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Michael Brie

Nancy Fraser and Karl Polanyi – A Possible Dialogue

First Draft

The essential connotation [to ‘nation’] is always about the communion of humans. The heart of the feudal nation was the privilege; the heart of the bourgeois nation was property; the heart of the socialist nation is the people, where collective existence is the enjoyment of a community culture. I myself have never lived in such a society. Karl Polanyi in his last letter written, shortly before his death on 23 April 1964, to Rudolf Schlesinger, the editor of Co-Existence, the journal he founded (quoted from Polanyi-Levitt 1990a, 263). (quoted in Polanyi-Levitt 1990a, 263)

Man has learned much since morning, For we are a conversation, and we can listen To one another. Soon we'll be song. … Friedrich Hölderlin

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Contents

The beginning of the journey: Nancy Fraser meets Karl Polanyi – but which one? .......... 3

First part of the dialogue: Clearing up misunderstandings – ‘Polanyi light’, ‘Polanyi faked’, and ‘Polanyi himself’ ......................................................... 5

Second part of the dialogue: Hearing who is speaking – The socialist Karl Polanyi and his vision of freedom ......................................................... 9

Excursus: The philosopheme of the murdered Chinese – or the vision of a responsible society of the free ............................................................. 13

Third part of the dialogue: Fascism as an epochal challenge and Karl Polanyi’s alternative ......................................................................................... 15

Fourth part of the dialogue: From the double to the triple and quadruple movement ..... 17

Fifth part of the dialogue: From the quadruple movement to the open space of alternatives .................................................................................... 18

Sixth part of the dialogue: The real movement in the space of alternatives .................... 22

Seventh part of the dialogue: From market society to solidary society ........................... 26

Eighth part of the dialogue: Paths of Transformation ...................................................... 29

Literature ........................................................................................................................ 32

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The beginning of the journey: Nancy Fraser meets Karl Polanyi – but which one?1

It was a dark Berlin autumn evening in 2012 when Nancy Fraser delivered her Rosa Luxemburg Lecture ‘A Triple Movement? Parsing the Politics of Crisis After Polanyi’ and took us along on a journey. She sat in the overcrowded hall of a former brewery in the old central district of Berlin and asked why there is no ‘Polyanian’ counter-movement for the ‘protection of society’ against neoliberalism. She listed the obstacles: the lack of a clear leadership of such a counter-movement, the fragmentation of the organised labour movement, and the devaluing of the national arenas of struggle. But for her all these obstacles were not sufficient to explain the lack of an effective resistance to neoliberalism. The need remains great and the counterforces much too meagre. However, she also made clear how suspect the earlier form of ‘social protection’ is. A movement should not once again be unleashed, which in the years after the Second World War led to bureaucratised patriarchal welfare and developing states, even characterised by racism. Weren’t the new movements of the 1960s and 70s right to be up in arms against this? They decried the ‘oppressive character of bureaucratically organized social protections’ (Fraser 2013a, 127 f.) ‘financed on the backs of postcolonial peoples’ (Fraser 2013a, 128), pointed out the structural disadvantaging of women as well as people of colour in the USA, the ‘invidious character of public provision premised on restrictive, hetero-normative definitions of family’ (Fraser 2013a, 128). And these are only a few of the protest movements’ criticisms of the social and welfare states, which were characteristic of the post-1945 period in the USA and Western Europe.

For Fraser, a mere repetition of the old counter-movements seemed equally impossible and undesirable. A real breakthrough would, according to her, only be possible through an alliance with a third movement, that is, with the already mentioned emancipation movements. These movements, she said, arose from the confrontations with post-war capitalism and ‘do not fit either pole of the double movement’. ‘Demanding access, as opposed to protection, their paramount aim was not to defend “society” but to overcome domination’ (Fraser 2013a, 128). In the process, liberatory factors of the markets should not be ignored ‘to the extent that the protections it disintegrates are oppressive’ (Fraser 2013a, 129).

Fraser summarised the resulting diagnoses of the period: ‘I propose, accordingly, to analyse the present constellation by means of a different figure, which I call the triple movement. Like Polanyi’s figure, the triple movement serves as an analytical device for parsing the grammar of social struggle in capitalist society. But unlike the double movement, it delineates a three-sided conflict among proponents of marketization, adherents of social protection and partisans of emancipation. The aim here is not simply greater inclusiveness, however. It is rather to capture the shifting relations among those three sets of political forces, whose projects intersect and collide. The triple movement foregrounds the fact that each can ally, in principle, with either of the other two poles against the third’ (Fraser 2013a, 128 f.). On this basis she developed her vision of a new emancipatory project, which connects the justified concerns about emancipation, social protection, and individual rights of freedom.

Precisely because I consider this project so important there was a moment during Fraser’s lecture that evening that caused me some worry; I imagined a conversation taking place with Polanyi as doppelgänger. It was a brief remark that struck me: ‘We can already see, contra Polanyi, that social protection is often ambivalent’ (Fraser 2013a, 129). But I remembered having read in Polanyi: ‘Speenhamland was an unfailing instrument of popular demoralization. If a human society is a self-acting machine for maintaining the standards on which it is built, Speenhamland was an automaton for demolishing the standards on which any kind of society could be based. Not only did it put a premium on the shirking of work and the pretense of inadequacy, but it increased the attraction of pauperism precisely at the juncture when a man was straining to escape the fate of the destitute’ (Polanyi 2001, 103 f.).2

1 My thanks are due to Frank Adler, Dietter Klein, and Claus Thomasberger for their critical advice whose import reach far beyond the current essay. 2 Block and Somers point out that the ‘facts in the famous Poor Law Commissioners‘ Report (1834)’ to which Polanyi refers, were not the reports by the ‘poor’ themselves but almost exclusively of those who were

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Nancy Fraser invited us that evening to take part in her search for a way out of the crippling blocks within capitalism’s crisis. While listening to here I was reminded of a wonderful reflection of Ernst Bloch’s who at a very advanced age and from his own experience wrote: ‘It is especially in creative work that a formidable boundary is crossed, which I call the transition point to something which is not yet known. Toil, darkness, thundering ice, and a calm sea and prosperous voyage are found here. If we can break through this point we see the country where nobody ever was, which indeed itself has never before existed. And which needs at once people, wanderers, a compass and depths in the landscape [Tiefe im Land]’ (Bloch 1959, 1 f.). And it seemed to me that setting out and reaching the country ‘where nobody ever was’, ‘that had never even existed before’ requires a very intensive dialogue across generations. It could be a dialogue between Nancy Fraser and Karl Polanyi but also with social protest movements and left forces of the last two decades.

In 1954 Polanyi published an article on Shakespeare’s Hamlet against the background of his own experiences in the First World War, through which he had always had with him an edition of Shakespeare’s works. He wonders why Hamlet follows his father’s requests for revenge and at the same time denies it to himself: ‘Hamlet‘ is about the human condition. We all live, insofar we refuse to die. But we are not resolved to live in all essential respects in which life invites us. We are postponing happiness, because we hesitate ourselves to live… Life is man’s missed opportunity‘ (Polanyi 1954, 350). Polanyi carries out a dialogue with Shakespeare’s Hamlet in order to explore his own lived and unlived possibilities since time had not been accommodating to him. He suffered from the fact that his world had given him so little ‘enjoyment of a community culture’. Like Hamelt’s friend, the humanist Horatio, we could also invoke the spirit of Polanyi. ‘Stay, illusion! If thou hast any sound, or use of voice, Speak to me: If there be any good thing to be done, That may to thee do ease and grace to me, Speak to me…’

In such a dialogue with Polanyi we should not fall into the temptation to separate The Great Transformation from subsequent works, because according to Alfredo Salsano, what we have here is ‘a life-work, that, by virtue of coherence that is apparent only when seen as a whole, still has real vitality’ In so doing he identified one of the peculiarities of the reception of The Great Transformation. This book has mostly been appreciated in complete absence of what the author himself said about it. This also applies to Nancy Fraser. She limits her reading of Polanyi to The Great Transformation. Polanyi was 56 years old when he began to write it. However, it is incomprehensible when removed from the context of his total oeuvre. Reading it in isolation misleads one into taking it as an epiphany that suddenly appeared in the world, without asking where the light emanating from this work comes from. Reading it that way we do not go beyond being enthralled at the so brilliantly illuminated phenomena, forgetting that in other places Polanyi treated the phenomena not illuminated here. As in Plato’s Cave, everyone gazes on the shadow images while no one looks at the source of the ‘illumination’ nor at what remains ‘dark’ in the work. The work itself accommodates this, as it is such a wonderfully convincing and coherent narrative,

responsible for poor relief (Block and Somers 2014, 129). It was the upper class’ view on those who depended on its mercy. The causal assumptions of the 1834 report and the criticism based on it are questionable, according to Block and Somers. They summarise their own analysis as follows: ‘Instead of bread scales undermining work effort, we get a picture of a rural population facing broad structural forces that undermined their capacities for self-support. In this context it is difficult to see increasing poor relief as anything but a partial remedy to problems outside the control of the rural poor’ (Block and Somers 2014, 142). Edward P. Thompson too give another, differentiated picture of the situation and of the actions of the rural workers in reaction to the Speenhamland System: ‘On the side of the poor, threats to the overseers, sporadic sabotage, a “servile and cunning” or “sullen and discontented” spirit, an evident demoralization documented in page after page of the Poor Law Commissioners‘ Report. “It would be better for us to be slaves at once than to work under such a system … when a man has his spirit broken, what is he good for?” In the Speenhamland counties of the south the labourers had their own bitter jest – the farmers “keep us here [on the poor-rates] like potatoes in a pit, and only to take us out for use when they can no longer do without us”’ (Thompson 1968, 247).

3 On 23 February 1941 Polanyi wrote to his daughter Kari: ‘So about four weeks ago I began writing, and tomorrow I intend to go to New York to hand the Introduction and the first three chapters to the publishers. Curiously enough, it is not a draft, but a finished text, ready for print. Of the many surprises the writing was connected with, this is one’ (Polanyi-Levitt 2004, 13).

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which gives the impression of having emerged in one piece.3

From the very beginning a misunderstanding has to be cleared up – the reduction of Polanyi’s work to that of a reformer who wants to counter the excesses of market radicalism with social protective measures and believes that the crisis of modern civilisation can be overcome in this way. This leads to the second and third part of the dialogue, in which Polanyi speaks as a socialist and anti-fascist who sees the ‘Great Transformation’ as the overcoming of capitalist market society, which is necessary if we are to live in freedom. On this basis Nancy Fraser’s triple movement will then be taken up in a fourth dialogue and expanded to a quadruple movement in which market radicalism and social protection, on the one hand, and emancipatory and oppression movements, on the other, confront each other. Fifth, we will then see that even this does not suffice for understanding the ‘political grammar’ (Nancy Fraser) of the present. A space of alternatives will be sketched in which solidary emancipatory movements and authoritarian movements of oppression confront each other with the contradiction of inter-subjective claims to freedom and demands for access to the basic goods of society. Sixth, this leads to a brief look at concrete projects of dealing with these contradictions – to neoliberalism, liberal socialism, libertarian commonism, and authoritarian social paternalism. Seventh, this then makes it possible to look at Polanyi’s actual vision, a Great Transformation towards a society which reorganises the production of wealth of modern societies on an emancipatory-solidary basis and removes the basic goods of that society – nature and labour, money and knowledge – from their subordination to markets. Eighth, and finally, this leads to the question of paths to transformation. From the dialogue with Karl Polanyi and Nancy Fraser an ever farther-reaching polylogue with many societal movements arises. It can, I hope, help overcome the divisions of the left within the common struggles for a societal change in capitalism going beyond it to ‘another world’. Still, the conversation has to begin with the clarification of a misunderstanding.

First part of the dialogue: Clearing up misunderstandings – ‘Polanyi light’, ‘Polanyi faked’, and ‘Polanyi himself’

When Karl Polanyi’s name is mentioned reference is always made to the so-called double movement. In this kind of reception, Polanyi often appears as a reformer who wants to force back the unleashed markets into the river bed of social dams, whatever the concrete forms of social control and regulation are – as long as they brake the destructive effects of the markets. The present seems to repeat his diagnosis of the epochal situation of the 1920s and 1930s – ‘only at another scale’ (see also Gill and Mittelman 1997, 80; Zincone and Agnew 2000, 7) or with another emphasis, that of ecology (Burawoy 2010, 309). In such a reading of his work, Polanyi’s concerns are largely reduced to the idea that ‘ever-wider extensions of free market principles generated counter-movements to protect society’ (Webster and Kalekin-Fishman 2009, 265).4

This is the Polanyi whose spirit Nancy Fraser invoked that evening and which she described in this way: ‘In the first half of the 20th century, social struggles surrounding the crisis formed what Polanyi called a “double movement”. As he saw it, political parties and social movements coalesced around one side or the other of a simple fault-line. On one side stood political forces and commercial interests that favoured deregulating markets and extending commodification; on the other stood a broad-based, cross-class front, including urban workers and rural landowners, socialists and conservatives, that sought to ‘protect society’ from the ravages of the market. As the crisis sharpened, moreover, the partisans of “social protection” won the day. In contexts as divergent as New Deal America, Stalinist Russia, fascist Europe and, later, in postwar social democracy, the political classes appeared to converge on at least this one point: left to themselves, “self –regulating” markets in labour, nature and money would destroy society. Political regulation

3 On 23 February 1941 Polanyi wrote to his daughter Kari: ‘So about four weeks ago I began writing, and tomorrow I intend to go to New York to hand the Introduction and the first three chapters to the publishers. Curiously enough, it is not a draft, but a finished text, ready for print. Of the many surprises the writing was connected with, this is one’ (Polanyi-Levitt 2004, 13). 4 Gareth Dale gives an overview of this reception of The Great Transformation (2010, 221–230). 4 Gareth Dale gives an overview of this reception of The Great Transformation (2010, 221–230).

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was needed to save it’ (Fraser 2013a, 120).

