N E W S L E T T E R - Pugwash Conferences on Science and ...

N E W S L E T T E R

Volume 43 J Number 1 J June 2006

issued by the Council of the PugwashConferences on Science and World Affairs

Nobel Peace Prize 1995

The Iranian Nuclear Issue

T A B L E O F C O N T E N T S

TO THE PUGWASH COMMUNITY: . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1

REPORTS ON RECENT PUGWASH WORKSHOPS

Pugwash meeting no. 311 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 323rd Workshop of the Pugwash Study Group on the Implementation of the Chemicaland Biological Weapons Convention: Achieving a successful outcome of the SixthReview ConferenceGeneva, Switzerland, 3-4 December 2005

Pugwash meeting no.313 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 134th Pugwash Workshop on Stability, Security and Cooperation in Northeast AsiaBeijing, China, 12-15 January 2006

Pugwash Meeting no. 314 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17Pugwash Workshop on Prospects for Self-Governance in Jammu & KashmirIslamabad, Pakistan, 10-12 March 2006

Pugwash Meeting no. 315 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25Pugwash Workshop on Security Architecture in the Horn of AfricaNairobi, Kenya, 17-19 March 2006

Pugwash meeting no. 316 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 314th Pugwash Workshop on Threats without Enemies; HIV/AIDS: Sharing of Experiences, What Works?Chennai, India, 7-9 April, 2006

Pugwash meeting no.317 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35International Conference on Iraq and Regional Stability and Iran’s Nuclear EnergyProgram: Policies and Prospects—A Joint Conference of the Pugwash Conferencesand the Center for Strategic Research, TehranTehran, Iran, 24-25 April 2006

Pugwash meeting no. 318 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4224th Workshop of the Study Group on Implementation of the Chemical andBiological Weapons Conventions: Achieving a Successful Outcome of the SecondCWC ReviewNoordwijk, The Netherlands, 13-14 May 2006

Pugwash meeting no. 320 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 47Pugwash Workshop on Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Disarmament: The Role of EuropeAmsterdam, The Netherlands, 7-8 June 2006

SPECIAL SECTION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 52Papers from the Pugwash Study Group: Threats without enemies: The security aspects of HIV/AIDS

NATIONAL PUGWASH GROUPS

Russian Pugwash Group . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 74

REPORT FROM INTERNATIONAL STUDENT/YOUNG PUGWASH . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 76

OBITUARIES

Iwao Ogawa, Robert Reford . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 77

Members of the Pugwash Council . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 79

Calendar of Future Meetings . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . inside back cover

PugwashVolume 43 J Number 1June 2006

Editor:Jeffrey Boutwell

Research Assistant: Celeste LeRoux

Design and Layout: Anne Read

Printing: Cardinal PressFredericksburg, Virginia

COVER: Iran’s nuclear negotiator,Dr. Ali Larijani, at the Pugwash/CSRconference, April 2006

PHOTO: Jeffrey Boutwell

Pugwash Newsletter, June 2006 1

Continuing Challenges to Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Middle East Stability

The first half of 2006 witnessed continuing sectarian vio-lence and domestic insurgency in Iraq and the inability ofIran and the international community to find a politicallyacceptable means for ensuring adequate transparency andconfidence that Iran’s nuclear technology program wouldnot be diverted to military purposes. To that end, the Pug-wash Conferences and the Center for Strategic Research inTehran co-sponsored an international conference in April2006 covering both Iran’s nuclear energy program and theequally important issue of Iraq and regional stability (seep. 35). Unfortunately, little progress was made on eitherissue, whether at the conference or by the internationalcommunity. When added to the continuing stalemate inthe Palestinian-Israeli peace process occasioned by theelection of a Hamas government, the outlook for MiddleEast stability could not have been more bleak.

56th Pugwash Conference on Science and WorldAffairs—Cairo

Accordingly, these and other major challenges to securityin the Middle East will be the focus of the 56th PugwashConference on Science and World Affairs - A Region inTransition: Peace and Reform in the Middle East, takingplace in Cairo, Egypt from 10-15 November 2006. Underthe direction of Pugwash Council member MohamedKadry Said, and with the help of Ambassadors MohamedShaker and Mohamed Ezzeldine Abdel Moneim and othermembers of the Egyptian Pugwash group, efforts havebeen underway for more than a year to invite senior poli-cymakers and other specialists from throughout the Mid-dle East, and internationally, to join Pugwash in Cairo.Plenary sessions and working groups at the 56th PugwashConference will focus on such topics as nuclear non-prolif-eration generally and weapons of mass destruction in theMiddle East in particular; the Israeli-Palestinian peaceprocess, Islam and the West; and the future of Iraq.

50th Anniversary of the Pugwash Conferences in 2007

Plans have also been underway for some time to commem-orate in 2007 the 50th anniversary of the first Pugwashconference, held at Cyrus Eaton’s Thinker’s Lodge in Pug-wash, Nova Scotia in July 1957. A workshop on Revitaliz-ing Nuclear Disarmament is scheduled to be held atThinker’s Lodge from 5-7 July 2007, along with eventsplanned by the Pugwash Peace Exchange and the PugwashParks Commission. In October 2007, the 57th PugwashConference in Bari, Italy will provide an opportunity for amajor retrospective of fifty years of Pugwash efforts toreduce and eliminate nuclear, chemical and biologicalweapons and discussions of Pugwash strategies for realiz-ing these objectives in the future. Many national Pugwashgroups will also be holding commemorative events of the50th Pugwash anniversary, information on which will beregularly posted on the Pugwash website.

Pugwash Study Group: Threats without Enemies: The Security

Aspects of HIV/AIDS

In February 2004, nine specialists on various aspects ofHIV/AIDS met in a private house in Betty’s Bay, near CapeTown, South Africa, to map out plans for a long-term Pug-wash Study Group that would study the security implica-tions of the HIV/AIDS pandemic in various settingsaround the world. Led by the chair of the Pugwash Coun-cil, Marie Muller, and Nola Dippenaar (South Africa) andGwyn Prins (UK), that first meeting led to three more spe-cialized HIV/AIDS workshops (two in South Africa andone in India, hosted by Pugwash President M.S. Swami-nathan at his institute in Chennai) and a joint workshop inCorsica with the Pugwash Study Group on Science, Ethicsand Society.

To the Pugwash Community

2 Pugwash Newsletter, June 2005

With funding from the Rockefeller Brothers Fund and theparticipation of medical, military, security, policy, and cor-porate specialists, the Study Group produced an impres-sive body of analysis and reports that had a marked influ-ence on the policy debate over HIV/AIDS in South Africa,while also contributing to a substantive sharing of experi-ences with colleagues from India and East Africa at theChennai conference. It also happened during the evolutionof the Study Group that Gwyn Prins co-authored (withTony Barnett) a major report for the United Nations,HIV/AIDS and Security: Fact, Fiction and Evidence – AReport to UNAIDS (September 2005).

The Study Group represented the best of the Pugwash tra-dition of bringing solid science to bear on important pol-icy issues, and several of the papers written for StudyGroup meetings can be found in the Special Section, onp. 52.

Acknowledgments

For continued support of the Pugwash Newsletter, we aregrateful to the Italian National Research Council, the Ger-man Research Society, the John D. and Catherine T.MacArthur Foundation, and the Cyrus Eaton Foundation.

JEFFREY BOUTWELL, EDITOR

Thinker’s Lodge, Pugwash, Nova Scotia.


P U G W A S H M E E T I N G N O . 3 1 1

23rd Workshop of the Pugwash Study Group on the Implementation of the Chemical and Biological Weapons Convention:

Achieving a successful outcome of the Sixth Review ConferenceGeneva, Switzerland, 3–4 December 2005

Report byC. A. McLeish

Review Conference of the Conven-tion on the Prohibition of the Devel-opment, Production and Stockpilingof Bacteriological (Biological) andToxin Weapons and on their Destruc-tion (the BWC)—and at a momentwhen the situation in arms controland non proliferation was notencouraging. It was observed that theinternational community, includingPugwash, needs to participate in acommon search for answers.

The focus of the workshop wasthe Sixth Review Conference of theBWC although it was noted that thethird Intersessional Meeting of StatesParties was due to open in Geneva on5th December 2005, the day follow-ing the close of the workshop. Theworkshop received its regular reporton CWC progress in implementation

and also received an update onUnited Nations Security CouncilResolution 1540 (2004). In additionto these reports on developments out-side the BWC during the previousyear, the main items for discussion bythe workshop came under the rubricof achieving a successful outcome atthe Sixth Review Conference includ-ing: what might constitute a success-ful outcome and what needs to bedone to achieve a successful outcome.In looking beyond the Sixth ReviewConference, the workshop discussedaction plans and topics for futureIntersessional Meetings.

CWC Progress andImplementation

A report was given on the status ofimplementation of the ChemicalWeapons Convention includingupdates in relation to chemicalweapons destruction and CWPFdestruction and/or conversion; verifi-cation overview; action plans; andeducation and outreach. Other itemstouched upon included verificationsystem optimization, internationalcooperation, assistance & protectionand institutional issues such as the re-election of the Director-General, theestablishment of the working groupto prepare for the 2nd CWC ReviewConference, and the report by theDirector-General, due by mid 2006,evaluating the effects of tenure-policyimplementation.

This was the twenty-third ofthe current Pugwash work-shop series on chemical and

biological warfare and the twelfth tobe held in Geneva. The workshopwas hosted by the Swiss PugwashGroup, and was jointly convened bythe Harvard Sussex Program onChemical and Biological Weapons(HSP). More than fifty-nine peopleattended the workshop, by invitationand in their personal capacities, from21 countries: Australia, Belgium,Brazil, Canada, China, Finland,France, Germany, India, Ireland,Italy, Japan, the Netherlands, NewZealand, Norway, Pakistan, RussianFederation, Sweden, Switzerland, theUnited Kingdom (UK), and theUnited States of America (US). Thisreport of the workshop is the soleresponsibility of its author, who wasasked by the meeting to prepare ashort report in consultation with theSteering Committee. It does not nec-essarily reflect a consensus of theworkshop as a whole, or of the StudyGroup.

The meeting opened with a wel-come from the Swiss Pugwash Groupand the observation that this work-shop was occurring at a criticalmoment—one year until the 6th


Pugwash Meeting No. 311

Since the last report to the work-shop destruction figures for chemicalweapons agent tonnes and items,including munitions and containers,stands at some 12,200 agent tonnesout of a declared total of 71,400 and2,375,105 items out of a total of8,671,564 (as of end of October2005). Whilst destruction of chemicalweapons production facilities is ontrack, the workshop was told thatconversion of facilities has beendelayed for reasons such as the ECdecision-making processes and Libyaentering the regime as a latecomer.The workshop was reminded thatconversion of such facilities was orig-inally seen as an exception but is nowapplied to approximately one third ofall declared production facilities.

With regard to verification, theworkshop was informed that, as ofend October 2005, some 2256inspections had taken place compris-ing of 124,479 inspector days. Over70 percent of the total number ofinspector days have been at ChemicalWeapons Destruction Facilitiesdespite there being only 43 such facil-ities declared to the OPCW by sixStates Parties. An opinion wasexpressed that the CWC requiresthese facilities to be under verifica-tion at all times. Such a verificationdemand has resource implications ifefforts to increase the pace ofdestruction are not matched with anincrease in inspectorate size.

The report then turned its atten-tion to the Action Plan on NationalImplementation of Article VII. It wasnoted that the plan was based on arecommendation from the FirstReview Conference (28 April–9 May2003) and adopted by the Confer-ence of the States Parties at its eighthsession (20-24 October 2003). Thetarget adopted then was to have full

Article VII implementation by thetenth session (7-11 November 2005).At that tenth meeting the action planwas reviewed and considered basi-cally a success because the number ofcountries working on national legis-lation had increased. However, con-cerns about CWC national imple-mentation remains—the mainconcern being the numbers of StatesParties without legislation, or withmajor gaps in their legislation, butwith significant chemical activities inproduction, trade, or use.

In recognition of this ongoingconcern the workshop was informedthat it was decided at the tenth ses-sion of the Conference of the StatesParties to adopt a series of follow-upmeasures focused on improvingimplementation. For those States Par-ties without a national authority andlegislation, the Technical Secretariathas requested them, by the end of2005, to submit an implementationplan with target dates. The TechnicalSecretariat in turn is now required toreport to each Executive Council ses-sion on the status of implementation.Should full implementation not befulfilled by the 47th session of theExecutive Council in November2006, or notification of steps submit-ted to the Technical Secretariat, theExecutive Council will consult withthose States Parties before a finalreview, scheduled to take place at theeleventh session of the Conference ofthe States Parties in December 2006,decides whether any appropriatemeasures should be taken to ensurefull implementation.

Turning to the universality actionplan adopted by the Executive Coun-cil at its twenty-third meeting (Octo-ber 2003), the speaker noted that it“was inspired by the idea” of full uni-versality of the Convention by 2007.

In the year since the last update to theworkshop, the speaker reported thatgood progress had been made—sinceOctober 2004 seven new states par-ties had joined the CWC and it ishoped that Iraq will join the CWC inthe next year. It was noted that theOPCW has no regional offices andhas no plans to establish them somuch of the universality workdepends on its relationship withregional organisations such as EU,AU, PIF, OAS, ASEAN. It wasreported that the OPCW is workingactively in the African region and thatan exception to the ‘no regionaloffice’ stance might be made for thisregion. It was reported that communi-cation channels with the Arab Leagueare now open but that there was stillno progress regarding North Korea.

Regarding international co-opera-tion the workshop was told that atthe tenth session of the Conference ofStates Parties a decision had beenadopted on Article XI implementa-tion. The issue of Article XI imple-mentation has remained unresolvedsince the PrepCom era so achieving adecision on this issue should be seenas confirming progress. Some of themain elements of the decision out-lined to the workshop included: con-firming the current portfolio of theTS ICA programmes; encouragingStates Parties to develop cooperationprojects; exchange scientific/technicalinformation; chemicals & equipmentand offers of cooperation; encourag-ing further programme development;and avoiding duplication of effortsby other International Organisations.The workshop was told that thisdecision still left many issues unre-solved—for example, for some StatesParties the main obstacles to ArticleXI implementation remain trade reg-ulations and the Australia Group.



There are also divergent views as tohow much international cooperationprogrammes should be implementedby the OPCW, and how much byStates Parties.

One of the areas of interest to theworkshop was the matter of educa-tion and outreach. The workshopwas told of the joint efforts withIUPAC on how to integrate CWCrequirements into professional codesof ethics/conduct and how to inte-grate CWC awareness and knowl-edge about its implementation intochemistry education. In October2005 the material produced byIUPAC was piloted at a conference inMoscow. The next pilot will occur inSeoul in June 2006.

A further area of interest to theworkshop was the advancement intechnology relevant to the Conven-tion. It was suggested that moreattention needs to be given to the nonlethal weapons issue. Concern wasexpressed that asking whether a newtechnology was covered or not couldbe eroding the norm contained in theConvention. Although acknowledgedas a delicate issue, several partici-pants recommended that an informaldiscussion process ought to be initi-ated now. It was believed that such aprocess need not necessarily be doneunder the auspices of the OPCW.

In addition to the more generalreport on the OPCW, the workshopalso received a paper on what nextfor the OPCW. It was noted that inprinciple the CWC regime was in bet-ter health than the other regimesdealing with WMD and that the pro-gramme on universality and nationalimplementation was impressive. Theissue of national implementation, theworkshop was reminded, will con-tinue to be an agenda item becausesituations and environments will

change. Regarding the balances inverification efforts, it was suggestedthat changes can take place withoutchanges to the Convention. It wassuggested that the current verificationeffort is not properly supported and,because verification was a basic pro-vision of the Convention, lack of sup-port constituted a serious problem.

It was also noted that the ten-yeardestruction deadline will not be met.Although not questioning the need toextend that deadline to 15 years,questions were raised about the para-meters of the decision that the Con-vention would necessitate. Severalparticipants asked whether thiswould be a one-time-only extensionor would States Parties to the Con-vention be forced to consider a newdeadline if that extended deadline isnot met. Participants also expressedconcern that the Convention wouldbe undermined if a second extensionwas requested because several thou-sand tonnes of agent remained intact. It was asked whether it was timeto revisit the definition of ‘destruc-tion’ so that a second extension willnot be requested.

UNSCR 1540 (2004)

The workshop was reminded thatUnited Nations Security Council Res-olution 1540 put the United Nationsin the front line of arms controlefforts again. Since UNSCR 1540came into force, the 1540 Committeehas received 124 responses, of which35 have been followed up. Of the 67states that have thus far failed torespond, most are in the African,Caribbean and Pacific regions. Thepower of UNSCR 1540, the work-shop was reminded, is that it appliesto both State Parties of the BWC, andalso to non State Parties: indeed itsmeasures do not differentiate

between those inside the treaties andthose outside of them. However,because the focus of Resolution 1540is terrorism there is pressure uponeven small states to adhere strictly tothe resolution so that terrorists can-not exploit them.

It was suggested to the workshopthat the respective organizations ofthe WMD treaties might wish toexplore the full possibilities andopportunities offered by Resolution1540. It was thought there somepressures existed that might lead tothe possibilities offered by Resolution1540 being squandered. Theseinclude a lack of experts from devel-oping countries; indifference or lackof support in capitals; and placingtoo much expectation on this mea-sure whilst it is still new and fragile.

The workshop was told that thegreatest threat to Resolution 1540was bureaucratic: that 1540 wouldbe swallowed up into other counterterrorism proposals and be mergedwith the other UNSC committees toform some sort of super committeeon counter terrorism.

The workshop was informed thatArgentina had held a Resolution1540 workshop in September of thisyear and that a further workshop willbe held in China next April. It seemsclear that the mandate of the resolu-tion will be extended beyond 2006 soachieving that extension will be thenext hurdle.

The workshop agreed that Reso-lution 1540 has been a useful tool inraising awareness about the WMDproblem and in mobilizing State Par-ties to work on or pass nationalimplementation legislation. However,participants noted that the measurehas also caused problems, such asState Parties prioritising Resolution1540 reports over their other treaty



obligations. It was thought that thisproblem was caused by State Partiesnot understanding that 1540 obliga-tions should have already been metby being a member of one of theWMD treaties—indeed those StateParties that are already in the CWCand BWC are already obliged toenact Resolution 1540 priorities.

As states will be reviewing theirobligations under both the BWC andResolution 1540 during 2006 theworkshop considered how the BWCand 1540 could and should interactin the future to achieve a more effec-tive non-proliferation framework.

Despite the complementarynature of the two approaches, theworkshop was reminded that certainpractical differences in their imple-mentation make the two very differ-ent animals. For example, there is afundamental difference in the scopeof the two regimes and in who islegally bound by their provisions. Itwas thought though that within thosedifferences lay a certain degree ofoverlap in both purpose and aim.Both, for example, contain similarlanguage and are founded on aninternational norm against theweaponization of disease (althoughwhere the BWC proscribes theseweapons in their entirety, the UNSCResolution 1540 proscriptions onlyapply to non-state actors). By com-paring key elements of Resolution1540 with texts from the BWC, theworkshop was reminded that there isa confluence in the activities pursuedunder the two regimes. These include

• Endorsing activities to create orstrengthen mechanisms for regulat-ing access to certain technologiesand resources;

• Enhancing implementation assis-tance so that those States in a posi-

tion to offer assistance (whetherdirectly or indirectly) do so;

• Pursuing the universalization andstrengthening of the BWC;

• Ensuring the effective nationalimplementation of the provisions ofthe BWC;

• Developing more effective coopera-tion and enhancing dialogueamongst States as a means ofaddressing the proliferation of bio-logical and toxin weapons;

• Improving awareness-raising activi-ties for industry and the generalpublic; and

• Regularly reviewing the regimes tofacilitate any decisions necessary tostrengthen their activities.

It was suggested that the future evo-lution of Resolution 1540 mightinclude assessing the legislative com-pleteness of states’ replies, harmoniz-ing regulations between countries(e.g. harmonization of national con-trol lists) and harmonizing legal juris-dictions.

The workshop was reminded thatat present, there is no implementingbody or organization in place to sup-port the work of the BWC that iscomparable to the OPCW or theIAEA. It was suggested that this lackof institutional presence may be a sig-nificant barrier to the integration ofthe BWC with other control mecha-nisms, including Resolution 1540,and that this complicates the devel-opment of any ongoing relationships.The authors of the report told theworkshop that they believed thatgiven the confluence of activities,there was a clear need to develop anoperational mechanism for the BWCto cooperate with the 1540 Commit-tee so that duplication of efforts canbe avoided and benefits maximised.

An historical note

The workshop received an historicalnote examining the tension betweenthe taboo against germ weapons andthe institutional norms of governmentsecrecy which can be seen to havebeen present during the offensive BWprogrammes in the 20th century.

The historical note reminded theworkshop that at the same time asprosecuting defeated fascist leadersfor crimes against humanity and forconducting a war of aggression inNuremberg, Allied Forces were sup-pressing evidence of identical crimesat the Toyko war crimes trial. It wassuggested that this was because USintelligence and military officials werebrokering a secret amnesty agreementwith Japanese biological weapons sci-entists to protect them from warcrimes prosecution—these scientistshad been responsible for inhumaneresearch on Chinese civilians and oth-ers and for repeated attacks on Chi-nese cities and towns with lethal anddebilitating disease agents.

In discussion the workshop wasinformed that many interviews werenow being conducted in China aboutthis period and that over 20 books(in Chinese) had been written on thesubject. The workshop was alsoinformed that the former offensiveprogramme was still a taboo subjectin Japan and that consequently dis-cussions about its nature or conse-quences do not take place. It was sug-gested that not having thesediscussions hampers the currentdevelopment of Japanese thoughts ondisease protection. It was alsoclaimed that the Japanese govern-ment still has documents about Unit731 which it refuses to release andthat such actions prevent this periodfrom being laid to rest.



The workshop noted that therewas much contemporary relevancefor this historical study. The paperhighlighted for example the unusualand complex circumstances in whichnational security rationales can justifydeviance from widely acceptedhumanitarian norms. The workshopnoted that national security has itsown norms based on protection of thestate through the pursuit of militaryor military-related advantage. How-ever, the culture of secrecy that oftensurrounds national security activitiesruns counter to the fundamentallyhumanitarian enterprise of studyingand controlling infectious disease out-breaks from any source. It was sug-gested that secrecy would actuallyincrease the health risks to the publicbecause countering outbreaks relieson timely and accurate information inorder to make appropriate safe deci-sions about medical intervention.

The Sixth BWC ReviewConference

What would be a successfuloutcome?

Much discussion during the work-shop centred on what might consti-tute a successful outcome of theupcoming Sixth Review Conference.For some, success would be definedby State Parties realizing tangibleproducts such as a comprehensivereview of the operation of the Con-vention; a Final Declaration withreaffirmations and extended under-standings such as a reaffirmation thatprohibitions embrace all scientificand technological advances; a reaffir-mation that possibility of use isexcluded completely and forever; anda reaffirmation that Article III is suf-ficiently comprehensive to cover anyrecipient whatsoever. It was also pro-posed that State Parties needed to

reinforce the importance of ensuring,through national measures, the effec-tive fulfilment of obligations underthe Convention in order to excludeuse of biological and toxin weaponsin terrorist or criminal activity and itwas suggested that this might be donethrough the adoption of a series ofaction plans on universal adherence,universal national implementation,and the adoption of measures toenhance the submission of CBMreturns by all State Parties.

Comment was made that therewas a need to avoid sending the samemessage as the Nuclear Non Prolifer-ation Treaty Review Conference i.e.that something was seriously wrong.It was thought that this Review Con-ference ought to do something useful.On the issue of reaffirming past com-mitments the workshop was askedwhat message might be sent if no reaf-firmation could be agreed this time?Some participants felt that there wasno need to make these reaffirmationsarguing that once something has beenagreed then it remains so.

The workshop consideredwhether the proposals being madefor next year’s BWC Review Confer-ence might be based on an undulylimited approach. It was thought, for

example, that the proposals airedwere thus far based on what waspolitically possible now in 2005, andcentred on today’s issues of concern.The opinion was mooted that StateParties need to ask where they wishthe BWC to stand in 10 years time,or at the 10th Review Conference.Are, for example, annual meetings along-term goal for the Convention orjust something to see State Partiesthrough the immediate future? It wassuggested that perhaps one reason forthe lack of ambition in the proposalsis that few in any of the delegationswill have ever been present for a fullreview of the Convention.

It was suggested to the workshopthat any proposal to strengthen theBWC rests on its broader politicalappeal and that given the crowdedpolitical agenda during 2006 effortsto prevent the spread of biologicalweapons and to strengthen the BWCare unlikely to be at the top of theagenda unless a lot of effort isexpended putting it there.

3. Achieving a successful outcome

A. The Preparatory Committee–what needs to be achieved?

In respects of the preparation of theReview Conference, the workshopreceived the suggestion that the Prep-Com for the 6th Review Conferenceought to last for a whole week sothat State Parties have time toconsider issues under the generalheadings:

• Date and duration;

• Provisional agenda;

• Draft rules of procedure;

• Background documentation;

• Publicity; and

• Final document(s).

It was proposed that State Parties

needed to reinforce the importance

of ensuring, through national

measures, the effective fulfilment

of obligations under the Convention

in order to exclude use of biological

and toxin weapons in terrorist or

criminal activity



In terms of date and duration of theReview Conference the workshopwas reminded that as this is to be thefirst time since 1991 that a fullreview of the Convention is to takeplace then it should last three weeks.It was agreed however, that if suffi-cient consultation had taken placeprior to the PrepCom then this sug-gested one week period of meetingfor the PrepCom could be reduced.

