Paradox of Innovation (Sabl)
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The Paradox of Innovation Andrew Sabl University of Toronto [email protected] Paper prepared for discussion at the NYU conference on “David Hume, Economic Rationality, and Policy,” 10-11 October 2019. This is a very rough draft for workshop purposes: comments are very welcome, but please do not cite without permission.
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Transcript of Paradox of Innovation (Sabl)
TheParadoxofInnovationAndrewSabl
PaperpreparedfordiscussionattheNYUconferenceon“DavidHume,EconomicRationality,andPolicy,”10-11October2019.Thisisaveryroughdraftforworkshoppurposes:commentsareverywelcome,butpleasedonotcitewithoutpermission.
1
“[T]heimperfectstateofourpoliticalknowledge,andthenarrowcapacitiesofmen,makeitdifficulttoforteltheeffectswhichwillresultfromanyuntriedmeasure….”—Hume,“OfPublicCredit”(1987:357).“Thereasonablemanadaptshimselftotheworld:theunreasonableonepersistsintryingtoadapttheworldtohimself.Thereforeallprogressdependsontheunreasonableman.”—GeorgeBernardShaw,ManandSuperman,“MaximsforRevolutionaries,”§124.
Thisisanexerciseinnormativepolicyanalysisinthewidestsense.Ratherthantreatingthe
rightnessorwrongnessofanyparticularpolicy,itisabouttheethicsofmakingpolicyin
generalandthetheoreticalbasisforthatethics.
Inearlierwork(Sabl2002),IbrieflyoutlinedaHumeandoctrinethatIcalledthe
“paradoxofinnovation.”Sincetheonlysoundbasisforpoliticsandpolicy1isempirical
observation,politicalactorswhoenact,orseriouslypropose,strikingdeparturesfrom
currentpoliticalinstitutionsorestablishedpolicies—evendeparturesthatturnouttobe
extremelybeneficialintheevent—aretypically,exante,dangerousandirrational.Sincethe
historicalrecordcontainsnoempiricalcasesofwhattheypropose,theycannowell-
groundedreasontobelievethatwhattheyproposewillwork.Therefore,almostby
definition,theirmotivationsaremoreorlessfanatical:rootedinreligiousorideological
dogmaratherthanexperience(i.e.generalizationsbasedonobservablefacts).Andthisis
thecaseeveniftheirprogramturnsouttobeagoodidea.Thisinsightliesatthecoreof
whyHume,forinstance,praisestheworkofEngland’sparliamentleadinguptothecivil
1Thewordsforpolicyandpolitics,stillidenticalinmanylanguages,werenotsharplydistinguishedin18th-centuryEnglisheither.Thediscoveriesin“politics”inHume’sessay“ThatPoliticsMaybeReducedtoaScience”wouldnotbeconsidereddiscoveriesinpoliticalsciencenowadays(theydidn’tputforthcausalexplanationsofeventsnormakepredicationsbasedondata)butpolicyrecommendations—orperhaps,giventheirscope,recommendationsforconstitutionaldesign.Theywere,inanycase,practicalandnormative:theyspokeofwhatwas“preferable”or“best”amongarangeofoptions(Hume1987:17,18).
2
warwhilerefusingtojoininWhigpraisefortheparliamentarians:theworkwasgood,but
itsagentswerereligiousandpoliticalfanatics.
Thatpreviousworkdidnotstresstheobviousflipsideofthisproposition:thosewho
proposestickingtoastatusquothatturnsouttobemistakenareexanteresponsiblebutin
retrospectretardprogressandhumanwelfare.Ifeveryoneacteduponthebestevidence
availableatthetime,societieswouldneverbecomefreer,lesshierarchical,ormore
prosperous.ThusbothShaw’sreasonablemanandhisunreasonableman—aswellas
reasonableandunreasonablewomenforthatmatter,andShaw’sworkportraysplentyof
both—facepotentialpoliticalandmoraljeopardy.
Thispaperwillexpandonthisearliertreatmentandsuggestsomemorefar-
reachingimplicationsofthisHumeanperspective.Goingbeyondexamplesdiscussedin
previouswork(freespeech,religioustoleration,legalsedition,theabolitionofarbitrary
executivepowers),thepaperwillexplorehowtheparadoxofinnovationapplies—in
Hume,andinpresentfact—toquestionsmoreusuallydescribedasthoseof“policy”:
taxation,regulation,monetarypolicyandthelike.Itwilldiscusstheethicsofinnovation—
includingthewaysofmakinguseof,whilehemmingin,“projectors”whoproposereplacing
adequateconventionswithnewones.Itwilltrytounpacktheparadoxicalresultthat
rationalpolicymakersmaybedependentondataresultingfrompoliciesthatwerefirst
adoptedbyaprioristfanatics—andmaythereforebetemptedtohopethatinnovationswill
betried“somewhereelse,”orappliedtopopulationstheydon’tcaremuchabout.Finally,it
willdiscussthepossibilitythatHumeanempiricistrationalitymaybeself-subverting:ifI
canbefairlycertainthatthe(retrospectivelyandobjectively)bestpoliciesIcanadopt
3
necessarilyrestondatathatIdonotcurrentlyhave,itmaybethatnothingIdocanbefully
rational.
AttheoutsetIshouldstipulatethatIwillbeattemptingtoputfortha“Humean”
position,notoneactuallyheldbyHume.Humewastemperamentallyopposedtothefuture
tense.Itwasnotjustthat,workingattheinfancyofsocialscience(andheknewit),hewas
diffidentaboutdrawingtoomanygenerallessons.2Andevenwhenhisinsightsaboutthe
pastseemedtailor-madeforadducingwarnings,however“formal”orabstract,aboutthe
future,heshowedlittleinclinationtodoso:forinstance,whilefaultinghiscontemporaries
forpraisingpastfanaticsforpushingreformsthatseemedexantedangerous,hedidnot
seefittoputforthanethicalframeworkforhowwould-bereformers,gradualistorradical,
mightapplythelessonsofthepasttothedecisionstheywouldfacethemselves.Finally,
whetherornotwewanttofollowIstvanHontandsomeothersinreferringtoa“latephase”
ofHume’sthoughtexpressedinhislaterletters,afterhestoppedwritingsubstantiveworks
inthe1760s(seeBaumstark2012,Hont2006),Iwouldmaintainthatinthoseletters
Humebecameconservativeinthestandardandboringsense:notaprincipledbelieverin
stickingwithestablishedconstitutionalformsquagoodforstabilityandthepursuitof
individualprojects,butonewhofearedpoliticalchangeassuch—withtheexceptionof
religioussecularization,whichhefearedwouldbealltooslow—andchangefrombelowin
particular.SoIwillbeextrapolatingfromthelogicofHume’sframeworkratherthanciting
hisactualpositions.
