe identified as a form of friendship. In the first place, hepresents philia as a distinctively human good, i.e. one that cannotinvolve a relationship either between inanimate objects or betweena living being and an inanimate one (NE VIII, 1155 b 28-30; MM II,1208 b 34-36). Secondly, friendship must be grounded on adisposition of benevolence (εὔνοια) towards one’s friends, i.e.one that causes the subject who experiences it to wish good thingsto the addressee of such a feeling (this can be indirectly evincedfrom NE VIII, 1155 b 29-30, where Aristotle speaks of theimpossibility of βούλεσθαι τἀγαθά towards wine). Third, such abenevolence must be reciprocated (that is, there must beἀντιφίλησις; NE VIII, 1155 b 28; MM II, 1208 b 29-31, 36); for theeunoia experienced by a single person toward another is just astarting point (ἀρχή; NE IX, 1167 a 3) for the creation offriendship, but not a sufficient condition of it. Finally,friendship can never be hidden to those involved in it (NE VIII,1155 b 34)34. As we might suppose in relation to the latterfeature, those people committed to friendship are expected tocultivate a shared and reciprocal awareness of the existence of abond between them. Provided that friendship is a suitable terrainfor reciprocal expectations of correct behaviour (as Aristotlewill make it progressively clear in the run of his argument), oncethe main aims and expected rules of conduct have become clear tothose who join a certain friendship, each friend will be aware notonly of what the others expect from him/her, but also of thethings he/she is allowed to claim from them qua friend. As areasonable implication of this, as I hope to show in this paper, ashared awareness of the bond of friendship might enforce the senseof indvidual responsibility and commitment to one’s friend whichis endemic to the friendship itself.

For Aristotle different friendships are shaped respectivelydifferent ways of experiencing the bonds of affection34 For a treatment of these requirements I refer the reader to J.M. Cooper,“Aristotle on the Forms of Friendship”, The Review of Metaphysics 30, No. 4 (1977),pp. 619-648; A. Price, Love and Friendship in Plato and Aristotle, Oxford, Clarendon Press,1990; cf. E. Irrera, “Between Advantage and Virtue: Aristotle's Theory of PoliticalFriendship”, History of Political Thought 26(2005), pp. 565–585.

(αἱ φιλήσεις, NE VIII 1156 a 6). More to the point, he identifiesthree kinds of friendship, which prove to be equal in number tothe objects of love (ἰσάριθμα τοῖς φιλητοῖς) (NE VIII 1156 a 7-10). Both in Book VIII and in Book IX of the Nicomachean Ethics thephilosopher stresses the positive qualities of virtuousfriendship, that is, a friendship based on the pursuit of τὸἀγαθόν by virtuous people, by differentiating it from both utilityand pleasure-based friendships. Aristotle appears keen toemphasize that, in the case of friendship by virtue, the act ofloving and wishing good things for one’s friend is due to aprevious recognition and positive evaluation of the other as avirtuous individual. For instance, at NE IX 1167 a 19-20, we readthat

Generally good will (εὔνοια) occurs because of excellence (δι᾽ ἀρετὴν), or akind of decency, where one person appears to another a fine character, orcourageous, or something like that…

The virtue possessed by the addressees of love is regarded as anintrinsic value, that is, one which makes some persons worthy ofappreciation (and therefore of love) “because of what they are”(διὰ τὸ αὑτοῖς)35. By contrast, friendships by utility andfriendships by pleasure are ultimately due to one’s desire toachieve something which one regards as good, that is, somethingthat one thinks will be attained by forming a partnership withcertain individuals, regardless of their inherent properties. Thisis why Aristotle labels such friendships as friendshipsκατὰ συμβεβηκός, that is, by accident (NE VIII, 1156 a 16-17). Bycontrast, when perfect friendship (ἡ τελεία φιλία) is at stake,virtuous persons wish the good of their friends, and they do sofor the sake of the friends themselves (NE VIII, 1156b7-10):

35 This is what may be indirectly inferred from NE VIII, 1156 a 14-15, whereAristotle claims that friends who love each other for the ske of utillity do notlove each other for what they are. Cf. J.M. Cooper, “Friendship and the Good inAristotle”, The Philosophical Review 86, No. 3 (1977), pp. 290-315; S. Stern-Gillet,Aristotle’s Philosophy of Friendship, Albany (N.Y.), State Univerty of New York Press,1995, pp. 60-64.

Perfect friendship is the one between good people, those resembling each otherin excellence. For these people, inasmuch as they are virtuous, wish good thingsfor one another, and are virtuous in themselves36.

(τελεία δ᾽ ἐστὶν ἡ τῶν ἀγαθῶν φιλία καὶ κατ᾽ ἀρετὴν ὁμοίων: οὗτοι γὰρτἀγαθὰ ὁμοίως βούλονται ἀλλήλοις ᾗ ἀγαθοί, ἀγαθοὶ δ᾽ εἰσὶ καθ᾽ αὑτούς ). 

On the one hand, throughout the two books of the Nicomachean Ethicsdevoted to the issue Aristotle suggests that, if faced at apersonal level, friendship and, in particular, perfect friendship represents an aspect of human life which, perhaps more thanothers, calls those who experience it to a costant, sharedcommitment to interaction and also to reflection on the humangood. It invites people to the acquisition of forms ofresponsibility towards the persons involved in the partnership. Onthe other, it should be noted that it is not the private dimensionof friendship which seems to capture the philosopher’s interest.Rather, as it emerges from the opening section of Book VIII of theNicomachean Ethics37, he presents the widely held view that

[F]riendship also seems to keep cities together, and lawgivers seem to pay moreattention to it than to justice (NE VIII, 1155a21-24),

and also the idea that

[for] like-mindedness (ὁμόνοια) seems to be similar, in a way, to friendship,and it is this that they aim most at achieving, while they aim most to eliminatefaction, faction being enmity (NE VIII, 1155a24-26).