It was suggested to the workshopthat, if it was intended that thisReview Conference be deliberatelydifferent from the preceding one, adifferent mandate to the Secretariatmight be needed. It was suggestedthat there was much value in the Sec-retariat undertaking specific pieces ofwork between the PrepCom and theactual Review Conference. Whilst thetopics for such papers and the extentof those pieces of work are matters tobe decided by the States Parties, itwas suggested that in addition to thethree background documents nor-mally prepared for Review Confer-ences (participation in CBMs, com-pliance by States Parties, andinformation on scientific and techno-logical advances) State Parties mightconsider additional background doc-uments detailing information onactions taken by States Parties fol-lowing MSP/2003, MSP/2004 &MSP/2005 and specifically focusedpapers on the possible modalities formeasures such as Action Plans, trans-parency and CBMs, etc.

Although there was a recognizedlimit on what the Secretariat can dothat is both substantial and innova-tive, the workshop participants didthink that such additional backgrounddocuments would greatly assist in thenecessary collective preparation forthis Review Conference.

B. The Outcomes of theIntersessional Process—how to dealwith these?

In respect of the outcomes of theintersessional process, the workshopwas reminded that the Sixth ReviewConference will consider the work ofthe intersessional meetings anddecide on any further action. It wasthought that State Parties might con-sider all the meetings together underone agenda item or consider each ofthe five topics under the appropriateArticle(s) of the Convention—so thatnational measures to implement willbe discussed under Article IV;

national biosecurity measures dis-cussed during the review of ArticlesIII & IV; investigation & response toalleged use when Articles VI & VIIare discussed, disease surveillancewhen Article X is reviewed andfinally codes of conduct under ArticleIV discussions.

Under the topic of codes of con-duct, the workshop heard tworeports from participants interestedin the role that ought to be played byscientists in the guardianship of theirwork. The first report addressedwhether the time has come to formu-late guidelines, perhaps in the form ofa voluntary Hippocratic oath, for theethical conduct of work performedby life scientists and the secondreport summarised the recent interna-tional biosecurity efforts involvingthe U.S. National Academy of Sci-ences, including a report from a con-

ference organized by the Interna-tional Form on Biosecurity (Como,20-22 March 2005) and the recentInter Academy Panel Statement onBiosecurity.

Both reports recognised that theissue of codes of conduct was notnew, one participant recalled that atthe Third Review Conference in 1991the Council for Responsible Geneticsorganised an oath which was similarto what is now being discussed. Fur-thermore it was also noted that callshad been made in 1992 for postdoc-toral students to be the focus of suchcodes because of the spread of post-docs within the academic communityand the scientific industries. How-ever, the importance of codes for allengaged in the life sciences was alsorecognised.

The observation was made thatdiscussions about codes have turnedout to be more complicated than ini-tially expected: regarded as a simpleexercise, issues concerning definitions,scope and legalities have proved morecomplicated than anticipated. Forexample, whilst participants fullyaccepted that scientists ought to beguardians of their own work, partici-pants debated whether that meant apurely self-governing system exclud-ing the possibility of external criti-cism. Some believed that rather thanleave this important oversight workto scientists alone, oversight commit-tees were needed to scrutinize thework of scientists. It was argued thatrepresentatives of many constituen-cies, not simply the scientific commu-nity, ought to sit on these committeesand review individual experiments orprogrammes of work before theexperiments have begun.

On the issue of whistle blowing itwas suggested that any code ought to

Discussions about codes have

turned out to be more complicated

than initially expected.



include some form of words that offerencouragement to those who wish tocome forward to report deviationsfrom the accepted standards of behav-iour and show that adequate protec-tion will be offered to them. It wasnoted that the global coalition againstcorruption ‘Transparency Interna-tional’ has developed some thoughtson the issue of whistle blowing andthe protection needed, although betterwording than presented there wouldbe needed for BW issues.

Both reports stressed the need sig-nificantly to increase efforts to edu-cate scientists about the nature of therisks associated with dual-use biolog-ical and chemical technologies andthe responsibilities of scientists toaddress and manage those risks. Itwas suggested that such awareness-raising courses could take place at theuniversity level, and that any univer-sities which undertake to teach suchcourses ought to be rewarded. At thevery least these courses need to makeit clear that scientists have obliga-tions under national and interna-tional law.

C: Key Elements of the Sixth ReviewConference

The workshop received a number ofreports concerning key elements ofthe Sixth Review Conference. Topicscovered included: advances in scienceand technology relevant to the BWC;national implementation; consulta-tion and co-operation includingCBMS; international co-operationand development and universality.

Concerning the issue of advanc-ing science and technology, the work-shop received two reports and wasforewarned about two issues. Thefirst, that the increasing multidiscipli-nary dimensions of scientific work

needs to be addressed; and the secondissue concerned a potential paradigmshift being indicated by the newresearch agendas. Concern wasexpressed that together these twoissues might result in the dual usedilemma being raised to a new levelof complexity. Looking beyond theSixth Review Conference, bothreports suggested that more frequentanalysis and review of science andtechnology advances was needed.Participants believed that scientificand technological advances wereoccurring too rapidly for a meaning-ful assessment to take place only atfive-year intervals.

There was debate amongst partic-ipants at this workshop about therecommendation put forward in bothreports that States Parties to theBWC should consider reaffirmingthat the prohibitions contained in theBWC covered all scientific and tech-nological advances. As before, someparticipants voiced their concern thatcontinual reaffirmations about com-mitments or obligations previouslymade might be construed as a neces-sary activity before those prohibi-tions are placed upon the new scien-tific or technological advancement.For example, it was noted thatalthough nanotechnology is a ‘new’technology it is already coveredunder the General Purpose Criterioncontained in Article I.

Participants were reminded thatthis General Purpose Criterion appliesto all science and technology advancesand that all participants need to bevigilant against deviant interpreta-tions. It was also suggested that timespent reaffirming commitments andprohibitions could be spent reviewingother aspects of the Convention.

The useful information that

emerged from the 2003 meetingsabout national implementation, theworkshop was told, needed to be fur-ther developed before the ReviewConference so that something mean-ingful could be done with it. Forexample, the suggestion was madethat a modular approach was neededwhereby an action plan was backedby an implementation support unitwhich itself fed into a legal advisorsnetwork. This latter network wasconsidered to be one way of co-ordi-nating assistance by states and NGOsand of also gaining experience fromother treaties. The workshop wasreminded that there was no one wayto approach such co-ordination activ-ities because political matchmakingas well as legal-system matchmakingand language matchmaking wasrequired for effective implementationassistance.

The idea that State Parties mightconsider implementing an action planusing the OPCW’s Action Plan onnational implementation as a modelwas discussed by the workshop. Par-ticipants were reminded that it took 6months from the decision being madeby the Executive Council to theaction plan existing. It was suggestedthen that an informal consultationprocess was needed which might con-sider issues such as objectives and cri-teria for such plans in the BWC con-text; the evaluation procedures at theend of such plans; and time framesfor such plans.

Agreeing on an action plan foruniversality was considered as some-thing uncontroversial which theStates Parties at the 6th Review Con-ference might be able to adopt.Indeed it was suggested at the work-shop that it might be possible to linkthat action plan with other activities



such as joint missions and workshopsand civil society collaborations. Theworkshop was told that newapproaches would needed if the BWCwas to catch up with the CWC interms of membership. At the time ofwriting, the BWC lagged behind byabout 20 states, having 155 StatesParties out of the 191 UN members.It was thought that these 20-oddstates hold no major political objec-tions to the BWC and so might bepersuaded to join before attentionturns to the common-difficult states.The idea of creating a special role forcertain countries to promote regionaluniversality was put forward. If sucha role were to be given to the deposi-tory states then this role might pro-mote general universality to allWMD related treaties.

The workshop was reminded thatcentral to the issue of universality isthe creation of incentives to join atreaty. Once such advantages are visi-ble for all to see then non States Par-ties, especially those that do not see adirect threat from biological weapons,might wish to be “in the club”. For

example, under the CWC schedule 1and 2 chemicals are not allowed to beexported to non CWC states partiesand although they have failed to agreeto ban exports of schedule 3 chemi-cals to non states parties these accessrestrictions are persuasive. Similarlyin the CTBT member states are givenaccess to a lot of data and given assis-tance. The Landmine Treaty alsorecognised the need to create incen-tives so that states might join thetreaty. In its case, certain states tookthe responsibility to convene ‘openended workshops’ in an attempt toimprove transparency and trust andto build confidence.

One issue raised in connection toincreasing transparency and trust wasthe CBMs. It was suggested that arevamp of the CBM form and con-tent might be timely with States Par-ties at the Review Conference consid-ering deletion of superfluous topicsand introduction of new ones, forexample whether codes of conductexisted in relevant areas of science.Old questions remained unansweredhowever but hotly debated by partici-

pants: how does one get more partici-pation in the CBM process? Howdoes one deal with omission or ambi-guities? What ought to be done withthe information gathered?

A consensus of sorts was devel-oped concerning the link betweennon-universality in the BWC and ithaving no implementing organisa-tion. It was noted that although thedepository states have a duty of stew-ardship to promote universality tothe BWC it is not really their rolebecause they have no real authorityto be any more proactive than otherStates Parties. However, it was sug-gested that the depository statescould make common lists of member-ship.

There was broad agreementamongst the participants at the work-shop that all those engaged in theSixth Review Conference needed toprepare actively for a successful out-come. The focus needs to be on whatcan be achieved to strengthen theregime prohibiting biological andtoxin weapons.

Participants

Dr. Jan van Aken, Head, Study Group onBiological Arms Control, Hamburg Uni-versity, Germany

Dr. Maurizio Barbeschi, Scientist, Pre-paredness to Accidental and DeliberateEpidemics, Department of Epidemic andPandemic Alert and Response, Communi-cable Disease Cluster (EPR/CSR), WorldHealth Organization (WHO), Geneva,Switzerland

Amb. Sergey Batsanov, Director, GenevaOffice of International Pugwash; Mem-ber, Pugwash CBW Steering Committee;Member, International Advisory Board,Geneva Centre for Democratic Reform ofArmed Forces (DCAF)

Ms. Una Becker, Research Associate,Peace Research Institute Frankfurt(PRIF), Germany

Dr. Kenneth Bernard (USA), Adviser tothe Director-General, World HealthOrganization (WHO), Geneva, Switzer-land [formerly: Special Assistant to thePresident for Biodefense, Homeland Secu-rity Council, White House]

Mr. Robert Blum, Foreign Service Officer,US Department of State, Bureau of Inter-national Security and Nonproliferation,Washington, DC [formerly: Delegate, USDelegation to the Organization for theProhibition of Chemical Weapons]

Mr. John Borrie, Project Leader, Disarma-ment as Humanitarian Action, UnitedNations Institute for DisarmamentResearch (UNIDIR), Geneva, Switzerland

Mr. Bernhard Brasack, Permanent Repre-sentative of Germany to the Conferenceon Disarmament in Geneva

Mr. Bob Brooks, National Coordinator,CWC/BTWC, Nonproliferation and Dis-armament (Chemical, Biological, Con-ventional), Department of ForeignAffairs, Ontario, Canada

Ms. Sarah Broughton, Head of CBW Sec-tion, Counter Proliferation Department,Foreign and Commonwealth Office, Lon-



don, UK [formerly: 2nd Secretary, UKMission to the UN, NY]

Dr. Vladimir S. Bundin, Senior Coun-selor, Department of Security & Disarma-ment Affairs, Ministry of Foreign Affairsof the Russian Federation, Moscow

Col. (ret.) Pierre Canonne, Member, Pug-wash Council; Senior Lecturer, Disarma-ment and Arms Control, Univ. Marne-la-Vallés/Paris, France

Monsieur Paulino Franco de CarvalhoNeto, Mission of Brazil

Dr. Marie Chevrier, Associate Professor,University of Texas at Dallas, Richard-son, Texas, USA; Chair, Scientists Work-ing Group on Biological and ChemicalWeapons, Center for Arms Control andNonproliferation, Washington, DC

Dr. Nancy Connell, Professor, Vice-Chairfor Research, Department of Medicine,and Director, Center for BioDefense, Uni-versity of Medicine and Dentistry of NewJersey-New Jersey Medical School,Newark, NJ, USA

Dr. Filippa Corneliussen (Norway),Research Fellow, BIOS Centre, LondonSchool of Economics, UK

Dr. Ottorino Cosivi (Italy), ProjectLeader, Preparedness for Deliberate Epi-demics, Global Alert and Response,Department of Communicable DiseaseSurveillance and Response (CSR), WorldHealth Organization (WHO), Geneva,Switzerland

Ms. Katharine Crittenberger, DeputyDirector, Office of Conventional & CBWAffairs, Bureau of Verification, Compli-ance and Implementation, US Depart-ment of State, Washington, DC; DeputyHead of Delegation, US Delegation toMeetings of BWC States Parties

Prof. Malcolm Dando, Professor of Inter-national Security, Department of PeaceStudies, University of Bradford, Bradford,UK

Dr. Deng Hongmei, Counsellor (Disarma-ment Affairs), Permanent Mission ofChina to the UN at Geneva

Mr. Daniel Feakes (UK), Research Fellow,Harvard Sussex Program SPRU-Science& Technology Policy Research, The Free-man Centre, University of Sussex,Brighton, UK

Mr. Jamie Fly, Action Officer, Nonprolif-eration Policy, Office of the US Secretaryof Defense, Washington, DC

Mr. Masahiro Fujikawa, Officer, Biologi-cal and Chemical Weapons ConventionsDivision, Disarmament, Nonproliferationand Science Department, Ministry of For-eign Affairs, Tokyo, Japan

Prof. Erhard Geissler, retired Head,Bioethical Research Group, Max Del-brueck Center for Molecular Medicine,Berlin, Germany

Dr. Jozef Goldblat (Sweden/Switzerland),Vice President, Geneva InternationalPeace Research Institute (GIPRI),Geneva, Switzerland; Consultant, UnitedNations, Geneva

Mr. Mikaël Griffon, Conseiller, MissionPermanente de la France

Mr. Andrew Grotto, Senior Analyst, Cen-ter for American Progress, Washington,DC, USA

Prof. Jeanne Guillemin, Senior Advisor,Massachusetts Institute of Technology(MIT) Security Studies Program, Cam-bridge, MA, USA; Professor of Sociology,Boston College Institution

Mr. Richard Guthrie (UK), ProjectLeader, CBW Project,. Stockholm Inter-national Peace Research Institute (SIPRI),Solna, Sweden

Dr. Gert Günter Harigel, Senior Physicist(Emeritus), European Laboratory for Par-ticle Physics (CERN), Geneva, Switzer-land (1995- ); Secretary and Treasurer,Geneva International Peace ResearchInstitute (GIPRI)

Ms. Melissa S. Hersh, Department of Dis-armament Affairs, UN Office, Geneva;

UK Emergency Planning College, CBRNRecovery Lecturer; CIMIC planning(UK/NL)

Dr. Iris Hunger, Senior Researcher, StudyGroup on Biological Arms Control,Hamburg University, Germany

Ms. Tehmina Janjua, Minister, DeputyPermanent Representative of Pakistan,Geneva, Switzerland

Mr. Ian Kenyon, Visiting Research Fel-low, SPRU-Science & Technology PolicyResearch, University of Sussex, Brighton,UK; Visiting Senior Research Fellow,Mountbatten Centre for InternationalStudies, University of Southampton,Highfield, Southampton, UK

Amb. Masood Khan, Permanent Repre-sentative of Pakistan to the UN, Perma-nent Mission of Pakistan, Geneva,Switzerland

Mr. Aftab A. Khokher, First Secretary,Permanent Mission of Pakistan to theUnited Nations, Geneva, Switzerland

Ms. Mitslal Kifleyesus-Matschie, Man-ager, EuroContact, Jena, Germany; Lec-turer, Erfurt University [Consultant,Technical Secretariat, OPCW, ExternalRelations Division (1994-98); HarvardSussex Brussels Researcher, Brussels]

Dr. Gabriele Kraatz-Wadsack, Colonel-Adviser on BW/CWNonproliferation/Disarmament, FederalForeign Office, Berlin, Germany

Mr. Patrick Lamb, Deputy Head, Non-Proliferation Department, Foreign andCommonwealth Office, London, UK

Ms. Johanna Lanning (USA), Intern/Stu-dent, Boston University, Geneva, Switzer-land

Mr. Kobi Leins (Australia), Project Man-ager, Mines-Arms Unit, Legal Division,International Committee of the RedCross, Geneva, Switzerland

Mr. Ajey Lele, Indian Air Force Officer(Wing Commander) working as ResearchFellow for the last four years at Institute

Participants continued



for Defence Studies and Analyses (IDSA),New Delhi, India

Dr. Patricia Lewis (UK), Director, UNI-DIR, Geneva, Switzerland

Dr. Jez Littlewood, Research Fellow,Mountbatten Centre for InternationalStudies, Department of Politics, Univer-sity of Southampton, Southampton, UK

Mr. Dominique Loye, Deputy Head,Mines-Arms Unit, International Commit-tee of the Red Cross (ICRC), Geneva,Switzerland

Ms. Jenifer Mackby (USA), Fellow, Cen-ter for Strategic and International Studies(CSIS), Washington, DC

Prof. Robert Mathews, PrincipalResearch Scientist, Defence Science andTechnology Organisation, Australia ;Associate Professor, Asia Pacific Centrefor Military Law, University of Mel-bourne

Ms. Kathryn McLaughlin, PublicationsCoordinator, BioWeapons PreventionProject (BWPP), Geneva, Switzerland;Fellow, Landau Network-Centro Volta(LNCV), Como, Italy

Dr. Caitriona McLeish (Ireland),Research Fellow, Science & TechnologyPolicy Research (SPRU), The FreemanCentre, University of Sussex,, BrightonBN1 9QE, UK

Prof. Matthew S. Meselson, ThomasDudley Cabot Professor of the NaturalSciences, Department of Molecular andCellular Biology, Harvard University,Cambridge, Massachusetts, USA; Mem-ber, Pugwash CBW Steering Committee

Dr. Piers Millett (UK), Associate PoliticalOfficer, Secretariat of the 2004 meetingsof the Biological Weapons Convention,Department of Disarmament Affairs,United Nations Office, Geneva, Switzer-land; Consultant on science and technol-ogy for the ICRC project on Biotechnol-ogy Weapons and Humanity

Amb. Andrea Negrotto-Cambiaso,Geneva, Switzerland

Prof. Kathryn Nixdorff (USA/Germany),Dept. of Microbiology and Genetics,

Darmstadt University of Technology,Darmstadt, Germany

Mr. Brian Parai, 2nd Secretary, Disarma-ment, Permanent Mission of Canada,Geneva, Switzerland

Ms. Fiona Paterson, Deputy PermanentRepresentative, UK Permanent Represen-tation to the Conference on Disarma-ment, Geneva, Switzerland

Graham S. Pearson, Visiting Professor ofInternational Security, Department ofPeace Studies, University of Bradford,Bradford, West Yorkshire, UK; Member,HSP Advisory Board; Member, PugwashCBW Steering Committee

Dr. Imtinan E. Qureshi, Minister (Techni-cal), Permanent Mission of Pakistan,Geneva, Switzerland

James Revill, Research Student, Strength-ening the BTWC, Bradford DisarmamentResearch Centre, Department of PeaceStudies, Bradford, UK

Mr. Paul van Rhijn, Second Secretary,Permanent Mission of the Netherlands tothe Conference on Disarmament, Geneva,Switzerland

Prof. Julian Perry Robinson, SussexDirector, Harvard-Sussex Program, Sci-ence & Technology Policy Research(SPRU), University of Sussex, Brighton,UK; Member, Pugwash CBW SteeringCommittee

Monsieur l’Ambassadeur Carlos Antonioda Rocha Paranhos, Mission of Brazil,Geneva, Switzerland

Mr. Roger Roffey, Research Director,Swedish Defence Research Agency (FOI),Stockholm; Member of the Board,Swedish Pugwash Group

Mr. Ben Rusek, Research Associate,Committee on International Security andArms Control (CISAC), Policy andGlobal Affairs, The National Academies,Washington, DC, USA

Mr. Teemu Sepponen, First Secretary, Per-manent Mission of Finland, Geneva,Switzerland

Mr. Nicholas Sims, Reader in Interna-tional Relations, London School of Eco-

nomics and Political Science (LSE), Uni-versity of London, London, UK [for-merly: Member of UK Delegation to FirstReview Conference of the BWC (March1980), Geneva]

Prof. Jean-Pierre Stroot(Belgium/Switzerland), retired Physicist;President of the Board of the GenevaInternational Peace Research Institute(GIPRI), Geneva, Switzerland; Associa-tion Suisse Pugwash, Geneva

Dr. Ralf Trapp (Germany), Senior Plan-ning Officer, Office of the Deputy Direc-tor-General, Organisation for the Prohi-bition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW),The Hague, The Netherlands

Mr. Arjen Vermeer, Trainee, PermanentMission of the Netherlands to the Con-ference on Disarmament, Geneva,Switzerland; Student, Centre Universi-taire de Droit International Humanitaire(CUDIH), Geneva , Switzerland

Amb. Hendrik Wagenmakers (Nether-lands), Consultant, Bern, Switzerland

Mr. Reto Wollenmann, Directorate forSecurity Policy, Arms Control and Disar-mament Policy, Bern, Switzerland

Ms. Angela Woodward (New Zealand),Deputy Director and Arms Control &Disarmament Researcher (Chemical &Biological), Verification Research, Train-ing and Information Centre (VERTIC),London, UK

Dr. Jean Pascal Zanders, Director,BioWeapons Prevention Project (BWPP),Geneva, Switzerland

S T A F F :

Ms. Claudia Vaughn, Program Coordina-tor, Pugwash Conferences, AccademiaNazionale dei Lincei, via della Lungara10, I-00165 Rome, Italy, Tel. (++39-06)687 2606, Fax: (++39-06) 687 8376,Mobile: (++39-333) 456 6661, E-mail:[email protected]

Dr. Marie-Anne Phelouzat, Assistant,Association Suisse Pugwash, 16 voieCreuse, CH- 1202 Geneva, Swizerland,Tel.: (++41-22) 919 79 23, Fax: (++41-22) 919 79 43, E-mail: [email protected]



4th Pugwash Workshop on Stability, Security and Cooperation in Northeast Asia

Beijing, China, 12–15 January 2006

Report byMark B.M. Suh

meeting and engaged in intensive andserious discussions at a comfortableand beautiful surrounding in Beijing.This meeting had an unusually largeparticipation of Chinese experts onKorea and security matters. Threepeople from North Korea partici-pated actively and presented papers.

The first session dealt with thecurrent security situation on theKorean peninsula and started outwith a brief assessment of develop-ments over the North Korean nuclearissue. One South Korean expertpointed out a repeated pattern of cri-sis over the North Korean issue andtried to explain why. According tohim, the reason behind this problemwas basically lack of trust and deeplyrooted mutual hostility between the

US and North Korea since theKorean War. He urged the conflictingparties to have more patience and bewiser to resolve the problem.

One of the North Korean partici-pants stressed that the prolongedhostile policy of the US is the realproblem and asked for change of thispolicy to solve the problem. Hedemanded the financial sanctions tobe lifted to remove obstacles to thesix-party talks. He also mentionedthat having nuclear capability is sim-ply matter of survival for NorthKorea. He also called for an end ofthe double standard in the non-pro-liferation issue, saying that somecountries such as Israel, Pakistan andIndia are accepted and respected bythe US as nuclear powers and also

The 4th Pugwash Workshopon East Asian Security co-sponsored by the Chinese

People’s Association for Peace andDisarmament (CPAPD) and the Insti-tute of Applied Physics and Compu-tational Mathematics (IAPCM) washeld in Beijing from 12th to 15th Jan-uary 2006. This workshop waslocally organized by the Program forScience and National Security Studies(PSNSS) in close cooperation withthree sponsoring institutions. Specialthanks to Gen. Pan Zhenqiang, Prof.Li Hua and Mr. Niu Qiang for theirefficient collaboration in organizingthe workshop within little time.

This workshop was not onlytimely but very important; as theregion is beset by the crisis over thedialogue process in search of a solu-tion to the North Korean nuclearissue through the six-party talks is injeopardy. Due to the financial sanc-tions against the DPR Korea(NorthKorea) by the US since last October,the tension between the US andNorth Korea is increasing and havereached a new height in the region.Participants from major countries inthe region, namely the US, China,Japan, Russia and the two Koreasplus two from Europe and one fromPakistan attended the three days



Japan is allowed to stockpile pluto-nium which can be used for nuclearweapons. He pointed out that the USmight have attacked Iraq becauseSaddam Hussein had failed toacquire nuclear capability.

Regarding the nuclear capabilityof North Korea, one of the leadingnuclear expert from the US reportedabout his recent two trips to NorthKorea including a visit to the nuclearfacilities in Yongbyon. Being the onlyWesterner who has seen the pluto-nium metal first-hand, he shared hisview on the North Korean nuclearcapability. According to his assess-ment, North Korea might possessalready about 45 kg of plutoniumand has acquired necessary technolo-gies to produce nuclear weapons, buthe does not believe in actualweaponization. He is rather con-cerned about plutonium being inwrong hands.

