Opposition to Affirmative Action: Racial Affect and Traditional Value Predictors Across Four...

Opposition to Affirmative Action: Racial Affect and Traditional Value Predictors Across Four Programs’

GLENN J. NOSWORTHY? JAMES A. LEA, AND R. C. L. LINDSAY Queen ’s University. Kingston, Ontario, Canada

Research on white opinions of such compensatory policies as busing and affirmative action has suggested that prejudice is the primary determinant of policy attitudes (Jacobson, 1985; McConahay, 1982). Often, however, racism is measured in a manner that confounds prejudice with values and concerns about justice. A study was conducted in which undergraduates (N= 185) were told that one of four affirmative-action programs for black students would be implemented at their university either in the following year or in 5 years. We found that: (a) support varied considerably across programs and was greater when implementation was imminent; (b) separate operationalizations of race prejudice and dispositional justice beliefs accounted for equal, and at times greater, variance in affirmative action opinions relative to a measure of symbolic racism; and (c) correlates of policy endorsement, including dispositional justice beliefs but not racial affect, varied from program to program. It is suggested that future research should explicitly distinguish race prejudice from values as predictors. It is also suggested that justice concerns, particularly regarding policy specifics, are important predictors of affirmative action attitudes that to date have largely been overlooked.

There has been much debate as to the motives underlying individuals’ resistance to political measures which would reduce racial inequality. While it appears that explicitly racist attitudes no longer have wide currency in North America (Taylor, Sheatsley, & Greeley, 1978), policies designed to assist members of disadvantaged racial and ethnic groups still face considerable opposition (Jacobson, 1985; Kinder & Sears, 1981; Lipset & Schneider, 1978). It has been argued that resistance to racial policies such as affirmative action and busing reflects a belief among whites that these policies are threatening to their interests. However, a growing body of evidence suggests

’The authors wish to thank the anonymous reviewers for their constructive comments on earlier versions of this report. This research was supported in part by the Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canada. An earlier version of this paper was presented at the 1992 annual meeting of the Canadian Psychological Association, Quebec, Canada.

*Correspondence concerning this article should be addressed to Glenn Nosworthy, Research Branch, Personnel Directorate, RCMP, 250 Tremblay Road, Room 450, Ottawa, Ontario, K I A OR2, Canada, or to James Lea, Department of Psychology, Queen’s University, Kingston. Ontario, K7L 3N6, Canada. e-mail: [email protected].

314

Journal ofApplied Social Psychology, 1995, 25. 4, pp. 314-337. Copyright 0 1995 by V. H. Winston 8 Son, Inc. All rights reserved.

AFFIRMATIVE ACTION 31 5

that this resistance may derive more from negative racial attitudes than from self-interest.

As researchers have examined this issue, there has arisen a distinction between two varieties of racism. “Old-fashioned” racism is characterized by highly negative stereotypes of blacks, endorsement of formal or informal racial segregation, and rejection of the notions of equal opportunity and equal access for all races (McConahay, 1982). Modem or symbolic racism, on the other hand, is considered a more subtle form of racism that is reflected in an individual’s opposition to changes in the racial status quo. As described by Kinder and Sears (1981), symbolic racism is actually an amalgam of two components: anti-black affect (which it has in common with old-fashioned racism), and a strong adherence to traditional American values such as individualism and the work ethic (values which blacks are presumed to lack). Those who make this distinction assert that old-fashioned racism has largely been replaced by the more socially acceptable form of racism, symbolic racism (McConahay, 1982; Sears, 1988).

Researchers have often compared self-interest and racial attitudes as predictors of voting preferences for white or black mayoral candidates (Kinder & Sears, 1981), as well as opposition to racial policies such as busing (Bobo, 1983; McConahay, 1982) and affirmative action (Jacobson, 1985; Kluegel & Smith, 1983). These studies have generally found symbolic racism to be the strongest predictor, followed by old-fashioned racism (where assessed). Mea- sures of self-interest have been only weakly predictive of whites’ attitudes, and often they are not predictive at all. These findings would seem to support the contention that racism (symbolic racism in particular) is the primary determinant of white opposition to racial policies, while self-interest is relatively unimportant (Sears, 1988).

The Components of Symbolic Racism

The symbolic racism construct is intuitively appealing. The notion that white bigots now hide behind whatever norm will ensure that blacks make no gains seems plausible. The research is not without its critics, however (e.g., Sniderman & Tetlock, 1986). One of the most central criticisms is of the construct’s definition. Racial affect and traditional values are deliberately “blended,” and measures typically contain both race- and justice-related content. For example, Kinder and Sears’ (1981) measure of symbolic racism included the following statement: “It is wrong to set up quotas to admit black students to college who don’t meet the usual standards.” Respondents may endorse this statement because they oppose aid to blacks or because they consider the admission of unqualified applicants unfair, regardless of the

316 NOSWORTHY, LEA, AND LINDSAY

applicants’ race. Sears (1 988) notes that respondents often do not believe that symbolic racism items are measuring race prejudice. Given that racial affect and traditional values are “blended,” this finding is problematic. A person might truly be primarily concerned with the upholding of cherished values. If that is the case, is it reasonable to call her a racist when she opposes a government policy that she believes violates those values? Sniderman, Piazza, Tetlock, and Kendrick (1991) have reported that people with traditional values (political conservatives) are, in fact, more likely to support aid for blacks than for equivalent whites. This poses a serious challenge to the contention that people will use traditional values as an excuse for not aiding blacks. In at least some instances, traditional values are related to greater help.

