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The Ahmed Kathrada Foundation

Non‐Racialism and PoliticalParties:

The Democratic Alliance

Fiona Anciano with

Angelique Thomas and Amarone Nomdo

2014

Contents

1. Understanding non-racialism: The definition of a contested

concept............................................................4

2. The history of the Democratic Alliance: 1959 to 2014............6

2.1 From the Progressive Party to the Democratic Party......................................................6

2.2 The transition to the Democratic Alliance........................................................................7

3. Ideology and Policy: from the Progressive Party to the Democratic

Party..............................................................9

Constitutionalism and a Bill of Rights..........................................................................................9

Race and voting (in)equality.......................................................................................................10

Working Within the Apartheid System.......................................................................................12

Economic Policy and Big Business..............................................................................................13

(In)visible Race: The Individual as Primary Political Unit........................................................15

Conclusion....................................................15

4. The Current Democratic Alliance: Transformation and Contestation

..................................................................17

Individual versus Collective Identity...........................................................................................17

The Necessity of Embracing Racial Identity: Rebranding the DA to

Attract ‘Black’ Support.......................................18

A Reversion to Liberal Roots?.................................20

Membership....................................................23

Economic policy and the role of the state: the coalface of non-racialism.............................25

Fractures in Façade: The Employment Equity Bill...............27

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Bibliography..................................................................................................................................30

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Abbreviations

ANC African National Congress

BBBEE Broad based black economic empowerment

CP Conservative Party

DP Democratic Party

MPs Members of Parliament

NNP New National Party

NP National Party

PFP Progressive Federal Party

PP Progressive Party

PRP Progressive Reform Party

UP United Party

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Non-racialism and Political Parties: The DemocraticAlliance

“Liberalism’s vision of non-racialism presents an intellectual and moral quagmire. If South Africa is on a journey to a non-racial society, must we, en route, make strategic interventions to counter the effects of apartheid’s asset stripping and restrictions? …Is thisnot, as some liberals aver…perpetuating the saliency of race? Does itleave the principles of non-racialism and equality under the law intact?” (James 2013)

Non-racialism as a concept has a rich and contentious history inSouth African politics. For many it was a core feature of thestruggle against apartheid, uniting a range of forces fighting for asociety free from racial discrimination. According to anti-apartheidactivist Ahmed Kathrada (interview 2011) non-racialism sat at theheart of the anti-apartheid struggle. Non-racialism, as a concept,during apartheid and after is most frequently discussed in relationto the way in which the primary liberation movement, the AfricanNational Congress (ANC) conceptualised it (see Cachalia; Suttner;Anciano; Frederikse). It is important, however, to understand towhat extent this concept is embraced and internalised by all aspectsof South African society, including of course key political parties.Given the symbolic and real-world importance of non-racialism, whatthen is the approach of the current official opposition party, theDemocratic Alliance (DA), to the ideal of non-racialism?

This paper will first unpack the concept of non-racialism, outliningacademic as well as political understandings of the concept. It willthen provide a timeline contextualising the history of the DA,staring with its predecessor the Progressive Party (PP) andfinishing with current party dynamics. To explore the DA’sevolution and its resultant approach to non-racialism it isnecessary to interrogate the ideology and policy positions of itspredecessors, from the PP to the Democratic Party (DP). Followingthis the paper will turn to the current transformation of the DA,demonstrating how it has changed course in its approach to race-based redress policies and how, ultimately, its conceptualisationand instrumentalisation of non-racialism is fragmented andinconsistent.

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1.Understanding Non-racialism: The Definition of aContested Concept

“If it were easy, it would have no value” (Bill Toomy).

Before turning to interrogate the historical and current approach ofthe DA to non-racialism there is the small matter of unpacking theway the concept has been defined; or should we say the complicatedand unresolved matter. As any scholar of non-racialism will attestmany attempts have been made to explain how the concept is appliedin South Africa (Everett 2009; Maré 2003; Taylor 1994; Suttner 2012),however, in practice it is understood in various ways by differentgroupings, or indeed individuals. Previous research demonstratesthat the meaning changes as political context changes (Anciano andSelemani 2011).

One position put forward is that, within the strict meaning of non-racialism, there are no such things as biologically or genetically-determined, and objectively verifiable, meaningful categories calledraces. In other words races are products of social construction andas such we can overcome these social constructions. From thisperspective non-racialism is about rejecting race thinking andracialism (Maré 2003). Race is a social construct; “biologically itis absolute nonsense but you have to get to the point where it issocially nonsense as well” (Hanekom, interview). This does not meanhowever, that one must deny the effects of racism. Here ‘racialism’refers to the idea that “there are heritable characteristics,possessed by members of our species, which allow us to divide theminto small sets of races” (Appiah in Maré 2003:2). Racism, on theother hand is the attribution of negative qualities to a particularperson who meets the racists’ physical criteria (normally skincolour) for categorisation (Maré 2003). When looked at from thisperspective non-racialism is seen essentially looking beyond race,and as such is ‘almost a vision of the future, a utopia’ (Ngwane,interview).

However, for most South Africans it is common reality that racerelations are embedded in everyday thinking and experience. For manythen the idea of non-racialism is really about non-racialisation, whereracialisation refers to interpreting events, discourses and

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motivations in terms of race (see Maré 2003:2). Thus you can supportthe idea of non-racialism and still hold onto the importance ofaccepting and embracing multiple identities. This links the idea ofnon-racialism to that of multiracialism. In the South Africancontext multiracialism refers to a society of more than one racewhere it is perceived that there are essential differences betweenthese race groups (Maré 2009). Although differences are recognisablethrough racial appearance, multiracialism does not embrace the ideathat one race is superior to another. Those South Africans whosupport the idea of multiracialism implicitly embrace the idea ofsocially constructed racial categories, however, in some cases theysee this as a step towards achieving a society that looks beyondrace (Anciano-White and Selemani 2011).

The challenge of defining non-racialism is highlighted bycontestations in the political party most associated with the term:the ANC. Although non-racialism became a central feature of the ANC(and Congress partners) after the adoption of the 1955 FreedomCharter it has never been clearly defined as a concept by the party(see Everatt 2009b). On the one hand it has been viewed as centralto a universalised, generic humanism; part of a unifying and nation-building project. In this view anti-apartheid politics wascharacterised by a universalist orientation which focussed on equaldignity for all individuals, regardless of real or imagineddifferences (see Suttner 2012; Cachalia 2012:59). This resonateswith the idea that non-racialism is about rejecting racialism; it isabout transcending ascribed racial differences.

On the other hand, parts of the ANC have understood andinstrumentalised the idea of non-racialism in a way that reflectsand supports multiracialism. Jordan (1997) explains that the ANC hasalways maintained that democracy, national liberation and non-racialism are inseparable; however, if democracy is to advancenational liberation it necessitates the empowerment of the mosthistorically oppressed, being non-whites. This empowerment is theprimary aim of the ANC, and thus requires the ‘liberation ofAfricans in particular and black people in general from politicaland economic bondage’. In this context ascending racial differencebecame associated with overcoming the class basis of racialoppression. To give non-racialism real meaning an understanding arosethat achieving racial equality (in the path to non-racialism)

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required fundamental structural social change (Cachalia 2012, 60).To overcome institutional racism the ANC has to focus on racedifferences in order to empower ‘blacks in general and Africans inparticular’. From this perspective the ANC embraces racialisation inorder to achieve non-racialism. Indeed ANC Secretary General, GwedeMantashe (interview), explains, ‘even today when we talk of non-racialism, the elements of multiracialism come to the fore…keepingidentities of people in different races’, but he notes that theideal of non-racialism is where race and colour will not be anissue, and that is the ideal to strive for. For Suttner (2012, 28)it is a paradox that throughout ANC history the movement hadtendencies towards the essentialisation of race alongside relativelyuniversalist aspirations.

The contractions discussed above illustrate that non-racialism is aconcept that is yet to be clearly defined and universally accepted.In analysing the DA’s approach to non-racialism it is necessary tolook at both how they interpret the meaning of non-racialism and atwhat their policies and ideologies say about their approach tobuilding a non-racial South Africa. In order to do so the paper willfirst present a historical overview of the formation of the partyfrom its origins in the early 1900s to its current manifestation asthe DA. We will then look at the ideological roots of the party.

2. The History of the Democratic Alliance: 1959 to2014

The DA, through its predecessors, has deep and somewhatcontroversial roots in South African political society. Itspredecessors operated under the apartheid regime, while opposingapartheid laws. This created a 'white' opposition towards apartheidthat manifested into a more conventional liberal opposition to theANC after the transition to a constitutional democracy. The partycontinues to evolve through its electoral battles and throughbuilding relationships with other political entities. This sectionwill provide an historical overview of the party necessary tocontextualise its ideologies and policies.

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From the Progressive Party to the Democratic Party

The origins of the DA date back to 1910, when white politicalparties, namely the South African Party and the National Party (NP)colluded in the formation of the Union of South Africa. Later, in1933, the United South African National Party and the National Partymerged to form the United Party (UP) (Muller 1981:429). Theseparties had multiple ideological shifts and differences whichresulted in the creation of various break away parties, one of whichultimately led to the emergence of the DA.

See figure 1.

In August 1959 a splinter group broke away from the then-officialopposition party, the UP, to form the precursor to today’sDemocratic Alliance: the Progressive Party. Several liberal membersof the UP’s caucus were frustrated with its passive approach to theruling NP’s parliamentary Bills further entrenching apartheid. Atthe time the UP were concerned about speaking out too stronglyagainst apartheid in case they antagonised their own reactionarysupporters (Suzman, 1993:34). The final catalyst that spurred theformation of the PP was the UP’s breach of a ‘solemn undertaking’ toacquire more land in Natal for non-whites (Bruckner de VilliersResearch 1975). Unable to countenance the UP’s approach, 12 UPMembers of Parliament (MPs) resigned and formed the PP. The partywas small, with only one seat in parliament for 13 years, held byHelen Suzman. Indeed Johnson (2012) notes that “when the PP wasfirst formed it was over-dependent on a wealthy fringe of whites(and sometimes Jewish) English-speakers. It seemed impossible thatit would ever break into the Afrikaans electorate or the ranks ofpoorer whites". However, in 1971 Colin Eglin was elected the partyleader and by 1974 the party’s support had increased allowing themto secure an additional six seats in parliament.