Another US expert assessed theSeptember 19, 2005 Joint Statementof the Six Party Talks and called forearly resumption of the talks.According to him, the statement isneither a breakthrough nor much adoabout nothing. He stressed that the

US needs to do more to improve theatmosphere for dialogue but NorthKorea should come to the negotiatingtable without any precondition. TheJoint Statement being a vital first-step, he called on the US and NorthKorea to work hard with more flexi-bility and creative thinking to make ita breakthrough. He thinks thatChina, as the host and facilitator forthe talks, can persuade North Koreasince it is in its national interest tohave North Korea return to the talkswithout precondition.

In the second session on thenuclear non-proliferation issue inNortheast Asia, the Japanese nuclearpolicy was in the focus of interest.Two Chinese experts drew attentionto Japan’s nuclear capabilities. OneNorth Korean participant also calledattention to Japan’s growing nation-alism and militarization. He arguedthat no one could guarantee thatJapan would not attack the US as itdid with Pearl Harbor. Some Chineseand North Koreans viewed theJapanese stockpiling of plutonium asa serious security threat not only tothe region but the whole world andcalled for a shutting down of the

Rokkasho Maru reprocessing plantwhich is scheduled to go into opera-tion this year. Japan’s current posses-sion of plutonium is enough to pro-duce 4000 nuclear warheads, and thenew plant might produce 5 to 12 tonsof plutonium per year.

One of the Japanese participantsstressed that transparency is the bestsolution to the problem andexplained the Japanese nuclear policyin historical and technical perspec-tives. He mentioned that due to thelack of nuclear waste storage facili-ties in Japan, it is cheaper toreprocess the spent fuel rods and tostockpile plutonium. Japan has nointention to go nuclear or misuse theplutonium for military purposes. It ispurely for energy self-sufficiency andfor nuclear policy as decided in the1950s and 1970s. Japan is now pay-ing a high price for this policy but itis difficult to reverse it due to thedomestic constraints. Nevertheless,Japan is in full safeguard with theIAEA and there is no danger of mis-use. Heated debates followed his pre-sentation mostly by the Chinese andNorth Korean participants. The issueis likely to be seen as a security chal-

Paolo Cotta-Ramusino and participants at the Bejing workshop.



lenge in the region as the RokkashoMaru plant starts operation this year.

The third and fourth session wasdevoted to the relations of the bigpowers and their influence on EastAsian security. Two Chinese expertsassessed the North Korean nuclearissue and its impact on the US policy.They pointed out that the Bushadministration has refused for threeyears and is still reluctant to dealdirectly with North Korea. One Chi-nese scholar proposed to help NorthKorea to overcome its economic diffi-culties and to narrow the gapbetween North and South Korea. Afew North Korean and Chinese par-ticipants blamed the US for using theNorth Korean issue as an excuse inorder to encourage Japan tostrengthen its military and to buildup the Missile Defense system againstChina. Growing military cooperationbetween the US and Japan is seen bysome as a serious threat to peace andstability in the region.

One of the US participantsexpressed critical opinion on theBush administration for provokingNorth Korea to speed up its nuclearprogram and to build up nuclearcapabilities. As long as the US hostil-ity exists, North Korea is likely tocontinue to expand its nuclear pro-gram. He emphasized that NorthKorea repeatedly offered to trade offits nuclear capability to end enmityby normalizing political and eco-nomic relations and by providingassurances not to attack it, not tointerfere in its internal affairs, orimpede its economic development bymaintaining sanctions or discourag-ing aid and investment from others.He called for serious change in Wash-ington’s hostile policy against NorthKorea and to end military exercises inthe South as well as to give up war

plans. He sees a need for a peacekeeping system on the Korean penin-sula and for an early resumption ofthe six-party talks.

Another prominent participantfocused the attention on strategicinterests of the US and Russia in theNortheast Asian region. He stressedthat the US acts according to its inter-national strategic interest and thenew Russia has not yet developed afully fledged strategic policy in theregion. He read out a letter signed byPresident Clinton to the NorthKorean leader Chairman Kim Jong Iltwo days prior to the Geneva Frame-work Agreement in 1994 where Clin-ton personally assured the North

Korean leader that two light waterreactors would be delivered. The let-ter went a long way to explain thecontinuing North Korean demandfor the light water reactors. Therecent financial restrictions in Macautargeting North Korea are seen aspart of the US financial encirclementby Pyongyang. They are, therefore,likely to remain a fundamental road-block against resumption of the six-party talks. The six-party talks areonly on the denuclearization issuewhich is the interest of the US. ButPyongyang is more interested in talk-ing about security from regimechange; as such change can come notonly by military intervention but alsoby human rights agitation and pre-cisely financial sanctions.

The final session focused on con-fidence building and search for last-ing security cooperation in theregion. One prominent US partici-pant called on the US to take the firststep to break the deadlock, as it ismuch more powerful and strongerthan North Korea. The US can affordto take the risk and solve the prob-lem, the sooner the better. The USshould provide security guaranteesand economic compensation inreturn for the North Korean disman-tlement of its nuclear program. Theplutonium stockpile in North Koreashould be neutralized, so terroristscan not get hold of it. He made aninteresting suggestion to resolve theproblem: All parties including the USand South Korea should help NorthKorea to modernize and upgrade itscomplete energy system into a morereliable and sustainable one. Inreturn, North Korea should offer its20-30 kg plutonium.

One influential South Koreanscholar urged the US as the center ofthe world to be more humble and toshow respect to small countries. Hesuggested that the US use more pre-ventive diplomacy in multilateralforums such as the six-party talksinstead of military preemption in uni-lateral approaches which have theirown limits. He strongly warnedagainst exaggerating the situationand talking too much about theworst case scenario on the Koreanpeninsula. He instead called for morepositive thinking and collective wis-dom to ensure stability, security andcooperation in Northeast Asia.

Secretary General of PugwashConferences, Prof. Paolo Cotta-Ramusino, in the end stressed thatcountries should not believe thatmere possession of nuclear weaponsis reliable deterrence against nuclear

Growing military cooperation

between the US and Japan is seen

by some as a serious threat to

peace and stability in the region.



attack or guarantee for security. Incontrast, the US would attack anycountry militarily to prevent fromtrying to develop nuclear weapons. Inthe case of North Korea, he stressedthat only full implementation of theSeptember 19th Joint Statement is thebest security guarantee, as the US islikely to have no more excuse toattack North Korea and the interna-tional community may feel moresympathetic to North Korea.

All in all, the three days work-shop was a fruitful and uniqueopportunity to discuss about sensitiveregional issues in different perspec-tives in order to understand each oth-ers interest better. It was clear thatlack of trust among countries in theregion still exists and needs to beovercome by mutual respect and bet-ter information. All participantsagreed that the six-party process isthe best mechanism at present andshould move forward to find a nego-tiated solution to realize the nuclear-free Korean peninsula. To this end,the Pugwash workshops are not onlyuseful but a much appreciated forumfor regional confidence-building andfor cooperation in peace building inthis conflict ridden region. The fifthworkshop is planned to be held thisJuly at the beautiful Kumgang Moun-tain and Panmunjom, North Korea.The main topic will be the security onthe Korean peninsula: How to trans-form the truce agreement into a peacemechanism.

Dr. Thomas B. Cochran, Director,Nuclear Program, Natural ResourcesDefense Council (NRDC), Washington,DC, USA

Mr. Ralph Cossa, President, PacificForum CSIS, Honolulu, Hawaii, USA;Executive Director, US Committee, Coun-cil for Security Cooperation in the Asia-Pacific (CSCAP)

Prof. Paolo Cotta-Ramusino, Secretary-General, Pugwash Conferences on Sci-ence and World Affairs; Member, Pug-wash Executive Committee; Professor ofMathematical Physics, University ofMilan, Italy; Director, Program on Disar-mament and International Security, Lan-dau Network–Centro Volta, Como, Italy

Dr. Siegfried Hecker, Visiting Professor,Stanford University and Director Emeri-tus, Los Alamos National Laboratory

Mr. Hyung-Taek Hong, Secretary Gen-eral, The East Asia Foundation

Dr. Taihwan Kim, Research Professor,Division of International Education &Exchange, Yonsei University; ManagingDirector, The East Asia Foundation

Prof. Chung-In Moon, Professor of Politi-cal Science, and Director of the ModernKorean Studies Institute, Yonsei Univer-sity; Adjunct Professor, Asia-Pacific Stud-ies Institute, Duke University

Prof. Eiichi Shindo, LLD, Director andProfessor, Edogawa University Center forGlobal Asia, Chiba, Japan; ProfessorEmeritus, University of Tsukuba; Intellec-tual Councillor, Japan Council on EastAsian Community

Dr. Mark Byung-Moon Suh, Member,Pugwash Council; Senior Researcher andKorea Coordinator, Free University ofBerlin, Germany; President, Korean Pug-wash Group; Chairman, Corea TrustFund; Visiting Scholar, Institute for PeaceAffairs (IPA), Seoul

Dr. Leon Sigal, Director, Northeast AsiaCooperative Security Project, Social Sci-ence Research Council, New York, NY

Dr. Tatsujiro Suzuki, Visiting Professorand Project Professor, University ofTokyo; Senior Research Scientist, Socio-economic Research Center, CentralResearch Institute of Electric PowerIndustry (CRIEPI), Tokyo; Co-Founder,Peace Pledge, Japan

Prof. Yoshida Yasuhiko, Professor, OsakaUniversity of Economics and Law, Japan;President, Association for HumanitarianAssistance to North Korea; Director,National Forum for the Promotion ofNormalization of Diplomatic Relationsbetween Japan and DPRK; Fact-findingvisits (7) to North Korea since 1994;Managing Director of the Center forNuclear Information in Japan

S T A F F :

Ms. Claudia Vaughn, Program Coordina-tor, Pugwash Conferences, AccademiaNazionale dei Lincei, via della Lungara10, I-00165 Rome, Italy, Tel. (++39-06)687 2606, Fax: (++39-06) 687 8376,Mobile: (++39-333) 456 6661, E-mail:[email protected]

Participants (Foreign)



Pugwash Workshop on Prospects for Self-Governance in Jammu & Kashmir and the Present Status of

Cooperation and Communication across the Line of ControlIslamabad, Pakistan, 10-12 March 2006

Report byClaire Galez

by force through Jihad. At this point,the Himalayan region’s projectedfuture still takes very different shapesin the minds of various stakeholdersand remains a prickly issue betweenthe two countries.

Since 2002, Pugwash Conferencespioneered a number of initiatives con-tributing to an India-Pakistan rap-prochement. Several closed-door ses-sions in India, in Pakistan and abroadwere organized with the intention ofoffering concerned parties and indi-viduals the chance to creativelyexchange their views with franknessin a tension-free atmosphere.

In November 2004, after intenseconsultations with the governmentsof India, Pakistan and different par-ties in Jammu and Kashmir (J&K)across the Line of Control (LoC),Pugwash initiated its first Kashmirspecific meeting in Kathmandu, host-ing eminent politicians, diplomats,intellectuals and civil society repre-sentatives. The experience was verysuccessful in that it resolved to inte-grate the Kashmiri leadership andsociety in a framework of semi-offi-cial dialogue with a reach to the for-mal circles of bilateral negotiators.Moreover, both India and Pakistanresponded quite positively to the ini-tiative.

On 10-12 March 2006, Pugwashconvened an enlarged meeting, prin-cipally of Kashmiri representatives

from Pakistan and Indian Adminis-tered Kashmir entitled “Prospects ofSelf-Governance in Jammu & Kash-mir and the Present Status of Coop-eration and Communication acrossthe Line of Control”. About eightydelegates from Pakistan and IndianAdministered Kashmir’s mainstreamand opposition political parties andmembers of the civil society, membersof the Kashmiri Diaspora, Indian andPakistani diplomats, academiciansand representatives of both countries’civil society participated in the meet-ing. On the eve of President Mushar-raf’s proposals for formulae of demil-itarization, increase of exchangesacross the LoC and on self-governancefor Kashmir, the meeting held in thePakistani capital, Islamabad, wasconsiderably enriched by an over twohour exchange of views with Pak-istan’s President, Pervez Musharraf.

The Pugwash Conferencesexpress deep appreciation to the gov-ernments of Pakistan and India forhelping facilitate the meeting. Pug-wash also expresses its deep appreci-ation to all participants for the gen-uine goodwill they showed inattending the meting and in makingfree and exceptionally constructiveinput. Pugwash is especially gratefulto President Musharraf for thewarmth and candidness with whichhe welcomed and interacted with thedelegation.

Throughout the document,unless otherwise specified,“Kashmir” or “Jammu and

Kashmir” is taken to mean the wholeterritory comprising both Indian andPakistani Administered Jammu andKashmir

The India-Pakistan bilateral com-posite dialogue intended at imple-menting normalization measuresmainly in the form of ConfidenceBuilding Measures (CBMs) and atconsolidating a long awaited peaceprocess has maintained a reasonablepace since April 2003. It remainsnonetheless that over the years, theState of Jammu and Kashmir’sapproximate total population of over14 million has been kept hostage ofthe most conservative ideologies,from claims over the entire territoryby either Pakistan or India, to force-ful annexation, status quo, re-Parti-tion or secessionism in the form ofindependence or access to Pakistan

Acronyms used in the document:

J&K: Jammu and Kashmir

IaK: Indian Administered Kashmir

PaK: Pakistan Administered Kashmir

NAs: Northern Areas

LoC: Line of Control

CBMs: Confidence Building Measures

Background

In declaring his intention to order aceasefire along the Line of Controldividing Indian and Pakistani Admin-istered Kashmir in August 2003, Pak-istan’s President made a break-through in the dangerously escalatingtensions between his country andIndia. In October the same year, Indiaresponded positively to the ceasefireoffer and to President Musharraf’sproposal for dialogue by putting a setof 12 Kashmir-specific CBMs on thetable. India also announced its readi-ness to broaden the New Delhi-Kash-mir dialogue and make it inclusive ofthe indigenous separatist leadership.In November 2003 both countriesagreed to extend the ceasefire alongthe India-Pakistan’s InternationalBorder (IB), the Line of Control(LoC) and the Actual Ground Posi-tion Line (AGPL) in Siachen; a planthat was implemented on 25 Novem-ber at midnight. Pakistan went anextra mile by announcing it would nolonger let its territory be used in sup-port to cross-border terrorism. Inspite of opposition at home, Presi-dent Musharraf also announced thathe would consider stepping downfrom Pakistan’s traditional stand oninternational platforms demandingthe implementation of UN Resolu-tions 1949.

Multi-track bilateral diplomaticexercises ensued with India and Pak-istan resuming talks on major issuessuch as the construction of dams, theopening of roads, bus and rail ser-vices, visa regulations, economiccooperation, energy policies, nuclearsafeguards, borders security, terror-ism and drug trafficking. Thesediplomatic exercises were occasion-ally accompanied by goodwill ges-tures and resulted in the implementa-tion of several CBMs including the

opening of bus services between thetwo parts of Kashmir. In a joint state-ment at the United Nations GeneralAssembly in September 2004 PrimeMinister Manmohan Singh, who hadtaken office in May, and PresidentMusharraf delivered a joint statementwhere they addressed the issue ofKashmir and “agreed that possibleoptions for a peaceful, negotiated set-tlement of the issue should beexplored in a sincere spirit and pur-poseful manner”.

After the earthquake of October2005 that devastated mostly regionsof Azad Jammu and Kashmir (Pak-istan Administered Kashmir) and wasone of the most colossal humantragedies in decades, Pakistan seldomaccepted Indian helping hand in reliefoperations. On the other hand,reports of the Pakistan Army’s depen-dence on banned Jehadi groups forrelief operations, the following resur-gence of violent political killings inIndian Administered Kashmir (IaK)and the Delhi bombings of 25 Octo-ber 2005 which killed over 60 peo-ple, made India more elusive in nego-tiations.

The bilateral normalizationprocess was not derailed but Indiaand Pakistan could ultimately onlyagree on opening five crossing pointson the LoC. For people in Kashmir,on both sides of the LoC, it was feltas ‘so little, so late’.

By December 2005, two roundsof India-Pakistan composite dialoguehad been completed, a third roundstarted on January 17, 2006.

In the framework of bilateral dia-logue with India, the question ofJammu and Kashmir remains centralfor the Pakistani establishmentwhich, for various reasons, cannotdeceive its local constituencies on itsdecades’ pledge to sympathise fully

with the people of Kashmir on theother side of the LoC as much as itcan hardly redraw national securityparadigms and compromise on estab-lished national security issues, includ-ing non-military security. In interna-tional circles the question of Kashmiris increasingly perceived as a matterof regional security with worldwideimplications, a view shared by mostdecision-makers in New Delhi but fordifferent reasons. New Delhi hascome to the realization that if there isno reason to avoid addressing theissue of Jammu and Kashmir withPakistan, for both countries the mat-ter is confined to security constraintsand the two should abide by the rulesof—and respect for—each country’ssovereignty while the thrust of con-flict resolution lies with the tradi-tional and emerging Kashmiri leader-ships of all parts of Kashmir. InKashmir, on both sides of the LoC,the process is viewed as extremelyslow, lacking inclusiveness and lack-ing perceptible positive effects. Disen-chantment towards both countriesincreases by the day while several keyconcerned parties, often holding dia-metrically opposite ideologies, hardlydare stepping down from their maxi-malist positions.

In an all inclusive effort, Pug-wash’ meeting in Islamabad offered aplatform to major Kashmiri, Pak-istani and Indian schools of thought,as varied and opposed as they can be.

The meeting in Islamabad openedwith a plenary session, followed by aclosed-door session of Kashmiri rep-resentatives. In parallel, Indian andPakistani delegates deliberated onhow to reconcile the bilateral peaceprocess of negotiations with theneeds and aspirations of the diverseKashmiri groups and their represen-tatives. What are the self-governance





formulae that would reconcile Indianand Pakistani constraints with Kash-miri aspirations? What are the mea-sures that each country needs to taketo grant “free political space” forKashmiri peoples to express them-selves and contribute positively toshaping the future of the State? Themeeting reconvened and concluded inplenary session

General debate

On the political front, some delegatesnoted that there could be no quick fixfor the State since a major feature ofJ&K is its geographic, ethnic, reli-gious and cultural diversity rooted indifferent historical realities andpresently evolving in varied politicalsystems. On the other hand, somedelegates warned against the dangerof further dividing the State on thebasis of its diversity. To view diversityin terms of convergence versus diver-gence was encouraged by some dele-gates. There are different models thatneed to be studied and discussed inorder to suitably ascertain the will ofthe people and implement an appro-priate form(s) of self-governance.Some delegates noted that the Kash-miri mainstream and emerging lead-

erships, irrespective of them belong-ing to Indian Administered Kashmir(IaK) or Pakistan Administered Kash-mir (PaK), remain deeply divided onboth the projection of a possible set-tlement or on measures that couldease tensions and improve the currentsituation.

In terms of conflict resolutionmost participants expressed theirappreciation for the India-Pakistanpeace process—or process of normal-ization—but when it comes to Kash-mir, for a majority of the participantsthe process is viewed as sluggish andboth India and Pakistan are perceivedas diluting their good will declara-tions in actual negotiations. Somedelegates pointed at the historic real-ity that if it is essential to acknowl-edge the centrality of the people ofKashmir this does not lessen theimportance of the role India and Pak-istan have and should play in resolv-ing their disputes and in creating sus-tainable political, social andeconomic space for Kashmiris onboth sides of the LoC.

On the question of Kashmir spe-cific CBMs, many delegates notedthat although some valuable CBMshad been agreed upon by both coun-

tries, most of these were still toorestrictive and inaccessible to thecommon man. The lack of engage-ment of the civil society createsincreasing disillusionment and alien-ation. If this perception is not imme-diately levelled out within the Kash-miri society, it holds the risk, in amedium-long run, to be counter-pro-ductive to the peace process. It isessential for the CBMs to be success-ful that they carry the benefit of atrickle down effect making a qualita-tive difference to the common man’spersonal life in terms of security,humanitarian relief and economicimprovement. On the other hand itshould be remembered that CBMsare not an end in themselves but step-ping stones. In the course of negotia-tions, India and Pakistan seem to behalted by much apprehension of eachother and of the Kashmiri people asdemonstrated in the aftermath of theearthquake. Kashmiri delegates at themeeting made the pressing demandthat both countries should demon-strate their good will by acting morepositively and visibly on the ground.

Status quo not acceptable:

Most delegates agreed that the pre-sent status quo within and towardsthe State was unacceptable. For mostdelegates, the State of Jammu andKashmir has the potential to becomea bridge of friendship between Indiaand Pakistan rather than a bone ofcontention. To this end, delegatesexpressed the view that both Indiaand Pakistan have to overcome theirdistrust towards the people of Kash-mir. Simultaneously, outside andwithin J&K, on both sides of theLoC, responsible leadership shoulddemonstrate genuine political will tomake the State recover from the deeptrauma of years of violence and inse-

President Musharraf and Pugwash Council member Pervez Hoodbhoy

curity that has affected up to theremotest parts of the State. It wasrecognized by a majority of partici-pants that the settlement of J&Kholds a key to durable peace, securityand prosperity in the region. Mostparticipants also agreed that for thepeople to decide their future by freewill in a democratic participatoryprocess they should be essentiallyfreed from violence and intimidation.Mature and able leadership shouldvigorously engage in bringing to thefold those who still believe in violentmeans.

In the course of the first plenarysession, the participants’ input alsomainly contributed to reviewing thesituation as perceived from differentparts of the State.

In the Valley of IaK, there is still ahigh level of violence where the con-frontation between terrorists, armedmilitias and mighty state securityforces claims innocent lives daily.Beyond human rights violations com-mitted by both the militants and thevarious security agencies, such cli-mate of destruction and insecurityimpedes any meaningful socio-eco-nomic and even political develop-ment in a context where societal con-ditions have only degenerated overthe years. A large majority of the par-ticipants therefore resolved that animmediate end to all forms of vio-lence is a cornerstone for politicalprogress and social reconstruction. Itwas also felt that an end to all formsof violence was crucial for people toregain confidence in their institu-tions, and for them to contribute con-structively to a genuine intra-Kash-miri rapprochement inclusive of allcommunities of J&K within andacross the divide.

Short of its demand for becominga Union State Territory within India,

Laddakh for its part, has achieved acertain modicum of autonomy whereboth its regions (Laddakh and Kargil)are represented in all democraticinstitutions of governance includingat the national level. Although Lad-dakh has not suffered from violentconfrontations in a direct fashion(barring the 1999 Kargil episode) thecollateral damage in Laddakh isstrongly felt in socio-economic terms.Would the peace process and mean-ingful CBMs lead to serious reduc-tion of high risk tensions betweenIndia and Pakistan, Laddakh wouldwelcome the reopening of its tradi-tional trade routes to Gilgit, Skarduand Central Asia. Concerned partici-pants underlined that divided familiesin the Laddakh-Baltistan sectorshould be given equal humanitarianconsideration and called for theopening of the traditional Skardu-Kargil route. It was suggested that ahealthy development meanwhilewould be to allow theLaddakh/Kargil Hill DevelopmentCouncils to visit the NAs and meetwith the Northern Areas LegislativeCouncil. On the other hand, whileLaddakh is by and large a self-admin-istered territory, to create a regionaldynamic that would have a genuinetrickle down effect and bear consid-erable benefits for the peoples of theregion, self-governance would haveto be equally applied to the contigu-ous territories of the Northern Areas.

In the Jammu region, the questionof minorities (principally Sikh andHindu) has to be taken into consider-ation. Minorities should be duly rep-resented in any breaking-grounddevelopment and be part of theprocess leading to self-governance.The question of internal migrationacross the State also deserves closerattention. Most Muslim or Hindu

families who left the Valley in thewake of unbearable violence havelost most of their possessions but alsomuch of their cultural and socialroots. These communities’ voice mustbe heard and they should participatemeaningfully in a process of self-gov-ernance and reconstruction.

In Azad Jammu and Kashmir, onthe Pakistan side of the divide, somedelegates expressed the view that thefact that there is no political violenceor active armed resistance does notmean that people have reconciledwith their status. This part of theState contributes positively to Pak-istan’s national economy but remainshighly dependent on Pakistan. Left inisolation the region is drawn towardsincreasing backwardness. Adminis-tratively, autonomy is only nominal.The true decision-making process istaking place at the Ministry of Kash-mir Affairs in Islamabad. In humani-tarian terms, people deeply resent thelack of accessibility across the LoC.Many families and communities aredivided by the LoC and people feelculturally and emotionally ampu-tated. In the aftermath of the devas-tating October 2005 earthquake aclimate of deep insecurity and lack oftrust in the federal government hassurfaced in most of the region. Somedelegates expressed serious concernat the vacuum left by the Federalagencies in relief operations, a vac-uum filled by banned Jehadi groups.

Several delegates were concernedthat the Northern Areas, a geographi-cally strategic territory of almost 1.5million inhabitants, remained status-less either as a part of Kashmir or vis-à-vis Pakistan since 1947. Some dele-gates expressed concern at the modelof governance applied in the NorthernAreas (national representation, dis-pensations for local administration,





economic dispensations). The issue ofinfiltration of organized Jehadi ele-ments post 9.11, modifying the tradi-tional peaceful fabric of society in theNAs was also evoked with concern.The delegates generally agreed that if amodel of self-governance were to suc-ceed in reflecting peoples’ aspirationsand in enhancing regional coopera-tion, this model should apply equallyto all parts of Kashmir even if somespecificity can be conceded on thebasis of ground realities and necessi-ties. In the meantime, there was alarge consensus amongst the partici-pants urging for developing contactsand communication between theNorthern Areas and the contiguousIAK region of Laddakh.

