1

DRAFT: Not for Reproduction Without Author’s Permission

Necessity Versus Nationalism: The Italian Immigration Paradox By Harlan Koff Department of Political Science

Duke University

Paper presented at the annual meeting of the American Political Science Association, San Francisco, CA, August 29-September 2, 2001.

2

The condradictions that mark Italian politics have fascinated scholars since the

beginning of the Republic at the end of World War II. Seeming paradoxes exist in most arenas

of Italian politics and society, often reflecting social, cultural, and economic cleavages that

date back many centuries. Stephen and Sondra Koff correctly write : « Because of its many

dualities, Italy has frequently been described as a study in contradictions. Youth versus

antiquity, continuity versus sharp change, the North versus the South, competition versus co-

operation, persistent economic cycle crises versus outstanding long-term performance,

regionalism versus centralization, clericalism versus secularism, and democracy versus

authoritarianism are just a few of the dichotomies…1 » Italian immigration politics have

followed this pattern. Scholars of immigration have correctly noted that Italy, in its short

history as an immigration state (since late 1970s), has been characterized by neither a tradition

of intolerance nor one of integration. Even though most Italians condemn xenophobia and

racism, tension between citizens and immigrants cle arly marks Italian society. Moreover,

immigration has evidenced many of the above-mentioned problems that characterize the

Italian political system, such as bureaucratic inefficiency and lack of trust in the government,

the North-South divide, and the fragmentation of the non-governmental sector.

Much has been written on anti-immigrant reactions in Italy. Most of these works focus

on the cultural and structural changes caused by Italy’s shift from an emigration to an

immigration state in the 1980s. These s tudies focus on public attitudes (Bonifazi, Dal Lago,

Balbo and Manconi), government reactions (Sciortino, Calavita, Papademetiou, Woods),

political parties, and social movements at the national level. However, scholars of

immigration to Italy, and Italian politics in general, have accurately noted that regional

differences are fundamental in Italian society. Differences in local cultures, and levels of

economic development have created substantial sub-national variance in Italian responses to

immigration (Koff, Pugliese, Ambrosini)This paper analyzes the distribution of anti-

1 Sondra Koff and Stephen Koff, Italy from the First to the Second Republic (London: Routledge, 2001): p. 1.

3

immigrant responses in contemporary Italy at the sub-national level. True to form, the Italian

response to immigration does not follow the usual trends present in advanced industrial states.

Unlike most European countries, xenophobic reactions have often been linked to regional

identities rather than nationalism. This is reflected by the positions taken by the political

parties of the right on the immigration issue. Whereas the nationalist Alleanza Nazionale

(AN), whose support is concentrated in the poorer South, has backed away from xenophobic,

anti-immigrant platforms at the national level, the ethno-regionalist Lega Nord (Lega) has

made immigration a central aspect of its political activity. Declarations against immigrants by

the Lega’s populist leader, Umberto Bossi, have been so strong, that he has been reproached

for « going too far » by his right-wing coalition partners, most notably Silvio Berlusconi, the

leader of Forza Italia (FI), and the current prime minister.

Anti-immigrant activity in the Italian party system reflects two distinct paradoxes

which have created friction within the right-wing coalition that currently governs. First, unlike

anti-immigrant reactions in many other advanced indiustrial states, nativist positions in Italy

cannot be explained by socio-economic factors. The success of the Lega, due in part to the

presence of elevated anti-immigrant sentiments, is concentrated in Italy’s notheastern regions

where the local economies are strong and most in need of immigrant labor. Even though many

small industrial factories would close without the influx of migrant workers, many

independent businessmen have supported the Lega and its xenophobic rhetoric and actions.

This has alienated Forza Italia (FI) to a certain extent, due to its position as a centrist party

which represents many business interests.

Second, due to the presence of the Vatican, religion has been a prominent aspect of the

immigration debate and the Lega has vociferously attacked Islam. In a recent special issue of

« Quaderni Padani, » a Lega affiliated journal, an editorial condemned the religion as one of

4

the « three worst diseases in history » along with communism and imperialism2. Statements

such as these have created much friction within the Catholic church and has led to official

criticism of the Lega from Italy’s center-right Catholic parties, the Cristiani Democratici

Uniti (CDU), and Centro Cristiano Democratico (CCD) which are also members of the

current ruling coalition. The presence of these seeming contradictions : 1) elevated nativist

positions in regions most in need of immigrant labor, and 2) the alienation of the Lega from

the Catholic Church due to its virulent anti-Islam, pro-Catholic positions, would suggest that

cultural rather than structural variables best explain Italian nativist responses to immigration.