The rhetoric on both sides of the affirmative-action debate is replete with references to the fair treatment of both beneficiaries and nonbeneficiaries. It therefore seems likely that justice beliefs account for some of the resistance to these policies: An individual may oppose an initiative, not because of attitudes toward the beneficiary group, but because the procedures entailed by the reform are considered unfair. It may consequently be fruitful to examine racial affect and justice values separately. That is, rather than only using blended symbolic racism items, it may be informative to employ justice belief items which are free of explicit racial content. This strategy might reveal the degree to which measures of symbolic racism are tapping generic justice concerns, rather than a new form of racism.

Attitudes Toward Affirmative Action

Symbolic racism is not the only significant correlate of attitudes regarding affirmative-action. Kluegel and Smith (1983) found that self-interest was related to affirmative action attitudes. However, negative racial affect, belief that affirmative action constitutes egalitarianism, and denial of racial injustice were stronger predictors. Jacobson (1 985) similarly found that resistance to affirmative action in general could be predicted by self-interest, but that old-fashioned racism and symbolic racism (particularly the latter) were much better predictors. In both studies, though, there were ambiguities about operationalizations.

Though primarily concerned with the issue of how affirmative action is framed (Tversky & Kahneman, 1981) in political rhetoric, Kinder and Sanders (1990) reported a number of antecedents of support for preferential treatment in hiring and college admissions. Interests, prejudice, belief in equal opportunity, rejection of economic individualism, and a belief in limited government were all related to support for preferential treatment, though the nature of the correlation depended on whether affirmative action was framed as unfair

AFFIRMATIVE ACTION 31 7

advantage for blacks or as reverse discrimination. One of the most important findings of this study, with respect to the present issue, was the significant prediction offered by traditional values when separated from prejudice. Also of interest were the comparable magnitudes of self-interest and racial attitude predictors.

The Present Study

Individuals may oppose a specific affirmative-action program for a variety of reasons, including prejudice, self-interest, and norm violation. Our primary interest in the present research is to examine the predictive value of racial attitudes free of justice content and justice attitudes free of racial content. An individual’s particular justice beliefs (i.e., beliefs as to what constitutes a just state of affairs), for example, are likely to determine the degree to which a policy is accepted, as has been suggested in some past research (e.g., Kinder & Sanders, 1990), and as one would expect from the extensive and growing body of literature on the influence of concern for justice on an individual’s attitudes and behaviors (Deutsch, 1985; Lind & Tyler, 1988; Walster, Walster, & Berscheid, 1978).

Predictors of affirmative-action programs may vary substantially with the specifics of a program and the context in which it is presented (Kinder & Sanders, 1990). We investigated attitudes toward four types of affirmative action designed to benefit black students (pilot-testing had indicated that undergraduates considered blacks to be the most unjustly underrepresented group at our university). These programs were: (a) advertising to encourage blacks to apply to the university; (b) special scholarships for black students; (c) reduced grade requirements for the admission and advancement of black students; and (d) unspecified quotas permitting, where necessary, the admission and advancement of underqualified blacks. Justification for the program was manipu- lated by informing half of the respondents that there was strong evidence that blacks still suffer discrimination in the educational system. In addition, we attempted to manipulate the personal threat of a program by varying the imminence of the programs’ introduction. We also measured subjective perceptions of self-interest, group-interest, and fairness.

We made the following predictions: 1. Reactions would differ across programs. Opposition to the programs

would increase in the following order: advertising, scholarships, reduced grade requirements, and quotas. This order would presumably reflect the level of threat and justice violations engendered by each program, quotas perhaps being perceived as the most threatening and least fair, because they ignore qualifications completely.


2. Participants in the high imminence conditions would feel more threat- ened and would therefore express more negative attitudes toward the program than participants in the low imminence conditions.

3. Participants in the high justification condition would express more positive attitudes toward the program than those in the low justification condition.

4. Opposition to each affirmative-action program would be predicted by high scores on measures of racism, proportionality (a concept embracing the notions of individualism and equity; Rasinski, 1987), belief in a just world (Rubin & Peplau, 1975), and anticipated negative impact on self and others. Opposition to the program would also be predicted by low scores on egalitarianism (Rasinski, 1987) and perceptions of fairness.

5 , Affirmative-action opinions would be independently predicted by justice ratings and racial affect.

Method

Subjects

One hundred and ninety-two introductory psychology students volunteered to participate in this study. The responses of seven students were discarded because of excessive missing data, resulting in a sample size of 185. None of the participants identified themselves as black.

Procedure

Data were collected during class time. The experimenter informed the students that he was conducting a survey to assess opinions on minority representation at the university as well as students’ reactions to a program proposed as a means of increasing this representation. After subjects provided estimates of the representation of blacks in the Canadian population, in the university system, and at their university in particular, they read a passage containing the experimental manipulations. They then responded to questions regarding the program and completed a number of manipulation check items. This was followed by justice beliefs and racism scales, and by items requesting basic demographic information.

After all response forms had been collected, the students were fully de- briefed and thanked for their participation.