Key concepts

Delegates to the Islamabad meetinggenerally agreed on the followingprinciples and recommendations:

Self-governance:

The modelling and implementationof self-governance cannot possiblytake place in a context of violence.Violence is incompatible with anyform of democratic process where thepeople of Kashmir’s dignity andintegrity would be restored and

where they would regain overduepolitical, economic and social spaceto their own benefit.

Ideally, in a simultaneous top-to-bottom and bottom-up approach, theprocess leading to self-governanceshould be brought about by consen-sus building mechanisms.

The principle of self-governance isnot necessarily based on a concept ofconstitutional change but on genuineand sustainable political, social andeconomic devolution in a harmonizedlegal framework that truly empowerslocal institutions and sustains aprocess of cooperation amongst thedifferent actors concerned by thegroup(s) empowered. States’ sover-eignty and peoples’ sovereignty arenot necessarily conflicting concepts.

Good governance within self-gov-ernance should be a fundamentalresolve.

Self-governance—Kashmir specifics:

Trust has to be restored amongst thepeople of Kashmir, irrespective oftheir shade of opinion. A climate oftrust amongst all parties concerned(J&K-India-Pakistan) has to prevailin order to move forward and mean-ingfully improve the political debateas well as peoples’ lives.

The concept of self-governance isso far ill defined. In view of the diver-sity of the territory and the specificityof certain regions of J&K, either bydefinition of their own populationsor in the eyes of India and Pakistan,some ground realities need to betaken into consideration in terms ofself-governance and devolution ofpower.

It remains nonetheless that allregions of Kashmir, across the LoCshould benefit simultaneously fromthe process of self-governance. Inorder to promote cross-LoC civilianexchanges in the form of relief andhumanitarian exchanges or in theform of trade, economic cooperation,political freedoms and other forms ofexpression, the process of self-gover-nance needs to be harmonized in allregions of J&K.

It should be taken into considera-tion that certain groups of people oneither side of the LoC hold the viewthat their future lies with India orwith Pakistan. The expression of dif-ferent views on the solution to theJ&K problem—if conveyed by nonviolent and democratic ways—shouldnot prejudice the cooperationamongst citizens on both sides of andacross the LoC with the purpose ofimproving living conditions anddefine the parameters of a healthypolitical debate on the future statusof the State. Neither should thedebate be discriminatory on the basisof class, religion, origin or gender.

There has been ample proof thatthere is no military/paramilitary solu-tion to the question of J&K. The con-cept of self-governance also includesthe dimension of security. In theprocess of implementation of self-gov-ernance it could be considered that itwould be the local authorities/institu-tions’ responsibility to guarantee the

Paolo Cotta-Ramusino, Amitabh Mattoo, Pres. Musharraf, Talat Masood

security of all citizens, includingminority groups who should be guar-anteed their full, equal rights.

Transitory measures towardsself-governance

Until and after an institutionalizedmodel of self-governance is put inplace in all parts of the State, the mil-itary establishments of both Indiaand Pakistan should reduce consider-ably their interference, either directlyor indirectly, in the governanceprocess of the State under theirrespective administration.

In view of the recent CBMsagreed upon by India and Pakistanon the opening of crossing points onthe LoC, people to people contactsshould be encouraged and facilitated.

The facilities offered by the CBMsshould be made accessible to Kash-miri individuals.

Kashmiri civilian institutions,including educational bodies, parlia-mentary bodies, cultural groups, pil-grims, traders, media, etc. should beencouraged and facilitated accessacross the LoC.

Communication, infrastructure,laws and regulations should beadapted both within the whole ofJ&K and at national level in Indiaand in Pakistan to address the poten-tial of cross-LoC initiatives in areassuch free movement of people, goodsand capitals, free flow of informa-tion, humanitarian relief, tourism(including pilgrimages), sharing ofenergy resources, preservation of theenvironment, etc. In the light ofemerging privatization and the devel-opment of liberal economic modelsboth in India and in Pakistan, institu-tional mechanisms could be put inplace for the Kashmiri legislators,leadership and entrepreneurs to beconsulted and take part in the deci-

sion process on these matters as theyshould become the main beneficiariesof these measures.

Elimination of violence, reductionof military force

There should be increased coopera-tion between India and Pakistan toend terrorism and violence in all itsforms and manifestations.

India, Pakistan and the local J&Kauthorities on both sides of the LoCshould ensure respect of the law andthe condemnation of all illegal activi-ties on either side of and across theLoC.

The reduction of military forceshould result from negotiations; itshould avoid key areas to be ren-dered more vulnerable by either ofthe protagonists and be motivated bythe resolve to de-escalate tensionsbetween the two countries as well ascreating a sustainable safer environ-ment for the citizens of J&K.

India and Pakistan should con-sider a significant reduction of troopson the LoC and in civilian areas onboth sides of the LoC, maintainingthe minimum necessary troops toensure the security of the citizens andprevent any unilateral adventurism.

Reduction of force should besimultaneous and reciprocal on thepart of India, who still maintains ahigh level military presence in its partof the State and Pakistan whose terri-

tory is still used by armed groupsinfiltrating IaK and also maintainslarge army contingents in key civilianareas on its side of the LoC.

Resolving issues like Siachen,Wullar/Tulbuk and Sir Creek wouldnot impede either country’s positionon Kashmir and would be greatlyhelpful in creating an atmosphereconducive to enhancing the peaceprocess.

****Although no clear-cut consensus wasachieved at the end of the Islamabadmeeting, most delegates expressedtheir support for the peace processbetween India and Pakistan andurged India and Pakistan to createmechanisms whereby Kashmiriswould have a voice in the peaceprocess.

On the side of the meeting, a con-siderable number of bilateral meet-ings took place between the Kashmirirepresentatives from both sides of theLoC as well as with personalities atthe highest echelons of power, includ-ing with General Musharraf andother Pakistani officials.

The meeting was viewed by mostof the delegates as a unique opportu-nity for leaders and individuals tointeract usefully.

A large majority of the partici-pants at the Islamabad meeting sug-gested there should be more opportu-nities of the kind.





Mr. Shohab Inayat Malik, Reader, Depart-ment of Urdu, University of Jammu; Assis-tant Dean, Students Welfare, University ofJammu

Mr. Mohd. Yasin Malik, Chairman, JKLF,Srinagar, J&K, India

Prof. Amitabh Mattoo, Vice Chancellor,University of Jammu, Jammu, J&K, India;Member, Prime Minister’s Task Force onGlobal Strategic Developments; Professorof Disarmament Studies, School of Inter-national Studies, Jawaharlal Nehru Uni-versity (JNU), New Delhi [formerly: Mem-ber, National Security Advisory Board]

Mr. Sonam (Pinto) W. Narboo, Member,JK Legislative Assembly (Ladakh), E-mail:[email protected]

Mrs. Dilafroze Qazi, Principal, SocialWorker, Women’s Activist, Srinagar, J&K,India

Mr. Abdul Rahim Rather, M.L.A. (Leaderof the Opposition–Lok Sabha), Jammu &Kashmir Legislative Assembly, Jammu,J&K [formerly: Minister in J&K)

Prof. A.N. Sadhu, Director, Priya DarshniInstitute of Management & Science, Uni-versity of Jammu. Jammu, J&K, India

Hakim Mohammed Yasin Shah, Ministerof Consumer Affairs and Public Distribu-tion in J&K Government, Srinagar, J&K;Chairman, Jammu & Kashmir PeoplesDemocratic Front, Srinagar

Prof. Bhim Singh, Chairman, J&KNational Panthers Party, Jammu; Member,Legislative Council in J&K (MLC) [for-merly: Professor of International Law andMember National Integration Council]

Mr. Nirmal K. Singh, President, BJP,Jammu, J&K, India; Professor of History,University of Jammu

Mr Annil Suri, Managing Director, TawiArc Electrodes Pvt. Ltd., Bari Brahmana,J&K, India; Quality Consultant, Univer-sity of Jammu [formerly: President, BariBrahmana Industries Association (2001-3,2004-5); Co-Chairman, Federation ofIndustries, Jammu (2002-present)

M.Y. Tarigami, Member LegislativeAssembly, Srinagar

Mr. Abdul Ghani Ganai (Vakil), SeniorVice President, JK Congress Party

Prof. Siddiq Wahid, Vice Chancellor,Islamic University at Awantipora, J&K

State, India; Director, All J&K WaqfBoard; Member of Governing Board, Peo-ple’s Convention on Environment andDevelopment, India; Member, India Forum

I N D I A

Ms. Sushobha Barve, Executive Secretaryand Chief Program Coordinator, Centrefor Dialogue and Reconciliation, Gurgaon,Haryana, India

Prof. Radha Kumar, Professor, MandelaCentre for Conflict Resolution, NewDelhi, India; Trustee, Delhi Policy Group

Amb. Gopalaswami Parthasarathy, Visit-ing Professor, Centre for Policy Research,New Delhi, India; Member, Policy Advi-sory Group, Ministry of External Affairs;Member, Editorial Board, Indian DefenseReview [formerly: High Commissioner/Ambassador to Cyprus, Myanmar, Aus-tralia & Pakistan; Spokesman and Infor-mation Advisor, Prime Minister’s Office]

A J K

Mr. Malik Abdullah, Tahreek-e-Hurriyat

Mr. Sardar M. Anwar Khan, Advocate,High Court J.K., and ex-President, JammuKashmir National Awami Party

Mr. Shaukat Maqbool Butt, President,Jammu and Kashmir National LiberationFront, Muzaffarabad, AJK

Barrister Sultan Mehmood Chaudhry,Leader of the Opposition in AJK Legisla-tive Assembly, Muzaffarabad, Azad Kash-mir [formerly: Prime Minister and Leaderof the Opposition in AJK LegislativeAssembly]

Col. (ret) Mohammad Farooq, Advisor toex-Prime Minister of AJK, Sardar M.Abdul Qayyum Khan [formerly: Chair-man, Prime Minister Team, AJK; DirectorGeneral, Civil Defence, AJK]

Mr. Raja Mohamed Farooq Haider, Advi-sor to the Prime Minister of Azad Jammu& Kashmir [formerly: Senior Minister,Gov’t of Azad Jammu & Kashmir (1988-90, and 1994-96); Chairman, Parliamen-tary Board, Muslim Conference AJ&K]

Mr. Muhammad Abdul Razzaq Khan(MARK) Khaleeque, President of JammuKashmir National Awami Party (JKNAP),Muzaffarabad, Azad J&K [retired civil ser-vant: Additional Secretary and Professor ofEnglish Literature]

Participants

J & K

Omar Abdullah, Member of Parliament(Lok Sabha); National Conference Presi-dent, Srinagar

Prof. Ashok Aima, Professor, The BusinessSchool, University of Jammu, J&K

Mr. Maulvi Iftikar Ansari, Senior Member,Peoples Democratic Party (PDP), Srinagar;President, All Jammu and Kashmir ShiaAssociation [formerly: Cabinet Ministerwith various portfolios; Leader of opposi-tion in Congress (I), 1983-85]

Prof. Noor Ahmad Baba, Professor andHead, Dept. of Political Science, KashmirUniversity, Srinagar, J&K, India

Mr. Ved Bhasin, Chairman, KashmirTimes Group of Newspapers; President,J&K Institute of Peace, Justice andDemocracy, Jammu

Prof. Abdul Gani Bhat, President, MuslimConference Jammu & Kashmir, Srinagar,and Professor of Persian

Prof. Posh Charak, Professor of Englishand Head of Department of Urdu, andDirector, Centre for New Literatures, Uni-versity of Jammu, Jammu, J&K, India[formerly: at University of Jammu: Dean,Faculty of Arts; Member Syndicate (2003-06); Head, Department of English]

Mr. Ghulam Rasool Dar, General Secre-tary, JKLF, Srinagar, J&K, India

Prof. Rajive Gupta, Professor, Universityof Jammu, Jammu, India

Mr. Arshad Hussain, Chief OperationOfficer, Greater Kashmir, Srinagar, J&K

Happymon Jacob, Lecturer, Centre forStrategic & Regional Studies, University ofJammu, J&K, India [formerly: ResearchAssociate, Observer Research Foundation,New Delhi]

Asgar Ali Kerbalai, Chairman, Kargil HillCouncil

Dr. Meenakshi Kilam, Director, Centre forQuality Assurance, University of Jammu,Jammu, J&K, India [formerly: FacultyMember, Department of ManagementStudies, University of Jammu; AssistantManager, Citibank N.A. (credit cards);J&K Institute of Public Administrationand Rural Development]

Mr. Sajjad Gani Lone, Chairman, Jammu& Kashmir People’s Conference, Srinagar,J&K


Mr. Amanullah Khan, Jammu and Kash-mir Liberation Front, Rawalpindi

Mr. Ejaz Afzal Sardar Khan, Amir Jamaat-e-Islami, AJK

Mr. Sardar Abdul Qayyum Khan, AllJammu & Kashmir Muslim Conference

Mr. Sardar Attique Ahmed Khan, Presi-dent, All Jammu & Kashmir Muslim Con-ference, and Member, Legislative Assem-bly, Azad, Kashmir

Mr. Sardar Khalid Ibrahim Khan, Presi-dent, Jammu Kashmir People’s Party,Islamabad, Pakistan

Justice Abdul Majeed Mallick, President,Jammu & Kashmir Liberation League,Mirpur, Azad J&K; retired Chief Justice,Azad Kashmir High Court

Mr. Hafiz Muntaz

Nawaz Khan Naji, Balawaristan NationalFront, Gilgit

Mr. Ghulam Raza Shah Naqvi, Chairman,Islamic Democratic Party, and Member,AJ&K Council

Dr. Waleed Rasool, Peoples’ League

Mr. Muhammad Farooq Rehmani, Con-venor, APHC, Muzaffarabad

Prof. Shafique-ur-rehman, Department ofBotany, University of Azad Jammu &Kashmir, Muzaffarabad, Azad Kashmir,Pakistan, Mobile: (++92-300) 539-3433,E-mail: [email protected]

Arif Shahid, Jammu and Kashmir NationalLiberation Front

P A K I S T A N

Dr. Samina Ahmed, Project DirectorAfghanistan/South Asia, International Cri-sis Group (ICG), Islamabad, Pakistan [for-merly: Research Fellow, Belfer Center forScience and International Affairs, John F.Kennedy School of Government, HarvardUniversity; Senior Research Analyst, Insti-tute of Regional Studies, Islamabad]

Sen. Farhatullah Babar, Senator, Senate ofPakistan, Islamabad; Press Spokesman toChairperson, Pakistan People’s Party [for-merly: Speech writer and Press Assistant toPrime Minister; Managing Editor, DailyFrontier Post, Peshawar, Pakistan]

Hon. Ahsan Iqbal Chaudhary, Chief Coor-dinator, Pakistan Muslim League-N;Chairman, Better Pakistan Foundation;Professor of Management, M.A.JinnahUniversity, Blue Area, Islamabad [for-merly: Deputy Chairman (Minister ofState), Planning Commission, Govt of Pak-istan; two-term Member, National Assem-bly (1993, 1997)]

Gen. (ret.) Mahmud Durrani, CouncilMember, IISS, London, UK [formerly:Chairman and Chief Executive, PakistanOrdinance Facotries Board; Commanderof an Armoured Division; Military Secre-tary to a President of Pakistan; Pakistan’sMilitary Attaché in Washington, DC]

Amb. Tariq Fatemi, Islamabad, E-mail:[email protected]

Mr. Inam Haq, former State Minister forForeign Affairs of Pakistan; Chairman,Institute of Strategic Studies, Islamabad,Pakistan

Prof. Pervez Hoodbhoy, Member, Pug-wash Council; Professor of NuclearPhysics, Department of Physics, Quaid-e-Azam University, Islamabad, Pakistan;Chairman of Mashal Books; independentdocumentary filmmaker for popularizingscience in Pakistan; activist for peace andsocial reform

Mushahid Hussain, Secretary General,Pakistan Muslim League, Islamabad

Lt.-Gen. (ret.) Talat Masood, IndependentColumnist, Commentator and Analyst,Islamabad, Pakistan [formerly: retired Lt.General; Secretary, Defence ProductionDivision, Ministry of Defence; Chairman,Pakistan Ordnance Factories Board; vari-ous command, staff and instructionalappointments in the armed forces]

Dr. Shireen M. Mazari, Director General,Institute of Strategic Studies, Islamabad,Pakistan

Prof. Abdul Nayyar, Sustainable Develop-ment Policy Institute, Islamabad, Pakistan;on leave from the Physics Department,Quaid-i-Azam University, Islamabad

Ms. Sherry Rahman, Member NationalAssembly of Pakistan

Mr. Mehmood Ahmed Saghar, Vice-Presi-dent, Jammu Kashmir Democratic Free-dom Party (JKDFP). Rawalpindi, Pakistan

Hon. Abdul Sattar, Member, Sub-Commis-sion on Promotion and Protection ofHuman Rights, Palais des Nations, Geneva[former Foreign Minister of Pakistan,Islamabad]

Mr. Najmuddin Shaikh, retired PakistanForeign Service Officer; Member, Board ofGovernors, Institute of Strategic Studies,Islamabad; Senior Vice President, KarachiCouncil of Foreign Relations; Columnistfor Dawn, Karachi [formerly: Foreign Sec-retary to the Government of Pakistan(1994-97); Ambassador of Pakistan to Iran(1992-94), the USA (1990-91), the FRG)1989-90) and Canada (1987-89)]

Dr. Abdul Hameed Toor, Associate Profes-sor, Department of Physics, Quaid-i-AzamUniversity, Islamabad, Pakistan

Khalid Younus, Member National Assem-bly of Pakistan, Karachi and Islamabad

K A S H M I R I S I N U S / E U R O P E

Dr. Ghulam Nabi Fai, Executive Director,Kashmir American Council, Washington,DC

Mr. Farooq M. Kathwari, Chairman, Pres-ident and CEO, Ethan Allen Inc., Danbury,CT, USA; Chairman, Kashmir StudyGroup

Barrister Abdul Majid Tramboo, ExecutiveDirector, ICHR-Kashmir Centre, EuropeanUnion, Brussels, Belgium

P U G W A S H

Prof. Paolo Cotta-Ramusino, Secretary-General, Pugwash Conferences on Scienceand World Affairs; Professor of Mathe-matical Physics, University of Milan, Italy;Director, Program on Disarmament andInternational Security, Landau Network–Centro Volta, Como, Italy [formerly: Sec-retary General, Union of Italian Scientistsfor Disarmament (USPID)]

Ms. Claire Galez, Director, Centre forSouth Asian Studies (CSAS), Geneva,Switzerland; Research Associate, Centrefor Asian Studies (Geneva University –GIIS/GIDS)

Ms. Claudia Vaughn, Program Coordina-tor, Pugwash Conferences, via della Lun-gara 10, I-00165 Rome, Italy, Tel. (++39-06) 687-2606, Fax: (++39-06) 687-8376,Mobile: (++39-333) 456-6661, E-mail:[email protected]





Pugwash Workshop: Security Architecture in the Horn of Africa

Nairobi, Kenya, 18-19 March 2006

Report byMeghan Madden

regional, and international levels.The objective of this workshop wasto bring together key stakeholders inthe Horn of Africa and elsewhere,comprising officials of governmentaland inter-governmental organiza-tions, military and security personnel,academics, and the broad civil societyto discuss security architecture in thesub-region.

The issues discussed at theworkshop were divided intothree general categories: case

studies of conflict and peacekeeping,regional organizations and mecha-nisms, and examples of otherregional efforts at peacekeeping. Theworkshop began with a welcome byAmbassador Ochieng Adala of thePugwash Council and Africa PeaceForum. A meeting in east Africa wasfirst proposed three years ago, andthe Africa Peace Forum is glad Pug-wash provided this opportunity fordiscussion. It is hoped that the resultsof this workshop will be addressed atthe Pugwash annual conference inCairo in November.

Case Studies of Conflict andPeacekeeping in the Horn ofAfrica

Four presentations focused on Soma-lia, addressing the causes of conflictor the current prospects for stability.The roots of the Somali conflict canbe traced as far back as colonialism.Like most of the continent, nomadic

groups were divided by ethnic bor-ders. Following the end of colonial-ism, these borders were rejected asnationalism and the idea of a GreaterSomalia (the uniting of all ethnicSomalis within a single state) becamemore prevalent. Under the ultimatelydisastrous leadership of Siad Barre,this led to Somali aggression in warswith Kenya and Ethiopia. Militarylosses, the withdrawal of foreign sup-port at the end of Cold War, increas-ing tensions between clans, and thefailure of Barre’s socialist policies cul-minated in the collapse of the state.

There has been little improvementin the last decade. Internationalattention turned elsewhere followingthe failed intervention in 1993. Whenthe US withdrew its support of UNO-SOM the UN was unable to sustainthe mission, and although it hasretained a security presence, it isforced to work out of Nairobi. Thecurrent mission is not to create stabil-ity, but merely to protect nationaland international personnel and tocollect information. UNDP, UNISEF,etc continue to run aid projects, butthey are subject to periodic kidnap-pings and assassinations, and themission as a whole is handicapped bya lack of funding. If the UN were topull out the impact would probablybe minimal.

At the regional level, the Intergov-ernmental Authority on Development(IGAD) has been working diplomati-cally to re-form a central authority. A

Pugwash held its first workshop onsecurity in the Horn of Africa on 18-19 March, 2006 in Nairobi, Kenya.This event was co-sponsored by theAfrica Peace Forum and hostedAfrican participants from Egypt,Ethiopia, Somalia, Uganda, Tanza-nia, Eritrea, and Kenya.

The Horn of Africa region con-sists of seven states: Djibouti, Eritrea,Ethiopia, Kenya, Somalia, Sudan,and Uganda. Many of these statesface similar patterns of conflict, rang-ing from internal insurgency to crossborder disputes. Common problemsinclude poor governance, lack ofaccountability, extreme poverty, con-trol of natural resources, small armstrade, refugees and internally dis-places persons (IDPs), politics ofexclusion, and ethnic rivalries. Con-flicts in this region often go beyondtheir own borders and adverselyaffect neighboring states. Because ofthis interrelated nature it is necessaryto look at the Horn as a whole indeveloping a regional security archi-tecture.

It has become imperative to seeknew mechanisms for building securityin Africa, and in the Horn of Africain particular. The complex nature ofthe region’s conflicts calls for a uni-fied effort at the local, national,


governance settlement has beenreached and the new government hasreturned to Somalia, although it hasbeen unable to settle in Mogadishu.IGAD has attempted to facilitatetalks among the Somali factions, butit does not have the requisiteresources to take a forceful approach.Somalia continues to be a threat to itsregional neighbors as a source ofarms, piracy, large refugee flows, andterrorism (notably the 1998 embassybombings in Nairobi and Dar esSalaam). Although IGAD has offeredto send troops into Somalia toattempt to restore stability and physi-cal security, it does not have the legalauthority to intervene without amandate from the UN (which has sofar been withheld because of the armsembargo). If IGAD were to act uni-laterally, it would need approvalfrom Somalia itself (which has beenwithheld because of opposition fromthe warlords). Although IGAD hasthe political will, it will need to workwith international partners, the AU,and civil society to be effective.

At the local level, the Somali peo-ple have not been involved in the

peace process, nor have them beenable to return to normal lives. Theold state structure of Somalia is goneand the territory is effectively dividedinto three regions, including Soma-liland and Puntland. The traditionalmechanisms for dealing with conflictand justice have reemerged in areaslacking governments, but this is not along term solution.

A common theme in the discus-sion was the question of whetherSomalia should be held together as aunified state. It is possible the ideal ofa Greater Somalia is holding togetheran artificial state. If this is the case,the peace process is attempting toforestall the natural disintegration ofSomalia into its distinct regions. Apossible solution would be a carefullystructured federation system.

The discussion on Sudan focusedon the inter-clan conflicts in the southrather than the north-south, Muslim-Christian/Animist conflict that hascaught international attention.Because economic and geographicconditions make it very difficult forjournalists to find and feed informa-tion, there has been very little focus

on the conflict itself. Too few peoplehave visited Sudan to give the worlda clear idea of what is happening inthe south. Even the combatantsthemselves do not have informationon casualties, number of arms in cir-culation, etc.

It is estimated that more peoplehave died in conflicts in southernSudan than in the conflict betweenthe north and south. Historically,each tribe has had a system of chiefsand elders that deal with problemswithout police, imprisonment, or aformal justice system. Confrontationswere dealt with at the communitylevel before they could spread. Theintroduction of modern governmenthas circumvented the traditionalmeans of preserving the peace; how-ever, these systems are too small to betruly effective. Combined with theever increasing gluttony of smallarms, small sparks can easily turninto major tribal conflicts (generallybased on grazing land, water,women/marriage, and position).Today having a gun has essentiallybecome part of the transition to man-hood, and most men in southern

Meghan Madden and Oyugi OnonoOchieng Adala, Njeri Karuru and Ahmed Ibrahim Mahmoud




Sudan have some kind of weapon.Military position has replaced thetraditional justice system.

