Nature and excellence of character in Aristotle

NATURE AND EXCELLENCE OF CHARACTER

IN ARISTOTLE*

GABRIELA ROSSI

I.

An idea frequently found in the writings of ancient philosophers is that moral principles, which articulate what kind of life is the best for man, are grounded in nature. In each case, one must analyze what exactly each of these thinkers understands by “nature,”1 and in what manner moral normativity is grounded on this nature.2 In spite of the differences between the various philosophical positions on this issue, it is nonethe-less commonly held that most ancient moral doctrines establish a con-nection with nature as a source of their validity or of their normative strength. This general consensus seems less evidently applicable to the particular case of Aristotle. Among other reasons, this is because he does not establish anywhere an explicit connection between nature and the realm of morality, such that the latter would be straightforwardly grounded on the former. In other words, in Aristotle one cannot find an express programmatic intention of grounding ethics on nature. On the con-trary, if we examine Aristotle’s explicit statements, what we find are hints that he views this sort of basing of ethics on nature as unviable. He not

* A preliminary version of this article was presented at the workshop “Naturaleza,

Razón y Normatividad en la Filosofía Antigua”, in June of 2011at the Universidad de Navarra (Pamplona, Spain). For their suggestions and constructive observations on that occasion, I am especially grateful to Marcelo Boeri, Alejandro Vigo, and Marco Zingano. For her suggestions on a previous version, I wish to thank María Isabel Santa Cruz. I also want to thank Erik Norvelle for his help with the English.

1 It has to be determined in each case whether the author is referring to cosmic na-ture, or human nature, or both; whether human nature is what differentiates human be-ings from the rest of living beings or whether it is what human beings have in common with them, etc. Additionally, in connection with the former, whether human “nature” should be associated with the natural realm or whether it just designates the “essence” of human beings.

2 As J. Annas (1988: 167-170, and 1993: 135) convincingly claims, ancient ethical theories are not naturalist in the modern sense, i.e. as a meta-ethical position that claims that moral terms can be defined in non-moral terms.

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only claims that every scientific investigation should be conducted according to the method suited to the object studied,3 but also that each science has its own proper principles, from which demonstrations are made,4 and which cannot be derived from the principles of any other science. Interpreters who claim that there is a connection of foundation of this kind between ethics and the philosophy of nature (in a broad sense) in Aristotle have to reconstruct this non-explicit connection, to catch the philosopher red-handed, so to speak, resorting surreptitiously to a metaphysical or natural basis on which to found his ethics –this is a typical interpretation of the “function (e[rgon) argument” in NE I 7.5 The reason for the focus on this argument lies in the fact that Aristotle clearly establishes here the main principle of his ethics, v.gr. what the best life for man is. In this paper I will not discuss this kind of approach to this particular argument. Instead, I intend to examine the connection between nature and practical normativity in Aristotle, focusing on another classical locus in NE, where he expressly analyzes the relation of nature to excellence of character (hjqikh; ajrethv), i.e. the excellence of that part of the soul that can listen to reason, but is not strictly speaking rational.6 Still, this sort of excellence is related to the excellences of the rational part of the soul alluded to in the definition of the best life in the “function argument” (NE I 7, 1098a16-18). In fact, excellence of char-acter is necessary for the exercise of the practical intellectual excellence (frovnhsi~)7 (i.e. for the practical-political life). Furthermore, as most interpreters plausibly claim, it also accompanies the exercise of theoreti-

3 Cf. NE I 3, 1094b11-27; Ib. I 7, 1098a26-b8, esp. 27-29: [crh; ... ejpizhtein] ejn

eJkavstoi~ kata; th;n uJpokeimevnhn u{lhn kai; ejpi; tosouton ejf j o{son oijkeion th/ meqovdw/. 4 Cf. AnPo I 2, esp. 71b16-23; 72a5-6; Ib. I 12, 77a36-b15; Ib. I 28. It is true that in his

treatises Aristotle does not provide demonstrations, but rather searches for the principles of each science. Even in this case, deriving the principles of one science from the principles of another would amount to reducing the one science to the other. In the case of the use of principles not proper to the subject matter of his argumentation, Aristotle himself calls this kind of argumentation “eristic” (cf. SE 8, 169b20-25; Ib. 11, 171b6-12, 19-22).

5 For an analysis of this kind of reading of the function argument, see the paper by A. Ross in this volume.

6 Cf. NE I 13, 1102b28-1103a1. For a different view, which holds that not all excel-lences of character concern this part of the soul, because not all have to do with feelings, see D. Bostock (2000: 45-50).

7 NE VI 12, 1144a20-1144b1, Ib. VI 13, 1144b30-32.

Nature and Excellence of Character in Aristotle 157

cal intellectual excellence (sofiva), and hence it is part of the contempla-tive or intellectual life.8 Thus, in both cases, excellence of character is an essential component of what the best life should be.

I want to clarify in advance several important points concerning the relation between nature and practical normativity in Aristotle, in order to demarcate the discussion that follows. As is well known, in Aristotle’s conception nature is conceived of within a teleological framework, where the telos is identified with the good.9 Each natural process which a living being undergoes is aimed at its good, and even the constitution of the living being and its parts aim for the good of the living being.10 To this extent, nature and what is natural already involve a normative dimension. The first important point that emerges from this principle is that Aristo-tle’s natural teleology is immanent to each natural substance: it is always the good of the particular living being which is aimed at, and not a cos-mic or universal good. For that reason, if there were any connection between the ethical realm and the natural realm in Aristotle, this connec-tion could not be to a universal or cosmic nature, but to human nature.11 The second important point is that while nature aims at a good, and the best life for man is obviously also good, and both goods have normative power, it does not follow that both goods are the same, or that they share the same normative status, or that there is a foundational relation in any direction. It is neither the case that practical normativity is neces-sarily grounded in some sort of natural normativity, nor is nature to be conceived of as being for the sake of human ends.12 I believe that from

8 Cf. for instance J. Cooper (1975: 144-180); R. Kraut (1989), and with some nu-

ances, D. Bostock (2000: 204-209). It is clear, at least, that one who pursues the theoreti-cal life should live in a community and get along well with others, which one can do if he acts according to practical excellence; cf. NE X 8, 1178b5-6. Friendship also plays a role in the contemplative life, although it is not strictly necessary. Even when one is self-suffi-cient, theoretical activity is best pursued when in the company of others (cf. 1177a34).

9 Cf. Phys. II 2, 194a27-33; cf. Ib. II 3, 195a23-25. 10 PA I 1, 640a33-b1; cf. Ib. III 4, 665b2-5. In his biological writings Aristotle even

resorts to “the better” (to; bevltion) as an explanatory principle; cf. for instance GA I 4, 717a15-16ff., Ib. II 1, 731b22-24.

11 J. Annas (1988: 152-153, and 1993: 136) claims that this is common to all ancient ethical theories, while A. Laks (1988: 176-177) presents some well-founded caveats about it.