I. Immigration in the Italian Party System

At the conclusion of World War II, the radical right was effectively marginalized from

European party systems. These parties had been decapitated, as their leaders were politically

discredited and often imprisoned as Nazi or Fascist collaborators. Moreover, neo-fascism was

paying the consequences for changes in international politics. Following the Nuremburg trials

and the adoption of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the first international human

rights system was erected. Obviously, radical right party platforms were inconsistent with this

change in political values. Second, the Cold War put extreme right parties in a compromised

position. The United States (US) and the Soviet Union (USSR) both combatted neo-fascism in

Western Europe due to its ideological opposition to both liberal democracy and communism.

These factors effectively froze European party politics, creating a system which pitted secular

or Christian conservative parties versus various parties of the Left. The radical right remained

a negligible force, achieving modest results in post-war elections, despite the rise of

immigration and the implementation of the guest worker system, caused by the massive

economic reconstruction of Western Europe.

2 Reported in

5

During the past twenty years, two significant developments in European politics and

society greatly improved the fortunes of the radical right and led to a renaissance of

nationalism. The increased access to transportation, the unequal international distribution of

wealth, and the rise of ethnic conflict in the Balkans, have led to a rise in mass migration to

Western Europe. Non-Eur opean Union immigration slightly increased in traditional

immigrant societies, such as France, Germany and the United Kingdom. The most significant

demographic changes occurred in southern Europe, where mass migration transformed

previous emigration societies, most notably Italy, Spain and Portugal, into new immigration

states. This trend is illustrated in Table one. These demographic developments ocurred during

a period of economic recession and increased unemployment. Thus, foreigners once again

were blamed for putting increased pressure on European labor markets, and « stealing our

jobs. »

Table One : Immigration in the European Union, (1985-1998) Country

Immigrants present 31 December 1985

Immigrants present 31 December 1998

Variation % 1985-1998

Austria Belgium Denmark Finland France Germany Greece Ireland Italy Luxembourg Netherlands Portugal Spain Sweden United Kingdom European Union

308.800 860.600 117.000 17.000 3.594.000 4.512.700 111.100 91.300 318.700 101.600 552.500 79.600 293.200 390.800 1.785.000 13.133.900

739.837 864.616 256.267 85.060 3.970.786 7.365.833 161.148 111.100 1.250.214 152.900 662.372 177.774 719.647 532.000 2.120.600 19.170.163

139,6 0,5 119,0 400,4 10,5 63,2 45,0 21,7 292,3 50,5 19,9 123,3 145,4 36,1 18,8 46,0

Source : Caritas, Immigrazione Dossier Statistico 2000, Roma : Anterem, 2000.

These demographic and economic developments were accompanied by the political

revolution caused by the end of the Cold War, which led to a thaw in European party systems.

6

According to many scholars of West European party politics, party systems were

characterized by dealignment, evidenced by lower rates in voter turnout, ideological shifts

within the established party families of the Left and center-right, and the appearance of new

parties, such as the Greens, and the radical right. The combination of these factors opened a

window of opportunity for new xenophobic and authoritarian parties of the radical right.

According to P.H. Merkl, « ultra-nationalist feelings and movements are back with a

vengeance, like genies in the bottles in which they were so long confined. 3 »

Italian Neo-Fascism in the post-war period

The fortunes of right-wing populism in Italy reflected the trends for similar parties in

Western Europe during the post-war period. After the abuses of power under Fascism, the

founding fathers of the Republic wrote guarantees into the constitution (Article 49) for

freedom of political behavior and party formation. Even though these leaders attempted to

foreclose the possibility of a re-birth of Italian fascism, this emphasis on freedom of

association permitted the existence of the Movimento Socialista Italiana (MSI), Italy’s first

post-war, neo-fascist party. The party stood for classical fascist values: law and order, family,

and the Catholic church. It also represented nationalism, and to a certain extent, anti-

Semitism, and anti-immigrant sentiments. However, because Italy remained an emigration

state, this issue was not prominent on the public agenda.

The MSI was a visible but electorally weak element of the Italian political scene from

1945 to 1989. It generally received between five and seven percent of the vote. Its supporters

were largely either ex-Fascists who had been rewarded materially and emotionally by the

government of Mussolini, or alienated young people who had difficulty finding employment.