Notably, the axiological priority accorded by Aristotle tofriendship over justice ought not to be taken as the hallmark of afailure of the virtue of justice at bringing about correspondinglyjust actions. For as Aristotle makes it clear in Book V of theNicomachean Ethics, justice, if understood in its most comprehensivesense, is a form of respect for a law (τὸ νόμιμον, NE V, 1129a34)36 My own english translation of the passage. In translating it, I have benefitedfrom Arianna Fermani’s italian translation of the Nicomachean Ethics in A.Fermani (ed.), Aristotele. Le tre etiche, Milano, Bompiani, 2008.37 Cf. the opening lines of Book VII of the Eudemian Ethics, where friendship isimmediately described as a function (ἔργον) of political expertise (EE VII,1234b22-23)

that is qualified not only as a way to promote happiness for thepolitical community and its parts, but also virtue in a proper“Aristotelian” sense. Justice is a perfect excellence to thehighest degree (NE V, 1129b30: τελεία μάλιστα ἀρετή), that is, anexcellent disposition of character which compels individuals toact according to the rest of their virtues and, most crucially,with respect to another person. This is why justice is regarded asan ἀλλότριον ἀγαθὸν (NE V, 1130a2, ); for it involves a display ofconcern for the well-being of the addressees of just actions. Inthis respect, there is no need to suppose that justice betweenvirtuous persons not involved in a friendhip is less secure thanfriendship in promoting virtuous human agency towards others38.

Justice, therefore, is not an alternative to friendship; tothe contrary, it seems to emerge as a foundational component offriendship. Aristotle’s not only tries not to downplay thefunction of justice in interpersonal relationships, but he eventries to raise it to the level of friendship. For, as peoplegenerally believe,

of what is just, the most just is thought to be what belongs to friendship (NEVIII, 1155a27-28: καὶ τῶν δικαίων τὸ μάλιστα φιλικὸν εἶναι δοκεῖ).

Friendship, then, is not to be understood as a “device” to employin absence of justice. To the contrary, friendship – and, to thehighest degree, – friendship between virtuous people, seems to bepremised on just behaviours and attitudes which offer a display ofperfect justice. By stating that lawgivers care more aboutfriendship more than about justice, Aristote seems to encouragepresent and future lawgivers to direct their polis toward thehighest justice: This kind of justice cannot exhaust itself in anacritical, compelled abidance by the constitutional principlesalready established in the polis. Rather, as it generally happens ina friendship between virtuous and loyal persons, it may lead the38 On this point see for instance P. Schollmeier, Other Selves: Aristotle on Personal andPolitical Friendship, Albany (N.Y.), SUNY Press, 1994, ch. 4. It should be noted thatSchollmeier believes that the virtue of justice is in itself altruistic. On myview, this is not the case, given that Aristotle simply confines himself toclaiming that justice is an allotrion agathon, without suggesting that such a goodis wished for the sake of the other.

citizens to adopt virtuous behaviour without any reticence orpainful efforts. What is more, in placing higher emphasis to thevalue of friendship, Aristotle is probably inviting lawgivers toinject in the citizens not only the awareness that they are notsubjects who ought not either commit or suffer injustice, but alsothe development of a self-perceptions of individuals as friendsthat share a relevant dimension of life, that is, the life of thepolis, with its values and aims, planning joint stragegies to pursuethem. It is in this sense that the value of concord/likemindedness (ὁμόνοια) will appear as an inter-relational way ofhuman confrontation that allows to empower the sharing (κοινωνία)on which political friendship is grounded.

In Book IX of the Nicomachean Ethics (1167a22) ὁμόνοια is definedas something φιλικόν, that is, a value that can be referred to therelationship of friendship. As Aristotle explains, this is nottantamount to entertaining precisely the same opinions inabsolute, since beliefs can be shared even by those who do notknow each other, and a like-mindedness of this kind would not giverise to concord (NE IX, 1167a23-25). This attitude, then concernsthose persons related by a relationship of reciprocity and, as itmight be supposed, it does not necessarily imply an originaluniformity of visions. If this suggestion is plausible, the ideaof a concord that can be reached by means of reciprocalconfrontation of initially different positions may have a bearingon an understanding of the polis as a terrain of value-sharing that,nevertheless, makes room for inner reasonable disagreements lyingin wait for a joint solution39.

The agreement that, once reached, sparks concord, is not like-mindedness on any issue whatever (for example, on celestialphenomena). This is confirmed in NE VIII, 1167a34-b2, whereAristotle claims that

[B]eing like-minded is not a matter of each side’s being of the same mind aboutwhatever it may be but of being of the same mind in the same parcticular set of

39 On the issue of conflict within the political community see B. Yack, TheProblems of a Political Animal: Community, Justice, and Conflict in Aristotelian Political Thought,Berkeley and London, University of California Press, 1993, particularly chapter1.

circumstances, e.g. when both the masses and decent people think the best shouldrule; for in that way everyone gets what the are aiming for. Bringing this thought to a close, at NE VIII, 1167b2-4 he states that

[L]ike mindedness, then, appears to be a friendship between citizens, as indeedit is said to be; forit has to do with what is advantageous, and what affectspeople’s lives

(πολιτικὴ δὴ φιλία φαίνεται ἡ ὁμόνοια, καθάπερ καὶ λέγεται: περὶ τὰσυμφέροντα γάρ ἐστι καὶ τὰ εἰς τὸν βίον ἥκοντα).

