Natural Theology and the Interpretation of Scripture in Averroes, Maimonides, and Aquinas (ACPA,...

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Copyright © 2013-15 Francisco J. Romero Carrasquillo. All rights reserved.

Natural Theology and the Interpretation of Scripture in Averroes, Maimonides, and

Aquinas1

Francisco J. Romero Carrasquillo

Universidad Panamericana

Guadalajara Campus

Draft read at the ACPA Meeting, Washington, D.C., October 9-12, 2014

Commentators: Richard Taylor, Sarah Pessin, Timothy Bellamah


Abstract

The believing practitioner of natural theology is keenly aware of how necessary it is to interpret

Scripture (be that the Jewish or Christian Scriptures, the Qur’an, etc.) in a non-literal way in

order to accommodate it to the findings of natural theology. For instance, the classical theistic

attributes of divine simplicity, immutability, and eternity have forced philosophers like Averroes,

Maimonides, and Aquinas to read in a non-literal way scriptural passages that apparently allude

to God as having parts, as changing through time, and as being somehow in time. As a result,

many classical theists, in particular Averroes and Maimonides, have developed theories of

biblical interpretation that capitalize on an allegorical and inner meaning that is hidden to the

uninitiated underneath the veil of Scripture’s literal sense, and that is meant to be discovered by

the philosopher’s trained scientific mind. Moreover, in these theories the literal sense is shot

through with falsehood, whereas only the inner or allegorical sense is presented as always true

and harmonious with the findings of philosophy. Aquinas, however, diverges from this

approach: although he acknowledges the presence of a spiritual sense distinct from the literal, he

claims that the scientific study of Scripture (sacra doctrina) hinges not on the spiritual but on the

literal sense of Scripture, and that all theological arguments must always proceed from this literal

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sense. Moreover, nothing false can ever underlie the literal sense, no matter how bizarre the text

may be. Thus, whereas it is relatively easy to see how Averroes and Maimonides’ views on the

interpretation of Scripture are coherent with their philosophical thought, in the case of Aquinas

this is not so easy to explain. This paper examines and compares the views of these three

thinkers on the interpretation of Scripture and inquires whether Aquinas successfully develops a

theory of biblical interpretation that is in harmony with his natural theology and other

philosophical views.

INTRODUCTION

Scholars specializing in the philosophy of religion are typically well aware that many

classical theistic claims regarding the nature of God tend to be at least prima facie divergent

from the type of claims regarding God that is usually found in religious texts. Classical theism,

particularly that of the Aristotelian and Neoplatonic traditions, describes God as being

incorporeal, eternal, immutable, and utterly simple, whereas in the Torah, the Bible, and the

Qur’an God is diversely described as being angered, as ‘repenting’ or changing his mind in

reaction to creatures’ behavior, and even as having bodily features, such as fingers and hands,

breath, a throne, etc. Thus, a basic problem in the philosophy of religion is how to interpret this

type of claim in a way that is consistent with the findings of philosophy, and in particular of

natural theology. Assuming that the claims of classical natural theology are true, the following

questions arise: Must the Torah, the Bible, or the Qur’an be sometimes interpreted in a non-

literal way in order for them to harmonize with the findings of natural theology? Or more

radically, must the philosopher admit that the intended meaning of some texts of Scripture is

philosophically false, or that the sacred author or hagiographer has erred philosophically, in

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order to explain the discrepancy?

These questions puzzled many thinkers of the medieval period. This is understandable

given how seriously they tended to take the truth claims of both philosophy and religion. We

find especially interesting attempts to resolve the problem in the works of the greater Aristotelian

interpreters of the three monotheistic traditions, namely, Averroes, Maimonides, and Aquinas.

The classical theistic list of divine attributes, such as God’s simplicity, immutability, and

eternity, forced these three thinkers to read in a non-literal way some scriptural passages that

apparently allude to God as having parts, as changing, and as being somehow in time. But the

details of how they did so are unique in each case. This paper is a study of how each of these

three medieval Aristotelians attempted to resolve the problem, and especially of how coherent

their approaches are. Particular attention will be given to Aquinas, whose literalistic approach to

the problem seems at least on the surface to be the most problematic.

The paper will consist in three parts. First, I shall briefly review Averroes’

thoroughgoing rationalism in his approach to Qur’anic exegesis, which is characterized by his

capitalizing on an inner meaning whose content is in essence identical to Aristotelian philosophy.

In the second part, I study Maimonides’ adaptation of Averroes’ approach: according to this

view the Torah is authored primarily by the prophet Moses, who was for Maimonides the

archetype of an Aristotelian philosopher, and who in order to hide truth from the masses and to

make it accessible only to an intellectual elite communicates philosophical doctrine in an

imaginative and allegorical text whose literal meaning is shot through with falsehood. I hope to

show in these two sections that both of the preceding philosophers resolve the problem by

appealing to an inner or allegorical sense that represents the true meaning intended by the sacred

writer, a meaning which they view as the only one that is ultimately harmonious with the

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findings of philosophy. In the third part, however, I show that Aquinas significantly diverges

from the approach of his immediate Arabic predecessors. He acknowledges the presence of a

spiritual sense distinct from the literal, yet he claims that the scientific study of Scripture (sacra

doctrina) hinges not on the spiritual but on the literal sense of Scripture, and that all theological

arguments must always proceed from this literal sense. Moreover, nothing false can ever

underlie the literal sense, and this is the case no matter how bizarre the text may be.

This paper, then, consists ultimately in a philosophical comparison of the views of these

three thinkers on the interpretation of Scripture and inquires whether Aquinas successfully

develops a theory of biblical interpretation that is in harmony with his natural theology and other

philosophical views. My thesis is that whereas it is relatively easy to see how Averroes and

Maimonides’ views on the interpretation of Scripture are coherent with their own philosophical

thought, in the case of Aquinas there is an apparent inconsistency whose solution lies in a more

complex understanding of biblical authorship and inspiration.