2Citationtkabouthowwelackenoughexperiencetofixmanytruths.Onecouldalsonote,thoughthismaybeover-clever,thatworkingattheinfancyofsocialscienceleftHumeunabletodrawmeta-insightsabouthowsocialscientistsandhistoriansofdifferentgenerations,eachgenerationworkingasconscientiouslyastheyknewhow,wouldcometoadoptverydifferentmodelsabouthowtheworkworks.
4
Beforebeginningthesubstantiveargument,Ishouldsaysomethingaboutthelarger
theoreticalclaimsonwhichtheyrest.3Inmylatestbook(Sabl2012)Iarguedforviewing
Hume’sviewofgovernmentasrelyingonbothfundamentalconventionsandtechnological
improvement:agivencountry’sbasicconventionsshouldberespectedasinvolving
coordinationsolutionsdevelopedovergenerations(ormore),butformalcontinuitywithin
thoseconventionswas,andis,consistentwithimprovementswithrespecttohow
governmentalinstitutionsfunction.Inamoreprogrammatic,lessinterpretiveand
historicalcontext,oneshoulddistinguishbetweentwowaysinwhichinstitutionalchange
canbetechnological.4
First,theycandirectlyinvolvepoliticaltechnology,wherebywediscoveradurable
patternofdoingpoliticsthataddresswhathadpreviouslyseemedtobepermanent
problems.Humementionsthediscoveryofprimeministersashavingrenderedmuchof
whatMachiavellisaysobsolete5:touseacontemporaryexample,whateverthe
disadvantagesoftrustingBorisJohnson,heisunlikelytotrykillingtheQueenand
crowninghimself.Onemightaddinstitutionslikecaretakerprimeministersand
figureheadPresidentsinparliamentaryregimes(overcomingwhatHumethoughtwasthe
permanentproblemthatinunmixedrepublics,everyelectionwouldresemblea
revolution6);expert,nonpartisanelectioncommissions,andsoon.(Acountrycanbe
3TheseclaimsareabsentfromSabl2002becauseIdevelopedthemlater.Theyrepresentalargerframeworkwithinwhichtheparticular,“ethical”claimsinthatearlypapermakesense.Theymaymakesenseindifferentframeworksaswell,butthisoneismine.4AsnotedbrieflyinSabl2017:pagetk,“technology”ismoreaccuratethan“science”asametaphorbecause“the knowledge involved is simultaneously universally useful and highly differentiated”; the practices involves “work for everyone while remaining things that only specialists, and sometimes not even they, think about deeply and understand adequately.”5Citetk6Citetk
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backwardsintermsofpoliticaltechnologyaswithrespecttoanyothertechnology,asthe
U.S.isinlackingthenonpartisanelectoralcommission.)Second,politicalinstitutionsmay
involve“technological”changeinthatacertainpoliticaltechnologybecomesconceivable
andfeasiblewhenandonlywhenacertaintechnologicalchangeoutsidethepolitical
sphere—onemaycallthis“natural”technologicalchange,aslongaswedon’timaginethat
technologyintheusualsensedevelopsindependentofsocialinstitutions—hasoccurred.
Hume’sexamplesincludedprinting,andgunpowder;laterexamples,andtheirassociated
non-politicaltechnologies,mayincludemoderndemocracy(firearmssimpleandaccurate
enoughtomakeallcontemporaryarmiesmassaffairs)andcontemporaryfeminism
(artificialcontraception,washingmachines,early-twentieth-centuryIT7).Futureexamples
areunknowable.Wedonotevenhaveaclearideaofwhatpoliticalinnovationswillseem
necessaryandviableinanageofstrongAI—andAI,assomethingwecanimaginenow,
isn’teventhemostconfoundingcaseofatechnologywhoseimplicationscannotbe
predicted.
AllthisimpliesthesameproblemforpracticalpoliticsthatPoppernotedforphilosophy
ofhistory.Ifyouthinkyouunderstandhistory’slogic,youaremistaken,sincehistoryis
drivenbytechnologicalchange;there’snowaytopredictfuturetechnologicalchange
becausetheonlywaytoknowwhetherfuturesciencewillworkisthroughiterative
empiricaltestingandhypothesisformulation;andifweknewwhichhypotheseswere
productiveandwhichtestswouldyieldwhat,we’dalreadyhavethefuturescienceand
technologythatinfactwelack.Thepoliticalcorollaryissimple,andrepresentsageneral
7CiteBaier.Notethatotherinstancesofsocialchangearenottechnologicalinthissenseatall:equalityonthebasisofracewasneverunthinkable,justunthought.
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lessonregardingmoderationthatHumemighthavedrawn(butdidn’t):ifwethinkthat
technologicalimprovementisindefinite—or,perhapsmoreHumean,professnottoknow
whetherit’sindefinite—thentherewillbenoonce-and-for-allsolutionstopoliticalor
policyquestions(thoughwemayspeculatethatsomepastsolutionswillpersistinsome
form,justaswestillusewheelsandramps).Inthecontrapositive,inordertomaintainthat
suchsolutionsarevalid,wemusteitherassertasdogmathattechnologicalimprovementis
finite(aswithonereadingofHegelwithregardtomoralityandpolitics—arguablyRawls’
reading,explainingwhyhisidealis“stability,”notMill’s“development”8)orthat
technologicalchangeshouldbearrestedinthenameofaprioriconstraints,aperennial
suggestionbutoneunlikelytostick.
I.Exantepolicy:frompoliticstoeconomics.
IwillnotherefalselyclaimexpertknowledgeofHume’seconomics(thoughIreserve
therighttodosoelsewhere),norofthecontemporaryeconomics,especially
macroeconomics,thatwouldseemnecessarytoevaluatehiscontributiontothatfield.
FollowingtheHobbesiandoctrinethattheoristscanonlyexplaintherelationshipbetween
wordsandotherwords,notthatbetweenwordsandphenomena(thatbeingacontingent
andempiricalmatter9),Iwouldliketomaketwopointsatamoreformallevel,regarding
thekindofpolicyadvicethatHumecouldpossiblyhopetogive.
8CitestktointerpreterscallingRawlsHegelian(therearelots).Tobesure,evenMillatsomepointssuggestedthatheconsidereddevelopmentanasymptoticmatter,suchthatatsomepointofhumanprosperityandenlightenmentitwouldandshouldslow,orevenstop.9CitefromLeviathantk.