Experimental manipulations. There were three orthogonal, between-subjects manipulations in this experiment: (a) imminence (high vs. low), an at- tempt to manipulate objective personal threat by indicating that an affinnative- action program would be introduced at the university either in the next

AFFIRMATIVE ACTION 319

academic year or in 5 years; (b) justification for the program (present vs. absent), information suggesting that pervasive discrimination puts blacks at a disadvantage in the educational system; and (c) the type of affirmative action program to be implemented. Four forms of affirmative action were described. In the advertising condition, subjects were informed that the administration would be launching an advertising campaign aimed specifically at encouraging prospective black students to apply for admission to the university. In the funding condition, subjects were informed that the university would earmark a portion of its budget for scholarships to assist black students according to their needs and past academic performance; they were also told that this would entail a diversion of funds away from money earmarked for the general student population. In the grades condition, subjects were informed that admittance and continuation requirements would be relaxed for black students and that this might necessitate stricter requirements for non-black students in certain disci- plines in order to maintain manageable classroom sizes. Finally, subjects in the quota condition were informed that the administration would establish quotas requiring that a certain number of places in each department be set aside for black students, a program which might result in black students being accepted ahead of non-black students with higher grades.

The experimental manipulations therefore constituted a 2 x 2 x 4 factorial design with two levels of imminence, two levels ofjustification, and four types of affirmative action.

Scales. Several measures were used to evaluate possible predictors of attitudes toward affirmative action. All responses were on 5-point Likert type scales. Just world beliefs (people get what they deserve) were assessed using Rubin and Peplau’s (1975) Just World Scale (20 items), while justice ideology (egalitarianism, 6 items, vs. proportionality, 5 items, as norms of distributive justice) was measured via Rasinski’s (1987) scales. Two measures of racism were also included. Although a number of scales purporting to measure symbolic racism are available, McConahay’s (1986) Modem Racism Scale (6 items) was selected because it was not constructed on an ad hoc basis, it has undergone a number of refinements, and it includes no items pertaining to specific social or political programs. Furthermore, it was easily convertible to a format relevant to Canadian respondents.3 Largely owing to ethical consid- erations, we decided not to use established measures of old-fashioned racism, as they tend to include derogatory statements about blacks (pilot-testing indicated that some students were antagonistic to items of this type). Instead, we

3All references to the U.S. and Americans were repladed with “Canada” and “Canadian,” respectively. An item referring to school desegregation was excluded because of its irrelevance to the Canadian context.

320 NOSWORTHY. LEA, AND LINDSAY

designed our own measure of racism consisting of 12 items4 The defining feature of this scale was that the items were all worded in a positive manner so that participants would not be responding to clearly counter-normative questions (i.e., negative statements about blacks). To minimize the possible effect of response sets, the items were interspersed among items from the other scales, including the Modem Racism Scale. This tailor-made scale - reverse-coded for ease of interpretation - will be referred to as the ‘‘ implicit racism scale”. However, the term “implicit racism” is not intended to designate a distinct form of racism.

Dependent measures and additional predictors. Subjects read a description of an affirmative-action program which they then evaluated on the following dimensions (using 7-point Likert-type scales): (a) the program’s necessity; (b) its effectiveness; (c) its overall fairness, as well as its fairness to black students and non-black students; and (d) the degree of adversebeneficial impact on black students, non-black students, and oneself. After rating the program on these dimensions, subjects were then asked to report how strongly they would endorse such a program and to estimate the degree of support it would receive from the student body. Endorsement was the dependent measure of primary interest (i.e., “Would you personally endorse implementation of this policy?,” with endpoints labelled definitely not [ 13 and definitely [7]).

Results

Manipulation Checks

To assess our manipulation of imminence, subjects were asked to recall the year in which the affirmative-action program would be introduced. Overall, 93% of the subjects correctly identified the year, and this percentage did not differ significantly across imminence conditions (92% correct in the low imminence condition; 94% correct in the high imminence condition), x 2 = .12 1, ns.

With respect to the justification manipulation, subjects were asked to indi- cate how strong they believed the evidence to be that blacks are unjustly underrepresented at the university. The justification manipulation did not have a significant effect on responses to this item, F( 1, 169) = 1.10, ns. Given that the subjects as a whole believed the evidence of unjust under-representation to

4The version of the Implicit Racism Scale used in this study included items such as the following, to which participants responded on a 5-point Likert-type scale ranging from strongly disagree (1) to strongly agree (5): “The black community is a vital and enriching part of Canadian society.” “The media tends to portray an unduly negative image of the black community.” “Blacks hold the same values as other Canadians.” “Black children do not have an easy time growing up in Canada.”


Table 1

Mean Ratings of Four Types of Aflrmative Action Programs

Type of program

Ads Funding Grades (n = 48) (n = 47) (n = 46)

Quotas (n = 44)

F

Endorsement

General support Necessity Effectiveness

Impact on non-blacks Impact on blacks Impact on self

Fairness overall Fairness to non-blacks Fairness to blacks

5.56a

4.58a 5.19a 4.54

4.69a 5.77a 5.27a

5.04a 4.69a 5.54a

4.60b 2.28,

4.02a 2.72b 4.06b 2 .85~ 4.40 3.91

4.17a 2.63b 5.38a 4.11b 4.36b 3 . 1 1 ~

4.09b 2.35, 3.36b 1.87, 5.21a 3.72b

3 . 1 8 d

3.32b 3.68bc 4.27

3.1 lb 5.14a 4.301,

3.05, 2.1 1, 4.70a

42.01*

18.84** 18.93** 1.81

23.59** 11.89** 20.48**

40.71** 48.35** 13.20**

-

Note. All responses were made on 7-point scales. Impact refers to the degree of positive impact, with lower scores representing more negative impact. Means with different subscripts differ significantly at p c .01, according to Duncan’s multiple-range test. *p < .05. **p < .01.

be relatively strong (M= 5.12 on a 7-point scale), it may be that the statements regarding racial discrimination simply confirmed the opinions held by most students, rather than altering them.

