1

Anastasia Zolotukhina’

On the position of Crito in the Corpus Platonicum

Introduction. In the history of chronological studies of the Corpus Platonicum

Crito has almost always been considered as a sequel1 to the Apology of Socrates2, and,

with rare exceptions, as an early and undoubtedly authentic dialogue3. Nevertheless,

each part of this small dialogue presents difficulties to such an interpretation. In this

contribution I am going to re-examine the position of Crito in the Corpus, i. e. the early

character and the authenticity of the dialogue, using the following criteria: literary and

formal features, contents and characters of the second part of the dialogue with

continuous references to previous dialogues and the specific third part, that probably

reflects the late period of Plato’s Academy.

Composition of Crito.

‘Literary’ introduction. 43а-44b4

1. The speech of Crito: the arguments pro: ‘Socrates should escape’. 44b5-46a8

2. Traditional ‘Socratiс’ dialogue. 46a8-50a5

3. The speech of the Laws: the arguments contra: ‘Socrates should not escape’. 50a6-

54d1

Conclusion 54d2-e2

I. Literary features. Crito seems to depend on other dialogues, reproducing their

literary details in abbreviated form, whereas Plato normally does not repeat himself in

such details. In fact, the literary introduction of Cri. seems to consist of continuous

citations, most of all, from Phaedo:

Cri. 43a1: ἢ οὐ πρῲ ἔτι ἐστίν; – Phd. 59d3-8: ἕωθεν... πρῴ... πρῳαίτερον.

1 As G. Ryle calls it (Ryle, G., 1966, p. 146).

2 See i. e. the recent Dictionnaire des Philosophes Antiques, 2012, Vol. Va, p. 671: «Crito is contemporary with

Apology of Socrates and, as Apology, must have been written just after the death of Socrates». 3 The few exceptions are Th. Gomperz, H. Thesleff, some Italian scholars. For more detail see Montuori M., 1998,

pp. 11-18.

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43a5-6: Θαυμάζω ὅπως ἠθέλησέ σοι ὁ τοῦ δεσμωτηρίου φύλαξ ὑπακοῦσαι. –

Phd. 59e4: ὁ θυρωρός, ὅσπερ εἰώθει ὑπακούειν.

43b7: πρότερον ἐν παντὶ τῷ βίῳ ηὐδαιμόνισα τοῦ τρόπου. Cf. mention of

Socrates’ good temper in Phd.: εὐδαίμων γάρ μοι ἁνὴρ ἐφαίνετο, ὦ Ἐχέκρατες, καὶ

τοῦ τρόπου καὶ τῶν λόγων (58е3-4).

43b8: ἐν τῇ νῦν παρεστώσῃ συμφορᾷ – ibid. 116a5-6: περὶ τῆς συμφορᾶς

διεξιόντες ὅση ἡμῖν γεγονυῖα εἴη.

43b8-9: ὡς ῥᾳδίως αὐτὴν [sc. τὴν συμφοράν] καὶ πρᾴως φέρεις. – ibid. 116d1:

πειρῶ ὡς ῥᾷστα φέρειν τὰ ἀναγκαῖα, ibid. 116c5: πρᾳότατον.

43b10-с1: Καὶ γὰρ ἄν πλημμελὲς εἴη ἀγανακτεῖν τηλικοῦτον ὄντα εἰ δεῖ ἤδη

τελευτᾶν. – The verb ἀγανακτεῖν is used in Phaedo 12 times concerning one who is

near to death (62d4, 62e6, 63b9, 63c5, 64a8, 67e2, 67e9, 68b1, 68b9, 69e1, 115e2, 117d5.).

43c1-3: Καὶ ἄλλοι, ὦ Σώκρατες, τηλικοῦτοι ἐν τοιαύταις συμφοραῖς ἁλίσκονται, ἀλλ'

οὐδὲν αὐτοὺς ἐπιλύεται ἡ ἡλικία τὸ μὴ οὐχὶ ἀγανακτεῖν τῇ παρούσῃ τύχῃ. – Crito

says the same about others who delay their death in Phd. 116е2-3: καὶ ἅμα ἐγὼ οἶδα καὶ

ἄλλους, κτλ.

43с9-d3: τὸ πλοῖον ἀφῖκται ἐκ Δήλου, οὗ... ἀφικομένου... ἐξ ὧν ἀπαγγέλλουσιν, κτλ.