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A.Supra-rational
Humeanadviceoneconomicpolicywillbesupra-rationalinthesensethatthetermis
appliedbyPierreBayletoreligion:whenarealmofinquiryissupra-rational,itisnotthe
casethatsomeonebelievingonepositiontobetruemustrationallyjudgeanopposing
positiontobefalse.10Humejudgestheconventionofproperty,anditsassociatedartificial
virtueofjustice(IregardHume’sartificialvirtuesastheagent-centeredwayofdescribing
whathecalls,moreimpersonally,conventions,thoughIlackspacetoarguethathere),as
“lawsofnature”inhismischievouswayofredefiningthatphrase:theyarealwaysand
everywhereusefulincorrectingtoournaturalinfirmitiesofpartialityandshort-
sightedness.Butalthoughaproperty/justiceregimemusttracksomepsychologically
plausibleconnectioninordertocoordinatebehaviorinagivensociety,therearemany
differentwaysofsettlingcomplexcases(aswellasthemeta-questionofhowalegalregime
willsettlethosequestions,e.g.byRomanorbycommonlaw):weshouldthereforestick
withanyacceptablesystemofpropertyintheknowledgethatothersystemswouldalsobe
acceptable—theyjustdonothappentobeours.Anddifficultcaseswithinanysystemwill
alwaysexistandwill,HumenotesinthesecondEnquiry,besettledbyauthority:“all
questionsofpropertyaresubordinatetotheauthorityofcivillaws,whichextend,restrain,
modify,andaltertherulesofnaturaljustice,accordingtotheparticularconvenienceofeach
community.”11
10“Supra-rational”intheAnglophoneBaylescholarshiptranslateshisphrasedessusdelaraison(abovereason).11EPM3.2.34;seealsoibid3.2.33,and3.2.43:“Positivelawscancertainlytransferproperty.…Judgestoo,eventhoughtheirsentencebeerroneousandillegal,mustbeallowed,forthesakeofpeaceandorder,tohavedecisiveauthority,andultimatelytodetermineproperty.”
8
Whenitcomestopolicyadvice,though,such“positivist”counsel—andIdothinkthat
Hume,whilefarfromalegalpositivistingeneral,isonewithrespecttoboundarycases
wheretheplausibleinterpretationofexistingpropertylawisindeterminateoratleast
plausiblydisputed—isnotoriouslysilent.Knowingthatthelawinsomerealmiswhatever
theconstitutedauthorityproclaims,doesnottellyouwhattodoifyouaretheauthority.In
suchcases,whatauthoritiesoughttodocouldbedescribedas“somethingthatwillnot
traduceexistingconventions”tooblatantlyorviolently,sothatordinarycitizenscanstill
useandtradepropertyastheyareaccustomedto.Butthiswillbeamatterofjudgmentor
art,notphilosophyorscience,sinceeachofmanysolutionswillprobablybeadequateand
thedifferenceisamatteroftaste.(Indeed,whenitcomestodifficultcases,legalscholars
typicallyresorttowordsexpressingtaste:whilesomelegalopinionscanbe,likebad
attemptsatscience,“awful,”“incoherent,”or“deaftothefacts,”thegoodonesarenot
“correct”or“accurate”but“elegant,”“wise,”or“careful”—andscholarsdisagreeonwhich
ofthesewordsdescribewhichopinions.)TotheextentthatwerealizethatHumeisnota
“maximizing”utilitarian—IamtoldthatthatwordwasinventedbyBentham!—but
someonewhodefined“utility”inthesenseofmutualadvantageorcoordination,12itishard
toseehowthingscouldbeanydifferent:wearenottabulatingoutcomesbutanticipating
thewidestpossibleacquiescence,asspeakersassessanaudience.
B.Provisional,andrelativetothestateoftechnology.
Forthereasonsoftechnologicalchangeoutlinedabove,noHumeanpolicyprescriptioncan
bepermanent.Foronething,the“artificial”or“conventional”—aswemightnowsay,
sociallyconstructed—socialobjectsthatwearetalkingaboutwillshiftunderourfeetas
12HardinMoralandPoliticalTheoristtk.
9
peopleevolvedifferentconventionsthatstrikethemasuniversallyuseful.Milton
Friedman-eramonetarismwasrenderedinoperativenotbybeingrefutedbutbecauseit’s
nolongereasytoknowwhatcountsasthe“money”whosesupplyitisimportanttoget
right;currentandfutureinnovations(crypto-currenciesandnooneknowswhatelse)will
makeitevenharder.(ForfutureversionsIshallhavetolookatmorecarefullyatworkon
Humeonmoney,e.g.chapters6,7and9inWennerlindandSchabas2008).Similarly,ithas
beenveryhardtodecidewhethervariousthingsthatturnedouttomatteragreatdeal
(technologytransfer,linesofcode,bitsofDNA)countasproperty;thesamewillbetrueof
allkindsofthingswecannotnowimagine.
II.TheEthicsofInnovation:ZealotsofMeansandInstitutionalDesign
InthesecondEnquiry[citationtk],Humenotedthatthelegalformulasregardingthe
acquisitionandtransferofproperty,beinghumaninventionswhoseformsarearbitrary
providedthatitareconsistentandreplicable,canseemsooddanddevoidofnecessary
contentastoresemblereligioushocus-pocus.Thedifferencebetweentheceremoniesthat
transformmypieceoflandintoyoursandthosethattransformbreadandwineintoflesh
andbloodisthatproperty,inHume’sview,furthersspecificandtangiblehumaninterests
whereasreligiondoesnot.
ThelogicofHume’sexpositionsuggestsapossiblecategorythathisactualanalysis
omits,butthatcoversarealwordphenomenon:peoplewhoaresoattachedtospecific
conventionsofproperty—orotherusefulconventions—thattheyinsist,inspiteofall
evidencethatmoresuchconventionworksadequatelywell,thattheirpreferred
convention,orpreferredwayoftalkingaboutaconvention,isnotonlymoreefficientor
10
advantageousthanothersbuttheonlylegitimateconvention.Humewasamitigated
relativistregardingevenconventionsofauthority:allwere“equallylegal,”thoughnotall
wereequallyadvantageous[lettertoCatherineMacaulaytk].Allthemoresowithregardto
ordinaryconventionswhichcanchangeaslongasthoseofauthorityremainconstant.Yetit
isverycommonforordinarypeopletofetishizetheparticularconventionstowhichthey
areaccustomedasifallotherswereinferiororeveninvalid,andverycommonfor
intellectualstofetishizeparticularconventionstowhichtheyarenotaccustomedbuthave
becomeconvincedamounttomoralabsolutes(onthegroundsofamoraltheorythat
makesnoreferencetotheactualintereststhattheirconventionmightbesaiduniquelyto
further).Thisphenomenon,oftreatingconventionslikereligionsandinsistingonone’s
ownastheonetrueone,mightbecalledthezealotryofmeans.