I. AVERROES ON THE PRIMACY OF METAPHYSICS IN THE INTERPRETATION OF SCRIPTURE

It is by now a well-established reading of Averroes that he was not an Averroist, at least

not in the sense of holding a ‘double truth’ theory. Far from it, he upholds the unity of truth and

the harmony between religion and metaphysics, resolving any tension between them by

defending what has been called his “strong rationalism,” the view that Aristotelian metaphysics,

due to its infallible method of demonstration, has absolute primacy above all religious discourse.

That is, he views metaphysics as the best tool for interpreting reality, the activity whereby human

beings best achieve wisdom, through the certainty and demonstrative perfection of Aristotelian

‘science’ as laid out in the Posterior Analytics. Religious discourse, on the other hand, falls

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short of this type of wisdom, insofar as it results in mere opinion or instruction by proceeding

either dialectically from assumed premises or rhetorically by means of non-rational forms of

persuasion. Thus, any apparent discrepancy between a metaphysical claim and a religious claim

regarding God or reality is ultimately resolved by an appeal to the superiority of the former over

the latter.2

How exactly he argues for this solution to the problem can be gleaned from his Faṣl al-

maqāl (the so-called Decisive Treatise), where he employs the Aristotelian hierarchical

classification of discourses—demonstrative, dialectical, and rhetorical—in order to explain the

varying degrees of intellectual abilities in people with respect to how they assent to claims

regarding reality.

[P]eople’s natures vary in excellence with respect to assent. Thus, some assent by

means of demonstration; some assent by means of dialectical statements in the

same way the one adhering to demonstration assents by means of demonstration,

there being nothing greater in their natures; and some assent by means of

rhetorical statements, just as the one adhering to demonstration assents by means

of demonstrative sciences.3

Averroes arranges Islamic society according to this threefold division, as consisting in a

three-tiered class system with regard to their interpretation of religious texts (ta’wîl), with the

rhetorically-adept masses representing the lower classes, the dialectically-adept theologians lying

in the middle tier, and the philosophers adept at demonstration forming the intellectual elite of

society:

For people are of three sorts with respect to the Law. One sort is in no way adept

at interpretation. These are the rhetorical people, who are the overwhelming

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multitude. That is because no person of unimpaired intellect is exempted from

this kind of assent. Another sort is those adept in dialectical interpretation. These

are those who are dialectical by nature alone, or by nature and by habit. Another

sort is those adept in certain interpretation. These are those who are demonstrative

by nature and art—I mean, the art of wisdom. This interpretation ought not to be

declared to those adept in dialectic, not to mention the multitude.4

Thus, whereas those adept at demonstration can grasp an ‘inner’ (bâtin) sense within the text that

is hidden from the rest, those adept at rhetoric and dialectic are able only to glean an outer

(zâhir), or apparent meaning from the texts.

Demonstration is therefore the ideal method for interpreting the religious text, for it

uncovers its ‘inner sense’, thus grasping by means of some non-literal interpretation of texts the

truth itself contained therein. But since a very elite few have the intellectual capacity necessary

for following this interpretive method, Averroes restricts the correct use of interpretation to the

class of people who are adept at demonstration. A dialectician may employ some sort of method

for interpreting the Law, but will successfully reach its inner meaning. And finally, most people,

who are rhetorically inclined, will employ simple belief to accept the apparent sense, and will

have no business interpreting the Law.

Concerning the things that are known only by demonstration due to their being

hidden, God has been gracious to His servants for whom there is no path by

means of demonstration—either due to their innate dispositions, their habits, or

their lack of facilities for education—by coining for them likenesses and

similarities of these [hidden things] and calling them to assent by means of those

likenesses, since it is possible for assent to those likenesses to come about by

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means of the indication shared by all—I mean, the dialectical and the rhetorical.

This is the reason for the Law being divided into an apparent sense and an inner

sense. For the apparent sense is those likenesses coined for those meanings, and

the inner sense is those meanings that reveal themselves only to those adept in

demonstration.5

Therefore, the interpretation of religious texts must submit to the scientific conclusions of

philosophical demonstration, where such demonstration can be established. Should there be an

apparent disagreement between what Aristotelian metaphysics demonstrates to be true about God

and what religion proposes for belief regarding God, it is in all cases the belief that must “admit

of interpretation,” that is, otherwise than according to its face value. For example, given his

purely Aristotelian view of God, Averroes believes that the religious claim that God provides for

particular human circumstances, if taken literally, contradicts what can be known to be true in

metaphysics. And since “truth does not contradict truth,” this claim cannot be taken to be true in

its literal sense. Therefore, he concludes, it must be understood in some non-literal way.

Speaking of texts that “admit of interpretation,” Averroes tells us that:

Since the jurist does this with respect to many of the Law-based statutes, how

much more fitting is it for the one adhering to demonstrative science to do so.

