School of Political and Social InquiryMonash University

New Social Movement Theoryand the role of women in

Jemaah Islamiyah

Cally Colbron

Student # 12788031

Submitted in partial fulfilment of the requirement forthe degree of Bachelor of Arts with Honours in Politics,

Monash University26th October 2010

DECLARATION

This thesis contains no material that has been

accepted for the award of any other degree in any

University. To the best of my knowledge and belief, this

thesis contains no material previously published or

written by any other person, except where due reference

is given in the text.

Signed:

Date: 26th October 2010

i

ABSTRACT

This thesis focuses on the role of women in Jemaah

Islamiyah (JI) by applying New Social Movement Theory

(NSMT) to the organisation. NSMT framework illuminates

the significance of women’s activism in and around JI.

The three elements of NSMT framework applied to JI

highlight the significance of women as activists and as

important resources for network building and maintenance.

Women’s activism in and around JI falls into two

categories, those whose activism is directly and

knowingly related to JI, and those whose activism is not

directly connected with JI.

Those women who are married or related to male JI

operatives fall into the first category. The second

category is those women who are associated with the Pondok

Ngruki pesantren community, who are activists advocating

for syari’ah (shari’a- God’s revealed law) in Indonesia, but

are not JI activists, rather are part of a broader New

Social Movement, of which JI represents only one

ii

organisation and one option for activism across a

spectrum of possible modes of activism.

Finally this thesis compares women’s activism in and

around JI with women’s activism in Lashkar-e-Toiba an

Islamist group located in Pakistan, where some

commonalities exist, but mainly differences emerge,

highlighting the diversity of activism within JI and

other similar groups.

iii

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

I would like to thank my supervisor Dr Ben McQueen

for his never ending patience and particularly for

allowing me to pursue this topic as far as I could take

it when everyone else told me it wouldn’t be possible.

I would also like to thank my family, for putting up

with me throughout this year, especially Frances and

Elizabeth who never failed to enjoy coming to the library

with me!

iii

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Declaration.....................................iAbstract.......................................iiAcknowledgements..............................iiiTable of Contents..............................ivIntroduction....................................11. Literature Review............................6

1.1 Jemaah Islamiyah, Security and Terrorism.....7

1.1.1 ‘Indonesian Area Specialists’ Literature on Jemaah Islamiyah...........................81.1.2 ‘Security Studies Specialists’ Literatureon Jemaah Islamiyah...........................9

1.2 Women and Jemaah Islamiyah..................12

Conclusion......................................15

2. New Social Movement Theory..................172.1 Social Movement Theory......................17

2.2 New Social Movement Theory..................18

2.3 New Social Movement Theory Framework........23

2.3.1 Framing................................232.3.2 Mobilising Structures..................252.3.3 Opportunities and Constraints..........26

Conclusion......................................26

iv

3. New Social Movement Theory applied to Jemaah Islamiyah......................................28

3.1 Jemaah Islamiyah and New Social Movement Theory

.....................................................29

3.1.1 1970’s to 1985: Activism in the New Orderperiod.......................................293.1.2 1985-1997: Malaysian Exile.............343.1.3 1998-2002: Reformasi...................383.1.4 2002-2010: Bali bombings and beyond....42

Conclusion......................................47

4. Jemaah Islamiyah and Lashkar-e-Toiba: a comparative discussion of the role of women....49

4.1 Women in and around Jemaah Islamiyah........49

4.2 The role of women in Lashkar-e-Toiba........54

4.2.1 The role of women in Jemaah Islamiyah andLashkar-e-Toiba compared.....................57

Conclusion......................................59

Conclusion.....................................62Bibliography...................................65Honours Thesis release statement...............70

v

INTRODUCTION

This thesis contributes to the body of knowledge of

the Indonesian terrorist organisation Jemaah Islamiyah

(JI) by focusing on the role of women within the

organisation. Women in JI are not inducted members. They

do not contribute to the planning or enacting of

terrorism. They are rarely the focus of academic

scholarship on JI. Yet women are generally acknowledged

by scholarship on JI as being significant to the cohesion

of the organisation. This thesis attempts to answer some

of the following questions; what is the significance of

women in JI? Why do women agree to be part of the process

of cementing kin and social ties for the benefit of JI?

What do women get out of it? Are all women in JI linked

communities, such as the infamous Pondok (Islamic boarding

school) Ngruki part of JI? Do they all participate in

activism related to JI? Are they passively involved or

can they influence the direction the organisation takes?

Do they have the same goals as men in JI? Do women hope

to see syari’ah (shari’a-God’s revealed law) implemented

1

within Indonesia? If they do, how do they work for this

ends? Do women see themselves as activists for JI? Do

women imagine the same society under syari’ah as men? Are

there differences between men and women’s activism?

Chapter One begins with a discussion of literature

relating to JI. All data used within this thesis is drawn

from existing scholarship on JI. While there is a great

deal of quality scholarship relating to JI, there is very

little literature that actually takes women in JI as the

focal point for scholarship.

Due to the limited focus on women in existing

accounts of JI, New Social Movement Theory (NSMT)

framework is adopted within this thesis as a means of

analysing the role of women and the meaning of women’s

activism in and around JI. Chapter Two covers a

discussion of NSMT framework and how it will be applied

to JI within this thesis. NSMT relates to the study of

collective action, and in particular to movements whose

concerns revolve around the cultural and the moral.

Within Chapter Three the theory is applied to JI

with a focus on the role of women in four different2

phases of JI’s evolution. Each phase represents a shift

in activism for JI as an organisation, beginning with the

two decades prior to JI’s official inception. JI’s

interaction with the social and political landscape

during each phase is discussed.

The role of women in JI proves to be difficult to

define. Chapter Four discusses the role of women in and

around JI, and compares this to the role of women in

Lashkar-e- Toiba. The role of women in JI is vital to the

organisation’s ability to function, however the reality

of Ngruki as a community with indelible links to JI

appears to be less concrete as far as women are concerned

than for men associated with the pesantren. As the

segregation of the sexes is strictly enforced at the

pesantren compound this is less surprising than may at

first appear, given the association between the community

and JI in virtually all scholarship on JI.

Within JI, there appears to be two types of female

activists. The first type can be described as women who

are genuinely involved with JI, those that have married

inducted JI members, or are from families with a history3

of JI or Darul Islam activism. These women actively

support their husband’s neo-jihadi activism in ways that

include using their own businesses to support their

families or even funnel money to JI.

The second type of female activists are those who

are associated with JI in so far as being part of the

pesantren (Islamic boarding school) community associated

with Pondok Ngruki in Solo, Java. This pesantren features

significantly in literature on JI as fundamental to JI as

an organisation. Pondok Ngruki is described as providing

the original nucleus for the organisation, connecting new

recruits and a community of support. It appears that in

relation to the role of women in JI, the pesantren is in

reality less connected to the organisation than most

literature indicates. Women associated with the pesantren

are activists for syari’ah, and are involved in dakwah (da’wa,

proselytisation and propagation of faith), manifesting in

various ways from discussion groups and social groups, to

pastoral care including providing services for women such

midwifery. However activism for JI is less apparent. This

4

may well be different for the male members of the pesantren

community, a topic not explored within this thesis.

Women associated with the pesantren community at Pondok

Ngruki are new social movement activists aiming for the

implementation of syari’ah, which they perceive as a more

just and fair system of governance than any possible

alternative, but they are not necessarily associated with

JI. On the other hand, those women who are associated

with JI, particularly the wives of inducted members, who

are active in their support roles for the organisation,

are not generally associated with the Ngruki community.

Focussing on the role of women in and around JI

paints the reality of the Pondok Ngruki community and JI

as an organisation in a very different light than it

appears when men are the sole focus of analysis. Pondok

Ngruki cannot be taken as an assumed link in the JI

network. A further integrated approach may offer new

insights, on a topic that has been thoroughly

investigated in the wake of the 2002 Bali bombings and

the interest in JI that terrorist act inspired. This

thesis is not an integrated approach. This thesis focuses5

mainly on women in Indonesia. The role of men is not

explored in great detail as it has been done successfully

and thoroughly in the past by a number of scholars. It is

the sole purpose of this thesis to use new social

movement theory to explore the activism of women in JI.

This thesis does not examine international connections

and activities by members of JI or their wives and

families in any great detail. Further analysis of the

role of women, focusing solely on those women directly

connected with inducted men would no doubt produce very

different conclusions. While it is impossible to discuss

JI without mention of inducted male members and their

wives, the primary focus of this thesis is to make sense

of women’s activism, particularly those women associated

with the Ngruki community.

Activism of women in and around JI is complex and to

cover the diversity of activism inevitable within JI’s

international networks would require more space than was

reasonable for the purposes of this thesis. Though these

are certainly topics deserving of more attention. Pondok

Ngruki is an important beginning for the analysis of6

women’s activism within JI, as this institution is

mentioned without fail as a focal point around which JI

the organisation revolves, in most, if not all literature

on the topic of JI. Yet such an infamous place remains

open and operating, so attempting to make sense of the

role of women within the Pondok Ngruki community and the

meaning of this for JI as an organisation seems to be a

relevant starting point for research on women in and

around JI. This thesis is not a litmus test gauging the

activism of women in JI, as women around this community

probably have less to do with JI than is commonly

assumed. Nor should it be assumed that the conclusions

drawn on women’s activism at Ngruki transfer

automatically to men within that community, they do not.

As chapter four points out the difference in

activism between women in and around JI and women in

Lashkar-e-Toiba, a group that is also a proscribed

violent Islamist group from a Muslim majority country

shows that no generalisations can be made and no ‘types’

of female Islamist activists be cast, or profiles built

from this analysis. 7

This thesis instead aims as drawing out nuances in

women’s activism within JI, discriminating between

activism within JI, and broader social movement activism

for syari’ah, highlighting the diversity of activism engaged

in by women.

8

1. LITERATURE REVIEW

This chapter contains an overview of literature

relating to Jemaah Islamiyah (JI). Two perspectives of JI

emerged in the wake of the 2002 Bali bombings, those

which emerged from scholars with a background in

Indonesian or Southeast Asian ‘area’ studies and those

with a background in terrorism studies.

‘Indonesian area’ or ‘Southeast Asia Country’

specialists are not ideal descriptive terms. For want of

a better term, ‘area’ and ‘country’ specialists will be

used in this chapter to differentiate those scholars

whose knowledge of Indonesia, Southeast Asia, and often

Islam was used to examine JI in the wake of the Bali

bombings, and is generally the most well respected

perspective. The alternative perspective that emerged in

the wake of the 2002 Bali bombings was that of security

studies specialists, whose perspectives often tended to

contain different focuses resulting in different emphasis

on various elements of the organisation.

9

Beyond these two different perspectives, this

chapter will also discuss the ways scholarship on JI has

looked at the role of women in the organisation. The lack

of scholarship focussing on women in JI makes the role of

women in the organisation undefined. It is established

that the role of women is vastly different from the role

of men in JI. What that involves, beyond acknowledgment

that women are important in forging kinship ties within

the JI network, has not been elaborated upon in any depth

within scholarship on JI. This thesis is an attempt at

beginning to make sense of the role of women in and

around JI.

1.1 Jemaah Islamiyah, Security and Terrorism

In the wake of the 2002 Bali bombings interest in

Jemaah Islamiyah (JI), the group responsible grew

exponentially. Prior to the Bali bombings, there existed

virtually no scholarship on the organisation. The

exception was a report published by the International

Crisis Group (ICG) in early 2002, prior to the first Bali

bombings, which detailed the evolution of the JI network10

revolving around Pondok Ngruki, a pesantren (Islamic

boarding school) in Indonesia (ICG, 2002a). This report

is a significant descriptive analysis of JI’s evolution

and links to al-Qaeda (ICG, 2002a). Since that initial

report the ICG has produced a number of authoritative

publications on JI and related topics. The ICG and Sidney

Jones, the Senior Adviser for the ICG’s Asia Program,

based in Jakarta have published extensively on the topic

of JI. Subjects examined by the ICG cover various

elements of JI’s evolution. Some ICG reports include

accounts of the early Islamist activism of JI’s founders,

Indonesian clerics Abdullah Sungkar and Abu Bakar

Ba’aysir (2002a, 2002b), links to the Darul Islam movement

(2005a), the impact of and on communal conflict in

Indonesia (2002a, 2005c, 2007a, 2008a), publishing by JI

(2008b) and the potential of the group to radicalise

outsiders (2009). These reports represent a substantial

body of work on JI, drawing on a range of primary sources

as well as the ICG staff expertise with the subject

matter. It is unusual to find an academic publication on

the topic of JI that does not reference various ICG11

reports or Sidney Jones herself, pointing to the

unparalleled respect this organisation has earned and the

quality of ICG literature on JI.