– The history about the ship with an embassy from Delos is in every detail exposed in

Phaedo (58а6-с5; ср. ibid., 59e2: τὸ πλοῖον ἐκ Δήλου ἀφιγμένον... παρηγγείλαμεν,

κτλ.). In the Crito’s version there is a time discrepancy towards Phaedo, noted already by

G. Gomperz4: in the Phd. the disciples come to know about the ship’s arrival in the

evening before the Socrates’ execution, while in the Cri. Crito in the morning announces

that the ship will come during the day, but Socrates concludes from his dream that it

will happen only on the third day. So, the author of the dialogue artificially delays the

ship’s arrival, probably to allow the Phaedo’s events happen or to introduce the theme of

a dream, an almost necessary attribute of the Platonic Socrates. If Cri. precedes Phd. the

motives of such delay become unclear. Besides, a little below Socrates ‘forgets’ his

statement and suddenly agrees with Crito: ἐκτὸς εἶ τοῦ μέλλειν ἀποθνῄσκειν αὔριον

(46e3-a1), confusing the situation even more. 4 See in Montuori M., 1998, pp. xv-xvi.

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44a6: τεκμαίρομαι δὲ ἔκ τινος ἐνυπνίου... – cf. Phd. 60e4-5: in the beginning of the

conversation with his pupils Socrates also tells them about his dream (πολλάκις μοι

φοιτῶν τὸ αὐτὸ ἐνύπνιον...)

44b2: ἤματί κεν τριτάτῳ Φθίην ἐρίβωλον ἵκοιο. – The same verse, Il. 9.363, is

cited in Hipp. Min. 370с3.

44b7-8: ἀλλὰ χωρὶς μὲν τοῦ ἐστερῆσθαι τοιούτου ἐπιτηδείου οἷον ἐγὼ οὐδένα

μή ποτε εὑρήσω... – Phd. 117c9-d1: ... οἵου ἀνδρὸς ἑταίρου ἐστερημένος εἴην.

45а3: ἀλλ' ἐμοὶ πείθου καὶ μὴ ἄλλως ποίει. (also 46а8: ὦ Σώκρατες, πείθου μοι

καὶ μηδαμῶς ἄλλως ποίει). – Phd. 117а3: ἀλλ' ἴθι, ἔφη, πείθου καὶ μὴ ἄλλως ποίει.

Such a quantity of parallels shows the imitative character of Cri., its literary style

is poor and undeveloped in comparison with Phd., a literary masterpiece. The

unoriginality of Cri. can also be demonstrated by some other details taken from other

dialogues, for instance:

43a1: Τί τηνικάδε ἀφῖξαι, ὦ Κρίτων; - Prot. 310b6-7: ἔστι δὲ τί, καὶ τοῦ ἕνεκα

τηνικάδε ἀφίκου;

43a4: Ὄρθρος βαθύς. – Prot. 310a8: Τῆς γὰρ παρελθούσης νυκτὸς ταυτησί, ἔτι

βαθέος ὄρθρου.

43а10: Ἐπιεικῶς πάλαι. Cf. the beginning of Tht.: ΕΥ. Ἄρτι, ὦ Τερψίων, ἢ πάλαι

ἐξ ἀγροῦ; ΤΕΡ. Ἐπιεικῶς πάλαι (142а1-2).

So, as has been shown, Cri. reproduces many narrative details of the other

dialogues and seems to be posterior to them. But such dialogues as Phd. and Prot. are

written in the reported form and have a literary frame, whereas Cri. formally is a direct

dramatic dialogue with only two characters (a rare thing for Plato). The question is why

the author of Cri. does not adopt also the form of the other dialogues along with their

plots (in theory we can easily imagine Crito relating his conversation with Socrates to a

third person). According to our model, the literary form in the Corpus is not casual, it is

important for Plato and it must be considered. For example, the group of the Republic

can be separated out due to the form of the dialogues: all these dialogues are reported.

Then the form changes and Plato marks the change of literary form from reported to

direct in Theaetetus 143b5-c5. It is more likely that such a dialogue as Cri. appears after

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Theaetetus, and not only from the formal point of view. Theaetetus also launches a new

interest in the theme of the last days of Socrates, previously developed in such

dialogues as Apology and Phaedo. From this point of view the later dating of Cri. vs. the

Apology will not seem inappropriate. The use of earlier details and themes provokes the

use of some typical issues of earlier dialogues, as will be seen later, and is illustrated by

the reanimation of some old personages, such as Protagoras in the Theaetetus.

The image of Socrates. Is the “old” Socrates of Apology also revived in Cri.? Or, in

other words, is the Socrates of Apology the same as the Socrates of Cri.? This question

always goes along with the problem of the chronology of Ap. and Cri. and many

scholars have noted the difference between the two protagonists of these dialogues. The

main point of discrepancy is the speech of the Laws in Cri. and Socrates who obeys and

serves them as the greatest authorities. It badly fits the character of Socrates from Ap.,

for whom the uppermost value in his life is his service of God (τοῦ θεοῦ λατρεία – 23с).

Main points of discrepancy between the two images of Socrates:

1) the main authority: the service of God (Ap.), the service of the Laws (Cri.).

2) the main force: the individual (Ap.), the impersonal (Laws) (Cri.).

3) the main interest: the one (Ap.), the many (Cri.).

