Neorepublicanism and the domination of posterity

In this paper I examine whether the concept of domination

can be used to provide a coherent normative justification for

policies or institutional changes regarding individuals who are

members of future generations that will not overlap with the

current one. I refer to such people as “posterity.” There are two

ways that current agents might be thought to dominate posterity

based on two different conceptions of domination. First, one can

hold an outcome-conception of domination. On such a view,

domination names wrongful acts done by an agent or set of agents,

but done specifically to a subject who is highly vulnerable and

powerless to oppose those acts. Someone who holds this conception

might argue that current agents are causing harm to future

people, for example by causing climate change. Moreover, future

people are powerless either now or when they exist to oppose or

in any way counter their doing so. The act of causing climate

change therefore constitutes an unjust act of domination on the

part of current agents.

Second, one can hold a relational-conception of domination. On

this view, what counts as domination does not depend on what an

1

agent actually happens to do to a subject. Rather, it depends on

what the agent could do to the subject in virtue of the structure

of the relationship between the agent and the subject. The

concern here is with the arbitrary power that the agent has over

the subject. Slavery, traditional marriage and authoritarian

government could be taken as paradigm examples of relations of

domination. Someone who held this conception could argue that

because of the structure of the relationship between current

agents and posterity, current agents can exercise problematic

arbitrary power over posterity. Insofar as current agents can

make decisions that will have effects, whether for better or

worse, on posterity’s interests, and there are no external

constraints on current agents to force them to take those

interests into account in their actions and decisions, then this

lack of external constraint itself means that current agents are

in an unjust relation of domination with posterity. In this paper

I explore these two conceptions of domination and their

conceptual coherence when the subjects are members of posterity.

The impetus for this exploration is two-fold. The first is

the recent use of the concept of domination by a number of

2

theorists to make claims about why and how the current generation

should address climate change. Climate change is a problem with a

large temporal deferral between causes and negative effects

(Gardiner, 2011, pp. 32–35). The causes of climate change are

historic practices of greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions and land-use

change that continue to be highly beneficial to members the

current generation. The negative effects of climate change,

however, will mainly fall on individuals in future generations

whom those today will probably never meet.1 The theorists under

consideration claim that the current generation should not

continue emitting GHGs or engage in geo-engineering activities

that could minimize climate change like solar radiation

management (SRM) because in so doing the current generation

dominates posterity.

For example, John Nolt argues “that our emissions of

greenhouse gases constitute unjust domination, analogous in many

morally significant respects to certain historic instances of

domination that are now almost universally condemned” (2011, p.

60). Patrick Taylor Smith states that “SRM is an arbitrary

deployment of power that—especially when compared to the

3

alternatives—dominates future generations regardless of the

purpose for which the power is used” (2012, p. 46). Finally,

James Bohman states that the “present generation can dominate

future generations, as is the case now with the imposition of

opportunity costs on the future in global warming” (2010, p.

139). In this paper I examine these claims more closely in order

to understand how the concept of domination is being used by

these theorists and whether its use makes theoretical sense in

relation to posterity.

The second impetus for this paper is the continued

development of neorepublican political theory over the last

twenty years. Starting from a particular conception of what makes

a relation one of domination, theorists have developed

neorepublicanism into comprehensive theories of social justice

(Laborde, 2008; Laborde & Maynor, 2008; Lovett, 2001, 2010, 2012;

Maynor, 2003; Pettit, 1996, 1997, 2001, 2005, 2008a, 2008b, 2012,

2014; Richardson, 2002). In their work, Nolt, Smith and Bohman

relate their claims to neorepublicanism. For example, Nolt argues

that all the conditions of Frank Lovett’s neorepublican

definition of a relation of domination are met by the

4

relationship between the current generation and posterity. It is

worth gaining a deeper understanding of how neorepublicans use

the concept of domination to engage in normative criticism and

whether this makes sense when extended to the relatively recent

concern with justice to future generations.2

This is important because neorepublicanism represents a

recent and prominent political theory. Neorepublicans engage in

social criticism, propose changes to political institutions and

have built comprehensive theories of social justice. Philip

Pettit and Frank Lovett argue that neorepublicanism represents a

viable normative and institutional direction for research. Even

if it is not “a comprehensive blueprint or ideology” it can serve

as a viable public philosophy by which to assess institutions and

policies as better or worse (Lovett & Pettit, 2009, p. 26).3

Unlike other major theories of social justice, however, there has

been no focused treatment of the possibility of extending

neorepublicanism to posterity.4 In this paper, I outline the

theoretical issues that neorepublicans will have to address in

order to do so.5

5

Neorepublicans hold a relational-conception of domination,

not an outcome-conception. They would, therefore, not hold that

the act of harming posterity constitutes domination. Moreover, I

show that the particular way they understand what makes a

relation one of domination means that such a relation may not

hold between current agents and posterity. Finally, if it does

hold it may not be normatively problematic on their view. At

issue is what it means for an agent to be in a relation where it

has arbitrary power over a subject and why such relations are

something we ought to lessen. I conclude that the main strand of

neorepublicanism represented by the work of Philip Pettit and

Frank Lovett cannot extend to the relation with posterity. These

theorists therefore face a choice: bite the bullet or revise

their conception of domination.

This paper is organized into two longer sections. In the

first section I present Pettit and Lovett’s conception of a

relation of domination. I do so by way of showing the particular

theoretical choices they have made and why they have made such

choices. This discussion sets up the second section, which

examines the theoretical coherence of these choices and their

6

alternatives when the relation is between current agents and non-

overlapping future subjects.

1. Conceptions of domination

In this section I will set up the core ideas shared by

neorepublicans. I also review the debate on both how to define

domination and why it is that domination is something we should

lessen. This will allow me to test the claims made about

domination and climate change, especially when the agent who is

supposedly dominating a future subject could never meet or

interact with that subject because of a lack of generational

overlap.

At the outset, it is important to make a distinction between

the concept of domination and its possible conceptions.6 The

concept of domination is the abstract notion as such and what we

find if we look up the word in the dictionary. The concept of

domination has something to do with normatively-problematic

power. Throughout history, however, there have been a range of

ways the concept of domination has been understood, and a range

of relationships, social practices and political structures that

7

have been criticized because they were cases of domination.7 The

concept can therefore be specified further and given a

substantive construction or interpretation, thereby creating a

conception of domination. Neorepublicans like Pettit and Lovett

have worked to give a clear conception of what they understand

domination to be and have argued that their view represents a

core conception of domination. Moreover, they have also given

accounts of why that particular sort of domination is a bad which

we should lessen. I present an overview of the elements of their

conception and note the reasons they make the theoretical choices

they do between various options. Later we will see that these

choices leave them with a conception of domination that seems

conceptually incoherent when the agent and subject are members of

non-overlapping generations.