At this juncture white opposition politics were in a very fluidstate. The UP faced a series of tempestuous caucus meetings withregard to their lack of direction and poor electoral performance(Swart 1991). Another handful of UP leaders, spearheaded from thethen Transvaal, left the party to form the new Reform Party. Many ofthis new group’s principles and policies aligned closely with thatof the PP. It was thus unsurprising that six months after theirformation, and shortly after the PP’s gain in electoral support,

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these parties merged to form the Progressive Reform Party (PRP)((Bruckner de Villiers Research 1975). By 1977 the UP, still themain opposition party, formally disbanded. A large number of itsmembers joined the PRP or the ruling NP. The core of the remainingUP formed the New Republic Party, which did not have a successfulfuture, ultimately disbanding in 1988 (SA History Online n.d). Atthis point the PRP became known as the Progressive Federal Party(PFP). Under the leadership of Eglin, the new PFP became theofficial opposition against the NP. In 1982 the Conservative Party(CP) broke away from the NP due to disagreements over the NP'sproposed tricameral constitution, which the right-wing CP opposed(SA History Online n.d.).

During a State of Emergency in 1987, the PFP experienced a declinein support and the CP became the official opposition. However, thePFP did not lose hope and furthered their agenda by negotiating withsmaller parties, and eventually under the leadership of Zach de Beerthe PFP reached a peak by amalgamating with smaller parties such asthe Independent Party, the National Democratic Movement and a so-called ‘fourth force’ of disillusioned Afrikaners to form theDemocratic Party (DP) on the 8th April 1989. This merger united allwhite parliamentary opposition to the left of the NP (Kotzé 2001).

In 1989 the NP also found itself under new leadership when F.W DeKlerk took over from P.W Botha. In the September 1989 elections theNP lost support to the CP, while the DP secured 34 seats (BritannicaOnline n.d). Consequently, the NP's lack of support created concern,and in February 1990 it was a substantial factor in De Klerk callingfor radical change in South Africa (Sun Sentinel 1990) which was thebeginning of the process which led to the deconstruction of theapartheid regime.

The stages of dismantling the apartheid system brought about radicalchanges such as unbanning black political parties such as the ANC,the Pan African Congress as well as other similar parties andorganisations. A significant point of reference was releasing NelsonMandela from prison and starting the process of negotiation whereblack and white worked together to instil political change and forma new political landscape (Usborne 2010).

The DP leader, de Beer, was selected as the leader of the ManagementCommittee Chairman of the Convention on a Democratic South Africa

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(CODESA) where the Multi-Party Negotiating Process took place. TheDP was at this stage a vital catalyst in the negotiation on theInterim Constitution which included some of the core values the DPhad prided itself on since the formation of the PP in 1959 (Johnson2012).

The Transition to the Democratic Alliance

In 1994 South Africa held its first democratic elections where theDP won 1.7% of the national vote under the leadership of Tony Leon.The challenge the DP faced was that it could only be seen as thelegitimate opposition and thus a force to be reckoned with in theSouth African political landscape if it substantially broadened itsracial support base (Jolobe 2009). The DP witnessed increasingsupport securing 9% in the 1999 general elections. The DP's growthmeant a decline in support for the NP which consequently saw the DPovertake the NP to become the largest opposition party against theANC. Shortly after this take over, the DP realised it needed toincrease its advances and create a stronger opposition, resulting inan amalgamation of the DP, the Federal Alliance and the New NationalParty (NNP) (The Democratic Alliance n.d). This amalgamation tookplace on the 24th June 2000 and gave birth to the party which existstoday, the Democratic Alliance.

This new formation was at the hand of Marthinus Van Schalkwyk whoheaded political negotiations to create this new party structure(Jolobe 2012). However the alliance with the NNP was deemed anuneasy one and it only lasted a year when the NNP entered into a newalliance with the ANC in 2001 (DA n.d., Rule 2002). Despite numerouschallenges the DA faced, including the departure of the NNP, TonyLeon - then leader of the DA - still managed to ensure that the DAwas able to stand firm in the 2004 general elections, gaining 12.4%at national level and 50 seats in parliament.

In the 2006 local government elections the DA increased their shareof the vote, advancing the party’s representation in sixmetropolitan councils and ensuring it was the largest party in theCape Town Metro with 41.9% (DA n.d.). The DA formed a coalition inCape Town with six smaller parties, including the IndependentDemocrats under the leadership of Patricia De Lille (Jolobe 2012).Helen Zille won a tight contest and became the executive mayor ofCape Town (Stevens 2009). Soon thereafter she won the 2008 World

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Mayor prize (Vom Hove 2008). In 2007 Zille succeeded Tony Leon asthe party leader (unknown author n.d.) and began making significantinroads in trying to attain a larger support base particularly fromblack South Africans. Under Zille’s leadership the DA continued togain support in the Western Cape. In 2008, the DA re-launched itselfon Constitution Hill, a place symbolically linked to the FreedomCharter and Constitutional rights. Soon after, Sandra Botha the thenparliamentary leader retired and Athol Trollip won this seat (Mailand Guardian 2009), although he later lost it to Lindiwe Mazibuko-the DA’s first black parliamentary leader. It has been argued thatin terms of racial diversity Mazibuko is most certainly the bettercandidate (Fakir 2011). In 2014 Mmusi Maimane took over the post ofparliamentary leader. In 2010 the Independent Democrats announcedthey would formally merge with the DA by 2014. More recently, inJanuary 2014 electoral party AGANG, formed in 2013 under theleadership of Mamphela Ramphele, merged with the DA, with Rampheleslated as the party’s presidential candidate (City Press 2014). Thismerger was short-lived with Ramphele withdrawing her support andreturning to lead AGANG. Ultimately, the DA’s history is constantlybeing written. They are growing, expanding and changing, evolvinginto a more diverse group that they would maintain is reflective ofbroader South African society.

Figure 1: The evolution of the Democratic Alliance

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U n i t e d P a r t y ( 1 9 3 4 )

P r o g r e s si v e P a r t y ( 1 9 5 9 )

P r o g r e s si v e r e f o r m p a r t y ( 1 9 7 5 )R e f o r m P a r t y ( f o r m e d i n 1 9 7 4 a s b r e a k a w a y f r o m U P ) j o i n s P P

P r o g r e s si v e F e d e r a l P a r t y ( 1 9 7 7 )

D e m o c r a ti c P a r t y ( 1 9 8 9 )

D e m o c r a t i c A l l i a n c e ( 2 0 0 0 )A m a l g a m a t i o n o f D P , N N P a n d F e d e r a l A l l i a n c eN N P l e a v e s t o j o i n A N C ( 2 0 0 1 )I D j o i n s D A c o a l i t i o n ( 2 0 0 6 )I D a g r e e s t o m e r g e w i t h D A ( 2 0 1 0 )

3. Ideology and Policy: from the Progressive Party tothe Democratic Party

Through the multiple twists and turns in the development of the DA,there is one clear strand: all the parties broadly supported theideology of liberalism. This section will look at how theprecursors to the DA interpreted and applied liberal ideology andthe relationship this had to the idea of non-racialism. The partiesdid not expressly refer to the concept of non-racialism and so theirapproach to the idea will largely be teased out throughinterrogating their political and economic policies, and throughunpacking the meaning of liberalism itself. It is not possible toprovide a full historical narrative, thus this section will look atkey themes and draw on significant moments in the parties’ historyin regard to their approach to non-racialism.

Constitutionalism and a Bill of Rights

Early liberal thinkers such as John Locke argued that all humanshave the right to life, liberty and property and to creategovernments to protect these rights. John Stuart Mill supported theliberal view that governments can only restrict freedom if they arepreventing harm. Thus liberalism supports the idea of organisedgovernment that will maintain law and order but not infringe onhuman rights. Equality before the law, Constitutionalism, and theprotection of civil liberties are all core liberal tenets (Heywood2005; Jackson and Jackson 2008).

In this vein, the PP was the first party in parliament to produce anew comprehensive constitutional model (perhaps the first supportinga non-racial and democratic South Africa), under the guidance of theMolteno Commission. The Commission, operating between 1960 and 1962,interpreted its task as formulating constitutional principles for amulti-racial system. In keeping with liberal values the MoltenoCommission believed enforced separation (and enforced integration)between races was undesirable and that “free individual choice inall matters of social intercourse” should be encouraged (Bruckner deVilliers Research 1975). An important aspect of the MoltenoCommission relating to non-racialism was its support for a Bill ofRights. This Bill supported substantive freedoms and liberties forall South African citizens, a viewpoint that was certainly not

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endorsed by the ruling NP (Dubow 2012:58). It specified theprotection of rights such as freedom of religion, speech, movementand association, equal protection under law, and the equal status ofofficial languages (Eglin 2007:100). As Dugard (1987) notes, afterthe Motleno Commission “a Bill of Rights became the politicaldarling of the liberal cause”. This indicates that the PP clearlyrejected discrimination towards non-whites that would impact ontheir individual human rights. The PP’s support for a Bill of Rightscould also been seen as one precursor to the Bill of Rights we findin South Africa’s Constitution today.

Continuing this legacy, the DP played a significant role inpromoting liberal values during multi-party negotiations in the1990s. As Beinart (2001:281) explains, the DP’s electoral supportmay have been relatively small but its delegations at negotiatingplatforms were effective in influencing issues such as setting up aConstitutional Court, instilling a Bill of Rights and establishingupper and lower houses of Parliament. South African History Online(n.d.1) archives concur that at “Codesa and the subsequent Multi-Party Negotiating Process held at the World Trade Centre in KemptonPark, the DP played a vital role in the negotiation of an InterimConstitution which included most of the principles and ideals aroundwhich the PP was formed in 1959”. The DP thus felt (with goodreason) that many of its liberal principles were being enshrined inthe new South Africa.

