Oaths, Promises, and Compulsory Duties: Kant's Response to Mendelssohn's Jerusalem

Oaths, Promises, and Compulsory Duties:Kant’s Response to Mendelssohn’s Jerusalem

J. Colin McQuillan

I.

In his article ‘‘The Question of Enlightenment: Kant, Mendelssohn, and theMittwochsgesellschaft,’’ James Schmidt seeks to restore Immanuel Kant’sessay ‘‘An Answer to the Question: What is Enlightenment?’’ (1784) to itsoriginal context. According to Schmidt, Kant’s essay is ‘‘one response to aquestion which was addressed by a number of other writers and debated ina number of other forums.’’1 The question to which Schmidt refers is, ofcourse, ‘‘What is enlightenment?’’

The debate about the enlightenment question can be traced back to afootnote to an article that appeared in the Berlinische Monatsschrift in1783.2 The author of the footnote, Johann Friedrich Zollner, wrote an arti-cle defending ecclesiastical marriage against Johann Erich Biester, the editorof the Berlinische Monatsschrift, who had advocated a purely civil and con-tractual conception of marriage in an earlier article. Biester’s attempts toreduce marriage to a merely civil contract were ‘‘unenlightened,’’ in Zolln-er’s view, because marriage is the basis of the family and, therefore, society

1 James Schmidt, ‘‘The Question of Enlightenment: Kant, Mendelssohn, and the Mitt-wochsgesellschaft,’’ Journal of the History of Ideas 50 (1989): 270.2 Norbert Hinske, Was Ist Aufklarung? Beitrage aus der Berlinischen Monatsschrift, 4.erw. Aufl. (Darmstadt: Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft, 1990), 115. For a detailedreconstruction for the debate about the enlightenment question, see Schmidt, ‘‘The Ques-tion of Enlightenment,’’ 270–72 and Alexander Altmann, Moses Mendelssohn: A Bio-graphical Study (Oxford: Littman Library Of Jewish Civilization, 1998), 660–65.

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JOURNAL OF THE HISTORY OF IDEAS ✦ OCTOBER 2014

as a whole.3 Zollner feared that undermining the sanctity of an institutionlike marriage would confuse the public about the aims of the enlightenmentand threaten the reforms it hoped to bring about in Prussia.4 AnticipatingBiester’s response and the debate that was sure to follow, Zollner added afootnote to the end of his article, asking ‘‘What is enlightenment? Thisquestion, which is nearly as important as What is truth?, should very wellbe answered, before one begins to enlighten! And yet I find it answerednowhere!’’5 Taking up Zollner’s challenge, Johann Karl Wilhelm Mohsenproposed that the enlightenment question be debated by the Mittwochs-gesellschaft, the private literary club that served as the editorial board ofthe Berlinische Monatsschrift. For Schmidt, it is only natural to read Kant’sessay in the context of the debates that followed and the answers to theenlightenment question that were proposed by members of the Mittwochs-gesellschaft.

Schmidt’s article has a great deal to teach us about Kant’s essay andthe self-understanding of the German enlightenment. Subsequent studieshave clarified the relation between Kant’s conception of enlightenment andhis moral and political philosophy, his views on religion and history, andhis anthropology.6 They have furthered the comparative study of Kant’sanswer to the enlightenment question, the answer proposed by Moses Men-delssohn, and the contributions of the other members of the Mittwochs-gesellschaft.7 They have also placed Kant’s essay in its social and historicalcontext, shedding new light on the political ambitions of the Germanenlightenment during the reign of Frederick II.8 All of this is of considerablevalue, but I do not think it provides an adequate account of the originalcontext of Kant’s essay. By focusing on the debates in the Mittwochsgesell-schaft about the enlightenment question, I believe Schmidt and those whoshare his approach have missed a crucial element of the context of Kant’sessay. Consequently, they have not appreciated the contribution Kant’s

3 Hinske, Was Ist Aufklarung?, 112.4 Ibid., 113 (514).5 Ibid., 115 (516).6 See, for example, the essays collected in Volker Gerhardt, Rolf-Peter Horstmann, andRalph Schumacher, Kant und die Berliner Aufklarung: Akten Des IX. InternationalenKant-Kongresses (Berlin: Walter De Gruyter, 2001).7 See especially James Schmidt, ‘‘What Enlightenment Was: How Moses Mendelssohnand Immanuel Kant Responded to the Berlinische Monatsschrift,’’ Journal of the Historyof Philosophy 30 (1992): 77–102; James Schmidt, ed., What Is Enlightenment?:Eighteenth-Century Answers and Twentieth-Century Questions (Berkeley: University ofCalifornia Press, 1996).8 See Georg Cavallar, ‘‘Kant’s Judgment on Frederick’s Enlightened Absolutism,’’ Historyof Political Thought 14 (1993): 103–32.

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McQuillan ✦ Kant and Mendelssohn’s Jerusalem

essay makes to debates about another issue close to the heart of the Germanenlightenment: the freedom of conscience.

In what follows, I will argue that ‘‘What is Enlightenment?’’ should beread as a response to Mendelssohn’s defense of the freedom of consciencein Jerusalem, Or on Religious Power and Judaism (1783), as well as ananswer to the enlightenment question.9 In Jerusalem, Mendelssohn arguesthat the freedom of conscience is an inalienable right, because neither thechurch nor the state has the power to impose compulsory duties in mattersof conscience. This leads Mendelssohn to deny the binding force of oaths,which he regards as illegitimate attempts to impose duties to believe, not toquestion, and so forth. After reconstructing the context in which Mendels-sohn wrote Jerusalem and the structure of his arguments, I will explain howKant responds to Mendelssohn’s arguments in ‘‘What is Enlightenment?’’Kant’s moral philosophy commits him to the legitimacy of oaths, whichcompels him to place restrictions on the private use of reason in ‘‘What isEnlightenment?’’ I will also show how the Kant qualified these restrictionsand how his defense of the freedom of the public use of reason providesalternate grounds for the freedom of conscience. These qualifications andthe defense of the freedom of the public use of reason bring Kant closer toMendelssohn’s position, though they do not bridge the gulf between them.Finally, I will consider Mendelssohn’s response to Kant’s essay, which waspresented at a meeting of the Mittwochsgesellschaft shortly before ‘‘Whatis Enlightenment?’’ was published in the Berlinische Monattsschrift. Men-delssohn’s response to Kant’s essay confirms that there is much more to theoriginal context of Kant’s essay than the debate about the enlightenmentquestion, because Mendelssohn recognizes the differences between Kant’sdefense of the freedom of conscience and his own.

II.