The comprehensive peace agree-ment (CPA) has restored some mea-sure of peace to the area and the tra-ditional systems are regaining someof their influence. But there are majordifferences between traditional andmodern law. These two systems needto be fused to create traditionalauthority structures with modernsolutions.

The final state specific presenta-tion was on the continuing, yet oftenoverlooked, conflict in Uganda.Because it has spanned two decades,the causes of the original conflict (pri-marily political exclusion) are oftenneglected as the world focuses on theintransigent Lord’s Resistance Army(LRA) in the north. Many believe thatthe government has focused themajority of its efforts on entrenchingits position rather than attempting toresolve the conflict. There is also aclear divide between the north andsouth, with the majority of the latterlabeling the conflict a local issue andcontent to remain uninvolved.

Although the government hasconducted negotiations, these oftenappear to be merely token actions,generally in response to internationalimpetus (pressure by internationaldonors, allegations of human rightsabuses, etc) and lacking followthrough. Government military cam-paigns are generally conducted underinformation blackouts and the statewide implications of the conflict areignored.

On the regional level, both Kenyaand Sudan have been active in help-ing Uganda deal with the LRA(which is on the US terrorist list).Uganda has been viewed by many asa successful case of post-conflict

reconstruction. This is true in thesouth, but not in the north where theconflict is far from over. Given thelack of commitment by the Ugandangovernment, a third party intervener(regional or international) will likelybe needed to neutralize the LRA.

The final case study dealt withEthiopia, with a focus on the impactof technology and diasporas onAfrican conflicts. Technology on thecontinent was established primarilyfor development purposes; however ithas been circumvented to supportterrorism and to increase the influ-ence of diasporas. In the case ofEthiopia, the government has beenunable to provide basic services suchas education, health, and security.Instead, these are undertaken by pri-vate industries and NGO’s, oftenfunded by the diaspora, who haswide ranging financial and politicalinfluence. In the conflict betweenEthiopia and Eritrea, much of themoney, and therefore the commandand control capacity, comes fromAmerica and Europe. Some estimatesput the amount of money flowingfrom the Ethiopian diaspora asgreater than the Ethiopian govern-ment’s budget. The main problemwith the diasporas is that they haveall of the rights and none of theresponsibilities of citizenship. Theycarry passports from other countriesand are able to encourage revolutionsor unrest without having to deal withthe repercussions.

A second issue is that there is alarge population of highly educatedyouth who are unable to find jobs intheir home country. This is a univer-sal problem of disenchanted youthwho go to Europe, have difficultyassimilating, and become vulnerableto extremists. Projects are underwayto merge education and technology,

creating more jobs within Ethiopiaand decreasing the number of youthforced to leave.

Regional Organizations andMechanisms

Three non-governmental organiza-tions in the region were discussed aspotential tools in building a regionalsecurity architecture.

The International DevelopmentResearch Center works to createnorth-south cooperation in develop-ment, and has a project that focuseson a security in the Horn of Africa.The research looks at four broadareas (physical security, governance,resources, and military), with objec-tives that include analyzing the effec-tiveness of current mechanisms andengaging policy makers, intellectuals,and civil society. The priority of theIDRC is to create sustainable struc-tures to ensure the absence of warand to promote human development.The IDRC collaborates with regionalorganizations (IGAD, COMESA,AU, etc) to work with a comprehen-sive view of the impediments to secu-rity (including corruption, drought,refugees, and abuse of women). TheIDRC works by giving governments avested interest in the success of theirresearch; however, it is somewhathandicapped by its reliance on for-eign donors, the difficulty in creatingpolitical consensus in implementa-tion, and the lack of governmentcooperation.

The Great Lakes ParliamentaryForum on Peace (AMANI Forum) isan organization that works toincrease the participation of parlia-mentarians in discussions on peace.Membership currently includes morethan 650 MPs from seven countriesin the Great Lakes region. TheAMANI Forum supports an African



solutions to African problemsapproach and focuses on increasingthe accountability of governments,promoting dialogue between conflict-ing parties, upholding democraticpractices and human security protec-tion, reducing the negative impact ofinternational interest in regional con-flicts, and controlling the prolifera-tion of small arms. AMANI hasworked in partnership with otherorganizations such as the AU, IGAD(and the Conflict Early Warning andResponse Mechanism- CEWARN),the Regional Center on Small Arms(RECSA), and the All Party Parlia-mentary Group on the Great LakesRegion (APPG).

The Regional Center on SmallArms (RECSA) was established inJune 2005 to implement the NairobiDeclaration and the Nairobi Proto-col. These were created in response tothe continuing proliferation of smallarms throughout the region, andfocus on strengthen legislation gov-

erning arms, strengthening the opera-tional capacity of law enforcement,increasing cross border cooperation,collecting and destroying weapons,demobilization and reintegrationprograms for ex-combatants,improving relations with communi-ties, and enhancing regional coopera-tion and coordination. RECSA istasked with facilitating regional andinternational cooperation in combat-ing illicit arms trade, increasingaccountability and law enforcement,and promoting information sharingamong governments. Because smallarms proliferation is a problemimpervious to borders, regional andinternational collaboration are essen-tial to RECSA’s success.

Other Regional Examples ofPeacekeeping

Alexander Nikitin (of Pugwash Rus-sia) discussed Russian peacekeepingefforts to offer a parallel to Africanattempts. The Commonwealth of

Independent States (CIS) has takenadvantage of Chapter VIII of the UNcharter, which authorizes regionalorganizations to undertake missionson behalf of the UN. The UN hasincreasingly used this measure inpeace operations (NATO in theBalkans, ECOWAS in Liberia andSierra Leone, AU in Sudan). A exten-sion of this practice would be theestablishment of the proposedAfrican Standby Force (a similar pro-posal by the EU has yet to be imple-mented). However, as CIS has seen,real capabilities are very differentfrom those on paper, and troop readi-ness, language barriers, equipmentquality, etc are likely to prove morecumbersome than anticipated. TheAfrican approach to peace operationsshould be multifaceted, with differentfunctions for the military, diplomatic,regional, and international compo-nents. A general lesson from peace-keeping is that policy forces are justas important as military forces, espe-cially in post-conflict reconstruction.

Egypt has been an active inter-vener in the region, with missions inSomalia, Liberia, Angola, and West-ern Sahara. It has a large military andhas worked to improve not just itscapacity to participate and lead peaceoperations, but also the quality of itsparticipation. The Egyptian militarynow trains specifically for peacekeep-ing and has established institutes forlanguage and technology training.The African peacekeeping institutetrains peacekeepers in both Englishand French. Recommendations forthe future include the creation of astandby force (either African orEuro-Asian), increasing capacity fordisaster relief operations and mar-itime activities, and improving coop-eration in updating and understand-ing technology.

Salome Katia and Mitslal Kifleyesus-Matschie



Conclusion

The workshop concluded with a pre-sentation by Prof. Gwyn Prins thatlooked at the changing mentality inpeacekeeping and the future chal-lenges facing the African continent.In recent years there has been an ide-ological shift from non-intervention-ism to a responsibility to protect.Basic Principle “B” of The Responsi-bility to Protect, Report of the Inter-national Commission on Interventionand State Sovereignty (December2001) says, “Where a population issuffering serious harm, as a result ofinternal wars, insurgency, repressionor state failure, and the state in ques-tion is unwilling or unable to halt oravert it, the principle of non-interven-tion yields to the international

responsibility to protect.” As human-itarian interventions became morefrequent through the 1990’s, the pre-eminence of national sovereigntybegan to erode. Today the responsi-bility to protect supersedes sover-eignty if the situation fulfils certain“just cause” criteria (including(actual or apprehended) serious andirreparable harm to human beings,large scale loss of life, or large scaleethnic cleansing).

Since 1999 the responsibility toprotect has led to missions in Liberia,Sierra-Leone, and Sudan (among oth-ers). These have all had similar fea-tures such as subcontracting by theUNSC, action by unilateral states orad hoc coalitions, “normal” militaryoperations (not the peace keeping or

peace enforcement that dominatedthe 1990’s), and fulfilment of the“just cause” criteria. The questionthat now arises is who is the efficientand legitimate authority to becomeinvolved in a situation (the bestexample of this from workshop dis-cussions is IGAD in Somalia)? Simi-larly, we have to look at whose inter-est is it to do what, and who has thepolitical will to do what? As we haveseen in recent conflicts, the AU andIGAD have the desire to key playersin conflict management and buildingsecurity in Africa. Answering thequestions about their efficiency andlegitimacy is key in analyzing theirpotential in the Horn of Africaregion.

Participants

Amb. (ret.) Ochieng Adala, Member,Pugwash Council; Africa Peace Forum(APFO), Nairobi, Kenya [formerly: Per-manent Representative of Kenya to theUnited Nations, NY (1992-93); DeputySecretary/Director for Political Affairs,Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Interna-tional Cooperation (1988-92); Ambas-sador of Kenya to the Arab Republic ofEgypt, the Kingdom of Morocco, Zam-bia, Algeria and Tunisia (1984-88)]

Prof. Mwesiga Baregu, Professor of Inter-national Relations, University of Dar esSalaam, Tanzania [formerly: Head, Peaceand Security Research Program, SAPESTrust, Harare, Zimbabwe]

Dr. Jeffrey Boutwell, Executive Director,Pugwash Conferences on Science andWorld Affairs, Washington, DC, USA;Member, Pugwash Executive Committee[formerly: Associate Executive Officer,American Academy of Arts and Sciences,Cambridge; Staff Aide, National SecurityCouncil, Washington, DC]

Prof. Paolo Cotta-Ramusino, Secretary-General, Pugwash Conferences on Sci-ence and World Affairs; Chair, PugwashExecutive Committee; Professor of Math-ematical Physics, University of Milan,Italy; [formerly: Secretary General, Unionof Italian Scientists for Disarmament(USPID)]

Mr. Rolf Helmrich, UNDSS SecurityTraining Officer, Somalia [formerly: Lieu-tenant Colonel (rtd) German Air Force]

Ms. Njeri Karuru, Senior Program Offi-cer, Peace Conflict and Development,International Development ResearchCentre, Nairobi, Kenya

Ms. Salome Katia, Executive Secretary,The Great Lakes Parliamentary Forum onPeace – AMANI Forum, Nairobi, Kenya;Organizing Secretary, Women Educa-tional Researchers of Kenya; Ph.D Candi-date, University of South Africa

Dr. Mitslal Kifleyesus-Matschie, Man-ager, EuroContact, Jena, Germany; Lec-

turer, Erfurt University, Germany [Con-sultant, Technical Secretariat, OPCW,External Relations Division (1994-98);Harvard Sussex Brussels Researcher,Brussels]

Amb. Bethuel A. Kiplagat–ExecutiveDirector, Africa Peace Forum (APFO),Nairobi, Kenya; Special IGAD Envoy forSomali Peace Process (2003 – 2004);Kenya Ambassador to France and KenyaHigh Commissioner to the Court of St.James between 1978 – 1883); PermanentSecretary, Kenya Ministry of ForeignAffairs – 1983 – 1991; Currently, Chair-man of Eminent Persons – NEPAD AfricaPeer Review Mechanism (APRM); Chan-cellor, Egerton University, Kenya.

Dr. Alfred Sebit Lokuji, Consultant–Development, Management, PolicyAnalysis, Africa Peace Forum (APFO,Nairobi, Kenya [formerly: Director forCivil Service Training–Institute for Devel-opment, Environment and AgriculturalStudies (IDEAS), Yambio, Sudan (2001);Head of Department and Lecturer,



Department of Government and PublicAdministration, Moi University, Eldoret,Kenya (1997-2001)]

Ms. Meghan Madden, Intern, PugwashConferences Washington DC office, USA;Graduate Student-Masters in SecurityStudies, Georgetown University

Dr. Ahmed Ibrahim Mahmoud, SeniorResearcher, Al-Ahram Center for Political& Strategic Studies, Al-Ahram Founda-tion, Cairo, Egypt

Mr. Omar Bashir Mohamed, NationalDirector, Somali Studies Center (SSC),Mogadishu, Somalia; and Team Leader,Center for Peacemaking and ConflictStudies, Somalia

Dr. Alexander: Nikitin, Professor,MGIMO University, and Director,MGIMO Center for Euro-Atlantic Secu-rity, Moscow, Russia; President, RussianPolitical Science Association; Board mem-ber, Russian Academy of Political Sci-ences; Member of the International Pug-wash Council; Director, Center forPolitical and International Studies;

Elected Member, Russian Academy ofMilitary Sciences

Mr. James Thuo Njuguna, Ph.D. candi-date, Infectious Diseases and BiologicalWeapons Threats, University of Bonn,Germany

Dr. Paul Omach, Senior Lecturer, Depart-ment of Political Science & PublicAdministration, Makerere University,Kampala, Uganda

Mr. Oyugi Onono, Planning and Coordi-nation Officer, Regional Centre on SmallArms and Light Weapons, Nairobi,Kenya

Prof. Gwyn Prins, Alliance Research Pro-fessor, London School of Economics andPolitical Science, UK and Columbia Uni-versity, New York. [formerly: SeniorResearch Fellow, Royal Institute of Inter-national Affairs (RIIA), Chatham House,London; Lecturer in History and Politics,University of Cambridge; Fellow ofEmmanuel College]


Mr. Abdiraham Osman Raghe, Somalia,WSP International, Nairobi, Kenya;

Maj.-Gen. (ret.) Dr. Mohamed KadrySaid, Member, Pugwash Council; Head ofMilitary Studies Unit and TechnologyAdvisor, Al-Ahram Center for Politicaland Strategic Studies, Al-Ahram Founda-tion, Cairo, Egypt; Professor of MissileMechanics of Flight, Military TechnicalCollege (MTC), Cairo; Member of Strate-gic Planning Committee, Egyptian Coun-cil for Space Research and Technology[formerly: Deputy Director, Center ofDefence Studies, Cairo]

Mr. Francis Sang, Director/Coordinator,Regional Centre on Small Arms(RECSA), Nairobi, Kenya [formerly:Director, Criminal Investigation Depart-ment; Senior Deputy Commissioner ofPolice; Provincial Police Officer]

Mr. George Wachira, Executive Director,Nairobi Peace Initiative, Kenya

Mr. Dominic Welsh, Security Manager,Woodside Energy Kenya (WEK) [for-merly: UK government]; field of study:Security and Risk Management


P U G W S H M E E T I N G N O . 3 1 6

Pugwash Conference on HIV/AIDS:Sharing of Experiences, What Works?

M.S. Swaminathan Research Foundation, Chennai, India, 7–9 April 2006

Concept Note considered on par with conventionaldefense and security issues, particu-larly in the most affected regions. In2000, the UN Security Councilpassed Resolution 1308, which rec-ognizes HIV/AIDS as a securitythreat. This represents the first timethat the Security Council linked itsresponsibility for maintaining inter-national peace and security and theHIV/AIDS epidemic.

HIV/AIDS represents a threat tohuman security through its impact onsociety. In the countries that havebeen hit the hardest by HIV/AIDS(the “first wave” countries), lifeexpectancy has fallen precipitously.For example, life expectancy hasdeclined from 60 to 47 in SouthAfrica. As a result, these countrieswill face serious social and culturalchallenges in the coming years. AIDShas also resulted in the breakdown ofsocial and family structures and pro-duced a generation of orphans. Thiswill impair the reproduction of soci-ety and increase insecurity.

HIV/AIDS also represents a threatto human security through its impacton the military, which is charged withmaintaining internal and externalsecurity. Due to their mobility, sepa-ration from family, and more relaxedattitudes towards risk, military per-sonnel are highly vulnerable to HIV-infection. This impairs the military’sability to perform its function. It alsohampers its ability to engage inregional and international peacekeep-

ing efforts, which are key to bringingstability to places immersed in civilconflict.

The long-range nature of the epi-demic and the inadequacy of existingstatistical and analytical models makeit easy for policy makers to avoid con-fronting the security dimensions andimplication of the HIV epidemic.

Pugwash Conferenceson HIV/AIDS

Initially the Pugwash Conferences onScience & World Affairs concen-trated on the nuclear peril. However,with the start of the new millennium,the Pugwash Council reviewed itsbasic mission in light of new threatsto human security, particularly those,such as HIV, that cannot be attrib-uted to an enemy. As a result, it gavethe green light to the South AfricanPugwash Group to convene twoexploratory workshops to considerhow Pugwash could leverage its au-thority to stimulate greater dialogueamong policy makers, political lead-ers and experts on the threat posedby HIV/AIDS to human security.

In the first workshop, participantsdiscussed why the epidemic hadbecome so bad in South Africa, goingfrom near 0% prevalence in 1990 tonearly 20% in 2002. They concludedthat the wrong analytical tools havebeen used. The response had focusedtoo much on sexual behavior, andnot enough on larger social and eco-nomic processes, such as mobility,

Pugwash Conferences onScience and World Affairs

Bertrand Russell and Albert Einsteinconvened the first Pugwash Confer-ence on Science and World Affairs in1957 to bring together scientists fromaround the world to address the newthreat faced by humanity in the formof nuclear weapons. Since then, influ-ential scholars and public figuresfrom around the world have attendedmore than 275 Pugwash events in aneffort to find cooperative solutions toarmed conflict and other threats tohuman security. Because of thestature of many of the Pugwash par-ticipants in their own countries,insights from Pugwash discussionstend to penetrate quickly to theappropriate levels of official policy-making. In 1995, the Pugwash Con-ferences on Science and World Affairswas awarded the Nobel Peace prizealong with Sir Joseph Rotblat for“bring(ing) scientific insight and rea-son to bear on threats to human secu-rity arising from science and technol-ogy in general, and above all fromthe catastrophic threat posed tohumanity by nuclear and otherweapons of mass destruction”.

HIV/AIDS: A threat tohuman security

HIV/AIDS is a threat to internationalpeace and security and should be


violence, gender inequality andpoverty. The inability of politicalleaders to confront the reality of theepidemic was also discussed at lengthas a major reason for the failure tomount an effective state response tothe disease in South Africa. The

dearth of and misuse of HIV statisticsmakes this denial possible. Partici-pants agreed that current methodsfor studying complex security prob-lems, like HIV/AIDS, are inadequateand a new way of thinking is essen-tial. Several of the following areas

were flagged for future research: 1)the validity of the CIA’s estimation of10% HIV prevalence as an indicatorof social and political breakdown; 2)the costs and benefits of a securityanalysis of HIV/AIDS; and 3) securityissues related to the HIV/AIDS epi-demic in “second wave” countrieslike India and China.

The second workshop built on thediscussions of the first. Participantscalled for a refinement in the statisti-cal methods used to analyze the HIVepidemic in order to ensure that pol-icy makers do not underestimate theseverity of the epidemic and its secu-rity implications. They highlightedthe need to broaden economic assess-ments of the impact of HIV to takeinto account such “externalities” asthe social cost of HIV. Participantsalso singled out nutritional interven-tions (e.g. micronutrient supplemen-tation, food fortification and theaddition of essential micronutrientsto fertilizers) as a cost-effective meansof preventing the spread of HIV andimproving the health of HIV-infectedpeople, especially those who do nothave access to ARVs. It was recog-nized that, while ARVs provide thebest treatment option, drug resistanceposes a danger and more attentionneeds to be focused on prevention.Participants noted that women are atgreater risk of HIV-infection thanmen, because sexual inequality makesit difficult to negotiate safe sex.Therefore, they called for the devel-opment and dissemination of femalecontrolled methods of preventionthat may be used either without theknowledge or permission of men,such as microbicides and female con-doms. They recognized the need tostudy more closely the social con-struction of sexuality and the condi-tions of sexual intercourse.

Pierre Canonne, Naggapan Parasuraman, Jeffrey Boutwell

Mary Crewe discussing a point




Pugwash Conferenceon HIV/AIDS: Sharing ofExperiences, What Works?

In recognition of the global nature ofthe HIV/AIDS pandemic, it wasdecided to bring together expertsfrom “first wave” countries wherethe epidemic has struck first and withgreat intensity (e.g. South Africa andUganda) and those from “secondwave” countries where the epidemicthreatens to spiral out of control (e.g.India) to exchange successful andreplicable strategies for the preven-tion, management and mitigation ofHIV and AIDS. India was selected tohost the 5th Pugwash Conference onHIV/AIDS due to the fact that it hasthe second largest population livingwith HIV in the world and is poisedon the verge of a generalized epi-demic. It is envisioned that this con-

ference will result in invigorated andmore effective national responses tothe HIV epidemic as well as increasedinter-regional cooperation.

The focus will be on policies andinterventions that have successfullyreversed the spread of HIV andimproved the health and quality oflife of people infected by HIV. Theprogramme will comprise 8 plenarysessions organized around the follow-ing themes:

• Policy and state responses toHIV/AIDS and TB co-infection inAfrica and India

• Translating awareness into behav-iour change

• Ensuring access and adherence toanti-retroviral therapy

• Improving the nutrition and foodsecurity of people infected andaffected by HIV and AIDS

• Improving awareness and prevent-ing infections among young people,especially young women

• Sexual violence and the social con-struction of male and female sexu-ality in the face of HIV/AIDS

• Preventing paediatric HIV

• Controlling HIV within the defenceservices

The cross-cutting themes: nutritionand gender inequality.

Session 6 will consist of the presenta-tion of a proposal to conductresearch on sexual violence and thesocial construction of male andfemale sexuality in the face ofHIV/AIDS.

Participants

Dr. Ashok Babu, Senior ProgrammeManager (Private Sector Interventions),AIDS Prevention and Control Project(APAC), Voluntary Health Services,Adyar, Chennai 600113 India

Dr. Usha Baweja, Senior Advisor – Pro-grams, Clinton Foundation HIV/AIDSInitiative, 1st Floor, 142, Golf Links,New Delhi 110003

Ms. R. V. Bhavani, Officer on SpecialDuty (Tech), M.S. SwaminathanResearch Foundation, 3rd Cross Street,Taramani Institutional Area, Chennai600117 India

Mr. Aniruddha Brahmachari, ProgrammeOfficer (HIV/AIDS), UNDP, 55 LodiEstate, New Delhi 110001 India

Jeffrey Boutwell, Ph.D., Executive Direc-tor- Pugwash Conferences, 1111 19th St.,NW, Suite 1200, Washington, DC 20036USA

Col. (ret.) Pierre Canonne, Senior Lec-turer, Disarmament and Arms Control,Universite Marne-la-Vallés/Paris, 16 ruedes Gentianes, 39400 Morbier, France

Dr. Nabiryo Christine, The AIDS SupportOrganization (TASO), Old Mulago Com-plex, P. O. Box 10443, Kampala, Uganda

Ms. Sheila Rani Chunkhat, IAS, HealthSecretary, Government of Tamil Nadu,Chennai, India,

Ms. Mary Crewe, Director, Centre for theStudy of AIDS, University of Pretoria,Pretoria 0002 South Africa

Dr. D. Dhanikachalam, State AdvocacyAdvisor- Essential Advocacy Project,Futures Group, Ground Floor, Door No.1, Kustian Beach Road, Santhome, Chen-nai 600004 India

Dr. Clive Evian, Director, AIDS Manage-ment and Support, Johannesburg Hospi-tal, Norwood, South Africa

Dr. Pieter Fourie, Professor- Dept of Poli-tics & Governance, Johannesburg Uni-versity, PO Box 524, Auckland Park2006, South Africa

Prof N K Ganguly, Director General-Indian Council of Medical Research,New Delhi, India

Ms. Sudha Goody, UNDP ProgrammeOfficer (HIV/AIDS), UNDP, Apex Tow-ers, 54, 2nd Main Road, R. A. Puram,Chennai 600028 India

Dr. Gianni Guidotti, Program Manager-Drug Resource Enhancement AgainstAIDS in Mozambique (DREAM), Com-munity of Sant’Egidio, Piazza S.Egidio3/a, 00153 Roma, Italy

Dr. Indrani Gupta, Professor and HeadHealth Policy Research Unit, Institute ofEconomic Growth, University Enclave,New Delhi, India

Prof. Happymon Jacob, Lecturer- Centrefor Strategic and Regional Studies



(CSRS), University of Jammu, Jammuand Kashmir 180006 India

Dr. Jagadeesan, M&E Officer, TamilNadu State AIDS Control Society(TANSACS), Chennai, India

Professor Ashok Jhunjuhunwala, TeNeTOffice, Department of Electrical Engi-neering, IIT Madras, Chennai 600 036India

Ms. Sethulakshmi Johnson, Coordinator-Community Projects, YRG CARE-CRF(Community Research Facility), Harring-ton Road, Chennai 6000 31, India

Ms. Suneetha Kadiyala, Scientist, Interna-tional Food Policy Research Institute,2033 K Street, NW, Washington, DC,20006 USA

Dr. Ruth Kattumuri, LSE Country Repre-sentative in India, Confederation ofIndian Industries, Core 4A, India HabitatCentre, Lodi Road, New Delhi 110 003,India

Dr. P. Krishnamurthy, Director- AIDSPrevention and Control Project (APAC),Voluntary Health Services, Adyar, Chen-nai 600113 India

Dr. Sanjeev Kumar, Head, Social Coun-selling, Hindustan Latex Family PlanningPromotion Trust, New Delhi, India

Dr. R. Lakshmi Bai, Programme Director,Tamil Nadu HIV/AIDS Initiative, Volun-tary Health Services, TTTI post, Adyar,,Chennai 600 113 India