In more detail: 1) It is enough to give two citations: ἀναγκαῖον... τὸ τοῦ θεοῦ περὶ

πλείστου ποιεῖσθαι (I thought I must consider the god’s business of the highest importance –

hereinafter transl. by W. R. M. Lamb) (Ap. 21е) vs ἡμέτερος (of the Laws) ἦσθα καὶ

ἔκγονος καὶ δοῦλος (Cri.50e) … ἁπάντων τιμιώτερόν ἐστιν πατρὶς καὶ σεμνότερον

καὶ ἁγιώτερον καὶ ἐν μείζονι μοίρᾳ καὶ παρὰ θεοῖς καὶ παρ' ἀνθρώποις (your country

is more precious and more to be revered and is holier and in higher esteem among the gods and

among men – hereinafter transl. by H. N. Fowler) (Cri. 51a-b).

2) At the top of the hierarchy of Ap. stands God, and then follows man. At the

top of Cri.’s hierarchy stands the impersonal Just, that is, the Laws. They are personified

just because the real persons in Cri. lose their significance. In Ap. either the man himself

organizes his life, or there are the archons (other humans) or the God (in any case, an

individual principle) to do it (it is the case of Socrates) (28e). In Cri. all human life is

determined by Laws and Fatherland: e. g. they send men to war, and since everyone

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must obey their will, it is prohibited to desert (51b7-c1), whereas Socrates from Ap. does

not do so because of the order of the ἄρχοντες (58е1-4). Another example: in Ap. the

citizen must teach and persuade (διδάσκειν καὶ πείθειν) the judges (according to one of

the citizens, Socrates - 35c), and in Cri. the Laws permit the citizens either to persuade

them if they are not right, or to do what they say (52a2-3). The same thing concerns

education: in Ap. Socrates is interested in the person who by his knowledge of laws can

make young people better (24d-е) and in Cri. the Laws themselves give to the youth the

best education (50d).

3) The third point, which is rather similar to the second one, concerns the one

and the many in different aspects. For example, in Cri. the Laws are almost always

mentioned in the plural (except 50b7), whereas Socrates of Ap. usually speaks about one

specified law of Athens: this observation makes the similarity of Socrates’ attitude

towards laws in both dialogues irrelevant: cf. in Ap. 19a Socrates maintains that he must

obey the law (τῷ δὲ νόμῳ πειστέον), but in this very case he means one specific

Athenian law according to which it is necessary to defend oneself with an apology

(ἀπολογητέον); whereas the Laws in Cri. are not the laws of Athens, as it was

demonstrated by M. Montuori in op. cit. pp. 45-47. Concerning all Plato’s dialogues, one

may admit that the Laws of Cri. are the closest to the Laws of Lgg., as will be shown

below.

II. References to former arguments. Cri. is likely to be late also from another

point of view. The characteristic and unique feature of Cri. is the recurrent use of

references to former speeches. They are rather many (13) and usually look like this:

Socrates speaking to Crito refers to the arguments which were discussed earlier,

without any explanation and presupposing that Crito remembers it. This is unusual for

Plato: in some dialogues we can find allusions to something said before, but always

within one dialogue and often with an explanation to avoid any incomprehension. For

example, in Ap. 28а4-5: ὃ δὲ καὶ ἐν τοῖς ἔμπροσθεν ἔλεγον means 18b, i. e. the former

accusers of Socrates. Or, in Prot. 353b3-5, after mentioning the former argument,

Socrates immediately reminds his interlocutor of it: εἰ οὖν σοι δοκεῖ ἐμμένειν οἷς ἄρτι

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ἔδοξεν ἡμῖν, [that is,] ἐμὲ ἡγήσασθαι ᾗ οἶμαι ἂν ἔγωγε κάλλιστα φανερὸν γενέσθαι,

ἕπου. See also Resp. 504a4-b4 (“You remember, I presume,” said I, “that... Do you also

remember what was said before this?” “What?” “We were saying, I believe, that.. – hereinafter

transl. by P. Shorey). This never happens in Cri., on the contrary, every mention of

former arguments is given as something known and self-evident. But if we do not

consider Cri. as an early text, the situation changes. Some of the references can be

understood properly only on the basis of certain texts, definitely not of the first

academic period (see below). The addresses of these references testify the connection of

the dialogue with the tradition of discussion in Plato’s School. Here are some examples

of these references with probable addresses.