The party was often often linked to terrorism, especially during the 1970s, and it was divided

3 Peter H. Merkl, « Introduction, » in The Revival of Right Wing Extremism in the Nineties, edited by Peter H. Merkl and Leonard Weinberg, London : Frank Cass, 1997, p.6.

7

between those who supported the democratic system and worked within it, and those who

were « anti-system » and willing to utilize violence. In general, its support came from the

country’s poorer southern regions.

Two specific factors hindered the electoral success of the MSI. First, even though Italy

was characterized by a fragmented polity, it’s party system was marked by a stable electorate.

Hence, the party system was characterized by numerous minor parties, but was dominated by

the catch-all Christian Democratic Party (DC), which won every post-war election until 1992.

This party was divided by internal factions, known as correnti, which represented the real

source of competition for power in Italian politics. Thus, given the initial aversion to

populism which resulted from the Fascist era, and the rather « behind closed doors » nature of

DC politics which led to secret bargaining and clientelism, the radical right found little space

in the Republic’s party system. Moreover, Italy was an important battleground during the

Cold War and the « Catholics versus Communist » rivalry reflected that of the US and the

USSR, which aided these respective parties.

Immigration and the Transition the Second Republic

Scholars of immigration correctly note that political reactions to this phenomenon are

often the result of historical developments (i.e. Horowitz and Noiriel, Joppke, Ireland, etc.)

The previous section has shown that international factors limited the electoral success of the

Italian radical right in the post-war period. However, Italy’s first experiences as a receiving

country are particular because of internal political developments that coincided with the

beginning of mass migration. In 1992, the electoral earthquake caused by the end of the Cold

War, and the subsequent tangentopoli corruption scandal, led to a political revolution which

not only thawed the Italian party system, but dramatically transformed it. The DC was

discredited as the main source of clientelism and corruption in Italian politics, and it was split

8

into three minor parties. The Communist Party (PCI) moved toward the center and renamed

itself the Partito Democratico di Sinistra (PDS- Democratic Party of the Left). The spaces left

by these radical changes in the party system opened opportunity structures to right wing

populism for the first time since the fall of Fascism. In fact, Yves Mény, in Par le Peuple,

Pour Peuple, correctly recognizes the rise of three separate populist movements: 1) Silvio

Berlusconi’s Forza Italia which substituted the DC and Italian Socialist Party at the center of

the political spectrum, 2) Gianfranco Fini’s Alleanza Nazionale, which is the MSI

transformed into a more moderate center-right party, and 3) Umberto Bossi’s ethnoregionalist

Lega Nord, which, from 1996-2000 even espoused secessionist platforms.

It is within this context of political transformation that mass migration to Italy began.

In fact, immigration had been regulated by international treaties until 1986 when the country

passed its first immigration laws. Given the major changes occurring in the Italian political

system, immigration was obviously considered a secondary issue. However, as migrants

became more visible within Italian society, the question began to appear on the political

agenda. Already, in a 1990 opinion poll, 75.4% of the respondents agreed that « there were

too many foreigners in Italy.4 » Nonetheless, no nationalist, anti-immigrant party ever formed

in the new political system. This occurred for two reasons. First, the Italian party system was

marked by trasversalità- the idea that the positions of politicians cross-cut partisan divisions.

This was especially true with regard to immigration. Opponents included the Lega’s Umberto

Bossi, the normally moderate Republican Party leader, Giorgio La Malfa, and even many

leaders of the various parties of the Left, who opposed immigration because of the perceived

competition it created with the working class. In a 1999 lecture organized by the City of

Florence’s Immigrant Office, Enrico Pugliese accurately noted that Italian immigration

4 Corrado Bonifazi, « Italian Attitudes and Opinions Toward Foreign Migrants and Migration Policies » Studi Emigrazione/Etudes Migrations 24 (105) 1992 : 28.

9

politics have been characterized by the diffusion of nativist misinformation not only by parties

of the right, but by parties of the left as well.

Second, the neo-Fascist MSI, which would have been the most likely candidate to

adopt nativist positions, had been transformed into AN, and its leaders, were attempting to

shed the former party’s reputation for extremism. As a result, it distanced itself from neo-Nazi

social groups that had been attacking immigrants in Rome, Turin, and Milan and distributing

fliers which claimed an alliance with MSI. Moreover, AN leaders recognized the electoral

risks associated with nativist positions. As stated earlier, most Italians did not show openness

to immigration, but they did not support xenophobic platforms either. After the party’s

inaugural 1990 convention, at which Jean-Marie Le Pen, the leader of the anti-immigration

French Front National (FN), was a guest speaker, a poll demonstrated the lack of xenophobic

attitudes expressed by the AN’s own membership. Only 60% of the party delegates favored

repatriating all clandestine foreigners, compared to 94% of the delegates of the French FN.