12 D. Sedley (1991) has argued for such a reading of Aristotelian natural teleology. He claims that Aristotle holds an anthropocentric view of natural teleology close to that of

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the passage of NE II 1, 1103a18-26, which I take as a starting point and focus of my analysis, it emerges with some clarity that Aristotle was aware that there is no lineal continuity between natural normativity and practical normativity. My paper deals precisely with this issue, namely the limits and intersections between these two kinds of normativity. II. Aristotle begins the second book of NE taking up the discussion which opens Plato’s Meno, namely, in what manner we have excellences. Are they in us by nature, or do we acquire them? If we acquire them, can they be taught, or are they acquired by practice?13 In the first lines of NE II 1 Aristotle states that excellence of character is acquired by habitua-tion, and he then goes on to consider the first part of this complex ques-tion, namely whether or not excellences are in us by nature. I believe that this passage makes it clear that some proper traits of human nature are the conditions of possibility for excellence insofar as they make possible the realm of practical normativity, but they are not the basis on which this normativity can be straightforwardly grounded.

The passage I will focus on runs as follows: “This14 makes it quite clear that none of the excellences of character

comes about in us by nature; for no natural way of being is changed through habituation (ejx ou| kai; dh`lon o{ti oujdemiva twn hjqikwn ajretw`n fuvsei hJmi`n ejggivnetai: oujqe;n ga;r twn fuvsei o[ntwn a[llw~ ejqivzetai), as for example the stone which by nature moves downwards cannot be habituated into moving upwards, even if someone tries to make it so by throwing it upwards ten thousand times, nor will fire move downwards, nor will anything else that is by nature one way be habituated into

Chryssipus. I believe that this conception of Aristotelian natural teleology is misguided. For extended discussion of this point, see G. Rossi (2010). J Annas (1988: 156) also claims that Aristotle does not propose a universal teleology and that “there is no well-defined larger system that a human life is a well-adapted part of.”

13 Cf. Plato, Meno, 70a1-4. 14 That is, the fact that excellences of character come about in us through habituation

(cf. 1103a14-18).


behaving in another. The excellences develop in us neither by nature nor contrary to nature, but we are naturally able to receive them, and then again we are brought to completion by means of habituation (ou[t j a[ra fuvsei ou[te para; fuvsin ejggivnontai aiJ ajretaiv, ajlla; pefukovsi me;n

hJmi`n devxasqai aujtav~, teleioumevnoi~ de; dia; tou` e[qou~).”15 The general thesis that Aristotle holds in this text seems to be: (1)

that excellence of character develops in us (a) neither by nature (fuvsei) (b) nor contrary to nature (para; fuvsin); (2) that, (a) on the one hand (mevn), it is natural for us to receive these excellences and, (b) on the other hand (dev) we are brought to completion through habituation (where habituation is something different from nature).

It is not immediately clear what the crucial term “nature” (fuvsi~) and its derivations mean in this passage, nor whether it has the same meaning each time it appears in these lines. In the following analysis I will endeavor to clarify this meaning in order to clarify what exactly Aristotle is maintaining here and what are its implications. It is also not clear what the relation is among the different assertions that Aristotle makes in this passage. Another aim of the subsequent analysis will be to show that both assertions (1) and (2) above articulate the same basic ideas regard-ing nature, excellence, and habituation. I will start by analyzing the initial thesis (1.a), that excellence does not come about in us by nature, which in turn is closely related to thesis (2.b), that we are brought to completion by habituation.

The argument that Aristotle offers to support thesis (1.a) does not mention human nature, but rather the nature of stones (and of fire). It draws on the fact that none of these natures can be modified by habitua-tion in order to conclude that excellence of character does not come about in us by nature. What, then, does “by nature” mean here? The fuvsi~ of the stone in this example, and in general, the fuvsi~ of any animate or inanimate entity (leaving aside, for now, human beings), is a disposition to move or be moved in a certain manner. This “nature” cor-responds to the notion of fuvsi~ that Aristotle presents in Phys. II 1, as the primary and non accidental internal principle of an entity’s move-

15 NE II 1, 1103a18-26; Ch. Rowe’s translation, with modifications.

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ment and rest.16 It is fairly clear from Phys. II 1 that this principle of movement is the form or essence of each entity.17 I will call nature under-stood as the essence (internal principle of movement) of an entity “na-ture2”. Thus, to be a stone is to move downwards (if nothing prevents it), and to be fire is to move upwards (again, if nothing prevents it).18 Of course, thus understood, the same nature2 is shared by all individuals of a natural species, for they belong to that natural species.19 This means that this sort of disposition or potency, which constitute nature2 as an inner principle, is not acquired by natural entities, but is given (by birth, in the case of living beings) and is unchangeable. In order to understand this pas-sage of NE it is important to remember that Aristotle also uses the term “natural potencies” to designate a specific set of capacities which are dif-ferent from another specific set of capacities that belong only to human beings (i.e. rational potencies). That these potencies are “natural” means that they actualize themselves necessarily, if nothing prevents it. In other words, this means that given the conditions in which these potencies can be actualized, it is necessary that they actualize themselves. This is a characteristic of natural potencies, as Aristotle claims in Metaph. Q 5,

16 For the internal principle of movement as a capacity for moving and also of being

affected in certain manner, cf. Phys. VIII 4, 255b29-31: “It is clear, then, that none of these things [i.e. no simple body] moves itself, but these things do have a principle of move-ment (ajlla; kinhvsew~ ajrch;n e[cei): not of moving (kinein) or acting (poiein), but of be-ing affected (pavscein)”. This is a main point of my disagreement with J. Annas (1993: 142-158), who claims that the nature referred to in NE II 1 is not the nature of Phys. II 1. If I understand her right, Annas believes that “the stronger notion of nature is an appli-cation of the Physics notion of nature in ethical contexts” (146-147). That is, she encoun-ters the notion of the Phys. in contexts where fuvsi~ has moral normative strength. For my part, I hold that the notion of fuvsi~ found in Phys. II 1 is what I call nature2, which resembles more what Annas calls “mere nature”.

17 Cf. D. Quarantotto (2005); G. Rossi (2011: 43-67, 80-85). This explains in part why nature, thus understood, cannot be modified by habituation in any individual of the spe-cies. If the nature of an entity were to be thusly modified, it would amount to that entity ceasing to be what it is.

18 Cf. De Caelo, 268b26-30, 270a17-18, 276b8-10. 19 It is probably based on this text that Alexander of Aphrodisias says that excel-

lences of character cannot come about in us by nature in this manner, for in that case, if they were part of the human essence, every human being (or most of them) would have these excellences; cf. De Fato, XXVII 198.19-23.


1048a5-7.20 I will call the set of dispositions constituted by this last sort of potencies “nature1”. Now in some natural beings nature1 is identical to nature2 (and stones, like simple bodies, are particularly pristine examples of this identity). Nature1 is thus identical to the essence of that entity as an internal principle of movement.21

In the text of NE II 1, the example of the impossibility of habituating a stone to move upwards is supposed to count as an argument for the thesis that excellence of character does not come about in us by nature (fuvsei). It might be thought, as Ch. Taylor does,22 that the example of the stone does not prove that excellences of character are not in us by nature, but only that they are not against nature. I presume his claim is based on the fact that excellence is acquired by habituation, and habitua-tion cannot modify what the nature of the stone is, hence excellence is not (nor can it be) against nature. This would be the case, indeed, if one

20 ta;~ me;n toiauvta~ dunavmei~ ajnavgkh, o{tan wJ~ duvnantai to; poihtiko;n kai; to;

paqhtiko;n plhsiavzwsi, to; me;n poiein to; de; pavscein (“… with these potencies [that is: the irrational ones] it is necessary, whenever the agent and the patient approach each other so as to be capable, that the one acts and the other is acted on.” Based on Makin’s trans-lation).