Although the last claim would seem to relegate politicalfriendship to the sphere of utility, it seems that a politicalfriendship, when understood as profitable concord, also points tothe direction of virtue. An important reference in this senseappeaps in NE IX 1167b4-5, where Aristotle claims that the kind ofconcord that gets established in cities

…is found among decent people (ἔστι δ᾽ ἡ τοιαύτη ὁμόνοια ἐν τοῖς ἐπιεικέσιν),for these are like-minded both with themselves40 and with each other, sincegenerally speaking they have the same objectives (for what such people wish forstays the same […]), and they wish for what is just and what is advantageous,and also make these their common aim(βούλονταί τε τὰ δίκαια καὶ τὰ συμφέροντα, τούτων δὲ καὶ κοινῇ ἐφίενται)41., Community and an aware and responsible convergence of commitmentsis at the basis of a form of friendship which, despite aiming at acommon, long-lasting advantage, pursues utility by employingvirtuous attitudes exerted by correspondingly virtuous people. Itis not a case that the lines of NE IX that precede those statedabove state the following:

a city is said to be like-minded when its citizens share judgements about whatis advantageous, reach the same decisions, and do what has seemed to themjointly to be best (NE IX, 1167a26-29).

40 On the problem of friendship with oneself, which in NE IX is treated as a kindof inner harmony between reason and the part of the human soul that listens tothe logos, see A. Price, Love and Friendship in Plato and Aristotle, Oxford, ClarendonPress, 1990, chapter 4.41 On the aspect of the distinctive stability of friendship see EE VII, 1238a11-12, where friendship is opposed to volatile goods like wealth.

The aspect of choice appears intimately connected to friendship accordingto virtue. Explicit evidence of this is offered in Book VII of theEudemian Ethics, where political friendship is differentiated from ethicalfriendship in the following respect:

Political friendship, then, looks at the agreement and to the thing, but moralfriendship at choice; hence the latter is more just—it is friendly justice42.

(ἡ μὲν οὖν πολιτικὴ βλέπει εἰς τὴν ὁμολογίαν  καὶ εἰς τὸ πρᾶγμα, ἡ δ᾽ ἠθικὴ εἰς τὴν προαίρεσιν). As Aristotle goes on to explain (EE VII, 1243a34-35), the cause of the contrastbetween the two is that conflict is that moral friendship is nobler butfriendship of utility more necessary.

The fact that choice, as an activity related to virtue, ismentioned within the framework of a friendship ultimately groundedon the search for common utility discloses philosophicallyrelevant sceneries towards the possibility of a friendship whoseutilitarian nature interacts and blends well with some of thecharacteristic aspects of perfect friendship. Nevertheless,neither in the Eudemian nor in the Nicomachean Ethics does Aristotleshow himself willing to build up arguments able to bring to lighta fruitful interaction of utility and virtue based aspects; forsuch aspects are handled as conceptually distinct and rigidlyseparated.

As I believe, a peculiarly exemplificative case of such astrategy is represented by Aristotle’s distinction of utilityfriendship into two kinds: a legal and a moral one. At NE VIII,1162b21-25. we read that, Now it seems that, just as what is just is twofold, part of it beingunwritten and part what accords with written law, so too friendship interms of the useful falls into a type based on character and a type basedon legal requirements. Accusations occur most of all, then, when theterms on which a friendship is dissolved are not the ones on which it wasformed.

42 My own translation

(ἔοικε δέ , καθάπερ τὸ δίκαιόν ἐστι διττόν, τὸ μὲν ἄγραφον τὸ δὲ κατὰ νόμον, καὶ τῆς κατὰ  τὸ χρήσιμον φιλίας ἣ μὲν ἠθικὴ ἣ δὲ νομικὴ εἶναι. γίνεται οὖν τὰ ἐγκλήματα  μάλισθ᾽ ὅταν μὴ κατὰ τὴν αὐτὴν συναλλάξωσι καὶ διαλύωνται.ἔστι δ᾽ ἡ νομικὴ μὲν ἡ ἐπὶ ῥητοῖς, ἡ μὲν πάμπαν ἀγοραία ἐκ χειρὸς εἰς χεῖρα, ἡ δὲ  ἐλευθεριωτέρα εἰς χρόνον, καθ᾽ ὁμολογίαν δὲ τί ἀντὶ τίνος. δῆλον δ᾽ ἐν ταύτῃ  τὸ ὀφείλημα κοὐκ ἀμφίλογον, φιλικὸν δὲ τὴν ἀναβολὴν ἔχει: διόπερ ἐνίοις  οὐκ εἰσὶ τούτων δίκαι, ἀλλ᾽ οἴονται δεῖν στέργειν τοὺς κατὰ πίστιν συναλλάξαντας )43.

Surprisingly, such a distinction has not been sufficientlyexplored by scholars. Still, at least to my understanding, thiscontains a rich array of implications with reference to the ideaof a political friendship inspired by the search for virtue. Forin the Nicomachean Ethics Aristotle stresses the fact that both kindsof friendship, i.e. the legal and the moral ones, are utility-based relationships rather than virtuous partnerships.Nevertheless, friendship according to moral utility (as the labelitself chosen by Aristotle tells), makes room for the idea thateven a friendship having utility as its primary basis can bestructured according to virtue, and possibly even for the thoughtthat virtue can be employed both as a strategy of pursuit ofindividual advantage and as an end itself, i.e. one pursuedthroughout inter-relational and distinctively communitarian paths.For moral friendship, unlike legal friendship, is built onbehavioural codes which, although unspoken, forge the bases for arelationship patterned on the values of reciprocal loyalty,correctness and attitudes that, to some extent, try to eschewrecriminations.

