Networks and Nonprofits: Opportunities and Challenges 201Housing Policy Debate • Volume 7, Issue 2 201© Fannie Mae Foundation 1996. All Rights Reserved.

Networks and Nonprofits: Opportunities andChallenges in an Era of Federal Devolution

Langley C. KeyesMassachusetts Institute of Technology

Alex Schwartz and Avis C. VidalNew School for Social Research

Rachel G. BrattTufts University

Abstract

Community development corporations and other nonprofit organizations areincreasingly responsible for producing and managing low-income housing inurban America. This article examines the network of governmental, philan-thropic, educational, and other institutions that channel financial, technical,and political support to nonprofit housing sponsors. We analyze the relation-ships among these institutions and propose an explanation for their success.We then consider challenges the network must confront if the reinvention offederal housing policy is to succeed.

Block grants and rental vouchers, the dominant emphases of federal policy,present opportunities and constraints for nonprofit housing groups and theirinstitutional networks. While states and municipalities are likely to continueto use block grants for nonprofit housing, the viability of this housing will beseverely tested as project-based operating subsidies are replaced by tenant-based vouchers. We recommend ways that the federal, state, and local govern-ments should help the institutional support network respond to this challenge.

Keywords: Low-income housing; Nonprofit sector; Social capital

Introduction

In the 1980s, the federal government drastically reduced directsubsidies for the development of multifamily housing in urbanareas. The 1990s may well see the government stop subsidizingthe development of special needs housing for the elderly and thedisabled. Moreover, the government now proposes to rid itself ofpast commitments to existing federally subsidized and insureddevelopments. The government will only support the develop-ment of new housing through block grants to localities and statesand, perhaps, the low-income housing tax credit (LIHTC). Even

202 Langley C. Keyes, Alex Schwartz, Avis C. Vidal, and Rachel G. Bratt

more than in the 1980s, federal housing policy will emphasizetenant-based rental vouchers.

Federal housing priorities have shifted from categorical, supply-side programs to block grants and vouchers. At the same time,many cities and states are experiencing a growing shortage oflow-income housing (Joint Center for Housing Studies 1995).Because of these two changes and increased political pressurefrom community organizations, homeless advocates, and othergroups (Goetz 1993), local and state governments are becomingmore involved than ever before in the production, rehabilitation,and preservation of low- and moderate-income housing (Berenyi1989; Goetz 1993; Nenno 1991; Terner and Cook 1990). Agenciesuse block grants and other funding sources to support a broadrange of housing activities. Local and state governments oftensupport the development of low-income housing (especially ininner-city communities) through partnerships with communitydevelopment corporations (CDCs) and other nonprofitorganizations.

This article examines the capacity of nonprofits to produce andmaintain low-income housing in this period of devolution andvouchers.1 This capacity is shaped not just by the competency ofeach individual nonprofit group but by the strength of thenonprofit’s institutional network. Nonprofit housing organiza-tions do not exist in an institutional vacuum. They survive andprosper when they are part of a network of organizations thatsupport and undergird their initiatives. Thus, in consideringtheir present and potential role, we must address the extent towhich nonprofit producers are the point organizations in theirsupporting network of institutions.

In analyzing the institutional support system for nonprofithousing, we draw on the concept of social capital. Sociologists,political scientists, and other social scientists define “socialcapital” as the ability of individuals and organizations to acquireresources through membership in networks and other socialstructures (Coleman 1990; Portes and Sensenbrenner 1993;Powell 1990; Putnam 1993, 1995). The concept points to the waysocial and institutional relationships confer tangible benefits onparticipants, benefits that would not otherwise be readily

1 We are not arguing that nonprofit sponsors are the only or necessarily thebest sponsors of such housing but rather that, at present, they are majorplayers that are viewed by many city governments, foundations, and elementsof the U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development as being atthe center of any serious effort to revitalize and maintain inner-cityneighborhoods.

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available. Most definitions emphasize the role of mutual trust,reciprocity, and a shared sense of identity in forging the socialand institutional relationships that foster social capital. Al-though the notion of social capital is now invoked to explain anever-widening array of phenomena—perhaps to the point ofoveruse—we nevertheless believe that when grounded in specif-ics it offers a useful way of framing institutional support fornonprofit housing.2 This article illustrates the importance ofsocial capital through a discussion of institutional collaborationin two cities to improve the development and management oflow-income housing in the nonprofit sector.

The article is organized into five sections. First, we brieflysketch the changing direction of federal housing policy and theincreasing importance of state and local governments and non-profit organizations in developing low-income housing. Thesecond section examines the elements of the institutional sup-port network for nonprofit housing groups and discusses the roleof social capital in tying these elements together. The thirdsection presents two detailed examples to illustrate the influenceof social capital in shaping some of the nation’s strongest institu-tional support networks for nonprofit community developmentorganizations. The fourth section explores several key challengesfacing the institutional support network; and the concludingsection offers several recommendations for strengthening thenetwork.

From the old paradigm to the new

The production and management of rental housing for low-income families has been fundamentally transformed since 1983when the last federally sponsored multifamily production pro-gram was shut down. The Reagan administration terminatedSection 8 New Construction and Substantial Rehabilitationprograms and slowed to a trickle construction of new publichousing (mostly for replacement units) (Hays 1995; Listokin1991). The administration devoted the bulk of the U.S. Depart-ment of Housing and Urban Development’s (HUD’s) much re-duced budget authority to tenant-based Section 8 certificates andvouchers (Hays 1995; Low Income Housing Information Service1994). The only remaining subsidies designated as supply-side

2 The current debate over Francis Fukuyama’s recent book, Trust: The SocialVirtues and the Creation of Prosperity (Fukuyama 1995; Solow 1995), gives aclear indication that social capital is an “idea in good currency” (Schon 1971,123).

204 Langley C. Keyes, Alex Schwartz, Avis C. Vidal, and Rachel G. Bratt

were reserved for the elderly, the disabled, and those living inrural areas.3 The other federal subsidies for production of low-income housing were provided indirectly, through block grantsand tax incentives.

