Winter 2014 Volume 6 Issue 3

The Failure of Economics to Bring Peace in Israel-Palestine

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Volume 6 Issue 3Winter 2014

ISSN: 1837-9338

Quarterly Access (QA) is the national quarterly publication of the young professionals’ networks of the Australian Institute of International Affairs (AIIA).

All the views expressed in this publication are solely those of the individual writers. While providing a forum for discussion and debate on international issues, the AIIA does not formulate its own institutional views, and eschews political bias.

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The Editorial Committee comprises a group of students and young professionals.

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The Editorial Team:David Donaldson (Editor-in-Chief)

Hector Sharp (Managing Editor)

Liz de Fegely (Editor)

Katharine Brown (Editor)

Lachlan McCall (Editor)

In Brief5 Our Village, Our Contribution Nicholas Metherall

In Review22 Dangerous Allies by Malcolm Fraser Heath Pickering

In Depth7 The Failure of Economics to Foster Israeli-Palestinian Peace Eliyahu Kamisher

11 The Zapatista Movement: The Fight for Indigenous Rights in Mexico Iker Reyes Godelmann

15 The Future of Japan’s Non-Nuclear Weapons Status William Larn

18 The Curious Case of the Six Party Talks Richard Vogt

Volume 6 Issue 3Winter 2014

Editorial NoteEvents in recent weeks have seen one of the most tense and tumultous periods in international relations of the past decade. The standoff between NATO and Russia over Ukraine carries faint echoes of the Cold War, while the situation in the Middle East shows no sign of diminishing with fresh conflict in Iraq and Gaza. Amid this turmoil, Quarterly Access brings you in-depth analysis on issues that grab media attention, as well as those that do not.

In this winter edition we have a range of articles spanning issues from South America to the Gaza Strip.

As I write, the death toll in Israel and Gaza mounts as Israel proceeds with its first ground incursion into the Strip since 2008. Eliyahu Kamisher’s essay is a timely analysis of the economic failings behind the stalled peace negotiations between Israel and the Palestinians.

Nicholas Metherall writes on the importance of local contributions to ongoing development in Indonesia.

Iker Reyes Godelmann examines the influence of poverty and NAFTA in sparking Mexico’s Zapatista uprising.

William Larn considers the near-future prospects for Japan remaining a non-nuclear weapons state, finding it likely Japan will refrain from nuclearisation, while Richard Vogt looks at the failures of the six party talks to create a détente between North Korea and the rest of world.

Finally, Heath Pickering offers an interesting review of Malcolm Fraser’s provocative new book Dangerous Allies.

David DonaldsonEditor-In-Chief

5

Our Village, Our Contribution Nicholas Metherall

There is a small island called Solor in Indonesia which lies in the Savu Ocean near the intersection between Asia and the Pacific. The island’s population is largely dependent on the agricultural sector. Unfortunately, the island is incredibly arid, making it difficult to find fertile land. This leaves Solor’s rural communities particularly vulnerable to changing rain patterns and crop-destroying winds.

2014 is the last year before the expiry of the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs); it also happens to be the year of Small Island Developing States (SIDs). As part of an Honours research thesis at La Trobe University, and surveys for a Strategic Planning and Action to Strengthen Climate Resilience of Rural Communities (SPARC) program, I spent several months living in villages on Solor Island. I spoke with farmers, fishing collectives, health clinic workers, women’s craft collectives, and other local community groups to learn about their vision for the next fifteen years.

Leaders of a small forestry group in one of the villages shared a story about their experience in climate change mitigation and adaptation:

“Forest helps the land retain water, it also provides our community with an additional source of income… In the past we would sometimes receive help from outside of the village [government and NGOs] for our forestry program. But the tree planting programs have had a high rate of failure. Those outside programs which don’t listen to us, only bring seeds for trees. But because of the strong dry winds and low rainfall, these [seedlings] often die before they have the chance to grow. But there are some other programs which do listen to us. We tell them to bring not just seeds but also more resilient young trees [saplings]. Now we have planted more than 40, 000 trees...”

Looking back fourteen years ago, a group of mostly UN experts went into a proverbial windowless committee room and wrote the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs). For a process with such significant global implications, it was a surprisingly exclusive and closed approach; the opportunity for consultation with key groups and stakeholders was very limited. This was particularly true for local community groups who, despite being the most likely targets of development programs, were the most marginalised from the agenda-setting process.

As a result, despite their accomplishments, the MDGs are often criticised for being imbalanced: overly donor-oriented, and without a foundation of voice and ownership among their intended beneficiaries.

Before deciding on the post-2015 agenda, world leaders need to listen to these voices and engage with a wider range of stakeholders and local communities. A truly effective post-2015 Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) Framework will need to contemplate the role of popular participation from local communities.

Participation and consultative processes should be encouraged throughout the many processes and levels of development, and by involving traditionally marginalised groups and community-based organisations (CBOs). Reinforcing inclusivity allows events ranging from high-level talks at an international level to participatory focus group discussions at a village level to benefit from the insights of local voices.

Local people have a better understanding of their context, and have unique insights into how their lives and livelihoods can be improved; they should be involved as active agents and partners of development, rather than as passive recipients.

Back on the Melanesian island, Yohannes, a rural community member, shared his experiences of large development programs. He said that while he appreciates the public service assistance that has been delivered by these nationwide interventions (to meet the MDGs) in the past, in the long run, he is concerned that such programs will leave behind a “culture of dependence.”

Concerns like these are not uncommon in the village and highlight the dangers of exclusionary, non-participatory processes. These concerns also raise questions about what exactly it is that locals really value and benefit from. Community members appreciate not only what is being delivered through a development intervention, but how it is being delivered and by whom.

In brief

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Exclusionary, top-down approaches to development may deliver short-term outputs such as infrastructure. In the long run though, such approaches do little to address the non-material concerns of villagers like Yohannes and the root causes of poverty and disadvantage. In fact, external technocratic interventions may further disempower villagers and create new forms of inequality by shifting agency toward external professional intermediaries (lawyers, economists, NGO activists, policy specialists, usually outsiders) and away from marginalised local communities such as women’s groups and lower socio-economic households.

A large participatory research project, Voices of the Poor, which collected the views of 60,000 poor people in 60 countries, found that poverty manifests itself in many non-material outcomes. This ranged from feelings of powerlessness, lack of voice, exclusion, breakdown of social fabric, dependency and even shame.

So how do policy-makers deliver concrete public service outcomes in health, education and other priority sectors without shifting autonomy away from local communities and contributing to this culture of dependence? Back in the Melanesian village, locals provide the answer. When asked to identify the greatest strengths and sources of pride in their community, six of ten community members in a focus group discussion referred to the term swadaya. Derived from Sanskrit but translated to an Eastern Indonesian context, swadaya refers to a concept of collective action where community members contribute within their own village. Swadaya could come in the form of rocks, sand and other physical materials donated by the village for the building of roads or bridges. It could include volunteered labour and time. It could even involve a women’s group working together to reduce maternal and neonatal mortality rates by providing nutritious supplements to help disadvantaged and malnourished mothers and children in their community.

On delivering public service outcomes without creating dependence on external assistance, a women’s discussion group points to a number of common themes surrounding swadaya, including a greater sense of ownership, participation and thus control of development interventions. “Swadaya is from our community, for our community… our village, our contribution.”1 Such forms of participatory development have gained momentum across a range of contexts.

Ubudehe in Rwanda refers to the traditional practice and cultural value of collective action. Since 2001, ubudehe has been utilised as a popular platform for democracy. People are given the political space to gain experience and engage with local government to solve local problems.

1 Ms Ibu Lamaholot, (Translated)

In Kenya, local community members from the Kibera slum, one of the largest slums in the world, become agents of change by contributing as Kibera mappers. Through the use of open source mapping techniques locals create topic and sector maps, for health facilities for schools, for sanitation and waste, and for security and vulnerability. The sharing of this information within the community through Voice of Kibera has prompted reflection and action and has empowered local community members to engage more effectively with local authorities.

There are some signs that high level policy-makers are starting to take local voices and participatory approaches more seriously. The High Level Panel (HLP) of Eminent Persons on the Post-2015 development agenda proposed a number of transformative shifts. Notably, this included the commitment to “ensure that no person – regardless of ethnicity, gender, geography, disability, race or other status – is denied universal human rights and basic economic opportunities.”

The challenge for policy-makers is to ensure that the principle of ‘leave no one behind’ realises its potential to empower disadvantaged communities, rather than just becoming a slogan. Here, the role of effective participation is critical. Advocates of developing countries such as Ibrahima Hathie, the research director at IPAR Senegal and the Southern Voice Initiative, argues that “if we want to achieve this aspiration [of leave no one behind], we must ensure that the various stakeholders are involved in the different processes [of negotiations and development]… It is [also] important to leave no voice behind.”

In order to learn from past experience and ensure that a post-2015 agenda is relevant to the complex local realities of an ever-changing world, policy makers will benefit from engaging with a wider range of local stakeholders. By involving developing country governments and their people as concrete partners rather than as symbolic beneficiaries, we have a greater chance of planting resilient trees which grow and last rather than vulnerable seedlings likely to be blown away by the dry winds.

Less than six months away from the 2015 deadline of the MDGs, there has never been a better time to listen to the voices of marginalised and disadvantaged communities.

Nicholas Metherall is a student at La Trobe University’s Faculty of Humanities and Social Sciences and was aGlobal Voices delegate to the Study Tour on UN Sustainable Development and Environmental Challenges.

In brief

7

The Failure of Economics to Foster Israeli-Palestinian PeaceEliyahu Kamisher

In recent weeks the Israeli-Palestinian conflict has reached another boiling point. Three Israeli teens: Gilad Shaar, Naftali Frenkel, and Eyal Yifrach were kidnapped and horrendously murdered, whilst Palestinian teen Muhammad Abu Khadr was slain in a gruesome revenge killing. These killings erupted into this week’s vicious clashes, another round in the seemingly endless string of perpetual viciousness that is the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.