As we read at NE VIII, 1162b31-36,

The type [i.e. of friendship] based on character does not operate on statedterms, but presents are given, or whatever else it may be, as to a friend; yetthe giver expects to come away with an equal amount, or more, on the basis thatit was not a gift he made but a loan, and if when the friendship is beingdissolved he is not in the same position as he was when it was formed,accusations will follow. This occurs because everyone, or most people, wish forwhat is fine, but choose what is beneficial…

43 Cf. EE VII, 1242b31 ff.

Although such a kind of friendship, being rooted in utility, mayend up in various forms of conflictuality between the subjectsinvolved, Aristotle seems to present it as a kind of friendshipwhich, although lacking the characteristic explicitness andclarity of legal friendship, raises above mere obedience to thelaws. The absence of explicit rules of conduct, in other words,does not imply a neglect of reciprocal expectations of virtuousbehaviour; for, as we read in the passage above, the one who doesnot get respected will issue a protest. Nevertheless, friendscommitted to an utility friendship of ethical kind expect theirfellows to return what they believe is due to themselves, and alsothat they do this in a fine way:

A person should, then, if he can, pay back the value of what hehas received, and voluntarily, for he should not make the otherparty a friend when that will be counter-voluntary for him

δυναμένῳ δὴ ἀνταποδοτέον τὴν ἀξίαν ὧν ἔπαθεν  καὶ ἑκόντι（ ἄκοντα γὰρ φίλον οὐ ποιητέον) (NE VIII, 1163a1-3)

The expectation reciprocally entertained by friends, then, is that of afriendship in which the risk of recriminations is minimized and goodactions are performed out of a deliberate choice. This is what is forinstance suggested with reference to perfect friendship at NE VIII,1163a21-23:

[H]owever, in friendships based on excellence there are no accusations, and themeasure look sas if it is the decision of the doer; for the determinant ofexcellence and character lies in decision.

(ἐν δὲ ταῖς κατ᾽ ἀρετὴν ἐγκλήματα μὲν οὐκ ἔστιν, μέτρῳ δ᾽ ἔοικεν  ἡ τοῦ δράσαντος προαίρεσις: τῆς ἀρετῆς γὰρ καὶ τοῦ ἤθους ἐν τῇ προαιρέσει  τὸ κύριον)44.

In conclusion, if we are right in assuming that perfect friendshipbetween virtuous people represents an orientative ideal for amoral-utility friendship, Aristotle’s insistence on the superiorpower of friendship over simple justice between people alien toeach other suggests justice lacks something which makes friendship44 A similar point is made in NE VIII, 1157a20-22. Cf. also 1158b9 and EE VII,1237b24-26.

a more secure guarantee of virtuous individual behavior and well-functioning of the polis45. First of all, just people can lackconcord, and, what is most important, by absence of sharedexperiences and goods, can be subjected to reciprocalmisunderstandings that bring about conflict. In other words, whatjustice might lack in comparison to friendship is a sharedawareness of being part of a partnership within which each personcultivates legitimate claims of respectful treatment. It is notprobably a case that Aristotle, although being willing toemphasize that justice and friendship revolve around the samefield and involves the same persons46, lays particular stress onthe aspect of “sharing things in common”:

and to the extent that they [i.e. the partners in a sharing community] share init, they are friends; for that is hte limit of the justice between them too.Again, the proverb says “What belongs to friends is shared in common”, andcorrectly so; for friendship depends upon sharing (NE VIII, 1159b29-31).

(καθ᾽ ὅσον δὲ κοινωνοῦσιν, ἐπὶ τοσοῦτόν  ἐστι φιλία: καὶ γὰρ τὸ δίκαιον. καὶ ἡ παροιμία “κοινὰ τὰ φίλων,”ὀρθῶς: ἐν κοινωνίᾳ γὰρ ἡ φιλία). 

In the following section of this paper I shall try to show in whatrespect virtuous lawgivers promote friendship in the polis byinstilling a shared awareness that the members of each polis – and,in particular, the one governed by the best constitution - arereal friends, as active components of the political community.

The political implications of primary friendship

45 As D. Frede (cit., 2013), p. 15 suggests, the two aspects are the goal of asound education in the polis. 46 Cf. NE VIII 1159 b 26-27: “friendship and justice have to do with the samethings, and involve the same persons. For in every kind of sharing communitythere seems to be a specific kind of justice, and also friendship”. The issue ofthe relationships between justice and friendship has been the object of a starkcontroversy, especially with regard to a supposed cause-effect relationshipbetween the two values. Just to mention two different positions, Newman (W.L.Newman, The Politics of Aristotle, 4 vols, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1897-1902, vol. 2,pp. 392-393) argues that friendship is the consequence of the establishment ofjustice, whereas Stewart (J.A. Stewart, Notes on the Nicomachean Ethics, 2 vols, Oxford,Clarendon Press, 1892, vol 2, pp. 262-264) holds the reverse position.

Having laid down these preliminary aspects of primary friendship,we might start considering some possible implications of primaryfriendship in the polis. First of all, in the opening lines of thePolitics, perhaps subscribing to a widely held opinion47, Aristotledescribes the polis as a κοινωνία, that is a centre of convergenceof the values, strategies and goals pursued by subordinatecommunities48 with a view to the realization of the human good,both at the individual and at the interpersonal level49. Thedevelopment of the polis itself can be explained in terms of therise of forms of κοινωνίαi, that is, interpersonal relationshipsthat characterize the dimension of the household (like thosebetween husband and wife, father and children, masters and slaves)and constitute the basis for further forms of associations (e.g.villages).