21 This distinction between the several senses of “nature” follows a different criterium than that of J. Annas (1993: 143-144). My distinction also does not coincide with that of Aspasius (38.9-20), who distinguishes four meanings of fuvsi~ in his com-mentary on the text: (i) nature as what happens always in the same manner, e.g. heavy bodies always move downwards; (ii) nature as that which is not present from birth, but is acquired without any effort by the agent, nor by habituation, nor through instruction, just like the growing of teeth; (iii) with another meaning, those things are “by nature” (fuvsei) for which we have potencies that can be contraries, just like health and illness are “by nature” in the body; (iv) finally, those things are “by nature” (fuvsei) which we are natu-rally (pevfuke) more receptive to and which we tend towards by nature (ajpo; th`~ fuvsew~). In this latter sense, health is by nature and illness is against nature, for it is a privation of health, and nature disposes the body towards health and not illness. In the same manner, says Aspasius, excellence is by nature and vice is against nature. I interpret Aspasius’s meanings (i) and (ii) as not being significantly different; they correspond to what I call nature1, while (iii) corresponds to nature1 under the form of active and passive potencies, depending on whether the form or the matter of the natural being (i.e. its two natures, cf. Phys. II 2, 194a12-13; cf. Ib. 1, 193a28-31) act as a principle of movement. Aspasius un-derstands that excellence of character is natural under the last meaning (iv) of fuvsi~. However, I do not see any support for this position, since this last meaning seems to coincide merely with nature2, i.e. with the essence as a tevlo~. Certainly, the essence has causal and normative power, but this is a natural normativity, not a practical normativity; cf. infra p. 9.

22 Cf. Ch. Taylor (2006: ad loc.).

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were to suppose that Aristotle is using the nature2 (essence) of the stone as an exact analogue of the nature2 (essence) of human beings, thereby implying that both essences are identical to the set of dispositions that I called nature1. But Aristotle does not think that the stone has the same nature2 as a human being, and that is precisely why human beings can acquire excellences of character. I think that Aristotle’s point here is that these excellences are not in our nature2 in the way that it is in our nature2 to breathe or to digest food, and as it is in the nature2 of the stone to move downwards. Excellences of character are not dispositions pos-sessed by birth that will be actualized most of the time23 and if nothing impedes it.

Hence, when Aristotle says that excellences do not come about in us by nature, he uses the term fuvsei as meaning nature1: something given (as opposed to acquired) which will be necessarily actualized due to an internal source, whenever nothing impedes it. This does not mean that human beings do not have these kind of given and unchangeable poten-cies, which are by nature1 in the exact same sense that the stone moving downwards is. These include, for instance, the potencies associated with the nutritive functions. But the things that are by nature1 in us seem to remain opaque to moral evaluation, and hence are outside the realm of moral normativity.24 It is no accident –given that in us this kind of dispo-sition is also by nature1– that there can be no excellence corresponding to the nutritive part of the soul,25 just as the stone cannot develop any moral excellence.

If we share with the stone a set of dispositions of the kind I call na-ture1, then what is the difference between our nature2 and the nature2 of the stone? The nature2 or inner principle of movement of the stone boils down to certain given and unchangeable dispositions, i.e. to nature1, while human nature2 does not. But before examining the peculiar status of human nature1 as a principle of movement and its relation to human nature2, I will briefly analyze claims (1.b) and (2.a).

23 I.e. in most of the individuals of the species. 24 What is or comes about in us by nature1 has an exculpatory role instead: NE III 1,

1110a23-26; NE III 5, 1114a23-28; NE II 5, 1106a9-10. 25 NE VI 12, 1144a9-10: tou de; tetavrtou morivou th~ yuch`~ oujk e[stin ajreth;

toiauvth, tou` qreptikou (“Of the fourth part of the soul, the nutritive, there is no excel-lence of this sort”; Ch. Rowe’s translation, with modifications); cf. I 13, 1102b11-12.


After stating that excellence of character is not in us by nature, Aris-totle promptly makes it clear that it is also not contrary to nature (para; fuvsin). The “nature” alluded to here cannot be anything other than our nature2, which makes sense especially if we interpret his position together with the claim that it is natural for us (hJmi`n) to receive the excel-lences. This means that acquiring them does not involve any violence or contrariety to our nature as an internal source of movement.26 They are not contrary to our nature2 in the way that it is contrary to the nature2 of the stone to move upwards. Understood in this way, there is no need to give any ethical normative strength to the concept of para; fuvsin when applied to the excellences mentioned in this locus.27 Instead, the concept as used in this passage can be understood under its usual non-ethical meaning: something which is in a natural being and happens in a differ-ent manner than that which is determined by its nature2, i.e. by its inter-nal principle of movement and rest. For instance, it is para; fuvsin for fire to move downwards or earth upwards,28 and the processes of decay in living beings are also para; fuvsin, for they involve the actualization of potentialities contrary to those of flourishing, which constitute the nature2 of the living being.29 Thus, what our text of NE II 1 can be taken to mean is merely that, if excellences were contrary to our nature in this manner, it would obviously be impossible to acquire them by habituation (as we do), just as the stone cannot be habituated to move otherwise. This means that the acquisition of excellences of character by habitua-tion does not entail violence against our nature2 as an internal source of

26 For the identification of para; fuvsin and violence (biva/), cf. for instance De Caelo

300a23, 301b21; GA IV 8, 777a18-19; Phys. IV 8, 215a1-6. 27 Aspasius (cf. 38.20-22) in his commentary on the text, says that vice is para; fuvsin,

and therefore claims that virtue is kata; fuvsin (cf. supra n. 21). But all that Aristotle says in this passage is that virtue is not para; fuvsin, from which it does not follow that vice is para; fuvsin. Such a claim would obviously entail the truth of the thesis that virtue is kata; fuvsin, which would clearly concede practical normative strength to the fuvsi~. In sum, there is no trace, in the passage of EN II 1, of the idea that vice is para; fuvsin, hence fuvsi~ here should not be understood as having practical normative strength.

28 Cf. De Caelo, 269b35-270a3. 29 Cf. Metaph. H 5, 1044b29-1045a6; De Caelo, 288b14-16. In the same manner, de-

fects of birth and monstrosities are para; fuvsin, for they involve embryos (or, in general, matter) moving in a manner contrary to the form as a source of movement, cf. GA II 6, 745b9-15; IV 4, 770b9-10.

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movement, and this is partly because, again, our nature2 is not like the nature2 of the stone: it not only involves capacities which will be neces-sarily actualized when the correct conditions are present, but also the capacity of acquiring capacities or dispositions. But this last sort of natu-ral capacity or disposition is unlike the rest of the natural dispositions in several ways.