1.1.1 ‘Indonesian Area Specialists’ Literature on Jemaah

Islamiyah

Beyond the ICG reports and briefing papers there are

a number of other scholars who have contributed

significantly to the growing body of scholarship on JI.

Australian academic’s Greg Barton and Greg Fealy are

recognised as foremost authorities on JI, and more

broadly Islam and Islamism in Indonesia.

Barton’s work on JI includes an historical narrative

of JI including evolution, connections with overseas

groups and training overseas, as well as the period of

Malaysian exile (2004). Barton’s work locates JI’s

ideology in the broader context of Islamic

intellectualism in Indonesia, and engages with the

ideology of JI and other neo-jihadist groups (2009; 2005;

2004). Barton’s work contextualises Islamist activism in

Indonesia, locating the evolution of radical Islamist

12

thought within the political landscape of Indonesia that

also consists of liberal Muslim thinkers. Barton charts

the effects of the relationship between the state and

Islamism in Indonesia since Sukarno (2005).

Fealy and Anthony Bubalo co-wrote a Lowy Institute

publication charting the evolution of Islamist activism

in Indonesia and the relationship between Middle Eastern

Islamism and Indonesia (2005). This lengthy report

includes a history of JI and JI’s relationship with

Indonesian Islamism and outside groups. This is an

invaluable reference for locating JI within the social,

cultural and political contexts it has emerged from and

draws out the nuances of Indonesian Islamist activism,

along the entire spectrum from nonviolent to violent

activism, as well as analysing the international

dimensions of JI as an organisation, including members,

ideological influences and connections with outside

groups. Fealy has also examined JI’s post 2002 publishing

and ideological debates (Fealy, 2007) and translated and

published an English translation of a large section of

the JI handbook; Pedoman Uman Perjuangan Al-Jama’ah Al-Islamiyyah13

(General Struggle Guidelines-PUPJI, translated by Fealy

in Fealy & Hooker, eds. 2006). Fealy’s analysis of JI and

DI ideology draws attention to the complexities of JI’s

evolution and both the connection with DI and divergence

from traditional DI ideological underpinnings and

engagement with pan- Islamism (2005).

As well as Indonesian ‘area’ and Islamic studies

specialists, there are a number of significant

journalistic accounts of JI, which are useful for an

understanding of JI. Australian journalist Sally

Neighbour represents one of the most prolific and well-

respected journalists whose work on JI resulted in the

award winning ‘In the Shadow of Swords: On the Trail of

Terrorism from Afghanistan to Australia’ (2004). In the

Shadow of the Swords is a lengthy and informative

exploration of JI including all the international

dimensions, drawing on a variety of sources including

interviews with many of the personalities involved.

Taken together the above works represent the

foremost in-depth analyses of JI’s evolution, they also

represent scholarship that emerges from what Kumar14

Ramakrishna has termed Southeast Asian Country

specialists (2009). Neighbour’s journalistic work fits in

with the perspectives pursued by the Indonesia area

specialists or Southeast Asian Country specialists that

Ramakrishna refers to.

1.1.2 ‘Security Studies Specialists’ Literature on Jemaah

Islamiyah

On the other hand as Ramakrishna points out in the

wake of the 2002 Bali bombings, there emerged scholarship

from academics with a security studies, or terrorism

studies background, particularly emerging from

Singaporean institutions (such as Ramakrishna himself)

(Ramakrishna, 2009). These security specialists tended to

emphasise connections with al-Qaeda on elements of JI and

minimise the importance of the precedence of violent

Islamist activism in Indonesia. This resulted in

differing conclusions about the significance of the

organisation as a whole. So called ‘Area’ or ‘Country’

specialists whose backgrounds generally included

expertise in the study of Islamic intellectualism and/ or

15

Islamist activism in Indonesia, Southeast Asia and

beyond, emphasised nuances in Indonesian Islamist

activism and identity. Citing the history of violent

Islamist activism (including terrorism) by the indigenous

Darul Islam movement, the fringe nature of such violent

activism as well as links to outside groups and training

in camps such as those in Afghanistan in the early 1990’s

were emphasised as important elements in consideration of

JI’s evolution (see for instance ICG, 2002a; 2002b; 2004;

2007b; Bubalo & Fealy, 2005; Barton, 2005). Whereas

security specialists tended to highlight the links to al-

Qaeda, indicating JI represented a terrorist group

possibly directed or even formed by al-Qaeda, with

international pan-Islamic goals, and an al-Qaeda dictated

agenda (Gunaratna, 2002). Southeast Asia was described as

both the second front for the war on terror, a hot bed

for violent fundamentalists, and at the same time

Indonesia was declared as becoming generally more radical

as a whole, and embracing a Middle Eastern radicalism

that departed from what perceived as a more tolerant

version of Islam practised in Indonesia (Gunaratna, 2002;16

Abuza, 2003; Abuza, 2007). Indonesia was seen as

abandoning the ‘local’ benign abagan version of Islam it

was famed for, mixed with pre-Islamic Javanese mysticism,

made famous by American Anthropologist Clifford Geertz in

the 1960’s (Geertz, 1960) in favour of a less tolerant

Middle Eastern influenced or Wahhabi influenced

radicalism. The post 1960’s ‘santri- fication’1 that

manifested in a variety of ways such as increased veiling

by middle class women, and increased attention to prayer

times, was perceived as proof of a tendency towards

radicalism by some security specialists (Gunaratna, 2002;

Abuza, 2003; Abuza, 2007).

Many prominent ‘Indonesian area’ specialists refuted

this alarmist assessment of Indonesia. Indonesia, it was

argued has always held a population with very diverse and

dynamic beliefs. There was never a generic Islamic

identity in Indonesia. There were always areas of1 Santri- fication refers to the Islamic revival that occurred

within Indonesia from the 1970’s. Santri refers to what Geertz

described as those Indonesian Muslims for whom Islamic doctrine is of

central concern, particularly the social and moral relevance of

doctrine (Geertz, 1960:127 in Schwarz, 1999: 166).17

conservatism, radicalism and liberality (Barton, 2005;

Crouch, 2005; Fealy 2005; Jones, 2005). There were always

extremes of every description, as well as everything in

between. Violent radicalism by minority fringe groups was

nothing new. And likewise the evolution of Islamic

thought in Indonesia was not a new phenomenon. Islamic

intellectualism has never been static in Indonesia, or

elsewhere in the world. The process of santri-fication or

Islamic revival was a complex phenomenon driven as much,

if not more so, by internal factors as any outside

influences. The political and cultural landscapes must be

taken into account in Indonesia from the past as well as

the post 9-11 period, for an understanding of JI. Harold

Crouch stresses that contrary to many assessments that

Islam in Indonesian has departed from the benign and

tolerant streams identified by Geertz in the 1960’s to

radical Islamism, the post-Suharto period “has not marked

the high point of Muslim involvement in political

violence in Indonesia” which actually occurred decades

earlier (Crouch, 2005: 43 emphasis added).

18

While these perspectives were dramatically different

in their assessment of the meaning of JI for Indonesia

and Southeast Asia in general, Ramakrishna has stated

that the cleavages between the two perspectives while

great are being bridged (Ramakrishna, 2009; preface, ff.

216-217). Ramakrishna’s own attempt at bridging the

divide is the exploration of radicalisation by elements

within JI, which aims to acknowledge the political and

cultural contexts and in particular the Darul Islam

tradition that have influenced JI’s evolution

(Ramakrishna, 2009).

1.2 Women and Jemaah Islamiyah

While most of the prominent scholarship on JI

mentioned above does acknowledge the role of women in the

organisation, women are rarely the focus of scholarship.

Women’s roles are acknowledged as significant to the

cohesion of the organisation as sisters, wives, mothers

and daughters of activists. The phenomenon of arranged

marriage for the benefit of JI as an organisation is a

topic touched on in most literature on JI. The ICG has a19

section on the significance of women in kinship roles to

the networks the organisation draws on (ICG, 2003: 26-

29). Despite these substantial contributions to the

understanding of JI as an organisation, women are seldom

the focal point. There are a number of reasons for this

gap in scholarship.

Women play a passive role in JI. Women are

considered as significant as wives, mothers and daughters

of male JI activists, but do not actually become members

themselves. The role of women in JI is a support role.

Women in JI do not participate in violence, neither the

planning, or the perpetuation. There are no female

suicide bombers or neo-jihadists in JI. There is no female

wing, training women to fight. Presumably this means that

for many interested in the phenomenon of radical, violent

groups like JI the role of women in JI is less

interesting than that of men or appears of less

significance than that of men, who are involved in the

action and are the ideologues. There are no salacious

examples of ‘black widow’ type female characters in JI.

From a terrorist studies perspective the subject of women20

in JI is less action packed than that of men. Combined

with this the fact that women in JI do not contribute to

the publishing of Islamic ideologues or translating or

writing their own ‘perspectives,’ makes focusing on

women, no matter how determined a scholar may be, a lot

harder than focusing on men in JI. The sole exceptions to

that rule are high- profile examples. Paridah wife of

executed Bali bomber Ali Gufron (Mukhlas) and sister to

ex-JI commander Nasir Abas, has published a memoir of

sorts on her experiences as a single mother after her

husband’s arrest (2005) and there is one other similar

‘autobiography’ by Fatimah Az-Zahra, the wife of Abu

Jibriel (White, 2010). Sally Neighbour has written a

biography of an Australian woman; Rabiah Hutchinson who

has had extensive contact with various high profile JI

members including Sungkar and Ba’aysir and spent time

living at Ngruki (2009). These three examples, which

aside from Neighbour’s journalistic account are naturally

one-sided, represent high profile JI women, and how

representative these women are is questionable. Certainly

Hutchinson represents an anomaly and in Neighbour’s book21

describes that during her time at Ngruki she was not

accepted by women in the community there, and was in fact

resented (Neighbour, 2009).

Beyond the mentions of women, which as stated are

not the focal point of most scholarship on JI and those

examples above, there are a few authors who more

consistently focus on women in JI. One example is Noor

Huda Ismail, an ex-Pondok Ngruki student and journalist

whose research on JI has led to his own pilot

deradicalisation program being implemented in some

Indonesian prisons (Foreign Correspondent, 2010). Ismail

has mentioned women consistently in his publications. Yet

Ismail’s work does not focus solely on women, but rather

on the kinship and social links involved in JI.

Nonetheless Ismail has interviewed many male JI members

and their families, including JI ‘wives’ and published a

number of papers on the networks JI draws on, including

discussing the role of marriage as a tool to ensure the

cohesiveness of those networks (2007, 2006, 2005b).

Ismail’s accounts of JI’s social and kinship networks are

thoughtful, and have the advantage of being an ‘insider’s22

account,’ as Ismail has spent time with many JI members

as a student at Pondok Ngruki himself (2005a).

Malaysian scholar Farish A. Noor has possibly

published the only English language academic paper that

actually focuses on the particular topic of women and JI.

Noor points to the important role women have played in

JI, as have all the significant scholars noted above, and

also points out the significance of the role of women in

representing JI in the media (2007a). Noor teases out the

complexities of the relationship of radical Islamism and

the Indonesian public. Noor’s analysis of the ways in

which JI interacted with the media in the wake of the

2002 Bali bombings, particularly when women associated

with JI (married to JI members, or mothers of JI members)

were interviewed by the media, or presented themselves in

the media shows a group of women with a nose for public

relations. Noor’s account of the role of women as

(unofficial) media liaisons, promoting JI as a pious

community, and countering perceptions of JI as terrorist

organisation is perceptive (Noor, 2007a). Noor’s

commentary on the role of women in JI points out that23

many women married to inducted JI members are well-

educated and independent women, who actively pursue

marriage to neo-jihadists in pursuit of the same dream of

social change that motivates their husbands, a notion

that seems disingenuous to many, particularly in the West

where media representations of groups like JI tend to

portray activists as fanatical, brainwashed and backwards

(2007b).