In this depiction the double movement is presented in a completely one-dimensional way. Roosevelt’s New Deal, Hitler’s racist-genocidal project via a Eurasia dominated by Greater Germany as well as Stalinist state socialism are assigned to the pole of the counter-movement without distinction. In relation to the resistance to deregulated markets, the differences amongst them appear to be secondary. The contrasts between the real goals of this resistance and the differences between the means employed become completely unrecognisable in respect to the one commonality – overcoming market society. We should follow Albert Einstein’s maxim: ‘It can scarcely be denied that the supreme goal of all theory is to make the irreducible basic elements as simple and as few as possible without having to surrender the adequate representation of a single datum of experience’ (Einstein 1934, 165). The difference between fascism and the New Deal, Stalinism or the kind of democratic socialism advocated by Polanyi is more than ‘a single datum of experience’. For Polanyi it would have made no sense to construct a theory that smoothed over the differences between social and democratic oriented responses and fascist ones.5

The conflicts of the 19th and 20th centuries can in no wise be reduced to the one-dimensional conflict between supporters of a market society and their opponents. Polanyi saw the central divide of his time as being between fascism and socialism; both were ‘rooted in a market society that refused to function’ (Polanyi 2001, 248). The claim that Polanyi was blind to the fact ‘that social security is per se ambivalent’ (Fraser 2013c, 140) is not sustainable. Fraser points out cautiously enough that ‘feminist theorists should not embrace Polanyi’s framework in the form in which it appears in The Great Transformation’ Her goal is ‘a new, quasi-Polanyian conception of capitalist crisis that not only avoids reductive economism but also avoids romanticising “society”’ (Fraser 2013b, 230).6

Naturally Nancy Fraser cannot find the path she is seeking on the map that she took along with her in her reading of Polanyi’s social transformation, for on her map that path is only indicated as an either-or – of market unleashing or protection of society. But Polanyi left behind completely different maps from his research voyages to discover an alternative to capitalist market society. We could also say that he was already in the waters where Nancy Fraser would like to take us, and it makes sense to study more closely what findings he brought back with him. Perhaps in this way we will more easily find the path that we still have to look for. Nancy Fraser’s introduction of a triple movement is a response to a problem that, in the way she presents it, does not even exist in Polanyi’s work. She supplements it through a second dimension, without his own theory needing this supplement, as we will show in what follows.

However, there is a reason for this misunderstanding. The actuality of The Great Transformation is

5 ‘Polanyi’s method, like Marx’s and many other great thinkers in the European tradition, is paradoxical in that complex, highly sophisticated historical analyses are performed using extremely simple conceptual frameworks. This method of “simple complexity” produces clear thought, nowhere more so than in The Great Transformation… ‘ (Gregory 2009, 134). 6 The reproach that Polanyi ‘romanticised “society”’ can only be maintained if one abridges the work to omit some of its essential aspects. Polanyi’s depiction of the Speenhamland System, it is true, has much to do with some important elements of Fraser’s critique of the Fordist welfare state – especially its paternalistic character, even if Polanyi, like so many before the 1960s (and some today) was blind to the gender dimensions of restrictions on freedom and individual possibilities for development along with the intersectionality of ‘class’, ‘ethnicity’, ‘gender’, and ‘age’ (Winker and Degele 2009). Polanyi depicts very accurately the ‘powerful reinforcement of the paternalistic system of labour organization’ (Polanyi 2001, 82) and emphasises that the abolition of the Speenhamland System was in the end also in the interests of the wage labourers ‘even though this meant depriving them of their legal claim to subsistence’ because ‘the “right to live” had proved a death trap to them’ (Polanyi 2001, 83). Polanyi treats in detail the restrictions on freedom that were bound up with the Poor Law legislation. For the simple people this meant the securing of their existence and the ‘seal of their disabilities’ (Polanyi 2001, 92). The ‘reactionary paternalism’ (Polanyi 2001, 107) of the Speenhamland System had become a ‘veritable masterpiece of institutional degeneration’ (Polanyi 2001, 100). It was an ‘unfailing instrument of popular demoralization’ and hindered the workers ‘from developing into an economic class’ (Polanyi 2001, 103) and autonomously resisting capitalist market society. This really sounds quite different from the romanticising of social protection. And he was in fact hostile to economism.

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so striking that the reader imagines it is above all dealing with the contemporary situation. Thus in the context of the end of the 19th century: ‘…the repudiation of foreign debts, or attempts to tamper with budgetary guarantees, even on backward governments, was deemed an outrage, and was punished by relegation to the outer darkness of those unworthy of credit’ (Polanyi 2001, 214 f.). Observations of this sort are constantly being made today. Not for nothing did Polanyi analyse international politics and economy for years for the Österreichischer Volkswirt. Many of our contemporaries therefore have a déjà-vu feeling reading The Great Transformation: ‘--- the world has been here before’, thus the British columnist Will Hutton in connection with ‘the veto on politics placed by the global capital markets’ (quoted in Polanyi-Levitt 1994, 132). Polanyi’s representation of the destruction of society, nature, and culture is alive 70 years after he wrote his book; his description of the crisis of the financial system is almost completely up to date; or as Joseph Stiglitz wrote in his preface to a re-edition of The Great Transformation more than 10 years ago: ‘Because the transformation of (19th-century, M.B.) European civilization is analogous to the transformation confronting developing countries around the world today, it often seems as if Polanyi is speaking directly to present day issues. His arguments – and his concerns – are consonant with the issues raised by the rioters and marchers who took to the streets in Seattle and Prague in 1999 and 2000 to oppose the international financial institutions’ (Stiglitz 2001, vii). And this is even truer today!

But this also has a flipside: In his magnum opus Polanyi describes the counter-movements against market society in the 19th century so vividly, so trenchantly, that the basis of movement as well as counter-movement – the capitalist market society – appears self-evident and natural. One is tempted to speak of a ‘natural law’, and market society appears as an unalterable fact on whose basis there can only be either more market or more social protection. This is diametrically opposed to Polanyi’s innermost intentions. In a certain sense his portrayal of the appearance of social protection measures in England is too plausible when he describes how from the unplanned efforts of England’s ruling classes, attempts grew, which in no way emerged from a common conviction and strategy to bring the destructive tendencies of unbridled markets under control, above all under the leadership of the Conservatives. In Polanyi’s view, they had brought ‘the principle of social protection’ (Polanyi 2001, 138) to bear. In passages in The Great Transformation, everything seems to happen automatically, and society heals itself as a matter of course. He writes: ‘The countermove against economic liberalism and laissez-faire possessed all the unmistakable characteristics of a spontaneous reaction. At innumerable disconnected points it set in without any traceable links between the interests directly affected or any ideological conformity between them. Even in the settlement of one and the same problem as in the case of workmen's compensation, solutions switched over from individualistic to “collectivistic”, from liberal to antiliberal, from “laissez-faire” to interventionist forms without any change in the economic interest, the ideological influences or political forces in play, merely as a result of the increasing realization of the nature of the problem in question’ (Polanyi 2001, 156). He summarises succinctly: ‘While laissez-faire economy was the product of deliberate State action, subsequent restrictions on laissez-faire started in a spontaneous way’ (Polanyi 2001, 147). Such a message and promise for the crises of capitalism is in its own way so catchy that it is much too convenient. It could lead one to believe that the poison of globalised market society would in fact, almost on its own, necessarily have to be dealt with through the antivenin of a strengthened social or also ecological government. Nancy Fraser calls this conception ‘Polanyian counter-movement’.

In the process what is completely forgotten is that Polanyi limited this kind of counter-movement, to the extent that it was sufficiently successful, to the second half of the 19th century. This is where he sees the spontaneous healing powers, even if the background of this ‘spontaneity’ consisted of fierce struggles and big social movements – Chartism, the 1848/49 Revolution in France, Germany, and other central European countries, and the emerging labour movement in all these countries. Without them there would have been no social reform. Significant intellectual reform movements also played a role in these struggles. Polanyi himself shows that the ‘Ten-Hours-Bill of 1847, which Karl Marx hailed as the first victory of socialism, was the work of enlightened reactionaries’ (Polanyi 2001, 174), but at the same time he points to the role of the Chartists and Owenites and the fateful effect of their suppression: ‘When Owenism and Chartism had burned themselves out, England had become poorer by that substance out of which the Anglo-Saxon ideal of a free society could have drawn its strength for centuries to come’ (Polanyi 2001, 175). The

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social reforms were a ‘revolution from above’ intended to prevent a revolution from below, and it was often carried out in the face of the resistance of the capital-owning class. Bismarck had developed an especially clear idea of this situation. In a 21 January 1881 address he said regarding his first social reforms: ‘Sooner or later there had to be an attempt to reconcile the workers with the state. […] Even a large sum is not too much to pay for the contentment of the propertyless classes, of the disinherited. […] When we use the results to secure the future of our workers, whose anxiety is the main reason for their hatred of the state, then this secures our own future …: in so doing we are preventing a revolution, which could break out in fifty years, but also in ten years …’ (Bismarck 1986, 356).7

In a certain respect the very detailed presentation of the history of England in the 19th century occludes the central concern of Polanyi’s book. He wanted to find a way out of the Great Crisis of the western civilisation of his own time, a crisis whose beginning he dated from the First World War. The focus of the reception of The Great Transformation on the presentation of the so-called double movement in the 19th century distracts us from Polanyi’s actual message, namely that this double movement collapsed in the first third of the 20th century. The book itself shares some responsibility for this impression. Because Polanyi concentrated on the origins of the crisis, that is, on the 19th century, the strategic choices for Polanyi’s own time seemed secondary – if for no other reason that his presentation of the 20th century occupies so much less space in The Great Transformation than that of the 19th century. Polanyi wanted to demonstrate the thesis ‘that the origins of the cataclysm [of world wars, the Great Depression, and fascism – M.B.] lay in the utopian endeavor of economic liberalism to set up a self-regulating market system’ (Polanyi 2001, 31). He shows how ‘the balance of power [between the main European states – M.B.], the gold standard, and the liberal state, these fundamentals of the civilization of the nineteenth century’(Polanyi 2001, 31) gradually collapsed, how the double movement came to an end – first in the First World War and then at the end of the 1920s, and at the beginning of the 1930s. All these bases of civilization are, according to him, ‘in the last resort, shaped in one common matrix, the selfregulating market’ (Polanyi 2001, 31). The double movement emerged, Polanyi said, from this matrix of a market society; And thus both sides of the double movement came to an end, that of the extension of marketization as well as that of social protection. He had no hopes for a social protection movement on the basis of market society. For him this was a part of the problem and not the solution.

Polanyi’s economic-political analyses of the 1920s and especially of the 1930s offered a detailed examination of the attempts to resurrect the self-regulating market system of the 19th century, and at the same time he investigated the efforts at protecting the various groups of society (workers, farmers, owners of wealth) from the effects of this system (on this see Polanyi 2002b). And through very concrete developments in England he showed how in central European countries the collapse of democratic capitalism grew out of both tendencies and from their antagonism. Against this background he was searching for a socialist alternative to fascism. Only if these central dimensions of his thought are disregarded is Nancy Fraser’s Polanyi criticism valid and his approach can be

7 In a completely similar way Winston Churchill said in 1909: ‘The idea is to increase the stability of our institutions by giving the mass of industrial workers a direct interest in maintaining them. With a “stake” in the country in the form of insurance against evil days these workers will pay no attention to the vague promises of revolutionary socialism… it will make him a better citizen, a more efficient worker, and a happier man” (quoted in Dale 2010, 76). Social reform ideas were also prepared intellectually in Germany, as they were in other countries, not least by Lorenz von Stein with his conception of social democracy and later of the social kingdom. At the end of his large-scale presentation of the political-social and intellectual history of France between 1789 and 1849, strongly criticising the propertied classes (of ‘industrial reaction’), and invoking an alliance of the state (in the leading position) and workers, he writes ‘… if the industrial revolution is victorious one result will be the definitive domination of capital and also a legal subjugation of labour [thus the end of the legal freedom of the workers – M.B.]; if social democracy is victorious, then we will see the beginning – perhaps after a very bloody period – of the social order of mutual interest’ (Stein 1959, 408). In England we could say that John Stuart Mill’s 1848 work, Principles of Political Economy, with some of their Applications to Social Philosophy represents the philosophy and political economy of social reform (Mill 1920). In France it was first Comte and then Durkheim who developed a sociology and philosophy of organic solidarity, which was translated by Léon Bourgeois directly into the sphere of the political (Böhlke 2010, 15–27). All these reform concepts had a direct socialist and communist prehistory.

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reduced to a double movement without ambivalence. Her insistence on escaping such a binary concept of market regulation and social protection by introducing a third, emancipatory tendency is understandable in this framework. However, it does not contradict but is consonant with Polanyi’s innermost intentions. But precisely this shows that there are good reasons for reformulating the concept of the triple movement.

It seems to me that Nancy Fraser has become the victim of the success of a simplified Polanyi reception. It is a reading of Polanyi that trims him to fit the thesis of a necessary ‘social’ reining in of the excesses of globalised markets, of financial-market capitalism and neoliberalism and in so doing divests him of his radical content that addresses root causes. Today this would mean the concept of a social democracy on the basis of, and accepting, neoliberalism – as the ‘highest form of liberalism’. This is the approach advocated by Colin Crouch. For him the answer to the challenges contained in Polanyi’s work is quite simple: ‘The point is to note when a destruction occurs; to ask what the market puts in its place; to ask also whether this is an improvement; and, if not, to propose alternatives’ (Crouch 2013, 49). His conclusion for today’s situation is: ‘… not only can social democracy thrive in a liberal capitalist environment, but in that environment it produces a higher degree of liberalism than conventional liberalism left to its own devices, because it is the clash between liberalism and social democracy that generates the incentive to keep seeking new creative compromises’ (Crouch 2013, 139). Polanyi then appears as the progenitor of an ‘embedded neoliberalism’. In this case, this would not be ‘Polanyi light’ but a ‘Polanyi faked’.