Race and voting (in)equality

While clearly supporting the liberal value of freedom, the PP wasmore conflicted in its approach to the notion of equality; whichindeed has a direct bearing on its approach to non-racialism. At itsfirst Congress in 1959 the party rejected racial discrimination intheory but then proposed a franchise that only allowed non-whiteadult citizens who qualified on educational or economic achievementto vote (Suzman 1993:48). Following this the Molteno Commission toosupported a system of qualified rather than universal franchise. Thefranchise policy proposed giving the vote to all South Africans overthe age of 21 provided they met minimum educational, income orproperty qualifications. A supplementary voters’ role would be inplace for those who did not qualify but who could pass a literacytest in one of the official languages (Bruckner de Villiers Research

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1975; Strangewayes-Booth1976; Eglin 2007). A number of the membersof the Commission, including black members, did not sign theMajority report that supported this point of view. S. Cooppan, ablack member, argued that limited franchise would result in thesubstitution of class over racial division. The majority ofCommissioners ignored this warning, primarily concerned with thethreat of African nationalism (Hackland 1984). They agreed that allpolitically conscious black South Africans demanded adult suffrage,but argued that this was not because they supported the values of‘personal freedom’, ‘the rule of law’ and ‘ordered progress’ that‘Western democracy was conceived in’, but rather because they wereinspired by ‘non-white nationalism’ which would ultimately beultimately ‘totalitarian in its logical outcome’ (Molteno 1960).

In supporting a limited franchise, the party yielded to a fear ofAfrican nationalism and clearly promoted the racist idea that thereis a fundamental difference between difference races, with someraces inherently inferior to others. Indeed, according to onecommentator

The constitutional and franchise proposals adopted by the party in1960 and 1962 were conservative and racist. Little notice was takenof the dissenting opinions of the black Commission members…and theNational Executive of the party actually took a more, rather thanless, conservative position than the majority of the Commission. Theparty was concerned with making the minimum concessions to buy offblack protests and defuse the nationalist struggle while appeasingwhite prejudice and assuring whites of continuing power and control(Hackland 1984).

A limited franchise policy, although progressively more non-racialthan policies of the NP or UP, fell far short of embracing the non-essentialist, or non-racialisation notion of non-racialism. This aspectof the Molteno Commission shows that, at best, the party supported amultiracial view of non-racialism, but even this may be too generousan assessment given its approach to a limited franchise, based onracial criteria.

Members of the PP at the time would no doubt argue that supporting aracially based qualified franchise was necessary in order not toalienate white voters. Indeed historian Beinart (2001:188) pointsout that at the time supporting a qualified non-racial franchise was

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“a challenging concept to whites”. Although racist, the policy diddemonstrate a rejection of apartheid ideology. Nonetheless the ideaof a qualified franchise was an anathema to the Liberal Party and toblack political movements and it was roundly rejected by them(Strangewayes-Booth1976:191). One could argue that it also did notsit easily with liberal values of voting equality and challenged thecore principles of the party. Indeed, by 1978, following the adventof the PFP, the party changed its stance to support universal adultfranchise.

In its 1978 Constitution the PFP stated that all South African’shave equal rights to full citizenship and that there should be nodiscrimination on the grounds of race, colour, religion or sex. Itfurther explained that political rights must be shared by all SouthAfrican citizens and those systems that “could lead to racialdomination are rejected”. It supported the provision of “equaleducational opportunities for citizens of all races” and clearlystated that statutory or administrative discrimination on thegrounds of race was unacceptable. It also rejected the “compulsoryremoval of populations” but accepted that where inhabitants ofcertain areas freely choose to move towards self-determination thatis respected, however no person should be compelled to become acitizen of an area other than the one in which he is permanentlyresident.

The PFP was thus moving towards unambiguous support for equalitybetween races. This move was heightened when the PFP acceptedconstitutional proposals from the Slabbert Committee, presented in1978. The proposals highlighted the party's commitment to "an equalright to full citizenship" for all South Africans. Thus, thequalified franchise was abandoned and a universal adult suffrage wasproposed. It called for a sharing of political rights by allcitizens and equal economic opportunity and ruled out "allinequitable forms of statutory or administrative discrimination onthe grounds of race, colour, religion or sex'' as "unacceptable inthe ideal society for which the party will strive" (Hackland 1984).

The Slabbert Committee also rejected a Westminster-style system andchose instead a system that included proportional representation,decentralized executive, legislative and judicial systems, and aminority veto. While this system was designed to guarantee the

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impossibility of majority domination, the PFP were clear that therewas no racist motivation. According to Eglin “it would be a completemisrepresentation of the recommendations in relation to dominationif the minority veto is presented as a measure to preserve theprivileged position of a minority at the expense of other groups insociety” (Hackland 1984).

As the PFP progressed their support for a non-racial South Africabecame more explicit. In particular Van Zyl Slabbert (1985)described how the party was “fundamentally opposed” to legalmeasures that prevented different race groups from voluntarilyassociating together. They rejected categorisation of one’s race atbirth through the Population Registration Act and the prohibition ofsexual relations across difference races through the Immorality Act,among other acts. Certainly, according to Hackland (1984) the 1978Slabbert Committee saw the need for a break with the ideologies ofthe past, both liberal individualist and racist, and the adoption ofnew ideological forms. This stance begs the question however, ofwhy the parties continued to operate within an racially unequallegislative system.

Working Within the Apartheid System

In its early formation the PP declared parliament as the main arenafor its struggle, as opposed to, for example, the Liberal Party whochose not to participate in an illegitimate parliamentary system.This choice by the PP led to many challenges and inconsistencies forthe party as it had to adapt its programmes to suit the wishes of atleast a portion of the white electorate (see Erkens 1985:10). As wehave seen, one early example was its initial approach to a limitedfranchise.

In answering the question of whether participation in the apartheidpolitical system, specifically parliament, conferred legitimacy onapartheid, David Welsh (2006: 12) argues that parliament “provided aplatform, and media coverage ensured that both the critique ofapartheid and the prospect of a more democratic and open societywere kept before the public”, and that ultimately fundamental changeto the system did eventually come through Parliament, (which heclarifies in no way diminishes the role played by extra-parliamentary movements). If the PFP had pulled out of parliament inprotest, Welsh argues it would have “been a one way ticket into the

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political wilderness” and they would have lost any influence theyhad on Nationalist thinking and the white voting public (see alsoEglin 2007:220). In reality if the party had fundamentallychallenged the system it would have lost support from those itneeded to function effectively in parliamentary politics (Kotzé2001).

In 1985 van Zyl Slabbert (1985:42-43) explained how important hefelt the parliamentary platform was in challenging apartheidpractices. In discussing the core functions of the PFP hehighlighted the importance of the parliamentary platform to counterracial polarization. He argued that parliament could be used tobroaden constitutional debates and oppose apartheid policies. It isalso essential to use parliamentary processes to question theactions of government through ‘question time’; “it generates a greatdeal of information which the government does not sometimes want tomake available” and assists people both within and outside SouthAfrica to better understand the nature of ‘the conflict’. Thesepoints however, must be taken in a context where, within a year vanZyl Slabbert had resigned as leader of the PFP as he believed extra-parliamentary politics to be more meaningful to the country (Suzman1993:254, Eglin 2007:218).

Through its belief in the potential of the parliamentary system,during the 1980s and 1990s the PFP, and later the DP, focussed onthe importance of constitutional negotiation. For van Zyl Slabbert(1985:44) it was “fundamental and inevitable” that whites would playa very prominent role in the transition to a democratic system;“there is no peaceful constitutional change possible…without whiteinitiative”. An important aim of the PFP and DP party was thus toform a bridge between parliamentary and extra-parliamentary groupsthrough the use of negotiation. The party was open to talking to allpolitical groupings during the transition, from the Pan AfricanCongress to right-wing Afrikaners (Kotzé 2001). Southern (2011:282)maintains, “Its presence should not be ignored or overlooked as apersistent parliamentary critic of apartheid policies”. In thiscontext it displayed a relatively non-discriminatory approach tonon-white political groups. However, it is clear that the party didnot fundamentally contest the essential legitimacy of white controlas it still participated in the racist political system; this raises

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the question of whether relatively ineffective opposition within thesystem, in practice, further legitimised the system.

It useful at this juncture to briefly discuss the membershipcomposition of the PP and PFP. Did they have non-racial membership?Certainly in its early days the PP supported, and indeed had,multiracial party membership (van Zyl Slabbert 1985:39). The partyhad little opportunity to build up a multi-racial membership basehowever, as, in 1968 the Prohibition of Political Interference Act(No. 51 of 1968) precluded different racial groups from being partof the same organisation.1 The PP decided to remain politicallyfunctional as a whites-only party. In 1978 the PFP stated in itsConstitution that any non-white person who had been a member of thePP prior to the promulgation of the Political Interference Actwould, once the Act was repealed, automatically become, once again,a full member of the party. In theory then, the PFP supported non-racial membership, but this was never tested in practice until afterthe party became the DP (when membership was open to all races). If,as the Liberal Party did, it felt multi-racial membership was non-negotiable it would have to have left formal parliamentary politics,which as discussed above the party chose not to do. At this stagethen, non-racialism was, at best, a theoretical aspiration of thePFP while racism was, in reality, practiced by the party2.

Economic Policy and Big Business

A key theme to address when unpacking the parties’ approach to non-racialism is economic policy as this points to the substantive wayin which the parties’ intended to address the racially framedeconomic legacies of apartheid. From an economic viewpoint,liberalism supports the idea of minimum government interference inthe economy. The state can promote competition, prevent monopoliesand provide consumers with information but should do little else.Liberal thinkers believe that spontaneous individual choice is more1 This Act led to the disbanding of the anti-apartheid Liberal Party.2 In terms of its active white members, van Zyl Slabbert (1985:39) explains thatover 90% of supporters speak English and the ‘typical’ supporter lives in urbanisedareas of “the Cape” and “Transvaal”. PFP members were believed to be well educated,likely to have attended University and been a “member of the upper social strata.The self-employed are also overrepresented in the party, as are Jews, Catholics andAtheists”. In general then the PFP was largely supported by the middle to upper-class white, urban, English speaker.