Mendelssohn wrote Jerusalem in response to a pamphlet called Searchingfor Light and Right in a Letter to Mr. Moses Mendelssohn. The pamphletwas published anonymously by August Friedrich Cranz, a proponent ofenlightened Christianity, in 1782.10 In Searching for Light and Right, Cranz

9 Norbert Hinske also suggests that Kant’s enlightenment essay should be read in thecontext of the debates about Mendelssohn’s defense of the freedom of conscience andJerusalem in Hinske, Was ist Aufklarung?, LII–LVII, 539–43.10 See Michah Gottlieb, ed., Moses Mendelssohn: Writings on Judaism, Christianity, andthe Bible (Waltham, Mass.: Brandeis University Press, 2011), 55–67; Moses Mendels-

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suggests that Mendelssohn had overturned the cornerstone of the Jewishreligion by denying that rabbis had the right to excommunicate membersof the Jewish community in the preface to his translation of Menasseh benIsrael’s Defense of the Jews (1782).11 Like other supposedly enlightenedphilosophers and theologians, Cranz saw Judaism as a backward andsuperstitious religion; as such, he thought it required a priestly class withthe power to enforce religious law and punish those who disobeyed its com-mands.12 By denying rabbis the right of excommunication, or any othercoercive authority, Cranz thought Mendelssohn had taken a step towardsChristianity, which Cranz regarded as a purely rational religion, appealingonly to the intelligence and good conscience of the faithful.13 Because Men-delssohn saw Judaism in similar terms, Cranz concluded that he had givenup everything that was particular to Judaism and was already, in effect, aChristian.14

Mendelssohn said this suggestion cut him to the heart.15 He respondedwith Jerusalem, an ambitious demonstration of the rationality of the Jewishreligion. In the second part of Jerusalem, Mendelssohn argues that Judaismis a rational religion because it recognizes all of the eternal truths of reli-gion, including the existence of God, providence, and the immortality ofthe soul.16 Because Mendelssohn thinks God teaches these truths ‘‘throughcreation,’’ he insists that they are ‘‘legible and comprehensible to all men,’’‘‘comprehensible to human reason,’’ and ‘‘can also be verified by humanpowers.’’17 Neither revelations nor miracles are necessary to recognize theeternal truths of religion, so those truths may be found in many differentreligions, regardless of their different historical contents and contexts.18

Judaism has a particular history and traditions that distinguish it from

sohn, Jerusalem: Or on Religious Power and Judaism, trans. Allan Arkush (Waltham,Mass.: Brandeis University Press, 1983), 84–90. Cranz’s pamphlet was only one in a longseries of publications attempting to convince Mendelssohn to convert to Christianity orpublicly declare his reasons for refusing to do so. See Altmann, Moses Mendelssohn, 209.11 Gottlieb, Moses Mendelssohn, 57–58; Mendelssohn, Jerusalem, 85–86. Altmannexplains the biblical and theological background of Mendelssohn’s views on excommuni-cation in Alexander Altmann, Die trostvolle Aufklarung: Studien zur Metaphysik undpolitischen Theorie Moses Mendelssohns (Stuttgart-Bad Cannstatt: Frommann- Holz-boog, 1982), 229–43.12 Gottlieb, Moses Mendelssohn, 57.13 Ibid., 60–61.14 Ibid., 57–61.15 Mendelssohn, Jerusalem, 85.16 Ibid., 80–94; See also Allan Arkush, Moses Mendelssohn and the Enlightenment(Albany, N.Y.: SUNY Press, 1994), 37–68.17 Mendelssohn, Jerusalem, 89–93.18 Ibid., 90–94.

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other religions, but for Mendelssohn there can be no doubt that it is bothrational and true. Neither Cranz nor any other supposedly enlightenedtheologian can claim that distinction for Christianity alone.

Mendelssohn’s account of the rationality of Judaism remains contro-versial. Some see Jerusalem as an exemplary synthesis of reason and reli-gion; others think Mendelssohn cedes too much ground to rationalism andmodernism.19 Yet there is considerably more to Jerusalem than Mendels-sohn’s response to Cranz. The account of the rationality of Judaism in thesecond part of Jerusalem is preceded by a defense of the freedom of con-science in the first part, which is no less radical than Mendelssohn’s defenseof the rationality of Judaism.20 It is to this part of his work that Kant wouldrespond in ‘‘What is Enlightenment?’’

That Mendelssohn would support the freedom of conscience shouldnot be surprising. Constant demands that he justify his religion made Men-delssohn well aware of the prejudices that persisted among enlightened phi-losophers and theologians. His tenuous position as Schutzjude in Berlinalso made the limits of civil toleration perfectly obvious to him.21 Yet Men-delssohn does not base his arguments on his own experience or the experi-ence of any other persecuted minority; his rationalism provides his defenseof the freedom of conscience with its foundation. Because Mendelssohnthinks individuals are able to comprehend religious truth for themselves,using their own reason, he concludes that neither the church nor the statehas the right or the power to impose ‘‘compulsory duties’’ in matters ofconscience. The same view led him to deny that rabbis possessed the rightof excommunication in his preface to the Defense of the Jews; however,it acquires a much broader scope in the first part of Jerusalem, where

19 On Mendelssohn’s account of the rationality of Judaism and the controversies sur-rounding his arguments, see Leo Strauss, ‘‘Einleitung Zu Morgenstunden,’’ in MosesMendelssohn: Gesammelte Schriften (Jubilaumsausgabe, Bd. 3.2) (Stuttgart-Bad Cann-statt: Frommann-Holzboog, 1974), 25; Arkush, Moses Mendelssohn and the Enlighten-ment, 167–240; Allan Arkush, ‘‘The Questionable Judaism of Moses Mendelssohn,’’New German Critique 77 (1999): 29–44; and Michah Gottlieb, Faith and Freedom:Moses Mendelssohn’s Theological-Political Thought, 1st ed. (Oxford: Oxford UniversityPress, 2011), 5–9.20 Mendelssohn’s biographer, Alexander Altmann, provides a very helpful analysis of thestructure of Jerusalem, drawing on Mendelssohn’s drafts. See Altmann, Moses Mendels-sohn, 514–52.21 On Jewish life in eighteenth-century Berlin, see Herbert Seeliger, ‘‘Origin and Growthof the Berlin Jewish Community,’’ The Leo Baeck Institute Yearbook 3 (1958): 159–68;and Altmann, Moses Mendelssohn, 15–17. For Mendelssohn’s views on civil tolerationand their relation to his defense of the freedom of conscience, see Altmann, Moses Men-delssohn, 244–75.