Ihavearguedelsewhere(Sabl2012)thatHumeisa“conservative”withregardto
fundamentalconventions—thoseregardingwhoholdsauthorityoverwhat,andthelimits
tosuchauthority—butopentoliberalorevenradicalchangeregardingmoreordinary
conventions,regardingwhichexperimentislessharmfulpreciselytotheextentthat
agreementonauthoritylimitsthestakesofchange.RegardingHume’shistoryandpolitical
writingsthecaseforthisdistinctionrequiressomeeffort;whilethedistinctionbetween
fundamentalandotherconventionsis(Iargue)pervasive,itremainsmostlyimplicit,and
clearstatementsofitarescattered.Regardingpoliticalethics,Hume’srareforaysinto
prescribingwhatparticularagentsoughttodo,Humeisclearer:withregardto“formsof
government”itisnever“wise”todowhatwedowithrespecttoeverythingelse,namely“to
tryexperimentsmerelyuponthecreditofsupposedargumentandphilosophy”—because
governmentalauthorityisbasednotonwhatis“accurateandcommodious”butwhetherit
11
is“established”(“IdeaofaPerfectCommonwealth,”inEssays512-513).13Humeisso
convincedthatconstantinnovationsregardingfundamentalsarewrongheadedthathe
portraysfourth-centuryAthensashavinginventedakludgyalternativetotheinstitutional
andaristocraticchecksthatkeptEnglandstable:thegrapheparanomon,anpractice
wherebythoseproposingdeparturesfromcertainfundamentallawscouldbecriminally
indictedforproposingsuchdepartures(eventhoughtheAssemblyasawholehad
approvedthem).14
However,beyondsuggestingacondemnationofinnovatorswhowelcomethe
replacementofconstitutionalgovernmentwithauthoritarianalternativesbecauseonlythe
latterletthemtryouttheirvisionary,untestedeconomicschemes—toaHumean,asto
theiruntutoredhumanguineapigs,suchpeoplearefairlyunambiguouslyevil—the
rejectionoffundamentalinnovationtellsuslittleabouttheethicsofordinaryinnovations.
IamnotcompletelysurewhataHumeanshouldsayinsuchcases.Butsome
preliminarythesesseemwarranted.
1.Politicians,bureaucrats,andprojectors.
Theword“projector”wasacommonpejorativeineighteenth-centuryEnglish.Adam
Smithusedittomeansomethinglike“speculator”:hewasfondofthephrase“prodigals
andprojectors,”andproposedlimitsoninteresttopreventsuchfromgainingaccessto
credit.Bentham,inaworkwrittenasaverylonglettertoSmith,proposedtouse
“projector”muchaswenowuse“entrepreneur,”andaccordinglyopposedsuchlimitson
13Seealso“OftheOriginalContract,”inEssays476-7(“[V]iolentinnovationsnoindividualisentitledtomake:theyareevendangeroustobeattemptedbythelegislature:moreillthangoodisevertobeexpectedfromthem….”)andthediscussioninSabl2002,pagestk).14SeeHume,“OfSomeRemarkableCustoms,”andthediscussioninSabl2011.(Thatthegrapheparanomonwasa“quasi-constitutional”mechanism(Ober[tk])isnowafairlycommonclaimamongscholarsofancientAthens—butHumeseemstohavegottentherefirst.
12
thegroundsthatattemptstoemploycapitalinnovelbutpotentiallyproductivewaysstood
toproducegreateconomicbenefits(Bentham1818:pagetk).15Inparticular,heaccused
Smithofignoringaparadoxofinnovationinthispaper’ssense,giventhatmanyeconomic
enterprisesformerlyconsideredunlikelyprojectsarenowroutinelinesofbusinesswhose
utilitynoonequestions:
[Smith’sscornaimedat“projectors”]condemnsasrashandill-grounded,allthoseprojects:bywhichourspecieshavebeensuccessivelyadvancedfromthatstateinwhichacornsweretheirfood,andrawhidestheircloathing,tothestateinwhichitstandsatpresent:forthink,Sir,letmebegofyou,whetherwhateverisnowtheroutineoftradewasnot,atitscommencement,project?whetherwhateverisnowestablishment,wasnot,atonetime,innovation?
…
Thecareerofart,thegreatroadwhichreceivesthefootstepsofprojectors,maybeconsideredasavast,andperhapsunbounded,plain,bestrewedwithgulphs,suchasCurtiuswasswallowedupin.Eachrequiresanhumanvictimtofallintoitereitcanclose,butwhenitoncecloses,itclosestoopennomore,andsomuchofthepathissafetothosewhofollow(ibid.:pagestk).16
Humeusestheword“projector”fairlyseldom,butusuallyclosertothepejorative
sense.Thosedescribedasprojectorsincludethosewhothinkofnewthingstotax(“Of
PublicCredit,”Essays357,360);thosewhoimaginenewschemeswherebystatescan
15BenthamwrotethatSmith’sinsultagainstprojectors“falls…onsuchpersons,as,inthepursuitofwealth,orevenofanyotherobject,endeavour,bytheassistanceofwealth,tostrikeintoanychannelofinvention.Itfallsuponallsuchpersons,as,inthecultivationofanyofthoseartswhichhavebeenbywayofeminencetermeduseful,directtheirendeavourstoanyofthosedepartmentsinwhichtheirutilityshinesmostconspicuousandindubitable;uponallsuchpersonsas,inthelineofanyoftheirpursuits,aimatanythingthatcanbecalledimprovement;whetheritconsistintheproductionofanynewarticleadaptedtoman'suse,orinthemelioratingthequality,ordiminishingtheexpence,ofanyofthosewhicharealreadyknowntous.Itfalls,inshort,uponeveryapplicationofthehumanpowers,inwhichingenuitystandsinneedofwealthforitsassistant”(DefenceofUsury.,pagetk).IdonotclaimthatBenthamwasageniusofprosestyle.16Themetaphorispurposeful:MarcusCurtius,inamythdescribedbyLivy(HistoryofRomebook7),wasawarriorwhojumpedintoachasmtosaveRomeinaccordwithaoracle’sprophecythatthechasmwouldswallowthecityunlessthecitysacrificedwhatitheld“mostdear”—maleyouthandstrength,reasonedCurtiuscorrectly,andthechasmclosedoverhim,savingRome.Thelessonisthatevenunsuccessfulprojectors“sacrifice”themselvesforthecommongood.
13
discharge(defaulton?)debts(ibid.,361)—andHumehimself,shortlyafterthepublication
oftheTreatise;asheruefullywroteinaself-doubtingletter,
“MyFondnessforwhatIimagin'dnewDiscoveriesmademeoverlookallcommonRulesofPrudence;&havingenjoy'dtheusualSatisfactionofProjectors,tisbutjustIshou'dmeetwiththeirDissappointments”(LettertoHenryHome,4June1739,Letter3inNewLetters,propercitationtk).
ButinnoneofthesecasesdoesHumeclearlyspecifywhathemeansbyaprojector;it
seemstogenerallyrefertosomeonewithhigh-flyinghopesandover-ambitiousschemes—
perhaps,tobealittlemorespecific,thosewhichoutrunavailableevidencethattheymight
work.(InTreatise1.3.10.4,documentingtheeffectsofthepassionofadmiration,Hume
lamentsthat“amongthevulgar,quacksandprojectorsmeetwithamoreeasyfaithupon
accountoftheirmagnificentpretensions,thaniftheykeptthemselveswithintheboundsof
moderation.”)