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effective than government regulation in coping with complexsocieties and that individuals know better than the state what is intheir best interests. From a traditional liberal standpointgovernment has no mandate to transfer wealth by subsiding the weakor poor as advantages generated by the rich will filter down to thepoor. Redistribution is economically inefficient and incompatiblewith equality of rights. Traditional liberals did note that economicinequality is unavoidable but believed through enacting theirprinciples eventually everyone will have a higher standard of living(Heywood 2005; Jackson and Jackson 2008).

Before looking more closely at economic policy it is important tonote that one of the significant features of the PP, PFP and DP hasbeen their close association with big business. It is clear that“the Progressive Party associated since its inception with bigbusiness” (Cobbett, et al). Indeed, well known business man and headof Anglo-American Harry Oppenheimer was to “play an important rolein the formation of the Progressive Party and its development overthe years” (Eglin 2007:61). He provided both much needed funds andpublic support for the PP and its subsequent incarnations. Hackland(1984:131) argues that after the PP’s serious defeat in the 1966elections that the party decided to direct its efforts andpropaganda directly at ‘business’. Critics of the DP in the late1990s claimed it was “hand in glove” with big business and concernedabout preserving white economic privilege (Worden 2000:168).

The PP, PFP and subsequently DP’s close relationship with bigbusiness undoubtedly influenced their economic policies, as didliberal values. In the early days of the PP, for example, the partypartly supported the restoration of the freedom of trade unions, butqualified this position with the view that unskilled workers beorganized into unions under the control of the Department of Labour.This placated the concerns of mining capitalists (Hackland1984:130).

The 1978 PFP Constitution did, however, specify that all citizenshave the right to an equal opportunity to share in the system offree economic enterprise. In this way the PFP was attempting tofollow core liberal values of equal access to economic opportunity.The 1981 PFP Economic Commission further proposed the establishmentof a corporatist relationship between capital, management and labour

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based on the understanding that each have an interest in the welfareof the other. The party progressed further by changing the PP’spolicy to call for the right for all workers to organize in tradeunions of their choice. The PFP also wanted to avoid nationalizationand limit the state’s role in planning. The Slabbert commissionperceived the need to create an ideology of state neutrality andseparation from capital. The commission believed that the role ofgovernment is to distribute wealth, not to create it, as this wasthe role of business (Hackland 1984).

A common, and indeed liberal, theme running through their economicpolicy was that the redistribution of wealth should not entail thereduction in the wealth of the wealthy. Thus “the wide gap in incomeand wealth in South Africa requires special action to enable thosein a disadvantaged position to better their situation…This aim canbe achieved only by lifting the under-privileged rather than byimpairing the standards enjoyed by the more fortunate” (Schwarzcited in Hackland 1984:133-4). The language used here is clearly de-racial, in the sense that it ignores racial realities, and sosupports an economic theory that the market is colour blind.

By the 1980s the PFP may have been a party committed to non-racialvalues but it did not focus on a need for redistributive economicpolicies. The PFP’s economic approach was one of allowing capitalismand the free market to flourish and through this ensuring equalopportunity for all races. The DP too, while recognising the extremeeconomic injustices created by apartheid, focused on “creatingeconomies that can achieve rapid growth in order to overcome pastdiscrimination and present inequality” (Leon n.d.1) rather than onusing the state to transfer wealth. Economically the DP supportedliberal principles, such as the privatisation of the production ofall goods and services as well as the outsourcing of municipalservices (Leon 1999a). Certainly precursors to the DA did not followthe ANC’s class-based perspective that achieving non-racialismrequires the racialisation of economic policy. From this perspectiveit could be argued that the party’s economic policies supported anon-racialisation understanding of non-racialism, in that theydisregarded racial categories, seeing only individuals in acapitalist economy. However, their economic polices provided littlesense of how to ‘level the playing field’ in order to create equal

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economic opportunities for all races. The party’s economic stancewas one that fell short of providing real solutions to structuralracism in South Africa.

(In)visible Race: The Individual as Primary Political Unit

As the ideology of a rising commercial class, early liberal thinkersregarded the individual as the primary political unit. From a moralstandpoint liberalism supports the notions of freedom, dignity andequality and the idea that individuals must be allowed theopportunity to develop their talents, regardless of race, to thefullest (Heywood 2005; Jackson and Jackson 2008). Certainly, in theSouth African context the DP and its precursors largely regarded theindividual as a primary political unit as opposed to, for example,the NP’s view that South Africans are first and foremost members ofprimordial groups (that struggle to relate to each other and thusfunction best under separate political systems). Thus liberalism forthe DP, for example, meant “rejecting identity politics andovercoming ethnic, religious and racial differences to build unitedcommunities based on universal humanistic values” (Leon n.d.1).Similarly Erkens (1985:12) argues that liberal parties such as thePP would reject apartheid philosophy as individuals, as part ofraces or nations “by no means embark on their separate developmentunder the same equitable starting conditions”. Although broadlysupporting the ‘individual’ perspective of liberalism, Van ZylSlabbert (1985:45) did note that there are a variety of validreasons for group identification, including, ethnic, religious,language and ideological reasons. Overall, however, individualrights must be upheld. For liberal parties, individuals mustautonomously decide what is in their best interest (Kotzé 2001:123).

Yet, in 1999 the DP fought the elections on the campaign slogan FightBack. Although not expressly racist, it certainly appeared to focuson group identity, drawing parallels with the reactionary white fearof assimilation with black South Africans during apartheid, The SwartGevaar (the black fear). On the one hand the DP was standing for coreliberal values that centre on protecting the Constitution and actingas a check and balance to the government. In practice however, manySouth Africans implicitly understood the party to be saying thatSouth Africa was being overwhelmed by a black majority that neededto be fought against. It certainly targeted minority groups (Jolobe

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2009:133). Indeed, Maloka (2001:233) argues that the DP opted “for aroute that led to the abandonment of its liberal ideology. It nowprojects itself as a representative of white minority interests”.This view may be too extreme given the fact that the party in factgained Coloured and Indian voter support. The DA’s own Gavin Davis(Southern 2011:285) points out that the election campaign resultedin the party bonding with Coloured, Indian and White voters, as eachgroup harboured fears of being excluded in a country that theyperceived was increasingly favouring Africanisation. This furtherpoints to the likelihood that the fight back slogan compounded alreadyracialised electoral politics. It certainly did not strengthen aview that the DP was supporting non-racialism, nor individual ratherthan collective identity.

Conclusion

In concluding this section it is clear that the DP and it precursorsneither put forward, nor instrumentalised, a uniform understandingof non-racialism. In early incantations as the PP, and later as theDP the approach to race relations was fundamentally incongruent.From one perspective the parties could be viewed as overtly racistwhere they: supported a racially qualified franchise; whites-onlyparty membership; operated within (and potentially legitimised) aracially delimitated parliamentary system; explicitly campaigned tominority racial groups; and as the DP, in the guise of liberalism,did not address the role whites, as a racial group, played inimplementation and maintenance of apartheid. Certainly, the DP,throughout its existence, retained an overwhelmingly white middle-class support base (Kotzé 2001; Jolobe, 2009). This has implicationsfor the type of issues it focused on and its approach to non-racialism in practice. For example, in a 1999 poll, 67% of DPsupporters indicated that fighting crime should be a main priority(See Kotzé 2001). This is clearly not a policy focus that wouldsupport core concerns of building non-racialism. It also does notdeal with socio-economic equality or the building of a non-racialsociety. From this viewpoint the DP (and its precursors) could beaccused of a shallow and convenient interpretation of the concept ofnon-racialism.

From a different perspective, the parties arguably promoted amultiracial understanding of non-racialism: “the white liberal

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Progressive Party…made a great deal of the idea that multiracialismwas an undeniable reality that the government could ill afford toignore” (Cambridge History of South Africa 2012). Party leadersoften expressed a view that different race groups were equal to eachother. Suzman (1993:49) explains how the party had “manyconsultations with Black leaders”, describing a meeting with OliverTambo and other prominent members of the ANC at her house as well avisit to Albert Luthuli to gain support for the emergence of the newPP (see also Everatt, 2009 :203). In his analysis of whiteopposition to apartheid in the 1950s, Everatt further notes thatmany more whites may have opposed apartheid thatn the small bandusually cited (i.e. the Liberal Party, the congress movement, theCommunist Party of South Africa and the trade union movement)including “later Progressive Party members and the like” (Everatt,2009:18). This implies that the PP did not support racially basedlaws and racial categorisation of society.

From a third perspective, the PP, PFP and DP subscribed to idealsthat support an essentialist understanding of non-racialism. Theytheoretically placed individual identity and merit above that ofracial groupings. When asked on public platforms if theimplementation of PP policies could result in a black PrimeMinister, then leader of the party Steytler answered “Yes, ofcourse”. Steytler explained that “it’s not the colour of a man thatis important, it’s his merit as an individual” (Swart 1991:111.) Infact, in their approach to individual rights and capitalist economicpolicy one could argue they did not see race at all, even if theireconomic views on how to achieve a non-racial society required avery long term, and somewhat optimistic outlook of the role the freemarket can play in creating meaningful ‘equal opportunity’. Taken atface value, their understanding of non-racialism would be that ofnon-racialisation; a rejection of race thinking and racialism. Theremay be no simple categorisation of these parties’ approaches to non-racialism, but their views certainly do not resonate with those inthe ANC who see achieving non-racialism as a class based projectthat necessitates, in the interim, a focus on race. The parties’approach to non-racialism also strongly reflects the contradictionsin supporting the theory of liberalism while fearing the notion ofAfrican nationalism, and the tension inherent in trying to place theindividual as primary political unit, but still appeal to identitygroups to win voter support.