A first distinction in order to understand the neorepublican

conception of domination is between an outcome- and a relational-

conception. Why do neorepublicans emphasize a relational-

conception? The recent concern with domination as a normative

concept represents a move away from a focus on the distribution

of benefits and burdens and toward a focus on social and

8

political relations.8 But what counts as a social or political

relation of domination? Pettit states that being a slave is a key

instance of a relation of domination for neorepublicans.9 Lovett

states that his definition of domination is distilled from what

is common between the core cases of “feudalism, the institution

of slavery, certain sorts of familial arrangements, and

totalitarianism” (2010, p. 30). These core cases show that

domination has something to do with unequal relations of power

and with freedom. As an initial gloss, we could say that the

slave-owner dominates the slave because the slave-owner can make

the slave do things with impunity and the slave can get the

slave-owner to do very little. In virtue of this, the slave lacks

freedom.

The connection between social relationships and freedom

leads neorepublicans to argue that classical liberalism—which is

also concerned with individual freedom—has a conception of

freedom which cannot capture why it is that unequal power

relations are a problem in themselves. This is because classical

liberals emphasize actual interference instead of the unequal

capacity or ability to interfere. Neorepublican theorists argue that a

9

subject is less free if other agents have the greater ability to

interfere with that subject even if the agent never does so. To

be unfree is to be dominated, subject to a master, exposed to

another’s “power of uncontrolled interference” (Pettit, 2012, p.

56). On their view, freedom should be seen as non-domination

since classical liberalism’s non-interference is neither

necessary nor sufficient for freedom (2012, pp. 49–69).10

Without delving into these debates I simply note that a core

neorepublican claim is that we should think of domination as a

relation between an agent and subject that has nothing to do with

what that agent actually does or does not do to the subject. As

Lovett states,

I reject the idea that domination should be characterized in

terms of the contingent outcomes or results of certain

actions or events—as, for example, that one group dominates

another when the former benefits at the latter’s expense.

Rather, I argue that whenever persons or groups are

structurally related to one another in a particular way,

this situation itself constitutes domination, regardless of

10

the outcomes or results we happen to observe in any

particular case (2010, p. 25).

This is borne out by looking at the cases on which neorepublicans

base their conception of domination. No matter how caring and

benevolent is a slave-owner or a husband in a traditional

marriage there is still a problematic relation between the slave-

owner and his slave or the husband and his wife. The issue is not

what the husband or slave-owner make those subject to him do, but

that he can make them do things with impunity at all.

While a number of critics have expressed worries about the

relational-conception of domination, for my purposes I also do

not need to delve into that debate.11 In reply to Pettit and

Lovett I simply want to point out that some also use the concept

of domination to normatively criticize acts and not only

relations. We can see this by examining cases of domination

besides those chosen as paradigm by neorepublicans.

For example, European colonization included a set of

dominating acts. Jared Diamond recounts the genocide of

indigenous Tasmanians committed by British sealers and settlers

between 1800-1875 (1992, pp. 278–281). These aboriginals had been

11

isolated from other cultures for about 10,000 years and were

hunter-gatherers equipped with simple stone and wooden tools.

They were no match for the weaponry of European settlers. From

Christopher Columbus’s journals we learn that the aboriginal

Arawak Indians of Jamaica did not bear arms against the

Europeans’ arrival. They had no iron only spears of cane.

Columbus wrote that “[t]hey would make fine servants.... With

fifty men we could subjugate them all and make them do whatever

we want” (Zinn, 2005, p. 1). The Spaniards did so, enslaving them

and working them to death in mines.

The European actions were domination because of the great

harm of their actions combined with the fact that those on whom

they inflicted these harms were nearly powerless to stop them.

While it was not in itself unjust that the Europeans were more

powerful than the aboriginals, it was unjust for them to use this

power to kill, enslave, displace, rob and exploit those who were

much weaker than they were. Calling what they did “domination” is

a way to emphasize this particular sort of injustice. So an

outcome-conception of domination is coherent even if a different

conception might better capture what is of normative relevance

12

about social relations like slavery, traditional marriage and

dictatorship.

Returning to the structural-conception of domination held by

neorepublicans there is also debate about what features of such a

relation make it count as a relation of domination. On the

neorepublican view, one such feature is that the agent exercises

unequal power over the subject. But what does it mean to have

“power over” another? It clearly represents an ability which the

agent has in a greater amount than the subject. But is this the

ability to affect the subject? Or do we mean something more

specific when we say that the agent has “power over” the subject?

Pettit and Lovett take the latter view. Pettit uses the term

“intentional interference” to show the connection between the

will of the agent and the choices of the subject characteristic

of a relation of domination. He emphasizes intentional human

interventions in order to distinguish these from natural or

accidental events which can also shape an agent’s choices

(Pettit, 1997, pp. 53–54).12 Lovett argues that a relation of

domination is defined by an inequality in “social power” between

agent and subject. Lovett follows Hobbes and defines “power” as

13

an agent’s means to get what he wants. In that case, “social

power” is the means to get what one wants when this requires

interaction with a subject, specifically changing what the

subject “would otherwise prefer to do” (2010, pp. 68–75).13 As

opposed to a more general ability to negatively affect a subject,

on the view of both Pettit and Lovett an agent has unequal power

over a subject when the agent has a greater ability to

intentionally get the subject to do something.14

There are a number of reasons this move makes sense. First,

conceptual analysis of the notion of power has moved away from

thinking of “power” as “ability to affect.” As Peter Moriss

(2002) points out, while we often call the ability to cause

effects “power,” we must mean something more specific since there

are all sorts of ways we might affect others that we do not call

“exercising power over them.”15 Second, this view is supported by

looking at the paradigm cases of slavery, traditional marriage

and dictatorship. In these cases the issue is that an agent can

intentionally control a subject’s choices through “coercion of

the body (restraint), of the will (punishment, threat),

manipulation (agenda-fixing, non-rational shaping of beliefs,

14

rigging of consequences)” (Pettit, 1997, p. 53). A dictator can

pass a law that all Jews should wear badges with a punishment of

death for those who do not. A traditional husband can lock his

wife in her room if he decides that she should not go out. In the

paradigm cases at least, the agent’s “power over” the subject

entails a more specific ability to control the subject.

