1

NEPAL IN TRANSITION: UNDERSTANDING CONFLICT PREVENTION IN NEPAL

A Thematic Assessment of the United Nations Development Programme: Conflict

Prevention Programme

Submitted December 2014 DISCLAIMER The evaluation has been written and drafted by Andrew Edward Tchie during his seven and a half month consultancy period with the UNDP in Nepal. The observations were made from interactions with staff, participants, and stakeholders from the various districts that the UNDP operate in. The report is an evaluation of the collaborative leadership and dialogue pillar, a partial elevation of the Conflict Sensitive pillar and some initial observations on the Early Warning Early Response pillars. The author accepts sole responsibility for this report, drawn up for the United Nations Development Programme: Crisis Prevention and Recovery Unit which is currently managing the Conflict Prevention Programme in Nepal. The report does not necessarily reflect the views of the United Nations Development Programme and its affiliations.

2

FOREWORD Since the first decade of the twenty-first century there has been an increasing interest in the fields relating to the areas of conflict prevention and peacebuilding. Most of this was initiated in the early 1990’s by the former UN Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali, and later picked up in the Brahimi report and pursued by former Secretary-General Kofi Annan. The Brahimi Report, which was published in 2000, was concerned with conflict prevention in three ways and called for the United Nations and other international players to be more comprehensible and coordinated between the necessary and relevant players involved from conflict management, peacebuilding and development areas. The report brought new insight by clearly stating that there was a link between conflict management and the ties to economic development (Collier, 2002).The report also provides an important continuity with previous efforts at enhancing UN effectiveness, most notably by Boutros Boutros-Ghali’s in his “An Agenda for Peace and An Agenda for Development”, which laid down much of the conceptual groundwork in linking conflict prevention to broader concerns such as enhancing human security and development. Several reports were later released by Kofi Annan, the former UN Secretary-General who also urged the International Community to change course from one that was reactionary to a more preventative strategy (Annan 2001; 2006). This created a colossal wave in the direction of peacebuilding organisations and within the UN. Despite the obvious benefits of attempting to defuse potential conflicts before they emerge, policymakers have found it hard to sell the idea of putting time and money into addressing latent hostilities that may never become violent. This is partly because it is difficult to provide empirical evidence for the efficacy of these measures, and partly because examples of successful conflict prevention tend to be under-reported by governments and the media. One of these initiatives being implemented by the UN is the Conflict Prevention Programme in Nepal. After the end of the decade long conflict in Nepal , the People’s Movement II and subsequent signing of the 2006 Comprehensive Peace Agreement the country has been at a pinnacle cross road which requires leaders to apply innovative approaches to complex problems and establish more collaborative relationships. Ensuring that this is a successful transition The Conflict Prevention Programme (CPP) was designed to assist the Government of Nepal, and other key actors including political parties and civil society organizations, to find consensus on transitional issues and avoid the escalation of tensions. This report aims to evaluate the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) and the strategic implementation of the Conflict Prevention Programme (CPP) in Nepal. The report does not set out to criticize the initiatives of CPP, but sets-out to highlight the lessons learned from various field visits and to suggest ways in which the programme can be improved and continue to help Nepal during this transitional phase. The report also seeks to add value to the efforts of CPP’s work in conflict management, peacebuilding and conflict prevention. The report argues that in spite of the challenges facing CPP there is still a compelling case for policymakers, donors and international governments to continue to invest politically and economically into the programme. Finally the report also cautions the UN that a clear exit plan needs to be formed and created as soon as possible and that an over reliance on the UN by communities in Nepal will weaken the structure that needs to be formed during this transitional period. Thus, the report argues for more efforts to be put into equipping local stakeholder and civil society members with the necessary training that will help to usher Nepal forward into lasting peace.

Andrew Edward Tchie

3

ABOUT THE AUTHOR Over the past six year Andrew Edward Tchie has been learning and assisting peacebuilders, capacity builders, human rights organizations and conflict analyses by highlighting the issues from the field and ways to improve their practices. He has conducted external training and evaluations in Ghana, Uganda, Mauritius, Botswana, Kenya, Nepal, and Turkey. He has also been working with the UNDP’s Conflict Prevention Programme, where he supported the team based in Nepal to assess their current programme structure and make recommendations on how to improve the programme at the district and grass root level. While working with the UNDP’s CPP Andrew designed, drafted and developed a training module for the Conflict Prevention Programme that will be used in their five working districts. The module designed for the UN will be used to train the Nepalese media on how to conduct journalism in post conflicts and how to contribute to the efforts in peacebuilding during this transitional period. His PhD research looks at conflicts, human right violations and the behavior of combatants in conflict and how their conditions can cause the use of non-targeted violence against civilians. He teaches Conflict Resolution and Peace at the University of Essex in the UK. He is also an Associate Fellow with the Higher Education Institute and has over 13 years of experience working as a TV Senior researcher with the BBC, Channel 4, ITV, ITN, CNN, Bloomberg News and other affiliated stations. ACKNOWLEDGEMENT I would firstly like to thank all the staff at the United Nations Development Programme’s Conflict Prevention Programme (CPP) for welcoming me into the team and for providing me with the space to observe the outstanding and well developed work being initiated in the five working districts. It has been a truly inspirational experience and I am grateful for the opportunity to learn and play a small part in the work that CPP is doing to help usher Nepal through this transitional period. To Bhasker Kafle, Indira Ale and Shiv Vishwakarma, thank you for providing me with the opportunity to share my experiences in the field and also for allowing me to test many of the units developed in this training module during your workshops and to Elizabeth Drew for your vital counsel, encouragement, and forced lunches. To Rebecca Jayne Sumner thank you for your diligent assistance and your guidance on this report and your enthusiasm to help review and edit this report. To Alikea Beckett, thank you for your encouragement and support throughout my time here in Nepal. To all the senior facilitators working with CPP, thank you for your insightful perspective and for the opportunity to hear my views on Nepal and its transitional peace process. Finally, thank you to Peter Barwick, for the opportunity to learn, observe, and add to the work you and the CPP team are trying to achieve here in Nepal and for providing me with the space and freedom to develop this module under your leadership and guidance.