Analternatereadingof“IdeaofaPerfectCommonwealth”suggestsadefinitionof
“projector”thatisalittlesharperandmuchmorelikelytobetheoreticallyfruitful.Inmany
editionsHumebeganthatessaybywriting,
Ofallmankindtherearenonesoperniciousaspoliticalprojectors,iftheyhavepower;norsoridiculous,iftheywantit:Asontheotherhand,awisepoliticianisthemostbeneficialcharacterinnature,ifaccompaniedwithauthority;andthemostinnocent,andnotaltogetheruseless,evenifdeprivedofit(Essays,647note“a”).
Inthissense,a“politicalprojector”seemstobesomeonewhoiscavaliertowards
conventionsofauthority,whoseekswildconstitutionalinnovationsofthekindHume
mocksinhisessayonthegroundsthatestablishedauthorityisnottobetoyedwithand
cannoteasilybere-establishedoncebroken.A“wisepolitician,”ontheotherhand,seems
tobesomeonewhoproposessubstantialreformsthatdonotfloutconventionsof
authority.Humeelsewhereuses“projector”inmuchthesamesense.Inoneofhisinvented
14
speeches17intheHistoryofEngland,aparliamentaryopponentofCharlesIdescribesthose
whocounseledCharlestolevyforcedloansas“projectors”whowereasblameablefor
givingthisadviceaswouldhavebeenanyonewhohadrefusedtheloan(Hume1983
[1778]:5.189).Anotherinventedspeech,inthesameperiodandtosimilareffect,callsfor
vindicatingnot“[n]ewthings:”but“ourancient,legal,andvitalliberties,”byresisting
“projectors”whosetupCharles’privycouncilandunderminedthefoundationsofproperty
(Hume1983:5.191).LesstoHume’stastebutconsistentwiththisusage—andthistime
Hume’sownparaphrase,notevenapurportedquotation—parliamentinalaterandmore
uncompromisingphaseattackedthosewhoadvisedCharlestoresistparliament’stakeover
ofthearmedforcesas“enemiestothestate,andmischievousprojectorsagainstthesafety
ofthenation”(Hume1983:5.377).In“OftheProtestantSuccession,”Humewritesthat
hypotheticalagentbeforeCharlesII’sRestorationwhowouldhaveproposedproving
parliament’ssupremacyandexcludingthe“highclaims”ofStuartroyaltybysettingaside
theconventionofhereditarysuccessionandsettlingthecrownonsomeoneoutsidetheline
wouldinHume’sdaybeconsidered“anextravagantprojector,wholoveddangerous
remedies,andcouldtamperandplaywithagovernmentandnationalconstitution,likea
quackwithasicklypatient”(“OftheProtestantSuccession,”Essays509;Hume’s
comparisonofprojectorswithmedicalquacksisthereforedurable).
17[Iassumethespeechesareinvented,likemostofHume’sspeechesintheHistory,whoseresemblancetothesourcematerialisoftencursory,butIneedtodoublecheckHume’sfootnotes.Theworkhecitesas“Franklyn,”earlieras“Franklyn’sAnnals,”appearstobe[ThomasFrankland],TheAnnalsofKingJamesandKingCharlestheFirst(London,1681),availableonEarlyEnglishBooksOnline.]
15
Letusthen,defineaprojectorinthenarrowandtheoreticallyinterestingsenseas
someonewhoproposessubstantialchangesinaprominentandconsequentialsocial
convention.Thatprojectorsregardingauthority—whetherinpowerouroutsideit—are
perniciousis,inHume’sview,obvious.Projectorsregardingotherconventions,with
authorityintact,presentamorecomplexcase.GiventhatmoneyforHumeissucha
convention,oneproposingtodecoupleacurrencyfrom,say,thegoldstandard(or,aswith
Churchill,backtosuch)wouldqualifyasaprojector.(Oneofthefirstpeoplewidelycalleda
political“projector”inEnglishwasJohnLaw;ifIread“OfMoney”correctly,Humeinone
variantreadingmockshimselfbysayingthathishalf-seriousthought-experimentabout
turningbanksintostorehouses,whichaccepteddepositsbutneverlentthemout,wouldif
pursuedfurtherwinhimareputationasaprojector[“OfMoney,”Essays,variantreading,
632note“c”]).ThatlanguageisaconventionmeansthatG.B.Shawandotherswhohave
proposedradicallysimplifyingEnglishspellinghavealsobeenprojectors.IfIamrightthat
tolerationqualifiesasaconventioncumartificialvirtueforHume,thenachangein
tolerationregimes—say,awayfromanindividualisticregimeoffreespeechandtheharm
principletowardsacommunitarianprincipleof“respectivenessandrespectfulness”
wherebynomemberofoneculturalgroupwaspermittedtosignificantlycriticizeanother
(Lukes1995)—wouldalsobeaprojectofthiskind.Humeregardsas“projectors”theout-
of-touchFrenchadviserstoJamesIIwhoproposedchangingEngland’sreligion(apseudo-
convention,inmyterms)fromProtestantismtoCatholicism:whiletherewasnothing
wrongwiththeirbeliefthattheCatholicreligionhadanaffinitywithroyalism,
ProtestantismwassoestablishedinEnglandthatCatholicismwas“moredetestedthan
slaveryitself”(History6.286).Inourage,achangefromanightwatchmanregimetooneof
16
extensivetaxationandregulationalongwithawelfarestate—orvice-versa—would
requireaprojectoraswell.
Projectorsinthissensecannotallbebad.Onthecontrary,Iamclaimingsomesuch
alterationstoconventionsarebeneficial;thatnoneisautomaticallyruledoutaslongas
authorityremainstoarbitratethechangeandpreventitfromresultinginwantonviolence
anddisorder;andthat(astheexampleofChurchillandthegoldstandardshows)who
countsasaprojector,asopposedtoasoberandfact-basedproponentofreturningtothe
tried-and-true,willdependonone’stemporalandpoliticalperspective.NordoIintend
projectorinthemeaningofOakeshott’s“rationalist,”sincemanyofthethingshederidedas
rationalist(e.g.“votesforwomen”)involveadeparturefromwhatI’vecalled“pseudo-
conventions”thatarecurrentlypracticedbutcannotseriouslybedefendedaspromoting
theinterestsofallsubjecttothem.(Evenanimmediateandoutrightabolitionofa
despotismwherebyonegroupenjoystheabilitytodominateanotherthatispowerlessto
resistisnotaprojectintherelevantsense:itisradicalandextensivebutendangersno
conventionproperlysocalled.)HereIintendadifferentpoint:projectors—policy
entrepreneursinaparticularsense,whoseactivitiescanbesaidtoinvolvenotjust
quantitativebutqualitativechange—embodyacombinationofhazardandpotentialbenefit
thatoperatesinparticularandpredictableways.“Projector”shouldberegardedasasocial
roleandweshouldthinkaboutthatrole’spoliticalplace.