However, this was not always the case. It may seem like a myth or fable, but there was once a time when peace was possible. When Israeli Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin and the then leader national leader Yasser Arafat shook hands and smiled together on the White House lawn. The Oslo Accords set forth a process to establish a Palestinian state alongside Israel living “in peaceful coexistence and mutual dignity and security.”1 For a short glimmering moment, cooperation, not conflict, was the norm. Peace was a goal within arm’s reach, not a distant mirage.

This paper will examine a central document of the Oslo Accords, The Protocol on Economic Relations, also known as the Paris Protocol, and explain why the Paris Protocol has failed to engender peace. Signed on 29 April 1994 the Paris Protocol was meant to usher in a new era of economic cooperation, stability, and growth between the nascent Palestinian Authority (PA) and Israel. Many hoped that such economic cooperation would lead both Palestinians and Israelis to form a long and lasting peace. However, over twenty years after the agreement, little has materialized. Gaza remains economically unfeasible with unemployment at 31 per cent in 2013.2 The West Bank still faces an Israeli military occupation that restricts freedom of movement

1 Oslo I Accords (1993) http://www.acpr.org.il/publications/books/43-Zero-oslo-accord.pdf Accessed 16/07/20142 Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics, Press Release on the Results of the Labour Force Survey, http://www.pcbs.gov.ps/site/512/default.aspx?tabID

and economic development. Ultimately, the Israeli policies of rigid labour restrictions, importing foreign workers, and withholding Palestinian tax revenue have disregarded the Paris Protocol when it does not serve immediate Israeli political interests. Nonetheless, the Palestinians also critically failed to sufficiently curb corruption and terrorism creating a vital lack of trust and stability needed for economic cooperation.

Among the Protocol’s touted accomplishments was establishing the independent Palestinian Monetary Authority, allowing Palestinians to self-generate vital tax revenue, securing Palestinian jobs in Israeli labour markets, and opening the Palestinian economy to global import-export markets. However, in reality Israel is still greatly controlled by the Palestinian economy and only the “trappings” of economic autonomy was granted to the PA.3 Palestinians were not allowed to establish their own currency. This was partly because currency would carry a symbol of national sovereignty, something the Israeli government would not allow, but mainly because the PA could not realistically support a stable independent currency.4 Lacking an independent currency meant that the Israeli Shekel set all meaningful monetary policies such as inflation rates. Furthermore, the Paris Protocol delineated a customs union between Israel and the PA that entails the mutual acceptance of common tariffs and other taxation polices. This union made collabouration essential between the two economies, however, did not require any demarcation of economic borders, and put the majority of policy making in Israeli hands.

In a poll taken in October 1993 Palestinians respondents ranked job availability and standards of living ahead of repression, violence, and corruption as the greatest concern in the transition to self-government.5 Palestinian negotiators sought to secure Israeli labour market access through the Paris Protocol.6 This resulted in the labour normality clause, which states:

“Both sides will attempt to maintain the normality of movement of labour between them, subject to each side’s right to determine from time to time the extent and conditions of the labour movement into its area. If either

=512&lang=en&ItemID=790&mid=3172&wversion=Staging Accessed 16/07/20143 Levin, Jamie (2007) “Accord to Discord: A Political Economy Approach to the Oslo Process” in Palestine Israel Journal Vol. 14, 63. 4 Elmusa, Sharif and Mahmud El-Jaafari (1995) “Power and trade: The Israeli-Palestinian economic protocol” in Journal of Palestine Studies Vol. 24, No. 2, 20. 5 Levin, “Accord to Discord,” 67. 6 Arnon, Arie and Saeb Bamya (2007) “ Back to Negotiating the Final Status - The Economic Dimension: Past, Present, and Future” in Palestine Israel Journal Vol. 14, No. 3, 71

In depth

8In depth

side suspends the normal movement temporarily, it will give the other side immediate notification . . .”7

“Normality” essentially means unimpeded flow of Palestinian labourers into Israel. However, Israel still intended to ensure its security interests through the clause “subject to each side’s right to determine . . . the extent and conditions of labour movement.” Although it states “each side’s right to determine” in actuality this only applied to Israel, who was the only party with the potential desire and physical ability to restrict labour flows.

Another key section in the clause states, “If either side suspends the normal movement temporarily . . .” The use of “temporarily” is to ensure the Palestinian interest that if Israel does decide to limit labour, it will be brief. In other words in the case of a closure Israel will do the most it can to ensure Palestinian access to labour, while not endangering itself.

Yet Israeli labour closures have fully undermined the “attempt to maintain the normality of movement of labour” recognized in the Protocol. Following the signing of the Paris Protocol not only did labour fail to remain normal, but it was severely limited causing massive unemployment in Gaza and the West Bank. The total closure of labour flows in 1996 caused unemployment to spike to 66 per cent in the Palestinian territories. The closure was eased in June 1996; however, Palestinian unemployment still remained amongst the highest in the world. This specific closure resulted in a loss of 39.6 per cent of Gaza’s Gross National Product, and 18.2 per cent loss in the West Bank.8 In 1998 another total closure was implemented resulting in wage loss of $11.4 million for official workers. Following this closure Israel dropped the number of Palestinian worker permits to 27,350, 44 per cent below the previous amount of workers, and only a fraction of the employment levels envisaged by the Paris Protocol.9

The economic closures greatly diminished the Palestinian economy’s long-term development. Production capabilities become severely restricted as exports massively decline. The lack of stability discouraged investment and thus a viable private sector has failed to grow. The resulting economic crisis meant 40 per cent of foreign aid allocated to long-term development programs had to be redistributed to emergency budget support and employment generation funneled through the PA.10 Accordingly, the public sector - funded heavily by foreign aid - has become the main employer in the Palestinian Territories, however, this does not provide for natural and

7 Government of the state of Israel and the P.L.O, (1994) Protocol on Economic Relations “Paris Protocol” Article VIII <http://www.nad-plo.org/userfiles/file/Document/ParisPro.pdf> Accessed on 17/07/2014.8 Roy, Sara (1999) “De-development revisited: Palestinian economy and society since Oslo” in Journal of Palestine Studies Vol. 28, No. 3, 64. 9 Roy, “De-development,” 70.10 Roy, “De-development,” 72.

stable economic growth.

Israel had and still does have legitimate security concerns to close borders as the decade after the signing of the Oslo Accords marked a significant rise in terror activity by terrorist groups such as Hamas and Islamic Jihad. However, the severity and length of the closures by Israel showed a lack of effort and desire to reasonably maintain labour. In essence the cooperation “to establish a sound economic base” envisaged under the Protocol was thrown out the window.

The severity and length of the closure seems to be caused by two factors. First is the Israeli population’s growing sensitivity to terror, mainly resulting from a string of terrorist attacks including the infamous Jaffa Road Bus Bombings. The Israeli population became more averse to pursuing peace and implementation of the Oslo accords.11 This combined with the assassination of Yitzchak Rabin in 1995 lead the pro-Oslo Labour party to lose the elections in 1996, 2001, and 2003. With the fall of the Oslo camp, came the fall of the Oslo mentality which replaced economic cooperation in favor of a hardline security mindset.12 Consequently, Israel allowed for rigid labour restrictions to wreak havoc on the Palestinian economy in line with the emerging Israeli attitude.

Israel’s importation of foreign workers to supplement Palestinian labour is the most blatant rejection of the Protocol’s “normality of labour” clause. Palestinian labour became extremely unreliable due to Israeli closures. Needing dependable workers Israeli domestic producers petitioned for the importation of foreign workers as a stable work force. Subsequently, from 1992-1996 Israel increased foreign work permits from 4,000 to 107,000. The workers, mainly from South East Asia and Eastern Europe occupy the same jobs as Palestinians.13

According to the World Bank “Palestinian employment opportunities in Israel have been permanently reduced” due to the importation of foreign workers.14 With the importation of workers Israel has essentially denied any major resumption of Palestinian labour into Israel because there is no longer the employment opportunities. In this case Israel has completely undermined the labour relations laid out in the Paris Protocol. Labour is no longer suspended “temporarily” but permanently. Thus, even if the Palestinians fully comply with all Israeli security requests, there will never be a return to the labour flows foresaw under the Protocol.

11 Leon, Dan (1995) “Israeli Public Opinion Polls on the Peace Process.” Palestine-Israel Journal of Politics, Economics, and Culture Vol. 2, No. 1.12 Arnon, Arie (2007):“Israeli Policy towards the Occupied Palestinian Territories: The Economic Dimension, 1967-2007.” The Middle East Journal Vol. 61, No. 4, 587. 13 Ishac Diwan, and Radwān Alī Shabān (1999), “Development Under Adversity: The Palestinian Economy in Transition: Summary” World Bank Group, 5. 14 Diwan, and Radwān Alī Shabān “Executive Summary”, 3.

9In depth

Although Israel has disregarded the labour aspect of the Protocol, much of the Palestinian’s labour problems must also be attributed to problems within the Palestinian Authority. Former chairman of the Palestinian Monetary Authority, George T. Abed stated in 1994:

“I find it ironic that the Palestinian leadership . . . should be pushing for a large share of its labour to seek work in Israel. It ought to be the priority of the leadership to mobilize the Palestinians in an urgent national crusade to implement the development programs as fast as possible so as to create employment for its people at home.”15

In many respects the Palestinian leadership was short-sided in their economic goals, only seeking to cut deals with Israel instead of establishing long-term goals. Furthermore, corrupt politicians under Yasser Arafat squandered much of the foreign aid donated to the Palestinian development program and the Palestinians failed to establish an appropriate legal and regulatory setting to attract foreign investment.16 However, Palestinian shortsightedness and corruption was unable to debilitate the Palestinian economy as significantly as Israeli policy decisions. This is not to say that a vast amount of Palestinian politicians were not shortsighted and corrupt, yet the majority of the Palestinian economy was inextricably tied to and controlled by Israel. Thus, even though they were corrupt the Palestinian Authority lacked the ability to damage their own economy as drastically as Israeli policies did.