1. 46c8-d2: πότερον καλῶς ἐλέγετο ἑκάστοτε ἢ οὔ, ὅτι ταῖς μὲν δεῖ τῶν δοξῶν

προσέχειν τὸν νοῦν, ταῖς δὲ οὔ; (whether we were right when we always used to

say that we ought to pay attention to some opinions and not to others?) ... 47a10-11:

Χρησταὶ δὲ οὐχ αἱ τῶν φρονίμων, πονηραὶ δὲ αἱ τῶν ἀφρόνων; (And the good

ones are those of the wise and the bad ones those of the foolish?) The word ἑκάστοτε

probably marks the former tradition of discussion of the topic. As with other

issues in this part of Cri., this one is not original. See for example the discussion

on this point (true and false opinions) in Tht. 179с: ... not every opinion [δόξαν]

of every person is true (hereinafter transl. by H. N. Fowler), 170b: Οὐκοῦν τὴν

μὲν σοφίαν ἀληθῆ διάνοιαν ἡγοῦνται, τὴν δὲ ἀμαθίαν ψευδῆ δόξαν;

(wisdom is true thinking and ignorance is false opinion) etc. Almost the same in

Min. 314e: – ΣΩ. Τί οὖν; οὐκ ἔστιν τὰ μὲν χρηστὰ δόγματα, τὰ δὲ πονηρά;

(are not some resolutions good, and others evil? – hereinafter transl. by W. R. M.

Lamb) and 314e: Δόξα δὲ χρηστὴ τίς ἐστιν; οὐχ ἡ ἀληθής; (But what is good

opinion? Is it not true opinion?) and Alc. I 125a: Socrates: Do you mean by

“gentlemen” the intelligent or the unintelligent? (τοὺς φρονίμους ἢ τοὺς

ἄφρονας;) – Alcibiades. The intelligent. – Socrates. And everyone is good in

that wherein he is intelligent? - Alcibiades. Yes. – Socrates. And bad

(πονηρός) wherein he is unintelligent? – Alcibiades. Of course (hereinafter

transl. by W. R. M. Lamb).

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2. 47a13-b3: πῶς αὖ τὰ τοιαῦτα ἐλέγετο; γυμναζόμενος ἀνὴρ καὶ τοῦτο

πράττων πότερον παντὸς ἀνδρὸς ἐπαίνῳ καὶ ψόγῳ καὶ δόξῃ τὸν νοῦν

προσέχει, ἢ ἑνὸς μόνου ἐκείνου ὃς ἂν τυγχάνῃ ἰατρὸς ἢ παιδοτρίβης ὤν;

(Come then, what used we to say about this? If a man is an athlete and makes that his

business, does he pay attention to every man’s praise and blame and opinion or to those

of one man only who is a physician or a trainer?) Similar examples that

demonstrate the superiority of the specialist’s opinion are used in other

dialogues, so Socrates just reminds Crito about something already known: πῶς

αὖ τὰ τοιαῦτα ἐλέγετο;, and Crito immediately blurts out an answer: Ἑνὸς

μόνου. Cf. Lach. 184d-e: in some matters one should better believe a

gymnastics teacher than an opinion of the many; Alc. I 107b: For on each subject

the advice comes from one who knows, not one who has riches. 107c – the doctor,

107е – the gymnastics teacher. See also Min. 316c-e (the medical art) and 317e-

318a (gymnastics). See also the same examples in the Laws, illustrating two

methods of legislation: Lgg. 720a-e. The division of the methods of body cure to

medicine and gymnastics is found for the first time in the Gorgias (464b).

3. 48b5-6: σκόπει εἰ ἔτι μένει ἡμῖν ἢ οὔ, ὅτι οὐ τὸ ζῆν περὶ πλείστου ποιητέον

ἀλλὰ τὸ εὖ ζῆν (and now see whether we still hold to this, or not, that it is not living,

but living well which we ought to consider most important). The commentators (e. g.

Adam et al.) usually point out the passages from Ap. 28b (one must not

consider danger more than the virtuous life and always be sure of acting justly

- δίκαια) and Gorg. 512e (one should care not about living a long life – which

depends only on God – but about living ὡς ἄριστα). Unexpectedly the most

similar passage is found in Aristotle, at least from the lexical point of view: he

often uses the expression itself, τὸ εὖ ζῆν. See e. g. Topics 118a7: βέλτιον γὰρ

τοῦ ζῆν τὸ εὖ ζῆν, but also in Politics (1258a1, 1280b39: τέλος μὲν οὖν πόλεως

τὸ εὖ ζῆν, 1326b9) and in all ethical works (e. g. Eth. Eud. 1214a15, Eth. Nic.

1098b21 et al.). Such parallels with Aristotle can be interpreted as follows: both

Aristotle and the author of Cri. reflect school disputations on this topic (i. e.

they correspond to the situation in the Academy and not to each other).

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4. 48b8-9: Τὸ δὲ εὖ καὶ καλῶς καὶ δικαίως ὅτι ταὐτόν ἐστιν, μένει ἢ οὐ μένει;

(And that living well and living rightly are the same thing, do we hold to that, or not?)

Cf. Alc. I 115a9-10: Socrates. Well, are all just (τὰ δίκαια) things noble (καλά)?