Similarly, 46% of AN delegates supported the abolition of social services for immigrants

compared to 87% of their French counterparts5.

This vacuum created by the lack of a nationalist radical right position on immigration

was quickly filled by the Lega Nord. The Lega was born in 1989 as the collective force of

autonomous local movements. Its appearance is one of the most significant results of the

transformation of the party system. One could argue that Forza Italia has occupied the spaces

previously filled by the Christian Democratic, Socialist, and various minor parties which

dominated the center. Conversely, the Lega, opened a new position in the party spectrum and

prevented the formation of a new bi-polar system, by introducing a regionalist political

ideology. The Lega’s platform originally focused on the center-periphery cleavage which

resulted from Italy’s late and incomplete unification. Specifically, it denounced the economic

differences between the North and the South, which the Lega views as an economic drain.

10

This economic argument, however, was often tinged by ethnic overtures and the Lega

successfully transformed this political issue. Previously, most attention was paid to « the

Southern question » defined as the economic development of the poorer southern regions. The

Lega effectively changed the focus of this problem from economics to identity, giving birth to

« the Northern question. » The party was not defending merely the interests of the northern

regions, but also the identity and rights of citizens of these areas who had been « colonized

and oppressed » by Rome.

This movement culminated in the creation of the « Padanian » identity. Padania

includes those inhabitants of the country’s northern regions « along the great river Po from

Emilia and Friuli, from Liguria, Lombardia, and the Marche, from Piemonte, Romagna, and

Sudtirol-Alto Adige, from Toscana, Trentino and Umbria, from Valle d’Aosta, the Veneto,

and Venezia Giulia 6. » I refer to the creation of Padanian identity rather than its « revival »

because, aside from the vague reference to the Po, this « nation » is founded on a list of

regions collected by party leaders with little specific historical significance, beyond the North-

South divide (Meny). Nonetheless, the Lega has established numerous initiatives to strengthen

this regional identity: they passed a declaration of independence, a citizens’ bill of rights, and

a constitution of the sovereign state of Padania. Political institutions, such as a Parliament

were erected. Finally, support structures were instituted to strengthen the party base, such as a

trade union, a soccer team which competes against other regional sides, such as the Basques,

and even a Miss Padania competition. This political approach was success ful as the Lega

quickly grew, gaining 10.1% of the total vote in 1996.

With regard to immigration, the embrace of identity politics also led to the formation

of strong nativist positions. The Lega contested all values that were not Padanian, whether

southern Italian or foreign. Article six of the Padanian Citizens’ Bill of Rights states: « The

5 Laura Balbo e Luigi Manconi, I Razzismi Reali (Milan : Feltrinelli, 1992): p. 88. 6 Declaration of Independence and Sovereignty of Padania.

11

community of Padanian citizens is open to all other women and men, but they retain the right

to establish regulations aimed at preventing the deterioration of their ethnic and cultural

heritage. 7 » Some scholars of the Lega, such as Roberto Escobar, have argued that these

stances resemble Nazism. Even though this interpretation is exagerated, the centrality of

identity politics to the Lega platform cannot be overstated.

Immigration, Crime, and Catholicism

Today the priests of the nation-state flippantly juxtapose onto it the dogma of the so-called « diversity » state. How is this possible? Because what they exalt as diversity is an import imposed exclusively by the arrival of non-European populations, leaving less room than ever for our own deeply -rooted diversities. The multicultural society pushed today by the political-economic-intellectual power nexus is the imposition of steadily vaster communities of new arrivals onto the « welcoming » society, made progressively more uniform and stripped of self-awareness8.

Following Italy’s 1996 legislative elections, the Lega began to shift its party platform.

The ethno regionalist arguments discussed above remained the main focus of the party’s

activity. However, an important second strand began to receive increased attention next to the

center-perifery issue. The Lega’s leaders significantly increased much of their attention to the

issues of globalization and immigration. Specifically, the Lega focused on two questions

related to immigration: crime and the spread of Islam.