Second part of the dialogue: Hearing who is speaking – The socialist Karl Polanyi and his vision of freedom

Every dialogue begins with listening. This also applies to Karl Polanyi. One of the reasons why the socialist Karl Polanyi is so little known has to do with the unavailability in English of many of his important writings from the 1920s. And the vehement post-1945 anti-communism led to the eclipse of questions of system transformation. Although Polanyi taught at Columbia University in the USA, his wife Ilona Duczynska was barred, as a former member of communist parties (from which she was regularly expelled, among other reasons for her ‘Luxemburgism’), from living in the US, and they kept a house together across the border in Canada. This is another reason why the socialist Polanyi is still to be rediscovered.8

In 1940, still in England, Polanyi developed some initial ideas for The Great Transformation. The main title of a sketch for the book is extremely ambitious: ‘The Common Man’s Masterplan’. The title of the first part, ‘Origins of the Crisis’, already points to the original title of his 1944 work (Polanyi 1940, 1). Polanyi’s starting point is the capacity of simple citizens, the common man, to make the right decisions – precisely when long-term perspectives are at stake (Polanyi 1940, 7). It is for them that he wants to write, for ‘The unresolved problems which forced the great transformation upon us imperatively demand their solution in and after this war’ (Polanyi 1940, 1). For him democracy is not the work of the privileged and educated: ‘Democracy is a way of life and as a method of decision it is about the contents of life. Now these are not matters about which there is any set knowledge… And it is a simple fact that the way of life of democracy was not developed by so called educated people nor was it practiced by them nor was it even preferred by them, but it was practiced by communities of simple people like those of the History of Apostles, Quaker communities, pioneering villages of the early frontier or the pilgrim father’s on board the Mayflower’ (Polanyi 1940, 10). From this Polanyi derives how he wants to write his work. Here is a very abbreviated summary:

‘This book is addressed to the general reader and discusses the urgent problems of our time from the point of view of the common man. While the various shades of anti-democrats have their own story of the world catastrophe – the democrat has yet to produce his own story. This story should tell in simple language how it all started […] This story should be ruthlessly frank […] This story should be consistent […] The story

8 A decisive contribution has been made here by Michele Cangiani, Kari Polanyi-Levitt, and Claus Thomasberger with their German edition of Polanyi’s writings from the 1920s and 30s, which are concerned with his understanding of freedom and socialism as well as the confrontation with fascism (Polanyi 2005a).

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should be intelligent… This story should be true… This story should be complete … in the sense that it should envisage the scene of man’s collective life in all its breadth and depth […] This story should be practical […] This story should be the story of the common man […] This story should be about the unsolved problems of our time…’ (Polanyi 1940, 15–19).

The book that grew out of these ideas, The Great Transformation, can only be understood against a background that was largely suppressed in the reception of Polanyi’s work – the deeply grounded socialist background of his thinking, a socialism of the commoners.9 Curiously enough, this book was not then nor is it now understood by the general public as the work of a socialist and anti-fascist seeking a solution for the fundamental problems of his time (Polanyi-Levitt 2004, 4).10 In contrast to the mainstream reception of his work his horizon was neither a reformed capitalism nor a social market economy but another, non-bourgeois, civilisation – a socialist society of culture. Because this driving force of Polanyi’s continually new research breakthroughs over a period of 50 years, which included The Great Transformation, were not part of the reception of his work, the last chapter of his book, the section ‘Freedom in a Complex Society’, is seldom dealt with or, when it is, it is deprived of its socialist dimension. But if this book is above all a drama ‘of the Common Man’ it would be as if one closed it just before its (either happy or bitter) end. And so we cannot find out why the drama was written in the first place nor guess how it will end. The path chosen by Polanyi appears to be everything, the goal nothing. But it was this goal that led him to write his epochal work from 1941 to 1943 at the small remote Bennington College in Vermont, USA, while in Europe the fate of civilisation stood balanced on the edge of a bayonet before Moscow and Stalingrad; and its theoretical and political content remains completely unintelligible if this purpose is ignored.

Karl Polanyi is thus at once one of the most read and one of the most misunderstood 20th-century social scientists. To enter into Polanyi’s work without taking seriously the socialist and anti-fascist intentions that motivated the author is to miss the question he was actually formulating and take his presentation as a mere narration of 19th and early 20th-century English and Western European history. One might even think that Polanyi wanted to continue ad infinitum the play of the so-called double movement of the unleashing of markets, on the one side, and the protection of ‘society’, on the other. And this would mean that what is now at stake is no less, but precisely no more, than a new wave of ‘protection’. On the contrary, Polanyi saw the world facing a strategic choice, having to decide in favour of a socialist or a fascist answer in order to escape this socially destructive double movement. He did not conceive a third possibility. For him society had to break with market society, from which this double movement grows, and orient itself to a completely new civilisational basis if it was not to go under. In order to understand this perspective, we should briefly indicate the intellectual background of Polanyi’s thought.

Polanyi’s very specific socialist horizon was originally formed in the academic left Jewish-Hungarian circles of the Galilei Circle founded and led by him in Budapest, but there was also a predisposition in his family. In his very vivid portrayal, Peter F. Drucker wrote about Polanyi’s family: ‘The Polanyis, father and children, were the most gifted family I have ever known or heard of. They were also the most achieving family; every one of them had success and impact. But what made them truly remarkable was that all of them, beginning with the father in Victorian days and ending with Karl and his brother Michael in 1960s, enlisted in the same cause: to overcome the nineteenth century and to find a new society that would be free and yet not “bourgeois” or “liberal”; prosperous and yet not dominated by economics; communal and yet not a Marxist collectivism. Each of the six, the father and five children and the mother as well went his or her own quite

9 In 1942 then U.S. Vice-President Henry A. Wallace gave a remarkable address entitled ‘The Century of the Common Man’ (Wallace 1943), in which he supported Franklin Roosevelt’s ‘Four Freedoms’ and criticised Henry Luce’s concept of an ‘American Century’ (Luce 1941). The New Deal itself represented a shift towards ‘the common people’. 10 Strange to say, this also applies to the comprehensive work of Fred L. Block and Margret F. Somers, which only contains a superficial account of Polanyi’s ‘view on socialism’ (see Block and Somers 2014, 220–223). Gareth Dale in his introduction to Polanyi’s thought also notably separates his treatment of The Great Transformation from the last section of this very work and at the same time sees this conclusion of the book as its actual ‘manifesto’, if indeed there is any (Dale 2010, 239).

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separate way, but each in search of the same goal. They reminded me of the Knights of the Round Table setting out in search of the same Holy Grail, each in a different direction’ (Drucker 1994, 126 f.;

for a very critical view of this description of Polanyi see McRobbie 2006). Drucker summarises Polanyi’s concern in The Great Transformation in this way: ‘To Polanyi, the most important parts of The Great Transformation were the theoretical models of integration between economy and society that he developed. His aim was to show that the market is neither the only possible economic system nor, necessarily, the most advanced one; and that there are alternatives that harmonize economy and community, and yet permit both economic growth and individual freedom’ (Drucker 1994, 136).

The circles in which the young Karl Polanyi moved were remarkable: ‘They included not only Karl Popper’s family, the idealist-anarchist theoretician Ervin Szabó, the sociologist and historian Oscar Jászi, the composer Bartók, the psychoanalyst Ferenczi, the future Marxist philosopher Georg Lukács, but also foreign thinkers like Werner Sombart, Max Adler, and Eduard Bernstein’ (Cangiani and Thomasberger 2002, 12). His experiences as an officer at the Russian front in the First World War, a serious wound, and the traumatic experiences of the Hungarian Revolution and counter-revolution plunged him into a deep crisis. He experienced this as a personal as well as collective failure, according to Cangiani and Thomasberger in their introduction to the first volume of Polanyi’s writings of the 1920 through the 1940s. They quote from a manuscript written during a period of serious personal depression at the beginning of the 1920s: ‘We live in a time of trials. Nations and classes, states and individuals are experiencing continually more serious suffering in the last six years. And no one doubts that the cup of sorrow is not yet full. Nothing would be more natural than to tirelessly strive to understand what the causes of these agonies are, and how we singly or together can remove them’ (quoted in Cangiani and Thomasberger 2002, 12 f.). He subsequently devoted himself to this task. What marked Polanyi was that he experienced the World War both as a social as well as a directly personal crisis. He saw himself as having been complicit in it. As he saw it, along with others he had borne responsibility for what was unjustifiable, the primal catastrophe of the 20th century.

In the 1920s the hope still resonated with Polanyi that the complexity of society could be so reduced that society completely dissolves into interpersonal relations, into community [gemeinschaft]. In The Great Transformation, he was to call this expectation an illusion and ignorance of the ‘reality of society’ in complex societies (Polanyi 2001, 268). But in the 1920s he still wrote, though relativised: ‘We will have climbed to the highest stage of societal freedom when the societal relations of human beings become clear and transparent, as they actually are in a family or in a communist community. To directly monitor the effects of our life movements on the lives of all others and thus on our own lives, in order to take responsibility, on the basis of this knowledge, for the social effects of our existence – that is the ultimate social freedom’ (Polanyi 2005h, 150).11

The late 1930s, in other words the years immediately preceding the writing of The Great Transformation, was a time of intensive teaching activity for Polanyi, first in the circle of the Christian Left Group12 and then in the Workers Educational Association, whose president was R. H. Tawney.13 This framework of teaching and discussion represented the decisive space for his

11 Polanyi was not least influenced by Ferdinand Tönnies’ distinction between gemeinschaft (community) and gesellschaft (society). Tönnies understood socialism as an attempt emerging within ‘individualist socialisation’ to achieve the unified management of communication and labour, as the attempt that would, when consistenly carried out, mean the destruction of its own bases, that is, of individualistic socialisation (Crome 2006, 63–66; see in reference to state party socialism Ruben 1998; for a summary see Tönnies 1887, 293). 12 In this context he published Christianity and the Social Revolution (Lewis, Polanyi, and Kitchin 1935) together with John Macmurray, Joseph Needham, and others. Through this he could have also been influenced by Macmurray’s positions, who saw community and society as necessary poles of human-social existence, neither of which can be dissolved into each other : ‘The members of a community are in communion with one another, and their association is a fellowship. And since such an association exhibits the form of the personal in its fully positive personal character, it will necessarily contain within it and be constituted by its own negative, which is society. Every community is a society; but not every society is a community’ (Macmurray 1961, 146). 13 Repeatedly, Polanyi comes back to the motif of the ‘acquisitive society’, the subject of Tawney’s first

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thinking before he wrote his main work. This is where the narrative of the book arose and took final shape. Here he came into contact with England’s socialist thought, above all with that of Robert Owen. Here he formulated his specific view of the distinction between society and community, which also underpins The Great Transformation. This is also where he developed his position on the limits of Christian attempts to lead society back to community. From here on ‘recognition of the reality of society’, of the complexity of society, became for him an indispensable condition of every emancipatory-solidary politics. He said both positively and critically: ‘The Christian axiom about the essence of society is of the utmost boldness and paradoxy. It can be put in the simple phrase that society is a personal relation of individuals. Now, to regard society thus means to disregard altogether the share of institutional life and of other impersonal forces in social existence. In a sense it is the complete denial of the objective existence of society. […] Tow negative assertions seem to follow from this position. 1. Society as such, as an aggregate of functional institutions … is no concern of Christianity. His concern is with the individual in community, not with society. 2. Neither is history as such his concern’ (Polanyi n.d., 1–3). In view of the big catastrophes, however, this double ‘indifference’ is no longer acceptable. ‘… if the claims of community press for change in society, the judgement passed upon society is inexorable. And when history points to the next step in the achievement of universal community, its claim to the allegiance of the Christian is unconditional’ (Polanyi n.d., 3). The aim has to be a ‘democracy of freedom’ (Polanyi n.d., 16), which simultaneously preserves the institutions of a complex society and subordinates them to the free life of its citizen.

In the already cited 1937/38 Notes from the Training Weekends of the Christian Left we find some remarkable utterances: ‘There is no contracting out of society. But where the limits of the socially possible are reached, community unfolds to us its transcending reality. It is to this realm of community beyond society that man yearns to travel’ (Polanyi 1937, 16). Taking up this approach he then continues in The Great Transformation: ‘If industrialism is not to extinguish the race, it must be subordinated to the requirements of man's nature’ (Polanyi 2001, 257).

The interrelationships between the realm of universal community, the habitation and uniqueness of the individual, and his/her freedom with responsibility, together with the irreducible complexity of society as well as, finally, democracy as a mode of life and way of shaping society are key concepts in Polanyi’s work and form the matrix of his understanding of socialism.14

influential book (Tawney 1920). Tawney had criticise an ideology that derived the fulfilling of societal functions purely from ‘free’, egotistical action, and he contrasted this with the vision of a society that rests on the connection between personal responsibility and social functions: ‘A society which aimed at making the acquisition of wealth contingent upon the discharge of social obligations, which sought to proportion remuneration to service and denied it to those by whom no service was performed, which inquired first not what men possess but what they can make or create or achieve, might be called a Functional Society, because in such a society the main subject of social emphasis would be the performance of functions. But such a society does not exist, even as a remote ideal, in the modern world, though something like it has hung, an unrealized theory, before men's minds in the past. Modern societies aim at protecting economic rights, while leaving economic functions, except in moments of abnormal emergency, to fulfill themselves’ (Tawney 1920, 28 f.). Polanyi later called the model of an acquisitive society ignorance of the reality of society: ‘No society is possible in which power and compulsion are absent, nor a world in which force has no function. It was an illusion to assume a society shaped by man's will and wish alone. Yet this was the result of a market view of society which equated economics with contractual relationships, and contractual relations with freedom. […] Any decent individual could imagine himself free from all responsibility for acts of compulsion on the part of a state which he, personally, rejected; or for economic suffering in society from which he, personally, had not benefited. He was "paying his way,” was "in nobody's debt,” and was unentangled in the evil of power and economic value. His lack of responsibility for them seemed so evident that he denied their reality in the name of his freedom’ (Polanyi 2001, 266). Polanyi exposed this as a convenient illusion. 14 We can only go briefly into his specific view of 1920s and 30s Soviet socialism. Like many of his left-wing contemporaries he blinded himself to the extent of Stalinism’s destruction of civilisation. He also refused to acknowledge the gap between his understanding of socialism and Soviet-type socialism, which along with democratic space had also destroyed the bases of individual freedom (in this connection see Arendt 1993, 39 f.; for my own position Brie 2014a; for remarkable perspicacity at a very early date see Luxemburg 1918). His relationship to socialism was mainly shaped by the non-communist left and by Central and Western European experiences. For him, ‘Bolshevism’ was a subform of socialism alongside others. In this way he

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In his final years Polanyi wrote in a letter full of hope, especially because of the anti-colonial uprising in Asia and Africa: ‘My life was a world life – I have lived the life of the world. But the world stopped living for several decades, and then in a few years it advanced a century. So I am only now coming to my own, having somewhere lost thirty years on the way – waiting for Godot – until the world caught up again, caught up to me. In retrospect, it is all quite strange, the martyrdom of isolation was only apparent – ultimately, I was only waiting for myself’ (quoted in Polanyi-Levitt 1990b, 112).