Thedivisionoflaborbetween“responsible”politicalauthorities—towhomtheyare
responsiblevariesbyregimetype—andbureaucraticfunctionariesisastapleofthe
literatureinpoliticaltheoryandpublicadministration.Typically,someversionofthe
evolvedBritishparliamentarymodel,inwhichresponsibleministerssettingbroadstrokes
17
ofpolicyforimpartialcivilservantstoimplement,isbothpracticedandtheoretically
preached.(Schumpetertkconsideredarespectforthisdistinctiontobeanunder-
appreciatedpreconditionofdemocraticgovernance.)Projectors,however,areathirdtype.
Theyarenottypicallyfunctionarieswhohaverisenthroughtheranksandhaveadopteda
civilserviceethos;theymaynotbeeitherdevotedtoorgoodat“administration”as
normallyunderstood.Nor,however,aretheypracticingpoliticianswhodrawmeaning
fromseekingandwinningthefavorofvoters.Theircareersaredevotedtobigideas,tothe
possibilityoftransformingthe“waywedothings”(conventions)forthebetter,andthey
aredeterminedtowinfameforhavingbeenthepersonwhothoughtofanewwayandgot
otherstoadoptit.Theyare,inshort,zealotsofmeans.
Whattodoaboutthisisanempiricalquestionandonebeyondmyexpertise.FornowI
wouldmerelycallforgeneralizingwhatIhavecalledtheHumeanprincipleof“separation
ofallegiancefrommerit”(Sabl2012;thinkofhowBritishmonarchsneednolonger
commandtheirownarmies)tothecaseofthepervasivelyanti-empiricistincentivesthat
policyentrepreneursface.Afewspeculations:
(a)projectorswilltendtoundervalueconvention.Thatpeopleareusedtodoingthings
acertainwaystrikesmostordinarypeople,politicians,andbureaucratsalikeasa
(defeasible)reasontocontinuelettingthemdoit.Projectorsmaybemorepronethanwe
realizetoregarditasnoreasonatall,sincetheirwholereasonforbeingistorubbishthe
currentwaysquainefficient.Theyneedtobereminded(sometimesforcibly)ofsomething
thatothersconsidersecondnature:thathavingsomesettledwayofdoingthingsis
necessarytoalmosteveryonewithrespecttogreatgobsofhumanlife,andthatthosewho
proposediscardingoneconventionhadbetterhaveaplausibleaccountofhowtheir
18
preferenceisnotonly“better”butholdssomeprospectofbecomingcommon,effortless,
andhabitual,notachorebutabackgroundassumptionofordiarylife.
(b)Aszealotsofmeans,Projectorsfacedifferentincentivesfrombothpoliticians,who
feartheelectoralconsequencesofbadoutcomes,andcivilservants,taskedwithfindingthe
mostefficientandleastdisruptivemeanstowardspositiveends.Theironlypossible
contributionistochangeouropinionofwhichmethodmightbecontemplatedinorderto
achieveacertainend,andtheironlypotentialrewardscomefrombeingidentifiedwith
thatparticularmethod(aconvention-breakingmethod).Theyarealsounlikelytowaitfor
empiricaltestsofwhethertheirmeansworkortorespecttheresultsofthosetestsifthey
fail.Theyarethetypestocomplainthattheirproposals“failedbecausetheywerenever
reallytried”(becausevestigesoftheoldconventionwereretained)—notrealizingthatthe
reasonfornottryingwasresistancetothevertiginoussocialdisorderthatdoingsowould
haverequired.Theyarenaturalenemiesoffallibilism.Innaturalscience,thefactthat
proponentsofagivenparadigmaretypicallyunyieldingindefenseofithasasimple
remedy:whileindividualsarerarelyconvinced,moreadequateparadigmsdefeatoldones
throughgenerationalreplacement(Kuhntk).Inthesocialrealm,wherewemustalllive,to
afirstapproximation,underthesamesetofconvention(pseudo-conventions,whichare
notactuallynecessary,aside),thingsareharder.WeareliabletofacebothTypeIandType
IIerrors:projectorsinsistingthatachangeisnecessaryandsalutarywhenitisn’t,and
bureaucratsandpoliticiansinsistingthatitisn’tsalutarywhenitis.Projectors,ofcourse,
seeonlythefirstdanger.
(c)Forthisreason,thehabitinpresidentialregimesofsometimesappointing
projectors,ratherthanpoliticiansorbureaucrats,tocabinet-levelpostsisalmostcertainly
19
abadidea:thepoliticallyresponsiblepositionsshouldgotoopportunistswho,because
theyarejudgedprimarilyonresults,will—unlikeprojectors—bequicktodumpprojects,
andcashierprojectors,whentheyfail.Inthemidstofsuchfailure,theprojectors
themselveswillremainabsolutelyconvincedtheyareonthevergeofsuccess.
{Ilacktimetodevelopthenexttwopoints—thoughtheylinkupinfairly
straightforwardwayswithHume’swritingsonparties,whichIplantofillinlater:the
pointsarethereforeinoutlineform,andsuggestionsarewelcome—AS.}
2.Similarly,weneedadivisionoflaborbetweenpoliticalpartiesandinterestgroups.
Ononetheoryofthedistinctionbetweenthetwo,politicalpartiesassemblebroad
coalitionsmadeupofinterestgroupsthatare“policydemanders”:ideologiesareanadhoc
wayofexplainingwhytavernownersshouldbeinthesamepartyastraditionalist
preachers(or,alternately,thesamepartyasfeminists[Bawnetal2012]).American
politicalscientiststypicallypreferpartiestointerestgroupsbecauseofthelatter’s
partialityandnarrowness:veterans’groups,representingtheirmembers,alwayspropose
morebenefits;politicalparties,aspiringtorepresenthalfthepopulation,anticipatethetax
increasethatwouldberequiredandroutinelytellthemtogoaway(Schattschneider2003
(1942)).Buttheethicsofinnovationsuggestsaslightlydifferentemphasis:theproblem
withpolicydemandersisthatthey,too,arezealotsofmeans(perhapsnotnewmeans,as
withprojectors;infact,theycanbereactionarieswhoproposereturnstoconventionsthat
everyoneelsehasforgottenorisverygladtohaveovercome).Again,theadvantageof
partypoliticiansisnotthattheyarepublicspirited,orleadbroadcoalitions,butthatthey
20
areopportunistswhoprimarilyseekofficewinningvotes.Beinghacks,theyareproneto
rejectproposalstocoercivelychangeconventionswhen,andforthesimpleandsufficient
reasonthat,mostpeoplehavenodesiretomakethatchange.Policydemandersmayregard
thatfactasallthemorereasontofightover“principle”(aprinciplethatdoesnotreferto
concreteadvantagesbuttounnegotiablemeans,regardlessofoutcomes).Hume’scritique
ofpartiesof“speculativeprinciple”here(“OfPartiesinGeneral,”Essaysaround60-63)
mustbeadaptedtoexplainthecontemporaryphenomenaweobserve:whileHume
thoughtthatsuchpartiesderivedtheirunaccountableanduncompromisableopposition
fromreligiouszeal,itnowseemsthatthezealotryofmeanswilldojustaswell.