The Community Development Block Grant (CDBG) program and,starting in 1991, the HOME program funnel block grants on aformula basis to states and localities for a range of housing andcommunity development activities (Hays 1995; Rich 1993). TheTax Reform Act of 1986 revamped the structure of tax incentivesfor housing and other real estate investments. While it drasti-cally reduced the value of depreciation allowances and narrowedthe eligibility for tax deductions of passive income losses, the actintroduced the LIHTC (Case 1991; Clancy 1990; Hendershott1990). The LIHTC is administered by state housing financeagencies with minimal oversight by the federal government.Made “permanent” in 1993 but now facing a potential “sunset” in1997 (Cooper 1995), the LIHTC has helped finance almost800,000 multifamily rental units since its inception (Tassos1996) and currently accounts for about 40 percent of the nation’smultifamily housing starts (Oser 1994). However, the LIHTC israrely able to fund the entire cost of developing low-incomehousing. The proceeds of LIHTC syndications must be combinedwith other sources of equity and debt, often including CDBG andHOME funds, to make a project viable (Clay 1990; DiPasqualeand Cummings 1992; Hebert et al. 1993; Stegman 1991).4 Thissystem of patchwork financing is the hallmark of most low-income housing development in the 1980s and 1990s (Commu-nity Information Exchange 1994).

Current proposals for HUD’s “reinvention” and the restructuringof federal housing policy in general further emphasize blockgrants and vouchers and the termination of direct federal sup-port for individual housing developments. HUD, for example,proposes to “voucher out” the public housing system, rapidlyreplacing project-based subsidies with tenant-based vouchers(HUD 1994). It proposes essentially the same for the stock ofprivately owned subsidized housing. HUD’s proposed mark-to-market plan would eliminate project-based subsidies and mort-gage insurance for such housing. HUD would restructure

3 These programs include the Section 202 program for the elderly and thedisabled, Housing Opportunities for People with AIDS, certain McKinney Actprograms for the homeless, and the Section 515 Rural Rental Housing andRural Cooperative Housing programs.

4 For example, a recent HUD-funded study of 15 LIHTC developments foundthat they used an average of 7.8 funding sources (Hebert et al. 1993).

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existing mortgages and, if necessary, fund critical capital im-provements so that the owners could charge “market rents” andoperate without any project-based subsidies. Qualified tenantswould receive rental vouchers they could use for their currentresidence or for a new one (Bodaken 1995; Dunlap 1995; HUD1994). HUD would also eliminate its remaining categoricalhousing production programs (Section 202, Housing Opportuni-ties for People with AIDS) by consolidating them into a newblock grant program for states and localities. Of course, HUD’sproposed reinvention may never be implemented as planned, butthe basic ideas of vouchers and block grants are likely to shapethe ultimate outcome.

In summary, the production of subsidized housing, particularlyin the inner city, now requires multiple financing sources andtypes of subsidies, entails a decreased role for HUD and anincreased role for state and local governments and other institu-tions, and involves greater participation by nonprofit and lessparticipation by for-profit developers. State and local participa-tion in subsidized housing policy making has increased as HUDhas withdrawn (Goetz 1993; Nenno 1991).

With the demise of deep-subsidy production programs, develop-ing affordable multifamily housing in poor inner cities becamefinancially unattractive to most for-profit developers. Nonprofitorganizations have become an “idea in good currency” for thedevelopment of inner-city affordable housing (Schon 1971, 123).5Embraced both by the political right, which sees in them thehistoric strands of self-help and bootstrapping, and by the

5 Very little data are available on the location of low-income housing producedby for-profit developers. Nationally, the for-profit sector accounts for theoverwhelming share of total housing production, with the nonprofit sectorcontributing a minuscule proportion. However, most for-profit housing devel-opment takes place in suburban and nonmetropolitan areas. Most privatesector housing development in central cities tends to be for relatively affluenthouseholds. Private developers also account for the majority of housing unitsdeveloped through the LIHTC. Unfortunately, no data have been collected onthe intrametropolitan location of this housing. Most of the housing expertsinterviewed for this study believe that most private sector LIHTC housing hasbeen developed in suburban areas, not in inner-city communities. With theprivate sector largely absent from depressed inner-city neighborhoods to date,CDCs and other nonprofit groups often have represented the only source ofnew housing development and housing rehabilitation, especially for low-income multifamily housing. An unpublished study sponsored by the LocalInitiatives Support Corporation provides some support for this contention,finding that CDCs accounted for about 90 percent of affordable housingproduced in the 1980s in the city of Boston, where CDCs are especially active(Vidal 1995). More definitive and current information on the location of LIHTChousing should become available through Jean Cummings and DeniseDiPasquale’s research (in progress) on the LIHTC.

206 Langley C. Keyes, Alex Schwartz, Avis C. Vidal, and Rachel G. Bratt

political left, which views them through the community controllens of the 1960s, nonprofits represent a politically viable ap-proach to affordable housing.6

Nonprofit housing producers appeal to state and local govern-ments for several reasons. Perhaps most important in this era ofexpiring use is their goal of permanent affordability (Davis 1994;Goetz 1993; Mayer 1990).7 Community-based housing sponsorsare in business for the long haul and have no intention of reapingcapital gains or charging market-rate rent (Bratt 1989; Davis1994; Vidal 1995). They are committed to housing the poorest,most needy households and often provide more than housing:opportunities for employment, health care, child care, education,and other services (Leiterman and Stillman 1993; Sullivan 1993).

In many cities, nonprofits are the only organizations willing andable to assemble the multiple sources of funding necessary toproduce low-income housing (Committee for Economic Develop-ment 1995; Vidal 1995). Often the relationship between govern-ment agencies and nonprofit organizations is so close that, asGoetz (1993, 130) puts it, “the distinction between the ‘success’ ofthe local public agency and the ‘success’ of the CDCs becomesblurred.” For example, 11 of 18 housing trust funds studied byConnerly (1993) have established priority or set-aside fundingfor community-based organizations. Similarly, in New York Citythe bulk of the 124,000 low- and moderate-income housing unitsbuilt or rehabilitated under the city’s multibillion-dollar capitalbudget housing program have been developed by nonprofit orga-nizations (Bratt et al. 1994).

Nonprofit housing organizations are active throughout the UnitedStates. According to a national survey conducted by the NationalCongress for Community Economic Development (NCCED 1995),there are more than 2,000 nonprofit community-based develop-ment organizations in the United States, 90 percent of which are

6 The following paragraphs summarize the major contributions and limitationsof CDCs and other nonprofit housing groups. For more information andanalysis, see Bratt 1989; Bratt et al. 1994; Clay 1990; Dreier and Hulchanski1993; Keating, Rasey, and Krumholz 1990; Mayer 1990; McNeely 1993;National Congress for Community Economic Development 1995; OMG, Inc.1995; Pickman et al. 1986; Rasey 1993; Schill 1994; Stoeker 1995; Sullivan1993; Vidal 1992, 1995; Walker 1993; and Zdenek 1987.

