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Operation Allied Force: Gratification without Commitment?

Introduction

NATO’s air and missile campaign against Yugoslavian targets in Kosovo between 24 March and

10 June 1999, known as the Operation Allied Force (OAF), represents an unprecedented example

of a military campaign that is conducted almost exclusively through aerial warfare. Although other

offensives, where air forces played the essential role had been executed earlier, OAF can be

considered the first offensive to depend solely on aerial power. It has been claimed that the OAF

“heralded a new era of warfare where precision weapons and airpower alone promise swift and

decisive results” (Crane, p. 211). The dissociated and impersonal nature of air power, which helps

prevent entanglement in high-risk conflicts is described by the somehow unsavory but aptly

explanatory analogy “gratification without commitment” (Byman & Waxman, p. 38).

Considering the unprecedented extent to which the OAF was a result of advanced air strike

capabilities, the OAF serves as a case study that can be compared to its Weberian “ideal type”.

Max Weber defined “ideal type”1 as a deliberately simplified and exaggerated mental construct

against which to measure observable reality. This paper aims at discovering Kosovo War’s place

and in the “airpower debate”, trying to measure it against Giulio Douhet’s “The Command of the

Air”, which will serve for the purposes of this paper as the “ideal type” of airpower operations.

The methodology to be employed in this paper begs for three distinct but interrelated chapters. The

first chapter tries to establish a theoretical framework for the modern warfare, therefore very broad

in its scope. It aims at examining the supposed transformations in warfare, specifically the

humanization and economization of warfare. The second chapter is narrower in scope, focusing

on airpower alone it follows the arguments between the theorists who claim that aerial power is

sufficiently efficacious in resolving conflicts, and those who are more suspicious as to its adequacy.

The so-called “airpower debate” therefore, with its practical and moral implications, will be the

focus of the second chapter. Last, longest and most important chapter will try to assess military

significance of OAF in terms of its strategy, tactics, operational traits, auxiliary or complementary

military possibilities, and its implications following the conflict.

1 Encyclopaedia Britannica Academic Edition. 2013. “ideal type.” Accessed 19 October 2013. http://www.britannica.com/EBchecked/topic/281796/ideal-type

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Changing Structure of War

a. Changing Scale: Humanization, downsizing, economization

The way in which war is waged is a reflection of the social and economic relationships of a specific

period of time. As a consequent, modern warfare as theorized by Clausewitz is a reflection of

modern worldview in general. In this vein, MacIsaac (p. 623) categorizes popular war, and its

inevitable precondition levee-en-masse, a phenomenon of 19th century warfare. Luttwak (p. 113)

agrees, only to condemn modern implementations of what he calls “Napoleonic” or “Clausewitzian”

wars and propose a “post-Clausewitzian” framework for modern warfare (p. 122). As a result of

this thinking, contemporary social and economic relationships require professional armies,

economization and specialization of war. But this fact is hardly enough to call for a “post-

Clausewitzian” theory of war considering the comprehensiveness of the Clausewitzian theory and

its applicability to recent warfare.

Giulio Douhet takes his place amongst the promoters of a new type of warfare. Although less

assertive in directly challenging Clausewitz himself, Douhet is bolder in suggesting that at least

some of the Clausewitzian principles of warfare becoming obsolete. Douhet, who died in 1930,

cannot be blamed for not being able to foresee the limited-scale wars of late. His ideas, as to the

scale of warfare, were still to be tested (and justified) by World War II. Thus, he rightfully posited

that the social structures of the day had to “result in total wars”, where belligerent nations’ “entire

population and resources” are devoted to the war effort (p. 5-6).

On the other hand, recent trends suggest that war is indeed downscaling. Douhet’s insightful

thinking and careful wording as to the relationship between “social structures” and “war effort”

are able to account for this transformation. It is argued that this change of perception, the necessity

of downscaling came with the Cold War (Luttwak, p. 110). The parties of the conflict, in what

Luttwak suggests a “new culture of restraint”, were fully aware of the destructive capabilities, and

therefore extremely reluctant to enter into major wars in fear of escalation to a nuclear war (p. 111).

According to Luttwak, changing wars require changing war theories, and he proposes a post-

Clausewitzian theory, given that less and less people are involving in wars that are smaller and

smaller in size.