The view that the relevant unequal ability is the ability

to control the choices of another agent has come under fire by

some theorists of global democracy who argue that it is poorly

suited to take account of the situation of globalization.

Globalization names the “unprecedented extent, intensity, and

speed of social interactions across borders” (Bohman, 2007, p.

22). The actions and decisions taken by one political unit or

large corporate agent may have strong negative effects on agents

far outside that unit’s borders or jurisdiction. According to

Bohman, since those affected are indefinite and “cannot be

individuated, they may be part of some agents’ plans without

having freely given their cooperation or consent” (2007, p. 25).

When one is thus made “part of a cooperative scheme,” one is

dominated insofar as one cannot “influence the terms of

15

cooperation with others and not be ruled by them” (2007, p. 27).

Given these new “circumstances of politics,” Bohman and others

have argued that all those affected by a decision should be

included in the decision-making process by which agents make

these important decisions or policies (Goodin, 2007; Shapiro,

2012b, pp. 219–20). In reply, others have argued we should

maintain the view that only those subjected to coercive legal

decisions are owed inclusion (Abizadeh, 2008; Owen, 2012). While

I also do not delve further into this debate here, I will argue

that the neorepublican view of what counts as a power

relationship is too narrow to allow us to claim that current

agents are in relation of domination with posterity. This is

because it is not clear that posterity can be specifically

subjected to current agents’ actions or decisions.

So far we have seen that both Pettit and Lovett present a

relational conception of domination and that one condition for a

relation to be domination is that the agent has a greater ability

to wield power over the subject. Lovett adds a second

“dependence” condition. He argues that a relation of domination

like a traditional marriage makes the wife less free, no matter

16

what the husband does or does not make her do, in part because

there is little possibility for the wife to leave the

relationship (2010, pp. 49–52). This is one thing that

differentiates relations of domination from other unproblematic

relations of unequal power. One reason why slaves and traditional

wives are in a relation of domination is because they are trapped

because leaving the relationship means they face the threat of

being tortured, killed, ostracized or impoverished. Such social

costs could be lessened or eliminated, thereby reducing the

unfreedom that can arise from such relations of dependency. So

“dependency” is a second condition of a relation of domination

for Lovett.

A third and final condition for a relation of domination is

arbitrariness. This condition is a key concern for

neorepublicans. As Lovett points out, an imbalance of power and

dependency are necessary but not sufficient conditions to make a

relation of domination. For example, through social and

institutional conventions a librarian has the power to prevent a

student from getting her degree unless she pays her fines, a

power which the student does not have over her. Moreover, the

17

student is dependent on that relationship because she is held in

that relationship by the costs of never getting her degree (2010,

p. 85). Yet, we do not judge this relationship to be one of

domination. What this shows, Lovett explains, is that a further

condition for a relation to be one of domination is that the

agent’s power is arbitrary, which name “a particular manner or

mode” by which that power can be exercised (2010, p. 94).

Take the examples of parents and governments. Parents make

decisions about what their children should do and then get them

to do those things and governments pass laws and use the threat

of violence to enforce them. Still, the parents or governments

are not in a relation of domination with their subjects as long

as they cannot get them to do things simply according to their whim. In

order to ensure an agent’s power is not arbitrary what is

required is some external constraint on an agent’s will, an

“anti-power” that controls the agent’s ability for uncontrolled

interference (Pettit, 1996). The fact that it is constraints

external to an agent which shape whether she exercises power

arbitrarily shows that “domination is an institutional failure”

(Smith, 2012, p. 49).

18

Just what sort of constraint makes power less arbitrary is a

matter of ongoing debate. One question is whether the external

constraint should ensure that the exercise of power meets a

substantive standard if it is not to be arbitrary.16 As Henry

Richardson points out, the exercise of power might be arbitrary

insofar as its exercise is not externally constrained to track a

subject’s (1) subjective preferences, (2) objectively-defined

interests or (3) the subject’s interests after a deliberative or

communicative exchange of reasons with the agent (2002, pp. 37–

55). As we can see (2) is moralized in the sense that the

external constraints on the exercise of power must track

interests which can be defined according to a conception of human

well-being.17 On the other hand, (1) and (3) are non-moralized in

the sense that they are defined either by what the subject

herself happens to want, or what she wants after communication

with the agent. Both Pettit and Lovett think we should define

arbitrariness in a non-moralized way.18 As Christopher McCammon

explains, they “think it’s preferable to work up a conception of

domination that those with different ideas (or no ideas) about

moral legitimacy can agree to” (McCammon, 2015, p. 1031, n. 13).

19

Finally, we need to look at the debate regarding the

normative element of conceptions of domination. The normative

part of a conception of domination tells us why there is a

general moral-political duty to reduce or eradicate relations of

domination. Broadly, answers can come in two forms:

consequentialist and deontological. On the one hand, living in

dominating relations with others might be bad for those

dominated, so promoting well-being requires lessening such

relations. Pettit and Lovett take this view. On the other hand,

insofar as others are in a relation of arbitrary power over her,

a subject may fail to receive what she is owed or fail to be

respected as a moral person. James Bohman and Patrick Taylor

Smith take this latter view.19

Regarding the former, living out one’s life in relations of

domination like slavery, traditional marriage or under a dictator

might be contrary to flourishing. In Republicanism, Pettit argues

that living with others who have the power to arbitrarily

interfere with you, even if they do not use it, creates

uncertainty that makes planning and living life more difficult

and anxious. It also has the cost of constant deference and

20

strategizing in regards to the dominator. Moreover, one’s

domination is likely to become common knowledge, thereby reducing

one’s social standing with others (1997, pp. 80–109).20

In later work, Pettit argues that living in relations of

domination is bad for a subject not because it undermines the

possibility to flourish but because the relation in itself makes

a subject less free. Being in a relationship of domination itself

already constrains the subject’s available choices. Pettit aims

to cash out the unfreedom of relations of domination in non-

normative, rational-choice terms.21 In that case, a relation of

domination would be something we should lessen in so far as we

aim to promote the overall value of individual freedom.