The jurist has only a syllogism based on supposition, whereas the one who is

cognizant has a syllogism based on certainty. And we firmly affirm that,

whenever demonstration leads to something differing from the apparent sense of

the Law, that apparent sense admits of interpretation according to the rule of

interpretation in Arabic.6

Yet this should not lead us to think that the apparent meaning of religious texts is there to

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deceive the uneducated masses. Rather, as we saw Averroes claims that God has been gracious

to grant to those who do not have the intellectual disposition for demonstration certain

‘likenesses’ of the inner meaning that they can grasp. So the dialectical and rhetorical

approaches will not grasp the inner sense, but they will be grasping similitudes or likenesses of

the truth of the text’s inner sense. In fact, far from falling into error by their belief in the

apparent sense of a text, the people adept at rhetoric and dialectic will be in a sense set on the

path to truth, in a manner that is appropriate to their natures. Not that the religious claims about

God that Averroes calls ‘likenesses’ are literally true, in the speculative sense of corresponding

to reality. Rather, this type of claim is ‘true’ only in the pragmatic sense of having practical

value for society, and thus of being morally praiseworthy. Religion, therefore, is necessary for

political life, not because of its epistemic value, but because of its moral value insofar as it aims

at the practical ordering of the masses towards a virtuous life:

All the learned hold about religions the opinion that the principles of the actions

and regulations prescribed in every religion are received from the prophets and

lawgivers, who regard those necessary principles as praiseworthy which most

incite the masses to the performance of virtuous acts.7

Since metaphysics can only lead some—the elite—to happiness, it is necessary to make use of

religion for this social purpose, for it has the advantage of being able to lead the masses in the

path towards virtue.

Religions are, according to the philosophers, obligatory, since they lead toward

wisdom in a way universal to all human beings, for philosophy only leads a certain

number of intelligent people to the knowledge of happiness, and they therefore

have to learn wisdom, whereas religions seek the instruction of the masses

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generally.8

Were the rhetorical or dialectical masses lead to employ the demonstrative method of

interpretation, they would be confused, would fall into error or unbelief, and would thus be led

astray. For this reason, just as it is obligatory for the elite who are adept at demonstration to

employ the method of interpretation, because it is their way to achieve wisdom, conversely it is

forbidden to those who are not adept at demonstration to employ interpretation. For the latter,

interpretation would amount to unbelief.

For anyone not adept in science, it is obligatory to take [religious texts] in their

apparent sense; for him, it is unbelief to interpret them because it leads to

unbelief. That is why we are of the opinion that, for anyone among the people

whose duty it is to have faith in the apparent sense, interpretation is unbelief

because it leads to unbelief. Anyone adept in interpretation who divulges that to

him calls him to unbelief; and the one who calls to unbelief is an unbeliever.9

Thus, if one looks closely at the Fasl Maqal, it appears that Averroes is not ready to say

there is falsehood in Scripture. There is no ‘double truth’ here: the inner sense is simpliciter true,

and external sense, though not in itself true, is not deceptive; it is there to lead to truth. As we

shall see immediately below, however, in Maimonides the situation is more complicated.

Scripture is at once the source of truth, but it contains external meanings with no truth in them

and which can even lead to idolatry, but which are meant to conceal the truth from those not

adept at demonstration.10

II. MAIMONIDES’ NEGATIVE THEOLOGY AND THE INTERPRETATION OF THE BIBLE11

In his Guide for the Perplexed, Maimonides’ main concern is to defend an

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uncompromisingly apophatic view of God, inspired in the Neoplatonic tradition. According to

his version of Neoplatonic apophaticism, God has no essence or positive attributes, and every

claim regarding God’s nature must be interpreted as being in some way or another a negation of

an attribute in God.

To achieve this goal within the Guide Maimonides dwells on a detailed commentary on

biblical texts which seem to ascribe corporeality to God. He approaches these texts much in the

same way as would Averroes, whose thought on the matter Maimonides evidently inherited.

Like Averroes, Maimonides views scripture as having an inner sense that bears the content of

classical philosophy and which is veiled underneath a literal sense. This inner sense is meant to

be discovered by the philosopher’s trained scientific mind and is hidden from the uninitiated

masses underneath the veil of the Torah’s literal sense. This literal sense is the only sense that

the masses are capable of understanding, and the philosopher must not disturb them with higher

philosophical interpretations of the Torah, for these interpretations would be scandalous to them.

Yet Maimonides’ view does have some interesting features that make it peculiar and

different from that of Averroes. Obviously, Maimonides presents his inherited Averrovian views

in Jewish, rabbinic terms, but more importantly he adds new philosophical elements that make

his view distinct from that of his predecessor. In general, Maimonides seems to adopt an even

“stronger rationalism,” that is, a more radical understanding of the superiority of metaphysical

reasoning over the claims found in religious texts regarding God, one that lacks some of the

nuances we found in Averroes.

For Maimonides, the aim of the Torah (of the “Law”) is to improve and perfect the soul,

and this is understood is strictly intellectualistic terms, that is, as a process of acquiring correct

opinions and eventually true knowledge of reality. The commandment to love God (Deut. 6:5) is

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reduced to a commandment to acquire metaphysical knowledge. And the greatest obstacle for

fulfilling this commandment is a literal interpretation of scripture, which results in a corporeal

notion of God and hence in idolatry. He acknowledges that the soul’s nature requires that its first

encounter with scripture and religion generally be saturated with corporeal and anthropomorphic

descriptions of God, and it is for this reason that he is so fond of reminding his reader of the

rabbinic dictum that “the Torah speaks in the language of humans.”12 Yet the path to perfection

consists in setting these things aside and eventually overcoming them, embracing a thoroughly

apophatic or negative theology.

Another distinct feature of Maimonides’ account of scriptural interpretation is his strong

emphasis on the importance of allegory. Given Maimonides’ radical apophaticism, it is

understandable that for him scripture’s language about God should be mostly allegorical. As we

saw, for Maimonides as for Averroes these allegorical literary devices admit of both apparent

and inner senses. The reason for this is that the sacred writer (in the case of Maimonides’

scripture, the writer is Moses, whom he views as the paradigmatic Jewish prophet who perfectly

understands philosophical truth) composes scripture under the inspiration of the active intellect,

but crafts the message in such a way that the truth is hidden under the veil of imagery (e.g., by

using corporeal descriptions of God) and imaginative stories (e.g., the theophany at Mount Sinai)

in order thus to communicate it in a rhetorically effective and persuasive way to average people,

allowing them to live according to the truth that they cannot directly grasp.13 The trained

philosopher, however, can correctly interpret scripture by uncovering the philosophical truth

behind the imagery. Thus, allegorical interpretation is for Maimonides the key for the proper

understanding of scriptural texts. As for Averroes, for Maimonides wherever the literal meaning

of a text is philosophically demonstrated to be false, as when God is described in a corporeal

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way, it is necessary to abandon that literal interpretation and seek an allegorical understanding of

the text.