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Another reason proposed for the downscaling of war, namely the “humanization” aspect, can be

found in what Pinker adduces to be an overall decline in violence due to what he calls “civilizing

process” (p. 59) and “humanitarian revolution” (p. 129). As a result of this overall transformation

towards pacifism, wars are not what they used to be; civilian casualties, however unintended, are

considered to be terrible tragedies by the public (Pinker, p. 266) and consequently put great

pressure on the antagonists. In fact, contrary to Douhet’s expectations, belligerent parties were

refusing to use chemical weapons as early as World War II (MacIsaac, p. 630).

b. Clausewitz vs. Douhet?

For the purposes of this paper, it is important to shed light on Douhet’s place in the theory of

warfare in general. The fact that Clausewitz’s “On War” remains the most comprehensive and

influential writing on the topic inevitably makes him the benchmark of all studies of war.

Douhet’s objections to the Clausewitzian principles was not aiming at the scale of the future wars,

but in the overall implementation of war. Airpower, Douhet suggested, created a whole “new

battlefield” (p. 3), and he delicately challenged the Clausewitzian view of war suggesting the

“radically different character” of the future wars thanks to the invention of airpower (p. 6). He

claimed that the aerial force is the “offensive weapon par excellence” (p. 15) and due to the fluidity

and ubiquity of air’s nature, airpower “is not adaptable to defense” (p. 17). The climax of the

challenges that Douhet poses to Clausewitzian views was the announcing of the end of the notion

of “defense”, to which Clausewitz had devoted almost a quarter of his massive “On War”, thus

repudiating one of the most important pillars of Clausewitzian theory. Douhet’s contributions to

the theory of warfare, on the other hand, should not necessarily mean that he is “against”

Clausewitz; but rather, he should be regarded as a theorist that is applying Clausewitzian principles

to an unprecedented phenomenon.

Contrary to the claims that World War II proved Douhet wrong (Dudney, p. 64), it seems that the

use of nuclear bomb in 1945 seems to be the ultimate vindication for Douhet. As a matter of fact,

Douhet’s prophecies about the future of air power, such as impossibility of defense against air

strike (p. 15), irrelevance of accuracy (p. 19), second-strike capability (p. 20), indiscriminate nature

of targets (p. 10), and necessity to destroy rivals’ second-strike capabilities in order to “conquer

the command of the air” (p. 19-20), are perfectly and impressively apt in describing nuclear

warfare. Seen under this light, not being able to foresee the invention of radar, long considered as

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a failure on Douhet’s tab, turns into a theoretical advantage since a full-blown nuclear war would

make the usefulness of radars questionable.

Consequently, the framework drawn by Douhet seems much more capable than that of Clausewitz

in explaining nuclear warfare, especially considering that nuclear warfare is essentially aerial in

nature. As a result, Douhet’s definition of air power in its absolute sense, although not confronting

Clausewitz directly, stands to pose some challenges, as explained above. What begs to be answered,

on the other hand, is whether the OAF was “Clausewitzian” or “Douhetian” in character, which

will be addressed in due course.

The “Airpower Debate”

Regardless whether or not air power transformed warfare, there is no doubt that it provided new

strategies and tactics to be employed in warfare. Douhet considers the transformation in warfare a

qualitative one: he does not see the invention of aircrafts merely as a technological improvement,

rather he sees the opportunity that a changing battlefield presents. The three-dimensional, easily

accessible, and freely navigable nature of air, in his view, was bound to change the conventional

warfare as discussed above (Douhet, p. 8). He argues that because airpower made it possible to

control the whole battlefield a fighting party should do his best to deny his rival a place in this

battlefield, which he calls “conquest of the command of the air” (p. 24).

Douhet’s comprehensive analysis with regard to airpower and his conclusion in favor of the use

of airpower led to a debate as to whether aerial power should be independent or auxiliary to ground

and naval operations. By equating “the command of the air” with victory, and by placing airpower

above all other military branches (p. 29), Douhet effectively became responsible for the outbreak

of a war in its own right, a war of ideas, which is known as the “airpower debate”. Douhet further

asserted that airpower’s use as auxiliary to ground and navy operations was “illogical” (p. 4), and

claimed that an air force independent from army and navy is not only possible, but also necessary

(p. 5). For the better part of the century this debate has been ongoing with no winners.

MacIsaac (p. 628) underlines that even in the beginning there were those who, as opposed to

Douhet, regarded aerial warfare as an addition to traditional warfare at best, not a paradigm shift.