On the other hand, it might be that living in such a

relation of domination wrongs the subject since that relation in

itself fails to be one which the subject is owed in virtue of

being a person. James Bohman argues that persons are owed non-

dominating relations because they are members of the “community

of humanity,” and because they have a status and dignity that is

tied to “the rational capacities that make persons sources of

value” (2007, p. 105). Similarly, Patrick Taylor Smith argues

21

that insofar as all persons are moral equals, if they live in

relations of domination with others they are wronged. As he

states, being dominated means being “wrongfully subject to a

particular kind of political power, a subjugation that is

intrinsically inimical to that individual’s autonomy, freedom, or

status as a citizen” (2013, p. 14).22

To conclude, we can take Lovett’s definition of domination

as representative of the dominant neorepublican conception of

domination. Lovett argues a subject is in a relation of

domination with an agent if, and only if, three conditions are

met: (1) Imbalance of power: the agent can wield a greater amount of

power over the subject than the subject can wield over the agent,

with “power over” conceived as the intentional control of the

subject’s choices; (2) Dependency: the subject is not free to exit

the relationship as a whole because of the high costs of doing

so; and (3) Arbitrariness: there is a lack of “appropriate” external

constraints on the agent’s exercise of power. Finally, there is a

moral-political duty to eradicate such relations of domination

for either consequentialist or deontological reasons.

22

2. Evaluating neorepublican conceptions of domination in regards

to posterity

We are also now in a position to better evaluate the claims

made about climate change by Nolt, Smith and Bohman. As noted in

the introduction we find two sorts of claims in the literature.

The first is that by causing climate change the current

generation is dominating posterity. The second is that the current

generation is in a problematic relation of domination with posterity.

In this section I argue that both views are coherent as long as

we do not hold the specific neorepublican conception of

domination. First, there is a way to conceive of domination as

the outcome of certain actions such that causing climate change

might be seen as an act of dominating future generations. This is

because what current generation emitters are doing is causing

serious harm to posterity but this is the particular moral wrong

of domination because posterity is also highly vulnerable to

these effects and powerless to stop them. Second, taking a

relational-conception of domination I argue that there is a

problematic relation of domination between current agents and

posterity. This is because (1) current agents have a greater

23

ability to affect a vulnerable posterity than posterity has to

affect current agents, and (2) there are few external constraints

on current agents which ensure they are using this ability to

affect posterity in ways that do not threaten their objectively-

definable interests. This lack of external constraint wrongs

posterity. Defending such a view requires making a number of

theoretical decisions about what counts as domination that are

different than the ones which neorepublicans make. If

neorepublicans agree that the current generation dominates

posterity because we exercise arbitrary power over them, they

will have to change their conception of domination in order to do

so.

The claim that current agents dominate posterity by causing

climate change appeals to an outcome-conception of domination.

Even though neorepublicans reject this conception I argued above

that we do use the term “domination” in order to describe actions

which are unjust in a particular way. It seems right to say that

the European Conquistadors and settlers dominated the aboriginals

and that this was an especially egregious wrong. They dominated

24

them because they treated them unjustly and because those so

treated were almost completely unable to fight back or escape.

Yet we could replace “the Europeans” with “current high

emitting agents” and “the aboriginals” with “posterity.” By

failing to abate GHG emissions, current agents are knowingly

creating costs and harms to posterity, just as the Conquistadors

did to the aboriginals (Nolt, 2011, p. 62).23 Moreover, posterity

does not have the current or future options available to contest

their treatment that even very weak contemporaries do (Nolt,

2011, p. 67). There is little posterity can do, either now or

when they exist, to fight back or escape these effects. They

cannot now vote against, complain, contest, condemn, or revolt.

Nor will they be able to escape from our current activities’

future effects; when they are born they will inherit the world we

have left them and over which they initially have no control.24

So there is a coherent outcome-conception of domination on

which, by engaging in activity which knowingly harms posterity,

current agents are doing something especially unjust given the

situation of posterity. While climate change is caused by an

aggregate of agents, so was European colonization and we could

25

capture the particular injustice of climate change by calling it

an act of domination.25

What of the neorepublican conception of a normatively-

problematic relation of domination? Are current agents in such a

relation with posterity? They are, but only if we make a number

of theoretical choices that are different than those made by

neorepublicans. On my view, since current agents, in particular

policy-makers, are not externally constrained to track

posterity’s interests such agents are in a relation of domination

with posterity (Smith, 2012, p. 50). To support this claim, we

need to think of “power over” as a broader ability to affect and

we have to think that such power is arbitrary when it fails to

track interests understood on an objective view of well-being. If

these theoretical choices make sense, then current agents are in

a relation of domination with posterity’s subjects, even if not

according to Pettit and Lovett’s view. I further argue that

Pettit and Lovett’s conception of domination cannot see this

relation as something we ought to address because their view of

why relations of domination are bad cannot hold between agents

who cannot ever have the possibility for interaction.

26

Recall Lovett’s definition of a relation of domination. On

his view a relation of domination holds between an agent and a

subject when there is (1) Imbalance of power, (2) Dependency and (3)

Arbitrariness. So first we should ask whether current agents

exercise unequal power over non-overlapping posterity? Pettit and

Lovett argue an agent only has power over a subject when the

agent could change what that subject would otherwise prefer to

do. Can the will of current agents relate to the will of future

subjects in the same way the will of the slave-owner relates to

the will of the slave? I argue that it is not clear that we can

say that posterity is “subject” to the will of current agents.

We might think that posterity is subject to the will of

current agents because current agents can permanently foreclose

future options. For example, Bryan Norton argues that the

preservation of some wilderness spaces can be justified in terms

of posterity’s options. He asks us to

suppose that our generation converts all wilderness areas

and natural communities into productive mines, farmland,

production forests, or shopping centres.... Does it not make

sense to claim that, in doing so, we harmed future people,

27

not economically, but in the sense that we seriously and

irreversibly narrowed their range of choices and experiences?

A whole range of human experience would have been

obliterated; the future will have been...impoverished (1999, p.

132).

Perhaps no one in the future will be worse-off because they miss

wilderness, but if the current generation completely destroys

wilderness then we will have deprived future people of the choice

to value it.26

Environmental problems like wilderness loss or climate

change may be irreversible or permanently foreclose options. Such

problems, however, are usually side-affects. The activities which

cause them are not done with the express purpose of subjecting

posterity to our will. While intentional actions like that are

rare, however, they are possible. Current generation agents can

have express intentions about the choices of future subjects and

some ability to make them choose them. For example, Ludvig

Beckman (2016) argues that creating a constitution with built in

pre-commitment strategies is an example of current agents

subjecting posterity to their will.