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4. The Current Democratic Alliance: Transformationand Contestation

How does the DA currently understand and instrumentalise non-racialism? Do they now present a coherent and comprehensive visionof non-racialism? In analysing their approach to non-racialism it isalso important to question whether the party’s policies and ideologyhave moved far from the liberal ideological roots of itspredecessors. To interrogate the DA’s understanding of non-racialismit is necessary to look at two key, and interlinked, areas: theparty’s support for the ‘individual political unity’ versuscollective identity (and its concomitant approach to partymembership) and economic policy, including racial redress. Bydrawing on available documents3 including the DA’s FederalConstitution, vision documents, election manifestos, economic policydocuments and speeches it is possible to chart the party’s approachto non-racialism and race relations more broadly.

Individual versus Collective Identity

In its early days the DA did not expressly refer to the term non-racialism, nor did it detail how it would define the concept. Its‘vision’ and ‘principles’ focussed on the idea of an ‘OpenOpportunity Society’, as set out in its 20024 Federal Constitution.This philosophy is underscored by the idea that “The dignity ofevery person and the freedoms enshrined in the constitution cannotfully be realised unless everyone has the means to pursue his ownhappiness and improve the quality of her life…The creation ofmeaningful opportunity must be central to the programme ofgovernment.” The Federal Constitution lists 18 principles to whichthe party subscribes with a focus on traditional liberal values suchas the right to freedom of association, the rejection of unfairdiscrimination, equality before the law, the right to private

3 Although the DA publishes its current policy documents on its website, it must be noted that it is very difficult to find historical official DA documents through a web search. A very limited number can be found in libraries. We did request a comprehensive set of documents from the party headquarters, but we never received these.

4 This Constitution was amended in 2005 and 2007, however it is very difficult to track what the amendments were as we were unable to find an original version of the Constitution. The 2012 Federal Constitution has no changes to its vision, mission and principles (DA 2012).

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ownership and to participate freely in the market economy as well asthe “progressive realisation” of access to housing, health servicesand social security for all people who are unable to helpthemselves. While the vision does support the idea that SouthAfricans should aspire to relate to a ‘South African identity’ aheadof any other ascribed group identity (noting this requiresovercoming historical racial divisions) it still largely supports aliberal notion of individual identity above group identity.

Similarly, the DA’s 2004 election manifesto put forward numerousparty positions yet none specifically referred to group basedidentities, or indeed mentioned different race groups. The primaryway in which it expressly dealt with race-related issues was througha discussion on race-based quotas. Here the party acknowledgedhistorical injustices and the need to overcome these but came outstrongly against the race-oriented policy of affirmative action. Itfelt ‘racial imbalances’ in the economy could be addressed throughpolices that focus on individual merit, not race.

By late 2004, after a party wide ‘visioning process’ the DA, for thefirst time started to explicitly use the term non-racialism in itsdocuments and vision, and in so doing present a more nuanced view ofindividual versus collective identity in a South African setting. Ina speech at the party’s Federal Congress summarising outcomes of thevisioning process, DA leader Leon (2004a) explains that theoverarching vision of the party had remained broadly the same,however, he lists five ‘cardinal principles’ on which the DA stand.First remains the core liberal idea of “individual freedom andopportunity” with the second of these “non-racialism and diversity”.The remaining values include being an effective opposition, a caringparty and having integrity and accountability. Leon then notes thatalthough the individual should be the ‘touchstone of value in oursociety’, individual identities are shaped by the communities inwhich they live.

In unpacking the new DA principles, Leon equates non-racialism anddiversity to the idea that everyone is equal even if they havedifferences of religion, culture etc. The party acknowledges theimpact of apartheid racism and exploitation and the concomitant needfor measures to increase access to opportunity for those “fellowcitizens who were deprived and oppressed in the past”. However, Leon

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is very clear, that from his perspective, the answer to racism is‘not more racism’; the DA will not “put colour above all else” interms of jobs and public services. Thus, the party believes in‘diversity’ but not the ANC’s version of ‘representivity’; whererepresentivity is based on the idea that only someone from aparticular group can represent that group. Leon equates this withVerwoerd’s apartheid views.

While demonstrating a greater appreciation of the complexities ofsocial identity Leon (2008) believed that the ANC’s perspectives on“demographic representivity” ignored individual differences withinrace groups. Certainly, from his perspective the world view of theDA which sees the individual as the building block of society is afundamentally different view to that of the ANC which sees “theracial group as the building block of society”. Thus, Leon was verycritical of the ANC’s approach to non-racialism. He stated thatracialised thinking “has been resurrected in the past several yearsby government policies that put race first and foremost, whilepretending to honour the principle of non-racialism”. He felt thatthen President Thabo Mbeki had continually ‘played the race card’undermining what the true principle of non-racialism should entail:not seeing race (Leon 2004a). In a BBC (2004) interview Leonexplained

…the Constitution itself—which we all agreed to—is predicated onnonracialism. But to simply start a racial scorecard and say we havenot transformed unless we have X percentage blacks and X percentagewhites, is actually a re-racialisation. And it is that which we takeour stand against”…. what you don’t do is re-introduce racialism intothis society…then you’re saying that the only antidote to racism ismore racism...I am not interested or obsessed with people’s racialidentity. The previous South Africa failed because of that fact.

While at times recognising the complex manner in which SouthAfricans ascribe to a social identity, and noting historical racialissues, the DA at this point in its trajectory, largely maintained aliberal outlook, avoiding references to racial identity, rathercelebrating the individual as primary political unit. On the surfacethis presents a non-essentialised view of non-racialism; however itsidesteps the reality of socioeconomic inequality experiencedlargely along racial cleavages. It also, as we shall see, posed a

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challenge for the party when it came to attracting voter support andbroadening its membership base.

The Necessity of Embracing Racial Identity: Rebranding the DA to Attract ‘Black’ Support

It was becoming increasingly clear that if the party ever hoped tomove from the margins of opposition into government it would need toattract black African support. This is not to say that SouthAfricans only vote along racial lines; however, evidence suggeststhat DA was strongly associated with protecting white, or minority,interests which alienated it from large sectors of society. Recentresearch shows that 56% percent of voters who identify with the DAspeak Afrikaans and nearly 35% speak English, with the remainingsmall percentage divided into various African languages (Graham2012:3). Demographic profiling of DA supporters leads Graham toconclude that:

The main opposition parties are not perceived to provide viablepolitical alternatives for many black voters. The DA is also seen asan overwhelmingly ‘white’ party by many blacks and is thus not asuitable alternative to the ANC given the country’s historicalcontext.

In 2006 party strategist, Ryan Coetzee argued that the party neededto take a “long, hard and critical look” at its performance amongAfrican voters and establish what the obstacles are to winning theirsupport. The DA’s inability to win African votes would lead to DA“irrelevance and slow disintegration” (Rossouw and Dawes 2011;Jolobe 2012). Certainly in the 2009 elections the strategicobjective of the DA was to “make inroads into the black community”.DA MPs conceded that “race is central to voting in South Africa”(see Southern 2011:290,296).

Thus it is not surprising that, as far back as 2004, Leon (2004a)stated in a speech summarising Federal Congress outcomes that theDA’s vision of non-racialism and diversity included implementing aprogramme to achieve “better diversity in our party's membership andour leadership structures”; in other words to increase support inblack communities. The document called for DA leaders to “workclosely with black DA activists and assist them directly inaddressing the people's needs”. Although this presents a cleartension between the ‘non-racial’, ‘individual’ as primary politicalunit approach and embracing racial identity it is a tension that

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arguably results from the political necessity of mobilising votersupport. Certainly in the past the party lacked racial diversity inits active membership and, as the DP, had not actively courted blackmembers (Jolobe 2009:132).

It was, however, only with Helen Zille taking the leadership reignsin 2007 that the DA began to overtly re-brand itself in order toattract black support and be deemed more inclusive; a party "thatdelivers for all". According to one researcher (Sauter 2011) thenew DA leader marked a new era for the party, its image, itsposition and even their position in society. The party continued tospeak about issues that cut across class such as service deliveryissues, poverty, housing, health and unemployment, however, more sothan in the past, the party, and Zille in particular, targeted blackvoters, campaigning in townships. She frequently and publicallyspoke in a black African language (Xhosa) to break the perceivedbonds of exclusivity in the DA. In rebranding, the party hoped tolose its image as a white, or indeed minority only, party (Jolobe2009). In an attempt to show that it fully embraced all race groupsin South Africa the party also used symbolic imagery such aspictures of DA members and leaders from different races groupsstanding together (DA 2009). This distinct change of image beforethe 2009 election amounted, according to Southern (2011:287) to thekeenest attempt, out of all South African political parties, to dojustice to the idea of ‘unity in diversity’: “it conveys the ideathat the party is paying more than lip service to post-apartheidSouth Africa’s core principle of non-racialism”.

Under the new DA brand Zille, in contrast to earlier DA writings,actually referred to race groups. In one of her weekly newslettersshe explains that under apartheid “blacks were far poorer thanwhites and had worse education, housing and health care” and thatthe remedy for this is to “give full and equal opportunity to blackpeople”. She is quick, however, to decry the manner in which the ANCimplements policies that are intended to address racial inequality(Zille 2009). Zille moves away from Leon’s approach of criticisingthe ANC for its approach to ‘representivity’ (which he sees asfocussing group identity) and instead criticises the party for beinga closed, crony society, where the prospects of “each individual aredetermined by his links and access to the small leadership networkin the ruling party” (DA manifesto 2009). In this way Zille is able

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to criticise the ruling party but avoid a negative focus on racethat could be seen as indicating a lack of support for race-basedeconomic transformation policies. It is also perhaps indicative of aDA that may, on day, choose to support policies that are based onracial representivity. These viewpoints certainly marked a shift inthe party’s direction regarding the salience of race-based identity.The party may not have moved so far as to support race-basedpolicies; however it was a step change from focusing on minorityconcerns.