It is widely argued by the critics of airpower theory that however important airpower is, it is not

categorically different than any other warfare, and successful coercion depends on many other

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factors, including but not limited to “overall military balance, internal stability, diplomatic support,

etc.” (Byman & Waxman, pp. 6-7; Lambeth, pp. xxi). The “independent air force” of Douhet, on

the other hand, to which he devoted an entire chapter in his book, is an important point in the

“airpower debate”, and is later vindicated to some extent by the establishment of independent air

forces within armies of states. MacIsaac (p. 638) cites the 1943 Field Manual 100-20, Command

and Employment of War Power, where airpower is refused to be defined as an auxiliary to land

power, but as an equal to it.

The following chapter tries to evaluate OAF in terms of the “airpower debate” and aims at

assessing whether it was really the use of airpower, as Stigler proposed, or the presence of other

factors, as Byman & Waxman suggested, that led to the capitulation of Serbs as a result of OAF.

Understanding of this fact will help us understand implications of possible future airpower-

dependent campaigns.

Operation Allied Force

a. Origins and Actors of the War

Although causes of the Kosovo War requires a significant amount of research and writing in itself,

understanding of the path that led to the war is important in evaluating the grand strategy and its

implementation. In February 1998, Yugoslav Federal Army (YFA) attacked the Kosovo Liberation

Army (KLA). Soon turned into an indiscriminate surge of violence, this offensive resulted in the

displacement of 250,000 Kosovars and thousands of civilian casualties, which in turn led to a

NATO decision to intervene (Vennesson, p. 8).

The actors were the NATO alliance with its 19 member-states, the Yugoslavian Federal Army,

and the KLA. For the first time since its creation NATO was engaging in a conflict. The US was

by far the most important provider of NATO. Compared to the world’s largest and strongest

military alliance, the YFA was quite limited in resources and technology. The third element of the

fighting was the KLA, although this latter is unanimously considered to have no effect on the final

outcome of the war (Byman & Waxman, p. 30; Stigler, p. 129).

It has been argued that OAF was an existential point in the history of NATO. The end of the Cold

War, and the demise of the Warsaw Pact seemed to have left NATO an obsolete anachronism.

NATO’s commitment to military success in Kosovo, therefore, is considered not only as an attempt

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to redefine its role in the post-Cold War international system, but also as a litmus test to assess

NATO’s capabilities (Stigler, p. 130).

b. Strategy and Tactics:

Clausewitz defines strategy as “the use of an engagement for the purpose of the war” but he also

underlines the importance of “its chief means of execution, the fighting forces” as a crucial

component of strategy (p. 177). Strategy, therefore, is not only the manner in which the master

plan of the war is to be executed, it comprises also the subjects of such an execution. In this vein,

main strategy of the allied forces was to use airpower2 to coerce the Milosevic regime to give up

once and for all, any organized violence against Kosovar civilian population, and come to terms

with the alliance. On the other hand, in the Clausewitzian sense, the second component of the

strategy was the fighting forces, or the alliance. Maintaining the alliance is, therefore, commonly

considered to be a part of the strategy (Byman & Waxman, p. 31; Vennesson, p.13). When the

necessity to maintain the cohesion of alliance was added to the overall strategy, it became clear

that the alliance’s strategy was composed of irreconcilable factors (Lambeth, p. xxii).

As for the strategic priorities of Serbian forces, the main objective was to survive the attacks for

as long as possible. For Serbians, the war was obviously defensive, and the strategy of this defense

was to disperse to the field and “refuse to fight” (Ribnikar, pp. 126-127; Lambeth, p. xvii).

Dispersion not only of the “fighting forces” in Clauswitzian sense, but also of the resources, was

to provide a certain ambiguity of targets and because of NATO’s reluctance in harming the civilian

population, this strategy worked very well and forced the alliance to change tactics3. Although it

is not possible to know the truth for sure, Milosevic’s aim was believed to survive the bombing as

long as he can, and to hope for a dissolution within the alliance by propagandizing collateral

casualties to the Western public opinion (Byman & Waxman, p. 33). Although widely unheeded

by mainstream academic research, Milosevic might have actually been hoping for a NATO ground

operation. Three reasons come to mind that make this scenario likely: Firstly, unlike the aerial

operation, YFA could have a chance, albeit slim, to counter the NATO power in a ground operation.

Secondly, given that the Yugoslavian forces inflicted zero damage to allied soldiers during the

2 Strategic airpower, in its modern context, should be understood to include all kinds of aircrafts plus

missiles. 3 After the 78 day conflict, only 14 of Serbian tanks were reported to be destroyed despite expectations of as many as 120 (Ribnikar, p. 128).