Rather fittingly, Maimonides explains his doctrine on allegorical interpretation by using

allegorical imagery. He comments on Proverbs 25:11: “A word fitly spoken is like golden

apples in silver filigree casings.” 14 The “silver filigree casings” refer to the apparent or external

sense of the text, which are “words fitly spoken” aimed at the masses, whereas the golden apple

is the internal sense, the philosophical truth aimed at the elite. Maimonides is therefore stressing

the importance of hiding truth (gold) in more familiar (silver) garb, and, as such, the efficacy of

giving voice to truth always indirectly, which must be attractive and fanciful (silver filigree) so

as to impress itself upon the imagination of the average person.15

This brings us to the topic of falsehood in scripture. Maimonides emphatically argues

that the literal sense is shot through with falsehood and can in fact be an obstacle for true piety,

for it results in a material conception of God and hence in idolatry.

For this reason also man is blind to the apprehension of the true realities and

inclines toward the things to which he is habituated. This happened to the

multitude with regard to the belief in His corporeality and many other

metaphysical subjects as we shall make clear. All this is due to people being

habituated to, and brought up on, texts that it is an established usage to think

highly of and to regard as true and whose external meaning is indicative of the

corporeality of God and of other imaginings with no truth in them, for these have

been set forth as parables and riddles….16

As a result, in Maimonides we find the same intellectual elitism as in Averroes. Yet

Maimonides’ elitism is more explicit than that of Averroes, insofar as he admits that scripture

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teaches truth only to those adept at demonstration and falsehood to those who are not adept. In

the introduction to the Guide, Maimonides explains that Jewish law forbids discussing certain

theological problems, such as the account of creation, in public, such discussions being reserved

to advanced students and scholars. The reason is that scripture is an esoteric text insofar as its

true meaning is not its apparent meaning, and its correct interpretation is accessible only to an

intellectual elite, and that most people have a lower level of comprehension and therefore cannot

arrive at it, and remain in error. He even claims that sometimes it is necessary to hide truth by

resorting to contradictions. Sometimes a teacher needs to teach contradictory views to different

students, according to their levels of understanding, or to start discussions on the basis of

contradictory assumptions. “In such cases the vulgar must in no way be aware of the

contradiction; the author accordingly uses some device to conceal it by all means.” This sort of

“divergence” is observable within the introduction to the Guide itself, and Maimonides himself

openly warns the reader of this fact.17 In fact, Maimonides even implies that Scripture itself

contains contradictions. In the introduction, he gives seven causes for why a reader finds

inconsistencies and contradictions in a work. The third of these reasons is revealing:

The passages in question are not all to be taken literally: some only are to be

understood in their literal sense, while in others figurative language is employed

which, if taken literally, would seem to be contradictories or contraries.

Sarah Pessin is keen in pointing out that it is a “pretty serious problem” that for

Maimonides the allegorical artistry of scripture, besides having as its intended effect leading

people to live in the truth, has as an unpleasant side effect its leading them to falsehood about

God and consequently idolatry.18 And perhaps Maimonides is willing to pay this price to have a

coherent solution to the problem of the reconciliation of scriptural truth and metaphysics. For

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Aquinas, however, this would actually be too high a price, given his views on the authorship of

scripture. That is, for him it simply cannot be the case that scripture leads people to falsehood,

because God is the author of scripture, and God cannot possibly be the author of falsehood. This

means that for Aquinas the solution to the problem of harmonizing scripture and natural

philosophy must lie in a distinctively different strategy.

III. AQUINAS ON NATURAL THEOLOGY AND THE INTERPRETATION OF SCRIPTURE

As we have seen, Averroes and Maimonides have very similar accounts of scriptural

interpretation and its relation to natural theology. They simply defend the superiority of

metaphysical reasoning over religious discourse and resolve any apparent discrepancy between

the two by correcting religious belief by interpreting it philosophically. As I hope to show in this

section, Aquinas cannot go in this direction. The account of Thomas Aquinas is quite different,

as is to be expected given his Latin scholastic background, which is a synthesis of the much

richer Christian traditions of scriptural interpretation that originally developed in Antioch and

Alexandria. The heavy influence that this heritage has on Aquinas makes his solution to the

problem of the harmony between scripture and natural theology quite complex and fascinating.

The first and most basic principle that serves as support for Aquinas’ whole theory of

scriptural interpretation is that of the divine authorship of Scripture. Aquinas is convinced by his

Christian faith of the fact that God (or the Holy Spirit) ‘inspired’ the hagiographers of the

Hebrew and Christian bibles, and by this he understands that God is the principal author of their

words, whereas the hagiographers themselves were instrumental causes of the text. Aquinas

makes brief mention of this belief in several places of his corpus,19 but never seems to offer an

argument for it. The doctrine, then, seems to have the nature of a principle of the science of

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sacred theology, that is, an article of faith.