This change was reflected in the 2009 DA election manifesto, whichwent further than previous manifestos in addressing the complexitiesof identity politics. It provided some understanding of the DA’svision of a non-racial society when it described the country as a‘melting pot of cultures’, where all citizens should be made to feelwelcome, and individual identities celebrated, while still unitingunder a common South African identity. Section six of the sevensections of the manifesto explicitly focused on the idea of a“society that has a place for all”. Here the manifesto looked at howeducation, the media, the Arts, heritage sites and publicparticipation can be used to ‘build a common South Africanidentity’, ensure tolerance for diversity and buildmulticulturalism. Moving somewhat from the core liberal value ofindividual above group, the manifesto also puts forward the idea ofsupporting diversity by ensuring that any group that meets certaincriteria could apply to establish a representative body that wouldthen maintain and promote its cultural interests. In essence themanifesto promoted neither a clear essentialist view of non-racialism nor a multicultural one. In conjunction with itsrebranding exercise under the new leadership of Zille, the vagueapproach in the manifesto towards non-racialism can perhaps be seenas a further step away from the liberal notion of seeing beyondrace, towards a more complex, politically pragmatic, multiracialview of non-racialism.

A Reversion to Liberal Roots?

While the party may have, through necessity, started to accept thesalience of racial identity in South Africa, there was by no means afundamental or consistent change towards supporting group-basedidentity politics. In an interview with this author in 2011,

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discussing her understanding of the concept ‘non-racialism’, partyleader Zille clearly favoured the liberal view of individualidentity:

My perception of non-racialism is approaching each person as a uniqueindividual and not merely as some kind of representative of thecategory. So race is one identity marker and obviously given ourhistory it is an important identity marker, but it is not the onlyidentity marker. To make race subsume everything else and to believethat racial categories are the only ones that can define a person’saspirations, views, positions, political philosophy, is fundamentallyfalse. So each individual has many, many identities. The commonexperience of a racial reality is certainly one identity but itcannot be seen as the defining identity imposed on other people. Ifthat is the defining identity people choose for themselves that isgood for them, they can do that. But in a free society people don’thave an identity imposed upon them by virtue of racial categoryprescribed by others. That is my understanding. That is also the DA’sperspective.

In a similar vein the 2011 DA local government manifesto hardlyreferred to race issues at all. The same liberal commitment to anopen opportunity society is present, with a clear focus onopportunity relating to redress of historical inequality; howeverthere is no mention of the principle of non-racialism. There is alsono explicit discussion of diversity or building a ‘society for all’,beyond assertions to deliver services ‘for all’ with a focus onpoorer areas. The manifesto, as with 2009, did however support theeffective implementation of BBBEE. That strengthening ‘diversity’ orbuilding a multicultural society was not overtly mentioned in themanifesto may simple reflect an occupation with very local issuesrelevant to municipal mandates, rather than broader ideologicaldiscussion. However, one is left with the question of how the DAenvisions building non-racialism at the most local, and indeedpotentially most relevant, level of the community. The support foran individualised notion of identity also begs the question of howthis perspective can be reconciled with the DA’s earlier call tofocus on historical redress and give ‘full and equal opportunity toblack people’?

A further example of the DA’s tightrope walk between embracingracial identity and keeping true to liberal values could be seen inthe way in which its rebranding exercise played out in the lead up

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to the 2014 election. The party still recognised it had to attractblack voters, but it now attempted to do so not primarily throughrelating to, and identifying with their skin colour or culture, butthrough identifying with their history; that of being oppressedunder apartheid. In this way they are able to avoid a focus onracial classification.

In order to undo the negative associations many South Africans haveof the party in regard to its approach to race relations and itsrole in the apartheid system, the DA attempted to reframe its pastand its association with anti-apartheid activists. Thenparliamentary leader Lindiwe Mazibuko (2012), for example, in aspeech on leadership explained that “A nation reveals itself notonly by the leaders it remembers, but also by the leaders itproduces. Biko paid the ultimate price for his vision of a non-racial society”. By mentioning Biko, a fierce anti-apartheidactivist, Mazibuko associates the DA with a highly respected fighterfor equality and emancipation from racial domination. Moreover, sheties his vision of non-racialism with the DA's by stating that, “TheDA is not only concerned with winning the battle for votes, asimportant as it is…We want to win the battle of values; non-racialism, diversity and difference, and a strong society whereeveryone is an ‘insider’”. And, indeed, here the DA reverts back tonon-racialism as being a core value of the party.

The DA also used highly regarded anti-apartheid documents such asthe Freedom Charter to further rebrand their history (and depicttheir commitment to the idea of non-racialism). The party statedthat “We recognise the importance of the Freedom Charter inarticulating a non- racial vision for South Africa…at a time whenthe apartheid state was entrenching racial discrimination on thestatute books” (DA n.d b). The DA positions itself in agreement witha seminal document in South African liberation history. It thenattempts to weaken the ANC’s ownership of this vision by statingthat “the Charter’s claim that ‘South Africa belongs to all who livein it, black and white’, is being undermined by the ANC’s project ofracial nationalism”. In depicting the ANC as fault-bearers for notupholding such a profoundly important concept the DA is bothreframing its own history and implicitly taking ownership of thecorrect way in which non-racialism should be understood andimplemented.

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The re-branding of the DA further included political campaigns suchas "Know your DA" which place a focus on Helen Suzman as a politicalleader and icon. The DA disseminated images of Suzman with Mandelaand used her legacy to claim a position in society as a non-racialparty who always rejected apartheid and who were pioneers (withinthe system) in the fight against apartheid. Indeed in their currentvision statement the party explicitly refer to Mandela where theystate that a final concept in their vision is: “the idea that SouthAfrica is ‘for all’, or as Nelson Mandela famously said, ‘belongs toall who live in it, both black and white’”. In references to theFreedom Charter and in the ‘know your DA’ campaign the party arestill able to project, to some degree, a liberal, non-essentialisedversion of non-racialism.

Confronting the ‘Quagmire’: Reconciling liberalism and race-based identity

Throughout its convoluted approach to non-racialism the DA hasalways been aware of the tension between embracing racial (or group)identity and liberalism’s focus on individual identity. As itsFederal Chairperson Wilmot James (2013) explains:

“…liberalism’s vision of non-racialism presents an intellectual andmoral quagmire. If South Africa is on a journey to a non-racialsociety, must we, en route, make strategic interventions to counterthe effects of apartheid’s asset stripping and restrictions? Onequestion we faced, for example, was should we use apartheid’s racialtaxonomy to determine the categories of persons disadvantaged bydiscrimination to qualify for broad based black economic empowerment(BBBEE)? Is this not, as some liberals aver, simply not perpetuatingthe saliency of race? Does it leave the principles of non-racialismand equality under the law intact?

In a speech to the Liberal International Congress Zille (2008)explained that the liberal ideal of the free individual is morecompatible with a relatively homogenous society as identity politicsis “a powerful force that cannot be ignored”. In South Africahistory has led to race becoming the primary marker of ‘identity’(and dispossession). Liberals must thus find ways of identifyingwith groups of people who feel alienated by what they perceive to bethe ‘liberal culture of superiority’. For Zille this can be done bybuilding “genuine bonds of friendship, care and common interest withpeople across all communities.” This she described the DA doing in

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Cape Town through its coalition with parties that span racial,ethnic and religious difference rather than ideological difference.While recognizing that it is ‘pointless’ to abandon the DA’s corevalues and principles, Zille favored building a broad-basedopposition to challenge the ruling party than remaining a small (andwhite) ideologically pure liberal party.

Another way of doing this, Zille explained, is through extendingopportunities to people from disadvantaged backgrounds who have ahigh ‘potential to succeed’ rather than blanket racial quota systems(Zille 2008). This is reflective of the party’s general response tothis ‘quagmire’, which has been to use disadvantage (mostlyhistorical) as a criteria for preferential ‘opportunity’ rather thanrace. This is evident in many of its policies and public statements.James (2011) explicitly states that “previous disadvantaged, notrace, should guide redress or we risk reverting to the kind ofbackwards, divisive thinking that has defined our history”. In aninterview with Zille in 2011 she further explains that:

Obviously some South Africans, often on a racial basis, have facedgreat oppression in their lives and lack of opportunity so it is ourjob to ensure that is redressed, without preventing other people fromusing their freedoms and fulfilling their aspirations. That happensthough sustained economic growth and good education. But the point israce is not the only marker of that. Of course we believe in equityand affirmative action but not as an imposition of racial categoriesas the only marker of redress and not in the way that sees redress asa zero sum game.

If you can drive economic growth at the rate it should be driven…thenyou are talking about an increased opportunity society, and so the DAlooks very much at increasing opportunities and not at manipulatingoutcomes and certainly not through imposed racial categories.

When challenged outright with the question of whether the partywould favour some races over others to ensure historical redress shestated:

Yes, we would definitely... In our Young Leaders’ Programme I wasgoing through the applications and I see an application from a younggirl who was from a very bad school, dreadful place. She got aUniversity matric and then did her degree, and she did quite well. SoI realise given her background she must be very bright and I said gether in. She didn’t do nearly as well as other people who applied, but

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taking account of her circumstances I said this person is obviouslyexceptional.

It is clear the party see an ever increasing need to accept thesalience of racial identity, but it is unclear how they envisagedoing this while still criticising the idea of representivity, andholding onto an individualised, liberal notion of identity.Certainly this results in an approach to non-racialism that has,over the years, become increasingly contradictory, even in light ofthe party’s own recognition of the ‘quagmire’ it faces.

Membership

A further manifestation of the tension between race based politicsand liberalism is found in the party’s approach to its leadershipand membership. Certainly the liberal idea of individual merit aboveracial identity is a reality they would like to apply in theirchoice of leadership and membership subscription, however, it isevident that the party believe that much of the work that needs tobe done to allow potential black voters to align with them is toactually show racial change, or what they call ‘diversity’ withintheir party.

Indeed the party has only had white leaders from Colin Eglin, ZachDe Beer and Tony Leon to the current leader Helen Zille. Furthermorethe merger with the NNP, although a failure within a short period oftime, left the DA with a membership based infused with ex-NNPmembers, few of whom were black Africans. This membership base, inconjunction with the original DP membership base that promoted ideassuch at the minority group targeted ‘fight back’ campaign, wouldhave strengthened the perception that the DA is a home for minorityrace groups. According to Jolobe (Interview with Jolobe 2014) itwould also have played a role in keeping the DA focussed on minorityconcerns and away from addressing the real challenge of tacklingredress for those racially discriminated against during apartheid.