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the freedom of conscience defines the limits of civil and ecclesiasticalauthority.22

Mendelssohn’s arguments about the limits of civil and ecclesiasticalauthority are derived from the social contract tradition, especially the Levi-athan (1651) of Thomas Hobbes.23 While Hobbes thought the social con-tract granted the state broad civil authority, including the right to regulatereligious practices, he denied that this authority extended to matters of con-science. The state cannot impose obligations on the conscience of its sub-jects, because it does not have the power to enforce its commands. The statecan regulate the conduct of its subjects, and even their speech, but it cannotcontrol what they think and feel in the privacy of their own hearts andminds.24 Nor can individuals make contracts voluntarily submitting theirthoughts and feelings to an external authority, because such contractswould be unenforceable by a common power. In that case, the bondbetween the two parties would be no more than a verbal promise, whichHobbes considered too weak to impose an obligation.25 Mendelssohn takesfull advantage of these arguments in Jerusalem, in order to show that thefreedom of conscience is an inalienable right.26 Neither the church nor thestate can acquire ‘‘by means of any contract, the slightest compulsory rightover anyone else’s convictions.’’27

Mendelssohn concedes that the state has the right to sanction fanaticsand atheists, because they deny the eternal truths that are common to allreligions.28 Because he thinks belief in God, providence, and the immortal-ity of the soul are necessary for the preservation of civil society, Mendels-sohn admits that it is permissible for the state to punish or exclude thosewho do not hold these beliefs.29 However, he denies that the state has anyright to punish subjects whose beliefs are consistent with the eternal truthsof religion. Even if their beliefs in question contradict the established doc-trines of the state church, Mendelssohn denies that the state has the rightto force its subjects to renounce their views. To require that subjects denypropositions that are consistent with the eternal truths of religion would

22 Mendelssohn, Jerusalem, 61.23 For the influence of Hobbes on Mendelssohn, see Altmann, Moses Mendelssohn,518–21.24 Thomas Hobbes, Leviathan: With Selected Variants from the Latin Edition of 1668,ed. Edwin Curley (Indianapolis: Hackett, 1994), 300 (III.37.13).25 Hobbes, Leviathan, 84–88 (I.14.18–I.14.32).26 Mendelssohn, Jerusalem, 61.27 Ibid.28 Ibid., 63.29 Ibid.

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be to impose what Mendelssohn calls a ‘‘compulsory duty’’ in matters ofconscience, when the social contract grants the state no ‘‘compulsory right’’to do so.30 Because the social contract only gives the state the power neces-sary for the preservation of the life, liberty, and property of its subjects, itdoes not grant the state any authority in matters of conscience.

Mendelssohn accords the church even less authority than the state.While the state may compel its subjects to obey those commands that arenecessary for the preservation of civil society, the church can only ‘‘admon-ish,’’ ‘‘instruct,’’ ‘‘fortify,’’ and ‘‘comfort’’ the faithful.31 It has no coerciveauthority in matters relating to the conduct or the convictions of its mem-bers. Mendelssohn does not even allow the church to promise rewards toorthodox believers. Nor can the church threaten those who hold unortho-dox or heretical views with punishment. Doing so would suggest the churchpossesses the authority to determine what merits reward and punishment,which Mendelssohn denies. If the church wishes to influence the conduct orthe convictions of its members, it must convince them of the truth andgoodness of its teachings with rational arguments. Mendelssohn thinks thefaithful owe the church an ‘‘attentive ear’’ and ‘‘a willing heart,’’ but theyretain the right to think for themselves and judge the arguments presentedto them according to their own reason.32

Mendelssohn’s understanding of the limits of civil and ecclesiasticalauthority led him to oppose civil and religious oaths. While his argumentsagainst the legitimacy of oaths are no less philosophical than his defense ofthe freedom of conscience, there is a historical reason why Mendelssohnconsiders oaths a particularly dangerous extension of civil and religiousauthority. In 1782, a state councilor, Ernst Ferdinand Klein, consultedMendelssohn about the reform of the rules for court proceedings then beingconsidered by the Prussian high chancellor. Klein was especially interestedin Mendelssohn’s views on the admissibility of oaths sworn by Jews.33

Rejecting traditional prejudices about the dishonesty of Jews, Mendelssohnwrote a memorandum confirming that Jews could be truthful in their oaths.He also argued that Jews were morally obligated to keep their promisesby their religion.34 However, Mendelssohn denied that swearing an oathobligated Jews to incriminate themselves ‘‘in matters of severe corporal

30 Ibid., 46–47.31 Ibid., 60.32 Ibid., 59–61.33 Altmann, Die trostvolle Aufklarung, 497.34 On the ‘‘scandalous authors’’ who thought Jewish law and rabbinic tradition permittedJews to lie under oath, see ibid., 497–98.

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punishment, let alone life and death.’’35 Many took Mendelssohn’s state-ment as an admission that Jews were deceitful and untrustworthy, but itwas actually a general statement about the binding force of oaths.36 WhileMendelssohn agreed that keeping one’s oaths is sanctioned by religiousmorality, he denied that they were binding in all cases. Oaths are simplynot binding in matters of life and death, because a person cannot be obli-gated to kill himself or to make statements which would condemn him, asHobbes had already shown.37

Mendelssohn extends this argument to matters of conscience in Jerusa-lem, where he argues that oaths represent an illegitimate attempt to createcompulsory duties in matters of conscience. If someone swears that theyhold certain propositions to be true, then they would be violating the dutyimposed by the oath, if they were to deny the truth of those propositions asa matter of conscience. This would be problematic in at least two kinds ofcases. In the first case, where someone believes a certain proposition is true,swears an oath to that effect, and then realizes the proposition is false, theycould still be held accountable for violating the obligation imposed by theoath. Even if they were right and the proposition turned out to be false, theobligation to maintain what one has sworn to uphold would still makethem guilty of perjury. The same would be true in the case of someone whoswears an oath affirming what they do not understand.38 Ignorance doesnot excuse them from their obligations, even in cases where they later cometo understand that what they have sworn is wrong. In both of these cases,Mendelssohn feared, the duties imposed by oaths would limit the freedomof conscience, stifle rational criticism of state policy and religious doctrine,and prevent the reform of civil and religious institutions.

The creation of ‘‘compulsory duties’’ in matters of conscience wouldallow the church or the state to reward obedience and punish disobedienceby means of force. However, because it is impossible to make a contractregarding one’s convictions, Mendelssohn maintains that civil and religiousoaths ‘‘give rise to no new duties.’’39 Because oaths fail to establish a ‘‘com-pulsory duty’’ to maintain what one has sworn to uphold, Mendelssohnconcludes that ‘‘the most solemn invocation of God to be a witness of thetruth neither gives nor takes away a right which did not already exist with-out it, nor does it impose on the man who invokes God any obligation

35 Ibid., 498.36 Ibid.37 Hobbes, Leviathan, 82–87 (I.14.8–30).38 Mendelssohn, Jerusalem, 66–68.39 Ibid., 64.

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which was not incumbent upon him even without the oath.’’40 At best,Mendelssohn says, an oath may serve ‘‘merely to awaken man’s conscience,if by chance it has fallen asleep, and to draw his attention to what the willof the judge of the world has already demanded of him.’’41

As we will see, it is on precisely this point that Kant will object toMendelssohn’s arguments in ‘‘What is Enlightenment?’’ Kant cannot acceptthe conclusion that oaths do not impose compulsory duties. Recognizingthat Mendelssohn’s rejection of oaths follows from his account of the limitsof civil and ecclesiastical authority, Kant was forced to defend the freedomof conscience on different grounds. His distinction between the public andprivate uses of reason is meant to serve that end. This distinction allowsKant to affirm that individuals have the right to hold and express whateverconvictions their conscience demands, while also maintaining that oathsare binding, because they impose moral obligations on those who swearthem.