Experimental Manipulations: Imminence and Type of Program

In initial analyses there were no main nor interaction effects for justification, therefore all data were collapsed across this variable. Responses on the various dependent measures were subjected to 4 x 2 (Program x Imminence) analyses of variance. There were no significant Program x Imminence interac- tions, so these results will not be presented. However, main effects were found for the program and imminence variables.


Table 2

Mean Responses to Affirmative Action Across Levels of Imminence

Imminence

Low High F ( n = 91) (n = 94)

Endorsement

General support Necessity Effectiveness

Impact on non-blacks Impact on blacks Impact on self


3.71

3.58 3.74 4.18

3.52 5.05 4.04

3.43 2.82 4.7 1

4.15

3.77 4.18 4.39

3.82 5.16 4.49

3.87 3.24 4.89

3.93*

1.01 4.24* 1.13

2.69 0.25 5.32*

6.06** 5.69* 0.68

Note. All responses measured on 7-point scales. Impact refers to the degree of positive impact, with lower scores representing more negative impact. *p < .05. **p < .01.

Response means and F ratios for ten evaluative measures across type of affirmative-action program are presented in Table 1 . Program type significantly influenced all of the central ratings, with the exception of perceptions of program effectiveness. It should be noted that an identical pattern of responses was found across all measures: Advertising aimed at prospective black students was responded to most positively on all dimensions, followed by special funding, quotas, then grade-requirement changes. Interestingly, homogeneity of variance tests revealed that variance in perceived impact on oneself (i.e., self-interest) was significantly lower for the relatively mild programs (advertising and scholarships), as compared to the more dramatic prospect of reduced grade requirements or quotas (SD = 1 . 1 1 , 1.29, 1.36, and 1.64 for advertising, funding, quotas, and grades respectively, Cochran’s C = 36, p < .05). Thus, while there was some consensus that the mild programs were not threatening (a weak floor effect), there was less consensus about the impact of the stronger programs.

Tabl

e 3

Inte

rcor

rela

tions

Am

ong

Pred

icto

rs o

f End

orse

men

t

1 2

3 4

5 6

7

Ove

rall

1. S

ymbo

lic ra

cism

2.

Im

plic

it ra

cism

3.

Jus

t wor

ld

4. P

ropo

rtion

ality

5.

Ega

litar

iani

sm

Ads

pro

gram

(n

= 4

8)

6. I

mpa

ct o

n se

lf 7.

Im

pact

on

grou

p 8.

Ove

rall

fairn

ess

Fund

ing

prog

ram

(n =

47)

6.

Im

pact

on

self

7. I

mpa

ct o

n gr

oup

8. O

vera

ll fa

irnes

s G

rade

s pro

gram

(n =

46)

6.

Im

pact

on

self

7. I

mpa

ct o

n gr

oup

8. O

vera

ll fa

irnes

s Q

uota

pro

gram

(n =

44)

6.

Im

pact

on

self

7. I

mpa

ct o

n gr

oup

8. O

vera

ll fa

irnes

s

.73*

**

.29*

**

.41*

**

-.42*

**

.36*

**

.36*

**

-.43 *

* *

.32*

**

-.13*

-.1

9**

.02

.09

-.04

-.I6

-.0

7 -.2

1

.03

.25*

.I

9

-.36*

* -.

I9

-.21

-.I3

-.01

.05

.52*

**

.46*

**

-

.60*

**

-.41*

* -.4

9***

-.3

9**

-.43*

* -.5

1***

-.3

9**

-.26*

-.2

5*

-.22

-.41*

* -,4

7***

-.3

8**

.I4

.24

.20

-

.66*

**

.63*

**

-

.69*

**

-.I9

-.0

6 -.

I6

-.22

-.I0

-.2

8'

-.31*

-.2

6*

-.2 1

-.04

-.2

7*

-.21

.3 1 *

.0

2 .2

5*

-

.73*

**

.72*

**

-

.65*

**

-.29*

.l

l -.0

3

-.38*

* -.

I2

-.33*

-.37*

* -.0

3 -.3

3*

-.30*

-.0

3 -.

I6

.2 1 .oo

.07

-

.30*

.7

0***

-

.43*

*

Not

e. P

artia

l cor

rela

tions

coe

ffic

ient

s, c

ontro

lling

for i

mm

inen

ce, d

id n

ot d

iffer

sign

ifica

ntly

from

the

valu

es p

rese

nted

abo

ve.

*p <

.05.

**p

< .0

1. *

**p <

.001

.


Table 2 depicts response means (and their associated F ratios) on the same set of measures across levels of imminence. Small but significant differences (p < .05) were found with regard to perceived program necessity, fairness to non-black students, overall fairness, impact on self, as well as program endorsement. These differences were, however, in the direction opposite to that predicted: Subjects responded more positively to an affirmative-action program when its implementation was imminent, rather than delayed.