In the first place, the natural disposition to receive the excellences is not actualized by nature, but by non-natural means, i.e. by habituation. To this extent, it is misleading to call this a “natural” disposition, for it seems to be the contrary of what Aristotle elsewhere calls “natural potencies” (Metaph. Q 5). The fact that we receive (devcomai) the excel-lences is highly relevant, for it implies the presence of something else from which we receive them, something external to us. In this sense, it is clear that this natural capacity for excellence is not actualized by nature. It is not an internal principle that develops if nothing impedes it (as hap-pens with the processes due to fuvsi~ as an internal source of change), but a capacity which requires external sources to develop, and develop in the right way. In particular, the right kind of early moral education is necessary in order for a child to acquire the excellences of character, such that he first performs virtuous actions by following the example of –or obeying– an appropriate mentor. After a period of habituation, as an adult, he can perform these actions due to the (already acquired) excellence he has acquired. This is coherent with Pol. 1334b12ff. and the role of early training in habits for the formation of the right moral char-acter in the citizens of the polis,30 which is, in turn, for the sake of educa-tion in rationality (cf. 1334b27). These loci partly explain why Aristotle claims in (2.b) that we are brought to completion by habituation, since education through habituation is pursued with a view to the end of rea-son (lovgo~) and intelligence (nou`~), which comprise the end (tevlo~) of our nature.31

In the second place, even when its actualization does not depend on an internal principle, this natural disposition for acquiring the excellences

30 This training in habits takes place prior to the training of reason, and is acquired

through gymnastics (Pol. VII 3, 1338a10ff.) and musical education (Pol. VII 5-7). 31 Pol. 1334b12-15; cf. esp. b15: oJ de; lovgo~ hJmin kai; oJ nou`~ th~ fuvsew~ tevlo~. Cf.

infra n. 72.


is unlike other natural dispositions because its actualization, in the end, depends on the agent. And this brings us back to the problem of human nature as a principle of that special kind of movement called action. In the next section I analyze this particular characteristic of human nature2, and argue that it does not entail a particular ethical ideal, but is rather the condition of possibility for the realm of practical normativity. Indeed, it is the condition of possibility for any ethical ideal.

III.

In the previous section, I showed that excellences are not given in us by birth, not even under the form of capacities or potencies. What we have instead is the capacity to acquire them through non-natural means. To this extent, what is due to nature (fuvsei) is opposed to that which is acquired. It is opposed, for instance, to excellences and to habits in gen-eral, even vices.32 In fact, this opposition is entailed by another proposi-tion that can be found in many passages concerning moral responsibility, where nature as a cause, and what is due to nature, is opposed to what depends on the agent (ejf j auJtw/). In this kind of context, in fact, what is due to nature remains beyond moral evaluation. Thus, in NE III 1, 1110a23-26, Aristotle says that mixed actions, when performed under a duress that no one could withstand, and which overpowers human nature (ajnqrwpivnh fuvsi~), deserve sympathy (suggnwmhv) and not blame, just as in the case of involuntary actions, which are not morally imputable to the agent.33 Indeed, in EE II 8, these actions are considered involuntary. Here also the duress exerted on the agent is greater than his nature can withstand (1225a21), and makes the actions thus performed involuntary

32 Cf. NE II 5, 1106a9-10: ajgaqoi; de; h] kakoi; ouj ginovmeqa fuvsei: ei[pomen de; peri;

touvtou provteron (“we do not become excellent or bad by nature –but we talked about this earlier”; Ch. Rowe’s translation); cf. A. Laks (1988 179-180) who also argues that Aristotle tends to downplay the role of fuvsi~ in moral theory rather than appealing to it.

33 Cf. NE III 1, 1109b30-35. I take the treatment of to; eJkouvsion and to; ajkouvsion in NE III 1 (and EE II 6-9) as a discussion about moral responsibility, as do T. Irwin (1980), R. Sorabji (1980), S. Sauvé-Meyer (1993), D. Bostock (2000). For a different reading, which claims that NE III 1 is not about moral responsibility, see R. Hursthouse (1984), J. Roberts (1989), M. Zingano (2008).

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because they do not depend on the agent. What depends on the agent is here again opposed to nature as a limit on the agent’s choice: “for what depends on one, on which the whole issue turns, is what one’s nature is able to withstand” (1225a25-26).34 In all these cases, the exculpatory role of nature as a cause of our defects or bad actions and dispositions seems to result from the fact that nature is given and not acquired by the agent as a consequence of her own actions.

Taken more generally, I believe that what is due to nature (under-stood as the set of given dispositions that I call nature1) and what depends on us can be taken as two kinds of ontologically different causes. It is uncontroversial that nature is a cause qua internal source of movement. In most living beings, this internal source of movement which is their nature2 is identical to what I called nature1. But in the na-ture2 of human beings, there is also another kind of capacity (in addition to those contained in nature1) which makes possible a form of causality different from that of nature1, and which makes possible the realm of moral normativity. This form of causality is that which depends on us.

Aristotle refers many times in his ethical writings to what depends on us (ejf j hJmin), especially when he endeavors to delimit what can be an object of deliberation (bouvleusi~) and of choice (proaivresi~), and also when he discusses the problem of involuntariness and moral responsi-bility. In the first case, “what depends on us” has a prospective meaning and delimits the sphere of practical possibility, that is, of what is possible for an agent to do in a particular circumstance.35 In the second case, “what depends on us” has a retrospective meaning (it refers to what caused an action) and is opposed to the involuntariness of extreme duress resulting from the circumstances. I will not focus here on the prospec-

34 I follow Woods’ translation, with modifications. In NE III 5, 1114a23-28, bodily

defects are also evaluated by means of this logic: Aristotle explains that no one blames people who are ugly or blind by nature (dia; fuvsin), i.e. by birth, but one would blame those who become ugly or blind due to lack of self-care. The difference is, again, that the former conditions, being by nature, do not depend on us (ejf j hJmin), whereas the latter do.

35 Cf. EE II 10, 1225b36-37, 1226a2-6, 1226a32-33, NE III 3, 1112a33-34, 1113a9-11, Rhet. 1359a37-39. This is relative to the agent and to the circumstances of her action, of course. In fact, within the discussion of practical deliberation and choice, Aristotle says that deliberation and choice are about the things that one thinks (oi[etai) or can be produced by oneself (cf. EE II 10, 1225b34-36; NE III 2, 1111b23-26).


tive aspect of this concept, which involves the factual circumstances of action; instead, I will concentrate on the ontology of the kind of causa-tion that we could call ejf j hJmi`n. For this issue, the key text is EE II 6, 1222b15-1223a1536:

“[i] All substances are by nature principles of a sort, which is why

each one can actually generate many things of the same sort: for in-stance, a human being generates human beings, and, in general, an ani-mal generates animals and a plant plants. [ii] A human being, moreover, is the only animal that is also a principle of some actions; indeed, of no other animal we would say that it acted. [iii] Among principles, those that are of that sort –those from which movements first arise– are called controlling principles. (…) [ii’] A human being is the principle of a cer-tain movement, for an action is a movement. (…) [iv] So that, if there are some of things that are capable of being one way or the opposite, then their principles are necessarily of the same kind. In fact, what follows from what holds of necessity must itself be necessary, whereas what results from these [sc. from what can be in one way or another] can turn out in opposite ways, [v] and many of such things depend on men, and they themselves are the principles (ajrcaiv) of such things. So it is clear that those actions that man is a principle of, and over which he has power (kuvrio~), can come about as well as not come about; and that it depends on him that these <actions> –over whose being or not being he has power– come about or not. He himself is the cause of all those

36 I am aware that EE is an earlier work having doctrinal and methodological differ-

ences from NE. As P.-L. Donini (1999: xvi-xix) has pointed out, EE approaches ethical problems from a rather theoretical perspective, attempting to connect these issues with the more general structure of physical movement. However, it is precisely for this reason that EE offers theoretical elements which help to clarify the kind of ontological-causal structure underlying the production of rational voluntary actions considered as move-ments. I think that this hermeneutical approach, when exercised prudently, is legitimate. On this matter I agree with Donini when he says that this methodological feature of EE, in contrast to NE, does not indicate that Aristotle had completely rejected the validity of the former: “qualcosa che non è esplicitamente detto nell’ opera posteriore e che si trova invece nella più antica non necessariamente si debe credere sia stato da lui sconfessato o abbandonato” (Donini, 1999: xviii). Thus, both approaches can be compatible to some extent.