III.

In 1783, shortly after Jerusalem was published, Kant wrote to Mendels-sohn, praising his work for its ‘‘penetration, subtlety, and wisdom.’’42 In hisletter, Kant told Mendelssohn that he regarded Jerusalem as ‘‘the proclama-tion of a great reform that is slowly impending, a reform that is in storenot only for your own people, but for other nations as well.’’43 BecauseMendelssohn had managed to unite his Judaism with ‘‘a degree of freedomof conscience that would hardly have been thought possible and of whichno other religion can boast,’’ Kant thought Mendelssohn had ‘‘thoroughlyand clearly shown it necessary that every religion have unrestricted freedomof conscience, so that finally even the Church will have to consider how torid itself of everything that burdens and oppresses conscience.’’44 Kant toldMendelssohn this would finally allow humanity to be ‘‘united with regardto the essential point of religion.’’45

It should be noted that it is only in the last paragraph of his letter that

40 Ibid.41 Ibid.42 Immanuel Kant, Correspondence, ed. Arnulf Zweig (Cambridge: Cambridge UniversityPress, 2007), 204 (X:347).43 Ibid., 204 (X:347).44 Ibid.45 Ibid.

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Kant offers Jerusalem such high praise. Kant mentioned the work earlier inhis letter as well, but only to say that he could find no evidence in Jerusalemof the ‘‘nervous infirmities’’ that Mendelssohn had used to excuse himselffrom reading the Critique of Pure Reason (1781/87).46 That Mendelssohnhad not read the Critique of Pure Reason troubled Kant deeply. In 1781,Kant had confessed to Marcus Herz that he was ‘‘very uncomfortable atHerr Mendelssohn’s putting my book aside.’’47 Kant explained that Men-delssohn was ‘‘the most important of all the people who could explain thistheory to the world.’’48 ‘‘It was on him,’’ Kant told Herz, ‘‘on Herr Tetens,and on you, dearest man, that I counted most.’’49 The fact that Kant onlypraises Jerusalem after several pages in which he chastises Mendelssohn forfailing to read the Critique of Pure Reason, and begs him to ‘‘use yourposition and influence in whatever way you think best to encourage anexamination of my theses,’’ suggests to some scholars that Kant’s praise ofJerusalem might have been disingenuous.50

While I would not go so far as to suggest that Kant was disingenuousin his letter to Mendelssohn, it is clear that Kant objected to several of thearguments Mendelssohn employed in his defense of the freedom of con-science. These objections could be said to qualify the praise Kant offered toMendelssohn, but they do not imply that he was insincere in the admirationthat he professed for his work. Kant and Mendelssohn agreed that religioustruth could be grasped by human reason and they both rejected the signifi-cance of miracles and revelation.51 They also valued the freedom of con-science; however, Kant felt compelled to respond to Mendelssohn’s defenseof the freedom of conscience, because he had a very different understandingof the nature of conscience and the sources of obligation.

For Mendelssohn, conscience is an inner world of feeling, thought,belief, and judgment. The freedom of conscience cannot be renounced,transferred, or otherwise alienated, because no external power is capable ofimposing or enforcing obligations in matters of conscience. Kant rejectsthese arguments because he thinks human beings are morally autonomous;they impose their obligations on themselves. Kant gave forceful expressionto this view in the Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals (1785),

46 Ibid., 202 (X:344).47 Ibid., 181, 190–91 (X:270, 308).48 Ibid., 181 (X:270).49 Ibid.50 Ibid. On the claim that Kant’s praise of Jerusalem is disingenuous, see Arkush, MosesMendelssohn and the Enlightenment, 275–76. For an alternative view, see Altmann,Moses Mendelssohn, 517.51 Kant, Correspondence, 152–54 (X:175–79).

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which was published only a year after ‘‘What is Enlightenment?’’ appearedin the Berlinische Monatsschrift. In the Groundwork, Kant claims thatautonomy is ‘‘the ground of the dignity of human nature and every moralnature,’’ because the dignity of a rational being depends on its ability todetermine its will through its own reason. Rational self-determinationestablishes our duties as obligations.52 However, Kant also holds that theduties we impose upon ourselves are the universal and necessary laws thatany rational agent should will; they are categorical imperatives.53 For thisreason, the presence or absence of external authorities compelling us toobey is immaterial to Kant’s conception of obligation. Duty is establishedby reason, not by compulsion.

Later, in Religion Within the Boundaries of Mere Reason (1793) andthe Metaphysics of Morals (1797), Kant develops an account of conscienceas an aesthetic precondition of morality and an inner judge that holds ourduties before us and reminds us of our obligations. In these works, Kantdoes not present conscience as a matter of personal conviction, core values,or deeply held beliefs; conscience is the voice of reason, confirming that ouractions are consistent with the moral law and warning us when we fail todo our duty.54 Kant thinks every human being, insofar as they are a rationalmoral being, has the capacity to hear that voice and recognize its authority,though sometimes they experience it aesthetically, as a kind of moral senseor moral feeling. Denying this feeling, by comforting a dying man sufferingfrom a guilty conscience, is for Kant ‘‘a crime against the human beinghimself and against those who survive him,’’ because our sensitivity tomoral feeling is an indication of our rational moral autonomy.55 In the Reli-gion, Kant argues that the conscience of the dying man should be ‘‘stirredup’’ and ‘‘sharpened,’’ because that is ‘‘the purpose for which such supportgiven to conscience at life’s end can be held necessary.’’56 Kant builds uponthis claim in the Metaphysics of Morals, where he argues that we have aduty to cultivate our conscience, so we are always aware of our duty.57

The principles of Kant’s moral philosophy led him to reject Mendels-sohn’s arguments about the limits of civil and ecclesiastical authority. Kant

52 Immanuel Kant, Practical Philosophy, ed. Mary J. Gregor (Cambridge: Cambridge Uni-versity Press, 1999), 85 (IV:436).53 Ibid., 67–73 (IV:414–21).54 Ibid., 529–30 (VI:400–401).55 Immanuel Kant, Religion and Rational Theology, ed. Allen W. Wood and George diGiovanni (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999), 117 (VI: 78).56 Ibid., 117 (VI: 78).57 Kant, Practical Philosophy, 529–30, 559–62 (VI:400–401, 437–41). See also Allen W.Wood, Kantian Ethics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008), 182–92.