If we go on a journey with Nancy Fraser; if we try to contribute to new solidary emancipatory movements that are up to the challenges of the crisis of neoliberal financial-market capitalism – so goes the thesis of this article – Polanyi could prove to be a travelling companion even today, who was waiting for us until the moment that the period moved closer to him. And perhaps he was not only here but was ahead of us the whole time.15 This Polanyi, however, is not a ‘Polanyi light’ but the Polanyi who for fifty years, in the face of two world wars, fascism, and the Soviet socialist experiment, grappled with the cataclysms and crises of western capitalism in a way that few of his contemporaries did. This is ‘Polanyi himself‘. It is really with him that we need to carry out a conversation. For this purpose we need to take note of a very particular understanding of freedom in complex societies, which he illustrated through the parable of the ‘murdered Chinese’.

Excursus: The philosopheme of the murdered Chinese – or the vision of a responsible society of the free

In his 1927 lecture manuscript ‘Über die Freiheit’ (On Freedom) Polanyi writes: ‘You have surely all heard of the philosopheme of the murdered Chinese. Through a miracle, so it goes, we will be given a gift by which through simply pressing a button every wish we utter at a given moment will be immediately granted, but at a price: every time we press the button one of 400 million Chinese will die in far off China. How many people would refrain from pushing the magic button?’ (Polanyi 2005g, 152 f.) This ‘philosopheme’ goes back to François-René de Chateaubriand (1768-1848), who reconverted to Christianity in post-revolutionary France and was the founder of its literary Romanticism as well as an avowed Royalist. In 1802, in The Genius of Christianity, he wrote: ‘Conscience! Is it possible that thou canst be but a phantom of the imagination, or the fear of the punishment of men? I ask my own heart, I put to myself this question: “If thou couldst by a mere wish kill a fellow-creature in China, and inherit his fortune in Europe, with the supernatural conviction that the fact would never be known, wouldst thou consent to form such a wish?”’ (Chateaubriand 1871, 187 f.; on the philosophical-historical background see Ginzburg 1994).

This ‘philosopheme’ found its way into literature with Honoré de Balzac, in whose novel Father Goriot we find the following dialogue, which plays simultaneously on the superficial education of the protagonist and the conventional reference to Rousseau as the intellectual father of the

missed what was specific to the Soviet system of rule. In the 1930s he wrote that ‘Russian socialism is still in the dictatorial phase, although a development in the direction of democracy has already become clearly visible (Polanyi 1979, 124). In 1939 he said ‘The working class must stand by Russia for the sake of socialism. Both parts of the sentence are of equal importance. To stand for socialism and not for Russia is the betrayal of socialism in its sole existing embodiment. To stand for Russia without mentioning socialism would also be the betrayal of socialism, which alone makes Russia worth fighting for’ (quoted from Karl Polanyi’s 1939 manuscript “Russia and the Crisis”’ by Nagy 1994, 99). In 1943 he cited ‘the French Revolution, the American Revolution, the Russian Revolution, and socialist Britain’ within a list of Rousseau’s legacy (Polanyi 2005d, 310); and after 1944 he saw the problems of Soviet socialism in the fact that on the one hand the Russian Revolution ‘centers rather on the practice of co-operation and the ideal of human fraternity than on liberty and equality’ and, on the other hand, that ‘the Russians are moreover in a different phase of their revolution’, ‘far from having reached final fruition’ (Polanyi 1944, 6–7). 15 In 1994, in the era of market fundamentalism, Kenneth McRobbie wrote in the preface to a volume about Karl Polanyi: ‘At this moment, Karl Polanyi seems very far away. He beckons to us, to be sure, but as if from decades into the future. He believed in mankind. But he overestimated both this generation’s power of reason, and its ability to conceive of how human self-interest might best be served. And we find it difficult to see where lies the path that may lead towards him’ (McRobbie 1994, IX).

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Revolution, of Sentimentalism, and at the same time of the Terror (siehe dazu Falaky 2011). The interconnection between the ‘social question’ and ‘ethics’ becomes very obvious. The dialogue deserves to be quoted in detail: ‘Rastignac went at once to the École de Droit. He had no mind to stay a moment longer than was necessary in that odious house. He wasted his time that day; he had fallen a victim to that fever of the brain that accompanies the too vivid hopes of youth. Vautrin's arguments16 had set him meditating on social life, and he was deep in these reflections when he happened on his friend Bianchon in the Jardin du Luxembourg. “What makes you look so solemn?” said the medical student, putting an arm through Eugène's as they went towards the Palais. “I am tormented by temptations.” “What kind? There is a cure for temptation.” “What?” “Yielding to it.” “You laugh, but you don't know what it is all about. Have you read Rousseau?” “Yes.” “Do you remember that he asks the reader somewhere what he would do if he could make a fortune by killing an old mandarin somewhere in China by mere force of wishing it, and without stirring from Paris?” “Yes.“ “Well, then?” “Pshaw! I am at my thirty-third mandarin”’ (Balzac 2010).

From this parable, and against the background of his own experiences in a liberal market society and of the First World War, Polanyi comes to a new reading of the relationship between freedom and responsibility: ‘This whimsical philosopheme offers us a true symbol of the situation in which even the best person today finds himself in relation to his co-citizens. Everyone who is able to pay a suitable price on the market can immediately conjure up everything which humanity can produce. The consequences of this trick are found beyond the market. He knows nothing of them; he cannot know anything about them. For each one of these people, the whole of humanity consists today of nameless Chinese, whose life he is at any moment ready to extinguish, and in fact does, without batting an eyelid, in order to fulfil his wish’ (Polanyi 2005h, 153). Adam Smith’s invisible hand is deadly – or at least it can be, it is just that we do not know concretely. Every ‘coal that we have just thrown into the oven, the light by which we now see’, can, as Polanyi says, through an industrial accident embody a portion of a human life’ (Polanyi 2005h, 154). And as long as the relations are ‘not transparent’, it will be impossible to fulfil the Kantian imperative to act according to that maxim ‘whereby you can, at the same time, will that it should become a universal law’ (Kant 1903, 421). For independently of any purpose or maxim, the consequences of acting under the given conditions of market society may imply a lethal boomerang effect.

Based on this insight Polanyi formulated a new radical concept of freedom, which includes both individual responsibility and the necessity of societal transformation. His idea of the relationship between freedom and responsibility takes the negative freedoms as givens and asks under what social conditions people can deal with freedoms in such a way that they do not harm others but support themin living their own free lives. He wanted to think about what society would have to look like so that people could be put in a position to act completely responsibly, be able to be responsible for the consequences of their own decisions, and – as he adds – ‘where no choice is possible, by allowing us to shoulder the finally inevitable burden of our responsibility for coercing and interfering with the lives of our fellows’ (Polanyi 1937, 16).17 No one who today steps into a car or airplane, buys coffee, heats her/his house, or even opens the mains faucet can escape from this distressing confrontation with a life that cannot be personally controlled (in terms of concepts see

16 Vautrin is a central figure in Balzac’s work. The Romance philologist Curtius calls him ‘a criminal in the grand style, who goes his dangerous way in full consciousness, […] carried by man’s sense of superiority, who has examined earthly matters and realised that there are only two possible alternatives to choose: either stupid obedience or revolt’ (quoted in Wikipedia 2014 [German]). 17 This idea of direct personal responsibility was no abstract principle for Polanyi but a directly ethical imperative. Peter F. Drucker gives us a picture of Polanyi’s extremely modest way of life, although as the editor of the weekly, Der Österreichische Volkswirt, he earned a good living. When he brought this up he got an unequivocal answer of Polanyi’s wife: ‘”What a remarkable idea; spend your paycheck on yourself! We never heard of such a thing.” “But”, I stammered, “most people do that.” “We are not most people”, said Ilona, Karl's wife, sternly; “We are logical people. Vienna is full of Hungarian refugees, refugees from the Communists and refugees from the White Terror that succeeded the Communists; and a good many cannot earn an adequate living. Karl has proven his capacity to earn. Therefore it is obviously only logical for him to turn his paycheck over to other Hungarians and then go out and earn what we need”’ (Drucker 1994, 126).

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the article on the imperial mode of life in Brand and Wissen 2011). Beyond the social institutions through which we absolve ourselves of this guilt, the still unfulfilled community of humans calls us – locally and globally, today and in succeeding generations. This kind of life makes people guilty. And in this guilt the pain of missing solidarity is felt.

From this point Polanyi posed the question of a post-capitalist society. ‘The idea of assuming responsibility for our personal connection to the lives of “others”, for social realities, and to thus incorporate this into the realm of freedom is not feasible in the bourgeois world. However, it is equally unfeasible to give up this idea and wilfully to limit our responsibility and thus our freedom. The freedom/responsibility idea of bourgeois society points beyond the frontiers of this world’ (Polanyi 2005h, 146). The bourgeois idea of freedom is, in his view not realisable in a society constituted on a bourgeois basis. But state socialism is not an alternative. In the latter case all responsibility is delegated to the state ‘as the general scapegoat’ (Polanyi 2005h, 154), which only apparently depends on us. This kind of understanding of society gives rise, on the one hand, to the demand for a far-reaching reconstruction of relations, so that personal responsibility can be taken for the consequences of one’s own actions and, on the other, the demand also arises to do this in a complete way. Paraphrasing Hamlet’s famous question ‘ to be or not to be’, he writes: ‘The more organised … society becomes, the smaller the circles of cohesiveness in production, consumption, and civic life which let individuals become solidary, the more quickly approaches the hour at which the only choice one still has is either to be a coward and close ones eyes to the true relationship between one human life and another, thus giving up freedom in favour of any self-erected powers – or to boldly face reality in order finally, through this new responsibility, to reach the new freedom. If we see in socialism more than a question of filling people’s stomachs, more than a mere demand for justice, if we hail it as the final programme for the emancipation of humanity then we cannot and must not shrink back from this highest of all freedoms’ (Polanyi 2005h, 154).

Beginning with this concept of freedom, socialism for Polanyi was above all a society in which people live under conditions in which they can be directly and personally responsible for their actions and consequently must be. For this reason such a society ought not to be governed by an ‘invisible hand’ but needs to be substantially transparent in the interrelations between the deeds of individuals and their social consequences. At the end of his lecture on freedom Polanyi adds: ‘Socialism as a leap into freedom has to be taken not in the historical sense but in the logical sense. Beyond the demand for justice in classless society the real calling of the human race now appears to it, that is, the realisation of the highest social and personal freedom through the concrete acquisition of solidarity between persons’ (Polanyi 2005h, 164). From here he decisively rejects Mises’ positions, which the latter developed in his critique of a socialist society (Mises 1932; for a detailed criticism of Mises’ position see Polanyi 2005e). In this Polanyi drew important inspiration from guild socialism (Cole 1980) as well as from Austromarxism, above all from Otto Bauer (for the central European background to his thinking see Polanyi-Levitt 2006).

The problem of freedom in a complex society remained a central one for Polanyi in his later years. At the forefront of conversations with his student Abraham Rotstein between 1956 and 1959 was the emergence of a ‘machine society’ that further exacerbates the problems of market society. Rotstein summarised the position Polanyi took in those years thus: ‘For Polanyi, our communal decision to have an industrial, complex society meant that we bear responsibility for its unintended consequences; thus, we have cast a social net around each individual, constricting his movements. Any member of that society could not help but participate in compelling others’ (Rotstein 1994, 139). In this view, social transformation has to concentrate on extending the concrete individual freedoms within a complex society and create the institutional preconditions necessary for it.

Third part of the dialogue: Fascism as an epochal challenge and Karl Polanyi’s alternative

There is a second background to Polanyi’s The Great Transformation, which, just like his concept of socialism, has been almost forgotten. This is his examination of fascism – which is completely adequate to our times. For Polanyi, fascism grows, just as the socialism of his day, from the Great Crisis; they both emerged ‘in a market society that refused to function’ (Polanyi 2001, 248). And for him both were ‘revolutionary’ in so far as they strove to go beyond or behind the given situation.

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Graph 1: ‘Double Movement’, ‘Triple Movement’ and ‘Quadruple Movement’

Common to both were the radical break with market utopia and, in Polanyi’s formulation, the recognition of the ‘reality of society’: ‘Power and compulsion are a part of that reality; an ideal that would ban them from society must be invalid’ (Polanyi 2001, 267). This idea is only understandable if one first takes into account Polanyi’s own coming to terms with the communist notions of the Aufhebung of complexity in a completely transparent society totally subordinate to the organised common will (Rousseau’s volonté générale) – as already discussed above – and Mises’ critique of this. The complexity of society cannot be transcended, nor – which is his second thought in this connection – can it be reduced to the free acts of individuals, as liberalism does. The latter utopia ends in market society and thus in the destruction of the bases of every civilisation – of human individuality, nature, and society. From individual freedom as such, from its unhindered action, the greatest good does not result; rather it is precisely a general collapse that results.