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things that it depends on him either to do or not to do, and all those things that he is the cause of depend on him.

[vi] Now since excellence and vice, and the resulting deeds, are respectively praised and blamed (for blame and praise are given not to things that occur of necessity or by luck or by nature, but to the things we ourselves are a cause of; indeed, for things that someone else is the cause of, he gets the praise and blame), it is evident that excellence and vice have to do with those actions of which oneself is the cause and principle37.”38

The line of argumentation is roughly as follows: [i] all substances are

principles of movement by nature (kata; fuvsin). From the examples given we can infer that being a principle of movement by nature is to be a principle of movement according to the nature2 of the substance in question, i.e. according to its essence or form. Aristotle is thinking here of the form as a principle of movement in natural generations, which is what allows man to beget a man.39 It is noteworthy that this principle of

37 eijsi; dh; pasai me;n aiJ oujsivai kata; fuvsin tine;~ ajrcaiv, dio; kai; eJkavsth polla;

duvnatai toiauta gennan, oi|on a[nqrwpo~ ajnqrwvpou~ kai; zw/on {o]n} o{lw~ zw/a kai; futo;n futav. pro;~ de; touvtoi~ o{ g j a[nqrwpo~ kai; pravxewvn tinwvn ejstin ajrch; movnon twn zwv/wn: twn ga;r a[llwn oujqe;n ei[poimen a]n pravttein. twn d j ajrcwn o{sai toiautai, o{qen prwton aiJ kinhvsei~, kuvriai levgontai […] oJ d j a[nqrwpo~ ajrch; kinhvsew~ tinov~: hJ ga;r pra`xi~ kivnhsi~. […] w{st j ei[per ejsti;n e[nia twn o]ntwn ejndecovmena ejnantivw~ e[cein, ajnavgkh kai; ta;~ ajrca;~ aujtwn ei\nai toiauvta~. ejk ga;r twn ejx ajnavgkh ajnagkaion to; sumbainon ejstiv, ta; dev ge ejnteu`qen ejndevcetai genevsqai tajnantiva, kai; {o}} ejf j auJtoi~ ejsti toi~ ajnqrwvpoi~, polla; twn toiouvtwn, kai; ajrcai; twn toiouvtwn eijsi;n aujtoiv. w{ste o{swn pravxewn oJ a[nqrwpov~ ejstin ajrch; kai; kuvrio~, fanero;n o{ti ejndevcetai kai; givnesqai kai; mhv, kai; o{ti ejf j auJtw` taut j ejsti givnesqai kai; mhv, w|n ge kuvriov~ ejsti tou` ei\nai kai; tou mh; ei\nai. o{sa d j ejf j auJtw ejsti poiein h] mh; poiein, ai[tio~ touvtwn aujto;~ ejstivn· kai;; o{swn ai[tio~, ejf j auJtw.

ejpei; d jh{ te ajreth; kai; hJ kakiva kai; ta; ajp j aujtwn e[rga ta; me;n ejpaineta; ta; de; yektav (yevgetai ga;r kai; ejpaineitai ouj dia; ta; ejx ajnavgkh~ h] tuvch~ h] fuvsew~ uJpavrcon-ta, ajll j o{swn aujtoi; ai[tioi ejsmevn· o{swn ga;r a[llo~ ai[tio~, ejkeino~ kai; to;n yovgon kai; to;n e[painon e[cei), dhlon o{ti kai; hJ ajreth; kai; hJ kakiva peri; taut j ejstin w|n aujto;~ ai[tio~ kai; ajrch; pravxewn. (ed. Mingay-Walzer)

38 I follow Woods’ translation, with important modifications. 39 a[nqrwpo~ ga;r a[nqrwpon genna/, Phys. II 7, 198a26-27; cf. Metaph. Z 7, 1034a22-23;

PA I 1, 640a25; cf. MM I 10, 1187a30-35. That the specific form is the source of movement in natural generations is a thesis found in many loci (Metaph. Z 7, 1033b29-33, 1034a2-5; PA II 1, 646a30-35) and is pervasive in GA. Cf., for instance, GA I 20, 729a9-11; Ib. I 21, esp. 729b18-21; Ib. I 22, 730a28-30, 730b16ff.; and especially GA II 1, 732a1-


movement is expressly called kata; fuvsin, and that human beings are this kind of principle of movement kata; fuvsin, again, according to their own nature2. Also, this is a form of causality that human beings have in common with other living beings (animals and plants).

[iii] These principles, which are the first source of movement, are called controlling principles (ajrcai; kuvriai). That is, in a given process there is one principle of movement at the beginning that determines the kind of process that takes place, and which also gives unity to that pro-cess, being present –as a cause– all throughout the process. In the case of generations, this first principle is the form as an end (which deter-mines, e.g., that a wolf or a horse is generated). In the case of actions, this first principle is the choice,40 or in general, the intention to perform a certain action. There are certainly other sources of movement which are not first in a causal chain and hence are not controlling (for instance, the intermediate causes in a process, which are like operations and instruments which are caused for the sake of the end).41

[ii] and [ii’]: A human being is the only living being which is not only a principle of movement kata; fuvsin, but is also a principle of action, which is also a sort of movement (hJ ga;r praxi~ kivnhsi~). In other words, human beings are a principle of movement in two different ways: 1) as natural beings, humans are a principle of movement kata; fuvsin, just like every other natural being (i.e. they are principles of biological movements). 2) As an agent, a human being is a principle of movement of actions.42 This twofold character of human beings qua causes is just an-other aspect of the thesis that the nature2 of human beings contains a set of potencies which we can call nature1, but human nature2 is not reduci-ble to nature1.

In what follows [iv] Aristotle distinguishes necessary principles, from which things result by necessity and always in the same manner, and another sort of principle, which can be one way or the contrary (ejnde-

6, 734b28-735a3 where the source of movement is associated with the sperm as that which contains the “movement of nature” (hJ de; th" fuvsew" kivnhsi" ejn aujtw/), where nature is evidently the specific form.

40 Cf. NE VI 2, 1139a31-33. 41 Cf. Phys. II 3, 194b35-195a3. 42 Cf. also NE III 3, 1112b31-32: e[oike dhv, kaqavper ei[rhtai, a[nqrwpo~ ei\nai ajrch;

twn pravxewn.

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covmena ejnantivw~ e[cein),43 from which one thing or its opposite can come about (ejndevcetai genevsqai tajnantiva). Now [v] man is an in-stance of this last sort of principle. From the context it seems obvious that Aristotle is considering man as an agent, but it is still worth noticing that, even though he does not mention it here, it is clear that other things, like nature1, are also principles from which opposites can arise.44 Certainly, within the sublunary realm things like natural generations do not always happen in the same manner, but only most of the time (wJ~ ejpi; to; poluv), for there is room for the accidental here. Thus, a wolf does not always beget a wolf, but only most of the time, for it is possible that this particular wolf on this occasion might not beget a wolf, but rather a monstrosity.45 In this sense, man is a contingent principle kata; fuvsin (cf. 1222b15-18). But man seems to also be a contingent principle in a different manner: not merely as a natural being, but as an agent. Thus, man is the only animal which is also a principle of actions (cf. 1222b19). And the difference between nature1 as a cause and the agent as a cause lies, I believe, in the fact that nature1 does not produce one or another of opposite results in the way it is up to the agent to do one thing or its contrary.