4

LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS CLD Collaborative Leadership and Dialogue CPP Conflict Prevention Programme CPPB Conflict Prevention and Peace Building CS Conflict Sensitive EWER Early Warning Early Response GESI Gender Equality and Social Inclusion HQ Headquarters / United Nations Headquarters Nepal HR Human Resources IDEA International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance INSEC Informal Sector Service Centre LPC Local Peace Committee ME Monitoring and Evaluating NGO Non-Governmental Organisation ODN Open Data Nepal UN United Nations UNDP United Nations Development Programme VDC Village District Committee

5

CONTENT PAGE

Executive Summary 6 Introduction 7 General Findings 7 Brief Summary 9 Main Report 9 Challenges and Limitations of the Reports Analysis` 9 Central Report Findings 10 Areas for Expansion 19 Important Recommendations and Next Steps 21 Other Recommendations 22 Overall Findings and Implications 24

6

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY This report has been written to support the efforts of the UNDP’s Conflict Prevention Programme in Nepal and tries to provide a snapshot of the effort being undertaken in all of the UNDP’s current working regions where the CPP’s support is implemented. This evaluation aims at providing an overall independent assessment of the programmes past and current operations in conflict prevention and peace-building by identifying key lessons learned with a view of improving current and future strategies of the UNDP CPP’s programme. The reports intentions are to provide insights into the Nepal context that can be extended to other UNDP programmes that are helping to support countries through transitional periods. This report is based upon a triangulation of findings from qualitative sources that include interviews with staff, participants and senior facilitators over the last seven and a half months. It also uses these three sources to draw findings, evaluations, and recommendations for the UNDP Conflict Prevention Programme and uses previous reviews and evaluation documents from across all pillars that make up the conflict prevention programme. These include analyzing Do No Harm documents, observations on peace practice, using tools like dialogue, collaborative leadership, mainstreaming conflict sensitivity and partial analysis of early warning early response work. All of CPP’s pillars are to a certain extent concerned with issues of impact, results, assessment, and learning, as well as mechanisms for obtaining feedback and being accountable for programme effects. The report also tries to reflect on whether the current programme has relevance, impact, efficiency and sustainability. The reports evaluation has been done in reflection with current theories, practices, discussions, meta-analysis and some internal data obtained through the UNDP CPP monitoring and evaluating (ME). The report strives to identify different evaluation practices that can be employed to achieve more credible and useful findings relating to impact. The evaluation also pleads in favor of an increased focus on the root causes of conflict which has been insufficiently explored so far. Indeed, this requires working in the long-run, with a wide sector and geographical coverage, all of which CPP has shown itself to be particularly skillful in. The report also aims to share reflections and lessons learned from across the three working pillars and to help provide insights for other conflict prevention programmes working on transitional and conflict prevention issues. Finally the evaluation aims to promote a deeper and more meaningful discussion between peacebuilding practitioners within the UN systems, evaluators, and donors. It is not intended to be definitive or a final evaluation as the situation in Nepal is on-going, rather it tries to deepen the discussions and practices of peacebuilding initiatives within the UN.

7

INTRODUCTION The UNDP’s interventions in the field of Conflict Prevention and Peace-building (CPPB) should be seen against a backdrop of successive and diverse policies over the last decade initiated by the United Nations. The subject of this evaluation is to assess the UNDP Conflict Prevention Programmes efforts to support conflict prevention in Nepal. The report only covers activities and training which the programme is fully responsible for. The objective of this report is as follows: To provide an overall independent assessment of CPP’s current operations and support for conflict prevention and peace-building at a general level in Nepal from its four (now five) working offices. To provide an assessment and answer whether the programme is relevant, effective, has impact and is sustainable for Nepal. In addition to this the report tries to understand whether the programme is coherent, coordinated and complementary to the efforts needed to assist Nepal during this transitional period. Finally the report tries to understand and identify the key lessons with a view to improving current and future work of the programme. GENERAL FINDINGS This section provides a brief overview of the general findings from the UNDP’s CPP programme. The findings are neither district based nor a reflection of the work being done at the local level. Occasionally, the report points to particular findings from a district/ grass root level to draw examples of good practices. However, this section purely outlines the general management and operational issues that were noticed over the evaluation period. Gaps Brief Evaluation: There were gaps between the working pillars of CPP. The programme lacked an integrated approach which could actually assist all pillars working implementation approach. The programme devoted considerable attention to the geographical features of conflict in terms of districts, but synergies between different levels of intervention remained underexploited and explored. Challenges and Findings: Although the pillars have all made significant progress in terms of taking into account each of the three (excluding land issues under CLD) pillars objectives there was still a culture internally where collaboration was not well accepted and never occurred over the seven and a half months of observations. CPP generally took into account the needs of specific zones and intervened at different geographical levels and in zones where others were not or less present, albeit with weaknesses in terms of synergies between local, national, and regional levels. Recommendations: A culture of synergy needs to take place where all three working pillars are working in unity and supporting each pillar in a collaborative manner. This agenda should be pushed from senior management. More efforts need to be made across the board to incorporate the themes and agendas of all pillars. More focus and support needs to be provided to EWER and CS pillars that currently lack support. Positioning Brief Evaluation: General concepts were often not systematized and lacked coherent understanding of how to implement these tools. This concerned key concepts, such as conflict prevention, peace building, root causes, do no harm etc. Often at times these initiatives were mostly undertaken on an ad hoc basis. Only rarely was support directly geared to resolving the conflict or addressing the root causes of conflict. In most cases CPP aimed at mitigating the consequences of root causes.

8

Challenges and Findings: Conceptual orientations at policy level have generally not been appropriated at operational level and were not always univocal and shared at strategic level. CPP’s approach to conflict analysis, conflict sensitivity and mainstreaming was not systematized or structured. Staff except for CS members only received one round of internal training which mostly concentrated on their roles within CPP. Recommendations: Staff should collectively receive internal and external training, which should take place on a three month period. Training could also involve attending, participating and observing senior and experienced staff members who have strong conflict analysis backgrounds. Staff should be provided with opportunities to hear and attend academic and external training programmes which can enhance their current skills and add values and momentum to the work being done by CPP. Reaction Time Brief Evaluation: CPP often reacted quickly to conflict that emerged, but there were still short comings that remained which were not dealt with in terms of transitional long term preventative measures. Challenges and Findings: Although the Commission did not always anticipate deteriorating situations, it dedicated substantial attention to short term action. Often when sporadic outbursts of violence took place the programme staff tended to pause and were unclear about how to deal with the situation on the ground or whether to actually get involved. Recommendations: More content analysis needs to be done on a regular basis and needs to cover a wider variety of key sources and not just news sources which are based in Kathmandu. Coordination Brief Evaluation: CPP generally took steps to enhance coordination at different levels within the UN, but this generally resulted more in the exchange of brief information rather than in enhancement of complementary working partnerships. Challenges and Findings: The coordination from CPP within the UN system consisted mainly of the exchange of information as a minimum requirement. It rarely gave rise to a clear division of roles between partners so as to avoid gaps and duplication and enhance synergies at strategy, programming and implementation levels Recommendations: Expand collaboration with other UN agencies that can aid, assist and support the work of CPP. Promote a culture of synergy between the different agencies which helps foster a united UN and ultimately helps expand the work CPP is doing in a more focused and direct way. Enhance synergies at strategy programming level needs to take place with monthly meetings between the team leaders and other agencies. This keeps agencies updated and makes sure there is no duplication in the work being done.