It is worth noting that, in the Nicomachean Ethics, the notion ofκοινωνία seems to play a crucial role not only for an understandingof friendship, but also for the relationships between friendshipand justice50. For, as it seems, 47 This the opinion of T. Saunders (ed.), Aristotle, Politics, Books I and II, Oxford,Oxford University Press. Commentary at p. 55. On Saunders’ view, Aristotle willprogressively use κοινωνία in a “stronger” sense, that is, by emphasizingaspects of loyalty and reciprocal commitments between citizens. 48 What is most important, as many scholars have suggested, a κοινωνία is a wayof sharing values, methods goals (cf. R. Mulgan, Aristotle’s Political Theory, Oxford,Oxford University Press, 1977, p. 16; M.I. Finley, The Ancient Economy, Berkeleyand Los Angeles, University of California Press, p. 152; B. Yack, The Problems of aPolitical Animal: Community, Justice, and Conflict in Aristotelian Political Thought, Berkeley andLondon, University of California Press, 1993, p. 28), the word itself κοινωνία,by preserving its etymological relation to the adjective κοινός (“common”),leads the reader all the way back to the idea that all of its members sharesomething, i.e. a good and something choosable by individuals who, by nature,are structurally oriented to the pursuit of what is authentically good for them.49 It is worth remembering that, at NE I, 1094 b 4-9, Aristotle handles ἡπολιτική in terms of an expertise that employs the practical expertises thatremain, and furthermore legislates about what one must do and what things onemust abstain from doing. Its end is the human good, which is said to be the samefor a single person and for a city, although the good of the city “is a greaterand more complete thing both to achieve and to preserve: for while to do so forone person on his own is satisfactory enough, to do it for a nation or forcities is finer and more godlike. 50 The issue of the relationships between justice and friendship has been theobject of a stark controversy, especially with regard to a supposed cause-effectrelationship between the two values. Just to mention two different positions,Newman (W.L. Newman, The Politics of Aristotle, 4 vols, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1897-1902, vol. 2, pp. 392-393) argues that friendship is the consequence of the

[…] friendship and justice have to do with the same things, and involve the samepersons. For in every kind of sharing community there seems to be a specifickind of justice, and also friendship (NE VIII 1159 b 26-27).

By absorbing all the interests of its associates51, a κοινωνίαinvolves a form of active participation of its members and theconsolidation of shared values and goals, i.e. values and goalsaround which reciprocal commitment, communicative interaction andresponsible concern develops52.

As involving an aspect of awareness between the subjectsinvolved in the partnership, the friendship that arises in eachcommunity causes such persons to perceive themselves asparticipating in a form of life enervated by specific rules ofjustice, i.e. rules that each member of the community is expectedto follow, showing concern for one’s fellows and for the wellbeingof the community as a whole. This seems to be the sense attachedto the proverb “what belongs to friends is shared in common”, andalso of the idea that friendship resides in the κοινωνία (NE VIII,1159 b 33-34).

The idea of a κοινωνία rises above the search for sheerutility, and its goals are not simply relative to the preventionof enmity and conflict. This concept is expressed for instance inBook III of the Politics, where friendship in the community isdistinguished from partnerships between persons who interact insome sort of transactions (for instance, transactions ofeconomical nature) but dwell in separate places. These treat eachother as if there were in a defensive alliance, i.e. one set upmerely for assistance against those committing injustice againsteach other or for the sake of transacting business (Pol. III,1280b18-27). Of course, these partnerships must necessarily bepresent if there is to be a city, but they do not make the core ofits life. For a city is

establishment of justice, whereas Stewart (J.A. Stewart, Notes on the NicomacheanEthics, 2 vols, Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1892, vol 2, pp. 262-264) holds the reverseposition. 51 On such a function of κοινωνία see H.H. Joachim’s Commentary of theNicomachean Ethics (ed. by D.A. Rees, Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1951, p. 250).52 As Yack (cit.) maintains, communicative interaction within a community is notalien from conflict and divergence.

the partnership of families and villages in a complete and self-sufficient life(κοινωνία καὶ ταῖςοἰκίαις καὶ τοῖς γένεσι, ζωῆς τελείας χάριν καὶ αὐτάρκους). This, we assert, isliving happily and finely (τὸ ζῆν εὐδαιμόνως καὶ καλῶς) (Pol. III, 1280b40-1281a2)53,

Given that its distinctive end is not mere living, but living well(Pol. III, 1280b39-40: ἡ τοῦ εὖ ζῆν)54,

the political partnership must be regarded […] as being for the sake of nobleactions, not forthe sake of living together.

(τῶν καλῶν ἄρα πράξεων  χάριν θετέον εἶναι τὴν πολιτικὴν κοινωνίαν ἀλλ᾽ οὐ τοῦ συζῆν) (Pol. III, 1280b40-1281a2).

It is not by chance, therefore, that in the previous lines (Pol.III, 1280b5-10) the philosopher has stated .that whoever takesthought for good management devotes careful attention to politicalvirtue and vice. Virtue, in conclusion, must be a care for everycity which deserves its name, otherwise the partnership becomes analliance which differs from others from [alliances of] remoteallies – only by location (Pol. III, 1280b6-10).

Such an account of the polis, focusing on its potential forvirtue, paves the way for the idea that its inherent structuregets shaped out of a friendship that, although pointing at thecommon advantage, presents traits that are typical of virtuousfriendships. This aspect is highlighted by Aristotle within adiscussion of the rise of partnerships like marriages, festivals,and those communities grounded in some form of living together

i.e. partnerships that contribute to the ends of the city. Theformation of such communities is described as “the work offriendship” (φιλίας ἔργον),

for φιλία is the intentional choice of living together55 (Pol. III; 1280b38-39).