Aquinas acknowledges the presence in Scripture of a mystical sense distinct from the

literal. Yet as we shall see, the key to understanding this doctrine is the meaning Aquinas gives

to the term ‘literal’, which is very different from the meaning we have given to this word so far

in this paper. This distinction between the literal and mystical senses of scripture is in essence

Aquinas’ account of the well-known patristic doctrine of the four senses of Scripture, known in

the Middle Ages as the scriptural quadriga.20 Aquinas explains that there are two primary senses

or meanings for any one passage of Scripture: its literal sense and its mystical sense (or spiritual

senses). And these two senses correspond to two types of signification for Aquinas: the

signification of the word (vox) or text (littera), and the signification of the res. Ordinarily a vox

or littera is used by humans to signify a thing, a res; the res is the ordinary referent of a littera.

God, who for Aquinas is the primary author of Scripture, like any other author uses the littera of

Scripture to signify res. But those res that are the referents of the words of Scripture, have God

as their creator, and thus God, who relates to those res as an author relates to his text, can utilize

those things themselves as signs of other things. Thus, a vox or littera in Scripture can have two

referents: an immediate referent, the res that is immediately signified by the vox or littera, and a

mediate referent, the second res that is signified by the first. For example, in Exodus 12:46ff we

read the narrative text of the killing of the paschal lamb. The immediate referent of this narrative

text, or the res that is immediately signified by the littera, is the historical event of the killing of

the paschal lamb—and this is the ‘literal’ sense of the text. But this res itself is intended by God

as a sign of another res, namely, the sacrifice of Christ (the Lamb of God) on the Cross during

the Christian Paschal event, and this is the ‘mystical’ or ‘spiritual’ sense of the text.21 Therefore,

the literal sense is that which is immediately signified by the words of the scriptural text, and

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which is thus directly intended by the hagiographer, whereas the spiritual sense is that which is

signified, not by the words of Scripture but by the referent of the words, i.e., by the ‘thing’ (res)

which the words directly signify—and which thus is intended by God, and not necessarily by the

hagiographer.22

Now, Aquinas divides the mystical sense into three: the allegorical, anagogical, and

moral.23 First, the ‘allegorical’ sense of a passage is that where the referent is a prefiguration of

a later event in the history of salvation (see the example of the Paschal lamb given above).

Second, the ‘anagogical’ sense is that whereby the type refers to an eschatological antitype (e.g.,

as Jerusalem can signify the triumphant Church). And finally the ‘moral’ sense obtains when the

immediate referent of a passage is a further sign of the current state of Christian life (e.g., as the

exile of the people of Israel can be the type of the soul’s exile in this life).24

Now, what is truly astonishing is that, unlike his immediate Arabic predecessors, Aquinas

claims despite his Aristotelian and Neoplatonic natural theology that nothing false can ever

underlie the literal sense of scripture, and he seems to hold this no matter how bizarre the text

may be. He does not address this question directly, but in several places in his works he cites this

Christian doctrine as an article of faith. He, for example, states that if Scripture says that

something happens, one must not state that it did not, and cites St. Augustine to the effect that

“no Christian believes something contrary to Scripture,”25 and that “if we should admit that there

is something false in Scripture, its authority for confirming the faith would be void.”26 Similarly,

he says it is “heretical to say that something false can be found in the Gospels or in any canonical

scripture: and therefore it is necessary to say that all the Evangelists say the same thing and do

not disagree in any way.”27 He also cites St. Jerome as an authority on this point, saying:

Only those books of Scripture which are called canonical have I learned to hold in

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such honor as to believe their authors have not erred in any way in writing them.

But other authors I so read as not to deem everything in their works to be true,

merely on account of their having so thought and written, whatever may have

been their holiness and learning.28

Aquinas in fact argues that all theological arguments must always proceed from this

literal sense. That is to say, the scientific study of Scripture (sacra doctrina), which is the whole

subject matter of his masterpiece, the Summa theologiae, and which the absolutely highest

science and the most sublime form of human wisdom attainable through reasoning, hinges not on

some higher spiritual sense of the scriptural text but on the literal sense of the Bible.29

Thus we see in Aquinas a preoccupation that we did not see in his immediate Arabic

predecessors, namely, that of defending the truth, or even the absolute inerrancy, of the literal

sense of Scripture, and of insisting that the highest form of wisdom is based on this literal sense.

This makes us wonder, then, how he deals with the problem that arises when one compares the

literal sense of some passages, for example, the claim in Isaiah that God “has his throne in the

heavens and his footstool on earth” (Isaiah 66:1). Would he admit that there are texts in scripture

that must be interpreted allegorically in order to reconcile them with the findings of natural

theology? Or, conversely, would he be willing to reject or at least allegorize his natural theology

in order to make it fit the literal sense of scripture which he is so adamantly defending? From

what we have seen on the inerrancy of the literal sense, it would seem that it would be more

consistent for Aquinas to do the latter than the former.

Yet in his Commentary on Boethius’ De Trinitate we see a text that begins to open a

window for Aquinas, through which he can get out of the house whose door he has so tightly

shut. There, he addresses the question of how to deal with an apparent contradiction between the

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certain conclusions of philosophy and the literal sense of scripture.

It is impossible that those things which are divinely handed down to us be

contrary to those which are given to us through nature. For it is necessary that

either of them be false; and because both are given to us by God, then God would

be the author of falsehood, which is impossible.30

Hence, it seems that Aquinas should be at least equally willing to defend the truth of

natural knowledge as he is the inerrancy of the literal sense of Scripture. Therefore, whereas in

his immediate Arabic predecessors we saw a ‘strong rationalism’ that defended the primacy of

natural (metaphysical) reasoning over religious discourse—in Averroes the literal sense of

scripture is ‘true’ in some looser sense than the truth of metaphysics, and in Maimonides the

literal sense of scripture can be simply false and induce us to commit idolatry—in Aquinas we

see neither a rationalism nor its opposite, which we could call ‘fideism’, the view that the truth of

scripture trumps that of human reasoning. That is, Aquinas, unlike his predecessors, cannot

simply defend the superiority of metaphysical reasoning over religious discourse and resolve any

apparent discrepancy between the two by correcting religious belief by interpreting it

philosophically.