Australian academic Sally White has picked up a

similar theme more recently; challenging the perception

of women associated with radical, violent Islamist

activism that is commonly portrayed by the media (White,

2009). White questions the prevailing perception of women

involved in violent neo-jihadist groups in Indonesia as

victims. The perception in the media is often that these

women are ‘duped’ by the men in their lives. It is

supposed that women couldn’t possible have a stake in the

activities of neo-jihadist activism which is perceived as

inherently oppressive to women, otherwise the women are

portrayed as ‘brainwashed’ or backward. White uses the

example of the second wife of Noordin Mohammed Top, the24

infamous neo-jihadist responsible for numerous bombings

in Indonesia, from the second Bali bombing in 2005, the

Marriot Hotel bombing of 2003 and the and Australian

Embassy bombings 2004 and the most recent hotel bombings

in Jakarta in 2009. Munfiatun al Fitri, Noordin’s second

wife is in fact a well-educated woman who, while claiming

not to have known she was married to Noordin, was known

to have wanted to marry a ‘Jihadist,’ and held extreme

views, herself (White, 2009). White highlights the

element of agency in Munfiatun’s choice of husband,

questioning the assumption, particularly promoted in the

Western media, that Islamism holds no appeal to women and

that women involved have been ‘forced’ into arranged

marriages.

Conclusion

There is an array of in-depth and invaluable

scholarship and some significant journalistic accounts of

JI, however the topic of women in JI is less exhaustively

discussed or analysed. Women are not totally ignored, and

more scholarship seems to be emerging about the role of25

women, with Noor (2007a) and White (2009) contributing

thought provoking pieces to this topic. However women and

Islamism, including those involved with violent Islamist

groups is a topic that deserves further investigation and

analysis, not only in Indonesia, but all over the Muslim

world. The topic of women in JI, from the perspective of

security specialists offers none of the glamour of

suicide bombers, al-Qaeda operatives or militant training

for women in foreign camps. The role of women instead

revolves around the everyday; the role of women is

passive and supportive, as wives and dakwah (da’wa-

proselytisation) activists. These roles are nonetheless

significant and vital to movements such as JI. In fact

these roles may possibly define the broader social

movement that JI is a part of in many ways. Women’s roles

are fundamental to the maintenance of community, and it

is the sense of community and the loyalty to Pondok Ngruki

that defined JI as an organisation prior to the Bali

bombings according the ICG (ICG, 2002a). Yet the role of

women as community members and the role of Pondok Ngruki

as an important service provider within that community,26

beyond any connection with JI also points to the

difficulties of defining the role of women in the

communities around JI as terrorists or other activists.

The role of women in and around JI is a complex role, and

until it is examined more thoroughly, the meanings behind

women’s activities and the significance of their activism

to the direction of the broader organisation and movement

cannot be entirely understood.

27

2. NEW SOCIAL MOVEMENT THEORY

This chapter will begin with a brief discussion of

Social Movement Theory (SMT), followed by New Social

Movement Theory (NSMT) and then go on to expand on the

three main elements of NSMT framework used in this

thesis, using brief examples from JI along the way. SMT

is the study of collective action. SMT originally emerged

from within Europe to describe early labour movement

collective action, from the nineteenth century (Keane &

Mier, 1989: 5). Within the United States the study of

collective action also developed, however the two studies

took a different trajectory, with focuses on individual

versus collective influences being taken. From the 1980’s

theorists began to merge the two differing perspectives

into an overarching framework resulting in SMT. NSMT

emerged in particular to describe ‘new’ movements thought

to be emerging in the West from the 1960’s whose

collective identities deviated from traditional class

based identity markers and embraced new identities, such

as environmentalism and feminism.

28

2.1 Social Movement Theory

Within the study of collective action social

movements are defined as collective enterprises that are

dissatisfied with the status quo and seek to establish a

new way of living (Blummer, 1969: 99 in Crossley, 2002:

3). Social movements emerge out of strain or tension

whereby the expectations or aspirations of members within

that society cease to ‘fit’ with existing conditions

within society (Crossley, 2002: 37). These movements seek

to remake and reinvigorate society.

Applying Social Movement Theory (SMT) to Islamic

activism is not unique, although it is a relatively new

phenomenon despite the fact that SMT and the study of

Islamic activism have seen parallel theoretical

developments (Wiktorowicz, 2004: 2-6).

Scholars applying SMT and NSMT to Islamist movements

aim at de-mystifying and ‘de-essentialising’ Islamic

activism, while admitting the local contexts that Islamic

activism emerges within, also highlighting the

comparative similarities with social movements emerging

29

in very different contexts with outwardly different aims

(Wiktorowicz, 2004: 2-5 & Singerman, 2004: 143-144).

SMT theory is what Robinson describes as a ‘middle

ground approach’ in the analysis of collective actions,

between structuralist and rational choice schools

(Robinson, 2004: 113). SMT takes the ‘group’ as the

analytical focal point, granting individuals within the

group agency as rational and reflective decision makers

as does rational choice theory, but also recognising that

individuals operate within a group. The group operates

not within a vacuum, but within social structures which

can present both opportunities and constraints to group

activism, and must also be taken into account, for a

coherent understanding of contentious activism (Crossley,

2002: 56-76). For SMT the individual is a rational actor,

however they do not act simply for personal gain in a

profit/ loss sense, but within a social world where

values and culture can and do affect actions and

reflection. The various structures that influence groups

and individuals are found in the social, political and

cultural contexts that groups exist within and include30

world events, as is the primary focus of structuralist

advocates.

2.2 New Social Movement Theory

New Social Movement Theory (NSMT) emerged from the

1980’s, as a means of articulating the emergence of

movements appearing in the West from the 1960’s onwards,

whose constituencies represented ‘new’ identities that

departed from the traditional class based identities that

defined contentious and collective activism of classic

social movements. Diverse movements such as feminism; the

lesbian and gay movement; the anti-psychiatry and

psychiatric survivor movements and anti-globalization

movements in the West represent new social movements

(NSM) (Crossley, 2002: 10-12). Alberto Melucci’s 1989,

Nomads of the Present, represented the drawing together of

various elements of social movement and collective action

theory into an overarching framework, which identified

the new strains in society that collective action emerged

from. Melucci’s framework pulled together three existing

theories; structural approaches; resource mobilisation31

approaches and political exchange theories into NSMT

(Melucci, 1989).

The primary concern of NSM activism is to transform

the morals and values of society. NSMT uses the same unit

of analysis as SMT, but NSMs emerge from new strains

within society. NSMs are perceived to revolve around

concerns that go beyond traditional class based activism.

This contrasts with the class related concerns of

distribution of wealth, which were the primary focus of

classic social movement activism (Sutton & Vergas, 2006:

101-102). Dissatisfaction with the status quo comes from

post-industrial and post-material politics; concerned

with altering values and norms in society. NSM activism

forges new identities, linked to the post-material

concerns they mobilise around. These collectives are not

interested in being co-opted into the current political

system. The aim of NSM activism is not to gain access to

current political structures but to change the values and

norms of society. Whereas classic social movements

struggled “against real individuals and groups, such as

their bosses or the police” NSMs struggle against values32

and morality in society (Crossley, 2002: 5). Crossley

points out that as these abstract opponents are often

embodied in behaviour, therefore NSM activism and social

change instigated by NSMs involves changing behaviour

including activist’s own behaviour (Crossley, 2002: 5).

Alternative lifestyles are adopted and advocated as NSMs

are not concerned with holding on to tradition, but are

interested in re-moralising and re-politicising politics.

The aim of NSMs is to transform lifestyles and

identities; in this way activism often involves new ways

of living being adopted by activists (Crossley, 2003:

295-296). Symbolic direct actions form part of the

expression of, and forging of new identities. The anti-

hierarchical structures inherent in NSM activism

represent their refusal to play by the current rules,

because those rules are rejected as a new system of

living is advocated, often resulting in a self-limiting

radicalism (Sutton & Vertigas, 2006: 102-104).

Jemaah Islamiyah (JI) is part of a new social

movement, JI is an organisation that professes to aim at

practising “Islam in a pure and total way advancing from33

a community to a state based on Islam to a Caliphate”

(PUPJI: 5-6, translated by Fealy in Fealy & Hooker, eds.

2006: 365). This is a focus on behaviour. JI is not a

political party and activism for many associated with the

group is a lifestyle. JI is part of a new social movement

desirous of a new system of living. The dissatisfaction

with the current form of life is articulated in JI’s

ideology as dissatisfaction with the governance of

Indonesia by any law but syari’ah (shari’a- God’s revealed

law). The perception is that any alternative is un-Islamic

and incompatible with the ummah’s (Muslim community’s)

ability to function in a truly Islamic manner under any

law but God’s.

Activism in JI has ranged from most famously

violence in the form of the 2002 Bali bombings, as well

as numerous other acts of violence to non-violent dakwah

(da’wa, proselytisation). Involvement in JI encompasses all

of daily life, from marriage choices, preschool and

kindergarten choices, and social engagements such as

sporting teams and businesses (Ismail, 2006). For

individuals involved with JI, often this means that all34

aspects of life are involved in JI’s alternative

community.

Within NSMT, while social movements are defined as

the broader movement for change, social movement

organisations (SMOs) are the organisations that advocate

for change. JI is part of a broader NSM that aims to

transform Indonesian society. Activism involves

advocating for syari’ah; which is perceived to be more just

and moral than any alternative forms of governance.

Within this NSM in Indonesia there are many diverse

perspectives and advocates for differing methods of

activism. JI represents one SMO on this spectrum. An SMO

can be legal, or illegal like JI, and more or less formal

in structure. The environmental movement is an example of

a new social movement, within which Greenpeace represents

an SMO (Crossley, 2005; 302), as does the Friends of

Stonybrook Creek in Western Suburban Melbourne though

these SMOs represent very different types of

organisations. To be part of the environmental movement,

or define oneself as a ‘greenie’ or to practice

environmental activism, it is not necessary to be a35

member of Greenpeace, or to participate in the informal

activities of local ‘Friends of’ groups. Activists can

simply make ‘environmental’ choices in their lifestyles

and not be a member of an SMO at all; these are just some

of the options for activism available in a very broad

range of possibilities.

Like the environmental movement the movement for

syari’ah in Indonesia is broad, and JI is a fringe group

within this movement. Historical narratives of JI’s

evolution abound (Abuza, 2007; Barton, 2004; Bubalo &

Fealy, 2005; ICG, 2002). Scholars have tracked the

history of JI from its early roots in Islamist activism

linked to an Indonesian specific tradition emanating from

the Darul Islam (DI) movement. DI violently agitated for

an Islamic state in Indonesia from the period of Dutch

colonialism, and JI is seen to derive from this tradition

(Abuza, 2007: 48; Bubalo & Fealy, 2005: 87; ICG, 2005a:

5-6).

JI represents an SMO that is concerned with changing

the system of life in Indonesia to what JI activists

perceive as a more moral and value based system. JI’s36

grievance with the current system is not rooted in

concerns about the distribution of wealth or class-based

identities. JI is concerned with the cultural, it is the

morality and values of society as much as the political

that they wish to remake. The dissatisfaction is rooted

in a perception that morality is lacking in the current

system of governance and in contemporary Indonesian

society. Importantly, while JI derives in part from a

history of DI activism, and the legacy of DI activism

form part of the JI narrative, JI does not advocate a

removal to the past; JI is imagining a new Indonesian

society.

By placing a focus on group dynamics and exogenous

influences, NSMT explores the elements of activism within

JI that go beyond formal induction into JI. NSMT

framework emphasises networks and SMO responses to

opportunities and constraints highlighting the

significance of women’s activism within JI to maintenance

of the movement as a whole.

NSMT’s overarching framework focuses on three

interrelated elements of collective action. The first37

element is the framing processes engaged by an SMO,

concerned with the ways in which an SMO advocates or

markets their activism. The next element mobilising

structures and resources, focuses on the various networks

an SMO draws on. Responses to opportunities and

constraints are the final element in NSMT, and concern

SMO responses to the authorities and changes in the

political and cultural landscape that an SMO operates

within (Wiktorowicz, 2002: 190).

2.3 New Social Movement Theory Framework

There are various means by which NSMT can be applied

to case studies. Often a focus on one or two elements of

the framework is taken. All three elements of the

framework are integrated and in order to draw out the

role of women in JI despite the limited focus on women in

the data available, I will apply all three elements;

framing; mobilising structures: and opportunities and

constraints. A discussion of each element will follow.