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denies that our duties are imposed upon us by contracts, social or other-wise, because the binding force of contracts is founded on our moral obliga-tion to keep our promises.58 If the duty to keep one’s promises could beextended to matters of conscience, then it could be used to authorize amuch broader set of compulsory duties than Mendelssohn allowed. In thatcase, Mendelssohn’s arguments about the limits of civil and ecclesiasticalauthority would be immaterial to the defense of the freedom of conscience.His rejection of the binding force of oaths would also be unfounded. Oathswould be binding, not because we could be forced to do what we havesworn to do and not because we could be punished for failing to live up toour obligations, but because we make promises when we swear oaths andthose promises would constitute moral obligations. That would be suffi-cient to impose compulsory duties, given the terms of Kant’s moral philos-ophy.

Kant does not make these arguments against Mendelssohn directly in‘‘What is Enlightenment?’’ However, he does provide an alternate accountof the origin of civil and religious obligation, as well as an account of theefficacy of oaths, in his discussion of the private use of reason. Accordingto Kant, the private use of reason is the use one makes of one’s reason ‘‘ina certain civil post or office with which he is entrusted.’’59 The private useof reason may be restricted ‘‘in the interest of the commonwealth,’’ becausecivil posts and offices require ‘‘a certain mechanism . . . by means of whichsome members of the commonwealth must behave merely passively, so asto be directed by the government, through an artful unanimity, to publicends (or at least prevented from destroying such ends).’’60 Because a personmakes themselves a part of the machinery of the church or the state whenthey assume a position in those institutions, Kant thinks they concede theright to bring their own reason to bear on the performance of the dutiesassociated with that post or office. The parts of a machine must promoteits efficient functioning, in order to achieve the ends for the sake of whichthe machine was constructed, so the use those who hold civil posts andecclesiastical offices make of their reason must be subordinated to the endsthe church and state are meant to achieve. It follows that, with respect tothe private use of reason, it is ‘‘impermissible to argue; instead one mustobey.’’61

58 See also ibid., 423 (VI:273), where Kant explicitly rejects arguments like those Men-delssohn employs in Jerusalem and locates the binding force of contracts in the promisesthe parties to a contract make to one another.59 Ibid., 18 (VIII:37).60 Ibid.61 Ibid.

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Following this principle, Kant maintains that ‘‘it would be ruinous ifan officer, receiving an order from his superiors, waited while on duty toengage openly in subtle reasoning about its appropriateness or utility.’’62

Such hesitation would be contrary to his duty as an officer, because hisoffice requires him to execute the orders he is given. For the same reason,Kant denies that a citizen has the right to ‘‘refuse to pay the taxes imposedupon him.’’63 A clergyman is likewise ‘‘bound to deliver his discourse to thepupils in his catechism class and to his congregation in accordance with thecreed of the church he serves, for he was employed by it on that condi-tion.’’64 Kant thinks the oaths that officers, citizens, and clergymen swearcompel them to serve, not their own ends, but the ends of the church andthe state. The officer is a direct agent of the state in civil and military affairs,requiring him to execute the commands of his superiors. Citizens do nothave the same obligations, because they are members of civil society; how-ever, citizens still owe the state their obedience, because the state is neces-sary for the preservation of civil society. The case of the clergyman isdifferent still, because the clergyman is essentially a teacher, employed bythe church to explain to its members the tenets of their religion.65 Kantconcludes that the use clergymen make of their reason in their office isprivate, because ‘‘a congregation, however large a gathering it may be, isstill only a domestic gathering; and with respect to it he, as a priest, is notand cannot be free, since he is carrying out another’s commission.’’66

That the duties Kant attributes to officers, citizens, and clergymen arecompulsory duties, in Mendelssohn’s terms, is clear from Kant’s discussionof the citizen who refuses to pay his taxes. According to Kant, ‘‘an imperti-nent censure of such levies when he is to pay them may even be punishedas a scandal,’’ because it promotes ‘‘general insubordination.’’67 Kantthinks the state and, presumably, the church would be within its rights,were it to punish disobedience and suppress the threat of insubordinationby means of force. More important than these external incentives, however,are the moral grounds for honoring the oaths we have sworn. The oathsomeone swears as an officer of the state, a citizen, or a clergyman is apromise they are morally obliged to keep, regardless of whether they arerewarded or punished for their actions. Breaking that oath would be wrong,

62 Ibid.63 Ibid., 19 (VIII:37).64 Ibid., 19 (VIII:38).65 Ibid.66 Ibid.67 Ibid.

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because it would be a violation of the duty to keep one’s promises. Theconsequences of this violation are much more serious than the sanctionsimposed by the state: breaking our promises compromises our moral worth,our dignity, and even our humanity.68

For readers who remain unaware of Mendelssohn’s arguments, therestrictions Kant places on the private use of reason might seem out of placein an essay on enlightenment. Kant’s insistence that one must obey withoutargument the commands of the church or the state might even suggest asubmissive deference to authority. Yet the restrictions Kant places on theprivate use of reason are neither out of place nor merely submissive. Theyconstitute a direct response to Mendelssohn’s account of the limits of civiland ecclesiastical authority in Jerusalem. That Kant would use his enlight-enment essay to respond to Jerusalem should not be surprising: Jerusalemhad only recently been published when Kant was writing his essay and Kanthad read the book closely. Kant’s letter to Mendelssohn indicates that heappreciated many aspects of Mendelssohn’s work, but later comments alsosuggest a more critical engagement with Jerusalem.69 Finally, we shouldremember that Kant was writing from Konigsberg. Although he corres-ponded with a number of members of the Mittwochsgesellschaft during thisperiod, it is not clear that Kant knew very much about the debates takingplace in Berlin. This makes it rather unlikely that the debates about theenlightenment question provide a sufficient account of the original contextof Kant’s essay.

The final footnote of Kant’s essay confirms that he was far removedfrom the debates about the enlightenment question taking place in the Mitt-wochsgesellschaft in Berlin. Kant says he only learned about Mendelssohn’sanswer to the enlightenment question after he had completed his own essay,by reading an announcement in a newspaper.70 Because he had not yet readwhat Mendelssohn had written, Kant suggests that comparing their essayswould allow readers to determine ‘‘to what extent chance may bring aboutagreement in our thoughts.’’71 This comment is usually taken as an invita-tion to compare Kant and Mendelssohn’s answers to the enlightenmentquestion, but it could just as easily be treated as an occasion to comparetheir views on the freedom of conscience. I will take up this challenge in thenext section, arguing that Kant’s rejection of Mendelssohn’s account of the

68 Ibid., 552–54 (VI:429–31).69 Kant, Correspondence, 201–3 (X:344–45); See also Kant, Practical Philosophy, 187,423 (VI:167, 273).70 Kant, Practical Philosophy, 22 (VIII:42).71 Ibid.