But, then, what does Aquinas do in practice in the case of an apparent contradiction

between the literal sense of a scripture text and the certain conclusions of natural theology? As

mentioned earlier, the solution to this problem lies in the meaning of ‘literal sense’ in Aquinas.

Aquinas does not understand the ‘literal sense of scripture’ to mean its face value meaning,

which is what we would mean by that expression. Recall that for him the literal meaning of a

scriptural text is the reference that the vox or littera has to the res being spoken of. Aquinas

briefly mentions in two of his discussions on the interpretation of Scripture that the littera can

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signify a res in two ways: properly and metaphorically.31 Thus, for example, when it is said that

Christ ascended into heaven, and sits at the right hand of God the Father, the literal meaning of

the words “He ascended into heaven” is historical, that is, the words signify the historical event

properly; whereas the literal meaning of the words “He sits at the right hand of God the Father”

is metaphorical or parabolical, that is, the hagiographer signifies a res by means of a metaphor,

which leads the mind of the reader to understand the true referent of the text. Hence, the ‘literal’

sense of a text is subdivided into two senses: the historical and the parabolical or metaphorical.

In the case of a text with a metaphorical or parabolical sense, the res signified is signified by

means of a literary image. The literal image is not the intended referent of the hagiographer, but

is utilized as a literary device to lead the reader to the intended referent. In the Summa, he

alludes to the same doctrine in a brief response to an argument. He explains that,

The parabolical sense is contained in the literal, for by words things are signified

properly and figuratively. Nor is the figure itself, but that which is figured, the

literal sense. When Scripture speaks of God’s arm, the literal sense is not that God

has such a member, but only what is signified by this member, namely operative

power. Hence it is plain that nothing false can ever underlie the literal sense of

Holy Scripture.32

Thus, we see clearly in this text that in the case of a metaphorical expression in Scripture, like

that of God’s having an arm, ‘literal sense’ in Aquinas does not mean what we would understand

by that phrase. The ‘literal sense’ is that ultimately intended by the hagiographer, even when he

uses a literary device, like a metaphor. In this case the literal meaning does not involve God’s

corporeality; for Aquinas the intended referent here is God’s operative power. Hence, when

Aquinas defends the absolute inerrancy of the literal sense of scripture, he is nonetheless open to

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metaphorical interpretation of texts.

Therefore, ultimately Aquinas is not saying something that is completely opposed to the

‘strong rationalism’ of the Arabs. Despite his insistence on the inerrancy of the ‘literal sense’ of

Scripture, he ultimately he thinks that the reconciliation of Scripture with natural theology is

brought about by reading the text of Scripture in a metaphorical way, even when he affirms that

this metaphorical reading is the ‘literal sense’ itself of the text.

Conclusion

Given their willingness to do allegorical interpretation, it is easy to see how Averroes and

Maimonides views on the interpretation of Scripture are coherent with their philosophical

thought. They simply defended the superiority of metaphysical reasoning over religious

discourse, and when a discrepancy between the two arose, they simply claimed that religious

belief in every case must be corrected by philosophical reasoning, at least in the minds of those

adept at demonstration, although this interpretation must not be divulged to the masses. But in

the case of Aquinas this is not so easy to explain. He does not show the same willingness to

downplay the speculative value of scriptural texts as do his immediate Arabic predecessors, and

adamantly defends the inerrancy of the literal sense of scripture and the related idea that theology

must derive arguments from this literal sense. But once we see that his language is different

from that of Averroes and Maimonides, especially insofar as he understands the ‘literal sense of

scripture’ differently, and that he is well aware of the necessity of interpreting Scripture in a non-

literal way in order to accommodate it to the findings of natural theology, then we can begin to

see how his theory of biblical interpretation can be harmonized with his natural theology and

other philosophical views, and that ultimately his theory of biblical interpretation is not

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completely opposed to the ‘strong rationalism’ of the Arabs.

1 An earlier draft of this paper was read at the conference, “Thomas d’Aquin et ses sources arabes,”

organized by the Aquinas and the ‘Arabs’ International Working Group, and held at the Sorbonne in Paris, June 3-4,

2013. I am grateful for the feedback I received from the members of the group on that occasion. 2 For Averroes’ understanding of the epistemic value of religious propositions, see my “The Dialectical

Status of Religious Discourse in Averroes and Aquinas,” American Catholic Philosophical Quarterly 88 (2014),

361-379. Much of my discussion on Averroes’ view in this first section of the paper is a development of what I

discussed in that earlier paper, but this time as applied to the question of the interpretation of scriptural texts. See

also Richard Taylor, “Averroes: God and the Noble Lie,” in Laudemus viros gloriosos: Essays in Honor of Armand

Maurer, ed. R. E. Houser (Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press, 2007), 38–59; Taylor, “Averroes’

Philosophical Analysis of Religious Propositions,” in Miscellanea Mediaevalia 26: What is Philosophy in the

Middle Ages? Proceedings of the 10th International Congress of Medieval Philosophy of the S.I.E.P.M., 25–30

August 1997 in Erfurt, ed. Jan Aertsen and Andreas Speer (Cologne: Walter De Gruyter GMBH & Co., 1998), 888–

94; Taylor, “Ibn Rushd /Averroes and ‘Islamic’ Rationalism,” Medieval Encounters: Jewish, Christian and Muslim

Culture in Confluence and Dialogue 15 (2009): 125–35. 3 Averroes, Decisive Treatise, 8, in Decisive Treatise and Epistle Dedicatory, trans. Charles E. Butterworth