The Palestinian value-added tax (VAT), which was originally promoted as a symbol of cooperation and unity amongst the Israelis and Palestinians, later became an Israeli political pressure tool. The VAT is a sales tax and constitutes around two thirds of the Palestinian Authority’s self-generated revenue. However, the VAT must be no lower than one to two per cent of the Israeli VAT.17 Furthermore, the Protocol established the VAT to be collected by Israel and transferred monthly to the PA.

15 Abed, George T (1994) “Developing the Palestinian Economy. An Interview with George T. Abed” in Journal of Palestine Studies Vol. 23, No. 4, 43. 16 Roy, “De-development,” 78. 17 Paris Protocol, Article IV.

In essence the majority of Palestinian self-generated tax income is set by Israel and collected by Israel, but given to the Palestinians.

However, Israeli control of the VAT is not necessarily a bad thing. As George T. Abed states:

“Israel has one of the most efficient and developed VAT systems in the world and if the Palestinians were to run their system as efficient they could cover a substantial portions - perhaps more than half of their current budgetary requirements from the VAT alone.”18

Yet, Israeli governments have withheld VAT revenues multiple times, essentially in a punitive function. In December 2012 Israel withheld over $100 million dollars in VAT revenues in response to a unilateral bid by Mahmoud Abbas to upgrade the Palestinian’s status in the United Nations to “observer state.”19 More recently, the Benjamin Netanyahu government withheld tax revenue in response to the Fatah-Hamas unity government.20 There may be a legitimate argument for withholding funds from the unity government, due to its affiliation with a terrorist group. Nevertheless, the first case is in direct dismissal of the Protocol, which states:

“Representatives of the two sides will meet once a month, on the twentieth day of the month . . . The clearance claims will be settled within six days from the meeting, through a payment by the side with the net balance of claims against it, to the other side.”21

Principally, Israel must pay the Palestinian Authority the taxes it has collected on the 26th of every month. There is no clause that allows for withholding payments. Thus, Israel consistently violates the Protocol to politically pressure and punish the Mahmoud Abbas government.

In response to Israel’s withholding of taxes in 2012 the European Union called for Israel:

“To avoid any step undermining the financial situation of the Palestinian Authority. Any such action by Israel would undermine existing cooperation mechanisms . . . Contractual obligations, notably under the Paris Protocol, regarding full, timely, predictable and transparent transfer of tax and custom revenues have to be respected.”22

18 Abed, “Developing the Palestinian Economy,” 42. 19 Reuters, “Israel to Withhold Palestinian Funds” last modified 12/12/2012. http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/12/12/us-palestinians-israel-funds-idUSBRE8BB09V20121212 Accessed 17/07/201420 Times of Israel, “Israel to withhold PA tax transfers ahead of unity announcement” 01/06/2014 http://www.timesofisrael.com/israel-to-withhold-pa-tax-transfers-ahead-of-unity-announcment/ Accessed 17/07/201421 Paris Protocol, Article VI. 22 Council of The European Union, Council Conclusion on the Middle East Peace Process 3209th Foreign Affairs Council Meeting, Brussels: 10th December, 2012.

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According to the European Union Israel is deliberately undermining “existing cooperation mechanisms” by violating its “contractual obligations.”

To ensure proper implementation the Paris Protocol created a forum to resolve disputes called the Joint Economic Committee ( JEC). The JEC is meant to “follow up the implementation of this Protocol and to decide on problems related to it that may arise from time to time.”23 This committee is supposed to ensure fair implementation and equal representation. Yet, there is no actual enforcement ability established by the JEC to make sure the meetings are convened or its rulings abided by.

For example, in 2012 protests swept through the West Bank rallying against the high cost of living and unemployment. The Mahmoud Abbas Government consequently requested a review of the Paris Protocol, but it was denied. Danny Alon, Israel’s Deputy Foreign Minister at the time stated,  “there is no room to meet the Palestinian request to review the economic accords between [the two] governments.”24 The Protocol specifically states that each side “may request the review of any issue related to this Agreement by the JEC.”25 At the end of the day, however, this is only a request and the Palestinians have no leverage to make sure Israel complies.

23 Paris Protocol, Article III. 24 Ma’an News, “Israel Deputy FM: No room for review of Paris Protocol,” last modified 11/9/2012, http://www.maannews.net/eng/ViewDetails.aspx?ID=518826 Accessed 17/07/2014.25 Paris Protocol, Article II.

Although the Paris Protocol is internationally recognized and signed by both parties there is no enforcement mechanism to ensure the obligations of the Protocol are respected. In similar economic agreements enforcement is established by an interdependence of the countries. This allows both nations to provide a mutual economic threat if the other violates. Conversely, in the Israeli-Palestinian agreement there is only a one-sided dependence of the Palestinians. Therefore, although the Protocol provided an outline for economic relations, the lack of enforcement ability suggests that implementation will only occur at Israel’s behest. Thus, Israel can defy the Protocol with little to no repercussions.

Eliyahu Kamisher is a recent graduate of the University of California Santa Barbera. In 2012/13 he studied in Israel and worked as a freelance journalist in Israel and the OPT’s and surrounding countries. He also interned at the Institute for Terrorism Research and Response and the Orfalea Centre for Golbal and International Studies.

In depth

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The Zapatista Movement: The Fight for Indigenous Rights in Mexico

Iker Reyes GodelmannOn 1 January 1994, the Zapatista Army of National Liberation (EZLN), an indigenous armed organisation, declared war on the Mexican Government, demanding “work, land, housing, food, health, education, independence, liberty, democracy, justice and peace.”1 This article explains the factors that encouraged this indigenous uprising that began in Chiapas, Mexico, by highlighting the interests and demands of the indigenous peoples as well as the Mexican Government’s responses to them. It also addresses the limitations that both sides experienced during the struggle, and the consequences and effects this conflict brought to indigenous rights and living standards in Mexico. The EZLN movement was an eye-opening event for both the Mexican government and the non-indigenous population to realise the alarming situation of indigenous people in Chiapas. The indigenous conflict in Chiapas not only provoked a domestic awareness of indigenous rights, recognition and self-determination, but also an international awakening on these issues.

Understanding the Chiapas Indigenous Issue

Mexico has the largest indigenous population in Latin America.2 According to the UN Human Rights Commission, 15 per cent of the total Mexican population identifies as indigenous,3 with the majority living in the southern states. Mexico’s indigenous population accounts for 12.7 million people who speak 62 different languages.4 Among the 31 states that constitute Mexico, together with the Federal District, Chiapas has the most multicultural and multi-ethnic population of the country. According to the Mexican Institute of Statistics and Geographical Information (INEGI) 2010 census, Chiapas has 1.1 million indigenous people, representing 27.2 per cent of the state’s total population. Chiapas is one of the wealthiest states in Mexico in natural resources (with 30 per cent of Mexico’s fresh water supply), yet ranks as the second most marginalised state in the country.5 According to International Service for

1 International Service for Peace [SIPAZ] ( January 2002) Chiapas Peace Process, War Process, http://www.sipaz.org/en/chiapas/peace-process-war-process/334-1994.html,accessed 27 October 2013.2 Chiapas Support Committee (2013) Chiapas Factsheet, http://www.chiapas-support.org/factsheet.htm, accessed 27 October 2013.3 UN Human Rights Commission (2013) Advancing Indigenous Peoples Rights in Mexico, http://www.ohchr.org/en/NewsEvents/Pages//IndigenousPeoplesRightsInMexico.aspx, accessed 27 October 2013.4 World Directory of Minorities and Indigenous Peoples (2013) Indigenous Peoples in Mexico, http://www.minorityrights.org/4456/mexico/indigenous-peoples.html%20world%20dictionary%20of%20minorities%20and%20indigenous%20peoples, accessed 28 October 2013.5 Mexican Institute of Statistics and Geographical Information (INEGI) (2010 census), Mexico in Figures: the State of Chiapas, http://www3.inegi.org.

Peace (SIPAZ), half of Chiapas’ indigenous population “reports no income at all and another 42 per cent make less than US$5 a day.”6 Furthermore, 70 per cent of Chiapas’s indigenous population suffer from high levels of malnutrition. Throughout Mexican history, Chiapas’s indigenous people have been excluded from the governmental decision-making process as well as from enjoying basic human rights and services such as education and healthcare. Consequently, the EZLN was formed, to represent the rights and aspirations of Chiapas’s indigenous peoples. EZLN demanded that the Mexican Government put an end to indigenous segregation and oppression.7 This oppression was exacerbated by the enactment of the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), which was viewed as a threat to indigenous interests. The EZLN considered this as a governmental betrayal by opening opportunities for US and Canadian big agrarian businesses to buy or rent their land.8 Indigenous agricultural workers in Chiapas feared that international competition would wipe them out of the local markets. According to the Mexican Commission for Indigenous Development, 67 per cent of Mexico’s indigenous population work in the agricultural sector.9 The historical marginalisation and abuse of indigenous people in Chiapas together with the NAFTA implementation were the two key factors that sparking the Zapatista uprising.