38

2.3.1 Framing

Framing concerns the ways in which an SMO argues

their point. Framing differs from ideology in that

ideology is the fundamental beliefs of the movement,

whereas framing involves articulating the relevance of

those beliefs and legitimising the SMO strategies for

action. Frames must resonate in order to mobilise and

influence. Frames work to identify a problem, attribute

the ‘blame’ for the problem, and also offer a solution to

the problem. Frames are generally dynamic, and can alter

depending on the opportunities or constraints apparent at

any one time. Ideology on the other hand is generally

static, the goal may remain the same, but the way the

problem is framed and the methods of action advocated may

alter depending on exogenous factors (Wiktorowicz, 2004:

15).

JI’s ideology is that Indonesia should be ruled by

syari’ah and beyond that a Southeast Asia Kalipha (Caliphate)

as opposed to any other form of government. This has not

changed in the course of the organisation’s activism;

39

however methods for advocating for syari’ah have changed.

JI has at times advocated violence in the form of

bombings or participation in communal conflict, at other

times and sometimes simultaneously advocating non-violent

dakwah (da’wa- proselytisation). The framing of JI’s

alterations in advocating various methods of contention

has morphed. Framing concerns the way an SMO posits a

problem and how they promote and justify methods of

action to redress the problem or problems. Framing also

provides the rationale for supporting the actions

promoted (Wiktorowicz, 2004: 25-26). In order to resonate

with people and motivate frames must emerge from the

cultural and political landscape, resonating with

cultural symbols, language and identities (Wiktorowicz,

2002: 202). For JI the justification for violence is

coined in terms of jihad, and seen to be the duty of

Muslims, and also draws on Indonesian-specific cultural

nuances.

The move away from violence to dakwah has likewise

used Islamic terminology, and is framed in terms of

educating the ummah in order to create a strong base and40

prepare for a future when jihad may be utilised to bring

about a change in governance. The framing here argues

that in order to prepare for jihad and have more chance at

success the ummah must be sufficiently prepared and have

taken on the ‘pious’ lifestyle JI advocates in advance of

violent jihad. There is disagreement over frames and some

elements of JI have been so dissatisfied that they have

broken away, framing the issue in various alternative

ways, which prioritise violence to different degrees

(Jones, 2008). This has resulted in JI engaging in a war

of words or a war of framing in order to market their new

direction. With publishing of translations of Islamic

texts supporting the various alternative views being

printed by JI related publishing houses en masse in the

wake of the Bali bombings of 2002 (Fealy, 2007; ICG,

2008b).

2.3.2 Mobilising Structures

Mobilising structures are the means by which social

movements are able to mobilise individuals. While frames

legitimise mobilisation, mobilising structures are the

41

means by which that mobilisation is enacted. Mobilising

structures include resources such as networks, both

formal and informal. The nature of mobilising structures

has an impact on the options for activism, by offering

not only the ‘numbers’ for collective action, but also

impacting on the commitment of activists, providing new

recruits, spreading movement frames and repertoires of

contention available to activists.

For JI resources include the social and kinship ties

that link members, as well as the formal network of the

JI linked pesantren that helps spread the ideology and

movement frames. On the other hand there are also the

networks of JI activists involved in violence from

training camps in Afghanistan and the Philippines and

communal conflict in Indonesia. As repertoires of

contention reinforce overtime, these latter networks tend

to have a violent focus, as violence becomes habit.

JI’s different networks have very different

repertoires of contention; this becomes apparent when the

role of women is examined. Women function within JI as

community members involved in the mundane of day-to-day42

life, from education, raising children and domestic

duties. For women involved in JI these functions are

activism, as generally all daily activities are involved

in JI. That is to say, women live the alternative

lifestyle being promoted by JI; the ‘pious’ community JI

imagines for the whole of Indonesia, and eventually

beyond to the Southeast Asian Kalipha. Women take their

children to JI playgroups, kindergartens and schools, and

socialise within JI networks, whether religious study

groups or kin groups (Jones, 2007). These differing

experiences have a push and pull effect on the

organisation’s urge to violence, with the men’s role in

violence impacting on women’s ability to function within

their day-to-day when attention is on the organisation

and community in the form of arrests, court cases and

media attention.

2.3.3 Opportunities and Constraints

The final element in NSMT framework concerns impacts

on movements from outside and the responses to

opportunities and constraints that represent the ways in

43

which an SMO is able to engage with the political

process. This element can be, and often is dynamic.

Governments react to activism in different ways at

different times; sometimes creating space for

opportunities at other times constraining activism. This

is generally the focus of political process advocates of

SMT, however as Wiktorowicz points out, it is not only

the political that SMOs operate within, but importantly

for new social movements also the cultural and economic

(Wiktorowicz; 2002: 200).

One means of interaction with the cultural landscape

for an SMO is interaction with the media. This can shape

the way the public perceives the SMO, and in this way can

prove to be either a constraint or an opportunity. For JI

interaction with the media has been a significant factor

in its activism, and has seen women often taking centre

stage. By promoting their ‘alternative lifestyle’ or

‘pious community’ in the media the organisation is

attempting to counter negative perceptions within the

Indonesian public at high profile violence.

44

Conclusion

JI is an organisation that is part of a broader

social movement, aimed at changing Indonesian society and

generating a more ‘Islamic’ community. Social change is

pursued by a number of means. The techniques engaged by

JI and methods of activism are constantly evolving.

Applying NSMT and highlighting the opportunities and

constraints that JI has encountered sees the role of

women emerging as dynamic in responding to the changing

environment and challenges of negative attention in the

wake of JI associated violence. NSMT’s focus on

mobilising resources illuminates the significant role of

women in the pesantren network and also the wives of

inducted members, as important resources for JI. Framing

by JI is constantly evolving, resulting in different

modes of activism being emphasised at different periods

in response to the ability of JI and activists in the

wider NSM to function under outside pressures.

45

3. NEW SOCIAL MOVEMENT THEORY APPLIED TO

JEMAAH ISLAMIYAH

This chapter will apply New Social Movement Theory

(NSMT) framework to Jemaah Islamiyah (JI), in doing so

highlighting the significance of women’s activism in

maintenance of the movement. The three dimensions of

NSMT’s overarching framework; framing; mobilising

structures; and opportunities and constraints are

intertwined and interrelated. For this reason this

chapter will see stages of JI’s evolution divided into

four sections which loosely equate to changes in JI’s

framing of activism. The three dimensions of NSMT

framework will be applied to each stage of JI’s

evolution. Each period has been defined by a shift in

framing by JI and also sees alterations in mobilising

structures; resources; and opportunities and constraints

placed upon JI by exogenous factors.

What appears from an application of NSMT framework

is a pattern of strengthening of the networks JI draws on

for mobilisation, which in turn alters the types of46

activism advocated by JI. The direction JI takes in

regards to its advocating of violence appears to relate

to the networks available for mobilisation. As the

community networks surrounding pesantren grow the urge to

violence dissipates, although this is not a linear cause,

and various factors influence JI’s evolution. The

networks surrounding JI pesantren are primarily where

women’s activism takes place. JI’s post 2002 emphasis on

dakwah (da’wa) as opposed to violence is an emphasis on

community in which women within the movement play a

central role.

The evolution of JI can be divided into four stages

that have seen shifts in what NSMT refers to as ‘framing’

of activism. Framing is the way in which a type of

activism is justified at any one time. This chapter will

examine each period representing a shift in framing.

Beginning with an overview of events relevant to the

evolution of JI within that period, then going on to

examine the opportunities and constraints and the dynamic

ways JI reacts to such factors. And finally examining the

47

mobilisation structures JI builds and draws on during

each period.

For JI, framing shifts can be loosely divided into

four distinct timeframes; the 1970’s during which period

the New Order regime in Indonesia suppressed Islamist

activism to 1985 when Sungkar and Ba’aysir fled Indonesia

to Malaysia. 1985 to 1998 covering the period of

Malaysian exile, training in Afghanistan and the official

inception of JI in 1993. The period of Reformasi from 1998

when Sungkar and Ba’asyir returned to Indonesia until

2002 and the first Bali bombings. And the final stage is

the post 2002 period, looking at the backlash against JI

in the aftermath of the first Bali bombings and JI

dynamism following these events.

3.1 Jemaah Islamiyah and New Social Movement

Theory

3.1.1 1970’s to 1985: Activism in the New Order period

By the 1970’s Indonesian clerics Abdullah Sungkar

and Abu Bakar Ba’asyir were active in dakwah and

48

proselytisation. Ba’asyir and Sungkar were not involved

in the original Darul Islam (DI) movement, whose armed

rebellion ceased in the early 1960’s, however they were

sympathetic to the DI mission of establishing an Islamic

state within Indonesia (ICG, 2002a: 7). Activism for the

two clerics generally involved proselytisation and

preaching. Bubalo and Fealy state that around this

period, Sungkar commonly referred to the start of the

Indonesian state as August 7, 1949, the date that DI

leader Kartosuwirjo declared Negara Islam Indonesia (NII;

Islamic State of Indonesia) (Bubalo & Fealy, 2005: 87).

In 1967, Sungkar and Ba’asyir founded a

proselytisation radio station with Hasan Basri in Solo.

Ba’asyir, Sungkar and Basri, along with five other

Islamic scholars also founded the Pesantren Al Mu’min Al

Mukmin in 1972 (Noor, 2007c: 2). The pesantren moved to

Ngruki, Solo (and became known as Pondok Ngruki) in 1973.

The pesantren was created as a “Muslim educational and

welfare-based foundation” (Noor, 2007c: 6). The radio

station was shut down in 1975 by the New Order’s internal

security apparatus for its political content and anti-49

government tone (ICG, 2002a: 6-7). Sungkar and Ba’asyir

were then arrested in 1978 for allegedly “recruiting and

inducting others into Jemaah Islamiyah” (ICG, 2002a: 7). The

authorities linked this organisation to a group called

Jemaah Mujahidin Anshorullah that Sungkar was believed to be

the head of. Sungkar was also accused of serving as

“military governor of NII for Central Java” (ICG, 2002a:

4). The International Crisis Group’s (ICG) examination of

court documents relating to the case found that the

“government’s case against the two men rests far more on

the content of statements urging disobedience to secular

authority than on any evidence of an underground

organisation” (ICG, 2002a: 7). Sungkar and Ba’asyir had

been detained since November 1978 when they were tried

and sentenced to nine years in prison for subversion.

During this period Sungkar and Ba’asyir had not

formed their own movement, and dakwah via the radio

station, preaching and pesantren activities were the main

means of activism engaged in. In late 1982 Sungkar and

Ba’asyir’s sentences were reduced to time served and they

were released and returned to Pondok Ngruki, before50

fleeing to Malaysia in 1985 as the prosecution had

successfully appealed and rearrest was imminent (ICG,

2002a: 9). According to the ICG, since their initial

arrest and exodus to Malaysia, Ngruki linked violence had

occurred, including some bombings and other acts of

violence (ICG, 2002a: 9). Despite this violence, framing

of activism by Sungkar and Ba’aysir involved advocating

via proselytisation for an Islamic state, and urging

civil disobedience, such as refusing to salute the

Indonesian flag or disregard the country’s constitution

and refuse to pay taxes (Ismail, 2007).

In this period the constraints placed upon Islamist

activism in Indonesia by the New Order regime contributed

to the radicalisation of Ba’asyir and Sungkar. This

served in part to strengthen the identity of Ba’asyir and

Sungkar as Islamist activists, which later became

integral to the narratives of the movement. Persecution

by the state for Islamist activism was portrayed as

symptomatic of a Muslim collective continuously under

siege from hostile forces. Mohammed Hafez describes “the

interplay of political environments, mobilisation51

structures, and collective action frames” as relevant for

shaping “the development and behavioural repertoires of

social movements” (Hafez, 2004: 38). Hafez applies this

framework to explain the massacres of civilians carried

out in Algeria by the Armed Islamic Group (GIA) during

1997. These elements are of equal relevance to the

evolution of JI, though with differences in circumstance

that led to different outcomes. Hafez describes the

interplay of harsh and violent repression by state

authorities leading to a “political environment of

bifurcation and brutality” combined with activists

creating “exclusive organisations to shield themselves

from repression” and finally adopting “anti system frames

to motivate violent collective action to overthrow agents

of repression” (Hafez, 2004: 38). While the case of

Algeria in the 1990’s is very different to Indonesia in

the 1970’s and 80’s, and JI did not resort to the same

type of violence as the GIA in 1997, this interplay of

elements of NSMT framework is useful when applied to

Islamist activism in Indonesia during this period. The

targeting of state repression of Islamist activism in52

Indonesia during the 1970’s impacted on Ba’aysir and

Sungkar by seeing them firstly imprisoned and later

fleeing to exile in Malaysia. Such perceived persecution

contributed to “a shared sense of victimization and

legitimacy,” this perception according to Hafez allows

violence (even extreme violence in the case of the 1997

GIA massacres) to be justified. Barton describes the

environment of antagonism that developed in Indonesia

between Islamists and the State during this period, where

animosity between Islamists and security forces spiralled

rapidly (Barton, 2005: 80-81). On his way to Malaysia in

1985, Sungkar stopped in Lampung, South Sumatra, where he

attracted a following. A community grew and by 1989 the

group had attracted the attention of local authorities,

conflict rapidly developed, resulting in numerous arrests

then the killing of the subdistrict military commander

charged with speaking to the group. The military response

was to attack the compound, which had seen most of the

men flee the imminent reprisals, the attack by security

forces resulted in what Barton describes as a massacre,

53

with 100 dead, many women and children (Barton, 2005:

80).