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nature of conscience and sources of obligation did not prevent him fromagreeing with Mendelssohn about the scope the freedom of conscienceshould be granted.

IV.

Although Kant thought the duty to keep our promises restricted the free-dom of the private use of reason, he did not think those restrictions com-promised the freedom of conscience. Nor did he deny the right of thoseemployed by the church or the state to publicly state their convictions. Hisviews of the nature and sources of obligation simply required him to supplydifferent grounds than Mendelssohn had provided for the freedom of con-science. Kant sought to do this by limiting the conditions under which theprivate use of reason could be restricted and providing for a public forumin which matters of conscience could be freely discussed. Both of these solu-tions are outlined in ‘‘What is Enlightenment?’’

In order to prevent the obligations we owe the church and the statefrom standing in the way of enlightenment, Kant argues that oaths are onlybinding under certain conditions. He insists, for example, that an oath thatpermanently restricts the private use of reason cannot be valid.72 Kant callssuch an oath a crime against humanity, because he thinks human beingshave a moral duty to improve themselves and promote the interests ofhumanity.73 While we are morally obliged to keep our promises, an oathwhich prevents us from improving ourselves would be null and void,because one obligation cannot take precedence over another. Consequently,an oath to serve an institution like the church or the state can only bind ourconscience temporarily. These institutions may legitimately demand that wesubmit our reason to their ends for a certain period, in order to aid them inthe tasks they are meant to achieve. However, our acquiescence to thesedemands cannot permanently prevent us from seeking to improve thoseinstitutions. At some point, we must be able to reject the terms of the oathswe have sworn and renegotiate the terms of our agreements with institu-tions like the church and the state.

In addition to limiting the conditions under which oaths are binding,Kant also defends the freedom of conscience in his account of the publicuse of reason. The freedom that Kant thinks must be granted to the public

72 Ibid., 19–20 (VIII:38–39).73 Ibid., 517–24 (VI:385–94).

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use of reason allows every individual to say what their conscience demands,provided they speak ‘‘as scholars before the entire public of the world ofreaders.’’74 This formulation is often praised as a broad and inclusiveframework for free speech, freedom of the press, public discourse, civil tol-eration, and even reason itself.75 Yet Kant’s account of the public use ofreason actually includes two significant conditions—scholarship andpublicity—which restrict the exercise of the freedom of conscience. Whilethese conditions do not affect the content of what may be said in public,they determine how we must express ourselves when we speak publicly.Scholarship and publicity are, for Kant, the formal conditions of the publicuse of reason.

To speak as a scholar is not to speak as a member of an academy or aprofessor in a university, just as it is not to speak as a civil servant, a citizenof a particular nation, or a member of this or that church. According toKant, a scholar is someone who ‘‘regards himself as a member of a wholecommonwealth, even of the society of citizens of the world.’’76 The cosmo-politan perspective scholars assume frees them from the biases and interestsof particular communities. The arguments they employ are, for that reason,disinterested reflections on matters of general concern. Onora O’Neill con-siders this a sufficient condition for scholarship, because she regards thepublic as a general audience, free from the obligations that constrain theprivate use of reason.77 Consequently, O’Neill thinks the public uses onlythe internal evidence of reason in evaluating scholarly arguments. Whenan argument is acceptable according to this standard, O’Neill takes thescholarship condition for the public use of reason to be satisfied.

While O’Neill’s interpretation is appealing, Kant’s logic lectures sug-gest he had a much more rigorous notion of scholarship in mind. In severalpassages, Kant defines a scholar as someone ‘‘whose learnedness is notgrounded on common experience,’’ but is rather based on the ‘‘universalrules’’ of the understanding, which are nothing other than a priori princi-ples.78 These principles are important, because Kant does not think we can

74 Ibid., 18 (VIII:37).75 See, for example, Onora O’Neill, ‘‘The Public Use of Reason,’’ Political Theory 14(1986): 523–51; John Christian Laursen, ‘‘The Subversive Kant: The Vocabulary of Pub-lic and Publicity,’’ Political Theory 14 (1986): 584–603; Peter Niesen, Kants Theorieder Redefreiheit (Baden-Baden: Nomos Verlag, 2005); Katerina Deligiorgi, Kant and theCulture of Enlightenment (Albany, N.Y.: SUNY Press, 2006); Johannes Keienburg,Immanuel Kant und die Offentlichkeit der Vernunft (Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 2011).76 Kant, Practical Philosophy, 18 (VIII:37).77 O’Neill, ‘‘The Public Use of Reason,’’ 531.78 Immanuel Kant, Lectures on Logic, ed. J. Michael Young (Cambridge: Cambridge Uni-versity Press, 2004), 10–12 (XXIV:22–24).

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assume the cosmopolitan perspective necessary for scholarship by arguingfrom common understanding.79 Common understanding is a kind of empir-ical knowledge derived from experience. Because experience is always par-tial and particular, common understanding lacks the universality anddisinterestedness that are necessary for scholarship. Because a priori princi-ples apply in every case and appeal to all people, they are the only principlesthat are consistent with the demands of scholarship. If a member of thepublic wishes to speak as a scholar, then they must argue from a prioriprinciples, rather than common knowledge, everyday experience, or anec-dotal evidence. Their arguments must also be judged by a higher standardthan public opinion, which is based on common understanding. A scholarlyargument must be judged by the soundness of its principles and the validityof the inferences.

The soundness of principles and the validity of inferences might bebest judged by other scholars, rather than the public; yet the cosmopolitanperspective scholars assume requires them to address ‘‘a public in theproper sense of the word,’’ namely ‘‘the entire public of the world of read-ers.’’80 The breadth of this conception of publicity is crucial for Kant’sunderstanding of the public use of reason. Because the ‘‘entire world’’ ofthe reading public is not particular in any way, Kant assumes it will be thebest judge of the merits of a scholar’s arguments. Even if certain membersof the public are partial to a particular view or are otherwise biased intheir response to a scholar’s arguments, the breadth of Kant’s conceptionof publicity requires that they do not have the last word on the merits of ascholar’s arguments. Other members of the public must also be able toconsider the scholar’s arguments. They must be free to defend the claims ofthe scholar and engage the critics of the scholar’s arguments in debate, pro-vided they speak as scholars themselves. This allows every member of thepublic to exercise their reason and judge the merits of the arguments withwhich they are presented, not just a select few who reinforce one another’sprejudices. Kant thought such an inclusive public and such wide-rangingdebates would ‘‘work back’’ on the mentality of the people, making theenlightenment of the public ‘‘almost inevitable.’’81

So long as they meet the conditions of scholarship and publicity, thefreedom of the public use of reason extends even to those who hold civil

79 Ibid., 6–10 (XXIV:18–22).80 Kant, Practical Philosophy, 18 (VIII:37).81 See ibid., 304–9 (VIII:307–13), where Kant raises raise objections to Jerusalem on thisissue. See also Katrin Flikschuh, ‘‘Duty, Nature, Right: Kant’s Response to Mendelssohnin Theory and Practice III,’’ Journal of Moral Philosophy 4 (2007): 223–41.