3.Inthefirstperson,thepolicymakermaybeadvisedtoeconomizeonmoralized
means.Toseekanimprovementinthestateofaffairswhileremainingflexibleastomeans
willtendtoavoidboththepartisanblundersandthepartisanexecrationthatafocuson
meansislikelytoevoke.Here,however,thepoliticaleconomyispredictablyopposedtothe
fallibilisticethics:thezealotryofmeansisbadpolicybutpredictablyhardtopushback
agaist.Inwhatpoliticalscientistscall“policyfeedback,”programscreateconstituencies
thatthenrallyfortheprogramitselfratherthanfortheoverallsocialoutcomewhose
achievementwasthatprogram’soriginalrationaleandpurpose(Campbell2005;no
conservativebiasisintended,sincetheprograminvolvedmaybeataxbreak).18Thisdoes
notcontradicttheaboveprovidedthatthenumberofbeneficiariesinvolvedishighenough:
whenthatoccurs,hacksandpolicydemandersmarchinsync.Moreover,all-or-nothing
rallyingpoints(defendprogramX,abolishDepartmentY)makeformucheasiercollective
18Infact,thetextimplicitlyreversestheliberalpoliticalpreferencesofmuchofmanyscholarswhostudypolicyfeedback:theytendtowelcomethefactthatcertainprogramscannotbequestionedduetothepoweroftheirorganizedbeneficiaries.
21
actionthanlinearpolicyobjectives(makeprogresswithregardtometricQ)(Chongtk
CollectiveActioandtheCivilRightsMovement)Ipropose,then,amitigatedcounselof
despair:weoughttoaskskepticalquestionsaboutmeanstotheextentthatpoliticsis
sufficientlyopen,orinflux,astoallowthat.
Hereonecouldalsomakeapointinmoralpsychology:everybodythinksthatsome
meansaremandatory(eitherway:mandatorytoadoptormandatorytoprohibit),thatthe
meanstowhichtheyareparticularlyattachedarewithinthesmallsetofconventionsthat
reallyshouldbenonnegotiable.Butunderthepressureoflike-mindedzealotsofmeans,we
arelikelytohaveafunnyideaofwhichconventionsoughttobewithinthissetofminimal,
nonnegotiablemeans.Perhapsanattentiontopolldatahelpshere,notdirectlyinthesense
thatweshouldadoptwhateverpositionsarepopular,butindirectlytotheextentthatwe
cometorealizethatwhatthesmallcirclesaroundusconsiderunthinkableisactually
somethingthatmanyconsiderquiteplausible(Shklar[tkAPSApresidentialaddress]).
III.Experience“overthere.”
Theabovetreateddomesticcases.Infact,however,domesticinnovatorsareeasierto
holdtoaccountthaninnovatorswhoinflicttheirschemesonhelplessforeigners.Doingso
isverytemptingsinceitallowsthewould-beinnovatortobanktheintellectualprofitof
innovationwhileinflictingtheriskonthosehe(morerarelyshe)doesnotmuchcareabout.
Again,severalcasesmightbedistinguished.
1.Helplessexperimentalsubjects
Themostdisturbingcaseinvolvesexperimentingwithuntriedinnovationson
populationsoverwhichonehasgreatpower:directlypoliticalpowerinthecaseofold-
22
fashionedimperialism;or,morerecently,crushingeconomicpower,aswhencountriesare
giventhechoicebetweenstructuralchangeorbankruptcy.
AswithHume’srepeatedanalogybetween“quacks”and“projectors,”themedical
analogyseemsapt.Thoseatalosstofindsubjectsformedicalresearchnotuncommonly
turntotheradicallypowerless:mentalpatients,prisoners,concentrationcampinmates.
(Manyofusrecentlylearnedthatthecaesariansectionwasperfectedonunwilling
enslavedwomen,manyofwhomdiedinagonyalongwiththeirbabies[NewYorkTimes
1619articletk].)Thereisaliveliteratureontheethicsofusinginformationgainedinthis
way.[Tkformoreonthis;Ihaven’tconsultedtheliteratureinmanyyears.]Inpractice,as
withmostthings,wetendtouseallsuchinformationby“prescription”—recentdataseem
tainted,butoldinformationissomehowlaundered.19Thoughlessgrislyandpalpablyevil,
however,thesocial-sciencecasesmayfollowasimilarstructure.The“Chicagoboys”tried
onthevictimsofdictatorshipinChilewhatnobodywouldhaveelectedthemtodoin
Chicago.Now,however,nobodywouldthinkofexcludingChilefromadataseton
comparativeeconomicdevelopment.
Ontheonehand,attemptinguntriedexperimentsonhelplessforeignersseems
indefensibleif,aswiththemedicalcases,theavowedpurposeisintellectualprogressand
thereasonforchoosingforeignersisthatone’scompatriotswouldneversubmittothe
dangeroftheexperiment.Moreover,thecommonclaimthatwhatisbeingapplied
represents“soundeconomicprinciples”representsthearroganceoftheprojector:
19 Humerarelyusedthewordprescriptionbuthisuseofthephrase“longpossession”andtheideaofsomethinglikewhatBurkecalledprescriptionispervasive[Whelantk]—onedifferencefromBurkebeingthataconventioncanonlyacquirelegitimacythroughprescriptionifitservesidentifiablehumaninterests,thusreligionqualifiesforBurkebutnotforHume.
23
typically,thereismorethanonepossibleeconomicconvention,andmovinganother
countryclosertoone’sownisnomoredefensible,asamatterofeitherconsequentialist
ethicsormoralpsychology,thaniftheothercountrytriedtoimposeitsconventionsonthe
homecountryoftheeconomist.
Tostaywiththemedicalanalogy,theonlydefensibleinstanceseemsakinto
“compassionateuse”:theeconomicprojectorusesamedicinethatheorsheknowsisnot
proven—hasnotbeensufficientlytestedagainstdata—outofasincerebeliefthatthe
alternativewouldbequicklyanddemonstrablycatastrophic.Butcompassionateusehasits
rulesaswell20:thepatientmustbetoldthattheremedyisradicalandunprovenandmust
giveconsent.Again,duetothearroganceofprojectors,thisconditionisrarelymet;the
remedyisportrayedasroutine,asmoresafeandeffectivethanitcanpossibly,inunknown
circumstances,bepredictedtobe.Finally,thoughIdoubtthemedicalethicsliterature
coversthiscase,compassionateuseseemsinappropriatewhenthepersonproposingthe
cure(andhopingtowinfameandconsultingcontractsbyadministeringit)isalsothe
personwhoinflictedthefataldisease,asmanyweakercountriestakerichcountriestobe
doing.Itdoesnotcountascompassionateusetoproposeanuntestedremedyforgunshot
woundswhileholdingasmokinggun.