9

BRIEF SUMMARY The report overall finds that there is a need to improve four key strategic ways in which CPP operates at all levels. There is a need for “integrated approach” between the three pillars. The second area that CPP should take into consideration is the time dimensions (short term and long term and their linkages). The third area is the integration of different activities (Do no harm, mainstreaming and conflict sensitivity) and using this knowledge base to train local NGO’s and civil society groups who can all be a part of the CPP transitional exit plan, and fourthly, the geographical dimensions of possible conflicts, and the activities of different key players involved. The current lack in ability to draw on a wide range of instruments, long-term thematic experience, synergy and direction is potentially impacting on CPP and its credibility in terms of promoting its mandated values around managing conflict, peacebuilding, democracy, peace, and human rights. MAIN REPORT EVALUATION METHOD The method used in this report consists of three fundamental methods. The first is interviews and discussion with current staff members and senior facilitators who are all implementing the CPP’s agenda. The second uses data collected from feedback surveys distributed to participants after the workshop. This data was then compared with two other data sources who are currently working in these districts. The first source is from Informal Sector Service Center (INSEC) http://www.insec.org.np/ and the second is from Open Data Nepal (ODN) http://data.opennepal.net/, which uses government data and converts this into useable and free public data sources through workshops that CPP is working in. This is then compared with local level data which is collected by INSEC by the different district workshops. The final method involves a separate interview with between 5-6 participants from various workshops over the last seven and a half months. The report evaluated four of CPP’s current working district and a sub office districts headquarters Dhangadhi, Banke, Birantnagla, Janakpur and Bharatpur districts. The report used a combination of tools and techniques for data collection including the analysis of around 120 internal documents, 66 interviews (excluding representatives from CPP), external stakeholders, grassroots organizations and conversations with staff and senior facilitators. The report also sourced information from strategy documents and evaluations relating to selected districts, examination of intervention-specific documents and case studies, interviews with CPP HQ staff an analysis of the major trends and CPP existing documentation on conflict assessments and field observations. CHALLENGES AND LIMITATIONS OF THE REPORT ANALYSIS As much as this report has tried to make the report method robust and scientific in nature, the data collected by CPP was often compounded with participants being doubled located, and variables were limited to just four i.e. location, gender, age and status. This makes any analysis very difficult hence the use of data outside of the UNDP CPP’s current data. This was used to provide checks and balance on the regional levels analysis. The report stresses there is a need to improve the quantity and quality of the current information being collected. This related in particular to the process of obtaining (i) key documents on the selected interventions, and (ii) important strategic documents. Problems encountered in information collection were mainly due to an absence of information on results and impact. This was mostly due to the absence of systematic and detailed monitoring and evaluation of the operations.

10

CENTRAL REPORT FINDINGS IMPACT OF WORKSHOPS Brief Evaluation: In particular districts, like the far western and western regions, the CPP team play a crucial and key role in mitigating the impact of root causes, notably through an integrated approach. The teams created a family like unit where participants were supported in and out of office hours and the team generally had a positive contribution on conflict mitigation, stabilization, reconstruction and rehabilitation. However in other districts this impact was not as strong. Challenges and Findings: The overall impact of its support in terms of CPP contribution to the community remained impossible to predict. While the workshop is training participants, the training after several weeks is often forgotten and people needed reminding of what they were taught during the workshop by staff. There was no aftercare system put in place for participants who come from lower social, economic, and lower caste groups. This is vital considering that after a workshop is completed participants will return back to their environment and have to interact with members of the community who have not received CPP training. This can cause many of the participants to feel isolated and withdraw back into their shell. The role that CPP played tended to be exaggerated internally and to a certain extent is actually blurred. Indeed, the evaluation shows that mainstreaming was not widespread and that conflict prevention was not at the heart of the CPP strategy. In fact only rarely was support geared to addressing the “root” causes of conflict, in most cases the support aimed at best at mitigating the consequences of conflict or at addressing dialogue. Recommendations: Other districts should be provided with the opportunity as part of their development to observe the unique tools being used in pioneering districts like Banke and Dhangadhi. In one workshop the author attended, staff rode along with participants for four hours in a bus instead of turning up in a UN vehicle. While this method might not be suited for all districts, the personal touch that this approach added and helped to build some level of trust before the actual workshop. Participants should be provided with information connecting local organizations that can help build-up participants and provide them with the necessary leadership skills which the CPP workshops are not remitted to do. IMPLEMENTATION OF THE WORKSHOPS Brief Evaluation: There is a need for discrete and independent workshops focusing on different skills and targeting different actors. Challenges and Findings: The current programme is contributing to the peace process in Nepal, but should widen to provide participants with an array of skills to deal with political conflict as it arises. There is currently no mechanism put into place to help participants sustain the training they receive after the workshops. Workshops are often attended by hierarchal members of society that only reinforce the difficulties that Nepal is facing. Recommendations: Informational exchange and a needs assessment of individual subunits within and among regional organizations are very important. There should be a need to enlist the active support and participation of local populations in CPP district level programmes. CPP should consider partnership with a conflict and peacebuilding institution that focus on conflict prevention to help strengthen the knowledge base within the unit. More periodic local research with indigenous and other groups should be done to better understand the cultural dimensions of conflict prevention. Workshops involving local NGOs, the media and stakeholders should be divided into criteria from those involving regional organisations from the local level for the workshop to be more effective and consistent in context. Communications would be less