The importance of building diversity the party to ensure a raciallymixed party is an issue that is close to Zille’s heart.

The issue here is that you do supply-side affirmative action…That iswhat we have done everywhere we have been. In 10 years time the DAwill be the most empowered party with the most brilliant people.Black, white, coloured, Indian. And woman all over the place. Because

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we have been running our young leaders program which started fouryears ago, and it will transform this party. Because we have lookedat the supply side, not the manipulation of outcomes (Zille interview2011)5

Indeed the party’s first black parliamentary leader LindiweMazibuko, appointed in 2011, came though the DA ranks, starting as aparty researcher. Many have argued however that she may not appealto much of the poor black electorate but rather to the black,English speaking middle-class (Dlanga 2012). Nonetheless there isundoubtedly a growing ‘black’ cadre of leadership in the party. WithWilmot James as National Federal Chairperson, Patricia De Lille asthe current mayor of Cape Town and Mmusi Maimane as the newparliamentary leader, it is evident that the DA has made significantstrides to deliberately change the racial composition within theparty’s senior leadership. The majority of the premier candidatesfor 2014 elections in the nine provinces were black, which is alsoindicative of the changes the DA has sought to make (Mailula 2014).Indeed Zille, in a tweet in April 2013 asked “how can we be a‘white’ party when 4 of our top 6 are black, and 5 of our provincialleaders, and most of our membership?” (Rademeyer 2012).

These changes are not unproblematic for the party. Commentatorssuggest there is a cadre of mostly black ‘young turks’ driving aparticular agenda in the party (Jolobe interview 2014) and that “theblack caucus occasionally meets to share views on what direction theparty should take, especially on issues to do with empowering blackpeople inside and outside the DA” (Makinana et al 2013). The partydenies this, claiming “the idea of a black caucus is a myth” (James2013b). The perception exists, however, that the top leadership ofthe party and Zille in particular, have to mediate between thisgroup and the ‘old guard’: "There's a group of older conservativesthat is still powerful in the DA” consisting largely of experiencedmembers of the parties that merged to form the DA (the NNP, FederalAlliance and DP) who “are afraid that the young black professionalswho are rising up the ranks could take over” (Makinana et al 2013).Notwithstanding the internal racial dynamics of the party, the DAare faced with the challenge of being seen to identify with blackSouth Africans while still holding firm to the relatively colour5 Zille is open to criticism on this point, as the party saw the attempted

parachuting in of new black leaders, such as Mamphela Ramphele, who have not comefrom ‘supply side affirmative action’. (see Friedman 2014; Roelf 2014)

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blind values of liberalism. This is a challenge, we shall see, thatmanifests itself even more starkly in the party’s approach toeconomic policy.

Economic Policy and the Role of the State: The Coalface of Non-racialism

Historically the DA broadly supported the idea of a free marketeconomy, believing that economic development in a system of freeentrepreneurship, guided by correct policies, will stimulateeconomic growth. This growth will ultimately cancel out anyhistorical inequalities in the system (Kotzé 2001:123). Under theDP, and early versions of the DA, in keeping with a liberalideology, the correct ‘guiding’ polices were fairly narrowlyconceived. The 2002 Federal Constitution, for example, supported“growth in prosperity created through the exercise of the marketeconomy” but did see a role for government to ensure that “no onemust be left behind”; the government is responsible for providingaccess to education and training and promoting the progressiverealisation of access to social security, housing and healthcare forthose who are unable to provide for themselves. Indeed Leon (2004)argued that there was no need for economic policy to specificallytarget certain groups: “If we are fixated on racialism—if we’refixated on redress, rather than on economic growth, we aren’t goingto get the unemployed into employment. And that is the best ticketout of poverty”.

However, by 2008, under Zille’s new leadership, the party wascalling for more state intervention, accepting that you can’t leaveeverything to the market and that the state needs to provide someform of welfare intervention (Jolobe interview 2014). Although Zille(2008) stresses the need to limit the “wrong kind of stateintervention” she believes liberals must propose a “credible rolefor the state in growing the economy and assisting people who cannotfind a foothold in the economy on their own”. Zille (2008) expresseda need to rethink the application of liberal values in the contextof a highly unequal society; liberals in plural and unequalsocieties need to find credible ways of addressing poverty thatlargely coincides with racial categories. Previously the party hadacknowledged the historical salience of race in regard to poverty

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and inequality, now it placed a focus on the need to redress thelegacy of apartheid.

The need to rethink the role of the state was exemplified in DA’s2009 manifesto which expressly addressed the need for redress forhistorically disadvantaged (i.e. non-white) South Africans. Ittalked, for example, about ensuring that those “who were deprived ofthe land by the apartheid government” are helped to reclaim theirland (although it does not mention what race the deprived comefrom). The manifesto also supported broad based black economicempowerment (BBBEE) as a means to empower ‘disadvantaged SouthAfricans’. It called for BBBEE to emphasise skills training andsocio-economic investment but not allow the same individuals to useBBE credits repeatedly (DA manifesto 2009). The discussion of BBBEEis significant as the party, in a step change from its 2004manifesto, states that it is “fully behind broad-based blackeconomic empowerment” as “removing the discriminatory laws of theapartheid government is not enough on its own to empowerdisadvantaged South Africans”. Of course, being a manifesto it doesgo on to implicitly criticize the manner in which BBBEE has beenimplemented by the ruling party; nonetheless clearly supporting arace based policy signalled a new direction in the party’sconceptualisation of non-racialism.

At this juncture the party also supported further economic policieswhich involved relatively more state intervention, such as the basicincome grant, because “some people are so poor that they need helpto enter our economy” (Zille 2009).6 The party also favoured givingproportionally more state money to disadvantaged schools andpromoted the idea of a youth wage subsidy on the premise that itwould create jobs and build skills for otherwise unemployed youth.This would require substantial state intervention and a significantbudget allocation of several billion Rand. Indeed, in the DA’s Planfor Growth and Jobs (2012) there is recognition that the state must playan important, and active, role in reducing the legacy of race basedinequality and poverty. Certainly the Plan uses a liberal lens inits vision of ‘building an equal opportunity society’, talking of6 A basic income grant, or partial grant, is a limited income paid by government to all citizens on an individual basis, without means test or work requirement. The DA initially recommended an income grant of R110 per month for individuals who earn less than R7,500 per annum, which would meanit was, in effect, means related (see Makino 2003).

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those who have opportunities and those who don’t: an economy dividedinto insiders and outsiders. However, it acknowledges the need forpartial state intervention in the economy, including providingcritical infrastructure, correcting market failures, ensuringfairness by promoting broad-based ownership and participation andpromoting South African business abroad. A key section focuses onthe need to break down ‘barriers to inclusion’, acknowledging thateconomic growth needs to be ‘inclusive’ if it is to overcomeinherited inequalities. Here fairly wide-ranging state interventionis called for in the form of financial incentives to enhance BBBEE,state assistance to expedite land reform and broaden ownership inthe agricultural sector, a more ‘proactive’ social security systemand changes to the tax code to encourage wealthy South Africans togive more, among others.

The DA’s evolving economic policies, and its support for policiesthat require significant state intervention could be seen tochallenge its core liberal roots; however the income grant and youthsubsidy as well as other interventionist policies are reconciledwith liberal values by conceptualising them as a means to promoteequal opportunities. The current vision of the DA, for example, isstill clear that “positive action must be targeted at individualswho still suffer the effects of discrimination, not at groups” (DAn.d. a). Indeed this correlated closely with modern or socialliberal ideas as espoused by thinkers such as Rawls and T.H. Green,both of whom argued that the state has a role to play infacilitating a measure of ‘justice’ and equality in society.

Thus, the party may have been changing course in regard tosupporting some degree of racial categorisation in economicpolicies, but this was by no means a fundamental change in itsapproach group/race based identity. The 2012 Plan, for example, doesnot explicitly refer to racial categories. While supporting stateintervention to reduce poverty and deal with (largely raciallydelineated) inequality the plan refers to concerns such as highlevels of unemployment, noting how ‘women, young people and low-skilled job seekers’ are ‘hit the hardest’ by unemployment, yetnever referring to what race these groups may come from. In asimilar vein the document addresses indicators such as how manyhouseholds run out of money to buy food and income differentialsbetween the wealthiest and poorest earners, without racial

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categorisation. Aside from references to BBBEE, the word ‘black’ isonly used 10 times in the 88 page document. Of the other traditionalrace groups ‘white’ is mentioned three times, ‘coloured’ once andIndian twice with the bulk of the use of these terms in thehistorical overview. This is not a policy perspective that usesrace-based analysis. In this light it is a liberal document; viewingthe political unit as the individual and not a member of an ascribedgroup. Where citizens are grouped, it is largely along income lines(or an implicit class analysis) of poor or wealthy, gender lines orby age group. Thus, from an economic perspective the DA continues toput forward a disjointed view of non-racialism; acknowledging theneed for state intervention, that at times has a racial dimension,such as BBBEE, but more broadly trying to avoid racial grouping.There is neither a strong commitment to non-racialisation, nor a clearlymultiracial approach to non-racialism.

Fractures in Façade: The Employment Equity Bill

The challenges of reconciling race-based economic redress withliberal values came to a head in 2013 when the party voted in favourof the Employment Equity Amendment Bill of 2012. The Billeffectively supports setting racial targets that take into accountnational and regional demographic profiles. This is contrary to mostof the core values the party has stood for over the decades. TheFederal Chairperson had, for example, previously strongly objectedto the idea of setting racial quotas, stating that “if national orregional demographics determine opportunity, the state needs to beable to define what determines a person as ‘Black’ or ‘Coloured’,‘Indian’ or ‘White’ in order to assess what they qualify for andwhich demographic they represent. How will the state determine this?With a pencil test?” (James 2011). Certainly according to somecommentators (Jeffery and Cronje 2013) “DA support for this kind ofracial engineering will come as a shock to many of its currentsupporters. It also betrays the non-racial principles for which theparty has historically stood”.