The EZLN or ‘Zapatistas’ are comprised mainly of Chiapas’s indigenous peoples, together with some non-indigenous political leadership. The Zapatistas recognise themselves as an ‘indigenous peasant movement’ constituted by the diverse indigenous communities of Chiapas. The predominant communities that form the EZLN are the Tzeltal, Tzozil, Chol, Tjolobal, Zoque, Kanjobal and Mame.10 These represent one-quarter of Chiapas’s inhabitants and most of them live in extreme poverty.11 However, other indigenous groups from different states of Mexico have also shown support for the

mx/sistemas/mexicocifras/Default.aspx?i=i&, accessed 28 October 2013.6 Farmer, Leah et al. (2012) “Impunity in Mexico: The Indigenous of Chiapas Suffering at the Hands of their Government” in DePaul Journal for Social Justice, Vol 5, No 2, p. 373. 7 Ibid. p. 374.8 Collins, Stephen (2010) “Indigenous Rights and Internal Wars: The Chiapas Conflict at 15 years” in Social Science Journal, Vol 47, Issue 4, p.777 9 Commission for Indigenous Development [CDI] (2002), Socio-economic Statistics of the Indigenous Communities in Mexico, http://www.cdi.gob.mx/index.php?id_seccion=91, Accessed on 30 October 2013.10 Harvey, Neil (1998) The Chiapas Rebellion. Duke University Press: Durham. p.71

11 Ibid. p. 70.

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movement.12 The main ideological leader of the Zapatista insurgency is Sub-commandant Marcos. He has acted as the spokesperson for the EZLN since the insurgency’s creation. The group is founded on “traditional indigenous forms of organisation and governance.”13

The EZLN and the Mexican Government: Interests and Limitations

The EZLN’s war declaration took place on 1 January 1994, the same day as NAFTA’s implementation. The EZLN started the war by taking over 4 towns of Chiapas, including the touristic town of San Cristobal de las Casas. After 11 days of violence (where more than 300 died), the Mexican Government and the indigenous rebels began negotiations and ceased fire.14 The Zapatista’s interests and limitations were comprised and formally listed in the San Andres Peace Accords, two years after the Zapatista uprising. The Accords declared that the Mexican Government give fair treatment to the indigenous peoples of Chiapas. The Zapatistas interests were completely opposite to those of the Mexican Government regarding NAFTA. According to the New York Times, Sub-commandant Marcos categorised NAFTA as a “death certificate for the Indian peoples in Mexico, who are disposable for the Government of Carlos Salinas de Gortari.”15 The EZLN wanted the Mexican Government to provide a better quality of life for the indigenous peoples of Chiapas by incorporating their political, economical and social rights to the Mexican constitution.16 The San Andres Accords sought constitutional ability for indigenous peoples to exercise the right to self-determination.17 They claimed for autonomy as a “collective right to have diversity respected, control over native territories and recourses with them.”18 The Zapatistas fought for Emiliano Zapata’s ideology during the Mexican Revolution of 1910: “the lands should be owned by those who work on them.”19 Therefore, the interests and limitations of the indigenous peoples of Chiapas, represented in the San Andres Accords, not only regarded cultural autonomy and political participation, but also the recognition of self-determination rights within the Mexican constitution.

On the other hand, the Mexican Government had different interests to those of the Zapatistas. With NAFTA’s implementation, the government was forced

12 Chiapas Support Committee (2013) Chiapas Factsheet, http://www.chiapas-support.org/factsheet.htm, accessed 27 October 2013.13 Ibid.14 Collins, Stephen (2010) “Indigenous Rights and Internal Wars: The Chiapas Conflict at 15 years” in Social Science Journal, Vol 47, Issue 4, p.77315 Golden, Tim, “Mexican Troops Battling Rebels: Toll at Least 57” in The New York Times: New York City. 3 January 1994, p. A9.16 Collins, Stephen (2010) “Indigenous Rights and Internal Wars: The Chiapas Conflict at 15 years” in Social Science Journal, Vol 47, Issue 4, p.77417 Leyva Solano, Xochitil (2005) “Indigenismo, Indianismo, and Ethnic Citizenship in Chiapas” The Journal of Peasant Studies Vol 32, Issue 3-4, p. 556. 18 Chiapas Support Committee (2013) Chiapas Factsheet, http://www.chiapas-support.org/factsheet.htm, accessed 27 October 2013.19 Ibid.

to align the laws regarding agriculture with those of Canada and the US. Mexican interests were in favour of big transitional companies and privatisation. Moreover, the government did not want to give autonomy to the indigenous populations because it feared that by providing them autonomy, the country was going to ‘Balkanise’, or fragment itself. Additionally, the Zapatista insurgency brought social instability to Mexico and a lack of confidence to international investors, provoking a Mexican peso devaluation of 50 per cent.20 The Mexican Government intended to obstruct the EZLN uprising to reestablish foreign investor’s confidence, and stability of the Mexican economy. It sent a high military presence to Chiapas to overcome the EZLN and take back control of the region. Though, the government interests were limited in intimidating and oppressing the EZLN and in not accomplishing their requests. It wasn’t until 2001 that the Mexican Congress passed an indigenous law recognising the multi-cultural nature of the Mexican state, reiterating that “indigenous peoples could practice autonomy as well as self-determination within the framework of a united nation.”21 Consequently, autonomy was granted to indigenous communities, as well as political participation. The EZLN insurgency functioned for indigenous peoples as a catalytic converter of indigenous rights in Mexico and as an effective example for other indigenous communities around the world on how to pursue indigenous interests and how to overcome the limitations of indigenous rights.

Implications and Consequences of the Zapatista Movement

As a consequence of the Zapatista insurgency in Chiapas, the indigenous peoples in Mexico were granted the constitutional right of self-determination, with the exception of not attempting to destroy Mexico’s sovereignty.22 The incorporation of this right into the Mexican constitution was essential for the development of Mexican indigenous communities as well as for the Mexican democracy as a whole, because it encouraged the respect of indigenous traditions and practices within the country.

The Zapatista Movement was a consequential actor of indigenous political participation in Mexico. After 2001, indigenous people were able to “determine freely their political status and consequently to pursue their economic, social and cultural development.”23 Indigenous peoples’ representation in local legislatures was reinforced with this insurgency, while the Mexican

20 United Nations Department of Public Information (December 1997) Indigenous People: Challenges Facing the International Community, http://www.un.org/rights/50/people.htmself, accessed 30 October 2013.21 Leyva Solano, Xochitil (2005) “Indigenismo, Indianismo, and Ethnic Citizenship in Chiapas” The Journal of Peasant Studies Vol 32, Issue 3-4, p. 556.22 Leyva Solano, Xochitil, “Indgenismo, Indianismo, and Ethnic Citizenship in Chiapas” The Journal of Peasant Studies (2005) Vol 32, Issue 3-4, p. 556. 23 United Nations Department of Public Information (December 1997) Indigenous People: Challenges Facing the International Community, http://www.un.org/rights/50/people.htmself, accessed 30 October 2013.

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Government also ensured the legitimacy of cultural ways of indigenous government. 24 The Mexican Government guaranteed indigenous peoples’ right to participate in the policymaking of their communities, and to conserve their languages, as well as their lands.

Another consequence of the Zapatista insurgency was that a new political, economic, social and cultural relationship between the Mexican Government and indigenous peoples was formed.25 One can argue that the Chiapas struggle established opportunities for indigenous peoples to administrate their own territories in relation to their traditional ways of governance.26 For example, before colonisation, the elementary component of the indigenous government in Chiapas was the “calpulli”, better understood as small territories where indigenous peoples cultivated corn crops or “milpas”.27 The “calpiulec” was the authority of the “calpulli” since he was the one that administrated the lands by dictating the rules and conditions to the indigenous families that worked the crops within the lands.28 With the Mexican Congress’ approval of the self-determination right, indigenous peoples maintained their own traditions because they were able to keep in a certain way their “calpulli” lifestyle. The Mexican Congress’s approval of the indigenous law

24 Gaspar, Jonathan & Stephen Lyunn (1999) “Indigenous Rights and Self-Determination in Mexico” in Cultural Survival CSQ Issue 23.1 http://www.culturalsurvival.org/ourpublications/csq/article/indigenous-rights-and-self-determination-mexico, accessed 28 October 2013.25 Ibid.26 Chiapas Support Committee (2013) Chiapas Factsheet, http://www.chiapas-support.org/factsheet.htm, accessed 27 October 2013.27 Farmer, Leah et al. (2012) “Impunity in Mexico: The Indigenous of Chiapas Suffering at the Hands of their Government” in DePaul Journal for Social Justice, Vol 5, No 2, p. 37128 Ibid.

of 2001 was a mainstream event in the history of Mexican indigenous peoples, as it allowed them to preserve their ancient ways of living and their identity.

The Chiapas issue also motivated the creation of the National Commission for the Development of Indigenous Towns (in Spanish, Comision Nacional para el Desarrollo de los Pueblos Indigenas (CDI)). The CDI’s mission is to make public policies to develop and preserve indigenous peoples and communities by guaranteeing “respect for their cultures, enforcement of their rights and the achievement of a full life.”29 This Commission prepares legal opinions in order to support legislative work in regards to indigenous peoples.30 It also has the task to encourage the respect and defense of human rights of the indigenous population. However, according to the World Directory of Minorities and Indigenous People, the actions of this agency have “been criticised for failing to take cases of grievous rights violations, leading many indigenous leaders and rights activists to question its credibility.”31 Moreover, the current status of marginalisation that indigenous peoples experience in Chiapas daily demonstrates the CDI’s failure in providing them satisfactory living standards.

29 Commission for Indigenous Development [CDI] (2002) Mission and Objective of the CDI, http://www.cdi.gob.mx/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=1335&Itemid=200011, accessed 30 October 2013.30 Ibid.31 World Directory of Minorities and Indigenous Peoples (2013) Indigenous Peoples in Mexico, http://www.minorityrights.org/4456/mexico/indigenous-peoples.html%20world%20dictionary%20of%20minorities%20and%20indigenous%20peoples, accessed 28 October 2013.

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Evaluation of the Zapatista Insurgency outcomes

The theoretical progress to advance indigenous rights and living standards by the Mexican Government was a good step for achieving indigenous demands, reflected in the Zapatista revolt. However, in practice one can argue that the EZLN demands to the Mexican government were unsuccessful when examining the current conditions of the indigenous peoples in Chiapas.

Presently, indigenous peoples in Chiapas lack basic services such as education and healthcare. According to the INEGI, almost 20% of Chiapas’s population is illiterate and most of them report having attended school a scarce number of years.32 Moreover, the majority of indigenous peoples in Chiapas don’t have access to quality health services because the state accounts for “less than one doctor per 1000 inhabitants.”33 Chiapas provides more than “half of Mexico’s hydroelectricity”34 and 30 per cent of Mexico’s total water supply, but despite this, 90 per cent of its indigenous communities do not have energy or plumbing in their homes.35 Chiapas’s present-day lack of healthcare and deprived sanitation are evidence of the ineffectiveness of the Zapatistas movement, as well as of the Mexican Government’s actions in response to it.

Alternatively, the Chiapas issue can be examined as a positive approach for indigenous populations. The EZLN created a national and international awareness of the indigenous peoples’ situation in Chiapas. This rebellion generated a general consciousness among Mexico’s entire population in accepting its status as a multicultural and multiethnic nation and in recognising the existence of rich indigenous cultures and traditions within its territory.