11

inhibiting in this context and the training could be more contexts specific. For example the Media training workshop should not combine editors with news journalists or broadcaster’s as this can create a sense that the workshop is not important because lower level journalists are a part of the workshop. THE ROLE OF SENIOR FACILITATORS Brief Evaluation: Senior facilitators played a key and crucial role in the delivery of dialogue and facilitating constructive debates amongst the different political figures. This helped several struggling districts start and move their districts forward using dialogue as a tool. There was on some occasions an overreliance on the senior facilitators to usher the community forward in the future. Challenges and Findings: Senior facilitators play a crucial and critical role in helping the different levels of societies see issues that existed at the different levels and use this as a way of facilitating dialogue amongst the different players. There were often times an over reliance on the role that senior facilitators should and could play. At times this resulted in staff not being clear on the aims and objectives of the workshops and how to deliver objective debates to deal with the issues at hand. This also led to unclear objectives, conflict analysis and underestimations of what the issues were. This led senior facilitators to deliver unrealistic outcomes. Recommendations: A need to allow senior facilitators to usher dialogue between the conflicting parties but a deeper analysis should be provided to facilitators before the workshop and a meeting should take place between CPP staff and facilitators. More training needs to be provided on leadership tools and how this can be used at the grassroots level for political groups who are being trained under CPP. INTERNAL TRAINING FOR STAFF Brief Evaluation: Staff received some levels of training, but this was not a consistent theme throughout the time period. Challenges and Findings: There was not equilibrium of training between the different staff under different pillars. This meant some staff was able to deliver the content and training modules better and with more confidence in the material they were delivering. To be provided with more reading material to help assist staff in the delivery of the training outcomes. Recommendations: In-depth internal and external training on CPP related fields (e.g. conflict prevention, mediation, early-warning systems, conflict sensitivity, conflict analysis, mainstreaming of CPP, political dialogue for conflict prevention, etc.) should be made compulsory for staff working on CPP issues. CPP components could be integrated into existing core career development training. Overall there needs to be an increase in the amount of training provided to staff during the course of the programmes life. This could be done by scheduling training every three months that is a mixture of internal and external training. This might also include staff attending training events provided by other organisations that specialize in this area. Taking into account the fact that these training events take place in Headquarters, sufficient resources (time and financial) should be devoted to ensuring that staff can attend such training. Consideration might also be given to the time and cost-effectiveness of organizing some training events online or on a regional basis, which may also have other benefits in terms of promoting synergy. For instance, training could be attached to existing regional or central meetings and staff gatherings. External and international training schemes also exist (run by NGOs, universities, and international organisations) and consideration could be given to

12

participation in these schemes so as to facilitate joint training with other partners and exposure to other organisations. Providing mechanisms for ensuring effective knowledge management will strengthen institutional memory as well as the lesson-learning around CPP. Providing a focused set of workable tools and guidance for intervening in a post conflict or conflict (-prone) context particularly given the tension that may arise in the western and far western regions of Nepal. The programme should also develop and implement monitoring frameworks with specific indicators for operating in a post-conflict context. THE DECLINING OF CONFLICT SENSITIVITY AND DO NO HARM APPROACHES Brief Evaluation: There is a general awareness in CPP of the importance of a do-no-harm approach and conflict sensitivity. CPP is generally committed to do no harm and to the importance of ensuring conflict sensitivity. This general awareness was however rarely tangible and did not translate into explicit and formalized mechanisms to ensure a “do no harm” outcome was achieved at the district level. Challenges and Findings: In several cases CPP did make changes to the strategy and programming in response to the evolving context – with the aim of “doing no harm” (e.g. on conflict prevention, peace building, “root causes”, conflict analysis, mainstreaming, conflict sensitivity, etc.) Conceptual orientations at policy level had generally not been adopted at operational level and were not always univocal and shared at strategic level. CPP’s approach to conflict analysis, conflict sensitivity and mainstreaming needed to be more systematized, structured and not implemented on an ad hoc basis. Some conflict analyses were rarely documented and undertaken on the basis of structured approaches; they sometimes informed the support, but not systematically and often with gaps. Recommendations: Do no harm strategies need to be implemented by all staff from all pillars taking into account different synergy approaches to addressing the issues. There needs to be a focus away from simple pillar work to a focus that adapts a more all round and encompassing approach. There is also a need to integrate the work of “Do No Harm” into the training provided by staff and senior facilitators across the programme and team. REGIONAL STAFF AND WORKSHOPS Brief Evaluation: The work done by the different districts operated at different levels with some districts operating at a more meso-level engaging with all players while some districts struggled to make these connections. Challenges and Findings: Great work was being done and adopted in the western and far western regions that were able to pioneer unique and custom made approaches to delivering CPP training. These districts were also able to take the material off the paper and provide a deeper delivery of the issues at hand and found ways of using dialogue as a tool within the districts. Dialogue was used to a certain extent to address root causes, but on several occasions this was not noticed as a systematic activity and needed to expand beyond just using dialogue as a tool. Some districts appeared to be more aware about how to deliver training at various levels while other districts lacked the ability to deliver this to participants attending the training. Recommendations: Staff should be provided with an opportunity to develop these skills through training and monitoring other districts that are delivering stronger grass root approaches to dealing with the conflict. This can be done by allowing staff to rotate and observe different districts that are producing pioneering approaches. Ownership of the content material and training material by staff needs to now be converted into more tenderable and practical steps.

13

LOCAL VERSUS NATIONAL NEEDS Brief Evaluation: The report also found that the value added in terms of reducing tensions or preventing the outbreak, recurrence or continuation of violent conflict. Challenges and Findings: CPP was also perceived to have a strong “political profile” in the sense of not being tied to national interests and of conducting a dialogue with the different parties concerned in the post conflict Nepal. This created reliability in terms of its capacity to establish long-term partnerships and its continued presence, notably when others had suspended their cooperation and also in geographical areas in which others were not present or were less in evidence. CPP also devoted considerable attention to the geographical features of conflict, but synergies between different levels of intervention (local, national, regional) remained underexploited. LAND issues were also unexplored and need to be expanded upon and more specialists in this area brought in to provide lessons learned and an independent analysis on how the UNDP can play a vital role in this area. Recommendations: Conflict prevention has to move closer to the local and regional levels. CPP’s efforts have to be well tuned to local needs and invest in local capacity building in Conflict prevention, at all levels. More work needs to be done with local governments and organisations at the grass root levels who currently work in conflict affected districts like MercyCop. PARTICIPANTS AFTER CARE Brief Evaluation: Often after workshops there was little or no aftercare available to participants. There were no referrals of participants onto other organization who might also be able to assistant participants once they had left the training. Challenges and Findings: Staff often tended to conduct training with participants and often did not provide participants with referral to resources which participants can use as part of their development and training. While participants were empowered after the workshops several of the participants who were interviewed months after the training sessions tended to forget and were unable to recap what they were taught during the training session. Some participants also seemed to have slipped back into old practices which they had adopted before the training session. Recommendations: A need to make the sessions more sustainable and find ways of making the material more engaging and memorable. This can be done by using more practical examples that place participants with more tangible skills which they can use in their districts once they return. A need to provide participants with aftercare resources that they can use and access once the workshops are over. Follow up sessions need to take place where participants are connected to organistions with the resources to assist participants. This will help to empower long term and assist CPP with its exit plan in 2017. DISTRICT DYNAMIC AND UPRISINGS Brief Evaluation: Although CPP had initiated a new early-warning mechanism which was being deployed throughout the districts, they were generally not known about or widely used within the CPP. Instead, CPP mostly used informal and ad hoc channels to keep itself informed on the evolution of the countries situation. Challenges and Findings: Political dialogue with national authorities was also used as an early warning mechanism and for monitoring the conflict zone.CPP provided support for immediate crisis, conflict mitigation and the consolidation of peace through specific programmes and