Alcibiades. Yes. … 116a10-11: Socrates. And again, are they noble inasmuch as

they are good, and base inasmuch as they are evil? (Οὐδὲν ἄρα τῶν καλῶν, καθ'

ὅσον καλόν, κακόν, οὐδὲ τῶν αἰσχρῶν, καθ' ὅσον αἰσχρόν, ἀγαθόν). …

116c1-3: Socrates. Hence we have seen again that noble and good (καλόν τε καὶ

ἀγαθόν) are the same thing. Alcibiades. Apparently. See also Lgg. 859d3-5:

Concerning justice (δικαιοσύνη) in general, and men, things, or actions that are just,

we all agree that these are all beautiful (καλά) (hereinafter transl. by R. G. Bury).

5. 49a5-7: ἢ οὐδαμῶς τό γε ἀδικεῖν οὔτε ἀγαθὸν οὔτε καλόν, ὡς πολλάκις ἡμῖν

καὶ ἐν τῷ ἔμπροσθεν χρόνῳ ὡμολογήθη; (Or, as we often agreed in former

times, is it never right or honourable to do wrong?) An evident reference to the

Gorgias, e. g. 469b8-9: to do wrong is the greatest of evils (Οὕτως, ὡς μέγιστον

τῶν κακῶν τυγχάνει ὂν τὸ ἀδικεῖν).

These cases along with other references are almost all concentrated in the part of

Cri. which imitates the Socratic Dialogue (see the Appendix below). It is the most

‘traditional’ part of the dialogue, as it marks the connection with the school tradition

with formal, linguistic and conceptual means.

Some crucial issues such as οἱ πολλοί and unreliability of the opinion of the

many also presuppose acquaintance with the discussion of some topics in the Academy.

The statement about the opinion of the many can be found also in other dialogues: cf.

Alc. I 110d-e: Alcibiades. I learnt it, I suppose, in the same way as everyone else.

Socrates. ...From whom? Please tell me. Alcibiades. From the many. Socrates. They are no

very serious teachers with whom you take refuge, if you ascribe it to the many! Alcibiades.

Why, are they not competent to teach? Socrates. Not how to play, or not to play, draughts; and

yet that, I imagine, is a slight matter compared with justice. Besides, the use of the opinion of

the many as an argument in Cri. is almost identical to that in Prot. 353a sqq.; the only

difference is that here it is Socrates who uses this argument: For perhaps if we said to them:

What you assert, good people, is not correct, but quite untrue – they might ask us [ἔροιντ’ἂν

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ἡμᾶς]... (353a2-4), and it is Protagoras who disagrees with him, doubting the value of

such an opinion: Why, Socrates, must we consider the opinion of the mass of mankind [τῶν

πολλῶν], who say just what occurs to them? [οἳ ὅτι ἂν τύχωσι τοῦτο λέγουσιν;] (353a7-8)

(cf. Cri. 44d9-10: for they are not able to make a man wise or foolish, but they do whatever

occurs to them [ποιοῦσι δὲ τοῦτο ὅτι ἂν τύχωσι]).

As for linguistic matters, we can see that some of the well-known topics are

introduced and discussed in school technical terms. For example, this is the case with

the theme of the specialist and the following theme of the body and the soul. The

markers of the technical style are two. One of them is the use of paraphrastic structures.

The notions usually are not named directly, but described, e. g., instead of naming the

soul directly Socrates uses a paraphrase: “that principle, whatever it may be in man,

which has to do with justice and injustice” (transl. by B. Jowett) - ἐκεῖνο, ὅτι ποτ' ἐστὶ

τῶν ἡμετέρων, περὶ ὃ ἥ τε ἀδικία καὶ ἡ δικαιοσύνη ἐστίν (47e8-48a1). We can find a

similar paraphrastic method in other dialogues. E.g., cf. the definition of the soul in Alc.

I 133b: ... especially at that region of it [soul] in which occurs the virtue of a soul—wisdom, and

at any other part of a soul which resembles this? Min. 321d8-9: … those things within it [soul]

on which its good and abject states depend (ἐν οἷς αὐταῖς ἔνεστι καὶ τὸ ἀγαθὸν καὶ τὸ

φλαῦρον). The method of posing a question without naming the object seems to be a

school method, used by a teacher to help the students to develop the definitions on their

own.

Another recurring technical device of Cri. is the repetition of the same expression

or of paronymous words in adjacent sentences: Plato usually does not use it and, in

general, does not repeat the same idioms in short passages. Examples: 43d2-8: ἥξει

τήμερον… ἥξει τήμερον… ἥξειν αὐτὸ τήμερον. 46b5-6: λόγῳ... λογιζομένῳ... λόγους.

47b2-6: ἑνὸς μόνου ἐκείνου… Ἑνὸς μόνου... τοῦ ἑνὸς ἐκείνου: in this case the

repetition seems to testify the well-known technical use of this formula in the theme

“specialist vs. the ignorant many”.