Finally, according to Xochitl Leyva, a contributor of The Journal of Peasant Studies, the Chiapas issue generated a united indigenous ideology, which refers to an “internal reaffirmation of cultural self-esteem (pride in existing selfhood).” Arguably, as a consequence of this revolt, indigenous peoples learned that by uniting among themselves and by fighting together common causes, their voice would become stronger within negotiations with the Mexican Government.

Conclusion

The Zapatista rebellion played a significant role in the expansion of indigenous rights and recognition in Mexico. As a consequence of the insurgency, together with its international implications - such as the loss of confidence

32 Mexican Institute of Statistics and Geographical Information (INEGI) (2010 census), Mexico in Figures: the State of Chiapas, http://www3.inegi.org.mx/sistemas/mexicocifras/Default.aspx?i=i&, accessed 28 October 2013.33 Farmer, Leah et al. (2012) “Impunity in Mexico: The Indigenous of Chiapas Suffering at the Hands of their Government” in DePaul Journal for Social Justice, Vol 5, No 2, p. 37334 Ibid. p. 36935 Graham, James (2013) “The Zapatista Mexican Rebellion, its Revolutionary Objectives and Tactics” in HistoryOrb, http://www.historyorb.com/latinamerica/zapatista.php, accessed on 31 October 2013.

of foreign investors - the Mexican Government was obligated to make constitutional reforms that granted indigenous peoples local political autonomy and greater political participation at a national level. Indigenous peoples not only gained from this rebellion the expansion of political rights, but also guaranteed greater preservation of traditions, languages and ways of living.

The Mexican Government has failed to reduce poverty levels and improve the quality of life standards in Chiapas: violence, social inequality and human rights violations to indigenous peoples still remain. However, as a consequence of the Zapatista revolt, the government has made efforts to overcome these problems by creating Federal agencies specialised in indigenous issues. The creation of the CDI can be seen as an example of these efforts. Regardless of the shortcomings of these government agencies, their creation is a big step towards accelerating the development of indigenous communities.

Mexico is a multicultural and multiethnic country. The EZLN movement played a fundamental role in representing the interests of these indigenous peoples by achieving protection of the rich Mexican indigenous heritage within the constitution. The Zapatista struggle was effective as indigenous communities were given greater autonomy, challenging their previous subordinate position as seen by the Mexican Government.

The Zapatistas had a positive impact on the expansion of indigenous rights and recognition in Mexico. It can serve as an example of how indigenous solidarity can put an end to indigenous exclusion and oppression. Although the Mexican Government has been unsuccessful in granting a better quality of life to those indigenous peoples in Chiapas, the EZLN was effective in displaying (nationally and internationally) the alarming situation that indigenous peoples are living in Mexico.

Iker Reyes Godelmann is completing a Master of International Relations at the University of Melbourne.

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The Future of Japan’s Non-Nuclear Weapons StatusWilliam Larn

The debate over Japan’s non-nuclear weapons status is complex and continues to resurface during periods of regional instability. The technological superiority provided by Japan’s civilian nuclear energy programme and its stocks of weapons-grade fissile material mean Japan is capable of producing nuclear weapons. 1 Although realism might suggest Japan will acquire nuclear weapons, it has thus far remained a non-nuclear weapons state. It is the intention of this essay to examine the likely near-future of Japan’s non-nuclear weapons status by assessing three key factors that influence Japan’s policy toward nuclear weapons: its national identity as a peaceful and non-nuclear weapons state, its commitment to the global non-proliferation regime, and its security calculations, focusing on the US-Japan alliance. The aim of this essay is to suggest that through these three factors, Japan will maintain its non-nuclear weapon status in the near-future.

Japan’s national identity as a peaceful and non-nuclear weapons stateJapan’s national identity as a non-nuclear weapons state and the only nation to have suffered the consequences of a nuclear weapons attack has led to its development as a highly pacifist state. In Japan, citizens continue to view activity connected to the military with extreme wariness. Commitment to the idea of a non-nuclear weapons state remains strong, even among the younger generation.2 Public opinion in Japan shows an aversion to nuclearisation3. Polling conducted by the Asahi Shimbun newspaper in 1968, while China was testing nuclear weapons, found that only 21 per cent of the population favoured Japan acquiring nuclear weapons.4 In 1978 and 1981 numbers had fallen to between 15 and 16 per cent and by 1999, a poll taken by the National Institute for Research Advancement found that only 7 per cent of those polled would favour Japan acquiring nuclear weapons.5 These polls indicate a downward trend while Japan moves through periods of greater security. However, the nuclearisation debate resurfaces during periods of regional instability, challenging Japan’s anti-nuclear self-conception. For example, North Korea’s nuclear test in 2006 resulted in a fall in support for Japan remaining a non-nuclear weapons state, with the Yomiuri Shimbun newspaper reporting that 28.6 per cent of people polled agreed that there is sufficient reason to discuss whether

1 Hajime Izumi and Katsuhisa Furukawa, ‘Not Going Nuclear: Japan’s Response to North Korea’s Nuclear Test’, Arms Control Association (2007), accessed April 27, 2014, http://www.armscontrol.org/print/2375 2 Matake Kamiya, ‘Will Japan go nuclear? Myth and reality’, Asia-Pacfici Review, 2:2 (1995): pp. 5-19.3 Llewelyn Hughes, ‘Why Japan Will Not Go Nuclear (Yet): International and Domestic Constraints on the Nuclearization of Japan’, International Secuirty, 31:4 (2007), pp. 67-96 4 Ibid, pp. 895 Ibid.

or not Japan should possess nuclear weapons.6 The aftermath of North Korea’s actions caused conservative political leaders like former Foreign Ministers Nakagawa and Aso to suggest “chipping away at the nuclear taboo and [preparing a] national agenda for a fundamental re-examination of Japan’s security policy that includes consideration of the nuclear option”.7 The polls do not reflect mainstream anti-nuclear sentiment in Japan, but they do suggest that there is a need to discuss the nuclear option. This offers the chance for politicians to use public debate to shift Japan’s national identity. However, this will remain a difficult task, as after North Korea’s satellite launch in April 2009, 19.4 per cent of respondents supported Japan’s nuclearisation, but 72.8 per cent disagreed with it.8 These polls do, however, suggest that North Korea’s belligerent actions could push Japan to adopt a more hard-line defence policy. What remains influential in Japan maintaining a non-nuclear weapons status in the near-future is the almost universal antinuclear sentiment among the Japanese people. 9 This suggests that the engrained national identity of Japan as a non-nuclear weapons state remains influential in maintaining this status.

Commitment to the global non-proliferation regimeJapan maintains a strong public commitment to the global non-proliferation regime and nuclear disarmament in an effort to “realize a peaceful and safe world free of nuclear weapons”.10 Japan remains a committed proponent of the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) and the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT), and continues to be heavily engaged in their proceedings. Japan’s engagement is most evident through its involvement in submitting resolutions to the United Nations General Assembly’s (UNGA) First Committee each year and working papers to the NPT review conferences and preparatory committees on disarmament.11 Its commitment is evident in its opening remarks for the 2010 NPT Review Conference that states, “the threat [of ] nuclear weapons [are] among the most serious challenges that humankind faces… Japan has a moral responsibility to act at the forefront of efforts towards the elimination of nuclear weapons and is firmly

6 The Maureen and Mike Mansfield Foundation, ‘Yomiuri Shimbun Novemeber Opinion Polls,’ The Maureen and Mike Mansfield Foundation (2006), accessed 2April , 2014, http://www.mansfieldfdn.org/backup/polls/2006/poll-06-18.htm 7 Mike, M. Mochizuki, ‘Japan Tests the Nuclear Taboo’, The Nonproliferation Review, 14:2 (2007), pp. 304.8 Reshmi Kazi, ‘Japan’s Nuclear Policy at Crossroads’, Strategic Analysis, 34:3 ( 2010), pp. 4389 Matake Kamiya, ‘Will Japan go nuclear? Myth and reality’, pp. 8-910 Japan Atomic Energy Commission (AEC), Framework for Nuclear Energy Policy (Naka: AEC, 2005), pp. 1411 Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan (MOFA), Facing Nuclear Dangers: An Action Plan For The 21st Century, (Tokyo: MOFA, 1999), accessed April 27, 2014, http://www.mofa.go.jp/policy/un/disarmament/forum/tokyo9907/key.html

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committed to its Three Non-Nuclear Principles”: not possessing nuclear weapons, not producing them and not permitting their entry into the country.12 Moreover, Japan has intentions to “advance its nuclear disarmament diplomacy and further enhance the international regime for nuclear non-proliferation”.13

This is noticeable through the Non-Proliferation and Disarmament Initiative (NPDI) that sets out to encourage greater transparency surrounding nuclear disarmament.14 The NPDI submitted a working paper to the preparatory Committee for the 2015 NPT Review Conference that sets out the framework for NPT signatories to implement, in order to strengthen IAEA safeguards and promote a more effective non-proliferation regime15. Japan maintains a multiple international obligations on this front, so if it seriously considered acquiring nuclear weapons it would have to remove itself from these international institutions; a “withdrawal from the NPT could damage the world’s most durable international non-proliferation regime”.16

Japan has also instituted domestic policy to safeguard its nuclear energy sector. The implementation of the Atomic Energy Basic Law of 1955 stipulates that “the research, development, and utilisation of atomic energy shall be limited to peaceful, purposes, aimed at ensuring safety and performed independently under democratic management, the results therefrom shall be made public to contribute to international cooperation”.17 Japan’s is committed to the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), where its nuclear energy program accounts for 20-30 per cent of IAEA inspections activity.18 The Japanese military identify no value in acquiring nuclear weapons. Even without domestic restraints, military planners do not see a strategic logic in nuclearisation and refrain from implementing policy in the nuclear energy sector to convert any reactors for enrichment purposes.19 Consequently, Japan’s non-nuclear weapons