14

political dialogue. There was a culture that was faintly embracive of the new EWER pillar, but these tools and mechanisms were generally not known about or widely used by staff and adapted as a culture within CPP. The current documentation on EWER was well explained and systematically ready to be deployed, but Interviewees noted a fragmentation in the deployment of this pillar in the field. Recommendations: There needs to be a culture where the EWER mechanism is well explained and that staff are provided with an opportunity to fully understand what their roles are in delivering this training. This would significantly help the training of LPC, VDC and other related community members. CPP should consider expanding this training beyond the targeted groups and should consider also using groups like students, activists, academics and lower end community members who will be able to provide a more in-depth perspective, different analysis and more in-depth reflections of the issues on the ground. More time needs to be provided to test the new pillar. More scooping in the field may need to be done to help provide a unique district level approach. RECONCILIATION THROUGH DIALOGUE Brief Evaluation: Great strives were being made to reduce violence amongst the different conflicting parties at the different conflicting levels which CPP worked in, Challenges and Findings: Using dialogue as a tool was working and helping to move different members in societies forward. This method also made great strides to help the different people in Nepal move forward by using the methods that CPP was initiating in the field. Recommendations: More of this work needs to take place at the various levels of society. This method should be taught to other local organizations that can create a wave of informed members who are using this method to help move people forward. SYNERGIES BETWEEN THE GEOGRAPHICAL LOCATIONS Brief Evaluation: While there are various approaches being used in different locations by various field staff, there needs to be more synergies between the approaches used. However there were not enough synergies between different levels and districts. Challenges and Findings: For instance by complementing actions within a districts. While districts had their own local level issues, they did not work collaboratively together to help use the lessons learned in other districts to move things forward. Some districts had similar issues which could have been dealt with by using testimonies from the different districts and regions. This would provide participants with more tangible examples of how to solve issues that they are struggling with. More collaborations with the different districts that can provide a different perspective on what is taking place on the ground within the different districts and what methods were used to deal with these issues. The adoption of new approaches that involve using the testimonies of different participants from the various districts that CPP operates in. This would involve asking these former ambassadors to come to current workshops and to talk to current participants about their conflict background and current issues and to talk about their experiences with CPP and how the training has helped to deliver sustainable peace in their districts. This would provide participants with more tangible examples and create a wave of people equipped to handle the conflict issues in their own unique way. For example, in Kailali the youth formed the Kailali Dialogue Youth Forum and it would have been good to mobilize one or two of these members to other districts to share their experiences in different districts on what, when and how they are

15

working in their districts and how this is reducing conflicts in their communities that CPP is working in. This could also play into CPP’s exit plan and wean Nepalese society off UNDP’s assistance. This helps bring a face to successful tools used by CPP and helps participants know the value of the tools being used in the different districts. Recommendations: Ensure that joint training and strategies can be used to help create a wave of change within the different communities. Share experience and use everyday people affected by the CPP training to be Ambassadors of change and advocates of the process. These ambassadors can also be used to help tweak workshop design and implementation programmes. Carefully and systematically analyses where the support could benefit from such synergies as part of conflict analysis. Developing more local level monitoring indicators for workshops and modules programmes that take account for the impact of local, regional and national levels where relevant, so as to ensure that programmatic results are considered together as well as separately with a view to identifying interactions and synergies at the different levels. EXPANSION: PREVIOUSLY AFFECTED CONFLICT DISTRICTS Brief Evaluation: CPP’s programme appeared to only be present in development regions which were previously not majorly affected by the conflict. Although these current development regions have a long term goal of reducing violence, there is still a need and work to be scooped and expanded into areas that have previously experienced conflict in order to make sure that there are no possible relapses. Challenges and Findings: The programme seemed to focus its efforts on development regions and there was a neglect to reach inaccessible areas where communities are isolated and can be easily used as tools for violence given their geographical locations. Despite a general trend towards being sensitive to conflicts’ geographical characteristics, some shortcomings in the understanding of conflicts from a geographical context were not well known or reported. Evidence from internal reports show that CPP thinking was targeted on (1) regional areas, (2) internal lines of fracture and (3) Development affected areas or communities. Recommendations: There is a need to scoop other districts that may be conflict affected and could benefit from the work that CPP is doing in the current working districts. Scooping in these districts need to take place to handle potential issues and conflicts that may arise during the conflict period. This will also provide CPP with the ability to deal with issues from a proactive approach. LOCAL GRASS ROOT ORGANISATIONS: A PARTIAL EXIT STRATEGY Brief Evaluation: Any predictions of future behavior are associated with probabilities of outcome and naturally predictions become more difficult the further they are from occurrence. This occurs for two reasons. The first is due to what is often called the “signal to noise ratio” referring to the difficulty of isolating causes (usually associated with underlying structural factors) from concurrent and unrelated events. This ratio increases as the distance between cause and effect increases, making advanced early warning difficult. Secondly, the closer to an event one moves the more likely that other factors (not just underlying structural causes but relational, psychological and dynamic patterns of interaction often associated with accelerators and triggering events) determine conflict escalation. This means that analysis must have an appreciation of the underlying structural factors but also human behavior as well, including individual, intergroup and intragroup dynamics. It also means that analysis must have a clear sense of stakeholder interests and an understanding of factors that generate peace and not just conflict. Long term fundamental dynamics relating to structural causes and consequences, mid-

16

term behavioral patterns and current events should all be consider in the CPP strategy on how to diffuse tension. While there have been some efforts to take this approach this was only observed in three of the working districts in the far western, western and central regions. There is a need for the programme to move away from a reactionary response to a more preventative approach. Challenges and Findings: The report also found that the programme needed coherence support at local or grassroots levels and that this necessary support needs to be more systematic. It was also found that the involvement of local populations in the design of CPP’s support had not been systematic either and there was more of a focus on working with government agencies and an expectation they could solve Nepal’s conflict issues. While this was making some progress in changing the mindsets of government members more needed to be done to reach the lower end members of society who are more likely to react to government policies. CPP could also benefit from helping to support and assist communities that are dealing with issues around national reconciliation processes that will help move the country forward. This can be done by collaborating with other UN agencies like human right agencies that can provide technical support and assistance in this area. Recommendations: On the one hand, where conflicts are well understood in both form and content and the causes are proximate and escalation is likely, the main problem will not be one of analysis but rather response. On the other hand, where conflicts are latent and only remotely suggestive of potential escalation, careful monitoring will be essential. For conflict prevention activities to be effective CPP should have a built in evaluation process or impact assessment capability that will, in effect, ensure self-monitoring and provide policy guidance on what to do. Equally, it may on occasion be important to hand off many of the responsibilities for response to those who are themselves stakeholders in the process. Such approaches might include capacity building for local stakeholders through such activities often associated with preventive development, support for human rights and democratization. CPP should consider expanding beyond national dialogue to a more dual focus that involves grassroots peace-building and community-based human rights advocacy. These groups are particularly relevant because the grassroots approach can complement the macro-level initiatives and can also help societies move forward quickly. This could also feed into CPP’s exit strategy and be a way of phasing out the programme slowly but at a steady pace. STAFF TRAINING AND HUMAN RESOURCES Brief Evaluation: Staff who joined seemed to have vast backgrounds and some were able to use this as transferrable skills which helped guide the work they were doing. There has also recently been a rapid expansion of CPP staff at HQ and in the field which has all helped aid the objectives of CPP. Despite this, conflict expertise remained too limited, with only a few being able to conduct deep conflict analysis and use conflict tools to find solutions to the problems that existed on the ground. Challenges and Findings: The programme did not have a human resources policy designed to govern necessary conflict Interventions, staff development and training in a conflict (-prone) context. They also needed to adopt a HR policy that was geared to supporting CPP staff, strategies, and public appeal notably with respect to the hiring of specialized staff, training, consideration for staff’s careers and the development of team leaders. Recommendations: Staff should be provided with up to date training which will better help them to be equipped for the jobs and respond to conflict from a preemptive position. HR policy within the UNDP needs to change to allow more technical expertise to be brought on board and help