7 More than 1.9 million units of subsidized housing (Section 221[d]3, Section236, and Section 8) are at risk of loss as federal subsidies expire and ownersbecome eligible to prepay their mortgages and charge market rents (Clay andWallace 1990). HUD estimates that the cost of renewing expiring Section 8contracts alone will total $14 billion through fiscal 1998 (Dunlap 1995).

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involved in creating affordable housing. A survey conducted in1989 of the 173 U.S. cities with populations above 100,000 foundone or more CDCs operating in 95 percent of them (Goetz 1993).The same survey also found that 82 percent of the cities withactive nonprofit housing developers provided them with projectfinancing, as did 63 percent of the states. More than half of thesecities and a similar proportion of states also provided nonprofitswith some administrative funding, predevelopment loans, andtechnical assistance (Goetz 1993).

CDCs are by no means the only important nonprofit organiza-tions producing and managing low-income housing. Nonprofitsthat produce housing for low-income people cover a broad rangeof organizational foci—from those primarily concerned withimproving the neighborhood and the quality of life in it to thosetargeting a particular constituency. While CDCs usually focus ona single neighborhood—commonly combining housing develop-ment with other services—other nonprofit housing groups targetspecific client groups (e.g., the elderly, the homeless, the men-tally ill, AIDS patients) and are less concerned with the well-being of particular neighborhoods.8

The role of nonprofit organizations in low-income housing devel-opment is recognized and reinforced in current federal legisla-tion. The National Affordable Housing Act of 1990 earmarks atleast 15 percent of a participating jurisdiction’s HOME funds forqualified nonprofit housing producers.9 Nonprofits are alsodesignated to play a leading role in the housing programs of therestructured HUD.10

8 For example, a recent survey of nonprofit housing organizations in sixdiverse U.S. cities found that 37 percent owned elderly or special needshousing but did not own any multifamily rental housing (Bratt et al. 1994).

9 Some federal legislation and regulations stipulate the involvement of non-profit groups in housing programs. The Financial Institutions Reform, Recov-ery, and Enforcement Act of 1989 gives nonprofits the right of first refusal topurchase from the Resolution Trust Corporation properties that had been inthe portfolios of distressed savings and loans. A similar provision, applicableto properties owned by failed commercial banks, was included in the Compre-hensive Deposit Insurance Act of 1991. Title VI of the Cranston GonzalezNational Affordable Housing Act of 1990 gives nonprofits and other “prioritypurchasers” the right to make the first bona fide offer to purchase a federallysubsidized development whose owner has announced an interest in prepayingthe mortgage. The Internal Revenue Code contains a provision that requires atleast 10 percent of each state’s annual LIHTC allocation to be earmarked forprojects that are at least partially owned by qualified nonprofit organizations.

10 For example, HUD’s original Reinvention Blueprint, issued in December1994, several times emphasizes the importance of nonprofit community-basedorganizations in producing and managing low-income housing.

208 Langley C. Keyes, Alex Schwartz, Avis C. Vidal, and Rachel G. Bratt

The growth of state and local housing programs and the increas-ing involvement of nonprofit housing groups are now widelynoted (Bratt 1989, 1992; Davis 1994; Goetz 1993; NCCED 1995;Nenno 1991; Stegman and Holden 1987; Vidal 1992; Walker1993). There is much less research on the relationships betweennonprofit housing groups and state and local governments andother providers of financial, technical, and political support. Theremaining sections of this article examine the nature of theserelationships in the institutional support network for nonprofithousing. The discussion draws from our recent research on themanagement of nonprofit low-income housing in six U.S. cities(Bratt et al. 1994).

The institutional support network: Social capital andthe nonprofit housing system

Nonprofit housing producers, in stitching together the patchworkfinancing of development deals, rely on a host of public, private,and other nonprofit organizations.11 These organizations playmany roles in supporting the production and management ofnonprofit housing. Some provide equity capital, loans, andgrants for housing development; others offer financial assistancefor troubled developments, subsidize the salaries of nonprofitstaff members, and underwrite other operating costs. State and

The focus on the development side of affordable housing is particu-larly important because of the lack of sufficient affordable housingsupply in many jurisdictions and the [lack of] expertise of privateactors (e.g., nonprofit community-based organizations, developers)in this area. . . . To ensure strong participation by community-basedorganizations, set-asides for entities such as the community housingdevelopment organizations (‘CHDOs’) recognized under existing lawwould continue. (HUD 1994, 9, emphasis added)

In addition, the Blueprint’s proposed Community Opportunity Fund (the newname for the expanded Community Development Block Grant) would provideassistance to community-based organizations for neighborhood revitalizationefforts. Finally, in its vision of a radically transformed public housing agenda,the Blueprint notes that in fiscal 1998 “No housing authority would receivefunds directly from HUD. . . . States and localities would have the option ofreplacing non-performing housing authorities with community-based organiza-tions or others” (HUD 1994, 13, emphasis added).

11 We are not arguing that the current financing system is ideal or evenadequate. (See Stegman 1991 and Clancy 1990 for discussion of the negativeexternalities and transaction costs involved in the current approach.) How-ever, given the current system, multiple sources of financing and subsidy areneeded, as well as the capacity to patch those elements together into onedevelopment package.

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local governments, as noted above, are critical sources of finan-cial and technical support for nonprofit housing groups in manycities. In fact, nonprofits would probably not be able to producesubsidized housing without the active support of the publicsector. National and local foundations have become key sourcesof funding for predevelopment costs, gap financing, and organi-zational capacity building. CDC coalitions typically act as politi-cal advocates at city halls and state capitols. Educationalinstitutions and consultants are primary sources for training andtechnical assistance (Bratt et al. 1994; Walker 1993). Elementsof the system also serve as monitors or de facto trustees of thenonprofit housing stock, supervising development and manage-ment performance of the nonprofit sponsors on behalf of govern-ment and corporate investors (Goetz 1993; Schwartz et al.forthcoming; Walker 1993).