53 Translation by Lord in C. Lord (ed.), Aristotle. The Politics, Chicago and London,The University of Chicago Press, 1984.54 Cf. Pol. III, 1280a31-33. 55 Lord translates φιλία as “affection”. In translation of this passage, I preferto leave it in the Greek form.

As we have already seen, agency according to intentional choice isa distinctive trait of virtue-based friendship, and this aspectrecurs in his descrition of city which, without community for thesake of living well, would be a simple “city of slaves or ofanimals”,

since they do not share in happiness or in living in accordance with intentionalchoice ( τοῦ ζῆν κατὰ προαίρεσιν) (Pol. III, 1280a31-33).

That in Aristotle’s ethical works a κοινωνία is regarded byAristotle as a proper form of friendship paves the way for theidea that the polis itself, qua κοινωνία is in its own right afriendship between individuals, and not simply a form oforganization of political power in which various forms offriendship take shape. Such a friendship finds in the subordinateκοινωνία a suitable grounding material for the development of afriendship of a different kind: the one between persons equippedwith a set of moral and intellectual capacities to have a share inpolitical power. To understand this concept, it is necessary tothink that Aristotle appears interested not only in exploring theorigin of the polis, but also in presenting it as a compound ofelements in need of analysis (cf. for instance Politics I, 1252 a 20-23; cf. III, 1274 b 39, where it is said that “the city belongsamong composite things”)56. Among such elements, some are regardeda sheer preconditions for the running of the city, that is, asindispensable elements for its well-functioning, but not as“parts” (μέρη) (cf. the distinction between mere “preconditions”and real “parts” for the polis at Politics VII, 1328 b 3-22). A polis,on the one hand, incorporates the same elementary forms ofpartnership from which it arises, such as the association ofpersons who cannot exist without one another (e.g. male and femalewho join for the sake of reproduction and develop increasinglycomplex systems of organization within the domain of thehousehold; Pol. I, 1252 a 25-30). On the other, family ties are notregarded as constitutive components of the city, and the same56 This duplicity of approach to the nature of the polis is for instance suggestedby Schütrumpf (E. Schütrumpf, Aristoteles, Politik, übersetzt und erläutert. Berlin:Akademie Verlag, 1991, p. 390).

holds for individuals who, due to a variety of reasons dependingon the nature of the constitution, are not allowed to take part inthe political life.

The subjects which Aristotle deems to be real parts of thepolis are those who have a share in the political life, either assimple citizens (i.e., as we learn in Book III, 1275 b 17-20,persons who are “entitled to participate in an office involvingdeliberation or decision”), or as holders of the highest politicaloffices, i.e. functions that require a display of autonomousrational and virtuous deliberative agency. Although (as it hasbeen suggested by Smith Pangle57), even elementary communities maydisplay forms of sacrifice and altruistic concern for itsmembers), I maintain that it is just among the human “parts” ofthe city that the seeds for a virtuous friendship can be found.For, as Aristotle explains at NE VIII, 1159 b 1-2,

‘equality and similarity make amity’58, and, most of all the similarity of thosesimilar in excellence (ἰσότης καὶ ὁμοιότης φιλότης, καὶμάλιστα μὲν ἡ τῶν κατ᾽ ἀρετὴν ὁμοιότης).

Of course, as Aristotle is well aware, not every polisinteriorizes virtuous principles of conduct, and not every citycan be founded on a substantial equality of citizens in relationto their degree of ethical and intellectual virtue. Still, as wemight infer from some passages in Books VII, the ideal polis does.In such a polis, the main aim to be promoted is the authenticeudaimonia of each citizen, which consists in the full-fledged,virtuous actualization of the rational functions of human beings.

As we may read in Politics VII, 1323 a 40 - 1324 a 2:

The best way of life both separately for each individual and in common forcities is that accompanied by virtue – virtue that is equipped to such an extentas to [allow them] to share in actions that accord with virtue.

And the best constitution in absolute

57 See Smith Pangle, cit., pp. 78-104.58 Cf. EE 1238b15-17: “These then are three kinds of friendship; and in all ofthese the term friendship in a manner indicates equality, for even with thosewho are friends on the ground of goodness the friendship is in a manner based onequality of goodness”.

must necessarily be that arrangement under which anyone [i.e., not just a fewcitizens] may act in the best manner and live blessedly (Pol. VII 1324 a 24-25).

Such a polis presents itself as a suitable terrain for primaryfriendship, insofar as all its citizens, being entitled to perfecthappiness, seem to possess a similar (if not equal) capacity forthe virtue which makes a good man:

[…] [T]he city is a partnership (koinōnia) of similar persons (homoiōn), for thesake of a life that is the best possible (Pol. VII, 1328 a 35-37).

Although similarity is not the same as equality, it seemsthat, in the ideal polis, equal is the degree of virtue attainableby citizens, given that each is allowed to achieve perfecthappiness. If the ideal city in Book VII is the one who actualizesa capacity for virtue shared by its citizens to an equal degree,those who attain it will deserve equal access to the highestpolitical offices. This is for instance what Aristotle suggests inBook II of the Politics within the context of a cricitism to Plato'sbest regime as illustrated in the Republic. In saying that theelements from which unity is generated in a city must bedifferent, he claims that

[I]t is thus reciprocal equality which preserves cities […]. This is necessarilythe case even among persons who are free and equal, for all cannot rule at thesame time (1261 a 32-34).