28

Even so, the situation is more attenuated than most paradigm

relations of domination. First, there are large uncertainties

over long stretches of time. While current agents might try to

get posterity to make a particular choice it is harder to use the

techniques available to a dominant agent who is relating to a

contemporaneous subject. We cannot directly coerce or manipulate

posterity even if we can permanently reduce some of their

available options. Second, take the core neorepublican case of

slavery. Despite the fact that current agents can shape the

choices available to posterity, is posterity “subject” to current

agents in the same way that a slave is subject to his master? The

master has much greater power over the slave than the slave has

in regards to the master but there is another aspect to the

relation. The master has the slave under his control and the will

of the slave is exposed to the master’s will. The slave lives out

his life with possible control around every corner, but current

agents does not have posterity under our will in the same way.

Barring the invention of time travel, when posterity lives our

will is gone, the damage is done and they must now just live in

their world. Their choices are not “exposed” to the will of their

29

predecessors in the same way as the will of the slave is exposed

to his master’s will.27

If we think that an agent can wield power over a subject

only in the restricted sense of being able to intentionally get

them to act in a certain way, we might conclude that current

agents do not meet a necessary condition for being in a relation

of domination with posterity. Since it is unclear whether current

agents have the ability to subject posterity to our current

choices, it is unclear whether the first condition of the

neorepublican definition of a relation of domination is met. We

could still think of current agents’ ability to affect posterity

for good or ill as an exercise of power over them. Assuming that

backwards causation is not possible, the direction of time’s

arrow means that current agents have a much greater ability to

affect posterity than posterity has to affect us. This is because

the effects of current acts only move forward in time. In the

intergenerational justice literature, this has been referred to

as unequal power.28

What about the dependence condition of Lovett’s

neorepublican definition? Above I agreed with Nolt that posterity

30

has no choice but to inherit the world we will have left them.

But would this count as dependency on a neorepublican view?

Lovett argues that a necessary condition for a relation of

domination is that there are serious costs for the subject if

they try to leave the relationship. We might think that things

are different for posterity. Posterity cannot but have us as

predecessors because of time’s arrow and the nature of human

generation, which makes exit not costly for them but

impossible.29 They have no choice but to inherit the world we

leave them but this is not the same sort of unfreedom as not

being able to choose to exit a social relationship. Every person

is born into a world that has been shaped by natural and human

forces which have always already constrained her freedom by

constraining her possibilities. This seems to be a fundamental

form of unfreedom. There is nothing we can do to reduce this

dependence since we cannot ask people to choose how they would

like the world to be before they exist. Even so, I think the

dependence condition is still met in the case of posterity, even

if such dependence cannot be reduced.30 The relation between

current agents and posterity is like the relation between parents

31

and an infant. The infant is not held in the relationship by the

costs of exit but because she is physically unable to leave and

because she is dependent.

An objection to this claim is that a relation between an

agent and a subject cannot be one of domination if the dependence

of the subject is an inescapable aspect of the relation. Smith

calls this the “inescapability objection” (2012, p. 50) and Nolt

states “[i]t might be thought that our domination of posterity is

nothing new – that past generations have always so dominated

their successors” (2011, p. 62). The response from both is

similar; namely, to argue that the current current generation is

in the historically unprecedented position of being able to

engage in activities and decide on policies which we know will

have negative implications for posterity. On their view, for the

first time the current generation wields substantive power over

posterity and so only now is the current generation in a relation

of domination with posterity.

On my view this is not the best response to the objection.

If the issue is the inequality between current agents and

posterity, then this has held for every current generation and

32

its posterity throughout history. The long-term decisions with

which climate change presents us have simply made the situation

more acute. So I think the best response to the inescapability

objection is to accept it. Yes, every current generation has

great power over posterity and every current generation’s

posterity is dependent and powerless to contest how the current

generation uses that power. The real issue, it seems to me, is

whether or not that relationship is left arbitrary. So we need to

examine the third condition of a neorepublican relation of

domination to see if it is met.

A relation of unequal power and dependence is arbitrary when

there are no external constraints on that relationship. As we

saw, such a relationship may be arbitrary when it is not

externally constrained to track (1) the subjective preferences,

(2) the objectively-defined interests or (3) the democratically-

constructed interests of those over whom it is exercised. The

first option represents the idea that a way to lessen domination

in relations is to have external constraints which make the agent

exercise power in a way that fits with what the subject actually

wants. In regards to posterity, this view is untenable since we

33

could not possibly know what posterity’s particular subjective

preferences will be. The third option is that an agent should

exercise power in a way that accords with the subject’s views

after both engage in a sufficiently deliberative democratic

procedure. The idea here is that the agent’s exercise of unequal

power over the subject is not arbitrary if it is externally

constrained to engage in some procedure of mutual deliberation

and communication to discover mutual interests for the exercise

of power. Again, this will not work in regard to posterity

because it requires actually engaging in democratic deliberation

and real communication. Rather, the second option seems to be the

most promising. On this view, the current generation’s ability to

exercise power over posterity is arbitrary because it is not

externally constrained to track posterity’s objectively-defined

interests, say, their basic needs. Since this is a moralized

conception of arbitrariness, and Pettit and Lovett insist on a

non-moralized conception, they may not be able to count the

relation between current agents and posterity as arbitrary.

On my view, current agents can be said to exercise unequal

power over a dependent posterity and there are few legal or

34

political constraints on this exercise to ensure that power

tracks posterity’s objectively-definable interests. In that case,

current agents are in a relation of domination with posterity.

While we can do little to reduce the inequality of power and

dependence, we could reduce arbitrariness by creating external

social and legal constraints. Some have argued for special

institutional and legal protections for the interests of future

generations (Benedek, 2006; Shoham & Lamay, 2006; Tremmel, 2006;

Wood, 2004). Others have argued that the interests of future

generations should have proxy representation in democratic

decision-making (Beckman, 2008; Dobson, 1996; Ekeli, 2005;

Goodin, 2003; Holden, 2002; Thompson, 2010). These calls for

institutional change can be framed in terms of reducing arbitrary

power over posterity.