Many functions of the support system are performed by organi-zations created specifically to respond to the needs of the hous-ing sponsors. For example, the national intermediaries(especially the Local Initiatives Support Corporation [LISC] andthe Enterprise Foundation) raise equity capital through thesyndication of LIHTCs and also provide grants, loans, and tech-nical assistance. Moreover, they often serve as a catalyst informing local housing partnerships. The intermediaries’ connec-tion to major corporations, including philanthropic funders andtax credit investors, serves to legitimize CDCs as viable organi-zations worthy of business and government support. As Walker(1993) argues:

Intermediaries . . . offer implicit guarantees of CDCperformance to private sector financial institutions andpublic sector housing and community developmentagencies. Through organizational needs assessments,monitoring of CDC performance, tying organizationalsupport to performance, and other mechanisms, inter-mediaries will legitimize CDC project efforts. (p. 402)

To understand this institutional network that supports thenonprofit producers of affordable housing, we developed ananalytic framework inspired in part by Robert Putnam’s MakingDemocracy Work (1993). This study introduced the term “socialcapital” to the lexicon of community development in America’sinner cities.12

12 Putnam was not the first to coin the phrase “social capital.” While the termcan be found in the work of James Coleman (1990) and others, its origin seemsto be Jane Jacobs’s The Death and Life of Great American Cities (1963).

210 Langley C. Keyes, Alex Schwartz, Avis C. Vidal, and Rachel G. Bratt

Putnam’s detailed research on the network of civic, political,and economic institutions in northern Italy makes a strong casefor the power of social capital in the “sense of mutual reciprocity,the resolution of the dilemmas of collective action and the broad-ening of social identities” (Putnam 1993, 76). At its core, socialcapital is about interdependence and collaboration and is usefulin teasing out the dynamics of the institutional networkundergirding the nonprofit producers of subsidized housing.

Analogous to Putnam’s articulation of social capital is the eco-nomic concept of networks that Walter Powell describes in “Nei-ther Market nor Hierarchy: Network Forms of Organization”:

In network modes of resource allocation, transactionsoccur neither through the discrete exchanges (markets)nor by administrative fiat (firms), but through networksof individuals engaged in reciprocal, preferential, mutu-ally supportive actions. (Powell 1990, 303)

For Powell and other sociologists analyzing business organiza-tions, networks are an operational way of looking at the conceptof social capital among firms and the efficient organization forproduction in an economic setting. Social capital as institutionalnetwork means reciprocity, trust, adaptability, and flexibilityamong individual companies for mutual economic benefit. Whenthe network is working toward and is organized for a sharedvision, Powell suggests that

[T]he basic assumption of network relationships is thatone party is dependent on resources controlled by an-other, and that there are gains to be had by the poolingof resources. In essence the parties to a network agreeto forgo the right to pursue their own interests at theexpense of others. (Powell 1990, 303)

Conceptually, the institutional framework surrounding nonprofithousing sponsors falls between the civic involvement with whichPutnam is concerned and the institutional economic frameworkof Powell. In a sense, the framework is a hybrid—drawing onboth economic interest and civic-mindedness.

The concept of social capital should be more than an engagingimage that has captured the imagination of many urban watch-ers.13 Organizations that develop and manage housing must

13 For example, social capital is a central principle in the Committee forEconomic Development’s recent report, Rebuilding Inner-City Communities(1995).

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adopt the terminology of sociologists and economists who focuson firms in the business world and civic associations. This trans-lation requires a closer look at the content of social capital in thenonprofit world of community-based housing.

Four themes constitute the substance of social capital in thoseinstitutional networks that effectively support the nonprofithousing sponsor: (1) long-term relationships of trust and reci-procity, (2) shared vision, (3) mutual interest, and (4) financialnexus.

Long-term relationships of trust and reciprocity

In many cities the institutional network of the nonprofit housingsponsor is sustained by long-standing relationships based ontrust, loyalty, and reciprocity among the individuals within thesupport institutions and the nonprofit housing groups. Keyindividuals are former colleagues, are current board members ofthe same organizations, or have switched positions from one partof the system to another. Staff members at the intermediaries,banks, and foundations previously worked at nonprofit housingorganizations, including those they now assist. Public employeesof community development departments in city hall move to aneighborhood housing sponsor or to a bank’s community develop-ment department.

Tracing the career moves of individuals in the nonprofit institu-tional network in Boston, New York, San Francisco, and Chicago(the cities with the densest networks) would demonstrate thecrossing of career paths and the interlocking memberships onboards, committees, and task forces.

Shared vision

A common ideology is widely shared within the nonprofit institu-tional network, which believes that nonprofit sponsors are theappropriate vehicle for building housing and developing commu-nities in inner cities. The shared vision is perhaps most clearlyheld by those institutions created expressly to support nonprofitsponsors—the Enterprise Foundation, LISC, the NeighborhoodReinvestment Corporation, and the National Community Devel-opment Initiative.

212 Langley C. Keyes, Alex Schwartz, Avis C. Vidal, and Rachel G. Bratt

Mutual interest

To the extent that foundations, city hall, and the intermediaries“put their money” on nonprofits, they have an enlightened self-interest in seeing those nonprofits succeed. Simply put, thebetter the nonprofit performs, the wiser and more effective thesupport institution appears. In New York, Oakland, California,and Boston, among others, programs rely on the nonprofit spon-sors. Housing policy has been shaped around them. And largeallocations of city or CDBG funds have been channeled to non-profit-sponsored housing. The community housing sponsors andmembers of the network are mutually dependent on each otherfor program and policy outcomes. The major foundations activein this field are greatly invested in the success of CDCs and intheir efforts to reknit the fabric of the nation’s inner cities.14

Financial nexus

In addition to the first three elements that we identify as mak-ing up social capital in the nonprofit housing world, connectionsare also derived solely from economic self-interest in whichrational choice and financial interest are the bonding element.Here, the language of Powell’s network form of organizationalrelationship comes into play.

Given the multiple funding sources required to develop subsi-dized housing, a range of lending institutions are involved withthe nonprofits and have a financial interest in their well-being.Obviously banks and state housing finance agencies fall into thiscategory, but perhaps the most interested actor in the network isthe equity investor seeking a significant financial return oninvestment. The LIHTC brings large-scale corporate investorsinto the nonprofit orbit. These corporations develop sizablestakes in the housing portfolios of the nonprofit organizationsand face significant financial losses if this housing falters. Thisfact puts pressure on the national intermediaries and theiraffiliates that syndicate the LIHTCs to the corporate community.Not only do the corporations suffer financially if the manage-ment of tax-credit developments violates federal regulations orgets into financial trouble, but the intermediaries would also loseface with their investors and contributors, making it much moredifficult for them to syndicate additional tax credit deals. This

14 These foundations include the Ford Foundation, the John D. and CatherineT. MacArthur Foundation, the Pew Charitable Trusts, The Annie E. CaseyFoundation, the Rockefeller Foundation, and Lilly Endowment, Inc.