12 Tetsuro Fukuyama, 2010 Review Conference of the Parties To The Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, (Tokyo: MOFA, 2010), accessed April 27, 2014, http://www.mofa.go.jp/announce/svm/state100504.html; Yoshihiko Noda, Message by Prime Minister of Japan to the Global Zero Summit, (Tokyo: MOFA, 2011), accessed April 27, 2014, http://japan.kantei.go.jp/noda/statement/201110/11message_e.html 13 AEC, Framework for Nuclear Energy Policy, pp. 4314 Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade (DFAT), Non-Proliferation and Disarmament Initiative (NPDI), (Canberra: DFAT), accessed Aril 27, 2014, http://www.dfat.gov.au/security/npdi.html 15 MOFA, Preparatory Committee for the 2015 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, (Tokyo: MOFA, 2012), accessed April 27, 2014, http://www.mofa.go.jp/announce/event/2012/4/pdfs/0427_01_03.pdf; International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), IAEA Safeguards Overview: Comprehensive Safeguards Agreements and Additional Protocols, (Vienna: IAEA), accessed April 27, 2014, http://www.iaea.org/Publications/Factsheets/English/sg_overview.html 16 Emma Chantlett-Avery and Mary Beth Nikitin, Japan’s Nuclear Future: Policy Debate, Prospects, and U.S. Interests, Congressional Research Service, February 19, 2009, pp. 1.17 Government of Japan, Atomic Energy Basic Act (Act No. 186 of 1955), (Tokyo, Government of Japan, 2004), accessed April 27, 2014, http://www.nsr.go.jp/archive/nsc/NSCenglish/documents/laws/1.pdf 18 Mochizuki, ‘Japan Tests the Nuclear Taboo’.19 Hughes, ‘Why Japan Will Not Go Nuclear (Yet): International and Domestic Constraints on the Nuclearization of Japan’.

status will remain influenced by its commitment to the international non-proliferation regime.

Security calculations – the US-Japan allianceWhat elicits greater influence over Japan’s non-nuclear weapons status is the famous Article 9 of the Constitution, which stipulates that “the Japanese people forever renounce war as a sovereign right of the nation and the threat or use of force as a means of settling international disputes”. Consequently, Japan has had to rely on security guarantees from other states, in particular the US. Thus it has been imperative that Japan “make ceaseless efforts to maintain and strengthen the deterrent capabilities of the Japan-US alliance for the peace and security of Japan.”20 US extended nuclear deterrence has played a vital role in influencing Japan’s non-nuclear weapons status, as Japanese nuclear possession would be contrary to US nuclear strategy.21 However, there has been advocacy in Japan to acquire nuclear weapons in order to pursue a foreign and defence policy that is strategically independent of the United States.22 Contrary to this, the bulk of Japanese leadership understands that national security would be poorly served by going nuclear.23 This is evident in the Japanese Defence Agency study conducted in 1995 that concluded a decision to go nuclear would only have a negative impact on Japan’s national security.24

While the US-Japan alliance remains strong, pro-nuclear advocates have suggested that “now that there is no longer any threat of Japan being drawn into the Communist camp, America has scant grounds to endanger itself in order to defend” Japan.25 This sentiment suggests that there is sufficient doubt that the US will defend Japan in an actual security crisis.26 However, this is not reflected on the international stage, as a joint statement issued by the Security Consultative Committee (SCC) reaffirmed the United States’ commitments “to the security of Japan through the full range of US military capabilities, including nuclear and conventional”.27 The SCC strategic vision is to revise the 1997 Guidelines for US-Japan Defense Cooperation through an expansion of the “security and defense cooperation in the Asia-Pacific region and beyond, and

20 Junnosuke Kishida, ‘Japan’s non-nuclear policy,’ Survival: Global Politics and Strategy, 15:1 (1973), pp. 15-20. 21 Sachio Nakato, ‘Japan’s Responses to the North Korean Nuclear Crisis: Responsive Engagement Perspectives,’ The Journal of East Asian Affairs, 27:1 (2013), pp. 47-74.22 Mochizuki, ‘Japan Tests the Nuclear Taboo’.23 Masaru Tomamoto, ‘The Emperor’s New Clothes: Can Japan Live Without the Bomb?’ World Policy Journal, 26:3 (2009), pp. 63-70.24 Masako Toki, ‘Sixty Years After the Nuclear Devastation, Japan’s Role in the NPT,’ Nuclear Threat Initiative (Washington DC: 2005), accessed April 28, 2014, http://www.nti.org/analysis/articles/sixty-years-after-nuclear-devastation-japan/ 25 Mochizuki, ‘Japan Tests the Nuclear Taboo,’ pp. 31326 Kazi, ‘Japan’s Nuclear Policy at Crossroads.’27 Security Consultative Committee, Joint Statement of Japan-U.S. Security Consultative Committee, (Washington D.C: 2013), accessed April 28, 2014, http://translations.state.gov/st/english/texttrans/2013/10/20131003283979.html#axzz2zmWUc7SP

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approving new measures that support the realignment of US forces in Japan.” 28 Moreover, the purpose of realignment is to “ensure that the US presence maintains deterrence and provides for the capabilities to defend Japan and respond to regional contingencies.”29 Following the SCC discussions, Secretary of State John Kerry reaffirmed that “The United States’ and Japan’s relationship has really long been the cornerstone of the regional peace and security of that region… we simply cannot achieve the goals that we want to achieve in that region and globally without ironclad guarantees between the United States and Japan.” Importantly Kerry highlighted that it was necessary “to update bilateral defense guidelines” that had not been altered since 1997 in an effort to bring closer security collaboration that would help the US and Japan to continue countering the threat from North Korea and maintain stability in the Asia-Pacific region.30 Lastly, the Japanese public has been concerned with regional security issues and is apprehensive of being abandoned by the US. This has led to renewed debates for Japan acquiring nuclear weapons, but it is evident that the US has no intention of reneging on its defensive agreements with Japan and as a result will continue to influence in a positive manner Japan’s current and near-future non-nuclear weapons status.

ConclusionIt appears likely that Japan will maintain its non-nuclear weapon status into the near future. Although conflict on the Korean Peninsula keeps Japan on edge, it is evident

28 MOFA, The Guidelines For Japan-U.S. Defense Cooperation, (Tokyo: MOFA, 1997), accessed April 28, 2014, http://www.mofa.go.jp/region/n-america/us/security/guideline2.html 29 Ibid30 U.S. Department of State (USDOS), Remarks With Japanese Foreign Minister Fumio Kishida After Their Meeting, (Washington D.C: USDOS, 2014), accessed April 28, 2014, http://www.state.gov/secretary/remarks/2014/02/221459.htm

that through the combination of Japan’s national identity as a non-nuclear weapons state, its international and domestic commitments to the non-proliferation regime, and the continuing strength of the US-Japan alliance, Japan will maintain its non-nuclear weapons status in the near-future. Polling conducted in Japan since the inception of its non-nuclear policy indicates that there has been a decline in support for nuclearisation, though with periodic increases at times of regional insecurity. Though there remains overwhelming support to maintain Japan’s non-nuclear weapons status, Japan’s citizens feel the need to debate acquiring nuclear weapons. Japan has remained committed to promoting the non-proliferation regime through its membership of the NPT, CTBT and the IAEA, and makes considerable efforts to further the non-proliferation regime through its annual resolutions to the UNGA and working papers to the NPT. In order for Japan to remain a non-nuclear weapons state “the nuclear umbrella has been a necessary condition for Tokyo’s non-nuclear policy”.31 Japan has relied on the strength of the US-Japan alliance to guarantee its security in the Asia-Pacific region. Japan’s national identity as a peaceful and non-nuclear weapons state, its commitment to the global non-proliferation regime and its security calculations suggest that through these three factors, Japan will maintain its non-nuclear weapon status in the near-future.

William Larn is studying a Master of International Relations at the University of Melbourne after obtaining a Bachelor of Arts from Monash.

31 T.V Paul, ‘Aligned Major Economic Powers: Germany and Japan,’ in Power versus Prudence: Why Nations Forgo Nuclear Weapons, ed. T.V Paul (Montreal: McGill-Queen’s University Press, 2000), pp. 37-61.

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The Curious Case of the Six Party TalksRichard Vogt

Nowhere in modern international relations is there a problem quite like North Korea (DPRK), arguably the last relic of the Cold War era. While some see the DPRK as a rogue state, unpredictable and willing to self-destruct rather than engage with the new world order, others have argue that it has reason to be cautious and even paranoid – nestled as it is beside key US allies Japan and South Korea (ROK), at the doorstep of what it considers the communist traitors of Russia and China. Held together by a militant strain of juche,1 a nationalist ideology of self-reliance, the DPRK has turned increasingly to nuclear weapons for its survival in the face of a collapsed second world and an expansive global first world.2

This paper aims to explain the broader motives of those engaged in the six-party talks (6PT). For brevity, minimal attention will be paid to US allies Japan and the ROK. Despite attempting to arrive at a peaceful détente, the parties have been unable to reach a settlement due to their different national objectives and widespread mistrust. While bilateral and trilateral dialogue has achieved some material gains, the brief emergence of multilateral engagement under the aegis of the 6PT in the end proved too global a platform for the DRPK. Having successfully exploited the talks to massage concessions while periodically releasing tension by controlled military action toward the ROK, the 6PT has no relevance in the current climate – an assertive China and Japan, a US in retreat, and a re-

1 Becker, Jasper. 2005, Rogue Regime: Kim Jong Il and the Looming Threat of North Korea. Oxford University Press, New York: specifically at pp.64-84.2 Park, Sang Hoon. 1994, “North Korea and the Challenge to the US-South Korean Alliance”, Survival: Global Politics and Strategy, 36(2): pp.78-91.

engaged Russia. The ROK has been hoping for soft diplomacy ever since the 1998 election of Kim Dae-jung, rather than the default setting of estrangement and aggression – though these tactics are considered unwise by propping up a regime that has for far too long been cheating the expectations of the international community invested in the 6PT.3

Viewed within a broader context that includes the original Armistice, the Cold War, the Agreed Framework (AF) of 1994,4 and the transition between three Kim administrations, there is remarkably little discussion of the fact that the 6PT were bound to break down. The 6PT began in earnest when the DPRK removed itself from the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) in 1993. The self-imposed isolation of North Korea has been puzzled over by scholars since the 1990s. In 2002 it was also declared part of the ‘axis of evil’.5 Such securitised rhetoric did little to enhance understanding of its tactics and willingness to flout international norms. Negotiations have forever been crisis management, viewed by DPRK through the

3 Chung, Jae Ho. 2014, “China’s Evolving Views of the Korean-American Alliance, 1953-2012”, Journal of Contemporary China, 23(87):p.432; Weitz, Richard. 2014, “North Korea: The Problem with Reconciliation Via Engagement”, The Diplomat, 23 January 2014. Available at http://thediplomat.com/2014/01/north-korea-the-problem-with-reconciliation-via-engagement/ accessed 13 May 2014.4 Agreed Framework of 21 October 1994 Between the United States of America and the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea. Available at http://www.iaea.org/Publications/Documents/Infcircs/Others/Infcirc457.pdf accessed 3 April 2014.5 Gilmore, Gerry J. 2005, Bush’s ‘Axis of Evil’ Speech Put Iraq on Notice”, US Department of Defense: News, 18 March 2005. Available at http://www.defense.gov/news/newsarticle.aspx?id=31166 accessed 21 April 2014.