Things that happen by nature1 can turn out in opposite ways, but it does not depend on nature1 to cause one thing or its opposite. Strictly speaking, a nature1 itself can only cause one of the two opposites. For instance, in a process of generation, the form of a man only causes a man, the form of a horse only causes a horse, and the form of an oak tree only causes an oak tree. When something different from a man (or horse or oak tree) results, this is due to some interference external to the process caused and controlled by nature1 (and an outcome of this kind is

43 I.e. which are contingent. 44 In lines 1222b17-18 of this passage man himself is mentioned precisely as a natural

being (and not as an agent), along with animals and plants. 45 Actually, within the natural sublunary realm, every potency is at the same time a

potency for contradictories (pa`sa duvnami" a{ma th" ajntifavsewv" ejstin, Metaph. Q 8, 1050b8-9), for what is potential can be unactualized (1050a10-11, 30-34). This holds good not only for rational potencies, as is clear, but also for irrational (natural) potencies (aiJ a[logoi) within the sublunary realm (1050a33-34). These latter do not actualize of necessity, but only most of the time and if nothing prevents it. For a thorough discussion of this issue and of anomalous generations in nature, see G. Rossi (2011: 226-230; 266-277).


called precisely para; fuvsin). The cause of the “opposite” result is something else, namely the matter.46 Does this mean that only one of the opposites depends on nature1 whereas the other does not? I believe that the difference between nature1 as a cause and an agent as a cause is even stronger: neither of the opposites depends on nature1. It does not de-pend on the stone to go downwards because it does not depend on it to go upwards: “… if the cause of walking <is in> oneself, then also is the cause of not walking. So if it depended on fire to go upwards, it clearly would also depend on fire to go downwards” (Phys. VIII 4, 255a 8-10).47 So, strictly speaking, neither what happens para; fuvsin nor what happens kata; fuvsin depends on nature1. In fact, in order to say that some result A depends on us, it is necessary that the opposite of A depend on us too.48

That neither result depends on nature1 in this sense means, in the end, that whenever the conditions are met to actualize those natural po-tentialities, it is necessary (and not avoidable) that these potentialities be actualized. Whenever a stone loses support, it cannot but fall; it is not up to the rock (ejf j auJtw/) to do it, even when the principle of movement is internal to it. Whenever the sperm of a man concocts the menstrual blood, if nothing interferes in the process, nothing but a man can result. For this reason, things that are by nature1 are not morally imputable to an agent, even when it is her own nature1 that produces these results.49

46 Cf. Metaph. E 2, 1027a13-15 (w{ste e[stai hJ u{lh hJ ejndecomevnh para; to; wJ" ejpi; to;

poluv a[llw" tou sumbebhkovto" aijtiva). Strictly speaking, to say that matter is the cause of the exceptional result is the same as saying that another nature1 different from the controlling nature1 is the cause, since matter also always acts according to its natural potencies. But we need not get into this complex problem here.

47 ([...] eij tou badivzein ai[tion auJtw/, kai; tou` mh; badivzein), w{st j eij ejp j aujtw/ to; a[nw fevresqai tw/ puriv, dhlon o{ti ejp j aujtw/ kai; to; kavtw.

48 Cf. NE III 5, 1113b7-8: ejn oi|~ ga;r ejf j hJmin to; pravttein, kai; to; mh; pravttein, kai; ejn oi|~ to; mhv, kai; to; naiv (“… when acting depends on us, not acting does so too, and when saying no does so, saying yes does too…”).

49 To this extent, it is not an accident that nature has the same status as chance and necessity, when considered in practical contexts (cf. EE II 6, 1223a10-12, II 8, 1225a9-11; NE III 3, 1112a30-33; Rhet. I 10, 1368b32-37). From a theoretical point of view, what is by nature is not by chance, and most of the time it is also not by necessity. From a practical point of view, however, nature1 is necessitating (for it does not depend on us), and is a factum of chance, insofar as it is an exterior good (cf. infra n. 65).

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What is proper to man as a contingent controlling principle of action (i.e. as an agent), then, is that it depends on him whether one thing hap-pens or not, as we see in text [v] above.50 In this case, there is no external interference in the process, but it is the same agent, qua principle of movement, that can be the cause of A and not-A. That both A and not-A depend on the agent means that even when nothing impedes the actual-ization of A, the potentiality of A can remain unactualized, and this hap-pens if the agent simply decides not to do A. This is why it is so relevant, in order to attribute moral responsibility to an agent for an action, to know whether the opposite course of action was or not within the agent’s power, i.e. if he could do otherwise.51 This is crucial to know in order to determine whether the action depended on someone (ejf j auJtw/), because only in this case can one consider that he or she was the cause of that action52 as an agent, i.e. as a moral and not as a natural being.

Finally, in section [vi] of the passage quoted above, one can see that this kind of causality ejf j hJmi`n (i.e. the kind of cause we are as agents) sets the limits within which there is moral imputability, i.e. praise and blame. Excluded from this realm are things done out of luck or due to nature.53

50 Cf. also NE III 1, 1110a15-18; Ib. III 5, 1113b6-8; cf. R. Sorabji (1980: 233-234). 51 For instance, the agent could not have done otherwise if he was moved by an

external force, or if he was under a certain kind of coercion, or if he performed a movement due to his nature1, i.e. by some sort of “internal” necessitation.

52 When Aristotle says, in [v] above, that man “is the cause of all those things that it depends on him either to do or not to do, and all those things that he is the cause of depend on him”, he is considering practical and not natural causality; that is, he is considering man as an agent.

53 Cf. R. Sorabji (1980: 227-238), and especially S. Sauvé-Meyer (2006), who interprets the discussion about voluntariness as an inquiry into the causal conditions of praise and blame. For discussion of what depends on us qua what we are the cause of, and hence that for which we can be praised or blamed (and punished), see EE II 9, 1225b7-10, Ib. II 10, 1226b30-32. Cf. also Alexander of Aphrodisias, De Fato XXVII, 197.17-21: “If then the wise man (frovnimo~) were of such a kind from his birth, and possessed [his wisdom] having received it from nature in addition to the other gifts given to him by her, it would not at all depend on him (ejp j aujtw/) to be of such a kind, just as it would not [depend on him] to be two footed or rational either; nor would he any longer be praised for being like this…” (transl. R.W. Sharples). Admittedly, the condition of being ejf j hJmin is part of the Aristotelian definition of a voluntary action in EE (1225b7-10), but is not included in the definition of voluntary action in NE (1111a22-24). However, in NE III 5, 1113b20-21, Aristotle states that actions which are ejf j hJmin are voluntary (cf. also Ib. 1114b28-29, 1115a2-3). For an attempt to integrate the ejf j hJmin condition within the Nicomachean definition of voluntariness, see T. Irwin (1980: 122).