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whole operation, a ground operation would provide a more suitable opportunity to Serbs to kill

NATO soldiers, which in turn, would initiate the domino effect within the alliance that would lead

to a failure. Thirdly, there is enough reason to believe that Milosevic thought a ground operation

as an action that would sparkle a nationalist resistance, bolstering his legitimacy.

Time was in fact the most important component of both parties’ strategies. NATO was hoping for

a capitulation as early as within the first three days (Lambeth, p. xix), whereas Milosevic seems to

have hoped for an operation just long enough to get western public opinion disillusioned with the

enterprise and break the pact, but short enough to let Serbs retain some of their strategic assets,

including those of “dual nature”, intact. Although Luttwak (p. 116) denounces the necessity of

short-time results to be a “Clausewitzian necessity” of early-modern warfare, there is no question

that our contemporary “social structures” require predictability as much as, if not more than, the

early-modern “social structures”, to borrow from Douhet.

Since maintaining the alliance’s cohesion was a strategic objective, anything that might prejudice

the cohesion should be avoided. Among those things which can endanger the alliance’s unity,

possible alliance casualties came first (Stinger, p. 137). Serbian civilian casualties ranked second

on this list of priorities. On the other hand, these two items were going against each other at every

level. In order to avoid military casualties, NATO flew sorties at higher altitudes (Crane, p. 217;

Byman & Waxman, p. 36). However effective this implementation was on tactical level, there was

a tradeoff: increased Serbian civilian casualties. This is an easy equation: High altitude results in

safer operation, which results in less accurate bombing, which results in greater risk for the civilian

population; a perfect you-can’t-have-it-all situation. It is, therefore, obvious that the two tactics on

NATO’s list were, most of the times, irreconcilable. Indeed, there were moments during the war,

when the alliance found itself in difficult situations: The accidental bombing of Chinese embassy

in Belgrade, for example, was one of the most “awkward” moments of the war (Crane, p. 217).

Ribnikar (p. 125) argues that the reason why the conflict dragged on for 78 days despite the

conspicuous inequality between the belligerents, was the failure of NATO to appreciate the

difference in the significance Serbs attribute to Bosnia and Kosovo, which he claims, came with

complacency. Lambeth (p. xx) emphasizes the importance of Kosovo for Milosevic’s political

career. Complacency, in fact is a dangerous side-effect of airpower. The distance and

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impersonality of killing, as well as the safety of operations, are likely to lead to a low esteem for

the enemy, and a lack of interest in knowing the enemy.

Although the strategy was somehow clearly defined by NATO in the Kosovo conflict, there were

significant discrepancies in tactical level as discussed above. These discrepancies can basically be

reduced to two important disputes: the first dispute was between The Supreme Allied Commander

in Europe, U.S. Army Gen. Wesley Clark, and his air component commander Lieut. Gen. Michael

Short, over the nature of targets. The former wanted to target ground troops in Kosovo (Lambeth,

p. xx), whereas the latter was in favor of targeting the “vital links” (Ribnikar, p. 129), or

“bottleneck targets” (MacIsaac, p. 634). Clark decided to go with his own doctrine early in the

conflict, but towards the end a compromise was reached in. In theory, Short’s tactical choice finds

a wider audience than that of Clark. For instance, Crane (p. 212) agrees with MacIsaac (636) by

illustrating Royal Air Force’s indiscriminate bombing of Germany during World War II being not

only immensely inhumane, but also highly ineffective in breaking the morale of the German

population and turning the population against the Nazi war machine.

Another divergence on tactical level was within the NATO alliance. As will be explored, the most

likely alternative to air war was a ground war, and ground war seems to be one option, on which

the members of the alliance was most unlikely to reach consensus. The alliance was essentially

working on the condition of unanimity, and the fact that all nineteen members of the alliance were

democracies put extra pressure on the governments to be risk-averse, lest they would alienate their

respective public opinions as well as those of other states. The result was a micro-management of

every military move by each member. Furthermore, the possible consequence of any such ground

war is always likely to end up in a comprehensive occupation; the very idea of which was enough

to leave European allies in terror (Stigler, p. 146; Crane, p. 217; Lambeth, p. xviii).

c. Other Options:

An alternate option to air war, and a highly disputed one, was ground war. Although never

executed, to try to understand whether this option was perceived by the Serbian authorities as a

practical alternative to the bombing or scoffed at as a bluff is important in throwing light on the