The first of these issues is not new to Italian politics. Scholars have noted the

traditional focus of Italian immigration legislation on control and public security. During the

early 1990s, the relationship, or the perceived relationship, between immigration and a

general increase in crime rates became daily news. Numerous immigrant criminal

organizations from North Africa, China, and Albania became involved in the importation of

illegal migrants, the drug trade and prostitution. Also, a number of murders which were

sensationalized by the Italian press caught public attention and influenced public opinion. . A

7 The Padanian Citizens’ Bill of Rights .

12

2000 national survey found that 73.5% of those who participated agreed that : « the presence

of immigrants increases crime rates9.»

Statistics seem to support these views. In the period between 1991 and 1995 the

number of immigrants charged with a crime more than doubled from 21,307 to 42,61410. In

addition, the number of immigrants incarcerated in Italian prisons skyrocketed from 13,033 to

24,55511. This situation offered the Lega a platform on which it could broaden its political

appeal to non-secessionists.

The second issue on which the Lega has based its anti-immigrant positions is the

importation of Islam. The party has identified itself as the protector of the Catholic church in

Padania. In general, as the introductory quote to this section indicates, the Lega criticizes

globalization on the grounds that it creates a homogeneous world culture which unjustly

reduces the specificity and importance of local identities. Catholic fundamentalism is an

important part of the Padanian identity. In fact, the Lega has strongly criticized the Pope for

his recent attempts to open the Catholic church to other religions, especially Islam. It has also

accused the church of contributing to the degradation of Catholic values in Italy through the

work of Caritas, which is Italy’s largest immigrant aid organization.

This rhetoric has been translated into significant political action and even public policy

in those cities and towns where the Lega has won local elections. The party has organized

protests and public masses against the construction of mosques in major cities, such as Rome,

Turin and Brescia. The most recent protest occurred in Lodi in September 2000 when

organizers of the march promised to « take apart the mosque brick by brick. » Even Silvio

Berlusconi and Gianfranco Fini criticized the Lega because « this will cause us to lose

votes.» At the local level, authorities affiliated with the Lega in the smaller towns of the

8 A Free Padania in a Free Europe: Foreign policy speech to the 1997 Federal Congress of the Lega Nord . p: 2. 9 Caritas, Immigrazione : Dossier Statistico 2000, Rome : Anterem, 2001, p. 207. 10 La Presenza Straniera in Italia negli Anni ’90. Rome: ISTAT, 1998 : p. 503. 11 Ibid., p. 510.

13

northeastern regions have utilized health and housing ordinances to close lay structures

utilized by Muslim immigrants as makeshift mosques and prevent the establishment of

Muslim places of worship. Not even local officials from AN have attempted to utilize such

measures in the cities that they govern in the south, which incidentally is where most of

Italy’s Muslim population is concentrated.

II. Explaining Anti-Immigrant Sentiment in Italy

Numerous studies of the Lega (Diamonte, D’Alimonte and Bartolini, Moioli) have

shown that patterns of support do not follow the trends that seem to characterize the

distribution of the radical right vote in most European countries. Unlike the French FN, the

Lega does not seem to gain strength in frontier areas. Also, given its views on the North-

South cleavage, it is a non-entity in Italy’s poorer regions (unlike Germany). Finally, this

party does not seem to excel in areas with an international economy, which many authors (i.e.

Kitschelt) have identified as a leading contributing factor to the success of the radical right.

What then explains the success of the Lega in Italian politics ?

Most studies of the radical right in Europe focus on structural explanations for its

recent success. Table two examines the distribution of the Lega vote at the regional level

along with many of the structural factors tied to immigration that usually are proposed as

explanatory variables. The levels of support for the Lega are considerably lower in Toscana

and Emilia-Romagna because these regions are traditionally considered part of Italy’s center,

rather than part of the north. The first three explanatory variables focus on regional

characteristics pertaining to immigration: the percentage of immigrants in the total population,

the percentage of immigrants among the total of those charged with committing crimes, and

the importance of Islam within regional migrant populations. Neither the overall presence of

immigrants nor the presence of Islam seems to influence the success rate of the Lega. Also, no

14

patterns exist between overall unemployment levels and the Lega vote. However, there does

seem to be a relationship between variations in immigrant criminal activity and the strength of

the Lega vote.