As well as contributing to a shared narrative of

victimisation, feeding into the moral logic used to

justify violence, harsh repression also forces activists

to form exclusivist organisations to ensure their own

survival. JI represents such an organisation. A further

radicalisation occurs as anti-system frames are adopted,

whereby the system is seen as “fundamentally corrupt” and

must be replaced with a new system. The movement struggle

is depicted in terms of a crucial black and white battle

between good and evil, with no grey area (Hafez, 2004:

38). Anti-system frames that justified violence were

adopted and refined by JI in the next period, and a pan-

Islamist discourse was increasingly adopted, eclipsing

the narrower DI Indonesian-centric aims. Both the GIA in

the 1990’s, pre- JI activists in the 1970’s and 80’s and

even DI in the 1950’s, when facing state repression

resorted to establishing exclusivist organisations yet

JI’s ultimately led to violence in the form of

participation in communal conflict including terrorist54

bombings and other violence targeting Christian

communities in communal conflict areas and later

terrorism in the form of the Bali bombings. In the case

of JI there was room to grow networks whose nature, while

still exclusivist was less extreme than the GIA, and

therefore JI never followed the trajectory resulting in

massacres of ‘it’s own;’ supporters of the organisation,

as both the GIA (Hafez, 2004) and DI did (Fealy, 2005;

21-23). JI was able to operate relatively uninhibited in

Malaysia, and still able to connect with elements of the

community around Pondok Ngruki within Indonesia.

The networks around the various JI related pesantren,

involved women, and marriage as a form of strengthening

networks was embraced. These opportunities for network

building connect JI as an exclusivist social movement

organisation (SMO) to the broader NSM community and

appear to counter the exclusive nature somewhat. Yet the

anti-system frames remain similar, and the Manichean

worldview adopted by all three groups sharpened as a

result of state repression. However the wider JI

community was unlikely to justify such extreme,55

indiscriminate violence, as resorted to by the GIA in

1997 and DI in the 1950’s. Building a vanguard Islamic

community, which was perceived to be occurring at Pondok

Ngruki during the 1970’s to 1985 was later framed as a

supreme purpose of JI activism according to the JI

handbook (PUPJI translated by Fealy, in Fealy & Hooker,

eds. 2006). This community building offered a focal point

for JI activism, that was lacking in the case of the GIA

where extreme repression in Algeria lead to a narrowing

of options of activism. For JI activism was more diffuse,

and the pesantren community allowed to continue and in fact

grow, rather than being totally repressed. In fact when

the Bali bombings of 2002 occurred, this caused major

rifts within the organisation as such violence was

difficult to justify as the ‘enemy’ was seen as less

clearly defined in the case of Bali victims when compared

to Christians in communal conflict areas who were seen to

be involved in violence against Muslims in those areas

(ICG, 2008b).

56

3.1.2 1985-1998: Malaysian Exile

From the late 1980’s to the 1990’s Sungkar and

Ba’aysir held senior positions in DI. 1985 to 1998 saw

Sungkar and Ba’asyir exiled to Malaysia. The response to

constraints in this period was both a radicalisation of

Sungkar and Ba’aysir, and to seek opportunities

elsewhere. Imitating the style of the Muslim

Brotherhood’s usroh, the practise of establishing small

cells was adopted. In these usroh individuals got together

and held study circles and discussion groups within which

individuals were encouraged to live ‘piously,’ avoid non

Islamic institutions and generally participate in dakwah

(Barton, 2005: 79). These usroh were not exclusive to JI,

the concept tapped into a new energy on university

campuses, as any other form of activism on campus became

restricted. During this period new Islamist translations

such as those of Sayyid Qutb and other international,

post 1960’s, Islamist ideologues became increasingly

available in Indonesia and discussed within the usroh.

Combined with this the Iranian revolution of 1979 offered

57

renewed energy to concepts of Islamic rejuvenation of a

corrupt polity (Barton, 2005: 79; Fealy, 2005: 26-27).

As well as this usroh network building within

Indonesia, Sungkar attended training camps and battles in

Afghanistan and furthermore funnelled recruits to

Afghanistan primarily from the Indonesian pesantren network

to participate in the mujahedeen training aimed at ousting

the Soviets from Afghanistan (although most Indonesian’s

attended these training camps after the Soviet withdrawal

(ICG, 2003: 2; Jones, 2005: 6-7). Via the Afghan

experience ties with likeminded Southeast Asian groups

such as the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) and also

future al-Qaeda operatives were forged (Bubalo & Fealy,

2005: 79-87).

Since its official inception in 1993, JI has

involved itself in dakwah as a means of establishing a

literal Jemaah Islamiyah or Islamic Community conducive

to syari’ah, as well as engaging in violence as a means of

furthering the JI aims of establishing an Islamic state

within Indonesia. Within JI rhetoric the concept of a

vanguard Islamic community is described as a qoidah aminah58

(secure base) (ICG, 2005a: 5-6). The qoidah aminah is

considered a necessary precursor to the establishment of

an Islamic state within Indonesia and beyond to a wider

Southeast Asian Caliphate. The consequence of attempting

to build the qoidah aminah sees JI activism often revolving

around education and preaching or dakwah and promoting the

JI version of a ‘pious’ lifestyle that is necessary for

qoidah aminah. Women are involved in this aspect of

activism by participating in study groups, discussions

and as students or teachers in JI pesantren and by ‘living

out’ the alternative lifestyle promoted. By the mid

1980’s to 1998 women’s roles as community members living

the ‘pious’ lifestyle necessary to qoidah aminah was well

established.

During this period the resources for mobilisation

that NSMT highlights; the network of pesantren in

Indonesia, continued to grow and developed within

Malaysia. The mobilising resources in the network of JI

linked pesantren serve both the religious and educational

outreach of JI’s mission by propagating JI teachings and

also providing other resources to the organisation.59

According to the ICG the network of pesantren provide

places of refuge for like minded travellers or those

wanted by the authorities, employment to members in the

form of teaching and preaching positions, and

occasionally military training (ICG, 2003: 26). The

pesantren environment is a means of disseminating the JI

ideology at the very least, and connecting JI to a wider

community of support, as well as tapping into a pool of

new recruits. JI linked pesantren alumni have at times

started their own pesantren, or work as preachers or

teachers at existing JI pesantren. This becomes a web of

individuals receiving a ‘JI education,’ and passing on

those teachings to others. A social network then expands,

where individuals are involved in one way or another with

pesantren. Individuals are teachers, students, preachers,

local community members, parents of students, alumni,

etc. In this way, a community of support develops around

these pesantren sympathetic to the JI ‘cause.’

Women are deeply embedded within this network, with

active roles within JI pesantren as well as being wives,

daughters and sisters of inducted male members of JI.60

Women participate in dakwah; often teaching at pesantren,

attending pesantren and/or leading study groups for women,

as well as organising kindergartens, playgroups and so

on. In this way women work as activists and also

facilitate the passing on of JI frames, as well as

building the resources for mobilisation. Noralwizah Lee

Abdullah is probably the most well know example, married

to JI operative Hambali she was said to be “a recruiter

who introduced the group to young Muslim women and

persuaded them to join as well…her task was to

indoctrinate the younger female recruits of the movement”

(Noor, 2007a: 13).

Generally women’s involvement is more subtle and

does not purport to ‘recruit,’ and women do not describe

themselves as part of JI, but instead see themselves as

living genuinely Islamic lives, and attempting to be good

Muslim women. Dakwah is not seen as political activism by

these women, but religious obligation. In this way dakwah

involves webs of networks and social groups. Applying SMT

to women’s activism in Yemen, Janine Clark describes the

process where women are gradually embedded into the61

Islamist movement as their understanding of da’wa evolves

with gradual contact with other activists (Clark, 2004:

179). Within JI whole families can be linked to some

pesantren as students, teachers and broader community

members involved in dakwah activities (ICG, 2003: 26).

Jones explains that involvement in JI goes from

playgroups to kindergartens for Quranic study, Islamic

elementary schools and pesantren, encompassing whole

families in activism just by ‘living’ the lifestyle

advocated by JI (Jones, 2007). This is a core element of

NSM activism. Women serve as both the maintainers of

networks for resource mobilisation, as well as activists

themselves, by living the alternative ‘JI’ way.

Within these networks, JI involvement often involves

whole families and intermarriage occurs between new

recruits and established member’s families. Arranged

marriages for the benefit of JI as an organisation

regularly occur. Mira Agustina is an example; her father

was of a DI pedigree, had JI connections, sent his

children, including Mira to JI linked pesantren, and took

part in communal conflict throughout Indonesia (Noor,62

2007a: 14). Mira’s marriage “was arranged and conducted

in just one day” (Noor, 2007a: 14) and saw her married to

Omar al-Faruq an al-Qaeda operative, thereby establishing

a familial link for al-Qaeda with JI. Likewise Paridah,

daughter to Malaysian man, Abas bin Yusuf known to be

involved with JI and sister to Nasir Abas the former JI

commander was married to executed Bali bomber Ali Gufron

(Mukhlas). Paridah’s father a JI activist arranged this

marriage; the couple had six children (McEvers, 2008).

The exile of Sungkar and Ba’aysir and the

limitations placed on Islamist activism by the New Order

during the 1970’s and 80’s constrained Islamist activism

for these two clerics. As options for activism narrowed,

new opportunities emerged. The radicalism of Sungkar and

Ba’aysir seems to have been heightened in this period.

Militancy was embraced and the networks Sungkar began to

generate around JI after 1985 via funneling recruits into

overseas military and radical, militant, religious

training first in Afghanistan then in the Philippines fed

into this tendency. A network of men emerged involved in

the social, familial and marriage networks of JI, and63

further bonded by the experience of military training and

contacts with likeminded groups. This phenomenon

contributed to a spiraling of beliefs and further

commitment to the cause, continually replicated with new

recruits over a very long period of time.

3.1.3 1998-2002: Reformasi

The fall of Suharto and the Reformasi period saw the

emergence of a new political climate in Indonesia and a

falling away of Suharto’s tight hold on the political

landscape. This period saw the previously exiled Sungkar

and Ba’asyir return to Indonesia and a space for the

likes of JI to organise more freely. This was a period of

economic and social upheaval in Indonesia. Violence

against the ethnic Chinese community that began to emerge

in the mid-1990’s peaked at the fall of Suharto in 1998.

This violence gave voice to the frustrations that many

pribumi (indigenous Indonesian’s) felt at years of

perceived favouritism by Suharto for New Order cronies

who it was perceived had benefited economically from the

corrupt regime at the expense of indigenous and

64

specifically Muslim Indonesians (Schwarz, 1999: 98 – 132).

The theme of a persecuted Muslim population framed by JI

held much appeal in this period of crisis.

In this environment the vote for independence in

East Timor occurred as well as an increase in sectarian

violence between Muslim and Christian communities in

Maluku (Abuza, 2007: 1-2). This continued in Maluku and

then in Central Sulawesi into the 2000’s and important

hot spots such as Ambon and Poso saw extreme violence

occur, causing outrage throughout Indonesia, with

demonstrations in Jakarta in January 2000. These areas

attracted people from different parts of the archipelago

to fight in defence of violence against Muslims there

(Abuza, 2007: 4). Areas of communal conflict that emerged

in the late 1990’s gave resonance to JI frames and

provided fertile opportunities for recruitment, from

disaffected locals as well as outsiders wishing to join

the fight.

The violence within these areas saw JI mobilise

around these events, seizing the opportunity presented to

put the training from Afghanistan and elsewhere into use,65

by participating in violence in Indonesia. This yet again

functioned to cement bonds between participants, some

veterans of Afghanistan, as well as new recruits.