I have argued that some theoretical options about what

counts as “power over” and “arbitrariness” are better suited to

recognizing that the relation between the current generation and

posterity is, as it stands, one of domination. The real

difficulty for the neorepublican conception, however, comes when

we try to extend their normative criticism of a relation of

35

domination to posterity. If current agents are in a relation of

domination with posterity, why is this a problem? If we could

reduce the arbitrariness of the relation by creating new legal or

political institutions, why should we? Importantly, are there

answers to these questions which make sense when the relation is

between an agent and a subject who do not even have the

metaphysical possibility of meeting? I argue that the

neorepublican view that a relation of domination is bad for the

subject does not make sense in such a situation. For us to care

about the relation between the current generation and posterity,

then, we will have to think that the relation fails to be

something which posterity is owed even if it does not in itself

harm them.

A relation of domination should be able to extend over large

temporal distances just as it can extend over vast spatial

distances. For example, colonialism and feudalism were systems

which created a relation of domination between governments and

distant subjects. Patrick Taylor Smith gives the example of

Norman the serf who owes fealty to Henry II but lives in Normandy

far away from the capital. Norman will never meet Henry II or any

36

of his government. Chances are that the king will not expropriate

Norman’s production nor will his government pay much concern to

Norman at all. Yet, Norman is still in a relation of domination

with the distant Henry II because if the king does decide to

exercise his power against the serf there is little Norman could

do about it (Smith, 2013, pp. 232–233). If the unequal capacity

for arbitrary power can create a normatively-problematic relation

of domination between agents who are spatially distant, then why

not between agents who are temporally distant?

I agree that a relation of domination can extend across

temporal distances. What cannot extend is Pettit and Lovett’s

understanding of what is bad with there being such a relation at

all. Recall Pettit and Lovett’s argument that a relation of

domination is bad for the subject because it creates uncertainty

and anxiety, requires deference and strategizing to keep the

dominator sweet and represents a public status-injury that

affects an individual’s feeling of self-worth and respect. The

majority of these aspects depend on the possibility of

interaction between the agent and the subject. As I argued above,

however, the will of posterity is not exposed to the will of

37

current agents in a way that could produce these ill effects over

a large temporal distance.

Moreover, Pettit’s view that a relation of domination in

itself lessens the freedom of the subject by changing her choice

situation also depends on such an exposure. For a relation of

domination to in itself make a subject less free requires that

the subject be constantly subjected to shifts in the powerful

agent’s unconstrained will. This constant subjection requires the

possibility of on-going interaction between the wills of the two

agents. This sort of interaction is possible at a spatial

distance but not after the dominant agent is dead. On Pettit and

Lovett’s view, then, it is not a problem that current agents

exercise unequal arbitrary power over posterity as this relation

of domination does not produce ill effects for posterity.

Lovett seems to implicitly recognize this in his discussion

of future generations. His discussion of future generations is

concerned solely with how the actions of current agents will

affect how much future subjects will find themselves in relations

of domination with their contemporaries. As he notes, how much non-

renewable resources we pass on will affect the future

38

specifically by affecting “the amount of domination…[they] might

experience” (2010, p. 182). While he notes that “decisions we

make today might obviously affect the well-being of people in

future,” he does not suggest that current generation agents can

stand in a relation of domination with posterity (2010, p. 182).

In fact, he clearly states that “[i]f two or more persons or

groups need not take into consideration what the other(s) are

likely to do in formulating their respective plans for purposeful

action, then their relations to another cannot be relations of

domination” (2010, p. 36).31

If the relation of domination with posterity does not in

itself make future subjects worse-off, the other option is to

follow Bohman and Smith and criticize it as wrong on a

deontological basis. This theoretical option can have much

greater traction when the agent and the subject could never

possibly interact. If a relation of domination wrongs a subject

even if it does not harm her, then it does not matter if the

agent and subject could never meet. Insofar as the agent’s

unequal power over the subject is not subject to the appropriate

39

external constraints, the institutional setup does not treat the

subject as a future autonomous moral agent, thereby wronging her.

A critic of this view could agree that policy-making power

has not historically been externally constrained to take into

account the objective interests of posterity. In that case, our

predecessors’ unequal power was unchecked in regards to us. Yet

most current agents do not judge ourselves to have been wronged

because of that lack of constraint. What we care about is whether

our predecessors used their unchecked power to do something to

knowingly harm us. Similarly, a critic could ask us to imagine

what posterity will think if we use our current unchecked,

unequal power to benefit posterity. It is reasonable to think they

would appreciate what we have done, and not judge themselves to

have been treated unjustly because we were not constrained to

benefit them. If we did do something wrong to them by affecting

their resources and freedom in a serious way, then reactive

attitudes seem appropriate.32 Such attitudes seem less

appropriate if the current generation used its unequal arbitrary

power to affect posterity in a morally appropriate way.

40

In reply, we can note that the existence or non-existence of

reactive attitudes does not show us whether or not a particular

relation wrongs those subject to it.33 We need only look to

history to see the range of relations which we now judge to be

ones of wrongful domination but which even those subject to them

did not judge to be so. On my view, because our predecessors

exercised unequal power over us but were not externally

constrained to take into account our objectively-definable

interests, our predecessors were in a wrongful relation of

domination with us because they were not constrained to be

sufficiently accountable to us. Even if we judge ourselves to be

lucky that we received great benefits from our predecessors, and

even if we do not experience resentment or judge ourselves to

have been wronged, it remains the case that we have been.

Moreover, without changes in current legal and political

institutions in order to externally bind ourselves, we are now in

a wrongful relation of domination with our own posterity.

Conclusion

41

In this paper my aim was twofold. The first was to examine

recent claims about climate change and the domination of future

generations made by a number of theorists. Some of these

theorists relate their claims to neorepublican theory, and so my

second aim was to examine the ability of the neorepublican

conception of domination presented by Pettit and Lovett to apply

to the relation between current agents and posterity.

One claim in the literature was that, by causing climate

change, current agents are engaging in acts of domination to

posterity. I showed how such an outcome-conception of domination

is coherent. That is, we might think that if current agents

continue to emit high amounts of GHGs, and this causes serious

harm to posterity, then this is especially unjust because

posterity lacks an ability to cause such serious effects to us

given the arrow of time. Moreover, since posterity is not yet

born they are completely powerless to do anything about our

current actions, whether now or later. I used an analogy to the

dominating actions of European colonists in regard to Indigenous

peoples to show the coherence of the claim that, by causing

climate change, the current generation is dominating posterity.