(Provo, UT: Brigham Young University Press, 2001). 4 Decisive Treatise, 26. 5 Decisive Treatise, 19. 6 Ibid., 9. 7 Cf. Maurice Bouyges (ed.), Averroes’ Tahafot at-tahafot, (Beirut: Imprimerie Catholique, 1930), 584;

English translation: Simon Van Den Bergh, Averroes’ Tahafut Al-Tahafut (The Incoherence of the Incoherence):

Translated from the Arabic with Introduction and Notes, 2 vols. (London: Luzac, 1969), vol. 1, 361. 8 Bouyges (ed.), Averroes’ Tahafot at-tahafot, 582; Van Den Berg trans., vol. 1, 360. 9 Decisive Treatise., 21. 10 See Sarah Pessin, “The Influence of Islamic Thought on Maimonides,” The Stanford Encyclopedia of

Philosophy (Summer 2014 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.),

http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/sum2014/entries/maimonides-islamic/: “Following on this general sensitivity to

various layers of textual meaning, Maimonides shares his penchant for allegorical reading together with many

Islamic philosophical exegetes, including Al-Farabi, Avicenna, and Averroes, and in this way is part of a larger

tradition of textual interpretation (ta‘wîl) in which Scriptures are seen as having “outer” (zâhir) as well as “inner”

(bâtin) senses.” 11 Much of this section shows my debt to Sarah Pessin for her work on Maimonides, from which I have

learned much, especially her Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy article on “The Influence of Islamic Thought on

Maimonides” as well as discussions after her paper presentations (both in sessions and in informal conversations) at

meetings in recent years of the Aquinas and the ‘Arabs’ International Working Group. 12 See Moses Maimonides, Guide for the Perplexed (henceforth GP), 1.26, in Moses Maimonides, The

Guide of the Perplexed, translated by Shlomo Pines (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1963), and GP 1.53. 13 Cf. GP 5.1. 14 GP, Introduction. 15 Sarah Pessin “The Influence of Islamic Thought on Maimonides,” section 7.2: “The truths which

Maimonides seeks to reveal with this image are manifold: sometimes, in order to do service to the golden truth, one

must craft delicate silver casings (viz., allegories, parables, stories, metaphors, and other effective uses of language);

these ‘casings’ are filigreed—incredibly difficult to make, as well as extremely beautiful and tempting to look at;

these casings cover the golden core reality (which is to say, allegories hide the truth in itself), and yet, they allow

onlookers to catch a glimpse—through the filigree's apertures—of the very golden core which they cover; and,

finally, in at once hiding and revealing the true center, these ‘casings’ of silver are not themselves gold: where gold

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stands for “truth,” we may say that these ‘casings’ are not themselves “truth.” Where the casings are the allegories,

parables, and other methods employed by the Lawgiver (in the Bible and in other forms of religious guidance), the

implication is that that many of the ideas of the Bible and of religion more generally (as, for example,

anthropomorphic descriptions of God as sitting, standing, talking, willing, etc.) are not actually true. They are,

rather, delicate craftings (even: works of art) designed to captivate the interests of average people and, in this way,

lead them to living in accordance with the truth (see GP 3.51 for the parable of the palace).” 16 GP, 1.31. 17 GP, Introduction. 18 Sarah Pessin “The Influence of Islamic Thought on Maimonides,” section 7.2: Allegory and Obscure

Writing: External Layers vs. True Ideas. 19 Quodlibet 7, q. 6 a. 1 ad 5: “Ad quintum dicendum, quod auctor principalis sacrae Scripturae est spiritus

sanctus... Nec est etiam inconveniens quod homo, qui fuit auctor instrumentalis sacrae Scripturae....” Cf. Ad Gal.

cap. 4, lect. 7: “Et hoc specialiter est in sacra Scriptura et non in aliis; cum enim eius auctor sit Deus, in cuius

potestate est, quod non solum voces ad designandum accommodet (quod etiam homo facere potest), sed etiam res

ipsas. Et ideo in aliis scientiis ab hominibus traditis, quae non possunt accommodari ad significandum nisi tantum

verba, voces solum significant.” 20 This distinction of senses, and indeed, the division of the spiritual senses, dates at least as far back as

Origen; cf. Joseph Lienhard, SJ, The Bible, the Church, and Authority: The Canon of the Christian Bible in History

and Theology (Collegeville, MN: The Liturgical Press, 1995), p. 55. 21 Super Galatas, c. 4, lect. 7: “Est enim duplex significatio. Una est per voces; alia est per res quas voces

significant. Et hoc specialiter est in sacra Scriptura et non in aliis; cum enim eius auctor sit Deus, in cuius potestate

est, quod non solum voces ad designandum accommodet (quod etiam homo facere potest), sed etiam res ipsas. Et

ideo in aliis scientiis ab hominibus traditis, quae non possunt accommodari ad significandum nisi tantum verba,

voces solum significant. Sed hoc est proprium in ista scientia, ut voces et ipsae res significatae per eas aliquid

significent, et ideo haec scientia potest habere plures sensus. Nam illa significatio qua voces significant aliquid,

pertinet ad sensum litteralem seu historicum; illa vero significatio qua res significatae per voces iterum res alias

significant, pertinet ad sensum mysticum.” 22 See De potentia 4.1: “Unde non est incredibile, Moysi et aliis sacrae Scripturae auctoribus hoc divinitus

esse concessum, ut diversa vera, quae homines possent intelligere, ipsi cognoscerent, et ea sub una serie litterae

designarent, ut sic quilibet eorum sit sensus auctoris. Unde si etiam aliqua vera ab expositoribus sacrae Scripturae

litterae aptentur, quae auctor non intelligit, non est dubium quin spiritus sanctus intellexerit, qui est principalis

auctor divinae Scripturae. Unde omnis veritas quae, salva litterae circumstantia, potest divinae Scripturae aptari, est

eius sensus.” Cf. ST I.1.10c. As Williamson rightly points out, although Gregory the Great, Alexander of Hales,

and Albert the Great all shared the same view as Aquinas, the “tendency to define the literal sense as what the author

intended [and not just as the history narrated in Scripture, the gesta]... reached its authoritative expression in St.