Finally, the choice of words sometimes is not typical of Plato’s early dialogues,

for example, ὑπάρχει (45b1) is used in the sense of “is”, not common for the dialogues

of the first academic period, where this expression means “is possible” (Phd. 81a5-6: οἷ

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ἀφικομένῃ ὑπάρχει αὐτῇ εὐδαίμονι εἶναι, Phdr. 240b5, Prot. 345а6 and other). The

meaning ‘to be’ can be found only in the Laws (e. g. 740e6: τὸ παλαιόν που ὑπάρχει

μηχάνημα).

It seems clear that in this part of the dialogue Socrates makes Crito remember

some essential tools for discussing a problem. The original points of Cri. for the most

part are exposed in the last section, the speech of the Laws.

6. Reflection of the contemporary school situation. The composition of Cri.

is not usual, as was noted by H. Thesleff5 who called it ‘climactic’6, that is, without a

normal culmination in the centre of the dialogue. In fact, the dialogue’s culmination is

the last part, the speech of the Laws, which corresponds to the speech of Crito as thesis

and antithesis. In the ‘Socratic’ part of the dialogue Socrates does not really answer the

arguments of Crito: they are really used and disproved only by the Laws. Such

composition seems to be influenced by a tendency of composing speeches pro et contra,

probably diffused in the late period of Plato’s Academy. The development of this genre

disputatio in utramque partem, die Disputation in Rede und Gegenrede in the

Academy as an important tool of conserving the tradition of academic dialectics was set

out by H. J. Krämer7. As for the Corpus Platonicum, the evidence for the practice of

disputation in utramque partem is likely to be represented by Theaetetus (where Socrates

initially presents the thesis of Protagoras and then disproves it) and Crito; but

Parmenides probably also indicates this practice by its positive and negative exposition

of the theory of ideas and the pairs of thesis-antithesis concerning the One and the

Other.

A special place should be given to the speech of the Laws. This passage has

always presented difficulties in interpretation when considered along with Apology:

some of them were discussed above in the section about the two Socrates. One of the

questions is how could Socrates agree with the Laws of Athens (there were different

5 Thesleff H., 1967. See e. g. p. 160: “Notable irregularities of composition occur, apart from Ap., Mx. and Ep. 7, in

Cri. and Prm.” 6 Ibid. p. 168.

7 Krämer, H. J., 1971, pp. 30-32.

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solutions, e. g. the speech of Laws does not represent the view of Socrates8 etc.). But all

these questions become superfluous if we take into consideration that the Laws of Crito

are not the Laws of Athens: firstly, it has been shown that their functions do not

coincide (see above Montuori) and secondly, it would be strange for someone like

Socrates, who despises the many and relies only on the opinion of one, to approve the

democratic laws. Besides, we know the inclination of Cri.’s Socrates towards the laws of

Sparta and Crete. On the other hand these are real, functioning laws and they cannot be

placed in the context of Republic with its discussions about legislation, which regards

the concrete laws as not as important as the parallel between state and soul. The most

adequate background for the Cri.’s laws seems to be the homonymous dialogue – the

Laws. The functions of the laws in Cri. are repeated in the Laws in more detail.

Sometimes even the order of the laws in question is the same. Parallels:

laws about marriage and education. They are the first duty of the

legislator in the Laws, Lgg. 720e10 sqq.: (Athenian) Come, tell me then, in

Heaven's name,—what would be the first law to be laid down by the lawgiver?

Will he not follow the order of nature and in his ordinances regulate first the

starting-point of generation in States? ... So it seems that, if the marriage laws

were the first to be enacted, that would be the right course in every State. There is

a special part in the Laws dedicated to legislation concerning the marriage

sphere, 772d5-776b4. In the Resp. the legislative order is inverted: the

beginning and the basis of all is the right education (see below), if it is

present, marriages and child-bearing will be arranged automatically (Resp.

423e4-7). About education as the second step of the legislation see Lgg.

631d6-7: And in regard to their marriage connections, and to their subsequent

breeding and rearing of children, male and female, both during youth and in later

life up to old age, the lawgiver must supervise the citizens etc. To education in

general is dedicated the VII Book. As was already said, in the Resp. one

should care about education first of all (Resp. 423e4), only in such a case

will the state be functioning normally, even without the special laws. 8 See e. g. Weiss, R., 1998, p. 4.

12

laws about war. The laws about behaviour during the war, about military

service and desertion are discussed in every detail in Lgg. 942а5-945b2.