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or ecclesiastical office.82 Kant says that a military officer cannot ‘‘fairly beprevented, as a scholar, from making remarks about errors in the militaryservice and from putting these before his public for appraisal.’’83 Nor doesthe citizen ‘‘act against the duty of a citizen when, as a scholar, he publiclyexpresses his thoughts about the inappropriateness or even injustice of suchdecrees.’’84 ‘‘As a scholar, who by his writings speaks to the public in thestrict sense, that is to the world,’’ Kant continues, ‘‘a clergyman in the pub-lic use of his reason, enjoys an unrestricted freedom to make use of his ownreason and to speak in his own person.’’85 The oaths we swear when weassume civil posts and ecclesiastical offices may restrict our consciencewithin these contexts, but they do not compromise the freedom of con-science or our right to express our convictions in general. They pertainmerely to the expression of our convictions in the context of civil or ecclesi-astical office.

Extending the freedom of the public use of reason to those who servein civil posts and ecclesiastical offices requires us to determine when some-one is speaking as a scholar and when they are speaking as a governmentofficial, citizen, or clergyman. Making that distinction could pose seriousproblems in some cases; yet the conditions Kant imposes on the public useof reason make the matter considerably easier. When someone speaks as ascholar, they must argue from a priori principles and address the entirepublic. This allows them to separate themselves from the roles they play ininstitutions and the values of the communities to which they belong. Speak-ing as citizens of the world, scholars are free to reflect on the institutionsthey serve and the communities to which they belong, proposing ways inwhich they might be improved and inspiring debates about the best way toachieve reform. Kant thinks denying scholars the freedom to speak in thisway is contradictory, because it demands that scholars fulfill their obliga-tion to keep their promises, but prevents them from acting on their duty toimprove themselves and enlighten their communities. It also shows remark-able disrespect for the dignity of humanity, because denying scholars thefreedom to use their reason independently treats them merely as parts of amachine. It does not consider their capacity to reason for themselves, whichis the basis for their dignity and their humanity.

The freedom that Kant demands for the public use of reason is just asbroad as the freedom of conscience that Mendelssohn defends in Jerusalem.

82 Ibid., 18 (VIII:37).83 Ibid., 19 (VIII:37).84 Ibid., 19 (VIII:37–38).85 Ibid., 19 (VIII:38).

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Although Kant insists that oaths are binding and oath-breaking is a viola-tion of our duties, he does not think this prevents anyone from using theirreason independently or speaking their mind in public. Kant specifies thecontexts in which the freedom of the public use of reason must be grantedand the conditions that apply to its use, but these do not affect the scope ofthe freedom of conscience, because they do not restrict the content of whatmay be said in public. Nor do they prevent anyone from speaking theirmind, so long as they are able to present a rational argument for their posi-tion. Anyone and everyone may take advantage of the freedom of the publicuse of reason, even those who are bound by obligations to the church andthe state, when they are not speaking as scholars. And this suggests there isgreater agreement between Mendelssohn and Kant than there at firstappeared to be.

V.

Throughout this article, I have argued that the original context of Kant’sessay ‘‘An answer to the question: What is enlightenment?’’ is broader thanhas often been realized. Going far beyond the debates about the nature ofenlightenment that took place in the Berlin Mittwochsgesellschaft, Kant’sessay responds to Mendelssohn’s defense of the freedom of conscience inJerusalem.

Kant takes a more conservative position on the freedom of consciencethan Mendelssohn, because his account of the private use of reason impliesthat there can be compulsory duties in matters of conscience. This leadsKant to argue that we must subordinate the use of our reason to the endsof the institutions we serve when we assume a civil post or an ecclesiasticaloffice. The promises we make when we swear to serve institutions like thechurch and the state are binding, because we have a moral obligation tokeep our promises. Yet Kant also denies that these obligations can stand inthe way of the ‘‘propensity and calling to think freely.’’86 The public use ofreason must be free and unrestricted, because denying that freedom is acrime against human dignity. The public use of reason must also be allowedto ‘‘work back on the mentality of the people,’’ so that they become betterable to reason for themselves. Kant’s defense of the freedom of the publicuse of reason may be far removed from Mendelssohn’s account of the limits

86 Ibid., 22 (VIII:41).

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of civil and ecclesiastical authority, but it is just as effective as a defense ofthe freedom of conscience.

Before concluding, I would like to say a few words about Mendels-sohn’s response to Kant’s essay, which I take to confirm the interpretationof ‘‘What is Enlightenment?’’ that I have proposed. Mendelssohn’s com-ments on ‘‘What is Enlightenment?’’ were presented to the Mittwochsgesel-lschaft shortly before Kant’s essay was published. Only the first section ofMendelssohn’s remarks deals with Kant’s views on enlightenment. The nexttwo sections discuss Kant’s distinction between the public and private usesof reason. Mendelssohn regards Kant’s distinction as a distinction betweenprofessional responsibilities (Berufsgeschafte), which admit the restrictionsKant places on the private use of reason, and the freedom an individualenjoys when they are not bound by professional obligations or other socialduties.87 Mendelssohn does not recognize the conditions of scholarship andpublicity that Kant places on the public use of reason, so he thinks Kantsupports the widest possible freedom for extra-professional concerns(Außerberufsgeschaften), provided the exercise of this freedom does notcome into conflict with one’s professional responsibilities.

However, in the last section, Mendelssohn raises a strong objection tothe restrictions Kant places on the private use of reason. He insists thatindividuals are entitled to violate their professional responsibilities, undercertain conditions, so long as they accept responsibility for their actions.88

In some cases—when institutions are in desperate need of reform or whenthe authorities have made it impossible to work within the system—theymay even be required to do so.89 This qualification is unproblematic forMendelssohn, since he does not think the oaths that individuals swear arebinding on their conscience. Consequently, there is nothing intrinsicallywrong with breaking an oath or the contract that defines their professionalresponsibilities. If that is what is required for progress and enlightenment,then Mendelssohn thinks the breaking of the oath is justified and the personwho violates the terms of their contract should be praised rather thanblamed.

Mendelssohn’s objection poses serious problems for Kant. While Kantagrees that the oaths and promises that restrict the private use of reasoncannot be made into a permanent bulwark against enlightenment, the

87 Moses Mendelssohn, ‘‘Offentlicher und Privatgebrauch der Vernunft,’’ in Moses Men-delssohn: Gesammelte Schriften (Jubilaumsausgabe, Bd. 8: Schriften zum Judentum, II),ed. Alexander Altmann (Stuttgart-Bad Cannstatt: Frommann-Holzboog, 1983), 227–29.88 Ibid., 228.89 Ibid.