Also, a negative relationship seems to exist between the Lega vote and the economic

integration of immigrants. Table three presents the official regional requests for foreign labor

presented in 2000. One finds elevated support for the Lega Nord in three regions, Veneto,

Piemonte, and Friuli Venezia Giulia, where the services of immigrant workers are highly

desired. This market situation represents the paradox discussed above. Even demographically,

recent studies have shown that all of the regions in this area of the country have among the

lowest labor substitution rates in Italy (Koff). Thus, one can expect the need for immigration

to become more accute in the coming years.These trends regarding immigration, labor and

crime are illustrated in figure one.

Table Two : Regional Distribution of Lega Nord Vote and Selected Variables Region

Lega Nord Vote 1996

% Imm. Of Total Pop.

% Imm. Of Total Crime

Presence of Islam*

Unemployment Rate

Piemonte 18,4 1,2 11,8 1 7,2 Lombardia 24,6 2,5 11,7 0 4,8 Trentino Alto-Adige

13,2 2,9 10,3 0 3,5

Veneto 29,9 1,6 12,3 0 4,5 Friuli Venezia Giulia

23,2 2,6 10,6 0 5,6

Liguria 10,2 1,4 25,3 0 9,9 Emilia Romagna 7,2 1,8 10,8 1 4,6 Toscana 1,8 1,8 11,1 0 7,2 *a value of 1 was assigned to those regions where Muslims outnumbered Christian immigrants. A value of 0 represents those regions where Christian immigrants outnumber muslims.

15

Table Three: Immigrant Residents and Need for Foreign Labor by Region Region Immigrant Residents* Number of Foreign Employees

Requested** Valle D’Aosta Piemonte Lombardia Trentino Alto Adige Liguria Friuli Veneto Emilia Romagna Toscana Umbria Marche Lazio Abruzzo Molise Campania Basilicata Puglia Calabria Sicilia Sardegna TOTAL

1,962 79,858 255,844 22,016 29,627 23,827 97,218 93,555 82,390 21,594 29,373 195,555 18,534 1,840 43,690 2,738 28,703 15,322 60,744 12,406 1,116,394

17 5,230 869 12,812 730 7,000 5,100 810 692 687 920 1,370 268 0 877 161 995 88 1,120 228 39,974

Source: Corriere della Sera, 16 luglio 2000. * Statistics from Ministry of the Interior for 31/12/99 ** Statistics from Ministry of Work relative to official requests from business

Figure One: Regional Distribution of Lega Nord Vote, Immigrant Crime, and the Request for Foreign Labor

05

101520253035

Piemon

te

Lomba

rdia

Trentin

o Alto-

Adige Ve

neto

Friuli

Vene

zia G

iulia Lig

uria

Emilia

Romag

naTo

scana

Region

Lega 1996

% Crime 1996

Number of Foreign EmployeesRequested

16

The contradiction between economic need for migrant labor and the electoral success

of the Lega Nord is even more evident when analyzed at the provincial level. Tables four and

five present the privincial distribution of the Lega Vote in the two regions where it is

strongest, Lombardy, and the Veneto. This data reinforces the pattern indicated at the regional

level, which suggests that the Lega does well in areas where immigrants are most needed to

support the local economy. This is illustrated by figures two and three which graphically

display the fit between the two sets of data, with the one exception of Milan in Lombardy,

where the Lega has had reduced electoral success.

Table Four: Provincial Distribution of Immigrant Labor and Votes for the Lega in Lombardy Province Number of Immigrant Employees Lega Vote '96 Lega Vote '01 Bergamo 4,307 29,75 20,26 Brescia 7,186 34,5 16,46 Como 3,200 34 16,81 Cremona 701 22,47 9,7 Mantova 1,56 21,43 8,73 Milano 11,197 16,69 7,33 Pavia 662 20,3 7,68 Sondrio 232 41,35 20,2 Varese 2,014 33,39 16,66

17

Table Five: Provincial Distribution of Immigrant Labor and Lega Vote in Veneto Province Number of Immigrant Employees (thousands) Lega Vote '96 Lega Vote '01 Belluno 922 41,55 9,85 Padova 2,223 23,7 7,54 Rovigo 169 15,67 5,47 Treviso 4,526 42,22 16,92 Venezia 1,051 22,1 6,03 Verona 3,496 25,81 10,41 Vicenza 7,767 36,23 13

Figure two: Provincial Distribution of Immigrant Labor and Lega Vote in Lombardy

05

1015202530354045

Berga

mo

Bresci

aCo

mo

Cremon

a

Mantov

aMilan

oPa

via

Sond

rio

Varese

Province

Number of Immigrant Employees(thousands)

Lega Vote '96

Lega Vote '01

18

The Lega Nord and Political Culture

As an indicator of the distribution of anti-immigrant votes in I taly, the Lega’s success

cannot be explained by political economy analyses. This is even more evident when the socio-

economic backgrounds of Lega voters are taken into account and one finds numerous

entrepreneurs and businessmen: the people who most benefit from migrant labor12 (see

D’Alimonte and Bartolini, Koff and Koff). Thus, attention must be turned to cultural factors.