Dr. Michael Loevinsohn, Applied EcologyAssociates, Wageningen, Netherlands

Dr. M. Maharajan, Tamil Nadu StateAIDS Control Society, 417 PantheonRoad, Chennai 600008 India

Dr. Minnie Mathew, Senior ProgrammeAdvisor, World Food Program, 2 PoorviMarg, New Delhi, India

Dr. S. M. Mehendale, Deputy Director(SG), National AIDS Research Center,Plot No. 73, ‘G’ Block MIDC, BhosariIndustrial Estate, Pune 411026, India

Dr. Stanley Michael, Health Officer,Directorate of Public Health, Govern-ment of Tamil Nadu, Chennai India

Professor Marie E Muller, Dean- Facultyof Humanities, University of Pretoria,South Africa

Dr. Rakhi Nair, Chief Program Coordi-nator- Wockhardt Harvard MedicalInternational HIV/AIDS Education &Research Foundation

Dr. Mabel Nangami-Nyarango, Head-Department of Health Economics andHealth Management, School of PublicHealth, Moi University, Box 4606,Eldoret, Kenya

Dr. Sathish Narayan, Consultant (ART),Tamil Nadu State AIDS Control Society,417 Pantheon Road, Egmore, Chennai600008 India

Ms. Elizabeth Noznesky, ProgrammeAssistant (HIV/AIDS), World Food Pro-gram, 2 Poorvi Marg, Vasant Vihar, NewDelhi 110057 India

Ms. Gayatri Oleti, Programme Manager(TN & AP), CARE India, Flat No. 3 (firstfloor), Crimson Park (Green Peace), PlotNo. 9/221, 42nd Street, 8th Sector, K. K.Nagar, Chennai 600078 India

Ms. Kousalya Periaswamy, President,Network of Positive Women (PWN+),9/5, Shanthi Apartments, Avenue Road,Nungambakkam, Chennai 600 034 India

Dr. Basanta Kumar Pradhan, NationalCouncil of Applied Economic Research(NCAER), Parisila Bhawan, 11,Indraprastha Estate, New Delhi 110002,India

Professor Gwyn Prins, Alliance Researchat LSE & Columbia University, Director,Mackinder Centre for the Study of LongWave Events, London School of Econom-ics and Political Science (LSE), HoughtonStreet, London WC2A 2AE United King-dom

Dr. S.Y.Quraishi, Secretary, Ministry ofYouth Affairs and Sports, Room No.103, C-Wing, Shastri Bhawan, New Delhi- 110001 India

Dr. Sai Subhashree Raghavan, President,SAATHII, 78 Ground Floor, PushpaNagar Main Road, Nungambakkam,Chennai 600034, India

Ms. Sujatha Rao, Additional Secretary &Director General, NACO, 9th Floor,Chandralok Building, 36, Janpath, NewDelhi 110001, India

Ms. Jayanti Ravi, Director- IndianNational Advisory Council, New Delhi110001 India

Dr. Seema Sahay, Senior Research Officer,National AIDS Research Center, Plot No.73, ‘G’ Block MIDC, Bhosari IndustrialEstate, Pune 411026 India

Dr. N. M. Samuel, Head- Dept. of Exper-imental Medicine, Dr. M.G.R. MedicalUniversity, 69 Anna Salai, Guindy, Chen-nai 600032, India

Dr. Avina Sarna, Program Associate, Pop-ulation Council/Horizons Program, Zone5A, Core C, India Habitat Centre, NewDelhi - 110 003 India

Dr. Avanjali Satpahy, Consultant(HIV/AIDS), M.S. SwaminathanResearch Foundation, 3rd Cross Street,Taramani Institutional Area, Chennai600113 India

Ms. Sheila Sisulu, Deputy ExecutiveDirector, UN World Food Program, ViaC.G.Viola 68-70, Parco dei Medici,00148 - Rome – Italy

Professor M. S. Swaminathan, Chairman,M.S. Swaminathan Research Foundation,3rd Cross Street, Taramani InstitutionalArea, Chennai 600113 India

Tina van den Briel, Senior ProgrammeAdviser (Food Technology and Nutri-tion), UN World Food Program, ViaC.G.Viola 68-70, Parco dei Medici,00148 - Rome – Italy

Dr. Mary Verghese, Project Director(HIV/AIDS:Global Fund), PopulationCouncil India, B-28, Qutab InstitutionalArea, Tara Crescent, New Delhi 110016India

Col. A. K. Verma, Director Health- Officeof the Director General, Armed ForcesMedical Services, Ministry of Defence,GOI, M Block, New Delhi-110001, India



International Conference on Recent Developments in Iraq and theProspects for Regional Security

Iran’s Nuclear Energy Program: Policies and Prospects

Co-Sponsored by the Pugwash Conferences on Science and World Affairs and the Center for Strategic Research, Tehran

Tehran, Iran, 24-26 April 2006

Report byEmile El-Hoyakem

the author and has not been endorsedby any of the participants.

Recent Developments in Iraqand the Prospects for RegionalSecurity

The first day was dedicated to an in-depth discussion of political develop-ments in Iraq and their impact for theregion. In addition to Iranian presen-ters and Pugwash foreign guests, theCenter for Strategic Studies invitedseveral Iraqi political leaders andanalysts to address the participants.

As Iraq’s eastern neighbor andlongtime foe, Iran has vital and legiti-

mate interests in what happens nextdoor. Indeed, Iran’s recent history ismarked by the long and bloody warit fought with Iraq. The legacy of thiswar is still vivid in both a psychologi-cal and political dimension. Theworld’s support of Saddam Husseinduring the 1980-1988 Iran-Iraq war,the heavy Iranian death toll, andIraq’s use of chemical weapons stillshape how Iran articulates and pro-motes its national interests. At thesame time, the historical, religiousand societal ties that link the twocountries guarantee that Iran willhave a major say in Iraq’s future.

This two-part conference onthe situation in Iraq, andIran’s nuclear program, was

held in Tehran on April 24-25 2006and was hosted by the ExpediencyCouncil’s Center for StrategicResearch. The first part of the confer-ence looked at developments in Iraqand their implications for Iran, Iraq’sother neighbors and regional stabil-ity. The second part of the conferenceexamined Iran’s nuclear program andregional security. Part of the confer-ence was open to the public and themedia and distinguished speakersincluded Expediency Council Chair-man Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani, Sec-retary of the Supreme National Secu-rity Council Ali Larijani, ForeignMinister Manoucher Mottaki, andformer Secretary of the SupremeNational Security Council and headof the Center for Strategic ResearchHassan Rohani. Closed-door, expert-only workshops delved into moredetailed and technical discussions ofthe topics at hand.

As is customary with Pugwashmeetings, most of the discussion washeld on a non-attribution basis, thusthis report is the sole responsibility of Tehran


Many Iranian participants heldambivalent views about the US inva-sion of Iraq. Paradoxically, in Iranianeyes, the US failure to build stronginstitutions, deliver key public ser-vices and goods and create a secureenvironment does not imply that Iraqis a failing state on the verge of civilwar, a view largely held in the West.This disconnect seems to have muchto do with the sense that Iran has suc-ceeded in cultivating good ties withIraq’s most powerful factions, posi-tioning itself as a key power-brokerin Iraq, and bogging down the UnitedStates.

While US intentions and objec-tives were largely condemned, therewas a sense that the US interventionremoved from power Iran’s mostpotent and committed foe and rede-fined the regional balance of powerin its favor. Moreover, there was asignificant measure of confidenceabout Iraq’s future direction. ManyIranian participants lauded the demo-cratic achievements that brought topower Iraqi parties with strong ties toTeheran and greeted with enthusiasmthe appointment of Jawad al-Malikias Iraq’s new Prime Minister. Indeed,from Tehran’s perspective, the elec-toral and constitutional processeshave established the preeminence of

Shia parties such as the SupremeCouncil for the Islamic Revolution inIraq (SCIRI) in Iraqi politics. Iranpatiently cultivated its ties to theseparties opposed to Saddam Hussein’sregime and now sees this investmentas having brought the substantivepolitical benefits it expected.

After decades of bloody enmityand strategic rivalry, Iran now seesitself as Iraq’s natural mentor andpartner. Participants asserted thatIraq was following Iran’s steps inestablishing a religiously-inspired sys-tem of governance, suggesting thatthe Iranian model of an Islamicrepublic could very well inspirefuture developments in Iraq. The via-bility of Iraq’s democratic institutionswas linked to the necessity to abideby edicts from Shia authorities, inparticular Grand Ayatollah Sistani,Iraq’s most revered marja’. Moreover,Iranian officials strongly recom-mended that Iraq’s constitution,approved by referendum in December2005, be not reviewed or amended,as is allowed for a period of fourmonths under a formal agreementbetween the different Iraqi parties.Reviewing the Constitution is widelyviewed as a Sunni attempt to re-nego-tiate some of the most contentiousclauses of the Constitution, including

the nature of federalism in Iraq andthe distribution of oil revenues.

The issue of security was hotlydebated. While Iranian participantsput much of the blame for the currentsecurity situation on the UnitedStates, they suggested that a fully-empowered Iraqi government wouldbe able to restore security. Iran rec-ommends a quick withdrawal of USand British troops from Iraq and aregional dialogue about Iraq’s future.Foreign participants doubted thisjudgment, stressing that Iraq’s policeand military forces need to be bettertrained and organized, lest they beovertaken by sectarian militias.

In addition, there was some con-fusion regarding the nature andpotency of the threat to Iraq’s stabil-ity. Those who maintained that vio-lence in Iraq is the product of anunlawful war and occupation andthat the insurgency in Iraq is a legiti-mate resistance movement alsoclaimed that there is a terrorist threatthat endangers the survival and unityof Iraq. However, when asked to clar-ify their definition and understandingof this terrorist threat, Iranians par-ticipants generally shied away fromthe question. Indeed, Sunni-Shia ten-sions in Iraq and their regional reper-cussions shadowed the discussionsbut were rarely mentioned. Shias areidentified as the victims and Baathistsas the perpetrators of terrorism. Par-ticipants had mixed views about therole of Iraq’s neighbors in contribut-ing to Iraq’s stability. It was assertedthat some countries were activelyencouraging terrorists

Moreover, while a small minorityheld that the United States had aninterest in stirring sectarian tensions,most participants identified USincompetence and lack of knowledgeof Iraq’s society as the key reasons for

Paolo Cotta-Ramusino




its failure to provide security to theIraqi citizenry.

In the same way, the reasons whythe United States invaded Iraq werepassionately debated. Chief amongthem was the perception that Amer-ica was driven by deeply-ingrained,oil-centered imperialistic ambitions.By invading Iraq, the United Statessought to dominate the oil-rich Per-sian Gulf region. Some argued thatthe need to counter a region-wide,Iranian-inspired Islamic awakening,dishonestly defined by the UnitedStates as terrorism, compelled it tointervene in Iraq and pressure Mus-lim nations, casting the current con-flict as one of cultures and civiliza-tions. Others identified Israel as thekey beneficiary of US policy in theMiddle East, and argued that theneed to secure Israel drove the UnitedStates into Iraq. The demonizing ofIraq as a WMD proliferator and astate sponsor of terrorism, followedby the failure to find WMD and thenow disproved allegations of tiesbetween Iraq and Al-Qaeda, added toa widely shared sense that the UnitedStates had a hegemonic agendadressed in benevolent intentions. Fewcredited the United States with a sin-cere desire to promote democraticvalues in a region plagued withauthoritarianism. On the contrary,the United States was criticized for itsperceived hypocrisy, especially in thelight of its opposition to Hamas,despite the latter having achievedpower through the very democraticelections that the Bush administra-tion espouses.

Foreign participants offered amore nuanced view of US objectivesin the Middle East and put US for-eign policy in the context of the post-9/11 world. They stressed that Presi-dent Bush, driven by the need to

respond to the 9/11 attacks, re-arranged America’s strategic inter-ests, prioritized threats emanatingfrom Islamic extremist movements,and embarked on a mission tochange the fundamental dynamics ofthe Middle East.

Iran’s Nuclear Energy Program:Policies and Prospects

The second day was devoted to a dis-cussion of Iran’s nuclear program andregional security. It featured formerand current officials from several Iran-ian agencies in charge of Iran’s secu-rity and nuclear policy. [Note: Theworkshop was held days prior to anIAEA Board of Governors meeting inVienna to consider Iran’s compliancewith its NPT obligations, and twoweeks after Iran announced it hadenriched uranium for the first time.]

Under Article IV of the Non-Pro-liferation Treaty, countries signatoriesto the NPT have the right to developa nuclear program for peaceful, civil-ian purposes. The IAEA is taskedwith facilitating and monitoring thetransfer of nuclear technology. Since2002, the IAEA has issued severalreports about Iran’s nuclear program,alternating praise and criticism ofIran’s cooperation, and culminatingwith the February 2006 referral of theIran issue to the UN Security Council.

Iranian participants, includingtop officials, reiterated Iran’s peacefulnuclear intentions, stressing the eco-nomic and technological benefits Iranwould derive from possessing home-grown civil nuclear capabilities. Inparticular, some Iranian participantsemphasized that exporting electricalpower as well as gas and oil woulddramatically improve Iran’s trade andcurrent accounts, shoring up Iran’sfinances and benefiting Iran’s popula-tion. In Iranian eyes, pursuing civil

nuclear energy is a key element ofIran’s development strategy and itsresponse to the looming energycrunch. Iran’s nuclear program alsohas a research dimension (medicaland university research, agricultureetc.) that is essential for any countryseeking to establish a scientific repu-tation.

All Iranian speakers insisted thatIran would never give up any of itstechnological achievements in thenuclear domain. According to oneparticipant, Iran’s nuclear program issimilar to “a bullet fired from a gun.You can’t put it back in the barrel.What has been learned cannot beunlearned.” The nuclear programenjoys considerable support amongthe Iranian population and is anachievement borne of the nationalconsensus in line with the IslamicRevolution. The international com-munity has to accept and adjust tothis new reality.

In parallel, Iranian participantsvehemently denied any intention tobuild nuclear weapons. Iran under-stands its obligations under the NPTand seeks to respect IAEA rules. This

Hassan Rohani



unfair and politicized charge dam-ages any effort to reach a lastingsolution to the crisis. As evidence ofIran’s peaceful intentions, Iranrefrained from using WMD evenafter being attacked by Iraq withchemical weapons during the Iran-Iraq war. Moreover, Iran’s securitydoctrine expressly forbids the devel-opment of nuclear weapons.

Iranian participants deplored thereferral of the Iran file from the Inter-national Atomic Energy Agency tothe UN Security Council, calling it apoliticized move that undermined thecredibility of the IAEA as a guarantorof the right of NPT signatories to thepeaceful use of nuclear energy. InIranian eyes, the breaches identifiedby the IAEA in its successive reportssince 2002 did not warrant or justifythis move, especially in view of Iran’ssubsequent cooperation with the UNagency and volunteer suspension of

uranium enrichment activities untilJanuary 2006. This episode has donemuch to tarnish the IAEA’s standingin Iran and worldwide. It sets a dan-gerous precedent for other statesmembers of the NPT that seek toacquire homegrown nuclear know-how. Some Iranian participantsthreatened to end all cooperationwith the IAEA or leave the NPTshould the UN Security Counciladopt a resolution imposing for sanc-tions against Iran. Iran would makeno distinction between comprehen-sive and targeted sanctions. Similarly,even sanctions imposed by one orseveral countries could irremediablydamage relations with the IAEA.

Nevertheless, as a sign of good-will, if its file were returned from theUN Security Council to the IAEA,Iran would again resume its dialogueand cooperation with the IAEA. Iran-ian participants stressed that Iran

would abide by all the standardIAEA safeguards and offer additionalguarantees on a volunteer basis. Nev-ertheless, Iran would rebuff anyIAEA effort to impose additionalsafeguards specifically designed forIran. It would interpret this as anunfair encroachment on Iran’s rightsunder the NPT.

International participantsinquired about Iran’s compliancewith IAEA safeguards—or lackthereof—and its procurement ofnuclear technology. In particular,questions regarding how and whereIran acquired the designs and proto-types of centrifuges necessary forenriching uranium, about the delaysand ambiguity in declaring keynuclear activities, and about theresumption of uranium enrichmentdespite IAEA demands, were raised.Moreover, some questioned Iran’seconomic rationales. For an oil-richcountry such as Iran, developingnuclear capabilities comes at greatfinancial cost. Moreover, the civiliantechnology is outdated, especially theBushehr reactor. Finally, as pointedout by a foreign speaker, only one-third of the countries that use nuclearenergy enrich their own uranium.

Foreign and Iranian participantsagreed that the crisis was of a politi-cal, not technical nature. Foreignspeakers outlined technical proposalsthat could emerge as solutions withsufficient diplomatic momentum andpolitical will:

• the multi-nationalization of Iran’suranium enrichment activities,described by one participant as“putting a UN flag on the Natanzfacility;”

• the establishment under IAEA aus-pices of international fuel centersthat would guarantee fuel supply toForeign Minister Mottaki



all nations and deal with spent ura-nium;

• the Russian proposal to enrich andtake back spent uranium on Russ-ian soil.

Foreign participants asked aboutthe confidence-building measuresIran could announce to demonstrateits peaceful intentions. They sug-gested that ratifying the AdditionalProtocol of the Non-ProliferationTreaty and adhering to the Compre-hensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty(CTBT) would send positive signalsto the international community andcreate positive momentum to reach afair and sustainable solution. Otherparticipants described in detail addi-tional verification and safeguardmeasures that Iran could implement.

Asked which model Iran consid-ered the most appropriate for its ownnuclear project, an Iranian speakerdismissed the North Korean andLibyan models and advocated theJapanese model. By demonstratingfull transparency, total cooperationwith the IAEA and its peaceful inten-tions, Japan has developed top-notchnuclear capabilities, including themastery of the complete fuel cycle.For many, the reluctance of the inter-national community to allow Iran toadopt this model arises from Iran’slack of transparency and cooperationwith the IAEA prior to the 2002 reve-lation that Iran was building a ura-nium enrichment plant in Natanz anda heavy-water reactor in Arak.

Iran’s history with its pre-IslamicRevolution nuclear suppliers informsmuch of its current stance on thenuclear issue. Iran’s most senior offi-cials reminded the audience thatprior to 1979, the United States,France, and Germany, today the dri-ving forces behind the international

community’s effort to obtain a per-manent suspension of Iran’s uraniumenrichment activities, were Iran’smajor partners in developing itsnuclear sector. For Iranians, thememory of the bitter disputes overthese suspended contracts betweenIran and its Western partners in theaftermath of the Islamic Revolutionacts as a powerful reminder of theneed to assert complete control overIran’s nuclear program. Even Iran’scurrent partners of necessity, Russiaand China, are considered unreliablewhen it comes to nuclear issues.Iran’s officials recalled severalinstances when these two countries,under US pressure, reneged on theircommitments at great financial andpolitical cost for Iran.

Iranian participants blamed theWest in general, and the United Statesin particular, for what they perceiveto be double standards in dealingwith Iran’s nuclear ambitions. Irani-ans complain about the nuclearapartheid forced on the developingworld. For Iranians, this attitudereveals lasting evidence of colonial-

ism. The issue of Israel’s undeclarednuclear capabilities dominated muchof the discussion. Israel, which didnot adhere to the NPT, is suspectedof having a large arsenal of nuclearweapons and maintains a policy of“nuclear ambiguity.” The fact thatthe IAEA does not have access toIsrael’s nuclear program amounts tointolerable uncertainty for Tehran.Moreover, it stands in the way of anyeffort to create a WMD-free zone inthe Middle East, Iran’s stated prefer-ence. Similarly, the US-India deal sug-gested to many that the United Statesprioritizes its own expedient interestsover international norms and obliga-tions. Under this deal that has yet tobe approved by the US Congress, theUnited States proposes to supportIndia’s own civil nuclear program inexchange for some guarantees andconcessions deemed insufficient bymany non-proliferation experts.

International Diplomacyand Regional Security

The Pugwash-CSR conference tookplace in the midst of the debate over

Ayatollah Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani.



US and international options vis-à-visIran and a few days before the April28 meeting of the IAEA on Iran.

Conference participants discussedIran’s strategic environment andthreat perceptions. Iran operates inwhat it perceives to be a hostile envi-ronment, surrounded by four nuclearpowers (Pakistan, Russia, Israel andthe United States) and two potentialfailing states (Iraq and Afghanistan).It must also deal with rising Sunni-Shia tensions, terrorism in theKhuzestan region, and attacks byKurdish separatists in northern Iran.The US rhetoric, captured by the“Axis of Evil” speech, and aggressivediplomacy, evidenced by the push forcoercive action at the UN, aggravateswhat is already a tense situation.

In this volatile environment, Iranmust preserve its independence, terri-torial integrity, vital interests, andstrategic depth. In particular, it mustassert its role in the Persian Gulf bystrengthening its relations with itsArab neighbors. The latter worrythat Iran’s nuclear program, espe-cially the Bushehr reactor with itsoutdated and unreliable design,comes at considerable environmentalrisks to their own populations andbasic infrastructure. To demonstrateIran’s goodwill and willingness toassuage Arab concerns, Iranian par-ticipants suggested joint scientificactivities with its Arab and otherneighbors. Iran believes that, insteadof being a point of tension, nucleartechnology can become a key area ofeconomic and scientific cooperation.Iranian participants stressed Iran’sgood diplomatic ties with most of itsneighbors and other middle powersthroughout the world.

In this charged atmosphere, thequestion of US-Iran relations and

their role in the current crisis was oneveryone’s mind. Not surprisingly,there is deep distrust in Iran for USintentions. Iran views the UnitedStates as prone to provocation,adventurism and aggression. ForIran, as evidenced by the threats offorce emanating from the UnitedStates, the United States is using thenuclear crisis to further its real objec-tive, regime change. The perceivedUS unwillingness to respond to Iran-ian overtures during the Khatamipresidency illustrates its malevolentintentions.

In contrast, foreign participants atthe meeting pointed outthe deep continued dis-trust of Iran felt in theinternational commu-nity, stemming fromIran’s rejection ofIsrael’s right to exist,exemplified by state-ments of PresidentAhmadinejad, and ofcontinued Iranian sup-port for what are con-sidered terrorist organi-zations. It is also forthese reasons, these par-ticipants explained, thatIran is fundamentallydifferent from a Japanor Brazil when it comesto considerations ofbeing a civil nuclearpower with indigenousfuel cycle capabilities.

Though disap-pointed by the Europeanposition, Iranian offi-cials left the door openfor more negotiationswith the E3. Theydeplored that the E3had rejected its March

2005 proposal and presented a mea-ger counter-offer in August 2005.Nevertheless, these nations have aninterest in preventing a showdown.At its core, their worldview, based onmutual respect and cooperation, dif-fers significantly with America’s.

Iranian and foreign participantsmentioned the need for a frameworkfor regional security in the PersianGulf. Concerned nations should buildon UN Security Council resolution598, which called for such a securityarchitecture. In particular, UNSCR598 could become the backbone of aregion-wide WMD-free zone.