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pressure to safeguard corporate investment (and their owncorporate credibility) motivates corporations to take a leadershiprole in the institutional support network.15

Grounding theory: Social capital in practice

To put empirical clothes on our social capital framework, weexamine in some detail the institutional network in two of thesix sites we studied in our management research—Minneapolis–St. Paul and Boston (Bratt et al. 1994). Two case studies, ofcourse, do not create a sufficient empirical foundation for thetheory of social capital and networks as the basis for successfulhousing production and management at the neighborhood level.The findings should be viewed as preliminary and exploratory.16

Minneapolis–St. Paul’s Interagency Stabilization Group

The Twin Cities provide a compelling example of social capitalwithin the institutional support network. Spearheaded by theFamily Housing Fund of Minneapolis and St. Paul, the networkhas recently coalesced around the Twin Cities Interagency Stabi-lization Group (ISG). Founded in 1993, ISG includes all of themetropolitan region’s major housing-related institutions.17 Topofficials of each institution meet weekly to develop stabilizationplans for distressed properties selected from a continuously

15 Compare this intense economic interest of the corporations with that ofHUD when it was the financial investor in the old housing developmentparadigm. The magnitude of the distressed HUD portfolio provides testimonialto the lack of market discipline in the relationship between sponsor and HUDin these programs.

16 More extensive and systematic analysis of the role of social capital in theinstitutional support network for nonprofit housing is likely to emerge fromthe recently launched assessment of the National Community DevelopmentInitiative’s second phase. In the first phase, from 1991 to 1994, foundationsand corporations invested $63 million to help CDCs in 21 cities increase theircapacity to produce low-income housing. In the second phase, which began in1995 with an additional $88 million commitment for loans and grants, thefunders (who now include HUD) have broadened the initiative’s focus tostrengthen institutional support for community-based nonprofit groups (OMG,Inc. 1995). Indeed, the request for proposal for the phase II assessment singlesout social capital as a key area for analysis.

17 These institutions include the Family Housing Fund of Minneapolis and St.Paul, the McKnight Foundation, LISC, the Minneapolis Community Develop-ment Agency, the St. Paul Department of Planning and Economic Develop-ment, the Minnesota Housing Finance Agency, and HUD.

214 Langley C. Keyes, Alex Schwartz, Avis C. Vidal, and Rachel G. Bratt

revised watch list. The group has decided to give top priority tostabilization of the existing stock; new housing development ison the back burner.

ISG coordinates how each institution invests its resources in thestabilization of distressed publicly subsidized housing. Memberscome to the table and commit some portion of their institution’sbudget to an appropriate element of the stabilization plan (e.g.,debt reduction, deferred maintenance, capital improvements).Most stabilization plans combine financial assistance with rec-ommendations or requirements that the owner modify its assetor property management practices. In some instances, ISG hasconcluded that the property should be sold or, in extreme cases,demolished. By November 1994, ISG had committed more than$5 million to assist 63 developments under nonprofit and for-profit ownership.

The shared commitment and high level of coordination andcooperation among ISG institutions would not be feasible if theseinstitutions had not developed a significant reservoir of socialcapital. Indeed ISG exemplifies all four dimensions of socialcapital outlined above, including a heavy dose of financial self-interest.

ISG draws strength from the personal and institutional relation-ships among its members and between its members and thenonprofit housing sponsors. These trusting relationships make itpossible for ISG members to coordinate the allocation of theirrespective resources to the stabilization plans. These numbersalso designated the Minnesota Housing Finance Agency as thesingle project monitor on behalf of all ISG member institutions,thereby eliminating many duplicate reporting and compliancerequirements for the property owners. These actions show howthe member institutions are bypassing their own internal bu-reaucratic procedures in favor of the collective judgment of ISG.

We cannot overemphasize the significance of a trusting relation-ship that enables organizations with a financial stake to stream-line their paperwork and to give authority to one member. Thereduction in transaction costs has not been calculated in dollaramounts, but it is significant and measurable—and the envy ofother cities that have multiple reporting requirements because ofa lack of reciprocity and trust.

These aspects of ISG’s operation epitomize Powell’s notion ofnetwork relations. Each element of ISG depends on resourcescontrolled by another, and each element agrees to forgo the right

Networks and Nonprofits: Opportunities and Challenges 215

to pursue its own interest at the expense of others. Such collabo-ration is possible because of the participants’ confidence in eachother’s competence and commitment. The sense of confidencearises in part from significant personal relationships and isreinforced by the weekly ISG meetings and the history of suc-cessful collaboration.

Mutual trust is also evident between ISG and the nonprofitowners of troubled properties. To receive stabilization funds,sponsors must be candid with ISG about the state of their devel-opments, producing extensive documentation on their financialstatus, property management procedures, and resident satisfac-tion. In approving a stabilization plan, ISG often requires thesponsor to modify the structure of its property management andasset management operations, sometimes even turning propertymanagement over to another company. Most significant, thesponsor must notify ISG of any new projects it intends to pursue,and ISG reserves the right to terminate stabilization funding ifit determines that the owner’s participation in additional devel-opment will jeopardize its ability to manage its current portfolioeffectively. Thus, the executive directors and boards of housingorganizations are relinquishing some of their decision-makingauthority to the collective judgment of the institutional supportsystem, as embodied by ISG.

ISG explicitly incorporates a sense of shared commitment andvision. As noted above, its membership unanimously emphasizesproject stabilization over new development. Each member recog-nizes the importance of correcting the financial and physicalproblems of the existing stock and of doing so in a systematicway. It is unlikely that the players in the Twin Cities’ institu-tional support network could have collaborated as closely andwith such coordination if they did not have the same vision ofcommunity priorities.

The degree of coordination also reflects mutual interests.Through collaboration each organization in the network canleverage its own resources with those of other institutions,thereby ensuring that its funds contribute to an efficient whole.

While emphasizing the elements of social capital (reciprocity andtrust, shared vision, and mutual interest), one should not mini-mize the significance of financial stake. Most ISG members havecommitted millions of dollars to the development of nonprofit-sponsored housing developments. The failure of these projectswould be a financial and political disaster. Trust, commitment,and financial interest all run in the same direction.