It is at the same time remarkable and frightening that in the reception of The Great Transformation the author’s ‘agonising question’ is completely overlooked. As he formulated it: ‘…upheld or not; is freedom an empty word, a temptation, designed to ruin man and his works [as in liberalism – M.B.], or can man reassert his freedom in the face of that knowledge [of the reality of society – M.B.] and strive for its fulfillment in society without lapsing into moral illusionism?’ (Polanyi 2001, 267) Polanyi had hoped that the ‘spirit and content of this study [of the great transformation – M.B.] would indicate an answer’ (Polanyi 2001, 267). In Polanyi’s mind there was no doubt about the need and inevitability of an end to the liberal age. And in fascism and socialism he saw the two real historical contenders for going beyond or going backwards. The direction of these ideological tendencies could not be more contrasting in his view. Out of the socially destructive tendency of liberalism fascism draws the conclusion, as Polanyi said, that freedom itself, the uniqueness of the individual and the unity of humanity must be destroyed (Polanyi 2001, 268).18 Socialism, on the other hand, would help implement ‘man’s claim to freedom’ (Polanyi 2001, 268) in a complex society.

Beginning with an analysis of Adolf Hitler’s January 1932 speech before German industrialists and corporate leaders, Polanyi comes to the conclusion that fascism wants to ‘abolish politics, make the economy absolute, and capture the state via the economy’ (Polanyi 2005b, 219). His conclusion is: ‘Fascism’s intervention in this sense accordingly means on the practical level the

18 ‘The state-political content of fascism is … nothing more than the eradication of the democratic idea, of democratic institutions, of social, economic, and political forms of democratic civilised behaviour. The idea of social equality and its institutions, the idea of citizens’ freedom and its institutions, the idea of human solidarity and its institutions are … to be stamped out’ (Polanyi 2002c, 191).

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salvaging of capitalism, indeed with the aid of a revolutionary restructuring of the whole system of state and society. What it plans is not a return to liberal ‘laissez-faire’ but a planned economy, which, however, is not directed by a democratic state as an adversary of the entrepreneurs but by those capitalists who govern the “economic caste”’ (ibid.).

Socialism shares with fascism ‘a common trait directed towards the “total”’ (Polanyi 2005b, 219). But this commonality cannot obscure the ‘religious war’ (Polanyi 2005b, 221) between fascism and socialism. A break with the ‘primitive, half-conscious, and unintegrated contemporary situation’ (Polanyi 2005f, 227) is obligatory: ‘The painful rebirth is descending on us independently of human will. However, what in fact depends on us, and on us alone, is whether this transformation brings society to a higher or lower level of existence than the present level. Whether it will bring more human freedom and equality within a community, in which the socialist economy is only the framework of a much truer and more comprehensive democracy than what now exists, or whether the end of western and Christian ideals will mean the human breeding farm of a eugenically improved capitalism under fascist rule’ (Polanyi 2005f, 228). Democracy and capitalism are incompatible. And, according to Polanyi, there are two answers to this incompatibility. Fascism removes democracy and leaves capitalism untouched (Polanyi 2005c, 236), but, in his view, there is another solution: ‘It means the retention of democracy and the overcoming of capitalism. This is the socialist solution. For just as capitalism needs fascist policy to complete itself, so democracy needs socialism as its own expansion. Socialism is democratic or there is no socialism’ (Polanyi 2005c, 236). For him socialism is ‘preformed in democracy’ (Polanyi 1979, 96). It is ‘the only economic system under which the substance of individualism can be maintained in the modern world’ (Polanyi 1979, 97). From this kind of system he hopes for an approximation to the ‘highest ideal condition of societal freedom’, in which the ‘personality’ can finally be ‘free’, namely: (1) ‘mastery of the necessary consequences of socialisation’, (2) ‘humanity’s universal goal’ of a ‘human state’, of a ‘human economy’, as well as (3) ‘the final responsibility for all social effects of our existence’ (Polanyi 2005h, 151). Socialism is the ‘solidary form of life’ (Polanyi 2005h, 160), as he writes in the 1920s.

Fourth part of the dialogue: From the double to the triple and quadruple movement

The first three parts of my dialogue with Nancy Fraser and Karl Polanyi were mainly moments of listening to what concerned Polanyi. It was necessary to take account of his own vision of solidary emancipation and socialism, his implacable contesting of fascism. For him, fascism was at once the expression of the movement to protect society and the attempt to radicalise market society through a society of organised economic power and generally to cast it in a racist form in which the freedom of individuals and democracy are destroyed. In contrast to what Fraser supposes, he not only knew ‘that social security is per se ambivalent’ (Fraser 2013c, 140); he even saw himself dealing with a movement that both invoked social security and posed a deadly threat. In a still more general way he wrote: ‘There can also be a dictatorial justice, and if justice, if realised through democracy, actually means civilisational progress, this is not because of the nature of justice but that of democracy, which is inseparable from the responsibility of the individual, however little that might be’ (Polanyi 2005h, 142 f.). The question then is whether there is a connection between Polanyi’s concept of democracy and Nancy Fraser’s triple-movement approach. Is a dialogue really possible between them?

The twofold repressions, on the one hand of Polanyi’s socialist positions and on the other hand of his anti-fascists positions, lead to the reception we have pointed to of The Great Transformation as a conception of a pendulum movement between market and state in a one-dimensional to-and-fro space (see Graph 1). With iron regularity, only more market or more ‘protection’ of society seems possible – tertium non datur! Or, as Jens Beckert writes, ‘…social change is conceptualized as a dynamic process of oscillation between embedding, disembedding, and reembedding’ (Beckert 2009, 53). The map of this double movement does not show the country of desire. There are good reasons why Nancy Fraser posits a triple movement in the face of this one-dimensional Polanyi. Against the background of the experiences of the new social movements since the 1960s it introduces an additional axis of the conflict that differs from the axis of the marketization of society versus social protection and transverses it. It is the vector of emancipation. But interestingly, this is

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happening not with the concept of a further double movement but only as a further, a third movement alongside ‘more market’ vs. ‘more social protection’. Under specific circumstances she credits the market with an emancipatory function, namely when ‘mechanisms of domination’ are dissolved (Fraser 2013a, 129).19 She sees a dangerous ‘love affair’ of emancipatory forces with neoliberalism so that we have arrived at a twofold attack on social security by the supporters of liberation movements and by market radicals (Fraser 2013a, 132) – under the hegemony of neoliberalism. But it remains unclear why she only speaks of the liberation movements and does not at the same time point out that there are movements for increased domination drawing on the potential of the markets as well as that of social protection. Within her own logic there are good reasons to speak of a quadruple movement (see Graph 1). From the combination of market orientation, very specific demands for protection, and a clear authoritarian orientation the Tea Party movement, for example, and the rise of right-wing populist and neofascist forces in Europe can be better understood.

With a closer reading of his work the Polanyi moment proves not to be a simple counter-movement to market radicalism but the epochal moment of a crossroads situation (Brie 2014b). This does not mean the point of time at which the pendulum would have to swing back to new social regulation, nor can the situation be grasped in a sufficiently complex way through a triple movement. If we are to understand the political grammar of the present we have to edit out the increasingly stronger tendencies to authoritarian and barbaric regression, as has long been seen in the orientation to repressive structures, fundamentalisms, fortress capitalisms, and the qualitatively new arms build-up (see Crouch 2008; Deppe 2013; Rilling 2013; Streeck and Schäfer 2013). However, we need a conceptual framework that organically encompasses these dangers.

In my opinion, we need to aufheben the concept of double and triple movement in another ‘grammar of the political situation’, that is, to preserve its productive aspects and integrate them into a different approach. The mainstream perception of the ‘double movement’ suggests a one-dimensional tension between the extension of markets and social protection, in which the dimension of the conflict between emancipatory movements and movements of authoritarianism – or, as Polanyi sees it, between socialism and fascism – are excluded. In this respect the so-called protection movements, those which Polanyi describes in detail for the 19th century, were mostly conservative or reactionary and aimed directly against the emerging labour movement as an emancipatory social movement. They selectively took up certain worker demands and integrated them into new forms of domination. They were revolutions from above, which did not hand over to workers the power to represent protective interests but arrogated it to themselves; thus they were revolutions that made people passive (Gramsci 1994, 1329 f.). By contrast, Nancy Fraser’s model of triple movement does not provide for the existence of movements that are primarily regressive, although she so vehemently opposes neoliberal market authoritarianism and is conscious of authoritarian communism of the Leninist-Stalinist or Maoist type. But a possible collapse into barbarism, which Polanyi had in mind as someone for whom the Great Depression, fascism, and Stalinism were vividly present, is not conceivable within the concept of a triple movement. It gets left out but should in my view be integrated. The tendencies to totalitarian rule and barbarism are inherent in our civilisation (on this see my analysis of Hannah Arendt’s reconstruction of the emergence of fascism in Brie 2007a, 129–132). Therefore, in what follows I recommend conceiving of a two-dimensional space in which not only two or three but at least four major goal orientations have their place. This is the already mentioned ‘quadruple movement’ (see again Graph 1).

Fifth part of the dialogue: From the quadruple movement to the open space of alternatives

However, the transition from a triple to a quadruple movement is not enough in itself to do justice to Nancy Fraser’s concern, which she summarises thus: ‘… the triple movement suggests a political project for those of us who remain committed to emancipation. We might resolve to break off our

19 A greater enforcement of market relations can have an emancipatory effect ‘when markets in consumer goods are introduced into bureaucratically administered command economies, or when labour markets are opened to those who have been involuntarily excluded from them’ (Fraser 2013a, 129).

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dangerous liaison with neoliberalism and forge a principled new alliance with social protection. In thereby realigning the poles of the triple movement, we could integrate our longstanding interest in nondomination with the equally valid interest in solidarity and social security. At the same time, we could reclaim the indispensable interest in negative liberty from the neoliberal uses to which it has been bent’ (Fraser 2013a, 132). In order to explore the possibilities of such alliances, we need in what follows to examine the horizontal axis of the ‘quadruple movement’. The question is whether the opposition ‘liberation of the markets’ vs. ‘social protection’ accurately catches the contradiction that needs to be dealt with in a solidary-emancipatory way. The dialogue should be continued.

For Nancy Fraser the point of departure is the objective of second-wave feminism. It represented, as Fraser says, a ‘transformative political project’ ‘premised on an expanded understanding of injustice and a systemic critique of capitalist society’. She adds: ‘The movement’s most advanced currents saw their struggles as multidimensional, aimed simultaneously against economic exploitation, status hierarchy, and political subjection. To them, moreover, feminism appeared as part of a broader emancipatory project, in which struggles against gender injustices were necessarily linked to struggles against racism, imperialism, homophobia, and class domination, all of which required transformation of the deep structures of capitalist society’ (Fraser 2013d, 217). For the future too she feels the main challenge is ‘to envision arrangements for re-embedding markets that simultaneously serve to overcome domination’ (Fraser 2013b, 237).

In order to do justice to this objective emphasised by Fraser I believe it is necessary to dissolve the conflation she assumes between market liberalism and the defence of contractual freedom or negative freedom, which is a part of her model. The one pole of the double movement, the liberal pole, is for her at once occupied by market liberalism and by the defence of inter-subjective rights of freedom. Because she defends the rights of freedom she is forced to defend market liberalism. In the same breath, however, she then demands that the alliance with market liberalism be terminated. The ambiguity of her position becomes clear when she writes: ‘At the same time one could say that emancipation, which markets completely reject, transmits essential liberal ideas to the ideologies of the free market and at the same time shuts out billions of people throughout the world. People who know that there is something still worse than being exploited: to not even be worth being exploited’ (Fraser 2013c, 141). Here the liberal ideas of contractual freedom or negative freedom, markets per se and exploitation are cited in one breath in contexts of a capitalist market society. But it is precisely on this identification that neoliberalism feeds. An emancipatory position has to break up this conflation of freedom and market society. This is why, in our thesis, the model of a triple movement but also that of a quadruple movement is not tenable in the way it was depicted above.

The fixation on the double movement of either regulation through the market or social protection blinds Nancy Fraser such that she ignores a central thought of Polanyi’s – his distinction between markets and a market society. She stresses, it is true, that Polanyi is right in that the danger comes from a commodification of ‘fictitious commodities’ (Fraser 2013c, 134, 135), but she herself does not conceptually distinguish between the ‘processing of social relations via the market’ (Fraser 2013c, 140) and a situation in which the market mechanism is extended ‘to the elements of industry – labor, land, and money’ (Polanyi 2001, 78), the market becomes self-regulating and the economy becomes market economy, through which society mutates to a ‘market society’. This mutation is the core of neoliberalism. It offers the extension of markets as an opportunity to escape bureaucratic or paternalistic dependencies and uses the resulting liberated energy for the erection of systems that are largely dominated by the globalised logic of the valorisation of financial-market capital. It reduces personal and bureaucratic domination and reinforces material dependency and subordination to the associated constraints of an unleashed capital accumulation. It extends the freedoms of protagonists who already have abundant market power and at the same time undermines the conditions for solidary development based on society’s common goods.

Polanyi dedicated all of his later historical-anthropological research to the question of the potential and limits of market-based social relations (Polanyi 1977; Polanyi, Arensberg, and Pearson 1957) because he believed it was irrefutable that in complex societies market relations are not only unavoidable but are also productive if they are embedded within entities that control them, helped by other forms of exchange and cooperation based on reciprocity and redistribution. His fundamental insight in The Great Transformation was: ‘To allow the market mechanism to be sole

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Graph 2: The space of alternatives

director of the fate of human beings and their natural environment, indeed even of the amount and use of purchasing power, would result in the demolition of society’ (Polanyi 2001, 76). The limitation of the commodity character, as Polanyi maintained in a definition of the double movement, is related precisely not to the commodity form that social relations take but is related to labour power, land, and money, that is to the ‘fictitious commodities’: Social history in the nineteenth century was thus the result of a double movement: the extension of the market organization in respect to genuine commodities was accompanied by its restriction in respect to fictitious ones’ (Polanyi 2001, 79).