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moral basis of those restrictions makes it impossible for Kant to agree withMendelssohn. Even in cases where it would be impossible to achieve reformin any other way, the oaths civil servants, military officers, or clergymenswears are binding, because any and all promise-breaking is morally wrong.For Kant, there are simply no situations in which it is possible to break anoath without violating our duties to keep our promises and tell the truth.Even suggesting there might be exceptions to this rule would mean thattruth-telling and promise-keeping are not categorical imperatives, under-mining the universality and necessity of the moral law. And this wouldcertainly trouble a cultivated conscience.

Mendelssohn’s objection highlights the differences between his viewand Kant’s, but it also indicates that he understood the implications ofKant’s distinction between the public and private uses of reason and theirsignificance for the freedom of conscience. Mendelssohn does not belaborhis objections by repeating the arguments he employed in Jerusalem,though his response seems to presuppose his rejection of compulsory dutiesin matters of conscience and his denial of the binding force of oaths. If‘‘What is Enlightenment’’ was indeed written in response to Mendelssohn’sposition on those issues, then our understanding of the original context ofKant’s essay must be expanded to include Kant’s debate with Mendelssohnabout the freedom of conscience, as well as his answer to the enlightenmentquestion.

St. Mary’s University.

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Appendix:Public and Private Use of Reason

Translated by J. Colin McQuillan and Alexander G. Cooper.

What follows is a translation of Mendelssohn’s remarks on ‘‘An Answer tothe Question: What is Enlightenment?’’ They were presented to the Mitt-wochsgesellschaft shortly before Kant’s essay was published in the Berlin-ische Monatsschrift in 1784. Mendelssohn begins by clarifying Kant’sdistinction between the state of enlightenment (Aufgeklartheit) and theprocess of becoming enlightened (Aufklarung), which another member ofthe Mittwochsgesellschaft—Oberconsistorialrath (O.C.R.) Johann SamuelDiterich—seems not to have understood. Mendelssohn then turns to Kant’sdistinction between the public and private uses of reason, which he explainsusing the distinction between Berufsgeschaften and Außerberufsgeschaften.Berufsgeschaft is an archaic legal term referring to the work associated withone’s profession and the duties of one’s office. Außerberufsgeschaft appearsto be a neologism. The terms capture Kant’s distinction between the publicand private uses of reason very effectively, because they make it clear thatthe private use of reason is restricted by the duties associated with the officeone holds, while the public use of reason is not bound by any such duties.Mendelssohn accepts the legitimacy of this distinction, but holds that thereare cases in which it is right and even necessary to violate the duties associ-ated with public office.

The comments of O.C.R. Diterich on the truly paradoxicalessay of Prof. Kant are just as correct as they are exhaustive, anddeserve that one make public use of them, as provided for by Mr.Kant. It strikes me, however, that some of these things have notentirely escaped Mr. Kant. He is perhaps more paradoxical in hisexpression than in his thought.

I.

What Mr. Diterich calls ‘‘enlightenment’’ [Aufklarung], Mr. Kantcalls ‘‘being enlightened’’ [Aufgeklartheit], which he expresslydistinguishes from ‘‘enlightenment’’ [Aufklarung]. In fact, the dis-tinction does not seem to be part of the language for nothing.

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‘‘Enlightenment’’ is that condition in which the effort to free our-selves from prejudices and to follow rational principles in impor-tant aspects of our lives becomes dominant. ‘‘Being enlightened,’’however, deserves to be called that condition in which prejudiceshave been abolished and the rational principles themselves havebecome dominant. Both terms appear to be absent from the Frenchlanguage, and constitute an advantage of our mother tongue,which can construct these abstractions as it pleases. The conditionof enlightenment is at times better than the condition of beingenlightened. When the resistance has been removed, the spring’stension slackens. The drive to truth loses its spur and the dominantprinciples misunderstand reason, from which they stem, and ceaseto be rational. Without the struggle with prejudices, reason itselfbecomes a pale imitation and the drive to originality leads back toprejudice and superstition again.

II.

What Mr. Kant calls the public and private use of reason is onlystrange in its expression. If I understand him correctly, he is merelydistinguishing between professional concerns [Berufsgeschafte]and extra-professional concerns [Außerberufsgeschaften]. ‘‘Profes-sional’’ concerns are those public tasks, which are assigned to meby society. With respect to these, I am obliged to submit myself tothe voice of the majority, because otherwise I would, as Mr. Kleinhas rightly noted, intrude on the freedom of others and wouldforce my reason on others. Professional concerns can only be car-ried out in one way, either according to the will of the majority oraccording to the will of the minority. This is what must take place,if society is to endure. Extra-professional concerns, however, arethose tasks, in which every citizen must be left his freedom andchoice, once the nation is in the state of enlightenment. This free-dom in extra-professional concerns Kant calls the public use ofreason. He does not want to limit it, however, so far as I can see,to the freedom of the press and writers, but would gladly grant toevery teacher of the people the freedom to fight against prejudicesand spread truth, so long as he is not serving in an official andprofessional capacity.

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III.

However, it is also the case, that if the teacher is in office andin his profession, he will very often be entitled to contradict theprinciples, on the basis of which he was employed, and introducereforms. ‘‘It is contrary to the contract,’’ one says, ‘‘which heentered into with the community.’’—I answer: at times I must bepermitted, even obligated, to act contrary to a contract, namelyunder the following conditions: 1) I must be convinced that itwould be to the advantage of the other party and that, givengreater insight, he would approve of my conduct. 2) Once thisgreater insight does not occur, and the opposing party insists thatthe contract be kept, then I must be willing to give up my project,and must not assume for myself the right to impose my perspectiveon them. 3) Finally, I must have the firm resolution to accept allconsequences and risks, indemnity and punishment, contempt andpersecution of the proposed reform myself and not to let any thirdparty suffer as a result.

Under these conditions, I would think, the wise teachers of thepeople that all of us have in mind have been able to permit them-selves to introduce reform in their public, professional discourse[offentlichen Berufsvortrage]. They were convinced that it wasbeing done for the good of the community that had employedthem and could assume that they would succeed in convincingthem of that. When they did not succeed, and they encounteredopposition from the authorities or the party that had enlistedthem, they were willing to desist and resign their office. Finally, allof us trust them to have the steadfast courage to patiently bear allthe consequences, which accompanies a reform of religious mat-ters, if the people are not prepared for it or if the teacher did notproceed cautiously enough. In case of opposition, they had ac-cepted to take on the complete indemnity, pay all reparations, putup with any penalty and punishment, which would be imposed bythe opposing party; and were therefore be entitled to act contraryto the contract, until they had been forbidden to do so emphati-cally enough.

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Oaths, Promises, and Compulsory Duties: Kant's Response to Mendelssohn's Jerusalem

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Transcript of Oaths, Promises, and Compulsory Duties: Kant's Response to Mendelssohn's Jerusalem