There is but one mention of them in the Resp., without any specification

(486а5-7).

laws about criminals. Exile and death in the Laws are the gravest types of

punishment: Lgg. 735e1-5. The most dangerous criminals are those that

insult gods, parents or city, and they must be executed, also because they

have done it in spite of the best education given to them (Lgg. 854e1-7). It

is also the case with the Laws’ accusation in Cri.: they remind Socrates

about the education given by laws (50d, 51c8-9, 51е5-6) and about the

gravest crime that one may commit: the insult to parents and the city

(51c2-3).

the concept of ‘the slave of the Laws’: 50e4: ἡμέτερος ἦσθα καὶ ἔκγονος

καὶ δοῦλος. It is the most particular moment of Cri. which is also the

closest to the Laws. Cf. the necessity and the primary role of obedience in

the Laws: Lgg. 762e1-5: Now it is needful that every man should hold the view,

regarding men in general, that the man who has not been a servant will never

become a praiseworthy master, and that the right way to gain honor is by serving

honorably rather than by ruling honorably—doing service first to the laws, since

this is service to the gods... and the definition of the governors as the slaves of

laws: Legg. 715c6-d6: οἱ δὲ ἄρχοντες δοῦλοι τοῦ νόμου. We do not find

anything similar in the Resp.: there the moral values of a man are the

highest ideal, man is above the law and does not need it in case of proper

education: “Nay, ‘t would not be fitting,” he said, “to dictate to good and

honourable men. For most of the enactments that are needed about these things

they will easily, I presume, discover.” (Resp. 425d7-e2). This phrase is

pronounced by Adeimantus just when Socrates starts to think about the

necessity of detailed elaboration of laws in different areas; but afterwards

they conclude that it is important to give the most general laws and the

13

elaboration of many particulars is useless (425е5 sqq.). This attitude is

completely different from that of the Laws and Cri.

These rather obvious examples can demonstrate how the inadequate approach to

a text can influence the commentators: strangely enough, these parallels are usually not

taken into consideration in the editions of Cri.9 or, if taken, no interpretation is given10.

Not only does Cri. seem to be close to the Laws’ problematic. It is possible to

consider Cri., along with a group of other small dialogues, as a preparatory stage of

collecting and discussing material for the Laws. In our opinion this group consists of

Cri., Alc. I, Euthyphr. and Min. The first three are connected with Tht. and one another

from the formal point of view (direct dramatic and depicting the last days of Socrates11)

and all of them are similar to each other from the thematic point of view (all of them

correspond to the Laws’ problematic).

Alcibiades I was always one of the most popular dialogues in the later Academy

due to the theme of self-knowledge. But in fact it is also a mixture of many rather

autonomous arguments concerning legislation and state. One of them is an important

issue that will determine the beginning of the Laws: war and peace in a state. As

Alcibiades is interested in it, Socrates asks him what is the most important thing to

know for a specialist in this area, and Alcibiades after short hesitation suddenly replies

that it is the just and the unjust (108 d10-109 b6). The discussion in the Laws begins with

the question about the main aim of the legislator, should it be war or peace, and the

interlocutors conclude that as the best condition of a body is wealth, the best condition

of a state is peace (Lgg. 627e-628d). Just the same comparison appears in the Alc. 126a-c.

In such a context the Alc.’s theme, that is further developed in 112a-c, finds its proper

place. Besides, we find in the Alc. historical excursuses and examples, and interest in

history is especially typical of the Laws. E.g., in both dialogues special interest is given

to Spartan history, and the theme of the just and unjust in wars is illustrated by

9 E.g. nothing is said about the Laws in the French edition made by L. Brisson (1997).

10 E.g. a rather recent edition made by Ch. Emlyn-Jones (1999), who notices the parallel about the slave of laws, but

does not comment on it. 11

In Alc.I the last remark of Socrates alludes to this theme: yet I am apprehensive, not from any distrust of your

nature, but in view of the might of the state, lest it overcome both me and you (135е6-8, transl. by W. R. M. Lamb).

14

historical events (Battle of Tanagra and of Coronea in the Alc. and battles between

Locrians and Syracusans, Athens and Ceos in the Laws).

The main theme of Euthyphro is piety in a state. The connection of piety, justice

and law is important and mentioned many times in the Laws (piety and state often go

together, e. g. 697b-c: And if any law-giver or State transgresses these rules... he will be guilty

of a breach both of religion [ὅσιον] and of statesmanship – transl. by R.G. Bury, see also 663b,

721a-c...), besides, the laws concerning religion are examined in every detail in Book X

of the dialogue. Small as Cri.is, it surely does not aim to give an exhaustive description

of the topic, but only to outline some points: one of the most important, it may be, is the

last definition of piety given by Euthyphro, that shows that the real object of the

dialogue is religion and piety in the state: However, I say simply that when one knows how

to say and do what is gratifying to the gods, in praying and sacrificing, that is holiness, and such

things bring salvation to individual families and to states [τὰ κοινὰ τῶν πόλεων – cf. Cri.