17

staff where there are weaknesses. Staff should be provided with clear development and training goals that assist their personal development and achievements. OVERALL STRATEGY, OBJECTIVES, AND SCOPE OF THE PROGRAMME REACH Brief Evaluation: While the programme had strong written plans and remits and had made great visible strives since its inception this in practice was not shared, embedded and adopted by all working pillars within CPP. Challenges and Findings: A series of tools and guidance for CPP such as the checklist on root causes of conflict, the guidance from the UNDP country office and a set of guidelines on CPPB-related sectors were not clearly available to staff. The current toolbox also did not allow the bridging of gaps between high-level policy commitments and their concrete implementation, as it lacked operationally, clarity and comprehensiveness and was not widely used or known. There was a lack of clarity and focus on what the actual long term and short term strategies where and what the actual scoop of the programme needed to encompass. The current strategy seems to be an offshoot of UNDP’s strategy from a development perspective and created difficulties when it came to mitigating conflicts. This was not in line with the paradigm shift required to address the challenges of a conflict (-prone) or post-conflict context as articulated in the CPP’s own policy documents. Compounding this issue was a lack of documented conflict analysis: CPP’s knowledge of the conflict situations has not been built on proper documented conflict analyses but rather on information gathered on the conflict situation through informal channels, national newspapers and information from political actors. This can limit the depth of its knowledge on the possible conflicts and affect CPP’s extent in which it can support and be aware of the conflict context. Lastly deteriorating situations were not always anticipated by CPP and in a number of cases the eruption of a crisis may take CPP by surprise. While the author has no doubt that CPP’s reaction will be a rapid response to crisis situations, its strategy and programming needs to be more adaptive to a changing situation. Recommendations: There is a need to identify more suitable and feasibly preventative measures. There is a need to utilize existing mechanisms being used within CPP and a more strategic approach in unifying the working pillars together where there are gaps in practices. Of course, in order to utilize existing capacities for conflict prevention there is a need to be aware of organizational limitations. Only then can we avoid unnecessary overlap and duplication and assure that each organization and unit works within its own comparative advantage. There also needs to be the freedom to introduce new ideas and practices that will allow for the flexibility necessary to meet ever new challenges that do not neatly fit into preconceived and experienced categories of human and state action. This freedom has been used in the far western region where they have been pioneering lower end initiatives with great results. This also aligns with national efforts for the districts and helps to facilitate ongoing dialogue and participation in regions. SYNERGY (EWER, CS, AND CLD) AND OTHER UN AGENCIES LIKE HUMAN RIGHTS Brief Evaluation: CPP has made great strides since its inception in 2011 delivering pioneering services which have helped reduce conflicts in many districts. There is a need for the tools, techniques and initiatives being used internally within CPP and its three working pillars to be adapted by all staff and used as an all-round strategy which strengthens the work, approach and implantation of CPP work. CPP work could also include more linkages with other UN agencies which have expert skills and technical knowledge that CPP lacks to be brought into the negotiation table. This would help the efforts of CPP but would help the UN Nepal make greater achievements in the aims and objectives that it strives to achieve in Nepal.

18

Challenges and Findings: A need for a more coordinated approach between the UN agencies needs to take place more often. There also seemed to be different organizational cultures, mandates and timeframes for engagement which demanded a careful sequencing of their respective interventions, which in practice however, frequently did not take place. Recommendations: A more integrated approach to working in collaboration amongst the team and with other UN agencies that can support CPP’s agenda. CPP support should take place through a comprehensive approach that integrates different types of activity (notably through mainstreaming), different time dimensions (short-term and long-term support and the linkages between them), the activities of different actors and different geographical dimensions (e.g. local, country or regional levels). THE NEED FOR STRONGER MONITORING AND EVALUATION TOOLS Brief Evaluation: Any predictions of future behavior are associated with probabilities of outcome and naturally predictions become more difficult the further they are from occurrence. This occurs for two reasons: The first is due to what is often called the “signal to noise ratio” referring to the difficulty of isolating causes (usually associated with underlying structural factors) from concurrent and unrelated events. This ratio increases as the distance between cause and effect increases, making advanced early warning difficult. Secondly, the closer to an event one moves the more likely that other factors (not just underlying structural causes but relational, psychological and dynamic patterns of interaction often associated with accelerators and triggering events) determine conflict escalation. This means that analysis must tend to not only be an appreciation of underlying structural factors but human behavior as well, including individual, intergroup and intragroup dynamics. It also means that analysis must have a clear sense of stakeholder interests and an understanding of factors that generate peace and not just conflict. Long term fundamental dynamics relating to structural causes and consequences, mid-term behavioral patterns should all be consider in the CPP strategy on how to diffuse tension. CPP could move away from a reactionary point of view and if data collection and monitoring was made stronger and more analysis was done to understand the nature of what was taking place amongst the different players. Challenges and Findings: One of the missed opportunities in terms of conflict analysis, mapping and monitoring within CPP is that it has not used specific indicators to track the evolution of conflict factors. In particular, within the framework of this evaluation indicators for monitoring conflict-related results were almost never included. This constrained measurement of the effects of the programme on the conflict situation. In addition to this the current monitoring being done by CPP had inflated results and often needed to be expanded beyond the five current measured variables. The monitoring also did not track conflict related issues but simply focused on attendance and this will not allow CPP to be able to monitor what is taking place on the ground and provide tailor made responses to this issue. Recommendations: CPP monitoring activities should have a built in evaluative process or impact assessment capability that will ensure self-monitoring and provide policy guidance on what to do. There needs to be an increase in the monitoring indicators used by CPP. This must include conflict scoops and variables that measure the likelihood of conflicts taking place. This should be incorporated in CPP related programmes on the evolution of conflict factors. The conflict-sensitive monitoring would contribute to ensuring that CPP is following the effects of its programmes on the conflict context and to providing the necessary signals during the implementation of particular workshops. Expand the current monitoring and evaluation system to beyond the variables currently recorded in order to conduct a more comprehensive analysis. Develop tools for monitoring and evaluating the impact of governance and conflict prevention