Staying with Nancy Fraser’s examples of women becoming breadwinners and thus escaping patriarchal or bureaucratic social-state dependency, in this case the space for market-based relations naturally is expanded. The question is whether and to what extent the effects of the new relations are emancipatory or regressive and oppressive, whether women are able to condition their market relations or these relations lead to a new and even more oppressive domination. This in turn depends on the social, economic, and cultural ‘capital’ of each of the affected groups in the concrete labour markets, the character of their regulation as well as the possibilities of voice and exit (Hirschman 2004). It is all of this that decides whether labour power is a commodity from the point of view of the employed and whether it is at the mercy of the labour market or self-realisation and social usefulness are in foregrounded.

This leads to a further objection to Nancy Fraser’s model of a triple movement, and this time it involves the vertical axis: Markets and social protection can be more or less clearly referred to specific institutions; but emancipation is not attached to any concrete institution. Fraser’s ‘third’ movement is a form of mediation, a form of conciliation between the other two. This naturally also works in reverse for movements that strengthen the character of domination in modern societies, whether through markets, by means of the state or community, or by the combination of these means. Real movements are always a form of mediation of contradictions – either more solidary-emancipatory or exclusionary and authoritarian, either more oriented to inter-subjective rights of freedom or to access to the basic goods of life. Account must be taken of this in a different model. Let us then try to formulate this kind of model step by step – in dialogue with Karl Polanyi and Nancy Fraser.

The proposal developed in what follows aims at understanding the map which measures the development of complex capital-dominated societies of the last two hundred years (their socio-historical space) neither as a pendulum motion between unleashing and taming of the markets nor by conceiving it through the addition of a third, an emancipato-ry, movement but by seeing the poles in a more general and fundamental way. In the process we will see that this kind of new mapping can connect much more directly than Nancy Fraser’s own triple movement to her earlier work on the concept of justice.

In undertaking such a new mapping of the socio-historical space of capitalist modernity, it is imperative to distinguish both analytically and in real terms between the extension of the liberal rights of freedom (economic, political, and cultural) and the implementation of a dystopic capitalism. One consists of steps towards an open access order characterised by the following features: ‘1. A widely held set of beliefs about the inclusion of and equality for all citizens. 2. Entry into economic, political, religious, and educational activities without restraint. 3. Support for organizational forms in each activity that is open to all (for example, contract enforcement). 4. Rule of law enforced impartially for all citizens. 5. Impersonal exchange’ (North, Wallis, and Weingast

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2009, 114). In the case of dystopic capitalism, ‘leaving the fate of soil and people to the market would be tantamount to annihilating them’ (Polanyi 2001, 137).

The valid objective of liberalism, one that will remain viable, that is, the defence and extension of the rights of freedom for individuals, is confronted on the other side by the need individuals have for protection as members of communities that provide them with the conditions for their lives. People from their very birth are at once individualities and communal beings, can only develop within this tension, and with the emergence of complex civilisations this tension acquires new dimensions. Classical liberalism reduces this communal horizon to a merely negative definition: The freedom of individuals (conceived as masculine) is not to be allowed to limit the freedom of other individuals (likewise conceived as masculine) (Habermann 2008). As the Declaration of the Rights of Man and of the Citizen (National Assembly of France, 26 August 1789) states: ‘Liberty consists in the power to do anything that does not injure others; accordingly, the exercise of the rights of each man has no limits except those that secure the enjoyment of these same rights to the other members of society. These limits can be determined only by law.’ (Französische Nationalversammlung 1982, 105 f.). The securing of the ‘enjoyment of equal rights’ for all is for its part, however, a positive communal task, which in today’s societies would require the constant redistribution of 40 to 50 per cent of the gross social product. Access to the basic goods of a free life (for this concept see Klein 2003), the whole public basic services system, the maintenance of the institutional conditions of an open access order, and a living culture are only possible if the communal bases of complex societies, the commons, are preserved and expanded. The oft denied condition for the life of a liberal order is its communal, which is to say, communist foundation (Brie 2012a, 2012b).20 As the state-socialist ‘experiment’ showed, this foundation can only be sustainably preserved and developed under conditions of an open access order.

In what follows, the proposed model differentiates between the space of possible alternatives and the real movements that fill this space. The horizontal axis of the model locates the basic contradiction of modern societies, and the vertical axis describes the alternative between its emancipatory or authoritarian form. In this respect these axis are fundamentally distinct from each other. The horizontal axis captures the indissoluble connection between the protection of individual civil liberties, which needs constantly to be renewed, on the one hand, and the creation as well as distribution of the material and spiritual conditions of freedom, on the other hand. What is at issue is how these poles are connected. By contrast, the vertical axis is of the either-or type – either progress towards solidary emancipation or regression through authoritarianism and exclusion.

Beginning with these considerations, the first axis in the system of coordinates of the socio-historical space of modern societies should be defined as consisting of the poles ‘access to the basic goods of a free life’ vs. ‘the implementation of the inter-subjective rights of freedom’. This involves the fundamental contradictoriness of every modern complex society, for each of these societies rests on different ways of mediating these poles. They are their two indispensable foundations. This axis directly takes up Nancy Fraser’s concept of justice as ‘parity of participation’ (Fraser 2003, 36). As she emphasises, it needs social arrangements ‘that permit all (adult) members of society to interact with one another as peers’ (Fraser 2003, 36). For this purpose, according to Fraser, two conditions would have to be met, neither of which can be reduced to the other: ‘First, the distribution of material resources must be such as to ensure participants’ independence and “voice”’ (Fraser 2003, 36). As she writes, this is the objective condition for justice. Communally controlled production of important goods of a free life and their largely equal distribution is the precondition for securing a fundamental parity of participation. This corresponds to the pole ‘access to the basic goods of a free live’. But justice, according Fraser, needs more: ‘…the second condition requires that institutionalized patterns of cultural value express equal respect for all participants and ensure equal opportunity for achieving social esteem’ (Fraser 2003,

20 Already at the time of the French Revolution the population was exasperated by what it experienced: ‘Freedom is nothing but a vain phantom when one class of men can starve another with impunity. Equality is nothing but a vain phantom when the rich, through monopoly, exercise the right of life or death over their like. The republic is nothing but a vain phantom when the counter-revolution can operate every day through the price of commodities, which three quarters of all citizens cannot afford without shedding tears’ (Roux 1793).

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36). This is the ‘intersubjective condition of participatory parity’ (Fraser 2003, 36).

In contrast to how Nancy Fraser conceived the triple movement, I first propose, starting from her concept of justice, that we distinguish struggles around the inter-subjective rights of freedom from the implementation of markets since authoritarian-repressive tendencies in markets must be differentiated from emancipatory-solidary ones in each concrete case. What always counts is their specific shaping. This, as Polanyi made clear, is essentially determined by the extent to which in the process the basic goods of a free life are subordinated or not to capital accumulation or also to repressive state structures, war lords, organised crime, etc. Second, this makes it possible to reformulate the vertical axis. While the horizontal axis makes up the basic contradictoriness of every complex society, what the vertical axis involves is the concrete way in which this contradiction is mediated – in a solidary-emancipatory or dominational-exclusionary way. On the one hand, the focus is on the inter-subjective rights of freedom or access to the basic goods of a free life; and, on the other hand, there is a struggle over whether progress towards solidary emancipation or increased personal, bureaucratic or material oppression and exclusion occur.

In the Communist Manifesto by Marx and Engels, the great vision is of an ‘association, in which the free development of each is the condition for the free development of all’ (Marx and Engels 1976, 506) and therefore no longer occurs ‘at the cost of the majority of human individuals and whole human classes’ (Marx 1989, 348). The contradiction between the development of the individual and the development of all is mediated in such a way that the freedom of the individual is at once so constituted that it no longer is obtained at the cost of the many but solidaristically promotes the freedom of all. This is accomplished above all by reproducing communal basic goods in a richer form. At the same time, the conditions for the development of the individual are made possible by these communal basic goods. The opposite of this is the exclusionary-authoritarian mediation of this contradiction, which was seen in its most extreme form in German National Socialism.

To summarise: The horizontal axis of the space of alternatives I outlined is not constituted in the model developed here by Polanyi’s double movement but is directly linked to Nancy Fraser’s two poles of participatory justice: inter-subjective rights of freedom vs. the communally guaranteed access to the basic goods of a free life. This requires more Nancy Fraser and less ‘Polanyi light’. The vertical axis in the model developed here points to the two contrasting possibilities of mediating these contradictions – in a solidary-emancipatory or an exclusionary-authoritarian way (see Graph 2). This at the same time captures Polanyi’s alternative of socialism or fascism. Fraser concludes her article: ‘… no emancipation without some new synthesis of marketization and social protection’ (Fraser 2013a, 132). Beginning with the positions developed here this is how we could reformulate her conclusion: No solidary emancipation without a new synthesis of the inter-subjective rights of freedom and access to the basic goods of a free life, the commons.

Sixth part of the dialogue: The real movement in the space of alternatives

If we observe this space of alternatives more closely we can possibly better understand and classify the real movements that Polanyi and Fraser wanted to confront. In this changed framework the productive approaches of double or triple movements are preserved and seen in a new light. A dialogue emerges with an entire spectrum of movements and counter-movements. I would like to do this in relation to neoliberalism, liberal socialism, libertarian communism, and social paternalism (Graph 3). Let us begin with neoliberalism: In Nancy Fraser’s representation the ‘advocates of the emancipatory perspective’ have ended by separating out the social question. These specific emancipation movements are, following her argument, largely movements for a further realisation of the inter-subjective rights of freedom of expanded recognition. They are, according to here, directed against the forms of economic, patriarchal, etatist, nation-state-centred structures of injustice inscribed into Fordist social state capitalism (see for details Fraser 2013d, 212 ff.; see also Winker and Degele 2009). It is precisely these structures that are attacked by the other side, by the class of owners of wealth, those protagonists that were interested in the most unimpeded ‘free’ accumulation of capital and wanted to blow up the cage of ‘state-organised capitalism’. Neoliberalism is the linking of capital-valorisation interests to the recognition of the inter-subjective demands for freedom while disregarding the social conditions of their realisation. The resulting

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Graph 3: Alternative movements of the present

contradictions are mediated in an authoritarian way by pointing to the material constraints of financial-market capitalism. The striving for individual freedom and recognition within difference and variety, for a self-determined life beyond the attributions of origin, ethnicity, and gender were subordinated by the project of neoliberal hegemony to the goals of the most unimpeded global capital valorisation possible and connected to the most varied loca-tions through the new technologies of information processing, real-time communication, and the networked manufacture of complex products. As Fraser writes: ‘On the one hand, the relatively small countercultural movement of the previous period has expanded exponentially, successfully disseminating its ideas across the globe. On the other hand, feminist ideas have undergone a subtle shift in valence in the altered context. Unambiguously emancipatory in the era of state-organized capitalism, critiques of economism, androcentrism, etatism, and Westphalianism now appear fraught with ambiguity, susceptible to serving the legitimation needs of a new form of capitalism’ (Fraser 2013d, 223). If the old labour movement subordinated struggles for recognition to those for redistribution,21 then today we see the domination of tendencies ‘to subordinate social struggles to cultural struggles, the politics of redistribution to the politics of recognition’ (Fraser 2009, 106).

The privatisation of parts of public services, the precarisation of work and life, the division along the lines of markets, which privileges to the most extreme degree the top groups and above all the 0.1 per cent (Atkinson and Piketty 2010), produce harsh new exclusions, remove essential processes from democratic control, and lead to the impoverishment and plundering of the communal bases of a free life. This symbiosis of radical economic liberalism, whose goal it is to establish a global market society beyond social and democratic control and realise the unimpeded primacy of capital accumulation with an individualised promise of freedom deprived of its ‘communist’ foundation and therefore of its chances of implementation – this is what is particular to neoliberalism. Its logical position in Graph 3 is in the lower left quadrant. Using Polanyi’s formulation: ‘The ruling classes had committed the error of extending the principle of uncompromising class rule to a type of civilization which demanded the cultural and educational unity of the commonwealth if it should be safe from degenerative influences’ (Polanyi 2001, 181). The dominance of capital valorisation is always connected to authoritarian tendencies – beginning in companies and ending with the constraints of the subordination of entire states and regions to the imperative of financial markets. Neoliberalism is the political-economic-cultural domination of a capital oligarchy and the coercion of an economy driven by the unleashed accumulation of capital.

There is a second movement, today still politically weak, which is grouped mainly around a Green New Deal, a New Public Deal, the concept of a global Marshall Plan, etc. (Candeias 2013; see, inter alia, Institut für Gesellschaftsanalyse 2011, 14–18). Their common background is a renewed social liberalism. Polanyi had already related positively to social liberalism, and many of his

21 This is of course an interpretation of the 19th- and early 20th-century labour movement against the background of their deformation and defeat through the reforms from above, the split into a communist and social democratic wing as well as through fascism and the Cold War. The original labour movement was, notwithstanding its internal restrictions, a movement that tried to organically connect the rights of freedom and social participation. It was a social and political freedom movement par excellence.

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proposals for the institutional shaping of the post-World War II order overlap with Keynes’ positions (see, inter alia, Polanyi 2002d; see also Polanyi-Levitt 2013, 71–93) and Roosevelt’s New Deal (u.a. in Polanyi 2002a). Historically however, social liberalism has been reduced to organised capitalism, whose dominant protagonists are corporations and corporately organised groups under the primacy of a reined in capital valorisation, represented in the West by Fordism and the post-World War II social state (Busch and Land 2013; on the fate of the New Deal see Fraser and Gerstle 1989).