50a8 τὸ κοινὸν τῆς πόλεως] – 14b (transl. by H. N. Fowler). Besides, the style of

elaboration of the topic is very similar to that of Cri.: piety is examined as a part of

justice, the examples of various specialists are used, and there finally appears the theme

of the state.

The connection of Minos with the first two books of the Laws was noticed

already in the 1806 by Ph. A. Boeckh, and then also by W. Jaeger and other scholars.

This undoubtedly unauthentic dialogue, like Euthphr., accumulates material for the

Laws, collecting all the information about the nature of law, especially the history (as in

the Lgg and Cri., the laws of Sparta and Crete are given as an example of perfect laws -

318c6-d5, as in the Laws and Alc., the Persians are mentioned - 316a2-3, etc.). Besides,

many topics are similar to Cri., as was partly shown above. The last part of Min. is

dedicated to the theme of body and soul, already familiar to us in Cri., and the dialogue

ends with a question: if we know what makes the body better, can we also define what

makes the soul better (321d)? The passage from Cri. 47e7 seems to answer this question:

it is the just. In comparison, the two passages seem to elaborate the same issue,

probably important for Plato during that period, namely, how the legislator could make

the soul better.

15

So, these four dialogues were probably written during the preparation for the

Laws and were meant to fulfil various tasks. For Min. it is just the definition of law itself;

for Alc. it is the foreign policy of the state, legislation in such countries as Persia and

Sparta, and the necessity of self-knowledge for a statesman; for Euthphr. it is the

correlation of piety and law in a state; and for Cri. it is the problem of obedience to the

law in all circumstances.

And finally, we should consider Aristotle as a possible background for all these

texts. According to the chronology proposed by I. Düring, Aristotle came to the

Academy in 367 BC12 and his presence is possibly marked by Plato in some dialogues,

such as Parmenides (where Plato is forced to defend his theory of ideas and does so

probably because of Aristotle, whose name is given to one of the characters) and

Philebus (where Plato concedes to Aristotle the existence of intellectual pleasure and one

of the characters, Protarchus, hints at Aristotle and his interest in the πρῶται ἀρχαί). In

some of the works of Aristotle, written or started in his academic period, we can find

the same problematic as in the above-mentioned texts. For instance, in Topics he

mentions the main argument of Euthyphro among typical school arguments: Propositions

such as the following are ethical, e.g. ‘Ought one rather to obey one’s parents or the laws, if they

disagree?’ (Top. 105b21-23, hereinafter transl. by W. A. Pickard-Cambridge) There are

also some general points, especially, in Politics, similar to the Laws and Crito: all citizens

belong to the State (Pol. 1337a 27-29), the State should regulate all stages of citizens’ life,

in primis, marriage and child-bearing (1334b – 1336a), a governor and, in general, every

citizen should know not only how to rule, but also how to obey (1277a 25-27, 1277b 9-

13). Moreover, one of the principles of work in the late Academy is presumably

introduced by Aristotle: the principle of collecting historical material on every topic,

that is, the historical excursus, present in the small dialogues such as Minos and

Alcibiades I and very important in the Laws. Here is the definition of this principle given

by Aristotle himself in the Topics, one of the first works: We should select also from the

written handbooks of argument, and should draw up sketch-lists of them upon each several kind

of subject, putting them down under separate headings, e.g. ‘On Good’, or ‘On Life’- and that 12

Düring I., 1968, col. 171-184.

16

‘On Good’ should deal with every form of good, beginning with the category of essence. In the

margin, too, one should indicate also the opinions of individual thinkers, e.g. ‘Empedocles said

that the elements of bodies were four’: for any one might assent to the saying of some generally

accepted authority (105b 12-18).

All these considerations make it possible to admit at least the late character of

Cri. and to doubt the authenticity of the dialogue: the author of Cri. is undoubtedly well

experienced in writing both dialogues and speeches, but is obviously inferior to the

literarily perfect Plato in the elaboration of characters and portrayal of conversation. All

these points permit us to consider the text as a school work of high level, created in the

Academy after Tht. in the context of Plato’s working on the Laws: by that time Aristotle

had begun to take an active part in Academic discussions.

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Dictionnaire des Philosophes Antiques. Paris, 2012.

Düring I., Aristoteles / Paulys Realencyclopädie der classischen Altertumswissenschaft.

Neue Bearbeitung begonnen von Georg Wissowa, Suppl. XI. Stuttgart, 1968, col. 171-

184.

Krämer, H. J., Platonismus und Hellenistische Philosophie. Berlin-New York, 1971.

Montuori M., Per una nuova interpretazione del Critone. Milano, 1998.

Platon, Apologie de Socrate. Criton. Introd. et trad. inédites de Luc Brisson. Paris, GF

Flammarion, 19972.

Plato, Crito, ed. by Ch. Emlyn-Jones, 1st ed. Bristol, 1999, repr. 2001.

Ryle, G., Plato’s progress. Cambridge, 1966.

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