19

initiatives. Conduct further solid analysis of linkages between governance and conflict prevention, Use past evaluation reports and recommendations as practical guidance for new programme design and development. Look into using data collected by organization like INSEC. AREAS FOR EXPANSION THE MEDIA AND ITS ROLES IN POST CONFLICT Brief Evaluation: The role of the media and the need to use the media to expand CPP work and assist Nepal’s peace process. Challenges and Findings: Current efforts to expand the work of CPP to the media have made some progress, but more could be done to enhance, encompass and educate the media during this transitional period. The current training provided to the media via CPP needs to be more post conflict sensitive and focused towards the media. Recommendations: Incorporating the media into CPP future strategies in resolving and moving communities forward, this can be done by recognizing the media’s role and reach and how they can influence the members in a society. This allows CPP to harness its power as a potential peace builder during this transitional period. Care must be taken to prepare media accordingly for the different roles it can play as information provider, watchdog, mobilizer and promoter, among others. Design and implement a media training programme that will educate, inform and assist the media to become gatekeepers or the four estate of society (Please see Journalism and the role of the Media A training module for the Media in Post conflict circumstances document submitted by the author). WOMEN AND PEACEBUILDING: Brief Evaluation: While several conversations and recommendations were made regarding this topic there has been a disappointing approach to adopt, plan and implement any of the recommendations made in the GESI guidelines. Evaluation: Over the last couple of months there seems to have been a culture of talking about implementing GESI into the work of CPP. However, this has struggled to take off and appears to not be on the agenda. There have been no experts brought on board to handle and implement this initiative and there seem to be a culture of neglect that reinforces the same hierarchy system that exists outside of the UN. Women-centered, women’s roles and initiatives tend to be marginalized. Recommendations: A need to incorporate women’s experiences into building peace initiatives conducted by CPP particularly at the local level into overall conflict prevention objectives and strategies of CPP. Women’s full participation in peace-building to be enhanced, a special focus upon building their capacities must be employed and a need for gender to be incorporated as an explicit aspect of CPP’s forward initiatives. Increase in women specialists and women leaders who specialize in women and conflict prevention. All peace-building initiatives must consider the impacts of and incorporate women into policies and projects, there needs to be a move away from a culture of token recognition to a culture that recognises the value and role women can play in Nepal’s transitional period. Local approaches to peace building should be recognized and built upon, including peace-building interventions of women-centered and local groups.

20

EXIT STRATEGY Brief Evaluation: There was currently no implementation or strategic approach outline on how CPP would be exiting. Challenges and Findings: A strategy of how CPP plans to exit was not fully developed, planned or executed. An exit strategy would help to ensure a continuum with the long-term aims and objectives. The lack of a plan can also limit capacities of national or local authorities to take over interventions and be used as an exit strategy for the future of Nepal and can constitute challenges to a successful transition in the longer term for Nepal. Recommendations: Local NGO’s and the wider civil society members should be trained and briefed on the CPP framework and be provided with the support for initiating this initiative in replacement of CPP. Training in conflict prevention needs to reach beyond the UN and embrace more regional organizations, member states and non-state actors. CPP should also collaborate with ongoing efforts to create standing expert groups on conflict prevention. The research finding made by CPP should be shared more often and distributed within the UN System. SHARING AND RECEIVING KNOWLEDGE Brief Evaluation: More efforts should be made to increase the sharing of outside research, empirical findings and update the internal knowledge system within and amongst CPP staff. Challenges and Findings: While staff would often share materials via email, there was very few resources which were accessible to staff that they could use as resources to develop the efforts of CPP. Most literature was either out of date or was not in line with new empirical assessments from other academic or research institutions. There was also a culture of not willing to embrace and enhance knowledge within the team. Knowledge management needs to improve within the team to allow others to draw on examples of lessons learned from the field. There was a lack of capacity to capitalize on CPP’s findings and the larger conflict environment. Recommendations: More internally reflective documentation needs to be produced on a three monthly basis. There is a need to expand staff knowledge by increasing access to outside information and collaboration with organisations which do similar work like Alliance for Peace, International Alert, Searching for Common Ground, and IDEA. Understood knowledge from organisations like this can prove to be a vital life line for the work that CPP is doing. The hand-over of responsibilities should be well-organised and passed on from one person to another. CPP activities should be well documented to allow for the smooth transition and flow of aim and objectives. This also means that information and reports should be systematized, clear and formatted. Informal and internal lunchtime briefings, on-line blogs, reflection periods for writing-up of “experience briefing notes” by field officer and from HQ in between postings, are all mechanisms that could be considered as efficient means of knowledge generation and sharing that can build on existing resources at low-costs. Academics at universities and research institutions have a crucial role to play in enhancing conflict prevention and conflict management skills within CPP. CPP should support external research that contributes to Nepalese transitional process; this will help all parties like CPP to develop successful approaches to sell conflict prevention to decision-makers and opinion-makers.

21

IMPORTANT RECOMMENDATIONS AND NEXT STEPS The next moves for the work of CPP is critical and timely, although the report has found several gaps in the work that CPP is doing. These gaps can help the CPP deliver its objectives and ambitions in the future. The following recommendations have been broken down into three key areas. CPP’s Overall role and approach

Strengthen CPP’s position as a key player in Nepal but also amongst NGO, civil society and other conflict prevention and peacebuilding organizations.

Create and construct a culture of integrated approach: The current gaps between the policy commitment to an integrated approach and its implementation are too wide and this gap needs to be closed

. Specific Strategic Issues

Clarify the role of CPP in conflict related issues: more focus should be placed into crisis management effort.

A focus on the root causes of conflict from the grass root levels and provides programmes or services which will help deal with this issue.

Realignment of different districts and their projects: while there is a need to provide a unique and custom made delivery for those in different districts there needs to be a clearer goal and target to make sure that all field staff are delivering different assistance which produce long and lasting effects.

Take a more integrated approach when it comes to issues. Development, Means and Implementation

There is a need for the procedures and implementation processes to be swifter and less hierarchal, currently initiatives are restricted and often dwindle and never take place. The process needs to be focused

A better anticipation of the conflict related challenges that might arise during the cause of CPP life.