Blame and praise are moral reactions, hence they entail a certain moral normativity. To this extent, causality ejf j hJmi`n, i.e. the fact that there are things which depend on us, involves moral normativity, and is its condi-tion of possibility. If there were nothing that depended on us to do or not to do, we would not make moral judgments about our actions since they simply would not make any sense, just as it makes no sense to apply moral judgments to movements derived from nature1.

Thus the possibility of moral judgments, and hence the realm of moral normativity, depends on this kind of causality, which is proper to man as a controlling principle of action. This capacity of performing or not performing a particular action in a particular circumstance is not part of our nature1 but rather, as I have shown, is excluded by it. It has to do instead with the rational nature2 of human beings, which allows them to deal with those of their own given desires and impulses that can listen to reason,54 such that they can be shaped through habituation. In fact, as a ground for the claim that there is no excellence pertaining to the nutri-tive part of the soul (which is by nature1),55 Aristotle says that it does not depend on the agent to do or not do any of those things that are due to the nutritive part.56 The movements caused by this part of the soul, then, remain outside the realm of moral normativity. If we also remember that this part of the soul does not listen to reason –i.e. it is a part of our nature that is not permeable to rational mediations57– we have an addi-tional basis for believing that the presence of reason, which is properly human and defines our own ergon, is what makes causality ejf j hJmi`n pos-sible, as well as excellences of character and vices.

In fact, what is said about man as a cause of actions applies also to excellences of character (and to vices). From the fact that actions depend on the agent, it follows for Aristotle that excellences and vices also depend on the agent, since they are habits or dispositional states which come about in the agent through habituation, i.e. through the repeated

54 Excellence of character has to do with the part of the soul which, despite being

irrational, can listen and obey to reason, cf. NE I 13, 1102b13-14, 1102b30-1103a5. 55 Cf. supra n. 25. 56 NE VI 12, 1144a11: oujde;n ga;r ejp j aujtw/ pravttein h] mh; pravttein. It also does not

depend on the agent to age or to die, cf. NE V 8, 1135a33-b2. 57 NE I 13, 1102b29-30.

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performance of the same kind of action.58 Since these actions depend on the agent, the dispositional state which comes about from them depends on the agent too,59 for its principle lies in the agent himself.60 As I have shown in the case of actions, that which is by nature1 excludes what de-pends on us.61 This also holds in the case of excellences and vices which come about in us through action –if they depend on us (ejf j hJmi`n) then they are not by nature:

“Now some people think we become good by nature, while others

think it is by habituation, and others again by teaching. Well, the natural element clearly does not depend on us, but belongs by divine causes of some kind to the truly fortunate”62 (NE X 9, 1179b20-23; transl. Ch. Rowe, my italics).

In this passage Aristotle considers three possible forms of having

excellences of character (i.e. of being good), which he had already con-sidered in NE II 1.63 Here, as well as in II 1, Aristotle rejects the thesis that we are good by nature (fuvsei), precisely because what is natural does not depend on us. What we may have by nature is just what Aristotle calls natural excellences, which are emotional dispositions favorable for tem-perance, courage, etc. Some people have these by birth and hence they

58 NE II 1, 1103a31-b6, 1103b14-25; EE II 1, 1220a31-34. 59 NE III 5 passim, esp. 1113b6-14, 19-21, 1114a4-10. 60 Cf. NE III 5, 1113b32, 1114a19: hJ ga;r ajrch; ejn aujtw/. Excellences and vices, as

dispositional states, also determine what sort of things appear to the agent as good, i.e. as desirable. This means once again that man is the only living being whose desires depend on himself to some extent (pw`~) because he can shape them through habituation (cf. NE III 5, 1114a31-b3, 1114b22-24).

61 Cf. EE II 10, 1226a22-26. 62 givnesqai d j ajgaqou;~ oi[ontai oi} me;n fuvsei oi} d j e[qei oi} de; didach/. to; me;n ou\n th~

fuvsew~ dhlon wJ~ oujk ejf j hJmin uJpavrcei, ajlla; diav tina~ qeiva~ aijtiva~ toi~ wJ~ ajlhqw~ eujtucevsin uJpavrcei. Cf. Alexander of Aphrodisias, De Fato XXVII, 198.8-12: “If then we had a capacity that admits of the virtues from [nature] in such a way that, as we progressed and were perfected we acquired this too, as [we acquire the ability of] walking, and the growing of the teeth and beard and any other of the things that we acquire in accordance with nature—not in this way either would the virtues depend on us (ejf j hJmin) (…) But we do not acquire [the virtues] in this way.” (transl. R.W. Sharples).

63 NE II 1, 1103a15 (didaskaliva); 1103a17f. (e[qo~); 1103a19 (fuvsei).


involve no rational mediation.64 This kind of innate excellence is consid-ered by Aristotle to be a gift of fortune, i.e. an exterior good.65 Thus, the “natural” aspect of these excellences means that they are innate, and therefore that they do not depend on us. In this manner, the passage confirms that the thesis that excellences of character depend on us (ejf j hJmi`n) is the obverse of the thesis, presented in NE II 1, that excellences of character do not come about in us by nature1 (fuvsei).

IV.

How, then, does our nature2, being different from the nature2 of the stone, explain our capacity of receiving excellences by habituation? One possibility is to consider this trait of human nature2 as something irre-ducible or explanatorily basic. Thus, for example, in Pol. 1332b1-3, Aris-totle simply claims that some qualities, having by nature a dual possibility of actualization (dia; th~ fuvsew~ ejpamfoterivzonta), are liable to be modified by the habits in either direction, for the worse or for the better. Another possible answer to this question is to explain the capacity of being habituated by recourse to rational potencies, discussed by Aristotle in Metaph. Q 2.66 In fact, as we saw, these potencies are different from natural potencies in that they are not actualized by necessity whenever the required conditions are met. Rather, they are potencies of contraries, and the agent’s choice is what determines which one is actualized in a given circumstance.67 However, the problem with this explanation is that at the first stage of the acquisition of habits, which begins very early in

64 NE VI, 13, 1144b14-17; cf. Plato, Laws 4, 710a5-b2. 65 That natural excellences are due to fortune means that they are external goods, and

hence they are good only insofar as they can be integrated into a certain conception of the good life. Such a life can only be conceived of by our practical reason (without it, these natural excellences can even be harmful: NE VI 13, 1144b8-9). This explains why the natural excellences are not properly speaking excellences: for this it is necessary that they be accompanied by frovnhsi~, i.e. by the rational—and properly human—factor.

66 H. Joachim (1951: ad loc.), F. Dirlmeier (1956: 297), Gauthier-Jolif (ad 1103a18-26), as well as most other authors, draw a connection between the discussion of rational potencies in Metaph. Q 2, 1046a36-b24 and the claim of NE II 1 that excellences of character can be acquired by habituation.