Intercorrelations of Predictors

Intercorrelations among predictor variables are presented in Table 3. As expected, the two measures of racism, the Modern Racism Scale and our own implicit racism scale, were highly correlated ( r = .73,p < .001). These measures also had moderate positive correlations with both proportionality and belief in a just world, as well as negative correlations with egalitarianism. This is consistent with the arguments of symbolic racism researchers that racism is associated with an adherence to values such as individualism and the work ethic (i.e., a politically conservative ethos; cf. Sniderman et al., 1991); however, the data give no indication as to whether modem racism is really an amalgam of justice beliefs and racist attitudes.

Self-interest, group interest, and overall fairness were positively intercorre- lated for all four of the programs (IS ranging from .30 to .73). The relationships of racism and justice values to self-interest, group interest, and subjectively perceived fairness varied considerably across programs. None of these correlations was consistent across programs, suggesting considerable variation in the relation of respondent dispositions to perceptions of the particulars of a program. One striking finding was that respondents with high racism and proportionality scores were particularly likely to see the funding program as having negative consequences and as being less fair, relative to other respondents (rs ranging from -.38 to -.51).

Individual Predictors of Endorsement

Correlations between the predictor variables and program endorsement are presented in Table 4.

Racism. Scores on McConahay’s (1986) Modem Racism Scale (M= 10.3, SD = 3.1, Cronbach’s = .75) showed significant but declining negative correlations with endorsement of the advertising ( r =-.45), funding ( r =-.36), and grades programs ( r =-.26), while for the quotas program the correlation was nonsignificant ( r =-.13). Scores on our implicit racism scale (M = 43.3, SD = 5.9, Cronbach’s = .79) were significantly correlated with endorsement of all


Table 4

Correlations Between Predictors and Affirmative Action Endorsement by Program

Type of program

Ads Funding Grades Quotas ( n = 48) ( n = 47) ( n = 46) (n = 44)

Symbolic racism Implicit racism

Just world Proportionality Egalitarianism

Effectiveness Necessity

Impact on self Impact on non-blacks Impact on blacks


-.45** -.43**

-.04 -.54** .o 1

.37**

.71**

.53** S O * * .25*

.59**

.55**

.28*

-.36** -.35**

-.32* -.39** .23

.33*

.66**

.63**

.66**

.40**

.81**

.69**

.49**

-.26* -.31*

-.38** -.23 .29*

.29*

.61**

.70**

.67**

.36**

.83**

.69**

.55**

-.13 -.41**

-.46** -. 12 .11

.I9

.78**

.7 1 **

.32**

.30*

.85**

.70**

.59**

Note. Partial correlations coefficients, controlling for imminence, did not differ significantly from the values presented above. *p < .05. **p .01.

four affirmative action programs, correlations ranging from -.3 1 to -.43. These results suggest that the endorsement of affirmative action decreases as negative attitudes toward the beneficiary group increase.

Justice belief. Scores on the Just World Scale (Rubin & Peplau, 1975) and the justice ideology scales (Rasinski, 1987) had correlations with affirmative- action endorsement that varied considerably from program to program. Belief in a just world (A4 = 57.8, Cronbach’s a = .68) was negatively correlated with endorsement of all affirmative-action programs, except advertising aimed at blacks; the significant correlation coefficients ranging from -.32 to -.46. Pref- erences for egalitarianism (M = 24.2, Cronbach’s a = .65) only correlated


significantly with endorsement of the altered grade requirement program, r = .29,p < .05. However, tendency to favor proportionality (M= 13.6, Cronbach’s a = .56) was negatively correlated with endorsement of the advertising program ( r = -.54, p < .01) and the financial aid program ( r = -.39, p < .Ol), but was not significantly related to endorsement of the other two programs.

One of the most striking findings is that the magnitudes of correlations of the belief in a just world with endorsement rise as the programs become more “ severe.” Correlations with proportionality follow exactly the opposite pattern.

Subjective interests, fairness, and effectiveness. Anticipation of positive personal consequences (self-interest) correlated positively with the endorsement of all four programs, with correlations ranging from .53 to .71. Ratings of the impact on non-blacks (group-interest) also correlated positively with affirmative action endorsement, with correlation coefficients ranging from .32 to .67. Anticipation of positive consequences for blacks was positively correlated with affirmative-action endorsement, correlation coefficients ranging from .25 to .40.

Rated overall fairness was very highly correlated with the endorsement of all four affirmative-action programs (correlations ranging from .59 to .85). Fairness to non-black students (correlations ranging fiom .55 to .70) and to black students (correlations ranging from .28 to .59) showed similar patterns. The anticipated effectiveness of the proposed program was moderately correlated with endorsement for the advertising, funding, and grade programs (correlations from .29 to .37), but was not significantly related to the endorsement of the quota program.

Owing to item proximity in our questionnaire and possible respondent desire for consistency in self-presentation, some of these correlations may be artificially inflated. These relationships are presented as merely suggestive of what respondents felt concerning the relationships of interests, fairness, effectiveness, and support for each affirmative-action program.

Regression Analyses

A number of correlates of support for each of the affirmative-action programs have been found. The primary concern of this research, though, is the relative impact of different predictors. In particular, we wish to examine the relative impact of the racial affect and justice/values components of symbolic racism. This was tested using multiple regression analyses.