Participants

P A R T I C I P A N T S F R O M

O U T S I D E I R A N

Prof. Abdulkareem Aldekhayel, Professorof Political Science and Associate Profes-sor, Dept. of Political Science, King SaudUniversity, Riyadh, Saudi Arabia

Dr. Sami M.K.M. Al-Faraj, President,Kuwait Centre for Strategic Studies,Kuwait City, Kuwait

Mr. Hashim Al Sharaa, Director General,Iraqi National Monitoring Directorate,Baghdad, Iraq

Dr. Jeffrey Boutwell, Executive Director,Pugwash Conferences on Science andWorld Affairs, Washington, DC, USA;Member, Pugwash Executive Committee

Dr. Thomas B. Cochran, Director,Nuclear Program, Natural ResourcesDefense Council (NRDC), Washington,DC, USA

Prof. Paolo Cotta-Ramusino, Secretary-General, Pugwash Conferences on Sci-ence and World Affairs; Member, Pug-wash Executive Committee; Professor ofMathematical Physics, University ofMilan, Italy; Director, Program on Disar-mament and International Security, Lan-dau Network – Centro Volta, Como,Italy

Dr. Patrick M. Cronin, USA, Director ofStudies, The International Institute forStrategic Studies (IISS), London, UK

Mr. Emile El-Hokayem, Lebanon,Research Associate, The Henry L. Stim-son Center, Washington, DC, USA

Mr. Mark Fitzpatrick, USA, Senior Fel-low for Non-Proliferation, InternationalInstitute for Strategic Studies (IISS), Lon-don, UK

Dr. Jozef Goldblat, Vice-President,Geneva International Peace ResearchInstitute (GIPRI), Geneva; SeniorResearch Fellow, UNIDIR, Geneva,Switzerland

Dr. Rosemary Hollis, Director ofResearch, Chatham House, London, UK

Mr. Hou Hongyu, Research Fellow, Chi-nese People’s Association for Peace andDisarmament (CPAPD), Beijing, China

Dr. Rebecca E. Johnson, Executive Direc-tor, The Acronym Institute for Disarma-ment Diplomacy, London, UK

Dr. Venance Journé, Researcher, NationalScientific Research Council (CNRS),Paris, France

Dr. Riad Kahwaji, Chief Executive Office,Institute for Near East & Gulf MilitaryAnalysis (INEGMA), Dubai, UAE

Mr. Michael A. Levi, Fellow for Scienceand Technology, Council on ForeignRelations, New York, NY, USA

Morten Bremer Maerli, Senior ResearchFellow, , The Norwegian Institute ofInternational Affairs, Oslo, Norway

Lt.-Gen. (ret.) Talat Masood, Indepen-dent Columnist, Commentator and Ana-lyst, Islamabad, Pakistan

Dr. Bill Miller, Diplomat/Historian,Woodrow Wilson International Centerfor Scholars, and Search for CommonGround, Washington, DC, USA

Mr. Niu Qiang, Secretary General, Chi-nese People’s Association for Peace andDisarmament (CPAPD), Beijing, China

Dr. Jose Mauro Esteves dos Santos, Gen-eral Secretary, Brazilian ArgentineAccounting and Control Agency(ABACC), Rio de Janeiro, Brazil

Mr. Husamuddin Gaber Sayed,Researcher, International Studies andDialogue of Civilizations Programme,Bahrain Centre for Studies and Research,Kingdom of Bahrain

Amb. Mohamed Shaker, Vice Chairman,Egyptian Council for Foreign Affairs(ECFA), Cairo; Chairman, Sawiris Foun-dation for Social Development; Chair-man, Regional Information TechnologyInstitute (RITI)

Mr. Jon Wolfsthal, Fellow, InternationalSecurity Program, Center for Strategicand International Studies, Washington,DC, USA; Professional Lecturer, George-town University

Dr. Bob van der Zwaan, Senior ScientificResearcher, Energy research Center of theNetherlands (ECN), Amsterdam, andHarvard University

I N T E R N A T I O N A L

S T U D E N T / Y O U N G P U G W A S H

Ms. Aleksandra Dzisiów, PhD student inIranian Sciences, and Participant in Post-graduate Studies of National Security atthe Academy of National Defence, War-saw, Poland

Mr. Juan Pablo Pardo-Guerra, Mexico,Chair of the Executive Board, Interna-tional Student/Young Pugwash; Postgrad-uate Student, Science Studies Unit, Uni-versity of Edinburgh, Scotland

Mr. Benjamin Rusek, Research Associate,Committee on International Security andArms Control (CISAC), National Acad-emy of Sciences, Washington, DC, USA;Member, Executive Board, InternationalStudent/Young Pugwash

P U G W A S H S T A F F

Claudia Vaughn, Program Coordinator,Pugwash Conferences, via della Lungara10, I-00165 Rome, Italy, Tel. (++39-06)687-2606, Fax: (++39-06) 687-8376,Mobile: (++39-333) 456-6661, E-mail:[email protected]



24th Workshop of the Study Group on Implementation of the Chemical and Biological Weapons Conventions:

Achieving a Successful Outcome of the Second CWC ReviewNoordwijk, The Netherlands, 13–14 May 2006

Report byKatie Smallwood

discussion summarised below underthe first two headings.

Preparations for the Second CWCReview Conference

The second CWC RevCon, which isscheduled for 2008, faces a numberof challenges:

Universality: So far 178 stateshave joined the Convention, but deci-sive pressure must be placed on thosestates that have not yet done so.

Industry verification: althoughthe industrial inspections carried outby the OPCW are advancing on rela-tively solid ground, a number ofissues are still unresolved:

• Currently, there are disproportion-ate numbers of inspections in cer-tain countries, but states partieshave yet to agree on an appropriateselection methodology.

• OPCW activities in general, andSchedule 2 sampling activities inparticular, must continue to receivehappy support from the chemicalindustry.

• A proposal for a 10% increase ininspections of Other Chemical Pro-duction Facilities (OCPF) has beenmade, but a balance between notover-burdening industry and main-taining the effectiveness of inspec-tions must be found. Consensusmust also be found with a numberof developing countries that opposethis initiative towards heavierOCPF inspection.

Developments in science and technol-ogy (S&T): the work of the OPCWmust remain sensitive to develop-ments in this area. The OPCW Direc-tor General has recently accepted aproposal from the Scientific AdvisoryBoard (SAB) for the establishment ofa new temporary working group on“advances in technology and theirpotential impact on the implementa-tion of the Convention”.

Functioning of the OPCW: theOPCW’s commitment to excellencemust be maintained and the practiceof adequate geographical representa-

This was the twelfth of the cur-rent Pugwash CBW work-shop series to be hosted by

Pugwash Netherlands. The Dutchministry of foreign affairs providedfinancial assistance for the meeting.

Attending the workshop were 20participants from 9 countries(Argentina, Germany, Iran, Italy, theNetherlands, Poland, Russia, the UKand the USA ), all by invitation andin their personal capacities. Thisreport is the sole responsibility of itsauthor, who was asked by the meet-ing to prepare a brief account of theproceedings in consultation with theSteering Committee. It does not nec-essarily reflect a consensus of theworkshop as a whole, nor of theStudy Group. As always, the work-shop was governed by the ‘ChathamHouse Rule’, so the speakers on par-ticular points are not identified here.

***The workshop opened with anauthoritative presentation onprogress in implementing the Chemi-cal Weapons Convention (CWC).This presentation focused on twotopics, preparations for the secondCWC Review Conference (hereafterCWC RevCon) and chemical weapondestruction, which then stimulated



tion must be enforced through theactions of the OPCW DirectorGeneral.

Tenure policy at the OPCW: thediscussion on tenure highlighted anumber of issues including the needto balance the retention of talent andexperience with a renewal of exper-tise. Additionally, whilst acknowledg-ing that the OPCW is not a careerorganisation, it was recognised thatscientists and engineers encounter anumber of difficulties when re-enter-ing industrial or research organiza-tions after time away.

External factors: such as the cur-rent crisis in the nuclear non-prolifer-ation regime and the dynamics of the“post-post-Cold War” era.

Chemical facility protection: theimplications of possible attacks onchemical plants have recently beengiven increased attention. This willhave implications for supply chainsand the bulk storage of chemicals.

The Destruction of ChemicalWeapons

There have been two important devel-opments concerning the destructionof chemical weapon stockpiles. First,Russia (with 2% of its stockpiledestroyed so far) has initiated destruc-tion operations at Kambarka and issoon to start at Maradikovsky. Russiahas also redesigned its destructionprogramme to enable it to meet theCWC’s 2012 deadline, but has statedthat international financial supportwill be essential. Secondly, the UnitedStates has recently announced it doesnot expect to meet its 2012 deadline.The United States has invested some$8 billion on seven destruction facili-ties with only two having completeddestruction activities thus far.

A number of important questionssurrounding the 2012 deadline

remain unanswered, notably hownon-compliance in these terms affectthe validity of future deadlines? Andhow non-compliance will beaddressed by the OPCW in 2012?

An option for the OPCW shouldthe 2012 deadline be missed is thatthe treaty’s non-compliance measuresbe explored. However, the emphasisshould be placed on re-instating com-pliance rather than finger-pointingand punishment. In this case, thenon-compliant state party should berequired to come back into compli-ance within a period of time.

The notion of intensified verifica-tion as a condition for an extensionof the destruction deadline was dis-cussed by the workshop, but it wasnoted that intensified verification ondestruction would remove vitalresources from industry inspections.

The workshop also heard a pre-sentation on global chemical weapondestruction. It was observed thatRussia probably began its destructionprocess too late and with too littlefinancial investment to meet the 2012deadline. In the United States a num-ber of technical glitches (for examplefires and the discovery of heavy metalcontamination) and political compli-

cations across states have slowed theprocess leading to the recentannouncement that the US too willnot meet the deadline (current predic-tions are for 2018 / 2019).

In other possessor states such asAlbania and Libya, the lack of inter-national funding is hindering thedestruction process. The lack ofpolitical will to complete chemicalweapon destruction was also identi-fied as a problem that must beaddressed, as well as the need to pro-mote discussion which would lead toa deeper understanding of the practi-cal problems of destruction.

***The workshop then moved into a dis-cussion of its main agenda topic – theSecond CWC Review. Preceding thiswas a short authoritative presenta-tion regarding preparations for theTenth Anniversary of the OPCW,which falls in April/May 2007.

The proceedings of the OPCW’sTenth Anniversary celebrations willbe an important staging post for theCWC RevCon in 2008. The eventswill promote participation from avariety of actors and will celebrateissues including the commitment to



multilateralism and the effectivenessof the OPCW, and will stress thechallenges the Organisation mustaddress. There will be events heldinternationally (such as in Brussels,Geneva, New York) and “academicevents” will cover topics such asawareness, implementation, multilat-eralism, developments in science andtechnology and the second CWCRevCon.

Weaknesses of the FirstCWC RevCon

With regard to the first CWCRevCon, held in 2003, the workshopparticipants felt the whole processwas started too late, which reflectedthe political situation at the time andthe change of OPCW Director Gen-eral. In addition, there was an insuffi-cient engagement of key stakeholders(industrial, scientific and academic)and the Conference proceedings werelargely driven by Hague-based dele-gations rather than capital-basedexperts.

For the Second CWC RevCon,preparations are being directed by anOpen-Ended Working Group for theSecond Review Conference (WGRC).The provisional structure for thisgroup is to have one delegation act-ing as Chair and four delegations asVice Chairs to avoid the group beingdominated by any one delegation.The Executive Council of the OPCW,during its impending 45th session, isdue to decide these issues. [Note: inthe event, EC-45 decided that the UKwould chair the WGRC, with Iran,Mexico, Russia and the Sudan asvice-chairs.] Importance was placedon the need to incorporate a widerrange of participants, such as thechemical industry, and facilitators tohelp resolve contentious areas.

Advances in Science andTechnology (S&T)

The paper addressing the topic oftechnical change was situated in thecontext of the cost-benefit balancethat in effect determines whethermember states remain inside theCWC. The presentation therebysought to identify the S&T topics itmight be essential for the SecondReview to address. For two of thesetopics, the presentation argued thatpolitical factors were likely to impedeadequate examination within thestructures of the OPCW and there-fore proposed that Pugwash itselfshould take on the task and make theresultant study reports available tothe OPCW member states and Tech-nical Secretariat. The topics identifiedwere (1) the challenges to the CWCinherent in novel disabling chemicals,including such attractions as thesechemicals present as counter-terroristweapons; and (2) how enhancedimplementation of the General Pur-pose Criterion could ensure thatnewly emergent toxicants are prop-erly controlled under the CWC. Thequestion for Pugwash to considerwas how its various resources,including the expertise of Study-Group members, might best bebrought to bear on the projectedstudies.

It was stated that the verificationtools used by the OPCW are runningbehind technological developments,and that it would be very difficult todetect the production of chemicalweapons; for this reason the focus ofthe CWC was on deterring produc-tion.

The structure, activities and trans-parency of the SAB were discussed:there is a need to balance the inde-pendence of the SAB against its isola-tion; balance its transparency against

it becoming a “recipe book” for ter-rorists; and a need for more funds tobe allocated for more frequent meet-ings that might lead to more innova-tive thinking.

It was also noted that, of the twomechanisms envisaged in the CWCfor altering its provisions, namely thefull-blown amendments procedureset out in art XV.1-3 and the changeprocedure of Art XV.4-5, the secondof the two could be used to accom-modate many forms of technicalchange; indeed this had alreadyoccurred in two cases: the storageand transport provisions for Saxi-toxin and destruction deadlines forstates ratifying the CWC after 1997.

Factors Outside the CWCFramework

The next presentation dealt withEuropean Union (EU) involvementwith chemical and biological non-proliferation activities. The EU hasincreased its presence in these areassince 2000 and has moved fromrhetoric to action through a numberof renewable Joint Action projects.The EU has funded the OPCW(2004) for universality and nationalimplementation, and the BWC(2005) through the Bioweapons Pre-vention Project (BWPP) thus settingan NGO precedent for the BWC.

However the EU’s Joint Actionprojects are not without their prob-lems; the decision-making procedureswithin the EU are slow, leading tolong-term rather than immediateplanning which is not efficient.

***The workshop then discussed thepreparations for the upcoming BWCRevCon later in 2006. The partici-pants of the workshop heard anaccount of the proceedings of the



Preparatory Committee for the BWCSixth RevCon, and concluded thatthey had been successful.

The Preparatory Committeeagreed that the Sixth BWC RevConwill take place over three weeks (20th

November – 8th December 2006), aprovisional agenda was adopted andthe Secretariat was requested to pro-vide six background papers, ratherthan four as in previous years. Thepositive outcomes from the Prepara-tory Committee benefited from thedetermination of the Chair for such aresult, but the success of the BWCRevCon will still rest on the willing-ness of states parties to negotiate.

Linkages Between Upcoming BWCand CWC Review Conferences

The next presentation identified anumber of short-term synergiesbetween the impending BWCRevCon and the CWC RevCon in2008 and highlighted precedent andareas of technological change thatpromote the long-term convergenceof the two treaties. For example, theemergence of chemical biology andother sciences combining chemistryand biology will provide the opportu-nity for convergence to be discussedin the context of the next twoRevCons. Furthermore, it was notedthat the taboo surrounding the twotypes of weapons is founded on thesame fear, that of disease. There wasadvocacy of the idea that the CWC,being the more rigorous treaty,should have some of its procedures,including verification, expanded intothe overlap between the two treaties.

Practical questions to be askedare: can the OPCW be helpful to theBWC? Would this have member statesupport considering that a number ofCWC member states are not party tothe BWC?

Successful Outcomes for the SixthBWC Review Conference

A paper was presented on the mea-sures of success for the approachingBWC RevCon. The conferenceshould reaffirm the validity of thetreaty; should identify areas of agree-ment and issues to be discussed dur-ing the inter-sessional meetings; andshould provide an opportunity toachieve agreement on certain areassuch as universality and implementa-tion.

However the Conference mustnot be over ambitious, a pattern offailure must not be set after the col-lapse of the 2001 Protocol negotia-tions, the poor outcome of the fifthBWC RevCon and the failure of theNPT RevCon last year. The paperproposes an electronic information-sharing network to aid the implemen-tation of the BWC and calls for adeclaration to be issued at the Pug-wash Annual Conference in Cairo(November 2006) regarding theimplementation of the BWC, immedi-ately before the BWC RevCon.

The final paper addressed mea-sures required to ensure successfuloutcomes for the BWC RevCon. Dur-ing the discussion it was emphasisedthat the most important outcomeswould be:

• Final document – this should bedrafted to be as consensual as pos-sible; a particularly contentiousarea could be the formation of anytype of support system for thetreaty’s implementation.

• Implementation plan – assistanceguidelines need to be established forcountries able to offer such assis-tance, this could be achievedthrough the electronic network out-lined above. The focus however

should be on the benefits of thetreaty i.e. the protection it affords.

• International cooperation on Confi-dence Building Measures (CBMs) –concrete measures to bring thesetogether must not be delayed bylong debates over principles andwording.

Future Work

The meeting concluded with remarkson the high quality of the discussionsduring the workshop despite thereduced number of participants andlate organisation. There was alsoattention to the aforementioned Pug-wash Annual Conference in Cairo. Itwas proposed that the next work-shop of the ‘Study Group on theImplementation of the Chemical andBiological Weapons Conventions’should take place at the time of theSixth BWC Review Conference inNovember 2006.

Papers presented

Serguei Batsanov: On the way to theSecond CWC Review Conference.

Serguei Batsanov: Sixth BWC ReviewConference – The Measure of Suc-cess.

Daniel Feakes: Recent EU Action onCBW Proliferation.

Graham S. Pearson and Nicholas A.Sims: Successful Outcomes for theBTWC Sixth Review Conference.

J P. Perry Robinson: AccommodatingTechnical Change: A Challenge forthe Second CWC Review.

Nicholas A. Sims: Linkages betweenthe BWC Sixth Review Conferenceand the CWC Second Review Con-ference.

Paul Walker: Update on ChemicalWeapons Destruction Globally.



Mr. Alessandro Argentini (Italy), ChiefExaminer, European Patent Office,Rijswijk, The Netherlands

Amb. Sergey Batsanov, Director, GenevaOffice of International Pugwash; Mem-ber, Pugwash CBW Steering Committee;Senior Consultant, Geneva Centre for theDemocratic Control of Armed Forces(DCAF)

Mr. Daniel Feakes (UK), Research Fellow,Harvard Sussex Program SPRU-Science& Technology Policy Research, The Free-man Centre, University of Sussex,Brighton, UK

Mr. Richard Guthrie (UK), ProjectLeader, CBW Project,. Stockholm Inter-national Peace Research Institute (SIPRI),Solna, Sweden

Mr. Peter Ito, Deputy Permanent Reprpe-sentative, US Delegation to the OPCW,The Hague, The Netherlands

Mr. Peter Kaiser (Germany), Head,Media & Public Affairs, External Rela-tions Branch, OPCW, The Hague, TheNetherlands

Mr. Ian Kenyon, Visiting Research Fel-low, SPRU-Science & Technology PolicyResearch, University of Sussex, Brighton,UK; Visiting Senior Research Fellow,Mountbatten Centre for InternationalStudies, University of Southampton,Highfield, Southampton, UK

Amb. Maarten Lak, Dutch PermanentRepresentative to the OPCW, The Hague

Mr. Arend Meerburg, retired; Advisor tothe Security Policy Department, Ministryof Foreign Affairs, The Netherlands;Member, Pugwash Netherlands; Member,Informal Expert Group on Global Secu-rity Matters

Konstantin Mikhalkin, Second Secretary,Permanent Mission of the Russian Feder-ation to the Organisation for the Prohibi-tion of Chemical Weapons (OPCW), TheHague, The Netherlands

Mr. Krzysztof Paturej, Director of SpecialProjects, OPCW, The Hague, The Nether-lands

Amb. Rogelio Pfirter, Director-General ofthe Technical Secretariat of the OPCW,The Hague, The Netherlands

Prof. Julian Perry Robinson, SussexDirector, Harvard-Sussex Program, Sci-ence & Technology Policy Research(SPRU), University of Sussex, Brighton,UK; Member, Pugwash CBW SteeringCommittee

Mr. Nicholas Sims, Reader in Interna-tional Relations, London School of Eco-nomics and Political Science (LSE), Uni-versity of London, London, UK

Miss Katie Smallwood, Research Student,Harvard Sussex Program SPRU-Science& Technology Policy Research, Univer-sity of Sussex, Brighton, UK

Mr. Victor Smirnovsky, Counsellor, Per-manent Mission of the Russian Federa-tion to the Organisation for the Prohibi-tion of Chemical Weapons (OPCW), TheHague, The Netherlands

Dr. Paul Walker, Legacy Program Direc-tor, Global Green USA (the US affiliate ofGreen Cross International, Mikhail Gor-bachev, Chairman), Washington, DC,USA

Amb. Bozorgmehr Ziaran, Delegation ofthe Islamic Republic of Iran to theOPCW, The Hague, The Netherlands, E-mail: [email protected]

P U G W A S H S T A F F :

Claudia Vaughn, Pugwash Conferences,Accademia Nazionale dei Lincei, via dellaLungara 227, I-00165 Rome, Italy, Tel.(++39-06) 6872 606, Fax: (++39-06)6878 376, Mobile: (++39-333) 456 6661,E-mail: [email protected]

Mrs. Jacqueline Topakian, Assistant toSergey Batsanov, Geneva Pugwash Office

Participants



Pugwash Workshop on Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Disarmament—The Role of Europe

Amsterdam, The Netherlands, 7–8 June 2006

Report by Bob van der Zwaan

energy and the NPT, (II) the presentsituation in the Middle East and par-ticularly Iran, and (III) the nuclearpolicy of NATO and nuclearweapons in Europe as well as its rolein advancing the nuclear non-prolif-eration and disarmament agenda. Ina fourth session open to the press anensemble of subjects were assessedrelated to the Iranian impasse andNPT compliance issues.

Introduction

The global nuclear non-proliferationand disarmament effort is experienc-ing one of its deepest crises to date.Despite intense IAEA inspections ofIranian nuclear facilities over the pastfew years and elaborate Europeandiplomacy to convince the authoritiesin Teheran to temporarily suspend itsuranium enrichment activities, impor-tant questions regarding its enrich-ment program remain. The interna-

tional community cannot exclude thepossibility that Iran is graduallyworking towards the expansion of itscivil nuclear activities to the develop-ment of nuclear weapons. Continuingsix-party talks have so far not suc-ceeded in persuading the regime inNorth Korea that it is in the benefit ofthe People’s Republic to dismantle itsmilitary nuclear complex. Othernuclear proliferation concerns in espe-cially the Middle East and South Asiaadd to the continuous nuclear threatthe world faces today. While it is uni-versally recognized that achieving fullimplementation of the 13 practicalsteps agreed upon at the 2000 NPTReview Conference is essential, virtu-ally no progress has been bookedsince then nor at the 2005 NPTReview Conference. Ten years after itsopening for signature, the CTBT hasstill not entered into force and negoti-ations on an FMCT are at a limbo,such that the future of both thesetreaties remains highly uncertain.

Also in the nuclear disarmamentprocess progress has recently beenpractically absent. Over the past years,the US has shifted from its policy inwhich nuclear weapons were regardedas weapons of last resort to one inwhich it may use nuclear weapons forpreemptive purposes. The likely devel-opment of a new generation of Ameri-can nuclear weapons constitutes amenace to the non-proliferationregime. Strategic nuclear arms agree-ments between the Russian Federation

The International PugwashConferences on Science andWorld Affairs and the Dutch

Pugwash Group co-organized, withfinancial support from the Nether-lands Ministries of Foreign Affairsand Defense, a two-day workshop onthe general status and specific prob-lems of the nuclear non-proliferationand disarmament regime, with a par-ticular focus on the role of Europe inmitigating the current crisis. Themeeting was held on 7 and 8 June2006 in the Royal Netherlands Acad-emy of Arts and Sciences (KNAW,Trippenhuis) in Amsterdam, gather-ing 25 participants from 10 differentcountries. Three sessions were dedi-cated to, respectively, (I) theprospects and challenges of nuclear

Amsterdam workshop participants.


and the US are at a standstill andreduced warheads and their deliverysystems are not dismantled irreversiblyin a transparent and verifiable manner,while remaining deployed Russian andUS nuclear weapons systems are keptat high-alert operational status. Theother official and de facto nuclearweapons states have no intention toreduce their nuclear arsenals, the 480American nuclear gravity bombsdeployed under NATO auspices infive European states are not subjectedto plans for reduction or elimination,and the reduction of American andRussian tactical nuclear weaponsremains excluded from any currentdisarmament negotiations. Theprocess of improving worldwide theaccounting and control of fissile mate-rials remains largely insufficient.Given the present situation, thenuclear non-proliferation and disar-mament regime is urgently in need of aserious examination.

Prospects and challenges ofnuclear energy and the NPT

While the future of nuclear powerremains strongly affected by its fiveproblematic features (waste, safety,proliferation, economics, and accep-tance) there are at least three socio-economic and/or environmental con-cerns that it could contribute toalleviate (climate change, air pollu-tion, energy security). The increasingattention to these concerns explainsthe current renewed interest in thecivil use of nuclear energy for powerproduction. The coming decades theinstalled nuclear capacity in Europe isunlikely to change significantly, whilethe relative benefits and drawbacks ofnuclear power, as well as sustainabil-ity arguments related to all energyresources, will determine its prospectsfor the longer run. World-wide, until

2050, the contribution of nuclearenergy to electricity generation islikely to remain between a lowerbound of constant capacity (i.e. inabsolute terms) and an upper boundof constant share (i.e. in relativeterms). Given the intimacy betweenthe civil, military, and terrorist appli-cations of nuclear technology andmaterials, there will be even more rea-son than exists today for all countriesto fulfill their NPT obligations, on theone hand, and engage in a graduallymore stringent nuclear control systemof fissile and radioactive materials, onthe other hand. It has to be urgentlyanalyzed to what extent a possiblerevival of the peaceful use of nuclearenergy and the associated construc-tion of new nuclear power plants canbe reconciled with the increasing wor-ries world-wide over the proliferationand terrorist risks involved with themultiple stages (front-end and back-end) of the nuclear fuel cycle. Tech-nology can play an important role inreducing the inherent and dynamicrisks of nuclear energy, but techniquessuch as lifetime reduction and trans-mutation of radioactive waste andproliferation-risk reducing reactorswith passive safety features can onlybe part of the solution. The establish-ment of institutions and the buildingof trust are essential elements inadvancing the nuclear non-prolifera-tion and disarmament agenda, whileallowing the peaceful use of nuclearenergy. Internationally a consensus isgrowing that a full internationaliza-tion of the nuclear fuel cycle is desir-able, including e.g. InternationallyMonitored Waste Repositories(IMWR), international fuel banks,multi-nation enrichment plants andreprocessing facilities, in order toguarantee the civil use only of nucleartechnologies and materials.

During the Cold War, globalnuclear relations rested on two mutu-ally supportive arrangements: theelaborate structure of nuclear deter-rence and the non-proliferationregime. A rough equality of militarypower was measured in terms ofassured mutual destruction, while anuneven distribution of militarynuclear capabilities assured a rankordering among nuclear weaponpowers. This balance of terror cre-ated a semblance of order, based pri-marily on the unprecedented com-mon interest of all states in avoidinga nuclear holocaust. Thanks to theNPT, nuclear weapon and non-nuclear weapon states found a com-mon ground in averting the spread ofnuclear weapons with all undertakingrespective obligations. During thepast 15 years, this nuclear weaponscontrol regime of which the NPT stillconstitutes the cornerstone, has beentested as never before, and has gonethrough at least three major crises(involving, respectively, Iraq, Iran,and North Korea) none of whichhave been satisfactorily solved. Whilesome modestly positive developmentstook place – as it was decided, forexample, in 1995 to extend the NPTindefinitely – the challenges ahead tomaintain and strengthen the NPT arelarge and multiple, relating to issuesof consistency, commitment, jurisdic-tion, inspection, and enforcement.Among the long list of challenges fig-ures also the evidence that the UStoday no longer sees nuclear armscontrol as an essential part of itsnuclear policy and is instigating sub-stantial changes in the nuclear non-proliferation regime, as exemplifiedby the recent nuclear deal betweenthe US and India. Considerableunease also exists about combiningthe campaign against terrorism with




preventive or preemptive counter-proliferation. With possibilities of anuclear response to chemical or bio-logical attack, a danger exists of aneven further potential use of nuclearweapons. Nuclear war has beenavoided so far because of the tabooagainst the military use of nuclearweapons during the nuclear era. Anysuch use in the future, accidental ordeliberate, could destroy whateverremains of that taboo.