67 Cf. Metaph. Q 5, 1048a5-13.

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life,68 we still do not have, properly speaking, rational potencies. A third possible answer, which seems to me to be plausible, is that our natural capacity for receiving excellences by habituation has to do with that part of our soul that is not rational, but is still capable of listening to reason. It does not necessarily have to be the agent’s own reason that is listened to. At an early stage of life, it can be “external” reason, namely that of the child’s parents. At a later stage in her moral and intellectual educa-tion, once the agent has acquired the corresponding habits, it will be her own, internal reason that this part of her soul will listen to. Thus, the fact that there is a part of the irrational soul that can pay heed and assent to reason is one of the conditions which make moral education possible. This part of the soul is, to some extent, “bidirectional” (as the passage of Pol. 1332b1-3 suggests), since it can be determined by different princi-ples, that is, it can listen to reason or not.69 If this thesis is correct, then reason (whether the agent’s own or the reason of a mentor) is a crucial part of our nature, our ergon, that allows us to acquire the sort of habits that constitute excellence of character (and, of course, the excellences of the intellect as well). At the same time, this “bidirectional” character (i.e. the fact that our reason can in fact determine action on a particular occa-sion)70 is reflected in the fact that what we do depends on us (is ejf j hJmi`n), and hence that we are morally responsible for our actions.71

To conclude, the question that remains to be answered is whether human nature2 also provides concrete ethical goals.72 And this is con-

68 Cf. NE II 1, 1103b23-25. 69 Based on an analysis of DA III 10, C. Natali (2004: 207-215) sustains, in a similar

vein, that the “variability” of human action described in EE II 6 can be explained by a “duplicity” of the principle of movement that causes human action. Thus, desire can be rational or irrational.

70 When it is not compelled by external coercion or by our nature (understood as that which is not up to us).

71 Cf. Natali (2004: 216-217). 72 J. Annas has claimed that in other writings, namely in Pol. I, Aristotle presents our

nature2 as providing ethical goals (cf. J. Annas, 1993: 150ff.). There are three places where –according to this author– nature seems to be used in a practical normative key: the claim that the polis is by nature (fuvsei) in Pol. I 2; the argument for slavery in Pol. I 4-6; and the discussion of wealth in Pol. I 8-10. These texts deserve a deeper analysis than I can pursue here. I will thus only comment briefly on the first and last case, where Annas sees a successful appeal to our nature as a source of moral normativity. 1) When dis-cussing the natural character of the polis, the point where human nature seems to be at


nected with the final claim (2.b) of the passage I cited from NE II 1: that we are brought to completion (teleioumevnoi~) by means of habituation. The allusion to our completion or attainment of our telos certainly sug-gests the idea that to acquire excellence were the fulfillment of our natu-ral tendencies, even when this end is achieved by non-natural means (and that is why we receive them from something else and don’t develop them from an exclusively internal source). There are also some passages which suggest this same idea. For instance, in Phys. VII 3, 246a10-17, Aristotle claims that

“Dispositional states (e{xei~) of body and of soul are not alterations,

for some of them are excellences and others are vices. However neither excellence nor vice are alterations, but excellence is a certain completion

stake is this: Aristotle claims that man is by nature (fuvsei) an animal who lives in poleis, more than any other (1253a1-3, 7-9; cf. NE I 7, 1097b11). To account for this, he intro-duces the tenet that nature does nothing in vain, and adds that man alone has discourse (lovgo~) to indicate what is morally right and wrong, and has perception (ai[sqhsi~) of good and bad, right and wrong, etc; and that mens’ sharing in these things makes a city (1253a9-18). The idea seems to be that, since man is naturally endowed with the capacity of perceiving and expressing what is morally right and wrong, he must be able to use and develop this capacity, and this can best happen within a polis. This is also consistent with the claim in NE II 1 that we are naturally able to receive the excellences. Thus, if there is an ethical goal prescribed by human nature here, it is that of making use of our given capacities (i.e. of our lovgo~ and our moral perception) in the best way (cf. also 1253a31-37). For this purpose, living in a polis provides the best conditions of possibility. This ethical goal does not seem very different –in its reach and specificity– from those we find in NE. Here again, our nature seems to be a condition of possibility for morality, and the moral goal it prescribes would be to make due use of that capacity. What is new is the claim that life within a polis is also a necessary condition for the development and use of that natural capacity. 2) As Annas claims, what sets the limit to the amount of gain that one will aim for is the concept of what a good life is (ajgaqh; zw/hv; cf. 1256b31-32, and also 1257b35-38; 1257b40-1258a10, and 1258a14-18). At some point, however, Aristotle claims that this amount is sufficient kata; fuvsin (1257a30), and that acquisition is limited in this way by nature (fuvsei). Thus, it seems that it is our nature that determines the limit where the acquisition is sufficient, and therefore our nature2 would provide an ethical goal. I believe, however, that this can be also understood in another manner. According to the passages cited, it is not so much that there is an ethical goal derivable from our nature, but that there is a certain conception of what a good life is. This conception, taking into account our biological nature and its needs as a datum, sets the limits for the amount of wealth that will be sufficient in order to meet our basic needs and live a good life, i.e. as a means for good life. But the practical normative strength (the material defini-tion of what a good life is), I believe, does not stem from our biological nature.

178 Gabriela Rossi

(teleivwsi~). In fact, whenever each thing acquires its own excellence, it is called “complete” (tevleion), for especially in that moment it is according to nature (kata; fuvsin) (…) Vice, instead, is the destruction and the disintegration of this <completion>.” I cannot discuss this problem thoroughly in this article. However, I

want to point out briefly that even when our nature provides an ethical goal, i.e. the pursuit of excellence, this can be interpreted in a deflation-ary way, that is, as naturally aiming for the best. What is natural is our ergon, and excellence would be the dispositional state (e{xi~) due to which we perform our own ergon well (eu\) (NE II 6, 1106a21-24). The point is whether our nature2 also determines the material definition of excellence in general, and of particular excellences, or whether it just entails the almost trivial statement that the best is preferable to the worst, i.e. that excellence is preferable to vice. Concerning the material definition of particular excellences, if we look at Aristotle’s concrete procedure, at least in the NE, we usually find him resorting not to our nature2 when it comes to defining these excellences,73 but to what is praised or blamed,74 i.e., to endoxa. Moreover, human nature seems to play no part in the defi-nition of excellence of character in NE II 6.

If there is any concrete goal provided by human nature, then, it is that of developing and making use of our reason and of our capacity to tell right from wrong (cf. n. 74). Our nature, however, does not seem to pro-vide any other positive ethical goals.75 Rather, human nature sets the conditions of possibility for practical normativity in general, through the

73 The only important exception seems to be the case of justice in NE V 7, where Aristotle describes that which is just by nature as being opposed to what is just by legal convention. Natural justice has the same strength everywhere (whether this is apparent to us or not), while legal justice seems to be more about particulars (cf. 1134b23-24) and is founded on convention and utility. But, somewhat surprisingly, both are mutable (1134b29-30). Nevertheless, Aristotle does not materially define what is just by nature, and even when the text is not entirely clear, I think Aristotle’s tenet could be interpreted not as a naturalist thesis, but merely as an anti-relativist thesis. Hence, that there is justice “by nature” could mean that there is a nature2 (essence) of justice, regardless of what is de facto just in different poleis.

74 Cf., for example, NE II 7, 1108a14-16; Ib. 9, 1109b14-26; IV 1, 1119b22-26; Ib. 4, 1125b8-17; Ib. 5, 1125b31-33, 1126b4-9; Ib. 6, 1126b16-19; Ib. 7, 1127a28-32.

75 I coincide with A. Laks (1988: 178) when he says that, in fact, Aristotle and Hellenistic philosophy do not belong together in this point.


capacity of perceiving moral right and wrong, and through the special causality exerted by human beings as agents, i.e. due to the fact that, as rational beings, we do some things not by nature but ejf j hJmi`n.

Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas Buenos Aires, Argentina

180 Gabriela Rossi

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Nature and excellence of character in Aristotle

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