As he goes on to explain, in political communities (presumablythose in which members are different in virtue and talents), it isbetter if the same always rule, where this is possible,

but in cases where it is not possible because all are equal in their nature, andwhere it is at the same time just for all to have a share in ruling […] there isat least an imitation of this. For some rule and some are ruled in turn, as ifbecoming other persons (οἱ μὲν γὰρ ἄρχουσιν οἱ δ᾽ ἄρχονται κατὰ μέρος ὥσπερ ἂν ἄλλοι γενόμενοι) (1261 a 39 b 4).

It is interesting, however, that the aspect of equality amongfriends, which seems to play a prominent role in perfect politicalfriendship, may also be referred to forms of constitutions which,differing from the ideal one, cannot be composed exclusively by

good men. Among such constitutions we may identify some belongingto the sphere of the “right” ones, that is to say, those regimeswhose inspiring principles are designed to promote the commonadvantage59. A notable example is represented by a specific form ofaristocracy that, although prescribing virtue of character as arequirement for access to the highest political offices, does notoperate in a city in which the ruled equal the rulers in virtue.The rulers and the ruled might not be equal in their degree ofpossessed excellence. Such a regime is grounded on rule by thebest (understood as virtuous men in the Aristotelian way) oncitizens who, although being respectful of the prescriptions inforce in the regime, do not seem to stand out for intellectual,ethical and political excellence.60

This might be for instance inferred by passages of Book III ofthe Politics and, more precisely, within a context of discussionbearing on the nature of the people apt for speficic forms ofpolitical power (Pol. III, 1287b36-41). Here, Aristotledistinguishes people apt by nature for mastery (φύσει δεσποτικὸν),whereas others for kingship (ἄλλο βασιλευτικὸν). AlthoughAristotle does not expressely state it, aristocracy seems to bequalified as a constitution in which the ruled are apt for aregime that he calls “political” (πολιτικὸν). The political one isdescribed as a just and advantageous form of power and, as it canbe inferred from 1287b40, it concerns either equal or similarpeople (τοῖς ὁμοίοις καὶ ἴσοις).

That in aristocracy the ruled are generally similar, and notequal to the rules in virtue emerges in the following lines, giventhat

59 On the distinction between right and deviant constitutions see Pol. III, 1279a22-31. 60 Aristotle’s treatment of aristocracy in the Politics is complex and manifold,and various are the kinds of aristocratic constitutions that can be found in therealm of history and political theory. Not every aristocracy is grounded inasymmetry of virtue between rulers and ruled, given that, as it seems, the Politicsmakes room for a view of the ideal polis as an aristocracy in which governmentis exerted in relays. By contrast, an example of an aristocracy in which rulersare superior to the ruled is Pol.IV.1293b1-7. On the issue of aristocracy and itsvarious kinds see my E. Irrera, The Normative Significance of Aristocratic Constitutions inAristotle’s Politics, «Res Publica Literarum», 1(2013), pp. 1-19.

[A]n aristocratic multitude is one of such a sort that it accords with itsnature to support a multitude capable of being ruled in accordance with the rulethat belongs to free persons by those whose virtue makes them expert leadersrelative to political rule.

(ἀριστοκρατικὸν δὲ ὃ πέφυκε  φέρειν πλῆθος ἄρχεσθαι δυνάμενον τὴν τῶν ἐλευθέρων ἀρχὴν ὑπὸ τῶν  κατ᾽ ἀρετὴν ἡγεμονικῶν πρὸς πολιτικὴν ἀρχήν) (Pol. III, 1288a9-13).

In such a constitution, despite the existence of citizens of agood nature expertise at ruling and its distinctive excellence isa prerogative of a few rulers. Confirmation of this is offered inthe closing paragraphs of Book III of the Politics, where Aristotle,after pointing out that three are the correct constitutions andthat the best one is the one managed by the best persons, speaksof a constitution (presumably aristocracy itself) in which therehappens to be a whole family preeminent in virtue with the respectto all the rest (Pol. III, 1288a33-41).

With a view to a better understanding of this concept, aninstructive correspondence may be identified in the section ofBook VIII of the Nicomachean Ethics devoted to an attempt to usevarious forms of friendship as theoretical patterns for anillustration of the various political constitutions. Aristotlespecifies that different are the ways in which friends establish aκοινωνία, and the friendships on which a community (either privateor political) rests can be based either on symmetry or asymmetryof roles and powers. While speaking of the aristocratic form ofgovernment in general, it is meaningful that he compares such aconstitution to a friendship between a husband and wife. Althoughpresenting a case in which both partners are described as virtuouspeople (NE VIII, 1162a25-26), he points out that the virtue of agood husband is not the same as that of a good wife, for theirtaks (ἔργα) are different (ἕτερα) (NE VIII, 1162 a 19-25)61. This is61 Cf. NE VIII, 1160 b 32-35: «The community formed by man and wife is clearly ofan aristocratic kind; for the man rules on the basis of worth, and in thespheres where a man should rule; those where it is fitting for a woman to rulehe gives over to her». See also EE VII, 1238 b 23-25: in which the relationshipbetween husband and wife is regarded as different from the one between fatherand son. For the latter resembles a partnership between beneficiary andbenefactor, whereas the former one between ruler and ruled. Although therelationship between husband and wife is regarded as similar to the one thatqualifies aristocracy, it is not a friendship between equals (as well as, after

why the relationship between the two cannot be of absolute parity,and the woman, although somehow complementary to man, is doomed tobe ruled by the latter, so giving rise to an asymmetricpartnership.