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lens of survival, and for the rest through the lens of security.6 Set alongside vastly different approaches by subsequent Washington administrations, prevaricating between engagement and isolation, it is that talks got so far before Pyongyang walked away in 2009. The 6PT had six rounds of negotiations during 2003-2007, and were effectively considered ‘dead’ in April 2009 when the DPRK was targeted with United Nations sanctions following its first nuclear test.7 To date there have been four separate UN Security Council Resolutions passed in condemnation of DPRK nuclear activity, the latter two supported by both Russia and China.8

What is curious about these talks, as opposed to the original AF, was that they were a multilateral forum that emerged under a Republican government, while the Democratic Clinton administration had some success negotiating bilaterally. The Bush administration had a chaotic approach to foreign policy, concentrating on the Middle East and global terrorism. The DPRK fit this latter agenda inasmuch as it was suspected of being an interstate supplier of nuclear arms and armaments. The only real ‘breakthrough’ during the 6PT was the Joint Statement of the fourth round, which did little other than restate the original AF of eleven years prior, and is sometimes cynically referred to as AF+.9 By relying upon China to host these talks it gave Beijing not only increased leverage but also the chance to dictate the frame of reference, thereby weakening any real chance of international coercion of the DPRK.

In contrast with American foreign policy prevarication and “infighting between hawks and doves”,10 Pyongyang’s behaviour has remained remarkably consistent, at least until Jong-Un. North Korea needs the threat of nuclear capability as a deterrent to gain concessions from the West. This is twofold: to secure both regime survival and to mitigate the US presence below the 38th parallel and in Japan. This is why the 6PT collapsed – the major players had fundamentally different agendas. The US sought to denuclearise Pyongyang, while North Korea wanted to maintain nuclear capability to resist US efforts to overthrow the communist monarchy. Similarly to North Korea, the four other states involved view the talks as regional in nature. The US, geographically isolated from the peninsula, has never really accepted the ‘odd man in’ position it holds and is unwilling to make subsequent concessions. In a sense, Pyongyang has been socialised by the Cold War into believing the nuclear option

6 Horden, Blaine. 2012, Escape From Camp 14. Viking (Penguin), USA: p.17.7 Watts, Jonathan. 2009, “Kim Jong-Il; nuclear talks depend on direct negotiations with US”, The Guardian, 6 October 2009. Available at http://www.theguardian.com/world/2009/oct/06/north-korea-nuclear-talks-offer/ accessed 12 April 2014.8 UNSC Resolutions 1718, 1874, 2087, 2094.9 Joint Statement of the Fourth Round of the Six-Party Talks, Beijing 19 September 2005. Text available at http://www.state.gov/p/eap/regional.c15455.htm accessed 12 April 2014.10 Cumings, Bruce (2004) North Korea: Another Country. Scribe Publications: Victoria Australia p.45.

is both a plausible and acceptable leveraging option. This use of such asymmetrical bargaining has dictated its 6PT tactics, with predictable engagement and withdrawal in order to gain maximum concessions from the US.

Whilst Russia and China have become increasingly vocal in their declining support for North Korea’s actions,11 the US has played a bizarre version of game theory. Classic game theory, as applied during the Cold War, holds that mutual deterrence is the best way to assure both oneself and one’s enemy of relative safety. By possessing similar levels of nuclear strike capability, and therefore a common vulnerability to catastrophic, guaranteed nuclear retaliation, the chance of either side using nuclear weapons is minimised. With nuclear weapons the measure of equality is far less stringent than conventional warfare due to the scale of devastation possible. What the US never fully appreciated was the imbalance in the Korean situation. Having threatened China with nuclear weapons in aide of Taiwan in the 1950s and by furthermore stationing large numbers of troops in South Korea ever since the 1953 Armistice, the US seems unaware of the signal it has been sending Pyongyang. Whilst under the security umbrella of Moscow this signal was minimised, but with the collapse of the USSR, and its inability to assure North Korea of its future, Kim Il-Song’s administration naturally felt exposed to both the Western alliance and its retreating allies in China and Russia. The US had utilised South Korea, as well as Japan, in its containment strategy against both major powers. There is little wonder that the Kim regimes would still believe this to be the case ever since the armistice, which, crucially, is not a peace treaty. It is in this context that Pyongyang sought to acquire nuclear weapons as the only dependable deterrent in its security policy.12 The need for nuclear capability was learned during the Cold War era, and was to be exploited as much for diplomatic leverage as for realistic self-defence. In a sense, the armistice is a legislated version of game theory, and indeed there has never been a normalisation of diplomatic relations between the US and North Korea.

American motives should not be discussed in isolation; indeed, they are visible within the context of other parties involved. Besides the relationship between North Korea and the US, who managed to reach a substantive agreement in 1994, China currently presents the central diplomatic obstacle, even prior to the collapse of talks in 2007. More specifically, the problem has been Beijing’s willingness to prevaricate between self-interest and regional stability.13 China has long seen Pyongyang as

11 Tisdall, Simon (2010) “WikiLeaks cables: How China lost patience with North Korea” in The Guardian, 30 November 2010. Available at http://www.theguardian.com/world/2010/nov/29/north-korea-china-us-buck accessed 15 May 2014.12 Roy, Denny (1996) “North Korea as an Alienated State” in Survival: Global Politics and Strategy, Vol. 38, No. 4, p.22-36.13 Huisken, Ron (2010) “China and the DPRK: With friends like these...” in East Asia Forum, 20 December 2010. Available at http://www.eastasiaforum.

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a buffer against the US presence in North East Asia, most prominently in South Korea and Japan. Taiwan, in this respect, is notably absent ever since Washington adopted the realist policy of abandoning its alliance in favour of formally recognising Beijing in 1972. The 6PT have been used by a rising China as leverage, to pursue stability in the Korean peninsula as much as to project power symbolically and pragmatically amid global negotiations. Secondary to these concerns, there is also the challenge of mass refugee flows into North-Eastern China if the North Korean regime were to collapse.

To single China out for its strategic self-interest, however, is both naive and perilously close to the contemporary Western myopia regarding the rise of China. There has been no shortage of Western newspaper columns attacking China’s implicit support of the Kim regimes. China has demonstrated no desire to accommodate American ambitions of regime change in North Korea. Stability has always been Beijing’s preferred default position during the 6PT, even after Kim Jong-Un’s recent vexatious behaviour. China has been big on multilateral rhetoric of peace and denuclearisation, yet slow to discipline Pyongyang for clear breaches of its commitments. As the main influence and protector of the regime in Pyongyang, China could rightly be seen to possess extra responsibility in needing to coerce and coach its communist ally in the rules of global multilateral diplomacy. It has failed to do this, until the accession of Jong-Un and a series of increasingly defensive activities from Pyongyang, possibly intended to provoke China into a wedge.14 The most charitable assessment of Jong-Un’s tactics is that North Korea is attempting to force Beijing to ultimately side with either Pyongyang or Washington. China in turn is exploiting its own leverage to coerce Pyongyang into refraining from overt aggression, using tangible measures such as sanctions and the withdrawal of bilateral banking transactions following the nuclear test of February 2013.15 There is now sufficient reason to believe Jong-Un lacks the strategic nous of his father and grandfather, who were both willing to play the long game of the 6PT, periodically relinquishing pride for aid, in order to fund the grand strategy of survival.16

In contrast to the predictability of China, Russia – with evolving relational complexity in the region – has created a more dynamic environment under which

org/2010/12/20/china-and-the-dprk-with-friends-like-these/ accessed 12 April 2014.14 Glaser, Bonnie S & Billingsley, Brittany (2012) “Reordering Chinese Priorities on the Korean Peninsula” in Report for the Center for Strategic and International Studies; Freeman Chair in China Studies: p.15. Available at http://csis.org/publication/reordering-chinese-prioirities-korean-peninsula accessed 29 April 2014. 15 Taylor, Brendan (2013) “Does China Still Back North Korea?” in Survival: Global Politics and Strategy, Vol. 55, No. 5, p.85.16 Keck, Zachary (2013) “Kim Jong-Un is No Master Strategist” in The Diplomat, 22 May 2013. Available at http://thediplomat.com/2013/05/kim-jong-un-is-no-master-strategist/ accessed 2 May 2014.

future talks would recommence. Even though Russia and South Korea are attempting to engage Pyongyang through the Rajin-khasan railway and a proposed cross-peninsula pipeline,17 these are ultimately self-interested ventures and have little to do with potential effects on the 6PT. Whilst the European Union was created from such commercial interests, the political atmosphere in North East Asia is significantly different, and a North-Asia version of the European Coal and Steel Community will not lead to peace. Furthermore, considering current US-Russia tensions over Crimea, such successfully negotiated ventures would arguably cause Russia to adopt a stance similar to China’s when the 6PT first emerged in 2003.