42

Second, I examined the relational-conception of domination.

On the view of neorepublican theorists, an agent and a subject

can be in a relation of domination no matter what the agent does

or does not do to the subject. I examined Pettit and Lovett’s

conception of what makes a relation one of domination and their

view of why we should minimize such relations. I showed that in

developing their conception they made particular theoretical

choices about how to define when an agent has unequal power over

a subject, when that power is arbitrary and why this is bad for

the subject. I argued that these theoretical choices mean they

will have difficulty recognizing the relation between current

agents and posterity as a relation of domination that ought to be

lessened.

What should we take from this discussion? First, it shows

us that how we conceive of “power over” makes an important

difference when it comes to thinking about the relation to

posterity. The claim that current policy-making is arbitrary in

regard to posterity makes a lot more sense if we think of power

as the ability to affect and not the more constrained notion of

power as intentionally getting another agent to do something. If

43

the current generation only exercises power over posterity when

we permanently foreclose an option or otherwise clearly and

intentionally bind their action in some way, then it is only that

sort of power which needs to be externally constrained in order

to be less arbitrary. Most policy-making, which may affect

posterity for good or ill but not “subject them to our will”

would not be considered arbitrary and so would not require

external constraint.

In fact, if we maintain the neorepublican conception of

“power over” we might face a paradoxical situation. Enacting a

constitution is one of the few ways the current generation can be

said to have the ability to intentionally exercise power over

posterity’s future choices. If we were to enact constitutional

changes in order to externally constrain current policy-making to

force it to take into account posterity’s objective interests,

this might itself be an arbitrary exercise of power over

posterity. They will inherit a constitution that will create pre-

commitments on their own future choices. Holding fast to Pettit

and Lovett’s conception of power may bar those very institutional

changes which are necessary to reduce the arbitrariness of the

44

relation between the current generation and posterity.34 In

short, as we move from the neorepublican paradigm cases of

slavery, traditional marriage and dictatorship to those – like

the relation to distant posterity – that have rarely been

considered relations of domination we should also move away from

their conception of power.

Second, however we think of “power over” that arrow of time

means that every current generation always has more of it over

posterity than vice versa. When this is combined with the fact

that there have historically been few external constraints on

current generation agents that force them to track the objective

interests of posterity, the result is the conclusion that the

current generation of many communities in history have been in a

relation of domination with their posterity. While this might be

obvious, it is not, in Smith’s terms “inescapable,” since the

issue is not the inequality of power but its historic

arbitrariness.35

Finally, this discussion shows us Pettit and Lovett’s

conception of domination is suited to recognizing and criticizing

a relation that can only hold between contemporaries. Others have

45

suggested that neorepublicanism is unable to condemn the full

range of perceived social and political injustices. For example,

Henry Richardson (2006) argues that it will struggle to condemn

disparities in effective political influence, Sharon Krause

(2013) argues that it cannot sufficiently criticize indirect

forms of discrimination such as racism and sexism and James

Bohman (2007) argues that it is poorly suited to the realities of

global politics. This paper shows that neorepublicanism will also

struggle to make theoretical sense when we come to the injustices

represented by a pressing long-term problem like climate change.

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1Notes Research suggests that a significant percentage remain for much longer periods of time, in the order of tens of thousands of years (Archer, 2005, 2006, 2009; Archer et al., 2009; Archer & Buffett, 2005). The IPCC states that, depending on how much is produced, “about 15-40% of CO2 emitted until 2100 will remain in the atmosphere longer than a thousand years” and 10-25% will remain after 10,000 years (Ciais, P. et al., 2013, pp. 472–3).2 I recognize that the concept of domination has also been used to criticize the relationship between humanity and the natural world but I am focused solely on relations between human agents and subjects here. See Jamieson, 2009; Leiss, 1994.3 Pettit elsewhere claims that neorepublicanism is a viable political ideal, since it aspires to “a central or supreme political role...to provide the basis for assessing the way the polity is constituted and the way it behaves within the limits set by that constitution” (2005, p. 88).4 Compare this to the large literature on Rawls’s theory of justice and future generations. For a representative sample see Barry, 1978, 1979; Gardiner, 2009; Heyd, 2009; Hubin, 1976; Norton, 1989; Page, 2006.5 I focus solely on the work of Philip Pettit and Frank Lovett because they have done the most to develop rigorous, analytically-oriented conceptions of domination.Lovett’s A General Theory of Domination and Justice is one of the few book-length treatmentsof the concept of domination in particular. 6 For more on the concept-conception distinction see Dworkin, 1986, pp. 70–1; Rawls, 1971, pp. 5–6, 8–11.7 Practices of slavery, systems of group discrimination and disadvantage, authoritarian or colonial political regimes, entire modes of production like feudalism, methods of economic organization like wage-labor, the structures of institutions like criminal incarceration or mental health and certain relations of power within the family have all been described as relations of domination (Lovett,2010, pp. 1-2).8 An early move in this direction can be found in Anderson, 1999; Young, 1990.9 Domination is best “exemplified by the relationship of master to slave or master to servant” and “in the republican tradition, by contrast to the modernist approach, liberty is always cast in terms of the opposition between liber and servus, citizen and slave” (Pettit, 1997, pp. 22, 31). Talisse (2014) and Wendt (2011, p. 182) criticize the neo-republican analysis of the slave relationship in terms of freedom as non-domination and offer rival analyses in terms of injustice or the denial of self-ownership.10 Whether freedom as non-domination really is a distinctive conception of freedom has been subject to serious debate. Critics argue that the potential for interference can be cashed out in terms of the probability of actual interference, which they say should be of concern to those who understand freedom as non-interference. See Carter, 2008; Goodin & Jackson, 2007; Waldron, 2007. For Pettit’sreply see 2008, 2011.11 Outcome-conceptions of domination can be found in Allen, 2000, p. 125; Kittay, 1998, pp. 33–35; Lukes, 2005, pp. 85–6; Miller, 1987, p. 2. Marilyn Friedman explicitly proposes an outcome-conception of domination as an alternative to