Furthermore the other social links that bond JI members,

including social groups such as volleyball or soccer

teams continued to expand. These networks created

cohesiveness within the organisation whereby elements of

the broader JI ‘community’ create a world within which

members operate that is in effect cut off from the

outside world (Ismail, 2006: 4). Ramakrishna, quoting the

Singapore White Paper on JI describes the way in which

recruits to JI “kept to themselves” after induction into

JI, reinforcing “the ideological purity of the group”

(Singapore White Paper as quoted in Ramakrishna, 2004:

41-42). This isolation from outsiders and deep in-group

indoctrination sees the group feeding on itself, urging

one another to action and maintaining a constant state of

readiness for activism as involvement in non-focused

social activity decreases (Horgan, 2005: 138).

Increasingly the individual is sublimated to the group

and violence is rationalised and justified. Taylor and66

Quayle describe this process whereby the group gives the

individual a sense of purpose, a sense of shared

commitment with other group members and the sense of

belonging to a worthwhile cause (Taylor and Quayle, 1994:

29-31). JI tends to create this scenario on a grand

scale, where the social or group network of ideological

indoctrination spans a great distance, with layers of

involvement. Strengthening the resources available for

mobilisation in terms of recruits bonded by various

social and kinship ties, including shared experience in

violence. Hafez points to the importance of such

‘exclusivist’ behaviour in a repressive state environment

for channelling a shared sense of victimisation and

legitimacy (2004: 38). JI perpetuated this perception of

shared victimisation in relation to violence against

Muslims in communal conflict areas from 1998 onwards.

Those recruited to participate in violence in these areas

describe being invited to study groups and watching

footage of atrocities being committed against Muslims in

areas of communal conflict (ICG, 2002b: 22). A sense of

victimisation developed, and gradually via further67

contact with other activists, a spiralling of beliefs

occurred to the point where the recruits were able to

commit violence themselves, and feel justified in doing

so.

For women activism involves dakwah and all elements

of day-to-day life and social interactions. For the men

of JI during the Reformasi period activism was increasingly

focused on violence. In this period JI was not only

involved in communal conflict, but also bombings. The

Christmas Eve bombings of 2000 saw approximately 38

Christian churches attacked simultaneously across

Indonesia (Bubalo & Fealy, 2005: 80) and other violence,

such as the beheading of two Christian schoolgirls

occurred. These actions were framed as defence of the

ummah against an aggressive and violent Christian

populace. Likewise the use of preman or thugs to fill out

JI ranks and commit fa’i, or robbery ‘for the good of the

cause’ or simply violent acts developed during this

period, as an urgency seemed to intensify around the JI

mission. Militancy was seen as being justified by

violence against the ummah in areas of communal68

conflict. Additionally communal conflict areas were

anticipated to be areas where the qoidah aminah, or

vanguard community could be established (ICG, 2005c: i).

The legitimacy of fa’i, like familial participation in

activism, is a tradition established by the DI movement

and carried on by JI (ICG, 2005a: 5).

While inducted male members were off participating

in the ‘jihad’ in communal conflict areas, many women were

running their own businesses. JI related businesses built

up over a number of years are significant resources for

the organisation in a number of ways. By ensuring that JI

community members are involved in JI business, the

cohesiveness of the organisation is maintained.

Businesses are often run by women in these communities,

and enable women to support their families while their

husbands are busy fighting jihad. It would be impossible

for men to go off and train or fight if there was no

means of support for their families. Successful business

ventures have also been used to funnel funds to JI,

including those of women associated with the

organisation. Likewise the role of women with their69

businesses has been used to conceal JI activism, and

women at times have been used as couriers by the

organisation (McEvers, 2004).

The practice of aiding women to set up small

business ventures around pesantren communities however is

not only done so for the benefit of JI. Many women

associated with JI linked pesantren engage in this practise

simply to supplement meagre incomes and support their

families. While being utilised by JI for the organisation

at times, women are generally required to have their own

means of employment within the wider community not

involved in the organisation. Similarly the JI linked

pesantren offer free or cheap education to female students

whose families have little other alternative, where state

schools and other private schools are prohibitively

expensive on tight incomes.

3.1.4 2002-2010: Bali bombings and beyond

The first Bali bombing in 2002 appears to have

erupted out of the urgency developing around the JI

mission since the late 1990’s. The Bali bombing of 2002

70

is the first real attempt at engaging in the al-Qaeda

style frame of a strike at the ‘far enemy’ on Indonesian

soil, and marks a shift in framing. Despite ties with al-

Qaeda dating back to the 1980’s Afghanistan training, and

including such links as intermarriage of JI families to

al-Qaeda operatives, JI has typically had an indigenous

Indonesian focus rooted in the history of the DI

movement. The al-Qaeda methodology only adopted by JI for

the Bali bombing of 2002 and believed to be funded by al-

Qaeda sources (Bubalo & Fealy, 2005: 84-85). In the wake

of Bali, an assessment of these events occurred within

JI. From this it appears four schools of thought have

emerged.

Firstly the interpretation that was taken by non-JI

related Indonesian Salafists, that this style of violence

was haram or forbidden in Islam. It is this logic that has

influenced the likes of former JI commander Nasir Abas.

Abas, in his publications and interviews with the media,

has described his turning from senior JI commander to

assisting the Indonesian police as influenced by an

abhorrence to the violence as an ends mentality of the71

Bali bombing. Abas describes the indiscriminate killing

of innocent civilians, particularly where Muslims will

likely be killed, as haram, claiming by following this

path Islamic teachings were twisted in justification of

such actions (Atran, 2005: 78). Abas has said that he is

opposed to the logic used to justify such indiscriminate

violence (Atran, 2005: 79).

The second school of thought within JI is

personified by Ali Imron who states that while these

attacks are not haram as such, they are detrimental to the

JI aim of establishing an Islamic state in Indonesia.

These types of actions fail to create or prepare a qoidah

aminah. In fact the negative impact of increased pressure

on the JI community by authorities lessens the ability to

function as a community, and erodes the ability to

prepare for syari’ah. While Ali Imron’s ideology like

Abas’s has been promoted by Indonesian authorities as

part of the de-radicalisation program in Indonesian

prisons, another school of thought within JI has also

independently engaged this frame. The JI ‘mainstream,’ as

it has been dubbed by Sidney Jones, while not opposed to72

the psycho-logic used to justify big-bomb attacks such as

the two Bali Bombings and the J.W. Marriot and Australian

Embassy bombings, sees large scale bomb attacks as

detrimental to JI’s longer term goals (Jones, 2006).

Framing of such attacks have little resonance in the

broader Indonesian audience, are difficult to justify and

therefore risk alienating the wider community of support.

The third school of thought within JI involves that

advocated by the Noordin group, who broke away from JI

and perpetrated a number of similar attacks, including

the second Bali bombing in 2005, the J.W. Marriot Hotel

bombing of 2003, the Australian Embassy bombings 2004 and

the 2009 Jakarta hotel bombings until Noordin’s death in

September 2009. The Noordin group, acting without the

endorsement of JI central command remained committed to

striking via theatrical and devastating bombings such as

Bali.

The final group has more recently evolved and is

represented by Dulmatin and the lintas tanzim project, a

coalition of Indonesian neo-jihadist groups (ICG, 2010:

2). Dulmatin who was killed by Densus 88 (Detachment 88,73

the Indonesian counter-terrorism unit) earlier this year,

aimed at establishing a secure base and engaging in

targeted violence. The framing of this mode of activism;

that it was a middle ground between the current JI focus

on dakwah and maintenance of community, and Noordin style

indiscriminate bombing with little if any religious

indoctrination for new recruits, and no meaningful

community building. For activists imbued with the habit

of violent activism lintas tanzim offered the continuance of

such activism, with military training and the advocating

of targeted assassinations and other targeted violence,

as well as the promise of establishing a vanguard Islamic

community.

These debates on framing see the urge to violence

pulled in opposing directions; based on a desire to

engage in violence by men who are accustomed to such

activism on the one hand and the desire to ebb JI

involved violence and focus on dakwah, re-establishing

legitimacy and maintaining the JI community on the other

hand. These debates have been played out in various

publications by JI linked publishing houses. Fealy74

describes texts being advocated by the Noordin school of

thought as tracts which use less sophisticated texts to

indoctrinate individuals into jihadi cells and require

little specialised knowledge of Islam (Fealy, 2007: 4).

This is a fast track to operational readiness that

bypasses JI’s traditional focus on religious

indoctrination (Fealy, 2007). The JI mainstream manifests

in publications that “deliberately…feature Middle Eastern

authors with legitimacy in the salafi jihadi community

who have distanced themselves from al-Qaeda” (ICG, 2008b:

7). The publications advocating Noordin style jihad

appear to have emerged primarily from translations by

jailed militants such as the best selling Aku Melawan Teroris

(I am Against Terrorists) Imam Samudra’s justification of

the Bali bombings which was written from his jail cell

(ICG, 2008b: 4-9). Most of the planning for the lintas tanzim

project likewise occurred in prisons organised by jailed

militants (ICG, 2010: 4). However as the ICG points out,

there is overlap between individuals involved in the

publication of both sides (ICG, 2008b: 16).

75

The backlash from Bali eroded the cohesion of the JI

leadership, importantly losing for some members like Abas

the ability to feel ‘justified,’ and undermining the urge

to violence. The legitimacy of JI’s religious credentials

also suffered a battering in the wake of such violence,

and certainly the further Bali bombs, J.W. Marriot and

Australian Embassy bombings have proven to be costly for

JI, as well as the use of preman who at times exhibited

little religious indoctrination (ICG, 2008a: 4). Such

indiscriminate violence brought unprecedented focus to

the organisation from the authorities, resulting in

hundreds of arrests and the deaths of some senior JI

operatives.

The public outcry that emerged, particularly in the

wake of the Marriot and Australian Embassy bombings,

which took the lives of mostly Indonesian Muslims attests

to this. Furthermore the JI ‘mainstream’ sees these

strikes at the ‘far enemy’ as producing attention on JI

from authorities in such extremes that the costs out way

the benefits (ICG, 2007b: 1-4). Involvement in communal

conflict violence is an opportunity with clear value;76

high recruitment value and financially is relatively

cheap, bomb attacks such as Bali are costly, and have

proven to have no recruitment value whatsoever; rather

they alienate JI and make further functions difficult

(ICG, 2007b: 1).

The lintas tanzim group hoped that a vanguard community

could be built in Aceh where syari’ah has already been

partly adopted by the local authorities, and is home to a

traditionally conservative Islamic community. This was a

miscalculation, as the Islamic community imagined by JI

and indeed Dulmatin and associates is a ‘new’ way of

living, and is not compatible with traditional Acehnese

conservatism and came into conflict with local religious

identities (ICG, 2010).

The importance of JI’s perception of itself in the

wider community was highlighted in the wake of the 2002

Bali bombings. Particularly during the subsequent arrests

and court cases related to the bombings, JI’s interaction

with the media exhibited the organisation’s ability to

seize the opportunity presented by attention in

multifaceted ways. NSM dynamism, and reflexivity saw JI77

seize on antipathy toward the issue of JI in the minds of

much of the Indonesian public. The fact that some

Indonesian officials with religious credentials and

indeed religious constituencies publicly met with

Ba’asyir gave weight to the wider community’s sympathy

with the JI cause. JI attempted to counter perceptions of

itself as al-Qaeda in Southeast Asia by portraying the

organisation as a mere religious community. Women’s role

in seizing the opportunity presented by interaction with

the media points to their significance as activists in

community based dakwah. Noor points out that between 2002

and 2005 when media attention on JI peaked, it was women

who fronted the media. Winning sympathy and public

support by promoting the group, as “little more than a

close-knit community of ordinary pious Muslims whose only

crime was to try to practice a traditional conservative

Islamic way of life” (Noor, 2007a: 16). Noor suggests

such portrayals were calculated by JI to specifically

play on Indonesian cultural norms and family values

(Noor, 2007a). While this presentation of JI as a

‘community’ is likely calculated to best affect the78

Indonesian public, it is also evidence of the NSM

alternative lifestyle as activism that revolves around JI

as an SMO. However the further al-Qaeda style attacks

have undermined this attempted construct. This has seen

the urge to violence ebbed, in an attempt to reconnect

with a wider community of support.