“airpower dispute” in the Kosovar framework. Stigler, who considers the OAF as a “clear victory

for airpower”, expectedly argues that the ground option was not only applicable (p. 126), but also

had little, if any, influence on Milosevic’s capitulation (p. 125). Before rejecting the feasibility of

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the ground threat, Stigler comprehensively analyzes it. The conclusions he reached are (a) despite

the existence of some vocal supporters, the ground option was never unanimously supported; (b)

nothing indicates that Milosevic did not recognize airpowers as strategic and coercive in nature;

(c) the KLA, who ran a resistance against Serbian ethnic cleansing, were never significant

throughout the war; (d) NATO’s bombing inflicted little damage to Serbian military, too little to

keep them from continuing to fight (p. 127-130). Byman & Waxman agree that NATO’s intentions

of waging a ground war were “uneven and unclear” (p. 26).

Reasoning on the alternative Serbian strategy that we explored under the “Strategy and Tactics”

section, we find that the ground option, which was probably thrown into equation to force expedite

Milosevic’s capitulation counterintuitively might have protracted the war. The center of gravity of

the war for Serbians was the solidity of the alliance (Lambeth, p. xiii), and Milosevic might have

believed that a ground war would mean expansive casualties for NATO and therefore a corrosion

within the alliance, and consequently a strategic gain. In this sense, it is highly possible, but

generally overlooked that Milosevic might not have given in for fear of a ground war, on the

contrary, he might have done so because the ground war was elusive.

What is clear about the alliance’s position about a full-fledged ground war was that the only power

that participated in the OAF vocally opting for a ground option was the United States. Almost all

European countries in the alliance were signaling an aversion to casualties and trying to assuaging

their respective public opinions against such allegations. Stigler (pp. 131-132) insists that even

United States’ position is dubious at best, considering there is no hard evidence as to whether

Clinton administration pressed NATO for a ground strategy.

Talking about a ground strategy might seem to be a good idea, but there are some complicated

implications it might bring along. As we discussed above, OAF was probably considering of a

ground option was to make Milosevic capitulate as early as possible, to avoid a large-scale

destruction. On the other hand, it might have complicating effects. Such a threat, if not thought out

thoroughly may protract the war if the enemy wants a ground operation; it may create questions

about the confidence in the strategy’s credibility, and more importantly, it may engender fault lines

between and amongst the allied countries. More than one of the enumerated complications seem

to have occurred in the execution of the OAF.

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The practicability of the ground option was another concern. Stigler, for one, challenges the

argument that NATO’s ground threat was solid, by presenting that NATO would have needed at

140,000 to 200,000 troops on the ground (p. 142). The deployment of such a large number of

troops would have required a long time; in General Clark’s (p. 285) estimation, this period would

be no less than 60 days for planning and 90 days for deployment. Lambeth (p. xv) seconds that the

ground option could not have had any effect on Milosevic’s decision, because it would have taken

months for the alliance before successfully implementing a ground strategy.

d. Political and Military Objectives and how did Air Strike served these

Before the campaign, President Clinton explained three primary objectives of OAF to the nation

in these words: “to demonstrate the seriousness of NATO’s opposition to aggression, to deter

Milosevic’s continuing and escalating attacks in Kosovo, and to seriously damage the Serb military

capacity to wage war in the future” (Crane, p. 216; Byman & Waxman, p. 15).

There are various explanations, many of them mutually exclusive, as to why Milosevic capitulated

when he did so. The contradictory nature of these explanations, together with the ambiguity of the

answers, do not provide the airpower debate with credible solutions. This section will briefly

analyze (possible) reasons behind Milosevic’s capitulation and (possible) role of the air strike in

serving these military objectives.

Those who advocate airpower’s supremacy, see Milosevic’s decision to capitulate as a result of

extensive bombing. For instance, Stigler (p. 153) categorically rejects the ground option to be a

credible enough threat to convince Milosevic to give in. A second reason presented by airpower

champions is that due to the bombing of “bottleneck” targets there was a growing discontent within

the Serbian population, who suffered extensive economic losses. Third reason that is suggested is

the loss of Russia’s support (Byman & Waxman, pp. 36-37). Russia could have provided the Serbs

with modern radar and missile systems that would have definitely jeopardized NATO’s “command

of the air” (Crane, p. 218). As is clear, all these three explanations derive from Douhet’s argument

that coercive airpower can achieve major political objectives.

On the other hand, some theorists argue that Milosevic’s capitulation cannot be explained by

airpower alone. Byman & Waxman cite other factors they believe were at least as influential (p.