Thomas Aquinas” (Peter Williamson, Catholic Principles for Interpreting Scripture, p. 173). Cf. Pope Pius XII,

Divino afflante Spiritu 26 (DS 2293 [3826]): “Wherefore the exegete, just as he must search out and expound the

literal meaning of the words, intended and expressed by the sacred writer, so also must he do likewise for the

spiritual sense, provided it is clearly intended by God. For God alone could know this spiritual significance and

reveal it to us.” 23 Allegorical = typological. Moral = Tropological. 24 Super Galatas c. 4, lect. 7: “Mysticus autem sensus seu spiritualis dividitur in tres. Primo namque, sicut

dicit apostolus, lex vetus est figura novae legis. Et ideo secundum quod ea quae sunt veteris legis, significant ea

quae sunt novae, est sensus allegoricus. Item, secundum Dionysium in libro de caelesti hierarchia, nova lex est

figura futurae gloriae. Et ideo secundum quod ea quae sunt in nova lege et in Christo, significant ea quae sunt in

patria, est sensus anagogicus. Item, in nova lege ea quae in capite sunt gesta, sunt exempla eorum quae nos facere

debemus, quia quaecumque scripta sunt, ad nostram doctrinam scripta sunt; et ideo secundum quod ea quae in nova

lege facta sunt in Christo et in his quae Christum significant, sunt signa eorum quae nos facere debemus: est sensus

moralis. Et omnium horum patet exemplum. Per hoc enim quod dico fiat lux, ad litteram, de luce corporali, pertinet

ad sensum litteralem. Si intelligatur fiat lux id est nascatur Christus in Ecclesia, pertinet ad sensum allegoricum. Si

vero dicatur fiat lux id est ut per Christum introducamur ad gloriam, pertinet ad sensum anagogicum. Si autem

dicatur fiat lux id est per Christum illuminemur in intellectu et inflammemur in affectu, pertinet ad sensum

moralem.” 25 De potentia, q. 4 a. 1 s. c. 4: Praeterea, quod Scriptura sacra dicit fuisse aliquando, non est dicendum non

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fuisse; quia ut Augustinus dicit, contra Scripturam sacram nemo Christianus sentit. Scriptura autem divina dicit,

terram aliquando fuisse inanem et vacuam. Ergo non est dicendum quin aliquando fuerit inanis et vacua. Hoc autem

pertinet ad informitatem materiae, quocumque modo exponatur. Ergo aliquando substantia materiae praecessit

formationem; alias nunquam informis fuisset. Cf. Super Sent., lib. 1 d. 33 q. 1 a. 5 co: si aliquis simplex et

Scripturas ignorans, crederet Jacob patrem Isaac fuisse (ad quod sequitur Scripturam esse falsam, quod est expresse

contra fidem).... 26 Super De Trinitate, pars 1, q. 2, a. 3: “[U]nde dicit Augustinus quod si in sacra Scriptura concesserimus

aliquid esse falsitatis, peribit eius auctoritas ad fidei confirmationem. 27 Super Ioannem, cap. 13 l. 1: Haereticum est dicere, quod aliquid falsum, non solum in Evangeliis, sed

etiam in quacumque canonica Scriptura inveniatur: et ideo necessarium est dicere, quod omnes Evangelistae dicunt

idem, et in nullo discordant. 28 Jerome, Epis. ad Hieron. 19.1, quoted in ST I.1.10c. 29 Quodlibet 7, q. 6 a. 1 ad 4: “Ad quartum dicendum, quod non est propter defectum auctoritatis, quod ex

sensu spirituali non potest trahi efficax argumentum, sed ex ipsa natura similitudinis, in qua fundatur spiritualis

sensus. Una enim res pluribus similis esse potest; unde non potest ab illa, quando in Scriptura sacra proponitur,

procedi ad aliquam illarum determinate; sed est fallacia consequentis. Verbi gratia, leo propter aliquam

similitudinem significat Christum et Diabolum: unde per hoc quod aliquid de leone dicitur in sacra Scriptura, ad

neutrum potest fieri processus, in sacra Scriptura argumentando.” Cf. [67464] Quodlibet III, q. 14 a. 1 co.

“Respondeo. Dicendum, quod in his quae in veteri testamento dicuntur, primo quidem observanda est veritas

litteralis.” 30 Super De Trinitate, pars 1 q. 2 a. 3c: [I]mpossibile est quod ea, quae per fidem traduntur nobis divinitus,

sint contraria his quae sunt per naturam nobis indita. Oporteret enim alterum esse falsum; et cum utrumque sit nobis

a Deo, Deus nobis esset auctor falsitatis, quod est impossibile. 31 Ad gal. cap. 4, lect. 7. Per litteralem autem sensum potest aliquid significari dupliciter, scilicet secundum

proprietatem locutionis, sicut cum dico homo ridet; vel secundum similitudinem seu metaphoram, sicut cum dico

pratum ridet. Et utroque modo utimur in sacra Scriptura, sicut cum dicimus, quantum ad primum, quod Iesus

ascendit, et cum dicimus quod sedet a dextris Dei, quantum ad secundum. Et ideo sub sensu litterali includitur

parabolicus seu metaphoricus. 32 ST I.1.10 ad 3.

Natural Theology and the Interpretation of Scripture in Averroes, Maimonides, and Aquinas (ACPA,...

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