Paridah, the sister of Nasir Abas and wife of

convicted Bali bomber Mukhlas is a prominent example of

JI’s female ‘public relations’ contingent. Paridah was a

heavily pregnant mother, with five children during court

appearances after being detained in late 2002 as an

accessory to the first Bali bombings (her husband was

convicted of his involvement, Paridah was found guilty of

a minor immigration charge as she is a Malaysian

citizen). The image of a heavily pregnant mother on trial

is a stirring one. Paridah has since written a book

entitled Orang Bilang Ayah Teroris (People Say Father is a

Terrorist) about her experiences as a devout women and

single mother of six (the youngest-Osama was born during

her trial) since her husband’s detention (Hari, 2005).

This is an attempt to construct JI as a community with79

religious and family values appealing to a wider

community of support. This can also be seen as an attempt

to reconnect with the perceived community of support,

particularly after the outrage at large bombings since

the first Bali bombing and in the wake of bombings, which

in fact killed mostly Indonesian Muslims.

The backlash against JI in the wake of the 2002 Bali

bombings, and the further violence carried out by the

Noordin splinter group, reverberated throughout the JI

community. While the damage to the organisation due to

arrests of many JI members, and the death of many, as

well as the leadership splits over framing inhibited JI’s

ability to function, the broader NSM has lost little

appeal. JI’s framing advocating violent activism has lost

appeal (if it ever held much beyond the fringes of syari’ah

activists), it is only JI as an SMO that has been

affected by this backlash, the broader NSM remains

active.

80

Conclusion

JI’s use of opportunities during its evolution is

dynamic. Applying NSMT highlights the role of women as

activists fundamental to the maintenance of JI’s

alternative community. JI’s calculated use of the

opportunity presented by media attention in the wake of

the first Bali bombings in 2002, where women were used to

promote the JI frame of a pious community attests to

this. The post 2002 focus on dakwah allows the women’s

role within the pesantren community to continue, as part of

the broader social movement attempting to ‘live by’

syari’ah and advocating for the implementation of syari’ah in

Indonesia.

81

4. JEMAAH ISLAMIYAH AND LASHKAR-E-TOIBA: A

COMPARATIVE DISCUSSION OF THE ROLE OF WOMEN

This chapter will compare women’s activism in and

around JI with women in Lashkar-e-Toiba (LET). LET is a

violent Islamist group based in Pakistan whose activism

primarily focuses on the issue of Kashmir. Both groups

represent violent Islamist organisations with pan-Islamic

aims that emerge from within Muslim majority countries.

This chapter begins with a discussion of the role

of women in JI, then moving on to discuss the role of

women in LET, and finally comparing the two.

4.1 Women in and around Jemaah Islamiyah

Women associated with Jemaah Islamiyah (JI) are new

social movement (NSM) activists, aiming for the

implementation of syari’ah (shari’a) in Indonesia, and beyond

to a Southeast Asian Kalipha (Caliphate). Women’s direct and

indirect involvement with JI as a social movement

organisation (SMO) most commonly entails living their

lives in a manner that they determine is closer to syari’ah82

or embodies a ‘total Islamic identity’ more so than

mainstream or secular Indonesia (Assegaf, 2010).

Involvement in JI communities means living a life that is

activism. All activities undertaken are done so with the

notion that they are somehow ‘more’ Islamic by complying

with their own interpretation of syari’ah and a ‘total’

Islamic identity perceived to be more pious than

mainstream Indonesian lifestyles.

Within Pondok Ngruki, the pesantren most commonly

linked to JI in media the doctrines taught involve an

exclusivist approach to Islam (Noor, 2007c: 15). This

does not necessarily correspond to JI frames. JI frames

justifying violence in the name of Islamist activism are

not universally taught by all teaching staff at Pondok

Ngruki (Noor, 2007c). All associated with the Pondok

pesantren al-Mukmin in Ngruki embrace the philosophy of al-

Wala’ wal-Bara’ or solidarity with like minded Muslims and

avoidance of others (non-Muslims and Muslims of divergent

beliefs), while this corresponds to JI’s narrow

interpretation of what is ‘correct’ in Islam, this does

not necessarily justify violence or agree with JI frames83

advocating the use of violence (Noor, 2007c: 15).

Arguably the exclusivist frames of activism encouraged by

Ngruki in fact are rarely linked to the use of violence,

proof being in the fact that of the thousands of students

who have attended Pondok Ngruki since the 1970’s, only a

minority have been linked to violence. Nevertheless Pondok

Ngruki is persistently linked to JI in the media and by

analysts alike due to the unambiguous connections to the

pesantren of many JI members, most infamously Ba’aysir

whose home is located within the pesantren compound.

Ba’aysir was one of the original founders of the pesantren,

along with fellow JI founder Sungkar and a number of

others (ICG, 2002b). Involvement in the pesantren community

is a form of NSM activism, and while this has lead to

induction into JI for a minority, and some current staff

are connected to JI or likeminded organisations,

association with Pondok Ngruki does not automatically

connect individuals with JI nor does it inevitably

promote frames that justify the use of violence to

‘defend’ Islam.

84

Within the pesantren community at Pondok Ngruki and

beyond to the further JI community there appears to be

two types of female activists. The first types are those

who ‘choose’ to be associated with JI. These women are

mainly those who marry men inducted into JI, particularly

the core of JI leadership and militants. Some of these

women come from Darul Islam (DI) or JI ‘families,’ others

do not. Most of these women are not Pondok Ngruki alumni,

but many are alumni of other JI linked pesantren. These

women play a passive role in support of the organisation,

although at times this may cross over to being more

active. These women have businesses, which either support

their families while their husbands are off participating

in neo-jihadi activism, or even funnel funds to JI for

operations, and at times have been used as fronts to

courier goods or messages for the organisation (McEvers,

2004). Noor raises the point that a number of women

associated with known JI operatives are in fact from

outside the DI/ JI pedigrees and most have economic

agency, are well educated and “choose to marry men who

85

are committed to a social reform project that is carried

out through violent means” (Noor, 2007b).

For women associated with JI men, activism is a

lifestyle that encompasses all elements of community

life, businesses, social groups, religious study circles,

children’s playgroups through to pesantren education, so by

marrying neo-jihadists they are activists themselves. One

such example White highlights; Munfiatun al Fitri, a

university graduate married Noordin in 2004, and had been

known to desire to marry a ‘jihadist’ and “knew her

husband-to-be was on the run for jihadist activities”

(White, 2009).

The second group of women associated with JI are

those women who are associated with JI by default, and

represent a different type of activists. Both groups

would not say they are involved in JI; women do not admit

the existence of JI as an organisation, and merely

‘confess’ to living in a community of believers. For

example Mira Agustina married to Omar al-Faruq, the man

believed to be the key go-between for JI and al-Qaeda,

claims to have been unaware of the role her husband86

played in JI (McEvers, 2004). Despite these claims of

ignorance of their husband’s role in these organisations,

many women have at times acted as couriers as well as

supporting their families while their husbands engage in

neo-jihadi activities. The second type of activists are

women who are associated with JI by default and are more

likely not to be aware of JI as an organisation. These

women are more likely to view themselves as living within

a ‘pious’ community. This second group constitutes women

who are associated with JI linked pesantren Pondok Ngruki.

While advocating for syari’ah and involved in the Pondok

Ngruki community, as students or teachers, there is

little evidence to suggest these women in fact have

anything at all to do with JI the organisation.

Without any empirical evidence as to what motivates

parents to send their daughters to the likes of Pondok

Ngruki, or how these community members feel about

violence in the name of the syari’ah project, speculation

remains the only option for answering this question.

Given the publicity attracted by the pesantren in the wake

of the 2002 Bali bombings due to it’s JI connections, it87

can be concluded that most parents of girls attending

Pondok Ngruki as students since that period, are

reasonably sympathetic to JI frames. At the very least,

as far as embracing the concept of an exclusivist ‘total

Islamic identity’ or al-Wala’ wal-Bara.’ Although it does not

necessarily follow that they are sympathetic to the

question of violence, and in fact the concept of

solidarity or al-Wala’ wal-Bara’ and the meaning of syari’ah for

women are not static concepts and interpretation even

within the confines of the Pondok environment are vastly

divergent and debated (Noor, 2007c: 15; Assegaf, 2009).

At a minimum, it can be assumed that cohesion between the

beliefs of women involved in the pesantren community in

general and JI in particular without any danger of

essentialising motivations, lies in a shared perception

that the application of syari’ah would result in a more just

and fair world. The media frenzy around Ngruki in the

wake of the 2002 Bali Bombings linked the school to

terrorism, a stigma that few could have remained ignorant

of, and indeed the pesantren has a history of close

scrutiny by the authorities (Ismail, 2005a, Noor, 2007c).88

Links to Sungkar and Ba’aysir have caused a taint that

Ngruki administrators have attempted to counter,

particularly since the late 1990’s (Noor, 2007c: 31).

It is worth pointing out that many of the female

students attending the pesantren come from poor rural

families, some are orphans. Ngruki may not have been

first choice for their families had money been no issue.

And certainly more families send their daughters to the

likes of Ngruki than their sons if they can afford to

send their sons elsewhere, they generally do, rather than

sending them to the cheaper boarding schools such as

Pondok Ngruki. So to an extent sending their daughters to

Pondok Ngruki must be considered, for some families as

based on fiscal incentives, rather than ideological

leanings. To what extent each motivation is considered

the most pressing by each family has not been researched

and therefore is impossible to judge.

What is possible to identify is the amount of syari’ah

activism that attendance at Pondok Ngruki involves. Syari’ah

activism for members of the Pondok Ngruki community

involves a total immersion in all elements of life.89

Dakwah is considered obligatory and dakwah encompasses all

of daily life, while also serving as a social outlet for

women associated with pesantren, as students or teachers.

Dakwah can involve discussion groups and ‘get togethers,’

and occasionally attendance at public rallies for syari’ah

along with activists from all over the country. Activism

tends to be a lifestyle (Assegaf, 2009). This immersion

in activism corresponds with the experience of female

Islamist activists in Yemen described by Clark (2004). In

Yemen, networks develop around nadwas, Quranic study or

discussion groups (Clark, 2004: 164-169). Within JI the

same principle applies where women that are directly

linked to the organisation, (via marriage or being

related to inducted male members) interpret dakwah in a

similar way, and all elements of women’s daily life

including socialising with other women, become related to

the issue of syari’ah.

Syari’ah activism is no different for the female

students and teachers at Pondok Ngruki, whether linked to

JI or not. In relation to Islamist activism in Yemen,

Clark highlights the scenario that develops around such90

activism on a large scale, where the result is a social

movement that changes behaviours. The acknowledged

connection with a social movement organisation (SMO), or

the extent that women are aware themselves of their

actions constituting activism becomes irrelevant, as

immersion on such a scale engenders changes in shared

social values (Clark, 2004: 165). This applies to women

at Pondok Ngruki, while they may not be at all associated

with JI (except by the media ‘terrorism’ label associated

with the school) they nonetheless represent women who

adopt the social values that JI is attempting to promote and

indeed live by them; adherence to syari’ah and a total

exclusivist Islamic identity, regardless of acceptance or

not of JI framing of violence.

4.2 The role of women in Lashkar-e-Toiba

Social change via dakwah networks is not the only way

that women associated with Islamist groups in Muslim

majority countries exhibit activism. For some groups

association with an SMO is more direct and an important

part of identity and activism. In Pakistan within91

Lashkar-e-Toiba (LET) women tend to adopt a strict

‘Islamic’ dress code, such as a niqab as a ‘uniform’ and

moral policing encompasses a large element of activism.

Activism contrasts greatly to that of women within or

around JI, or Yemeni Islamist women detailed by Clark

(2004). Though much of their stated aims are similar.

LET is the militant wing of the Markaz dawa wal’Irshad

(MDI-Centre for Religious Learning and Propagation). MDI

was founded in Pakistan in 1987. ‘Freeing’ Kashmiri

Muslims from Indian ‘oppression’ is the immediate goal of

LET, beyond this LET hopes to ‘free all Muslims from

Indian oppression,’ and establish a South Asian Caliphate

(Leather, 2003: 14). To this purpose MDI’s headquarters

in Muridke is modelled as a mini-Islamic city that can be

projected as an alternative model to non-Islamic

governance as is perceived to exist in Pakistan today.

MDI’s headquarters span 200 acres of land. On this

property there is a mosque, an iron foundry, a garments

factory, a furniture factory, sporting facilities and

markets (Abbas, 2005: 211). LET and MDI’s names were

changed in 2002, following the Pakistani Government’s92

proscription of LET in the wake of pressure from the post

9/11 United States War on Terror, to Jamaat-ud-Dawa

(Khan, 2009).