Components of symbolic racism. As previously noted, symbolic racism has been conceived of as an amalgam of anti-black affect and traditional values. If this is the case, then scores on the Modem Racism Scale (McConahay, 1986)


Table 5

Justice Beliefs and Implicit Racism as Predictors of Symbolic Racism

P R2

Implicit racism Justice beliefs

Just world Proportionality Egalitarianism All

.62**

.oo

.16** ..13** .29**

.52**

Total for all variables .55**

Usefulness index increments


.26**

.03**

Note. Entries in the column marked p are standardized regression coefficients for a model including all variables. Entries in the column marked R2 are the adjusted square of the multiple correlation coefficient for either the block or all variables, as indicated. R2 increments are calculated after all other variables have been entered. **p < .01.

should be predictable by measures of justice beliefs and affect toward blacks as measured by our implicit racism scale. As can be seen in Table 5, justice beliefs (proportionality and egalitarianism in particular) and implicit racism do indeed independently predict scores on the Modem Racism Scale. That implicit racism was the best predictor of symbolic racism may be due to the fact that the beliefs we measured are only one element of traditional values, or perhaps that anti- black affect is indeed the central component of symbolic racism.

The usefulness of the symbolic racism construct (at least in this context) may be examined by comparing its value as a predictor of affinnative-action endorsement to that of justice ideology and implicit racism entered as separate predictors. If symbolic racism has predictive value beyond that of justice ideology and implicit racism, then its usefulness is corroborated. As can be seen in Table 6, regression models including separate measures of justice ideology

Tabl

e 6

Sym

bolic

Rac

ism

Ver

sus I

mpl

icit

Rac

ism

and

Jus

tice

Bel

iefs

as P

redi

ctor

s of

Aff

irm

ativ

e A

ctio

n E

ndor

sem

ent

Endo

rsem

ent

Ads

Fu

ndin

g G

rade

s Q

uota

s (n

= 4

8)

(n =

47)

(n

= 4

6)

(n =

44)

P

R2

P R

2 P

R2

P R2

Sym

bolic

raci

sm

Alte

rnat

ive

Impl

icit

raci

sm

Prop

ortio

nalit

y Eg

alita

riani

sm

Just

wor

ld

All

Tota

l for

all

varia

bles

R2

incr

emen

ts

Sym

bolic

raci

sm

Alte

rnat

ive

-.12

.19*

* -.1

3 .1

1*

-.22

-.04

-.41*

* -.2

2 -.0

9 .0

5 .l

l -.1

2 .3

0***

.I

1 .2

9**

.10

-.01

-.o 1

.lo*

-.0

1

.OO

.05

.32

.oo

-.08

-.SO*

-.09

-.05

.2 1

-.01

-.29

-.37*

.1

4*

.22*

* .1

2 .2

5**

Use

fuln

ess

inde

x

-.02

.03

.07

.25*

*

Not

e. E

ntrie

s in

the

col

umn

mar

ked

are

stan

dard

ized

reg

ress

ion

coef

ficie

nts

€or

an e

quat

ion

incl

udin

g al

l of t

he v

aria

bles

. Ent

ries i

n th

e co

lum

n m

arke

d R

2 are

the

adju

sted

squa

re o

f the

mul

tiple

co

rrel

atio

n co

effic

ient

s for

eith

er th

e bl

ock

or al

l var

iabl

es, a

s ind

icat

ed. R

2 in

crem

ents

are

cal

cula

ted

afte

r all

othe

r var

iabl

es h

ave

been

ent

ered

. *p

< .0

5. *

*p <

.01.

***

p <

.001

.


Table 7

Racial Affect Versus Justice Beliefs as Predictors of Affirmative Action Endorsement

Endorsement Ads Funding Grades Quotas

(n = 48) (n = 47) (n = 46) (n = 44) p R2 p R2 p R2 p R2


Proportionality Egalitarianism Just world All

Total for all variabIes

R2 increments Racism Justice

-.30 .17** -.09 .lo* -.08 .07* -.30 .15**

-.44** -.26 -.09 .01 -.09 .09 .2 1 -.03 .I0 -.11 -.28 -.37*

.25** .13* .16* .16*

.30*** . I 1 .14* .22**

Usefulness index

.05 -.02 -.02 .06

.13* .01 .07 .07

Note. Entries in the column marked p are standardized regression coefficients for an equation including all of the variables. Entries in the column marked R2 are the adjusted square of the multiple correlation coefficients for either the block or all variables, as indicated. R2 increments are calculated after all other variables have been entered. *p < .05. **p < .01. ***p < .001.

and implicit racism provide predictiveness equal to that of McConahay’s (1986) Modern Racism Scale for two programs (funding and grades). The separate measures are significantly superior to the Modern Racism Scale for the other two affirmative action programs (ads and quotas).

We thus find that separate operationalizations of racial affect and justice ideology offer equivalent and at times superior prediction of affirmative action support. Still to be addressed is the relative impact of these two components of symbolic racism. We hypothesized that both would independently predict


attitudes toward affirmative action. As can be seen in Table 7, there is very little support for this hypothesis. In hierarchical regressions examining the additional contribution of racial affect or justice beliefs beyond the other component, only for the ads program did using both sets of predictors make a difference. In that case, justice ideology explained a statistically significant 13% of the variance in endorsement beyond that which was explained by racism. For the other three programs, justice ideology did not explain endorsement to a significantly greater extent once racism had been entered into the regression model. In no case did racism explain further variance beyond justice ideology.