By contrast, Keynes formulated a version of liberal socialism going beyond social liberalism, which he summarised in this way: ‘The question is whether we are prepared to move out of the nineteenth century laissez-faire state into an era of liberal socialism, by which I mean a system where we can act as an organized community for common purposes and to promote social and economic justice, whilst respecting and protecting the individual – his freedom of choice, his faith, his mind and its expression, his enterprise and his property’ (Keynes 1982, 500). In contrast to social liberalism, a liberal socialism shifts the weight to a subordination of liberal institutions to emancipatory goals and solidary inclusion (it can be located in the upper left quadrant of our model). Keynes’ long-term perspective was closely tied to his vision of full employment, the transition to a steady-state economy and a society of adequacy and leisure (Keynes 1963, 2003; Skidelsky and Skidelsky 2012).22 While neoliberalism relies on privatisation, austerity policy, regulation in the interest of the central oligarchies of financial-market capitalism (Dellheim 2014), and wants to organise society on a market model, that is, is market-radical (Klein 2008), liberal socialism is above all oriented to strengthening the inter-subjective rights of freedom by generalising them, deploy markets as an essential form of regulation, and at the same time make access to the basic goods of a free life independent of power in the market. Today a liberal socialism closely overlaps the concept of a socio-ecological transformation. Polanyi shows that English Liberals in the 19th century viewed ‘the idea of popular government’ with ‘abhorrence’ and that ‘the concept of democracy was foreign to the English middle classes’ (Polanyi 2001, 180). In neoliberal financial-market capitalism too, democracy and market (liberalism) go their separate ways once again (Demirović 2013; see also Deppe 2013; as Streeck 2013 bitterly realises). In the end it could be shown once again that when separated from one another neither democracy nor liberal institutions can be salvaged. One could also say that socialism and liberality have a common future or they have none.

A third, contemporary movement, which is gaining increased importance, is based on the reappropriation of common goods as a domain of the production of a free communality, commoning, solidary economy, the various forms of alternative production from cooperatives to peer-to-peer economy (Bauwens and P2P Foundation 2014; Bollier 2014; Daly, Cobb, and Cobb 1994; Dellheim 2008; Dolšak and Ostrom 2003; Elsen 2011; Helfrich, Kuhlen, Sachs, and Siefkes 2010; Huber 2013; Voß 2010). It could be designated libertarian commonism and is located in the upper right quadrant of our model. Here traditions of syndicalism and anarchism are taken up in modern form and libertarian communist traditions revived, such as those represented in the early 19th century by Godwin, Fourier, and Owen, among others. The classical cooperative movement, or also the social revolutionary conceptions for reconstructing rural Russia, as well as anarcho-syndicalism and the radical initiatives of William Morris, are elements of this historical tradition. Their special focus lies in a new kind of participatory organisation of public services, of the whole reproduction economy, the living networks of municipal life or also cooperative cultural production and consumption. This kind of libertarian commonism puts at its centre the reproduction of the bases of free communality, on the one hand, and the constant new production of relations of living solidarity, on the other hand. It is here that the economy of caring and gentleness reigns, a politics of commoning and of the commoner as well as a culture of dialogue, of conversation and of dance.23 Buen vivir positions are also indispensable approaches to a new free communality

22 It should incidentally be noted that Polanyi fundamentally understood Keynes as someone who had tried to salvage market economy through changing its mode of regulation. He did not take up those of Keynes’ positions which pointed beyond market economy. 23 Erich Fromm described a culture where ‘the conversation ceases to be an exchange of commodities (information, knowledge, status) and becomes a dialogue in which it does not matter anymore who is right.

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beyond the imperatives of a market economy and the growth compulsion (for a good example see Acosta 2009). Only in this new form does the ‘protection’ of society really become a breakthrough into more freedom, above all more free communality, more direct democratic participation and common ways of life in the spaces of the public sphere and of the commons. This is not a glorified throwback to a lost world but a look ahead to completely new possibilities, many of which have their starting point in the cooperative experiments of the past.

And, fourth, there is a movement that again defends the social and communal in an authoritarian and communal way, which reduces negative rights of freedom (beginning with ‘foreigners’) and tends to exclude people who think differently, who are different. The umbrella term for this is exclusionary authoritarian social paternalism. It is located in the lower right quadrant of the model. Its extreme case would be totalitarian rule. Together with market fundamentalism, this movement reinforces tendencies to barbarism. In view of the crises of post-colonial state-centred as well as neoliberal projects in all regions of the globe, state failure is endemic. Fundamentalist movements have considerable support. War lords pillage the areas they control and supply the world market. The barbarism of a militarised imperial neoliberalism, which reached its highest point with George W. Bush, and the barbarism of ‘protection’ against the dangers of the market and imperial powers on the part of fundamentalist movements are mutually strengthening. They are twin brothers.

There are various possibilities in this situation. The first variant is the continuation of neoliberal financial-market capitalism in the same or another form. For this the related structures and institutions have to be protected. As Stephen Gill writes: ‘Indeed, it can be shown that many of the neoliberal forms of state have been authoritarian’(Gill 1995, 420). Such a ‘protection of society’ in this case is mainly the protection of the reigning relations of power. Etatism is accordingly transformed (Brangsch 2012) and in the case of the European Union a deep crisis sets in (Demirović and Sablowski 2012). The degree to which the interests, needs, and also desires of the subaltern classes are included depends on the counter-movements, on the concrete form of hegemony and/or sheer domination.24 The narrower the basis for accumulation becomes, the more restricted the possibilities are of including broad parts of the population, and the more marked become neoliberalism’s authoritarian and exclusionary features (Candeias 2012a). It is an open question to what extent the commodification of the basic goods of society can be linked to the level of the provision of resources and of social stability that is necessary and sufficient for the maintenance of neoliberal capital valorisation. This is not predetermined but it will be decided in a practical way in the competition amongst alternatives. The weaker the alternatives are, the more brutal will be the evolution of neoliberal financial-market capitalism. Today’s neoliberalism could change into an openly authoritarian fortress capitalism (Raskin, Electris, and Rosen 2010).

A second variant includes forms of a capitalism under the primacy of political-cultural and security-policy objectives (Sum and Jessop 2013, 486). The most recent form of this kind of capitalism is the ‘Chinese Dream’ proclaimed by the new leadership of China’s Communist Party (Central Party School of the Communist Party of China 2013), which is wavering between the unleashing of capitalism along with social paternalism, on the one side, and socio-ecological reconstruction and broadened participation, on the other. The initiatives for Green Capitalism and a Green New Deal (Green New Deal Group 2008; WGBU 2011) also point in the direction of opening up new sources of accumulation (especially through the ecological, or socio-ecological, reconstruction of production, transportation, and reproduction), of a broader ‘historic bloc’, as well as of new modes of production and life (Brand and Wissen 2013; Institut für Gesellschaftsanalyse 2011, 19). In its most far-reaching form it could mean the primacy of the reproduction economy (Brückner 2010;

The duelists begin to dance together, and they part not with triumph or sorrow – which are equally sterile – but with joy’ (Fromm 2008, 29).

24 In the ‘best’ scenario, domination is coupled with hegemony. This means: ‘Undoubtedly the fact of hegemony presupposes that account be taken of the interests and the tendencies of the groups over which hegemony is to be exercised, and that a certain compromise equilibrium should be formed – in other words, that the leading group should make sacrifices of an economic-corporate kind. But there is also no doubt that such sacrifices and such a compromise cannot touch the essential; for though hegemony is ethico-political, it must also be economic, must necessarily be based on the decisive function exercised by the leading group in the decisive nucleus of economic activity’ (Gramsci 2000, 211 f.; on this concept see Haug 2004).

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Graph 4: Enterprises as protagonists of the reproduction of bourgeois-capitalist societies

Chorus 2013; Jochimsen 2003; Madörin 2006; Winker 2012). Basic societal goods are removed from the dominance of capital valorisation. It would mean a solidary mixed economy; the financial system would be strongly regulated (with reference to Polanyi and Keynes see Bischoff and Lieber 2013, 144–162; see also Troost 2010), and investments would be socially and ecologically controlled. This would mean transitions to a Green Socialism (Candeias 2012b; Rilling 2011). One could speak of a double transformation in capitalism and beyond it (Klein 2013).25

Seventh part of the dialogue: From market society to solidary society

Starting from Nancy Fraser’s ‘triple movement’ and the work of Karl Polanyi, the current struggles have up to now been embedded in a public space of political-social alternatives, whose two axes are formed first through the relation between the struggles for realising inter-subjective rights of freedom and attempts to expand access to the basic goods of a free life and, second, between the solidary-emancipatory and the exclusionary-authoritarian mediations of these struggles. Neoliberalism, liberal socialism, libertarian commonism, and authoritarian paternalism are movements within this space alongside others. The ‘political grammar’ of the present is reinterpreted in the light of Karl Polanyi and Nancy Fraser. In my view, this is how the plethora of opposing tendencies and the diverse hegemonic and counter-hegemonic options can be more compelling accounted for than by referring to double or triple movement. Still, the question remains whether this can give rise to a narrative to support ‘a coherent counter-project to neoliberalism’ (Fraser 2013a, 121). The narrative should be able to describefour aspects: socio-ecological reconstruction, redistribution from top to bottom and from private to public wealth, democratisation of democracy, and encompassing solidarity (see Klein 2012). In this process the dialogue finally becomes a polylogue.

An emancipatory-solidary alliance on the basis of such a narrative must go to the roots of market society. Its point of departure, according to Polanyi, was the transformation of the basic goods of a society – human labour power, nature, the important institution of money, and, it should be added, culture – into ‘fictitious commodities’. This transformation into ‘fictitious commodities’ is the condition of their entrepreneurial combination with the goal of capital valorisation (Graph 4). Vigour and self-assertiveness as well as

tendencies to civilisational one-sidedness and the destruction of such a mode of production arise from this self-valorisation of value. The basic goods of society are transformed into ‘fictitious commodities’, combined and recombined, subordinated to the capitalist-oriented imperatives of efficiency and innovation and oriented to possible future demand based on an ability to pay.

The disembedding of the basic goods of a society from their traditional patrimonial contexts carries a high price and has an immense power of attraction, for ‘Market society has produced more income, wealth, goods, and services than any other form of human social organization’ (Fligstein 2001, 3). This explains the importance of such a mode of production for those social groups that are aspiring to rise socially as well as for states and their elites that otherwise have no reason to expect security or prestige. Therefore capitalism has up to now been able to defend itself from every criticism, every resistance, and all desperate attacks, and able to absorb almost all elements of the latter (Boltanski and Chiapello 2005) and expand with renewed power and more victoriously 25 Adler and Schachtschneider (2010) provide an extraordinarily well substantiated overview of the main initiatives.

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than ever. Up to now Marx’ and Engels’ dictum has been borne out that the capitalist mode of production ‘compels all nations, on pain of extinction, to adopt the bourgeois mode of production; it compels them to introduce what it calls civilisation into their midst, i.e., to become bourgeois themselves’ (Marx and Engels 1976, 488). It is this power of attraction, this exorbitant productivity and capacity for renewal, which the great majority of the left either takes for granted and ascribes to each non-capitalist alternative or simply disregards or even consciously denies (on the critique of naïve anti-capitalism see Haug 2007). But if one does not talk about capitalism’s strengths one cannot talk about any alternative, not to mention socialism, however it is shaped (for a detailed treatment see Brie 2010). A great socialist transformation has to preserve and use the emancipatory strong points of bourgeois-capitalist societies for a completely different civilisation or it is condemned to failure at the very outset.

Today’s market society has changed in respect to the society that Polanyi depicted, which emerged in England in the 19th century. It is less rigid, and the interrelations between economy, politics, and culture are much closer. As Michele Cangiani and Claus Thomasberger wrote in their introduction to Polanyi’s economic analyses: ‘The result is a new institutional structure characterised by … an open but fragile international currency system requiring continual intervention, politically regulated national money and labour markets and a state oriented towards intervention. The market’s domination of society has thus not … ended. On the contrary, precisely because the market system is no longer independent, because it no longer represents a separate sphere and because it depends on social intervention and support measures, all other institutions had and have to be so reconstructed that they satisfy this function [i.e., of serving the market system – M. B.]’ (Cangiani and Thomasberger 2002, 38). The state, international governance structures, but also education and culture, law, etc. develop to conform to the market and competition (on the reconstruction of the state see Jessop 2007; on the intelinkage between the economical, the political and the cultural dimensions see Sum and Jessop 2013). Block and Somers rightly point out that in this respect every economic order is socially embedded (Block and Somers 2014, 155 ff.). The question, however, is to determine what the social area is from which the decisive, predominant dynamic springs and to which the protagonists (must) orient themselves. In a capitalist economic order this is capital accumulation.

What Polanyi reveals is the fact that the so-called factors of production (raw materials, knowledge, labour power, means of production, and even credit) are not commodities. In this sense Polanyi also breaks with Marx, for whom money as well as labour power have a commodity character (see Kuczynski 2009). Polanyi points to a fundamental contradiction: In a market economy these ‘factors of production’ ‘also must be organized in markets; in fact these markets form an absolutely vital part of the economic system’ (Polanyi 2001, 75). In reality however, they are only ‘fictitious commodities’; they are treated as commodities although they are really not commodities. His argument needs to be quoted extensively: ‘… labor, land, and money are obviously not commodities; the postulate that anything that is bought and sold must have been produced for sale is emphatically untrue in regard to them… Labor is only another name for a human activity which goes with life itself, which in its turn is not produced for sale but for entirely different reasons, nor can that activity be detached from the rest of life, be stored or mobilized; land is only another name for nature, which is not produced by man; actual money, finally, is merely a token of purchasing power which, as a rule, is not produced at all, but comes into being through the mechanism of banking or state finance’ (Polanyi 2001, 75 f.).

Under the imperatives of capital accumulation26 market economy always takes factors of production from spheres in which not commodity production but completely different basic relationships are at work. Raw materials, energy, and the products produced through their use are taken from the earthly environment, the gaiasphere and in turn influence the latter, become parts of it, change it, above all as the technosphere, as waste and pollutants. Human labour power is nothing other than a specific capacity of people that arises in the sphere of their communal-

26 Michael Burawoy is certainly right when he notes that Polanyi ‘…in his hostility to orthodox Marxism especially toward its theories of history and the centrality of exploitation – … lost sight of the imperatives of capitalist accumulation that lie behind the resurgence of markets’ (Burawoy 2010, 301 f., see also 2013, 38).