The Lega’s response to Islam is a significant indicator of its electoral base. In fact,

studies of the Lega have indicated that religion is a relevant factor to its success as the party’s

electorate is characterized by a strong adherence to Catholicism. In general, the Lega’s best

results have occurred in the « white » areas of the the northeast. Specifically, the party has

done extremely well in electoral districts which had previously been dominated by the DC,

before its disintegration. According to Ilvo Diamanti, in the 1992 parliamentary elections, the

Lega won approximately half of its seats in districts previously represented by the DC13.

12 The obvious explanation for this is that they support the Lega’s fiscal policies. 13 Ilvo Diamanti, La Lega (Rome : Donzelli Editori, 1993) : p. 37.

Figure Three: Provincial Distribution of Immigrant Labor and the Lega Vote in Veneto

0

5

10

15

20

25

30

35

40

45

Belluno Padova Rovigo Treviso Venezia Verona Vicenza

Province

Number of Immigrant Employees(thousands)

Lega Vote '96

Lega Vote '01

19

This does not totally explain the Lega’s success however, nor its strong response to

immigration. In fact, the Lega has broken with the church on the immigration issue which has

led to great criticism by many Catholics. If the Lega vote were merely based on religion, then

it should lose votes in these districts.

Analysis of the election data also indicates that the electors of the Lega are

concentrated in traditional societies. Figures four and five illustrate the provincial distribution

of the electoral results of the Lega in the regions of Lombardy and Veneto versus those for the

province’s capital cities. It is evident that the Lega has achieved more success in less

populated areas than it has in urban settings. Moreover, with the increase in the size of the

metropolitan area of the capital, one notices a widening in the divergence between the Lega

vote in the capital city and that of the province. In Treviso, Venezia, and Vicenza in Veneto,

and Milano, Brescia, and Bergamo in Lombardy these differences are more pronounced. The

smaller provincial capitals, instead, closely reflect overall provincial percentages. This

indicates that local cultures are significant variables. Specifically, it would confirm the

comparative work of Herbert Kitschelt, among others, who argues that the radical right can be

best analyzed in terms of nativist fears of economic and cultural internationalization, in this

case, represented by immigration.

20

III. Conclusion : Immigration, the Lega, and the Future of the Italian Radical Right

Since April 2001, Italy has been governed by a center-right coalition, which once

again includes the Lega Nord. The re-integration of the Lega, which had toppled the first

Figure four: Lega Vote- Province Versus Provincial Capital-Lombardy

0

5

10

15

20

25

30

35

40

45

Bergamo Brescia Como Cremona Mantova Milano Pavia Sondrio Varese

Province and Capital

Per

cen

t of V

ote Lega Vote Prov.'96

Lega Vote Prov. '01

Lega Vote Cap '96

Lega Vote Cap '01

Figure five: Lega Vote Province Versus Provincial Capital-Veneto

0

5

10

15

20

25

30

35

40

45

Belluno Padova Rovigo Treviso Venezia Verona Vicenza

Province and Provincial Capital

Per

cen

tag

e o

f Vo

te

Lega Vote Prov '96

Lega Vote Prov'01

Lega Vote Cap '96

Lega Vote Cap '01

21

Berlusconi government in 1994 by withdrawing, is the result of a process which began in

1996. Up to now, I have focused on geographical variance within elections to explain anti-

immigrant responses in Italy. However, it must be noted that the Lega has lost considerable

votes in recent elections. In fact, since that time, the party has continued to lose votes to

Berlusconi’s Forza Italia, especially in the areas examined above which were considered

strongholds. Following the recent parliamentary elections, the Lega found itself with its worst

result since the late 1980s, as it won only 3,9% of the vote.

This declining electoral success has coincided with an increase in Lega aggressiveness

in anti-immigration politics. In fact, when Bossi was named Minister of Reform in the new

government, he immediately announced that his first two projects would be the establishment

of devolution within the Italian administrative system, and revision of immigration laws. In

fact, the Bossi-Fini proposal has already been forwarded to the parliament. It strengthens

measures to combat clandestine immigration, and strictly ties immigration to employment.