216 Langley C. Keyes, Alex Schwartz, Avis C. Vidal, and Rachel G. Bratt

The Boston institutional support network

The institutional support network is well entrenched in Boston,where nonprofit housing sponsors have a history of sustainedoperation since the 1960s when they were an integral part of thecity’s massive urban renewal program. Some sponsors havefallen by the wayside, others have endured, and new ones arosein the 1970s and later in response to local, state, and federalinitiatives. While participation was modified by a recent down-turn in the city’s economy, Massachusetts and the city of Bostontraditionally commit not only federal funds but also their own tothe nonprofit sponsors that have been a vehicle for creating newand rehabilitated units for low- and moderate-income people.

The support network for subsidized housing production andmanagement has many players. The aggressive and innovativeMassachusetts Housing Finance Agency (MHFA) leads a groupof quasi-public statewide entities that finance affordable housingin Boston and provide technical assistance and seed money. TheMetropolitan Boston Housing Partnership (MBHP) is an um-brella organization that provides technical assistance, loans,grants, and asset management support to many community-based sponsors. Its board is made up of leaders in the bankingcommunity and representatives of the public and nonprofitsectors—the classic public-private partnership. HistoricallyMBHP has had tremendous clout with the banks because itsvigorous and deeply committed chairman was one of the mostinfluential bank presidents in the city. The Community Buildersis a highly skilled organization that has been providing technicalassistance to community-based housing organizations for morethan 25 years. It has also been involved in many of the housinginitiatives put forward by nonprofit sponsors in Boston.

The institutional support system for housing in Boston is denseand deeply rooted.18 Players have long-term relationships andoften have worked in more than one organization in the network.Lateral moves are common among city, state, and nonprofitsponsors of housing. For example, the current director of theBoston LISC office was formerly executive director of a success-ful CDC. The executive director of MBHP previously worked forthe state’s Executive Office of Communities and Development(EOCD), which provides supportive funding to the CDCs and isin charge of allocating LIHTCs. Until recently the executive

18 Some might say too dense and deeply rooted. In an era of increasingly scarceresources for housing development, issues of turf and control are ever present.

Networks and Nonprofits: Opportunities and Challenges 217

director of MHFA sat on the board of MBHP. He and two of histop assistants are currently consulting with the city of Bostonabout its future housing agenda.

The power of the shared vision, represented by CDCs in Boston,has been enhanced by foundation support from both local organi-zations and national funders such as the Ford Foundation. Somefor-profit housing developers believe that the system of nonprofitand public support for affordable housing is tilted in favor of thenonprofits. It seems that unless an organization adheres to thecommunity development image of neighborhood empowermentthrough nonprofit efforts, there is little likelihood of funding.Whether or not this is a fair conclusion, no thoughtful observerwould dispute that the city of Boston, the Commonwealth, andthe foundations have placed tremendous reliance and expecta-tion on the vision represented by nonprofit producers of housingoperating from a neighborhood base.

Extensive mutual interest among the various layers in the sup-port network has evolved after many years of incremental link-ing of organizations and agendas. The history of the networkreveals many examples of reciprocal and enlightened self-interest. Perhaps the most vivid example is MBHP’s firstproject, called BHP I. This 700-unit, scattered-site project wasrehabilitated in 1984 by 10 community-based sponsors. BHP Iwas undercapitalized from the start, and the physical conditionof the units and the rent structure established to support thebuildings have always been problems. Since 1990, many of theplayers have undertaken the long and complex process of re-structuring the developments. Despite sustained efforts to refi-nance, to deal with lead paint issues, and to absorb a diminutionof state rental subsidies, 8 of BHP I’s 10 developments were indefault by 1993.

The resolution, which finally came in the fall of 1994, involved acomplex set of transactions requiring cooperation among FannieMae, the city of Boston, MHFA, the individual sponsors, MBHP,EOCD, and a variety of other players. The projects are safe fromforeclosure for at least five years because of the extraordinarywillingness of individual players, through both self- and mutualinterest, to contribute funds, cut back on their return, and sharein the risk and losses associated with the reconfiguration. Thehistory of the negotiations is byzantine, exhausting, and amaz-ing. Many times when the process seemed lost and foreclosureinevitable, one more effort on the part of a combination of play-ers reworked the terms.

218 Langley C. Keyes, Alex Schwartz, Avis C. Vidal, and Rachel G. Bratt

The following minutes from the MBHP board meeting of Novem-ber 1994 indicate the degree to which support networks weremobilized to prevent foreclosure:

FNMA [Fannie Mae] is providing $6,619,739 to theworkout in the form of zero interest second mortgageswhich cover the write-down of the present first mort-gages ($3,511,735); funds towards capital improvementand environmental needs ($1,453,955); and funds tocover delinquent accounts payable, legal and closingcosts, the cost of environmental and capital needsassessments and past due bond trustee payments($1,654,049). The balance of the proposed uses are beingfunded by MBHP ($250,000); the City of Boston/PublicFacilities Department ($250,000); the Executive Officeof Communities and Development Lead Paint GrantProgram ($145,000); the Department of Mental Health($83,820); and the Massachusetts Housing PartnershipLead Paint Loan Guarantee Program ($338,640). Theten partnerships are expected to contribute a total of$865,330 from Replacement Reserve accounts, specialescrow and capital accounts and available partnershipcash. Each partnership will retain $5,000 to $10,000 tofund a new replacement reserve account. MHFA willsubordinate its debt ($1,468,150) behind Fannie Mae;contribute approximately $2,000,000 towards securityand . . . [the state rental subsidy program] will befunded under the 1993 declination schedule.

From one point of view, this is a dry and complex list of who ispaying how much for what; but the description is a mosaic ofnetwork players, each contributing to save the buildings andunits that symbolize a shared vision for revitalized neighbor-hoods in Boston.

Summary

The examples of support networks in the Twin Cities and Bostonrepresent the best of social capital in the community develop-ment field. We do not argue that these stories are reproduciblein any city that tries hard enough or that there is widespreadevidence that most cities are moving in this direction. We areconcerned with showing the concept of social capital as it appliesto the most advanced situations and the ways in which theconcept can describe the institutional context that has arisen to

Networks and Nonprofits: Opportunities and Challenges 219

deal with the complexities of financing, building, and maintain-ing subsidized housing in the inner city.

Challenges facing the institutional support network

Institutional support networks—strong or weak—are confrontedby several serious challenges in this era of block grants andvouchers. Four critical issues face these networks: (1) unevendevelopment, (2) the dangers of offering overly aggressive sup-port, (3) competition and conflict among networks supportingdifferent types of nonprofit housing, and (4) the need for stabili-zation of troubled developments.