Pettit’s relational one (2008, p. 252).12 There are those who regard unintended interference as equally inimical to freedom as non-domination. See Shapiro, 2012a; Talisse, 2014.13 Christopher McCammon has recently presented a rethinking of the neorepublican definition of domination that aims to respond to its major critics. Even so, he explicitly agrees with the view that power should be thought of in this way (2015, p. 1032).14 While we often say that social structures like racism or patriarchy dominate a subject, there needs to be some agent involved for the relation to be one of unequal power. An agent could unintentionally be in a relation of unequal power “without anyone having deliberately set out to subject others to domination,” but arelation of unequal power must be defined in terms of what the agent can or cannot do to the subject (Lovett, 2010, p. 47). That is, the structures of racism or patriarchy put an agent in an unequal position in relation to a subject in virtue of that agent’s membership in the dominant group, but the structures themselves do not dominate.15 For example, Company 1 invents a cheaper process to produce quality widgets and,because of its market share, is able to offer widgets for a lower price on the market. As a result, Company 2 goes out of business because they cannot compete on price. Company 1 has a greater ability to affect Company 2 than 2 has to affect 1, but by bringing the cheaper widgets to market does Company 1 exercise power over Company 2? If Company 2’s going out of business was an unintended side-effect of Company 1 following business practice this is not so clearly an “exercise of power over” Company 2. I thank a reviewer for pressing me to provide an example here.16 Lovett argues that the constraint need not meet a substantive standard. Any external constraint on power no matter what form lessens arbitrariness (2010, pp. 111–118).17 For example, Eva Kittay states that power is exercised “over another against herbest interests and for purposes that have no moral legitimacy” (1998, pp. 33–34).18 Pettit explicitly states that the notions of interference and arbitrariness thatare central to his account are not normative and that people with very different conceptions of value should be able to agree about what counts as arbitrary interference (2006, p. 278). Pettit and Lovett (2008) point out that there is on-going debate regarding the best conception of arbitrariness in the neorepublican literature (p. 14, n. 2) and while Pettit disagrees with Lovett’s view of arbitrariness, but both theorists support a strictly non-normative conception of freedom and arbitrariness.19 I thank Frank Lovett for pressing me to better clarify these two moral positions.20 Lovett similarly argues that living out one’s life in relations of domination isa bad because it stands in the way of human flourishing (2010, pp. 130–34).21 Say that Agent 1 has the power to arbitrarily interfere with Agent 2. 1 does notactually exercise that power because 1 likes 2 and so allows 2 to choose according

to 2’s wishes. Pettit argues that in this case there is still a sense in which 2 issubject to 1’s will. This is reflected by the fact that 1’s options are not what they would have been in the absence of such a power (Pettit, 2012, p. 59). This is because 2’s being able to choose X, Y or Z depends on 1’s not becoming malevolent and deciding to interfere. Pettit argues that 2’s dependency on the state of 1’s will does constitute a subjection to 1’s will that shows up in the options now faced by 2. 2 now faces a choice situation between X-if-it-pleases-1, Y-if-it-pleases-1 and Z-if-it-pleases-1 (2012, p. 60).22 In her work to extend neorepublicanism to address issues of global justice, Cecile Laborde’s presents a similar view when she states that domination “is definitionally connected to particular human interests that we have reason to value. Minimally and uncontroversially, domination infringes our basic interest in maintaining control or ‘discursive autonomy’ – it denies our agency as human beings” (2010, p. 55).23 In saying this I am assuming that there are convincing responses to the non-identity problem.24 In personal communication Lovett has replied that a relational-conception of domination can also criticize colonialism, as colonial powers are in a relation of uncontrolled or arbitrary power over colonized peoples. While I agree, my point is that there is also a conception of domination in terms of acts and some use this conception to engage in normative criticism. We could call this conception “harmfuldomination.” Most think that it is wrong to unjustifiably harm others, but some think that it is a worse wrong to unjustifiably harm others who are weak or vulnerable. Some in the intergenerational justice literature have emphasized the difference in power between current agents and future subjects. If current agents harm future subjects, then, this is not just harm but domination.25 This is Nolt’s view though we have seen that particular unjust outcomes are actually not neorepublicanism’s focus. I suggest that Nolt should not appeal to a neorepublican definition of domination as he has recently done to defend this view.26 Similarly, Bohman’s worry regarding climate change seems to be that its effects will be so great that they will undermine the possibility of democracy in the future and that posterity will be unable “to exercise competent control over their lives” (2010, p. 137).27 Another way to think about this is to reflect on our own predecessors. They have done much to intentionally or unintentionally foreclose current choices, but they do not now exercise power over us or subject us to their will.28 For example, Robert Goodin sees the position of the current generation as one of“unilateral power” over posterity since “we can help or harm them in a way that they will never be able to help or harm us” (1985, p. 177). More recently, Lukas Meyer states there is a “permanent asymmetry in power-relation between living people and those who will live in the future.... [R]emote future people do not evenhave the potential for exercising such power over presently living people” (2010).29 Dale Jamieson responds to Nolt’s position by noting that it is true that the current generation’s predecessors are causally responsible for “the fact and

condition of our existence...[but] this is simply a consequence of how generations are temporally related and does not bear directly on the question of domination”(2014, p. 159).30 Fabian Scholtes (2010) argues that since the dependence condition is met in regards to posterity this is in itself sufficient to say that the current generation is in a relation of domination with posterity.31 In personal communication Lovett agrees that his official view is that generations do not strictly speaking dominate one another. He notes that this is because generations are not related strategically to one another, but also because generations are not group agents. In reply to the latter point, I agree that a generation per se is not an agent but argue that there are a range of individual and group agents that exist today whose choices and policies will have known and profound effects on future subjects. It is not clear why such parties could not be in a relation where they have arbitrary power over the future subjects.32 Rahul Kumar argues that even though we do not stand in a concretely-characterizable relation to future people this does not “undermine the case for thinking that if we now make choices without appropriate regard for the implications of such choices for their interests, we will have wronged them—such that any one of the wronged will be justified, for instance, in taking herself to have privileged standing to complain, resent the attitude towards her embodied by our choices, hold us accountable for our failure, etc” (2009, p. 262).33 I thank a helpful reviewer for pressing me on this point.34 Smith (2013, pp. 241–43) discusses some perceptive responses to this bootstrapping issue.35 I therefore agree with Smith than enacting solar radiation management will exacerbate the existing domination of posterity. I am less convinced by his claim that SRM would dominate posterity even if “we have engaged in the relevant institutional reforms that require the current generation systematically and reliably to take the interests of future generations into account in their deliberations” (2012, p. 54).