The US would be wise to reconvene bilaterally (or even trilaterally under the guidance of either China or the UN), and avoid the particular power dynamics of multilateral bargaining, which complicate the aims of both major parties: stability and survival. The US has arguably lost its chance to denuclearise the peninsula; the next best option is to attempt to placate and socialise Pyongyang into the community of nuclear states, rather than to create a situation in which the regime would be willing to consider aggressive behaviour due to paranoia or imminent threat from the South. North Korean citizens’ growing access to global information is both a blessing and a curse,18 the downside being that such openness is causing the regime to resort to harsher tactics in order to secure its survival. Paradoxically, the effects of globalisation north of the 38th parallel may inhibit a successful nuclear détente by reinforcing the Kim administration’s most paranoid policy settings.

The continuation of Pyongyang’s nuclear strategy remains the trigger of nuclear proliferation on the peninsula, potentially encouraging Japan to seek security outside the US alliance. Preparations for a new, fourth round of North Korean nuclear tests not only exacerbate current diplomatic tension but further strain the rhetoric of unconditionality: Pyongyang is keen to recommence talks with the US, yet Washington refuses to do so without conditions. During the early rounds of the 6PT there was minimal activity at Yongbyon, North Korea’s main nuclear facility. Since Jong-Un’s ascension to power this has been replaced by a willingness to flaunt its nuclear capabilities, and an increase in activity, recently culminating in threats during President Obama’s visit to Seoul. Years of aggressive behaviour, without substantive retaliation, has taught Pyongyang that this behaviour works. Game theory on the peninsula is alive and well. This would be difficult enough if it were just the US and North Korea. However, the multilateral aspect of the

17 CNTV. 2013, “Putin urges unconditional resumption of six-party talks”, 13 November 2013. Available at http://english.cntv.cn/20131113/100632.shtml accessed 30 April 2014.18 Branigan, Tania (2014) “North Korea: the new generation losing faith in the regime” in The Guardian, 22 April 2014. Available at http://www.independent.mk//articles/4131/North+Korea+New+Generation+Loses+Faith+in+Regime accessed 13 April 2014.

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6PT then transforms into a kind of diplomatic prisoners’ dilemma, in which the variable motives of those involved needs to be countenanced and second-guessed by all in order to decide their own strategy. With bilateral negotiation the equation would only amount to North Korea demanding concessions and the US deciding which ones it is willing to concede. With six key regional states involved, the permutations become too difficult to calculate and the talks become less about the original intent of denuclearising Pyongyang and more about regional grievances. This is what the US has never fully appreciated from its hegemonic position. In some senses, Washington still believes it is about global nuclear capabilities and the threat of proliferation to rogue states. While the peninsula is mired in Cold War psychology, the US is captive to a post-9/11 mentality.

No shortage of opinion exists as to what is needed to restart the 6PT. There is, however, a decided lack of critical analysis as to whether such talks are likely to make a significant impact on the denuclearisation of the peninsula. When assessments do appear they are generally accompanied by the assumption that more parties should be involved.19 Considering the above, the chances of the 6PT reconvening in a manner similar to the way in which they were first held are slim. The global context has changed – there have been three different rulers in Pyongyang, the US is about to embark on a new presidential cycle, China and Russia are exerting themselves geopolitically and challenging customary international law, and South Korean nationalism is ascendant. The ongoing deadlock of the 6PT discourse has made it harder for either state to make the first concessions. While Pyongyang seeks re-engagement, and China is equally willing to broker the terms under which this is possible, the US has unequivocally stated that the Kim dynasty’s stalling tactics must end. Having gained interim years in which to further develop and test its nuclear potential, while periodically returning to talks in order to accept aid (further fuelling its power in future negotiations), the current Obama administration has finally drawn a line. In Washington’s eyes, the caveats of the past proffered by Pyongyang are over; only through direct negotiations will there be a chance of progress.

Equally important is the need for both major parties to accept the differing aims of the other. In a world of excess and transparent information, true game theory no longer exists. The Kim regime seems willing to bet that its relative inscrutability will gain it some power in the current military imbalance, though its need to ensure its survival is of equal significance. With a prevaricating China being overplayed in strategic circles – it needs North Korea as a bulwark nearly as much as Pyongyang needs it economically – the status quo will continue for

19 Buszynski, Leszek (2013) “The Six-Party Talks have had their day: time for an expanded dialogue” in East Asia Forum, 9 August 2013. Available at http://www.eastasiaforum.org/2013/08/09/the-six-party-talks-have-had-their-day-time-for-an-expanded-dialogue/ accessed 8 May 2014.

some time yet. Only a major shift in Washington will make change possible, failing an unforeseen collapse in the economic ability of Pyongyang to sustain its population. One cannot feel overly confident that this is likely in the short-term future, and as such, the 6PT are to be seen as an anomaly in US-North Korean relations. The talks should be abandoned altogether in the search for a new context under which to engage the DPRK, a framework which is not compromised by the regional dynamics of China, Russia, Japan and the ROK.

Richard Vogt is a Master of International Relations student at Macquarie University with an interest in Asia and the Pacific.

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Review: Dangerous Allies by Malcolm FraserHeath Pickering

Malcolm Fraser occupies a unique place in Australian politics. A former conservative Prime Minister turned Greens sympathiser. A former Defence Minister during Australia’s involvement in Vietnam and now chief critic of the Australia-US alliance. This transformation is articulated in his new book, Dangerous Allies, where he argues that Australia’s close relationship with the Unites States is highly questionable in the post Cold War era. Contrary to popular belief, Fraser argues that forming alliances with “great and powerful friends” has led to “strategic dependence” and actually puts Australia in a more insecure position. Instead, he advocates for a more independent Australian foreign policy.

The book begins with an historical account of how Australia’s pre-war strategic dependence with Britain was justified. Fraser writes, “When one looks at the Australia of those days, with its small population and lack of industrial resources, the grand bargain suited Australia well”. However, with Australia’s current relative power, the great wars over and the Cold War long gone, Fraser argues now is the opportune moment to follow a more

independent foreign policy path. By remaining in the alliance, Australia gets caught in America’s web of foreign military adventures that have little to do with Australia’s national interests. Instead, the current Asia-Pacific region that Australia once feared is transforming into a mature group of independent nations where peaceful progress can be achieved without American leadership. In any case, Fraser thinks American leadership is questionable. He says America shoulders “much of the blame” for “derailing” the new international order, especially in Iraq and Afghanistan, and seems “to leave behind continuing chaos”. In short, his ultimate policy aim is this: To ensure America cannot force Australia into a war unrelated to our interests.

One of Fraser’s main frustrations is that bipartisan support for the alliance remains virtually unchecked. He lambasts Howard for strengthening ties with Britain and America at the expense of damaging ties with South East Asia and especially Indonesia. He criticises Labor’s decision to base US marines in Darwin as this now makes Australia an even greater target for future hostilities. However, not all politicians receive a scathing. He praises H. V. Evatt for stepping “outside the policy of strategic deterrence” and attempting to advance a more independent Australian foreign policy model through the post war years. Australian politicians like Evatt, Fraser argues, are the exception rather than the norm. It is unlikely that bipartisan support for the alliance will deteriorate any time soon. Both the major parties recognise the value of having a great and powerful friend by their side. At the United States Studies Centre’s Alliance21 conference in June, the Foreign Minister, Julie Bishop and the Shadow Minister, Tanya Plibersek both spoke unwaveringly about how vital the alliance is to Australia’s national interests. For a book centred on “strategic dependence”, there is little discussion on Fraser’s proposed new strategy. Instead, readers will be disappointed to discover that a more independent foreign policy creates many questions that Fraser struggles to answer.

For instance, Fraser claims that in the Post Cold War era, the expansion of alliances makes strategic dependence less desirable. Contrary to Fraser’s core aims, current trends in international relations seem to indicate further alliance building. Sweden and Finland, unnerved by Russia’s action in Ukraine, have recently started to debate entering NATO.1 Likewise Japan and the Philippines

1 ‘Russia Warns Sweden and Finland Against NATO Membership’ on Defense News 12/06/2014 http://www.defensenews.com/article/20140612/

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have looked to secure ties with America over China’s recent actions in the South China and East China seas.2

Furthermore, a more independent Australian foreign policy would require a significant boost to the defence budget, currently around 1.7% of GDP. Fraser predicts that defence expenditure may have to be doubled to “2.5% or 3% of GDP”. While achievable, this would have serious political and economic consequences that are only lightly discussed.

There is also little discussion about the benefits of the alliance. For instance, the status quo gives Australia favourable access to American intelligence networks, advanced military hardware and diplomatic clout on Capitol Hill. Without the alliance or with a more independent foreign policy path, Australia faces being ignored or neglected by the superpower of this era.

Fraser is also critical of the alliance as it requires Australia to commit troops to US-led conflicts relatively unrelated to Australian interests. However, our modern commitments have been modest. Around 2,000 troops

DEFREG01/306120040/Russia-Warns-Sweden-Finland-Against-NATO-Membership Accessed on 12/07/2014.2 Glasser, B. ‘Armed Clash in the South China Sea’ Contingency Planning Memorandum No.14, Council on Foreign Relations, April 2014 http://www.cfr.org/world/armed-clash-south-china-sea/p27883 Accessed on 12/07/2014.

were deployed to Iraq, without a single combat fatality and most were posted to the south of the country and the Persian Gulf itself, both considered relatively safe regions. In Afghanistan, Australia deployed around 1,500 troops and suffered 40 casualties. In contrast, Canada deployed around 2,500 troops and suffered 158 casualties. Australia’s loses were comparatively small, suggesting that the costs associated with our commitments have been in Australia’s favour.

Despite a number of unresolved questions, Fraser’s contribution to the foreign policy debate is significant. His celebrity-like status has provided well needed publicity that other academics can only dream of. Most notably, he has boldly added further discourse to a side of a debate that is seldom given prime coverage.

Heath Pickering is a Master of International Relations graduate from the University of Melbourne. His thesis examined how parliamentary authorisation would affect future Australian Defence Force deployments.

Dangerous Allies is published by Melbourne University Press.

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