MDI and LET were established as the Afghan Jihad

against Soviet occupation was rounding up, by individuals

with a shared experience of that conflict (Yasmeen, 2005:

49). The LET focus on militancy in Kashmir emerged as the

Kashmiri uprising had begun in the wake of elections in

Kashmir widely perceived to have been rigged by the

central (New Delhi) government (Widman, 2002: 56-95). LET

includes a women’s wing, and women are reportedly trained

for armed jihad, although to date women’s involvement in

operations has been limited to couriering, scouting and

information gathering rather than active participation in

combat, and the ‘women’s corps’ may be simply a means of

competing with other neo-jihadist groups operating in

Kashmir who in fact have used women in combat, including

as suicide bombers, such as Jaish-e-Mohammad (Parashar,

2009: 247).

Yasmeen describes the role of women as defined by

LET, as one in which women are encouraged to limit their93

role in public, to “stay at home and perform the role of

nurturers,” while taking pride in their role as indirect

participants of the jihad, supporting their husbands and

sons roles as active participants (Yasmeen, 2005: 52).

The women’s wing of LET contributes to the organisation’s

propaganda including propagation of this concept of the

‘ideal’ neo-jihadist woman by publishing a women’s

magazine, which offers advice on the ‘correct’ way to be

a good Muslim women. Parashar points out that it is women

who play an important role in the enforcement of

fundamentalist ideology in Jammu and Kashmir by engaging

in moral policing of other women, particularly regarding

standards of dress (Parashar, 2009: 248). The LET women’s

‘uniform’ of full black burqa, gloves and socks are a

radical departure from typical ‘Islamic’ dress in the

region. Farhat Haq describes that during her own

experiences spending time with women from LET in Lahore;

she noticed other local women perceived such practices as

absurd (Haq, 2007: 1031). Furthermore Haq describes the

attempt to construct the ‘ideal’ neo-jihadist women

occurring at LET national conventions. For the annual94

convention women are bused in free of charge, and for

poorer women, this is seen as a free religious event. Haq

describes the female LET guards attempting to call older

women to order, to show respect to male speakers (who

were to be heard via loud speakers as they were

segregated from women) rather than chatting amongst

themselves and enjoying the free food and medical

services on offer (Haq, 2007: 1035-1036). The aim appears

to be an attempt as Haq points out to invent a tradition

signifying “the emergence of a jihadi Islamic ummah”

(Haq, 2007: 1031).

4.2.1 The role of women in Jemaah Islamiyah and Lashkar-

e-Toiba compared

JI also aims at building an ideal ‘Islamic’

community, however women in JI do not appear to partake

in moral policing in the manner women in LET take upon

themselves. Women in JI also inevitably have busy lives

outside the home, as generally women’s incomes are

required to supplement their husbands in order to support

their families. For those women not connected with JI

95

men, and simply involved in the ‘pious’ community around

Ngruki, dakwah tends to take women outside the house, as

well as their income earning occupations. This public

life for women in and around JI is something that appears

to be discouraged by LET, and as LET does financially

support families of militants and ‘martyred’ neo-

jihadists, so the necessity for women’s employment may be

less urgent. Yet LET also urges women to be politically

aware. LET belittles tendency of many women to focus on

the ‘four walls’ of a women’s daily life; the mundane

day-to-day activities (which tends to be the focus of

most women’s lives mainly due to necessity), Yet despite

the women’s corps, LET advocates women’s roles as

primarily ‘mothers’ whose greatest contribution to the

jihad is to sacrifice their sons (Haq, 2007: 1031). This

push and pull of defining the ideal neo-jihadi woman

results in some women being defined as the ‘ideal’ Muslim

woman and permitted to be active outside the home in the

course if promoting this ‘ideal’, which paradoxically

seems to involve restricting the behaviour of other women

(Parashar, 247: 2009).96

The framing of activism for women in LET differs

greatly to that of women associated with JI or the

surrounding communities. LET’s framing is aimed at

building a neo-jihadi consciousness, whereas within JI

the focus for women is on living via their own

interpretations of syari'ah.

Despite this differing focus for articulating

women’s activism, there are a number of similarities in

some elements of the ways in which women support LET and

JI. LET uses marriage in the same manner that JI has

done, to develop networks that both expand membership and

aid strategic capabilities (Parashar, 2009: 248). The

pastoral interpretation of da’wa is similar in both

organisations. The MDI compound offers modern technical

education and MDI and LET often offer free medical

services to the needy. Within JI linked communities

pastoral outreach, such as cheap or free education is

offered by pesantrens, and within Pondok Ngruki in particular

a number of services are offered to the local community,

which include health services. For LET, this occurs at

annual LET rallies, and training camps. LET has also97

participated in provision of relief after natural

disaster, framing such activities as da’wa. Due to the

proximity of LET training camps to disaster areas, being

already dotted around Pakistan complete with necessary

supplies, this proves to be an efficient means of

providing aid to affected locals. The MDI compound offers

the model vanguard Islamic community like the Ngruki

pesantren compound for JI. However LET is an integral wing

of MDI, whereas JI, in comparison has tenuous links to

Ngruki, being more linked to individuals such as Ba’aysir

and other JI members who may be staff at Ngruki, rather

than representing a wing of the organization. JI does not

look to the Ngruki community as the ideal base for the

qoidah aminah (secure base), though this may have been the

case in the past. Since the 1990’s, JI has sought other

locations to build the vanguard community, where neo-

jihadist violence was perceived likely to be more

acceptable to locals; such as Poso during the communal

conflict period, and most recently the lintas tanzim project

chose Aceh. Both attempts failed miserably.

98

MDI and LET focus on promoting a neo-jihadi

consciousness, whereas JI’s framing of activism,

particularly for women centres on the concept of a

vanguard Islamic community, living virtuously. Violence

is not a central tenet of teachings or activism at

Ngruki, though it is difficult to ascertain whether this

is the case at other JI linked pesantren. Framing of

violent activism is privileged by some personalities

within Ngruki, such as Ba’aysir, however this is only one

means of promoting the exclusivist approach to Islam

taught by the school, and is not universal to all

teachers at Ngruki (Noor, 2007c). LET conversely is

focused on violence. LET is the militant wing of MDI and

as such is an SMO that has at its very foundation the

urge to violence. LET originated from a desire by

veterans of the Afghan jihad to promote the value of jihad

at home, whereas JI activism began before contact with

Afghan training camps, although not in the guise of ‘JI’.

Both LET and JI frame justification of violence as

defense of the ummah under siege by hostile forces.

99

Conclusion

JI and LET both aim to establish pan-Islamic

Caliphates, JI first by establishing a vanguard Islamic

community in Indonesia, which will spread to the entire

country, then beyond to a Southeast Asian Caliphate. LET

desires to first ‘free Kashmiri’ Muslims from Indian

oppression, then all South Asian Muslims, by

establishment of a South Asian Caliphate.

JI has consistently failed in it’s attempts to

establish the vanguard community, although the community

around Pondok Ngruki is an example of an Islamist

community where dakwah plays a central role in peoples

lives, minus the neo-jihadi militancy (at least in

women’s daily lives). LET features the MDI complex as a

mini Islamic city and has training camps dotted around

Pakistan. LET and MDI are thoroughly integrated and were

conceived together, whereas the pesantren at Ngruki,

remained somewhat autonomous to JI after JI’s 1993

inception, and was established not as a neo-jihadi

training centre as MDI appears to have as its original

100

mandate, but as a facility for the provision of a

pastoral care approach to dakwah.

Women in JI receive no income support from JI if

their husbands are absent (in jail, training or

participating in neo-jihadi activities) and therefore are

required to provide or supplement their families’

incomes, although there has been fundraising for some of

the families of those jailed in the wake of the Bali

bombings of 2002, this is minimal in comparison to the

provisions set up by LET. Women in LET are discouraged

from participation in any public life, including earning

an income, and families of neo-jihadists and ‘martyrs’

are supported financially by the organisation.

Fundraising by LET is extremely well organised benefiting

from both international and local donors (Santhanam et.

al., 2003: 226, Abbas, 2005, Anon., 2010). This enables

LET to support the families of male activists, and helps

define women’s ability to participate in activism.

Women in JI linked communities appear to be able to

participate in dakwah on a broader, self determined scale

when compared to women in LET. There are a ‘vanguard’ of101

LET women, who are the moral authorities on dress and

behaviour enabling them to use their role publicly to

instruct other women (at times with intimidation). Some

female activists also participate in arranged marriages

and couriering for LET, but many families of LET

militants fall outside this ‘elite’ category and do not

enjoy these privileges of public activism. Within JI,

women’s roles outside the home are broader and therefore

in all probability there is less time available for

activities such as moral policing on top of daily

activities. The pesantren compound at Ngruki includes a

midwifery and healthcare centre, grocery co-operative and

childcare centre (Noor, 2007c) among other services of

which women participate in (or in the case of services

provided specifically for women, such as the midwifery

service, women are the sole participants and manage and

run this service). These are all perceived to be operated

in accordance with syari’ah (Assegaf, 2010) so provide an

outlet for activism that is less limiting than that of

the role of neo-jihadi mother, defined by LET for female

activism.102

103

CONCLUSION

Women in Jemaah Islamiyah (JI) participate in two

types of activism, those that directly connect to JI the

organisation, particularly wives of JI operatives whose

businesses act as fronts for JI logistical activities

such as couriering, or funnelling funds to JI. Then there

are those women associated with JI by their membership in

the Pondok Ngruki community, who are new social movement

activists aiming at living by syari’ah whose activism

consists of dakwah, but appear to have little to do with

JI the organisation.

New Social Movement Theory (NSMT) provides a useful

framework for exploring the role and meaning of women’s

activism in and around JI. There is little existing

scholarship on the role of women in JI, and more needs to

be done.

The three main elements of NSMT; framing, mobilising

structures; and opportunities and constraints offer a

framework that can be used to illuminate the role of

women in the organisation. Framing of activism by JI has

104

evolved over time, and has been influenced a great deal

by a variety of exogenous factors, from the New Order

repression of Islamist activism in the 1970’s and 80’s to

opportunities presented by communal conflict in the late

1990’s early 2000’s. Mobilising structures including

networks such as the kinship and social networks, and

pesantren that JI draws on for mobilisation have grown and

altered in importance. Opportunities and constraints for

activism have constrained or allowed space for activism

at different times resulting in a radicalisation of JI

peaking at the Bali bombings of 2002.

The role of women in this evolution has been vital,

as the network has grown, involving wives and families in

activism. This thesis argues that the role of women in

and around JI involves two different ‘types’ of

activists. The first group are those who are directly

(and willingly) involved with JI the organisation, such

as the wives of neo-jihadi’s including inducted JI

members. The second ‘type’ of activist is those women who

are associated with JI in literature related to JI by

virtue of being part of the Pondok Ngruki community. These105

latter activists are not involved with JI the

organisation, but are activists for syari’ah (Shari’a) in

Indonesia, and chose to live via their own interpretation

of syari’ah.

While activism around JI communities is diverse, it

contrasts greatly to the activism of women in Lashkar-e-

Toiba (LET). There are a few commonalities between the

activism of women in and around JI and those in LET.

However it appears there are more differences. Women in

and around JI appear to have more room for activism

outside the home, which seems to shape JI related

activism into more diverse activities than appears to be

available for female LET activists.

Further comparative case studies of women’s NSM

activism in Islamist groups is needed. Scholarship on the

role of women in these groups is limited, there is

comparatively a great deal of literature on the topic of

female suicide bombers, however even this is minimal when

compared to the wealth of information on men involved in

violent Islamist movements. This exploration of women in

JI shows that activism is diverse. Even within106

communities around JI, activism appears to have different

meanings for different women. Whether the ‘types’

identified within this thesis are dynamic or static is a

question that would require further research to answer.

How much of a cross over between types of activism for

women associated with JI communities is another question

that would require further research. The contact between

those women who choose to ‘marry into’ JI, and those who

reside within the Ngruki community as students and

teachers would be an interesting topic to evaluate. As

would the question of the acceptance of movement frames

between ‘types’ of activists, again this is question that

would require further research, probably extensive

fieldwork. It is not only women involved in JI that put

forward more questions than they answer, but also women

involved with violent Islamist groups in general.

107

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HONOURS THESIS RELEASE STATEMENT

I authorise the release of a copy of this thesis to

the Monash Politics Honours Thesis Collection upon the

completion of examination.

Signed:

Date: 26th October 2010

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