Subjective perceptions. We conducted exploratory regression analyses comparing the influence of prejudice, interests, and fairness on support for each of the four affirmative-action programs. Though our interpretation of these analyses is tentative, we believe that they may provide important preliminary information about the reasons for differential support of the four policies we examined. In particular, though the absolute magnitude of interest and fairness effects may be inflated due to item proximity (i.e., there may have been a response bias toward consistency in indicating that a particular program was fair and endorsed), we can still examine the relative impact of predictors on endorsement across the four programs.

For the advertising program, all three variable blocks (prejudice, interests, and fairness) made significant independent contributions to the prediction of endorsement (Table 8). This was the only program to which racial attitudes and, for that matter, self- and group interest, offered significant additional predictiveness over the other variables. For the remaining programs, only perceived fairness made a significant contribution after entry of the other variables. These findings suggest that prejudice is most important with regard to explaining attitudes toward the mildest form of affirmative action and that fairness concerns may be most important for the other three programs.

Discussion

This research has shed light on a number of important matters regarding attitudes toward affirmative-action programs. Most importantly, separate operationalizations of the components of symbolic racism were equal, and sometimes superior, in predictive ability to an established measure of symbolic racism. Furthermore, one of those components, race prejudice, did not add any explained variance once the other component, respondent justice beliefs, was considered as a predictor of policy opinions. Of second greatest importance is the dramatic difference in support for the four types of affirmative action programs examined. Despite equivalent anticipated effectiveness and equiva-


Table 8

Racism, Perceived Impact (Interests), and Perceived Fairness of Affirmative Action Programs as Predictors of Endorsement

Ads (n = 48) P R2

Racism

Interests Implicit racism -.31** .17**

Self-interest .26* Group-interest .16 All .32**

Fairness overall .31* .33**

Total for all .49** variables

R2 increments Racism Interests Fairness

.09**

.07*

.05*

Endorsement Funding Grades Quotas (n = 47) ( n = 46) ( n = 44) P R2 P R2 p R2

.03 .lo* -.lo .07* - . 1 1 .15**

.16 .12 .22

.14 . I8 -.04 .48** .53** .5 1 **

.63** .65** .60** .68** .67** .71** .66** .71** .74**

Usefulness index

-.o 1 . 00 .oo .02 .03 .01 .19** .16** .2 1 **

Note. Entries in the column marked P are standardized regression coefficients for a model including all of the variables listed. Entries in the column marked R2 are the adjusted square of the multiple correlation coefficients for either the block or all variables, as indicated. R2 increments are calculated after all other variables have been entered. *p < .05. **p < .01.

lent correlations with race prejudice, the specifics of the procedure led to responses ranging from substantial support to almost complete opposition.

Program Type

As expected, opinions of the advertising program were relatively positive,


slightly more so than for the funding program. However, contrary to our predictions, subjects objected to the differential-grades program more than to the quota program. It may be that subjects assumed that the quotas would be small or that they would only apply to clearly qualified blacks, thus rendering the quotas less threatening. Alternatively, students may simply reject any tampering with grade-point averages or similar requirements because they are seen as sacrosanct.

The enormous variation in endorsement of the four affirmative-action programs is intriguing in and of itself. Although we suspect this variation is primarily due to differences in the perceived fairness of the procedures as well as the degree to which the affirmative-action programs were seen as threatening to one’s interests, statistical control of these variables (overall fairness, self-interest, and group interest) failed to reduce the program effect to nonsignifi- cance. The variation in endorsement of the affirmative action programs therefore remains a problem for future investigation.

Our subjects perceived that programs would be equally effective, yet supported some of them and opposed others. Rather than anticipated outcomes of the affirmative-action programs, then, it is the implementing procedure that seems influential. This focus on procedure (cf. Kravitz & Platania, 1993; Tyler, Rasinski, & Griffin, 1986) and its potential for the successful implementation of public policies has previously been identified. As Nacoste (1987) notes, “ process-level variables can have powerful effects. In addition, the manipu- lable features of social policies often exist at the process level” (p. 131). If the effectiveness of various programs is in fact equivalent, there may be room at the process level for the development of programs that meet societal goals of distributive equity, without arousing hostility due to threat or norm violation.

Symbolic Racism and Predictors of Endorsement

Our data appear to confirm the notion that symbolic racism reflects both justice beliefs and affect toward blacks (as measured by our implicit racism scaie). However, an explicit combination of justice beliefs and racism was found to be a somewhat better predictor of program endorsement than was symbolic racism. Given that justice variables, in particular, showed different correlational patterns across programs, assessing the two components of symbolic racism (racial affect and traditional values) separately may be a more fruitful strategy in future research. There does not appear to be any advantage to the use of the sometimes confounded items found in symbolic racism scales.

One finding of importance is that the traditional value related to affirmative action opposition varied by program. Belief in proportionality was negatively correlated with support for the ads and funding programs. Those who see


individual merit as the appropriate basis of resource allocation did not like singling out blacks for special treatment. Opposition to the more severe forms of affirmative action (differential grade criteria and quotas) was most strongly related to the belief that the world is a just place where people get what they deserve. This difference strongly suggests that the examination of specific beliefs and norms as predictors of opinions of particular programs is warranted. Traditional values do not always relate to affirmative action opinions in the same manner across programs. To discuss the relation of symbolic racism (with its traditional value component) to policy support may thus be misleading, particularly if the details of the policy are not specified.