Uneven development

One shortcoming of the institutional support network is itsuneven development. Because some cities and states host morevibrant nonprofit housing organizations and richer institutionalsupport systems than others, localities with more aggressive andentrepreneurial systems are likely to produce more affordablehousing in the new policy climate than those with fewer, smaller,and institutionally isolated nonprofit housing groups. Thus,cities and regions with equal need for affordable housing willexperience different levels of development, depending on thenumber, size, and strength of the nonprofit housing sponsors andinstitutional support providers. Smaller areas and areas lackingin local foundations and traditions of institutional collaborationare less likely to nurture viable support systems for nonprofithousing sponsors.

The assessment of the first phase of the National CommunityDevelopment Initiative (NCDI) (see footnote 16) underscores theproblems posed by weak or uneven institutional support. Al-though NCDI initially emphasized the goal of increasing thehousing output of individual CDCs, it gradually recognized that“ ‘getting to scale’ entailed a process of improving the environ-ment in which CDCs operate, making it easier for CDCs to gainaccess to new resources and skills for organizational stabilityand project implementation” (OMG, Inc. 1995, 95–96). In study-ing the 21 cities involved in NCDI, the assessors found thatplaces with weaker environments tended to have limited under-standing of community development, limited or underdevelopedstrategies to guide local collaboration, little government partici-pation, and unfavorable economic and local market conditions. Insome of these cities, the support network was relatively new and

220 Langley C. Keyes, Alex Schwartz, Avis C. Vidal, and Rachel G. Bratt

undeveloped. In others, it suffered from low levels of coordina-tion and government participation. Perhaps most telling, theNCDI assessment found that CDCs in cities with weaker institu-tional support were less able to meet their housing productiongoals than their counterparts in cities with stronger networks.

The geographic unevenness of nonprofit housing activity under-scores the central role of the national intermediaries. Theseinstitutions are crucial in providing nonprofits located in institu-tionally barren environments with the necessary financial,technical, political, and moral support to foster a viable low-income housing industry. With the national government evermore remote, the intermediaries are increasingly responsible forstandardizing and simplifying the development process andfinding ways to disseminate their assistance as broadly as pos-sible. It is also incumbent on the intermediaries, with theirstrong corporate and foundation backing, to cultivate supportivelocal networks for nonprofit housing groups. LISC, the Enter-prise Foundation, and the Neighborhood Reinvestment Corpora-tion have accepted this challenge, as shown by their growingroster of local offices, their engagement in NCDI, and their jointsponsorship of the Consortium of Housing and Asset Manage-ment (CHAM)19—but the task is enormous.

Overly aggressive support

One challenge for the support network is to become ubiquitous.Another is to refrain from being overly aggressive in areas wherethe network is already strong. There is an inherent tensionbetween the availability of institutional resources for nonprofithousing groups and the increased expectations placed on thesegroups. On one hand, the institutional support network hasbecome something of a safety net for troubled properties andorganizations. On the other hand, the institutional supportnetwork often places increasing pressure on nonprofits to as-sume responsibility for more and more housing. One riskinvolved with this growth is that groups may become overex-tended. Their staff and management systems may not be able toprovide the same quality of service when, for example, theirinventory climbs from 200 to 800 units in two years—a not

19 CHAM is a collaboration among the Enterprise Foundation, LISC, and theNeighborhood Reinvestment Corporation. Launched in 1994, this nationalinitiative is intended to increase the capacity of local nonprofits to perform asresponsible owners and managers of affordable housing by expanding thetraining and technical assistance resources available to them. CHAM hasreceived initial funding from several national foundations (Bratt et al. 1994).

Networks and Nonprofits: Opportunities and Challenges 221

uncommon scenario in New York (Bratt et al. 1994). In Boston,the institutional support network strongly encouraged nonprofitgroups to take on the severely underfinanced BHP I develop-ments—with disastrous results (see above). In Oakland, Califor-nia, the city is pressing a successful CDC active in an Asianneighborhood to work in communities dominated by other ethnicgroups (Bratt et al. 1994).

The support system sees nonprofits as the best—and in somecases the only—resource to assume responsibility for low-incomehousing, especially when the developments are already occupied,poorly constructed, or inadequately financed. But there aredanger signs that without careful organizational development,sufficient resources, and in some cases growth control, commu-nity organizations can become overwhelmed by the magnitude ofthe housing problems.

Competition

The movement toward state and local block grants is likely tobenefit housing groups operating in settings with strong institu-tional networks. State and local governments that already relyon nonprofits to carry out their housing programs, and thatprovide them with financial and technical assistance to do so,will probably treat new housing block grants in the same manneras they did CDBG and HOME block grants. However, the shift toblock grants will mean that sponsors of and advocates for elderlyhousing, homeless housing, multifamily housing, and even publichousing will now compete for the same program dollars. Theinstitutional networks that have developed around particulartypes of housing and worked within the framework of specializedcategorical programs (Section 202, McKinney, Public Housing)must now vie against each other for the same block grants. Thechallenge will be for these distinct networks to find ways ofworking together—in other words, to develop social capital.

Project stabilization

Once open for occupancy, most new nonprofit-owned multifamilyhousing depends on rental income to cover operating costs.Except for Section 202 and other programs for the elderly,disabled, and homeless, the federal government has not offeredoperating subsidies for new developments since the early 1980s.Most housing developments subsidized through state and localprograms (including housing trust funds) and through the

222 Langley C. Keyes, Alex Schwartz, Avis C. Vidal, and Rachel G. Bratt

federal CDBG, HOME, and LIHTC programs do not offer subsi-dies for ongoing operating costs (Connerly 1993; Stegman andHolden 1987). Typically, these programs provide upfront subsi-dies in the form of grants and low-interest loans to reduce theamount of debt service expenses that would need to be coveredby rent rolls (DiPasquale and Cummings 1992). While thesesubsidies may make housing initially affordable to low-incomefamilies, they are not structured to cover operating costs such asutilities, maintenance, and taxes over time. Subsidies are notavailable to cover increased water bills, unanticipated repairs, orrevenue shortfalls owing to higher than expected vacancies orarrears. HUD’s proposed elimination of operating subsidies forpublic housing and developments funded under other project-based subsidy programs (e.g., Section 8, Section 236, Section202) means that their owners will join nonprofit sponsors ofnewer multifamily developments in depending on rent rolls forsurvival.