In the light of what Aristotle expresses in the NicomacheanEthics with respect the aristocracy patterned on the friendshipbetween husband and wife cannot be a perfectly virtuous politicalfriendship, nor can be those aristocracies marked by a heavydifference in virtue between excellent rulers and ordinary ruled.

A right constitution which in the Nicomachean Ethics is said tobe grounded on a substantial equality of the persons involved isinstead the one which Aristotle names “timocracy” (τιμοκρατία). AsAristotle explains at NE VIII 1160a24 ff., Such a constitution isbased on a property classification, although most people areaccostumed to speak of it merely as a “constitutional government”(πολιτεία). If compared to kingship and aristocracy, timocracyseems to be the worst among right constitutions. In the Politics, theconstitution at stake is called πολιτεία, and, for reasons oftime, it won’t be possible to cover in detail its complexity andplurality of forms. Nevertheless, what I believe is worthstressing here is that a substantial equality in nature seems tosubsist between the members of a city runned by such aconstitution. As we learn once again in the Nicomachean Ethics, Thefriendship between citizens in the constitution at stake isanalogous to the one between brothers (ἡ τῶν ἀδελφῶν), beingpresumaly persons of approximately the same age (NE VIII, 1161a3-5). It is notable that, as we read in NE VIII, 1161a19-22,

Friendship between brothers is like that between members of a comradeship: thetwo parties are equal in station and age, and this usually implies identity offeelings and of character. The counterpart of fraternal friendship is that whichexists under the timocratic form of constitution; since the ideal of Timocracyis that all citizens shall be equal and shall be good, so that they all rule in

all, it happens in various forms of aristocratic cities. Some of these, i.e.constitutions that might be called “aristocracies of virtue”, although groundedon the ruling power of authentically virtuous men, do not attain the level ofperfect virtue of a city like the ideal one, in which every citizen is supposedto be an equally good man). Such aristocracies, in their best conditions, areconstituted by a partnership of virtuous rulers and persons endowed with somedegree of good moral qualities (without being themselves fully virtuous).

turn, and all have an equal share of power; and therefore the friendship betweenthem is also one of equality.

Although outstanding virtue does not seem to be the hallmarkeither of friendships between brothers or of timocratic forms ofgovernment, an aspect that recalls the idea of a virtue-basedfriendship and allows us to relate such friendships to the latteris equality. Equality might be an incentive towards a profitablecooperation aimed in its turn to the promotion of justice andcommon advantage in the Politics. Such friendships, nevertheless, mayoperate in view of a degree of stability and minimization ofrecriminations which are typical either of utility-based moralfriendship (as distinct from purely “legal” utility friendships)or of proper friendships by virtue.

These aspects seem to be stressed by Aristotle even on theoccasion of a general discussion that transcends the domain ofpolity, and that is conducted in Book III of the Politics (1281a39ff)in relation to the possibility that the multitude (τὸ πλῆθος)should be sovereign than the few of greatest virtue. Such a viewseems to enjoy some currency in his thought, given that, whileexplicitly declaring that it might be a true one, he purports tooffer a justification for it. Although Aristotle does not justifythe thesis at stake by appealing to the notion of friendship, hemakes interesting references to the possibility that eachindividual of the multitude possesses some degree of virtue(although not the complete one in the properly aristoteliansense). For, as he declares,

because they are many, each can have a part of virtue and prudence (πολλῶν γὰρ ὄντων ἕκαστον μόριον ἔχειν ἀρετῆς καὶ φρονήσεως) (Pol. III, 1281b4-5).

An explanation of this standpoint is primarily premised on utilityissues. As he has claimed in the previous lines, it is possiblethat the many, though not individually good men, may become betterpersons by joining together, and this is so not individually butcollectively, just as public dinners to which many contribute arebetter than those supplied at one man's cost. For where there are

many, each individual, it may be argued, has some portion ofvirtue and wisdom, and when they have come together, just as themultitude becomes a single man with many feet and many hands andmany senses, so also it becomes one personality as regards themoral and intellectual faculties. (Pol. III, 1281 a 39-b15).

Another indirect reference to aspecs of perfect friendship isthe idea that an active involvement of the multitude in civicactivity may be a way to avoid inner strife and reciprocalrecriminations. Although, as we read from Pol. III, 1281b26-32,having such people share in the greatest politial offices is notsafe (given that they might err and act unjustly),

to give them no part and for them not to share [in the offices] is a matter ofalarm forwhen there exist manyy who are deprived of prerogatives and poor, thatcity is necessarily filled with enemies. What is left, then, is for them toshare in deliberating and judging.

It is not a case that, in the following lines, Aristotle mentionslegislators like Solon, who made arrangements to the effect of thepromotion of a wider involvement of the multitude in politicalaffairs. Once again, we see the relevance of the role of(presumably virtuous) lawgivers in the promotion of a politicswhich avoids recriminations and instills the seeds of friendshipamong the members of the polis. The condition that such lawgiversaim to create is one in which citizens,

when joined together, can have an adequate perception and, once mixed with thosewho are better bring benefit to cities, just as impure sustenance mixed with thepure makes the whole more useful than the small amount of the latter, but eachseparately is incomplete with respect to judging (Pol. III, 1281b34-37).

Provided that the multitude is not overly slavish (Pol. III, 1282a15),a the promotion by wise lawgivers of a sense of companionshipwithin the city reveals that political friendship is a friendshipby moral utility, i.e. one that, from cases of imperfectconstitutions like the polity up to the ideal city, heads in thedirection of perfect virtue. In this respect, the conceptualboundaries between types of friendship enucleated in the

Nicomachean Ethics become less rigid in the Politics, as well asthe relationship between advantage and virtue.