A surprising finding was that racial affect and justice beliefs more often than not failed to independently predict support for affirmative action (Table 7). Despite only moderate correlations between racism and justice belief measures, their ability to predict policy attitudes apparently overlapped. It may be that the R2 increments of 5, 6 , and 7% would reach statistical signifi- cance if more respondents were asked about their opinion of the programs in question. Nonetheless, only for the ads program were justice variables independently predictive of endorsement beyond racial attitudes. For other programs, neither the justice nor race attitude variables were predictive beyond the other block.

As well as replicating and extending findings with regard to the influence ofjustice beliefs (egalitarianism, etc.) on affirmative-action attitudes, we found a suggestion that a global assessment of program fairness was highly predictive of policy endorsement. This is consistent with a growing body of literature on the substantial impact of fairness with regard to social attitudes and behaviors (Deutsch, 1985; Lind & Tyler, 1988; Walster et al., 1978). As we we have noted, though, at least some portion of such relationships in our study may be artifactual. The questions were in close proximity in the survey, and some respondents may believe that what is fair and what they support are one and the same. More independent assessments of the presence of justice norms (e.g., experimentally manipulating consistency across persons or the accuracy of information; cf. Leventhal, 1980) might aid in demonstrating the extent to which policy fairness and endorsement are distinct.

Despite these concerns, some conclusions about the relative impact of predictors across programs can be drawn from our usefulness analysis (Table 8). Specifically, it appears that racism was only a useful predictor of endorsement of the mildest and most acceptable program, advertising. This was also the program for which subjective interests and fairness were the least predictive of endorsement. It is unlikely that one could oppose such an innocuous program purely on the grounds of self-interest, nor does the program offer blacks any benefits that could be easily construed as unfair. Nonetheless, individuals with


negative racial attitudes might object to the advertising program because it gives special attention to blacks. Thus, it may be that self-interest and perceived fairness were largely irrelevant in this case and that racism was permitted expression. As the programs become more severe (and less popular), however, even the most racially tolerant individuals may express opposition to them. These programs are both more threatening (because they involve costs for at least some non-blacks) and more likely to be judged unfair (because they give considerable advantage to blacks regardless of their qualifications). This line of reasoning, and our exploratory analyses, suggest that racial attitudes may not be the best predictor of reactions to social reforms which entail obvious costs for non-blacks or which make overt normative violations.

Program Imminence

A final set of results concerns our other significant experimental manipulation. Contrary to our expectations, participants responded more favorably to affirmative-action programs whose introduction was imminent. Although this may seem counterintuitive, there are several possible (albeit, speculative) explanations for this finding. It may be that subjects in the high imminence conditions concluded that the situation must be serious or that the program must have the support of highly credible persons for the university to be acting so quickly. As a result, they may have judged the programs to be more necessary, more fair, and therefore more worthy of their endorsement. That is, imminence may have been a heuristic suggesting necessity.

A somewhat different interpretation is suggested by Jacobson’s ( 1983) social-adjustment model of attitudinal reactions. Jacobson suggests that cognitive dissonance (Festinger, 1957) may arise when one holds negative attitudes toward a social policy whose implementation is unavoidable. In order to reduce this dissonance, individuals may adopt more positive attitudes toward the policy and its beneficiaries, thereby adjusting to the new social reality. Consis- tent with this, a number of studies have found that support for a reform does indeed increase as its implementation becomes inevitable (see Jacobson, 1983, for a review).

A third possibility is that the imminent affirmative-action programs were responded to more favorably because they were of greater personal relevance to the subjects.5 Research on attitude change indicates that information will be processed differently depending on one’s degree of involvement in the situation. High involvement leads to a systematic, concentrated evaluation of the problem at hand whereas low involvement leads to a heuristic assessment of

5The authors are grateful to Dr. Shelley Chaiken for suggesting this interpretation.


the issues through the use of peripheral cues (Chaiken, 1980; Petty 8c Cacioppo, 1986). It is certainly plausible that our respondents were less systematic in their information processing when they did not anticipate being affected by the affirmative-action program (our low-imminence condition). However, this ex- planation, like the others, can only be considered speculative pending further research.

Conclusions

Of the many findings of this study, one of the most important concerns the measurement of symbolic racism. Separate operationalizations of its two components (racial affect and traditional values) led to equal and sometimes a greater variance explained with respect to attitudes toward affirmative action than an established symbolic racism scale. Thus there seems to be little reason to use at least this blended symbolic racism measure. Furthermore, specific traditional values varied in their relationships with the endorsement of different programs. Relationships with racist attitudes did not vary. This also argues for more fine-grained operationalizations of racial affect and justice beliefs, rather than the use of omnibus measures.

A second particularly important finding concerns the dramatic difference in endorsement of the four types of affirmative-action programs examined. These differences exist despite the fact that there is no significant difference in the anticipated effectiveness of the programs. Support for the policies also show unchanging correlations with race prejudice. We suggest that differing levels of program support are primarily due to variations in the anticipated consequences and norm violations of these programs.

Attitudes toward affirmative action have rarely been examined in the context of the psychology of justice. Our findings suggest that such an approach may be an extremely useful complement to its past study in the context of prejudice.

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