This change of heart did not last long however; within weeks, andafter a Federal meeting, the party strongly rescinded its supportfor the Bill. Zille, apologising stated that:

"We dropped the ball…. Our representatives on the portfolio committeewere inadequately prepared. The many and varied submissions on the

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bill were rushed through the portfolio committee…we were unable todebate the implications of the bill adequately in caucus…theexplanatory memorandum produced by our spokespeople was defective…"(van Onselen 2013)

Ex-DA senior analyst van Onselen (2013) argues this apology isdisingenuous and that ‘dropping the ball’ had nothing to do withpressure and “everything to do with interpretation, knowledge, timeand effort”. Furthermore the representatives Zille refers to werenot in fact poorly prepared; they simply had had the wrong position.DA representative Sej Motau had previously commented on the Bill incommittee meetings and in fact stated in his speech to parliament,when the final bill was tabled for adoption, that “The DA fullysupports the constitutional provisions for affirmative action andthe objectives of the Employment Equity Act to promote redress anddiversity in the South African labour market". The DA’s change ofstance on the bill was, according to van Onselen “a matter ofprofound ideological disagreement”.

The DA had indeed, under the leadership of Tony Leon, been veryclear in its rejection of race based polices. As leader of the DPLeon strongly opposed the original bill when it was introduced intoparliament in 1998, stating at the time that it was a “perniciouspiece of social engineering: pious in intention but destructive ineffect…it does nothing for the poor, the marginalised, the ruralmasses…it uses race as a proxy to advancement” and that “Group-basedthinking as proposed in the Bill formed the cornerstone ofapartheid” (Leon 1998). The DA’s changing stance on the EmploymentEquity Bill highlights fundamental contradictions in trying to applya liberal, non-essentialist version of non-racialism in a countrywith a racially infused history and high levels of inequalityfractured along racial lines. The contestation over the bill bringsto a focal point the question of what exactly the DA means when itsays it supports the ideal of non-racialism.

To address the extensive criticism the party faced over its seemlyconfused stance on employment equity the party held a federalconference to discuss its policy on ‘economic inclusion’; in effectrace based policies. At the end of 2013 it disseminated a policy oneconomic inclusion that essentially acknowledges the need toimplement race-based redress policies in a ‘transitional phase’ inorder to overcome the legacy of apartheid. The document focuses on

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how the racial dimensions of apartheid and the ‘exclusionary racialculture’ created a context where the circumstances into which one isborn significantly affect their life chances. It describes in detailthe racial categorization and exclusion enforced by apartheid lawsand the resultant racially defined inequality and poverty faced bySouth Africans today. Sections of the paper talk about poverty,inequality, unemployment and education in racial terms, providingstatistics according to racial groupings of black Africans, whites,Indians and Coloureds. Although they state that, in government, keyways in which to redress race based apartheid inequality are througheducation and sustained economic growth, in terms of redress, from abusiness perspective, the party explicitly supports the new broadbased BEE scorecard. They see it broadening opportunities fordisadvantaged people, allowing ‘economic outsiders’ to take upeconomic opportunities. They will measure the success of theirredress programmes by the opportunities that have been created for“black advancement”. It is thus clear that in this document the DAhave, more so than ever before, embraced the idea of racialcategorization. In fact they use the term ‘black’ (not countingreferences to BBE) 31 times in a 22 page document in stark contrastto the Jobs and Growth plan of only a year early that refers toblack only 10 times in 88 pages. This is a step change from liberalterms such as ‘disadvantaged’ conventionally used by the party.

The DA is clear however, that race based policies should be short-lived. They do not want to “entrench” race as the “determiningfactor of our future”. Thus they recognize the need for atransitional phase in which race-based redress is used to overcomeapartheid legacies. In this way they seek to retain their long termvision of a “non-racial society” (DA 2013).

Although the document evidently has a group oriented perspective(that also calls for fairly extensive state intervention) the partydoes try to reconcile this focus on race with its historical liberalideology. They state that “Economic empowerment is consistent withthe core values of the DA’s Open Opportunity Society for All,including…its emphasis on individual freedom and choice…theconceptualisation of the role of the state in creating an enablingenvironment…and…its recognition of the need for policies of redressfocussed on expanding economic opportunity”. They also state that afocus on race based redress is necessary as formal equality does not

42

ensure a just society. They conclude that your path in life shouldnot be “determined by the circumstances of your birth, includingyour ‘race’ and material circumstances, but rather by your talentsand by your efforts” and they absolutely reject “discrimination onany grounds”. The latter claim clearly contradicts the way in whichprevious DA leader Leon (1998) conceptualised race-based policies;when the original employment equity bill was introduced he statedthat it goes against the wording of the Constitution, which talks ofany "persons or categories of persons disadvantaged by unfairdiscrimination".

Although the party are, in a distinct change from the past, nowexpressly referring to race groups, they do still try, as far aspossible, not to use race as an delineator; linguistically they useterms such as ‘previously disadvantaged’ or ‘creating diversity’.When they state that “We recognize the need to promote economicinclusion with a specific focus on previously disadvantagedindividuals who faced legislated and institutionally organized exclusion” (myemphasis) they are, given apartheid’s racially legislated history, plainlyreferring to individuals who are black (in its broadest sense). Notusing racial terminology may be one way in which they attempt toreconcile liberalism’s focus on the individual with policies thatfocus on group identity. It is however clear that the party nowsupport race-based policies.

In attempting to reconcile this new approach to race-based policyand the ideology of liberalism the document has quoted from the1960’s Liberal Party’s handbook which stated that “The state must…not shrink away from such measures of intervention as may benecessary to ensure the creation of a non-racial economy with fairdistribution and opportunity for all”. However, as one commentator(The Ratcatcher 2013) has pointed out, the Liberal Party referenceto ‘measures of intervention’ was in fact referring to the outlawingof any racial discrimination. They call elsewhere in the handbookfor the repeal of “existing restrictive legislation by makingdiscrimination on grounds of colour illegal”. It is thus a verychallenging task for the DA to reconcile its new approach to racialcategorisation with conventionally understood liberal views. Indeedas Johnson (2013) argues, “There is no doubt that the party's newstance is a defeat for the liberal tradition but it is too soon tosay whether it will mean the end of that tradition”.

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5.Conclusion: The Challenges of ReconcilingLiberalism, Non-racialism and Economic Redress

The DA is today a markedly different party to that of itspredecessors, or indeed to what it was 14 years ago. Ironically,however, its conceptualisation and instrumentalisation of non-racialism still presents the same contradictions and inconsistenciesit always has, albeit in different iterations. In theory the partyhas consistently expressed loyalty to the idea of non-racialisation,with its focus on individual above group, yet, in practice, it haslobbied racial groupings for support. In the late 1990s and early2000s, for example, it denied the salience of race while implicitlyappealing to minority race groups as evidenced through campaignssuch as ‘fight back’. More recently it has been a party trying totow a liberal line of the individual over group (racial) identity,while implicitly hoping to appeal to the majority black African racegroup. We see this, for example, with its concern to present a blackface as a symbolic leader of party (see Friedman).7 The party’sracial focus today is simply on a different racial group.

A second contradiction (which the party itself recognises) at theheart of any discussion regarding the DA and non-racialism is thetension between liberal values and the need to redress race-basedinequalities created historically. How does a party that subscribesto the individual as the key political unit deal with policyimplications that have historically affected a group? The DA, in itsearly years, and its precursors, tried to do this by staying closeto the principle that equal opportunities for individuals willeradicate race based inequality. As time has progressed it hasbecome clear that the longue dureé of this perspective means they arenot making inroads into support from the mass of the voting publicin South Africa.

It is thus not surprising that the party has, gradually over thepast several years, and rapidly over the past few months, startedto explicitly support race-based polices that will lead to economicredress. They have also focussed on changing the racial make-up oftheir own party. They may still use liberal language, but they are

7 Zille stated in a press conference that it is important to have a black senior leader who could say things she couldn’t.

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in many ways wrapping this around policy positions that stray farfrom traditional liberalism.

It is arguable the DA would like race not to be the litmus test forgroup identity that requires redress; they would favour the idea of‘disadvantage’. This is problematic, however, both in the context ofa highly racially unequal society and in the context of governmentpolicies that expressly focus on racial categorisation, inparticular BBBEE and affirmative action. The party is, in the end,an opposition party in a country with a highly racialised past,governed by an African nationalist party. In an ideal world they maynot choose to engage in supporting racialised group thinking, butthey function within a circumscribed political context. The DA isforced to deal with and acknowledge racial fault lines in SouthAfrican society. The challenge for the party is that it cannoteasily marry liberal concepts with multiracial ones, and it is amultiracial understanding of non-racialism that the majority of theSouth African electorate seem to relate to (See Politikon 2011).Thus as much as many in the party may wish to subscribe to a non-essentialised version of non-racialism, they have arguably turneddown the path of multiracialism.

The DA is in good company in this regard. As discussed in the firstsection of this paper the ANC have, in effect instrumentalised viewof non-racialism that reflects and supports multiracialism. Race-based policies are necessary in the (undefined) short term in orderto achieve true non-racialism in the long term. DA’s approach ofretaining a “vision of a non-racial society whilst recognising theneed for a transitional phase” resonates strongly here. This takesus full circle to where we started: the DA’s approach to non-racialism is contradictory. The party’s Federal Chairperson (James2011) stated that “At the heart of the ruling party there is onefundamental fracture: non-racialism”. Surely that fracture toobelongs to the DA.

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Interviews

Hanekom, Derek (1 August 2011) Deputy Minister of Science and Technology, Pretoria

Jolobe, Zwelethu (24 January 2014) Lecturer, University of Cape Town, Cape Town

Kathrada ,Ahmed (7 July 2011) Anti-apartheid activist, JohannesburgMantashe, Gwede (4 August 2011) ANC General Secretary, JohannesburgNgwane, Trevor (13 July 2011) Social movement activist, JohannesburgZillle, Helen (1 August 2011) Leader of the Democratic Alliance,

Cape Town

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