7); Clark (p. 425) claims that the prospect of a ground plan was ultimately what made Milosevic

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capitulate. In our belief, the possibility that Milosevic capitulated because the ground war was

evasive is an equally plausible option.

e. Post-conflict Major Implications

In spite of the fact that it has been perceived as “clean” warfare with limited casualties, airpower

is a primarily destructive force, and consequently there is a negative perception around the world

with regard to air strikes (Crane, p. 214). The OAF has contributed in the international aversion to

death from above. Airpower, strictly influenced by improving technology, is likely to continue to

be the center of the debates on morality and efficiency of the warfare, recently thanks to drone

warfare.

Secondly, and more importantly, owing to the dual nature of the targets, the OAF left a deeply

defunct economy behind. 70 percent of roads and 50 percent of rail bridges across the Danube

were destroyed, oil refinery facilities were completely wrecked, and half of the country’s

communication network was down (Crane, p. 219), yet loss of military personnel and resources

were alarmingly limited (Ribnikar, p. 128). Crane refers to a prediction of the Belgrade Center for

Human Rights which states that the “shattered possibilities of democracy in Serbia” as the most

important negative outcome of this destruction (p. 219).

Lastly, there were implications concerning NATO’s redefinition of its role in post-Cold War

period. Although there were significant weaknesses in NATO’s capabilities, especially in precision,

intelligence gathering and inefficiencies in interoperability (Crane, p. 220), the final outcome of

Milosevic’s capitulation guaranteed NATO a role in the post-Cold War stage.

Conclusion

The OAF is the culmination of the contemporary reduced, economized, and to a certain degree,

humanized warfare. Casualties were limited compared to a full-scale ground war. On the other

hand, the prolongation of war, whatever its causes may be, increased the number of Albanian

civilian casualties at the hands of YFA attacks.

The OAF also proved to be somewhere between Clausewitzian and Douhetian frameworks, but at

the same time, it has shown that there is need for a new theory of warfare. This paper concludes

that Clausewitz, in his grandness, is always able to explain many aspects of warfare, first and

foremost strategy and tactics; on the other hand, especially the notion of “absolute war” (pp. 579-

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581) is somehow obsolete in answering the demands of humanized warfare. As for Douhet, with

his keystone thesis, i.e. “the command of the air”, he showed successfully that victory belongs to

that who commands the air and thus he seems to be vindicated by the OAF. The very fact that all

strategic objectives of NATO has been attained, and that there was virtually no allied casualties

lead to this conclusion. Contrary to many scholars of the war, the conclusion that this paper reached

is that Milosevic did not give in because of the ground threat, but because of the absence of any

such ground threat; and this view concurs the prominence of air power, not only due to its

effectiveness, but also because its humaneness and therefore its ability to respond to today’s needs.

On the other hand, airpower has also proved, in the example of OAF, to be far from a clean and

precise surgical intervention and turned out to be highly destructive. Moreover, this destruction is

not only limited to economic losses, but able to tip the balance in detriment of democratic prospects

in a country. Regardless of whether aerial operations aim directly at civilian populations or aim at

strategic targets of “dual” nature, civilian population seems to get disillusioned by the “democratic”

and “peaceful” rhetoric behind these interventions. There should be, obviously, no compromise to

ethnic cleansing of any sort in the 21st century. However, without a direct involvement with all the

risks entailed, including a ground war, the NATO sent a message not only to Serbians, but also to

Kosovars who were increasingly subjected to Serbian mass killings, that NATO was not so much

interested in ending the mass killings as the victory itself (which is profoundly Clausewitzian and

Douhetian at the same time). Indeed, Serbian attacks on Kosovars escalated during the operation;

a million Kosovars got displaced and thousands got killed.

Therefore, the dilemma of aerial power lies in its success. The alternative to an intensive aerial

strike was the ground option, which, in the opinion of the writer of this paper, did only protract the

war even though aimed at the opposite. Thus, no matter how unprecedentedly efficacious airpower

has proven to be, the question to be answered is to what cost. This is a question of the relationship

between war and politics. Airpower’s blessing, therefore, is at the same time its damnation, as far

as political priorities are considered. Since “the political object comes to the fore again” after the

conflict (Clausewitz, p. 80) and “war is never an isolated act” (Clausewitz, p. 78). Airpower might

boast defying the laws of nature every now and then, but it can hardly challenge the laws of

warfare; that is to say, it is inherently impossible for the airpower to grow more important and

effective than the strategy itself.

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