Originally Bossi wanted to make illegal status a crime punishable by one to four years in

prison, but he was forced to retract his statements after his coalition partners once again

expressed their disaproval.

This decision by Bossi to link immigration to employment opportunities is significant.

This aspect of migration may ultimately become his electoral downfall. In the days, following

the the April election, La Repubblica published the following headline : « The northeast is no

longer rebellious. » In fact, the comparative data presented above illustrates the hard losses

the Lega suffered throughout the northeast. Most analysts have argued that this region has

begun to « normalize » and, in fact, Forza Italia has pushed the Lega out of many strongholds.

Italy’s party system seems to once again becoming bipolar.

Immigration has significantly contributed to this electoral shift. As the region’s

population ages significantly, there is a need for migrant labor that will only grow in the

22

future. This should quell the market for anti-immigrant slogans significantly. Even the

religious aspect of this issue has turned around as many factory owners have even constructed

places for Muslim workers to pray right on the premises.

It would seem that the Lega’s position as a third pole in the Italian party system is at

great risk. Its coalition partners, FI and AN have usurped the immigrant crime issue and

effectively included it into their electoral platforms. This has pushed the Lega even further to

the extreme in its reactions to immigration in an attempt to revitalize the ethnoregionalist

sentiment described above. On one hand, history teaches us that initial nativist reactions are

usually overcome through economic integration, which is already occurring in the Italian

northeast. Moreover, even though Italy does not have a strong record on integration, it does

not have a strong xenophobic tradition either. Most scholars agree that the country is

characterized by utilitarian indifference to immigration. This trait will hinder Bossi and the

Lega if their views become more extreme in the future.

References

Betz, Hans-George. Radical Right Wing Populism in Western Europe, New York : St. Martin’s Press, 1994

Biorcio, Roberto. « La Lega e La Transizione Italiana » Rivista Italiana di Scienza Politica

XXIX, (1) aprile 1999. Caritas, Immigrazione : Dossier Statistico 2000 , Rome : Anterem, 2001, p. 207. Costantini, Luciano. Dentro La Lega . Roma : Koine Edizioni, 1994. D’Alimonte, Roberto e Bartolini, Stefano. Maggioritario Per Caso . Bologna : Il Mulino,

1997. Diamanti, Ilvo. La Lega. Rome : Donzelli Editori, 1993. Diamanti, Ilvo. « The Northern League » in The New Italian republic edited by Stephen

Gundle and Simon Parker. London : Routledge, 1996. Escobar, Roberto. « La Battaglia della Lega » Il Mulino XLVIII luglio-agosto 1999, pp/ 661-

670. Guolo, Renzo. « I Nuovi Crociati : La Lega e l’Islam » Il Mulino XLIX (391) Sett.-Ott. 2000 :

23

pp. 890-901. Hainsworth, Paul. The Politics of the Extreme Right. London: Pinter Press, 2000. Kitschelt, Herbert with McGann Anthony, The Radical Right in Western Europe, Ann Arbor :

University of Michigan Press, 1995 Koff, Harlan. “Immigration or Integration?: Examining Political Events of the Year 2000” in

Italian Politics edited by Mario Caciagli and Alan Zuckerman, Oxford: Berghahn Books, 2001.

Koff, Harlan. “NGOs Versus Political Parties: Interest Representation and Anti-racism in

Western Europe,” in Searching for Peace in Europe and Eurasia . Lynne Reiner Press, forthcoming March 2002.

Koff Sondra, and Koff Stephen. Italy : From the First to the Second Republic. London :

Routledge, 2000. Meny, Yves. Par le Peuple, Pour le Peuple. Paris : Fayard, 2000. Merkl, Peter H . and Weinberg, Leonard, The Revival of Right Wing Extremism in the Nineties,

London : Frank Cass, 1997. Messina, Patrizia. « Opposition in Italy in the 1990s : Local Political Cultures and the

Northern League » Government and Opposition 33 (1) Winter 1998 : 462-478. Moioli, Vittorio. I Nuovi Razzismi. Roma : Edizioni Associate, 1990. Newpaper articles from la Repubblica and Il Giornale . Savelli, Giulio. Che Cosa Vuole La Lega Milano : Longanesi e Co., 1992.