Theseanalogiesarepurposelyabitshockingandcynical,Mandeville-style,tomakea
point:projectors,howeverintelligentandsubjectivelywell-meaning,arenottypically
sufficientlyawareoftheanguishandagonythattheirinnovativeschemesmayrisk.The
restofusmustremindthem,andinstitutionsmustbeputinplacetorenderthose
reminderssystematic.
20Inlaterversionspullabitofliteratureonthemedicalethicsofthis.
24
2.Eageranti-empiricistinnovators“elsewhere.”
Whentheforeignersinquestionarenothelplessbutself-governingandsupplytheir
ownprojectorsratherthanhavingoursfoisteduponthem,thecaseiscompletelydifferent
andaltogethermorebenign.Whattypicallyhappensisthatpeopleinothercountries
wrenchtheirconventionsintonewanduntriedshapesbecausetheyarenotHumeans.
Thinkinglike(cartoon)Kantians,theybelieveacertainchangetobemorallyrequireda
priori;orthinkinglike(cartoon)Hegelians,theythinktheycananticipatetheprogressive
“nextstep”entailedbyReasonorJustice,eveniftheyhaveneverseensuchunfoldingsin
operationonthescale,orunderthecircumstances,orwithrespecttothekindsofpeopleto
whichthey’reabouttoapplythem.Inbothcases,extremeinnovationsmayprovokewhat
fromaHumeanperspectiveisaperversepride.Relishingtheprospectofbeing
rememberedbyhistoryforbeingthefirsttotrysomethingthatlaterbecomesstandard,a
countryislikelytoforgetthemorecommoninstancesofthingsthatcountriestryfirstthat
areforgottenbecausetheyworkedoutverybadly.
Insuchcases,it’suptoothercountries’owncitizenstojudgetheresultsbytheir
outcomes(inthelargestsense,includingtheirsubjectiveacceptabilitytocitizenswhose
accustomedwaysofdoingthingshavebeendisrupted):Humerightlytookadimviewof
interveninginforeigncountriesbecausetheirchoiceofconventionsseemeduncongenial
oroddtous.Andtheethicsofothersbenefittingfromtheexperimentarenotdifficultatall:
thereseemsnoobjectiontolearningfromtheexperienceothers’misplacedrationalism,
whethertheeventproveditaccidentallygoodoraccidentallybad.Othersmayhavebeen
actingwithoutgooddata,butifenoughdoso,theywilleventuallyproducegooddatafor
us.
25
ThisisabenigneffectoftheotherwisemelancholytruththatHumeanismisalwaysand
everywhereaminoritytaste,tooempiricaltopleaseeitheramedianvoterwhoprefers
mythssuggestingthattheuniverseismoreorderlyandtractablethanitis([citeEnchanted
Americatk]),orintellectualswhopreferprojectors’schemestowhatdemonstrablyworks.
Non-Humeans’follyfuelsHumeans’wisdom.
3.UnknowingprojectorsanduncertainscienceTheliteraturecontainsmuchdisagreementregardingHume’sexpectationsforsocial
science—whetherhesawitasanenterprisethatwoulddeveloptoapproachprecisionor,
onthecontrary,asonethatwouldalwaysonlyfixafewtruthsandbesurprisedbyevents
thatcouldnotbeanticipated.(Isuspectthattheansweris,aswithHume’sessay“Dignity
orMeannessofHumanNature,”“precisecomparedtowhat?”)Bothsidesofthisdebate
tendtoassume,however,thatitwouldbegoodifscienceknewmoreandbadifitwere
destinedalwaystoknowless.
Theparadoxofinnovationsuggestsamoreequivocalattitude.Ifempiricistsmight
benefitfromtheenthusiasticexperimentsofnon-empiricists,wemayalsobenefitfromthe
would-beempiricismofpeoplewhoareinnovatingmorethantheyrealizebecausetheyare
drawingimperfectconclusionsfromincomplete(orselective)data.(Did1989provethe
inherentgoodnessofcapitalism?Did2008,onthecontrary,provethatcapitalismresultsin
catastrophe?Bothconclusionsstrikemeasutterlyunwarranted,butweallknow
intelligent,soberpeople—perhaps,combined,themajorityofthoseweknow—whobelieve
oneofthemandproposepoliciesaccordingly.)Ifweareexperimentingwithoutknowingit,
wecouldbejustthesameastheunwittingenthusiastsdescribedabove:dangerousto
26
ourselvesbutbeneficialtootherspreparedtodrawwiselessonsfromourfolly.The
prospectmaybesimultaneouslymorescarythanwewouldlikeasbeingssympathizing
withothers’welfare(andhopingtheysympathizewithours)and,incompensation,more
productivethanwerealizeoftheempiricaldatathatwillhelpusdobetterinthefuture.
Callthisasortofmetaphysicalhedge:aHumean“cunningofreason”forthosewholack
philosophiesofhistory.
IV.TruthoverFacts:Hume’sIncompletenessTheorem.
InarecentspeechJosephBiden,intendingasusualtosaysomethingelse,shoutedthat
hiscampbelievedin“truthoverfacts”(citationtk).Leavingasidethefactthatpolitical
theoristsdevoteourcareerstosomethinglikethisslogan,weallmustacknowledgemore
prosaicallytheexistenceofagreatmanytruthsnotbasedonfacts:thingsthatwillbe
proventrueinthefuturebutarenotdemonstrablebasedonevidencewehavenow.
Theworldkeepsthrowingupnewdata,butthisalonewillnotproducefundamentally
newwaysofrespondingtotheproblemsthatthesedatarepresent.Thatsortofinnovative
progressrequires,Ihavesuggested,learningfrompeoplewhoareeitherlessrationalthan
weareorinterpretavailabledatainwaysthatseemvalidtothembutlikeverypoor
scientificinferencetous.
Tothisextent,Humeanempiricistrationalitymaybeself-subverting.IfIcanbefairly
certainthatwhatlaterobservationwillknowtobethebestpoliciesIcouldadoptwill
necessarilyrestondatathatIdonotcurrentlyhave,IcannotbeconfidentthatanythingI
docanbefullyrationalallthewaydown.TheinnovationsIfavor,iftheyturnouttowork,
willdosobyaccident(orelsebedependentonsomeoneelse’shavingadoptedthem
withoutgoodreason,whereupontheyworkedbyaccident).ThosethatIrejectwillstrike
27
measunfoundedinwaysthatwillmakelatergenerationsscratchtheirheads.(Thinkof
ourcomplacentstoriesregardingsmallpoxinoculation:thetruthisthattheskepticswere
notnecessarilywrongthen.)Ihavesuggestedthat,andwhy,theresultshouldnotbea
counselofdespair.Therearewaysofcorrectingfor,orelsebenefitingfrom,ourownand
others’infirmities.ButwemightdrawtheveryHumean“lessonofmoderationinallour
politicalcontroversies”(“WhethertheBritishGovernment…,”Essayspagetk).
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