Improvement in the terms and definition within CPP that need to be driven internally by but also incorporated within the work of all three pillars. This in particular concerns key policy and operational concepts such as: “integrated approach”, “conflict prevention”, “peace-building”, “conflict analysis”, “conflict sensitivity”, “do no harm”, “mainstreaming”, “root causes”. The lack of a systematized approach to the issues mentioned previously.

EWER mechanism: The first recommended step is to rationalize current early-warning mechanisms, in particular to decide which early-warning mechanisms are critical and useful.

22

OTHER RECOMMENDATIONS

Making strategic use of partnerships and build on existing programmes and initiatives with key actors and institutions who have credibility and trust on the ground, as sometimes the UN is not the best placed to initiate a discussion on conflict-related issues.

Assessing whether immediate entry points for conflict prevention can be found at the local level, as compared to the national level.

There is frequently no consensus among UN agencies on what conflict prevention practically means on the ground, nor on how it differs in policy and operational terms from ‘normal’ development interventions that aim to address vulnerability, exclusion, and participation. There is also a need to strengthen awareness of how development interventions can fuel or exacerbate conflict, and of how development interventions can be deliberately [re-]oriented to mitigate and/or prevent conflict.

Prioritising of conflict prevention has not been established in the UN, but remains ad hoc and highly dependent on individuals. In this sense, there is a need at HQ to further clarify expectations with regard to UN Nepal’s involvement in conflict prevention and to promote it as a system-wide approach, possibly in a similar fashion to the human rights based approach. Relevant incentive measures could be established at all levels to encourage a more conducive atmosphere for risk-taking, innovation, and more pro-active leadership in the area of conflict prevention.

An increased awareness in the understanding of common conflict analysis/prevention tools within the UN.

Conflict sensitive programming should not be taken for granted. Experience has shown that, often, UN Country Teams operating in conflict prone or post-conflict situations are not sufficiently familiar with conflict analysis frameworks, tools and methodologies (Source). Too many times, little consideration is given to the potential negative impacts that development programming may have on peace and conflict dynamics, or to the potential positive impact development programming can have if accurately designed.

In-depth training on conflict sensitive approaches, tools and process and the development of a roster of experts and practitioners from within CPP and externally outside of the UNDP. This roster would help support the UN Country teams on the ground and provide hands-on training and the systematic documentation of country experiences and best practices.

The development of conflict sensitive, peacebuilding, mediation and capacity building strategies need to be filtered down to the programme design and implementation.

There needs to be a fundamental process of conflict analysis that focuses on actors and capacity mapping in order to determine what resources already exist in society to cope with current/future conflicts, at the formal and informal levels.

The need to develop conflict sensitive approaches that are complementary to human

rights and gender mainstreaming approaches. Further attention needs to be given to the

23

recommendation made by external consultants on the issue around GESI and it

implementation.

Systematically record emerging lessons learned and best practices from the different regions and focusing both on process and the outcome, in order to add to current knowledge understanding.

Create a roster of experienced rotating practitioners and international experts, who can be called upon to support processes on the ground, when the need arises.

To provide advanced training in conflict prevention for mid and senior level staff.

CPP should organize and encourage staff participation in capacity building workshops and courses, awareness raising seminars and conferences on early warning and prevention of violent conflict. Staff should be encouraged to present and share their own activities to outside institutions and organizations engaged in similar work.

Working relationships have to be forged between regional organizations and the UN, between regional organizations and other regional organizations and between organs, departments and institutions of the UN. Where such relationships exist at rudimentary levels, they need to be improved dramatically.

The UN should have at their disposal stand-by expert groups (with theoretical, practical and regional expertise on conflict prevention) for urgent advice on early warning and preventative measures

Beyond the rhetoric of cooperation between the UN, regional organizations and civil society actors, the relationship(s) between them needs to be understood and pragmatically assessed.

More emphasis also needs to be put on taking early action, to mitigate the risks of outbreak and recurrence of conflicts, for example through the effective utilization of conflict risk analysis.

Actions to prevent conflict should also address the root causes of tension between different ethnic and societal groups, or they are unlikely to have a long-term and positive impact.

Development of an exit strategy for national counterparts in programme countries when supporting this area.

24

OVERALL FINDINGS AND IMPLICATIONS While successful conflict prevention requires hard work on the part of many actors at all levels of society (including community NGOs, local and central government officials, the media and the military), active engagement by senior figures that are not seen as being partisan to one side or the other can often have a significant impact during a countries transitional period away from conflict. Such individuals can shine a light on potential conflicts that may not be receiving much political or media attention to ensure that they are dealt with promptly. An increasing number of violent conflicts are now being settled by negotiations rather than military victories. Yet if there are no outright winners, peace processes may produce groups with objectives and agendas that continue to clash even after the cessation of armed hostilities. In this context, it is important that international actors involved in peacebuilding direct their efforts towards supporting inclusive peace settlements and creating new governing structures that tackle the full range of issues that caused and perpetuated the conflict. If minority concerns are not adequately addressed, this can sow the seeds for further violence down the line. While it is essential to ensure that conflict concerns are incorporated into UN planning processes on the basis of a comprehensive root cause analysis, this is insufficient to ensure linkages with action on the ground. It is critical to ensure that a conflict sensitive lens also informs the translation of the strategies into programming, from design to implementation, and into sustained consultative processes aimed at the prevention of violent conflict. In this sense, CPP role should not be seen as a one-off exercise, but as a long-term overall approach to UN engagement with national actors and to develop programming. CPP needs to increase its support and capacity to deal with possible relapses and up-rise in conflict that might occur. This means CPP needs to adopt a more dual role geared towards tackling the root causes of conflict and mitigating their consequences. Therefore (and despite advancement made in this respect) it cannot be stated that CPP has undergone an immense paradigm shift towards genuine Conflict Prevention in Nepal. More generally there was also not a clear link between the overall policy commitment of CPP, an integrated approach and its actual implementation on the ground. Despite many of the hurdles that may have blocked the work that CPP is doing the project has made great strides to help move several communities forward and diffuse conflicts that might arise. For conflict sensitive frameworks to be effective there must be national ownership, because ultimately the responsibility for conflict prevention rests with national actors. While the report has been slightly critical of the effort that CPP has been involved in it is important to note that the work that CPP is /has been doing over the years has made massive strives to improve and help Nepal through this transitional period. This work has and will continue to touch the lives of many throughout the different districts or regions that the CPP is working in. Thus, it is important that the report is not seen as a way of showing that the CPP is not useful, effective or not warranted. However, what the report tries to highlight is the current gaps that exist within CPP and suggest ways in which these gaps can be closed and ways in which the work that CPP is doing can be more effective to all people during this transitional period.