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Graph 5: The four questions during the crisis of neoliberal financial-market-capitalism

individual life worlds (to which paid labour also belongs). ‘Money’ is nothing but one of the many institutions that characterise the social order. A judicial system, the possibilities for independent organisation in the economic, political, and cultural area, a developed finance and credit system, etc. are part of this. Together they form the sphere of societal institutions. Knowledge circulates in the cultural-public sphere, which developed gradually starting in the 17th century. Together they form the sphere of the natural-technical, of the social, of the societal and cultural wealth of every society. In the crisis of neoliberal financial-market capitalism it has become clear how fundamental the questions are that arise with such a capital-market-dominated economic and social order: What should we be allowed to create, how do we want to live, what do we want to decide on, what is a human being (Graph5)? Market society undermines its own foundations – ecological, life-world, societal-institutional, and cultural (this position is developed in detail in Brie 2014c and does not need to be repeated here).

It is time to recognise the Karl Polanyi who was a theorist of the great transformation pointing beyond capitalism, who has been eclipsed by the ‘Polanyi light’ limited to a discussion of the double movement inside the framework of capitalism. In his work he offers two transformation concepts: First, transformation for him is the transition to a market economy that describes the England of the early 19th century (Polanyi 1978, 59–71), and, second, for him a new great transformation was on the agenda with the collapse of the liberal order in the 1930s, whose contemporary scenarios he analysed – fascism, the New Deal, and Soviet socialism (Polanyi 1978, 314–329). He himself develops a conception of socialism as ‘the tendency inherent in an industrial civilization to transcend the self-regulating market by consciously subordinating it to a democratic society’ (Polanyi 2001, 242). The most important positive proposals that he then develops in his chief work are the removal of labour, land (nature), and money from the market. They are no longer to be primarily treated as commodities. In this, market economy would be overcome within a painful transitional period (Polanyi 2001, 258 f.). He advocates enforceable social civil rights to complete political rights: ‘The list should be headed by the right of the individual to a job under approved conditions, irrespective of his or her political or religious views, or of color and race’

(Polanyi 2001, 264). Freedom ‘should be upheld at all cost – even that of efficiency in production, economy in consumption or rationality in administration. An industrial society can afford to be free’ (Polanyi 2001, 264).

The alternatives that Polanyi faced in his own time are still ours: Will the foundations of our societies be irreversibly destroyed through the imperatives of capital accumulation, or can they still function in accordance with their own potential and with the goal of a richer human life today and in the future? The positive alternative is – at least for Polanyi – incompatible with a market society. ‘… the conflict between the market and the elementary requirements of an organized social life’ (Polanyi 2001, 257) must be resolved through overcoming market economy, or we will see civilisation sink into barbarism – this was Polanyi’s firm conviction in view of the epochal crisis of the 1930s and 40s. Dieter Klein underscores how apposite this approach is today: ‘ After the great transformation that Karl Polanyi analysed in his homonymous work there is a new transformation

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on the agenda, which will revolutionise all spheres of social life on earth and that categorically excludes a pure financial-capitalist regulation (Klein 2013, 12). It would involve the ‘transition to another, an alternative social system …, to a solidary, just society in harmony with nature, which can also be called a democratic green socialism’ (see also Brie and Klein 2011; Klein 2013, 13). Based on an analysis of Polanyi’s great transformation of the 19th century, Rolf Reißig has developed the concept of a great transformation of the 21st century or a Second Great Transformation towards a ‘sustainable solidarity society’ (see for the conept Reißig 2009, 2011, 2012).

Eighth part of the dialogue: Paths of Transformation

Nancy Fraser rightly points out that it is completely wrong to hope for a pendulum swing of the so-called double movement away from market radicalism and towards social protection and to work for it. For this protection can take on authoritarian, repressive, and even barbaric forms under the domination of capital oligarchies or with their active participation. Elements of various sorts of neofascism have been emerging for a long time now. The global surveillance of the communication of citizens is only one such element. The new border regime, drone-based warfare, the massive erosion of social civil rights, and above all the emptying out of democratic institutions are threatening. This kind of ‘protection’ is the flipside of precisely those tendencies of an unleashed market radicalism against which Polanyi is arguing. The continuation of a double movement is the attempt to stabilise capitalism on its own basis.

The decisive strategic task of a transformatively oriented left would be to challenge the foundation of the so-called double movement – the capitalist market society. This in turn overlaps with the goal of ‘non-reformist reform policies’ of the kind that Nancy Fraser asks for: ‘These would be policies with a double face: on the one hand, they engage people's identities and satisfy some of their needs as interpreted within existing frameworks of recognition and distribution; on the other hand, they set in motion a trajectory of change in which more radical reforms become practicable over time. When successful, nonreformist reforms change more than the specific institutional features they explicitly target. In addition, they alter the terrain upon which later struggles will be waged. By changing incentive structures and political opportunity structures, they expand the set of feasible options for future reform. Over time their cumulative effect could be to transform the underlying structures that generate injustice’ (Fraser 2003, 79 f.). Socially and ecologically oriented entry projects towards a Green New Deal would meld together with entry projects into a solidary economy in the broadest sense (Dellheim 2008), into a reproduction economy, based on commoning.27

In Polanyi’s 1940 ‘Common Man’s Masterplan’ a series of ‘entry projects’ are cited, which are also invoked at the end of The Great Transformation:

‘Regulated market means markets with no supplementary markets for labor, land and money. The security is possible in as society wealthy enough to banish want without even raising the question of the motive to work. The freedom of arbitrary rejection of job to be limited. The freedom of arbitrary dismissal limited. The freedom of unlimited profits limited. The unlimited rights of private ownership limited. The public spirited forms of enterprise fostered. The plastic society achieved. The helpless society transcended. The concept of freedom reformed. Christianity transcended. The philosophy of the common man established’ (Polanyi 1940, 2).

27 On the concept of entry projects see Klein and Brangsch (Brangsch 2009, 2014; Klein 2004). In this context the Institute for Critical Social Analysis has studied, among other phenomena, participatory budgets (Brangsch and Brangsch 2008), energy-democracy initiatives (Müller 2012), as well as free public transport (Dellheim 2011; Brie and Candeias 2012). Erik Olin Wright’s real utopias project has tracked these kinds of projects within a comprehensive concept of socialist transformation (Wright 2010, 2013).

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Polanyi’s late work further develops approaches to a plurality of exchange principles already adumbrated in The Great Transformation. The traditional societies, which he investigates, are characterised by reciprocity, redistribution, and a subsistence economy. At the same time, as Polanyi notes, they developed extensive markets, which were subjected to strict control. Despite this, the ‘safeguards of the rule of law and of the traders’ liberty’ were impressive. He adds: ‘Similarly, ways were found to reconcile economic planning with the requirements of markets in communities as different as democratic Attica of the fifth century B.C. and the preliterate Negro Kingdom of Dahomey in West Africa, more than 2000 years later’ (Polanyi 1977, XII). He rejected the alternative ‘market society or oppression’. For him, planning and regulation could be the condition for freedom. His vision is that of a society with a plurality of property and socialisation forms, in which a plurality of protagonists shape their own lives in a self-conscious way and on the basis of a free agreement on their goals and means. Today’s initiatives, either in the form of a socio-ecologically radicalised neo-Keynesianism and, on the other side, of a libertarian commonism, are preconditions for it.

All this has a prerequisite in Polanyi’s view – democracy. Democracy is in his understanding the only form in which free communality can still exist within a complex society with ‘aggregates of functional institutions’. He thought that democratisation would give rise to socialism as an attempt – however incompletely – to ‘make society a distinctively human relationship of persons’ (Polanyi 2001, 242). He is aware that the complexity of society always produces unintended consequences, which can never be fully controlled. Full oversight and transparency is impossible. However, a much higher degree of freedom and responsibility for the consequences of one’s own actions can be achieved. It is true that new relations of domination and new exclusions constantly emerge: ‘No society is possible in which power and compulsion are absent, nor a world in which force has no function’ (Polanyi 2001, 266). But, according to the last paragraph of The Great Transformation: ‘Uncomplaining acceptance of the reality of society gives man indomitable courage and strength to remove all removable injustice and unfreedom. As long as he is true to his task of creating more abundant freedom for all, he need not fear that either power or planning will turn against him and destroy the freedom he is building by their instrumentality. This is the meaning of freedom in a complex society; it gives us all the certainty that we need’ (Polanyi 2001, 268). Here, as already before in Rosa Luxemburg’s thinking, freedom is understood as the combination of socialism and democracy, as a goal that is at the same time the path.28

If we were to reformulate Nancy Fraser’s message on the basis of the approach developed here, it could be: We should work at counterposing to the alliance of neoliberalism and authoritarian social paternalism, which is now taking shape, an alliance of liberal socialists and thoroughly libertarian commonists. The socio-cultural basis would be a solidary lower-middle alliance (regionally, nationally, supranationally, and globally) whose most important milieu would be represented by (1) the social-emancipatory circle of skilled personnel in the public sector, above all in public basic services (education, healthcare, and culture), (2) the wage-earning strata in the services area, in industry, and in commerce, and (3) the precariously employed (for a detailed treatment see Brie 2007b, 2007c). Precisely the weakest social groups today are often pressed into political passivity (Kahrs 2012; Schäfer 2011). Their word counts for little (Bartels 2008). However, these classes and groups will only become a real force if they come into movement once again by combining their forces (Candeias and Völpel 2014; for concrete examples see Clawson 2003; Mason 2013; Whitaker 2007). A transformative left can emerge from a mosaic left (Urban 2009, 2014). We are still a long way off from this.

The preliminary conclusion of the dialogue: We advance through listening to each other

The civilisational dimension of Polanyi’s vision appears when he writes: ‘After a century of blind 28 Taking issue with Lenin and Trotsky, Rosa Luxemburg wrote in the summer of 1918 ‘…socialist democracy is not something which begins only in the promised land after the foundations of socialist economy are created; it does not comes as some sort of Christmas present for the worthy people who, in the interim, have loyally supported a handful of socialist dictators’ (Luxemburg 2004, 208). She wanted transformation in the sense of ‘resolute attacks upon the well-entrenched rights and economic relationships of bourgeois society’, but ‘in the manner of applying democracy’, ‘out of the active participation of the masses’, ‘subjected to the control of complete public activity’ (Luxemburg 2004, 308).

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“improvement” man is restoring his “habitation”’ (Polanyi 2001, 257). The horizons this opens up could be denoted by the concepts of landscape, urban community (‘polis’), the squares and loci of public communality (the ‘agora’), and the home. Far too many people remain unaware of the radicality of this task. It is a great, enormously attractive vision, which deserves to live. A great deal of this tomorrow has for a long time danced today, as Dieter Klein has vividly shown (Klein 2013, 169–202). The philosopher Lothar Kühne formulated this context thus: ‘In the landscape the individual is not only incorporated into a specific community through the house that is crowned by the landscape; in the landscape he/she also has the incipient spatial form of his/her incorporation into humanity, because the landscape indeed exists because of the house although it is essentially nature and earth. The finiteness of individual life has become negated by/absorbed, in creative everyday life, by the species. […] Thus the house takes back the values that have been separated out and seigneurially inverted in the church. The house is not seigneurial but is homey and wonderful’ (Kühne 1985, 39). To this end, however, the earth must become a paradise, which we take care of and cautiously preserve – the old Persian word for garden is pairi-daēza (Turner 2005, 121).29 The walls must crumble so that everyone can come and go freely in our cities and communities, no one as an outsider but always as a guest or at home, no one humiliated and no one exalted. Responsibility then can really be taken for freedom; solidary communality of provision and care would be a daily matter; citizens would put much time and effort into subjecting social institutions to democratic control (for an emancipatory perspective on time see Haug 2009). In the place of a society whose rhythms and spaces are determined by capital accumulation (Harvey 2006) the reproduction of solidary life would be shaped in all its diversity. Traditions of pre-capitalist and modern societies could be combined on a new basis in a ‘city of being’.30 A sustainable solidary society of good life would arise (Reißig 2009, 141 ff.) (Graph 6). Karl Polanyi’s contemporary Ernst Bloch captured this hope in these words: ‘True genesis is not at the beginning but at the end, and it starts to begin only when society and existence become radical, i.e., grasp their roots. But the root of history is the working, creating [and, we should add, caring – M.B.] human being who reshapes and overhauls the given facts. Once he has grasped himself and re-established what is his, without expropriation and alienation, in real democracy, there arises in the world something which shines into the childhood of all and in which no one has yet been: a homeland’ (Bloch 1995, 1375 f.).

29 In his utopia of a liberated, a communist future society, William Morris has a contemporary witness of the great transformation look back and say: ‘"Yes, […] the world was being brought to its second birth; how could that take place without a tragedy? […] The spirit of the new days, of our days, was to be delight in the life of the world; intense and overweening love of the very skin and surface of the earth on which man dwells [… ] many of the things which used to be produced – slave-wares for the poor and mere wealth-wasting wares for the rich – ceased to be made”’ (Morris 2004, 119, 121). 30 This vision was outlined by Erich Fromm who wrote in the conclusion of his work To Have or To Be: ‘Later Medieval culture flourished because people followed the vision of the City of God. Modern society flourished because people were energized by the vision of the growth of the Earthly City of Progress. In our century, however, this vision deteriorated to that of the Tower of Babel, which is now beginning to collapse and will ultimately bury everybody in its ruins. If the City of God and the Earthly City were thesis and antithesis, a new synthesis is the only alternative to chaos: the synthesis between the spiritual core of the Late Medieval world and the development of rational thought and science since the Renaissance. This synthesis is The City of Being‘(Fromm 2008, 164).

.

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Graph 6: Sustainable solidary society of good life

Karl Polanyi’s and Nancy Fraser’s concerns overlap through time and space. Their common denominator is solidary emancipation, the movement towards freedom for each and all. From this conversion friction grows, out of which the new can emerge. This is connected with innumerable narratives, which have grown out of the new protest movements against neoliberal financial-market capitalism. The dialogue becomes a polylogue; the conversation becomes a ‘song’, as Hölderlin wrote. Polyphony is the condition for a new narrative of solidary emancipation. But this requires a cooperative structure, which can emerge from listening to each other while we move ahead laboriously and searchingly. Perhaps the polylogue with Nancy Fraser and Karl Polanyi we conducted in this essay can contribute to this beginning.

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