The absence of operating subsidies makes it difficult for manydevelopments to remain financially secure over time. Theseproblems are exacerbated when developments are inadequatelyconstructed or renovated and thus require continual repairs,when they repeatedly suffer from vandalism and other types ofabuse, or when they are located in crime-ridden or drug-infestedareas (Bratt et al. 1994). When, as is often the case, projects arethinly capitalized, they may lack adequate reserves and may notbe fully renovated or may be built with less than optimal materi-als and equipment (Bratt et al. 1994; Walker 1993).

One of the biggest challenges to the institutional support net-work, therefore, is project stabilization. If the nonprofit housingstock is to be self-supporting through rent collection, the institu-tional support network needs to address the inadequate under-writing and the difficult surroundings of many nonprofitdevelopments. This is the intent of the Twin Cities’ ISG, and italso underlies HUD’s mark-to-market proposal. ISG attempts tostabilize distressed properties through debt reduction, capitalimprovements, additional capital and operating reserves, andother measures. HUD’s mark-to-market plan would draw onFederal Housing Administration funds to reduce mortgage prin-cipal and, in some cases, to support capital improvements so thatmarket rents can cover debt services and operating costs(Dunlap 1995). In some instances, rent rolls and reserves are fartoo small to support major capital improvements and thus re-quire outside assistance. New York City’s Department of Hous-ing Preservation and Development, for example, provides

Networks and Nonprofits: Opportunities and Challenges 223

low-interest loans for nonprofit and for-profit owners of low-income housing to replace building systems (e.g., roofs, plumb-ing, boilers, windows) (Bratt et al. 1994; Michetti 1993).

A formidable task for the institutional support network is tostabilize undercapitalized housing developments without simplybailing out irresponsible or incompetent nonprofit sponsors.Perhaps networks in other cities and states should emulateISG’s practice of assessing the management performance ofnonprofit (and for-profit) housing before committing any funds toproject stabilization.

Federal policy and the institutional network:Conclusions

Given the stream of changes flowing from the federal govern-ment, the institutional network that constitutes the nonprofithousing system is facing a difficult challenge. It must forge newrelationships and supportive arrangements to preserve theexisting stock of assisted housing at precisely the time thatuncertainty and fear of declining resources test existing ties andmake the necessary capacity-building investments in institutionslook expensive.

At the federal level, legislation should permit localities to sup-port projects both directly for construction or rehabilitation andindirectly by selectively tying vouchers to developments. Thisflexibility is especially important in localities with soft housingmarkets: Sponsors in neighborhoods with high crime rates orpoor schools will have difficulty competing for tenants withvouchers. CDBG funds, if combined in a new, more inclusiveblock grant, must continue to be usable for housing and will bean essential ingredient in any recipe to make nonprofit ownersmore competitive and better able to oversee their properties.

Perhaps the most immediate federal priority should be the pres-ervation of the LIHTC. The LIHTC has been both the salvationand the bane of low-income multifamily housing development. Itis the only way to provide the equity capital needed to lower therent of new or rehabilitated housing for low- and moderate-income households, but it is complex and usually must be aug-mented by other funding sources (Postyn 1994). But, for all thecontortions and splicing of financing that it has generated, theLIHTC has served a critical financing function. If it is elimi-nated, nonprofit and for-profit sponsors may not be able to con-tinue producing affordable housing.

224 Langley C. Keyes, Alex Schwartz, Avis C. Vidal, and Rachel G. Bratt

In addition to reducing urgently needed equity, the demise of theLIHTC would decrease the number of players with a financialinterest in inner-city affordable housing. Large corporations andother investors will no longer have a vested interest in the out-come of inner-city housing development. If the “sunset” of theLIHTC were to be accompanied by the introduction of a newsource of equity for financing inner-city housing, there would belittle protest. But such an alternative appears unlikely.

New responsibilities at the state and local levels will strainmany agencies. The national and local intermediaries, nonprofitcoalitions and advocacy groups, and HUD each have a role toplay in building capacity at the state and local level—particu-larly in cities and states with limited experience with nonprofithousing sponsors.

Competition for funding will shift from the federal budgetingprocess to localities. Cities will be tempted to respond byspreading declining subsidy dollars more thinly, weakeningunderwriting and further reducing fees. Conversely, advocacyorganizations (e.g., nonprofit housing groups, advocates forhomeless persons, public housing residents) may be tempted toundercut one another on behalf of their respective constituen-cies.

HUD is in a position to reward those localities that enhancetheir institutional networks. HUD’s review of Consolidated Plansshould include the extent of nonprofit participation, local invest-ment in capacity-building and institutional infrastructure,collaborative planning and implementation processes, and sensi-tivity to neighborhoods.20 The secretary should use the discre-tionary money in the proposed new block grants (over and abovethe funds distributed on an entitlement basis) to reward citiesthat do well on these issues. HUD is also in a good position toprovide visibility and how-to information about innovative ap-proaches developed by localities.

Whether called “public-private partnerships,” “social capital,” orsimply “mutual support,” the future of the community-basedhousing movement is very much wrapped up in the future ofinstitutional support networks. Over the past 15 years,

20 As of 1995, HUD requires eligible jurisdictions to submit Consolidated Plansdescribing and justifying their intended use of funds provided under theCDBG, HOME, Housing Opportunities for People with AIDS, and McKinneyTitle IV Homeless programs. This replaced the requirement that each jurisdic-tion prepare a Comprehensive Housing Assistance Strategy.

Networks and Nonprofits: Opportunities and Challenges 225

participants in the networks have demonstrated remarkablefacility in devising new program delivery mechanisms and insti-tutional forms that both address problems as they occur andattract new players to the network. This creative and construc-tive infrastructure is one of our most versatile policy tools in thestruggle to create positive living environments in inner citiesand should command our attention accordingly.

Authors

Langley C. Keyes is Ford Professor of City and Regional Planning in theDepartment of Urban Studies and Planning at the Massachusetts Institute ofTechnology. Alex Schwartz is Senior Research Associate at the CommunityDevelopment Research Center and Assistant Professor in the Robert J. MilanoGraduate School of Management and Urban Policy at the New School forSocial Research. Avis C. Vidal is Director of the Community DevelopmentResearch Center and Associate Professor at the Robert J. Milano GraduateSchool of Management and Urban Policy at the New School for Social Re-search. Rachel G. Bratt is Associate Professor in the Department of Urban andEnvironmental Policy at Tufts University.

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