The Middle East and Iran

Even while a new package of incen-tives to solve the controversy overIran’s nuclear program has just beenproposed by the US, Europe, China,and Russia, there is not yet an appar-ent concrete settlement of the disputein view. Article IV of the NPT as wellas its negotiating history clearly indi-cate that uranium enrichment is notbanned from any nuclear program aslong as it is for peaceful purposesonly. Hence, eventually the West willneed to acquiesce in Iran’s right toenrich uranium according to the NPT,but this should not relieve it from aconstant and thorough investigationof its current nuclear activities as wellas of the period preceding 2003 whenadvanced Iranian uranium enrich-ment activities were revealed. Whileover the past few years the IAEA hasundertaken more extensive inspec-tions in Iran than it has probably everdone before regarding any othernuclear program, it has evidently notyet done so to full satisfaction. TheIAEA should therefore be given theopportunity to continue far-reachinginspections, but insisting that Iranshould stop or suspend enrichmentindefinitely does not facilitate its taskin its safeguards activities to renderthe Iranian nuclear program moretransparent. Insistence on suspension

could delay if not hamper the ratifica-tion by Iran of the Additional Proto-col. While it may be good as trust-building measure to temporarilysuspend its enrichment technologydevelopment, in the longer run Irancannot be denied the operation ofdomestic enrichment facilities. A solu-tion could be to create requirements,in the case of Iran as elsewhere, thatany future uranium enrichment activi-ties may only take place in the contextof international consortia, e.g. similarto the existing ones of URENCO andABACC.

The initiative by the five nuclearweapons states and Germany to pro-pose a package with a number ofincentives in exchange for Iranaccepting to temporarily renounce itsenrichment program could be adevelopment on the right track. Itwould allow building confidence,while it would not preclude recogniz-ing Iran’s inalienable right to eventu-ally possess the full nuclear full cycleas long as it is employed for peacefulpurposes only. Especially an offerthat would include European supportfor a NWFZ in the Middle East and aregional forum to discuss and reachregional security arrangements isinteresting. The Iranian nuclear filecannot be discussed in isolation ofthe region’s political environment,security requirements, and threat per-ceptions. Indeed, the Iranian prolifer-ation crisis can only be handled in thelarger regional context, and shouldinclude the Arab perspective that hasso far not been given due attention.In order to understand the reasonsbehind nuclear proliferation in theMiddle East, one needs to examinethe overall political and securitylandscape in the region with its com-plex dilemmas of conflicts and threatperceptions, including a variety of

topics like the international non-pro-liferation situation and the NPT, theIsraeli nuclear arsenal, the interests ofexternal powers, and the position ofArab states regarding these issues.The Middle East problematique can-not be solved without addressing theIsraeli nuclear-weapon capabilitiesand the need to bring Israel into alevel playing field system that allowsit to adhere to the NPT and supportthe establishment of a zone free ofweapons of mass destruction.

NATO and the role of Europe

Clear ambiguity exists in the NATOdefense doctrine, since 23 of the 26NATO member countries are definedas being ‘non-nuclear-weapon states’that simultaneously belong to analliance that regards nuclear deter-rence as a key part of its military doc-trine, while NATO condemns theadoption of a nuclear deterrent byany other state. This contradictionhas long exerted a negative influenceover attempts by the internationalcommunity to take serious stepstowards global nuclear non-prolifera-tion and disarmament. With no realprogress in nuclear disarmament inRussia and the US, and in the absenceof a popular mass movement againstnuclear weapons, pressure fromwithin NATO may persuade theAlliance’s three nuclear-weaponstates that the international controland reduction of nuclear arms is notonly a viable option but is also morerational than attempts to impose uni-laterally non-proliferation policies onother countries. In addition to NATOnuclear weapon states France and theUnited Kingdom, especially countrieslike Belgium, Germany, Italy, and theNetherlands – that all four haveAmerican nuclear weapons on theirsoil – could become more vocal in



favor of nuclear reform: their jointcall for concrete nuclear weaponsreduction may provide the bestopportunity to advance the nuclearnon-proliferation and disarmamentagenda and thereby counter arenewal of the nuclear arms race insome parts of the world.

Since the European Counciladopted in 2003 two key documentsdescribing its major security strate-gies – the European Security Strategy(ESS) and the associated EU StrategyAgainst Proliferation of Weapons ofMass Destruction (referred to as theNon-Proliferation Strategy, NPS) –the European non-proliferation strat-egy has gained in coherence, but onlyconditionally in effectiveness. In deal-ing with the so far most difficult testcases, the NPT and Iran, the EU hasmaintained unity, and widely oppos-ing views within the Union, like inthe run-up to the Iraq conflict, couldbe avoided. Under the surface, how-ever, internal differences remain, andnotably on nuclear disarmament theapproaches of different Europeanstates vary substantially. The largestobstacle for a stronger Europeanengagement for a WMD-free worldremains the contradiction betweenthe “peace power” Europe as awhole and the policy of the nuclearpowers France and the United King-dom in particular. A discussion onthe need of nuclear weapons forEuropean security is overdue. Such adiscussion would not only need toaddress the nuclear doctrines ofFrance and the UK, but also the pur-pose of the approximately 480 USnuclear weapons still deployed in fiveEuropean states in the framework ofNATO.

With the difficult but steady devel-opment towards an increasingly bind-ing Union between European states,

the EU may well get into a positionenabling it to launch a European ini-tiative: using the British and Frenchnuclear arsenals as a bargaining chipto help the NPT out of its current cri-sis. Such an initiative could, for exam-ple, relate nuclear weapons reductionsin France and the United Kingdom toreductions in the third Europeannuclear weapon state, the RussianFederation, as well as the US. Animportant question remains how USand Russian tactical nuclear weaponscan be included in future nuclear dis-armament negotiations. Like in thecontext of NATO, also in the inte-grating European policy frameworkthe four EU non-nuclear weaponstates on whose territory US tacticalnuclear weapons are deployed underNATO auspices could influence thenegotiating process. The fact thattoday most of the European states stillregard their security under a nuclearprotective screen as better guaranteedthan without nuclear weapons weak-ens the credibility of Europeandemands for nuclear abstinence ofother states like Iran. One of the fun-damental reasons that the NPT isundergoing one of its biggest crises todate, is the fact that article VI onnuclear disarmament has not beenobeyed sufficiently by the nuclear-weapon states party to the NPT.Europe could contribute to resolvingthis crisis by reconsidering the neces-sity of the presence of nuclearweapons in both European nuclearand non-nuclear weapon states on theone hand, and by continuing its diplo-matic role as negotiator in interna-tional disputes and conflict situationson the other hand.

Concluding remarks

The current regime designed to pre-vent the proliferation of nuclear

weapons is in a crisis and the nucleardisarmament process has stagnated.Since the development and use of thefirst nuclear fission bombs over sixdecades ago, the global nuclear threatremains un-mitigated. This threat hasrecently even intensified, and thenuclear non-proliferation processtoday probably faces its greatest chal-lenge since the end of the Cold War.Most apparent at present are thenuclear impasses related to Iran andNorth Korea, but other proliferationintricacies, in especially the MiddleEast and South Asia, add to theworld’s nuclear concerns.

The participants of this work-shop, key experts from around theworld in the many aspects of thenuclear non-proliferation conun-drum, discussed the general statusand present problems of the globalnuclear non-proliferation and disar-mament process. The workshop con-stituted an independent forum forauthoritative scientists and policymakers assessing and bringing for-ward solutions to the current crisis,as well as providing suggestions foradapting the current political andlegal nuclear regime. In particular,the workshop has investigated whatthe role of European policies could beto advance the non-proliferation anddisarmament agenda. Lessons havebeen brought forward regarding howthe currently most pertinent nuclearproliferation problems could be miti-gated, among which the case of Iran,and to what extent European initia-tives can be undertaken embedded inthe broader ongoing process ofnuclear non-proliferation and disar-mament. This process, both desirableand feasible, should and could ulti-mately lead towards the universalelimination and abolition of nuclearweapons.



Prof. Wa’el N. Al-Assad, Head of the Dis-armament Department, The ArabLeague, Cairo

Mr. Ranieri Argentini (Italy), PhD studentin computational physics & chemistry,van’t Hoff Institute for Molecular Sci-ence, University of Amsterdam, TheNetherlands

Amb. Sergey Batsanov, Director, GenevaOffice of International Pugwash; Mem-ber, Pugwash CBW Steering Committee;Senior Consultant, Geneva Centre for theDemocratic Control of Armed Forces(DCAF)

Dr. Jeffrey Boutwell, Executive Director,Pugwash Conferences on Science andWorld Affairs, Washington, DC, USA;Member, Pugwash Executive Committee

Prof. Francesco Calogero, Member, Pug-wash Council; Professor of TheoreticalPhysics, University of Rome “LaSapienza”, Rome, Italy

Prof. Paolo Cotta-Ramusino, Secretary-General, Pugwash Conferences on Sci-ence and World Affairs; Member, Pug-wash Executive Committee; Professor ofMathematical Physics, University ofMilan, Italy; Director, Program on Disar-mament and International Security, Lan-dau Network – Centro Volta, Como,Italy

Dr. Eric T. Ferguson, Secretary of Pug-wash Netherlands; Consultant on Energyand Development, MacFergus bv, Zeist,Netherlands

Prof. Georg Frerks, Professor of ConflictPrevention and Conflict Management,Centre for Conflict Studies, Utrecht Uni-versity, The Netherlands; Professor ofDisaster Studies, Wageningen University;Chairman, Pugwash Nederland

Mr. Jörn Harry, Independent Adviser,Nuclear Safeguards and Non-Prolifera-tion, Scheveningen, The Netherlands;Honorary Member of the European Safe-guards Research and Development Asso-ciation (ESARDA); Fellow of the Institute

of Nuclear Material Management(INMM)

Dr. Berma Klein Goldewijk, Director,Cedar International, Center for Dignityand Rights, The Hague, The Netherlands

Dr. Johan van Klinken, formerlyResearcher in Nuclear Physics, TheNetherlands

Dr. Karel Koster, Coordinator, Nether-lands Support Campaign Mayors forPeace, Project on European Nuclear Non-Proliferation/Netherlands; Executive,Middle Powers Initiative; EuropeanCoordinator, Parliamentarians Networkfor Nuclear Disarmament; AdvisoryCommittee, IPPNW/Netherlands

Prof. Saideh Lotfian, Associate Professorof Political Science, and Associate Deanfor Research, Faculty of Law and Politi-cal Science, University of Tehran, Iran

Arend Meerburg, retired; Advisor to theSecurity Policy Department, Ministry ofForeign Affairs, The Netherlands; Mem-ber, Pugwash Netherlands; Member,Informal Expert Group on Global Secu-rity Matters

Dr. Steven Miller, Director, InternationalSecurity Program, Center for Science &International Affairs (CSIA), HarvardUniversity, Cambridge, Massachusetts,USA; Editor-in-Chief, International Secu-rity; Member, Pugwash Council; Co-Chair, U.S. Pugwash Group

Dr. Götz Neuneck, Physicist, and Mem-ber, Pugwash Council; Project Leader,“Interdisciplinary Research Group Disar-mament, Arms Control and New Tech-nologies”, Institute for Peace Researchand Security Policy (IFSH), Hamburg,Germany; Member, Council of the Ger-man Physical Society (DPG) and Chair-man of their Working Group “Physicsand Disarmament” in the DeutschePhysikalische Gesselschaft

Dr Arthur Petersen, Senior Policy Analystand Director, Methodology & ModelingProgram, Netherlands EnvironmentalAssessment Agency (MNP), Bilthoven,

The Netherlands; Treasurer, InternationalStudent/Young Pugwash; Treasurer, Pug-wash Netherlands

Drs. Maaike Reijlink, MA, Senior PolicyAdvisor, Principal Department of GeneralPolicy Affairs, Ministry of Defence, TheNetherlands

Amb. Mohamed Shaker, Vice Chairman,Egyptian Council for Foreign Affairs(ECFA), Cairo; Chairman, Sawiris Foun-dation for Social Development; Chair-man, Regional Information TechnologyInstitute (RITI)

Dr. Bart van der Sijde, Member, Nether-lands Pugwash Group; Adviser, PeaceCenter, Eindhoven University of Technol-ogy, and Editor of the Peace Center’sjournal

Mr. Ted Whiteside, Head, WMD Centre,NATO HQ, Defence Policy and PlanningDivision, Brussels, Belgium

Amb. Paul Wilke, Ministry of ForeignAffairs, The Netherlands

Amb. Bozorgmehr Ziaran, Delegation ofthe Islamic Republic of Iran to theOPCW, The Hague, The Netherlands

Dr. Bob van der Zwaan, Senior ScientificResearcher, Energy Research Center ofthe Netherlands (ECN), Amsterdam

P U G W A S H S T A F F

Claudia Vaughn, Program Coordinator,Pugwash Conferences, via della Lungara10, I-00165 Rome, Italy, Tel. (++39-06)687-2606, Fax: (++39-06) 687-8376,Mobile: (++39-333) 456-6661, E-mail:[email protected]

Participants


S P E C I A L S E C T I O N

Papers from the Pugwash Study Group:Threats without enemies: the security aspects of HIV/AIDS

Marie Muller and Gwyn Prins

This was approved in 2003. Lookingback, we realise that we knew verylittle at the time about the epidemicand about its security aspects. Someof us—the small group that forms thecore of the study group – had someexpertise on aspects relating to theissue and some background in fieldsrelevant to the problem. Two mem-bers of the group come from a med-ical/hard sciences background withthorough grounding in biochemistryand physiology—and had some verygood contacts in the virology field.Other members, had some back-ground and expertise in the securityfield. We knew without a doubt thatthe issue required an interdisciplinaryapproach and that we could providethat between us.

We decided to start with a verysmall workshop, held in the holidaycottages belonging to our parents.With no funding in place yet, wewere prepared to foot the food andincidentals bill personally. Partici-pants were warned that they mighthave to pay for travel themselves iffunding did not come through. Fortu-nately, funding came through shortlybefore the workshop. But we did runthe workshop on a shoestring, wemade beds and cooked and partici-pants helped with the dishes. Theirony is that we were later accused bythe journalist, Rian Malan, whoaccepted the invitation to attend, buton the day and without apology, did

not arrive, of squandering money aspart of an “AIDS Industry”.

The first workshop, held in Feb-ruary 2004 at Betty’s Bay, Cape, wasattended by nine persons and wasdesigned to be exploratory. BothSouth Africans and experts fromabroad came and included were someof the foremost experts. The discus-sion was extremely worthwhile andthe way forward became muchclearer to us, the core group.

The second workshop took placein June of the same year at MabulaLodge, Limpopo (near thePretoria/Gauteng area). Seventeenpersons attended, again includingboth South Africans and colleaguesfrom abroad. However, the venuewas chosen specifically because itwould be easier for a number of per-sons from the Gauteng area toattend. The workshop was intendedto focus much more specifically onthe security aspects, including themilitary angle, but also to highlightthe micro-nutritional aspect of com-bating the epidemic. It also furtherexplored the possibilities of model-ling and statistical issues.

The third workshop in the StudyGroup “Threats without enemies”Series took place in April 2005 inGordon’s Bay, east of Cape Town. Bythis time the core group was con-vinced that it was important to con-vey lessons to, but also to learn fromothers in the so-called “second wave”

HIV/AIDS represents a cate-gory of new challenges toHuman Security that may

be grouped under the heading ofthreats without enemies. There is noquestion that it is a threat to humansecurity. It is a security threat asdestabilising as any war; it has enor-mous social, economic and politicalimplications and has been recognisedas a security threat by the SecurityCouncil of the United Nations interms of Resolution 1308 of 2000.

Southern Africa is the hardest hitby the epidemic; South Africa, notthe hardest, but very hard. In SouthAfrica the life expectancy has gonedown from sixty to forty-seven in justa decade. It has also been said thatthe epidemic has become the mostpoliticised issue in present-day SouthAfrica. Apart from the enormoussocial, economic and political conse-quences, the HIV/AIDS epidemic willhave a range of security consequencesfor South Africa, some of which inthe “new” human security meaningof the word and others in the “oldfashioned” sense of the term.

As a result of the seriousness ofthe HIV/AIDS epidemic for Southand Southern Africa, but also itsgrowing impact elsewhere, in the so-called second wave countries,1 theSouth African Pugwash Grouprequested the Pugwash Council that astudy group be established to dealwith this “threat without enemy”.


Special Section: Papers from the Study Group on HIV/AIDS

(left to right) Marie Muller, Alan Whiteside, Hussein Solomon, Lorraine Dodd, Gus Stewart, Gwyn Prins, Mary Crewe, and Lindy Heinecken atBetty’s Bay workshop, February 2004 PHOTO BY NOLA DIPPENAAR

countries, such as India. The group oftwenty-three included two colleaguesfrom that country and afforded anopportunity to begin to think com-paratively. The workshop also fur-ther explored the modelling angleand heard interesting research find-ings pertaining to vectoring patterns.

The next workshop, in September2005, was a joint undertaking by thecore group—composed mainly butnot exclusively of Pugwash SouthAfrican members – and members ofthe Pugwash group that had beenconvening workshops on Science andEthics. In this workshop, held in Cor-sica, the focus would be specificallyon the moral-ethical aspects relatingto the epidemic and responses to it.The perspective was further broad-ened by the inclusion of personsworking in the field of HIV/AIDS inthe Arab world.

The fifth and final workshop inthe current series took place in Chen-nai, India in April 2006. It was

organised by the President of Pug-wash, Professor Swaminathan, in co-operation with the core group. Theworkshop afforded excellent oppor-tunity to exchange experiences andexpertise between the mainly SouthAfrican core group and their Indiancolleagues, but the invitation of oth-ers including other Africans (fromUganda and Kenya) broadened theperspective even further.

By the end of the series, the StudyGroup believed that it had reallymuch deepened and broadened itsunderstanding of the issue. A numberof by-products had also resulted fromthe process and some meaningfulcontacts, networks and researcharrangements had come out of theworkshops. At the annual Pugwashconferences that took place in thecourse of the series, Working Group6 gave opportunity to the StudyGroup to report on progress and tointeract with other Pugwashites.Some local, small seminars had also

been held by the South AfricanGroup to further disseminate results.

What is contained here are someof the most pertinent of contributionsmade at these workshops. It is hopedthat their publication here will con-tribute to filling some gaps in knowl-edge and understanding of the epi-demic, will lead to some new ways ofthinking about the problem and tothe better management of it globally.

In closing, the Study Group andthe Pugwash Conferences would liketo express their thanks to StephenHeintz, Nancy Muirhead andPriscilla Lewis of the RockefellerBrothers Fund in New York for theirsupport of our efforts.

NOTE1 These are north-eastern and west

Africa, Russia and surrounding coun-tries en especially India and China. Thefirst wave of large scale infections wasover central and southern Africa.

2 Special thanks to Celeste LeRoux,Pugwash research assistant, for addi-tional editing of these papers.


AIDS Management and Supportand JHB Hospital HIV Clinic

Despite the severity and magnitude ofthe HIV epidemic, one of the mostoutstanding and in my opinion mostcritical features of the epidemic is itssilence and invisibility. This invisibil-ity is one of the most unique andintractable aspects of the epidemicand which ultimately mitigatesagainst its control and management.Factors promoting this phenomenoninclude the following:

• Most people are unaware that theyhave HIV and have not been tested

• Those who know of their HIV posi-tive status still choose to keep thisfact a secret from their partners,family members, friends and fromthe society at large

• The diseases resulting fromHIV/AIDS can masquerade as com-mon everyday conditions such asskin rashes, pneumonia, diarrhoea,weight loss TB etc

• With severe illness or incapacity ordeath the reasons are often relatedto the above non-specific diseaseentities (TB, pneumonia etc)

• In many situations it is illegal todivulge someone else’s HIV statuswithout their permission

• Health care personnel are not per-mitted to divulge an HIV diagnosiswithout the person’s permission.

There are many good and badreasons why the above occur, e.g.stigma, fear, denial, ignorance, thenature of the disease and its sympto-

matology etc. However, ‘national col-lective denial’, misinformation anddisinformation, scandal , myth andmisconception, inappropriate use ofpublic media and political interfer-ence (all of these features exemplifiedin South Africa) all contribute signifi-cantly to keeping this disease awayfrom the public eye and in turn prop-agate its spread.

Not only is there a ‘silence’around the disease and the epidemicin general, but there is often, in manycountries especially in the higherprevalence ones, a deficiency in thedescription of the epidemic i.e. it’s epi-demiology – how the disease is dis-tributed, in whom and for what rea-son. The stigma and politicalovertures often promote a denial as towho are most vulnerable, who aremost affected and the reasons for this.

Lack of research into the sexual-ity or sexual practices of those mostaffected further promotes denial andmisconception.

In order to really deal with theHIV/AIDS and manage and control itappropriately, it is imperative that thedisease and the epidemic need to bemade more visible and tangible andthat we need to face up to its realities,‘warts and all’ and honestly face andadmit to it. By colluding with thesilence we are colluding with thevirus.

HIV is also a long term epidemic,maybe a 100-200 year or more phe-nomena, and changes in all aspects(the spread of HIV, the social deter-minants of HIV infection, the impactof interventions, the impact of theepidemic itself) are ‘long wave’ eventsand we should not expect short termsuccess or evidence of impact. Eventhe changes in the epidemic or theperception of it, or in the societyresponse to it will often be somewhathidden and silent for a long time. Weneed decades rather than years intothe future to know and understandthis change and we should thereforenot jump to conclusions too soon ortoo early.

The paper presented illustratedvarious aspects of the South Africanepidemic highlighting various epi-demiological features.

Graph 1 below, highlights thedynamic of the epidemic by way of ahypothetical epidemic curve attempt-ing to follow the epidemic over a 25year period from its onset, initiallydeveloping an HIV epidemic curve,followed by an illness epidemic andthen the resulting mortality. It alsoshould be noted that the plateau ofthe HIV curve is partly due to theincreasing mortality and should notbe regarded as a control of the epi-demic until the HIV epidemic curvereduces systematically and persis-tently over time.

Graph 2 below presents data col-

Some important and significant epidemiologicalfeatures and risk determinants of the HIV

epidemic in Southern Africa

Dr Clive Evian

Despite the severity and magnitude

of the HIV epidemic, one of the

most outstanding and most critical

features of the epidemic is its

silence and invisibility. . . .By

colluding with the silence we are

colluding with the virus.



lected by the Department of Healthon the HIV prevalence among preg-nant women attending public healthservices (generally a lower socio-eco-nomic sector of the society). The sur-veillance data collected since 1990shows a typical epidemic curve. Dataof this nature serve best as an indica-tor of epidemic trends rather than ofactual prevalence rates among thegeneral population, as ante-nataldata excludes men, non-pregnantwomen and age groups outside of thereproductive ages. In addition, ante-natal data in the teenage years maynot be typical of non-pregnantteenage girls.

Furthermore the trend curve pro-vided by this data suggests that theimpact of the epidemic is set to rise 3to 4 fold from the current impact i.e.the likely impact of the epidemic(deaths, serious illness, hospital bur-den, economic burden, etc) is reflec-tive of the epidemic size as it wasapproximately 10 years ago (as ittakes about 10 years from infectionto death). Since approximately 2005the epidemic has risen 3-4 fold, andtherefore the impact will rise thismagnitude given no substantialimpact of the ARV rollout.

Graph 3 below illustrates theprovincial variation in HIV preva-lence, and Graph 4 the age specificHIV prevalence in the ante-natal sur-vey highlighting the diverse nature ofHIV epidemics, and helps to illustratethe point that national epidemics arenot a homogenous or generaliseablephenomena, but rather a conglomer-ation of many micro-epidemics. HIVprevalence can change significantly indifferent provinces, cities and evensuburbs within cities.

The HIV epidemic is determinedby many non-biological influencessuch as social stability, population

Graph 11:

Graph 22:

Graph 33:



mobility and migration, genderequality and empowerment, educa-tion and literacy, economic empower-ment and poverty, substance use andabuse etc. Prevalence may also differsignificantly in different gender, age,race, groups etc.

In addressing the epidemic it isimportant to understand these influ-ences and determinants and to fur-ther ‘deconstruct’ these and then takeappropriate steps to counteract theseepidemiological forces

Graph 4 further illustrates thevery serious impact of HIV onteenage girls i.e. a 16% prevalenceand a severe rise in infection in thenext age group (20-24 yrs) toapproximately 31% i.e the 2000 15-19 year prevalence has almost dou-bled by 2004 in the next age cohort,highlighting the ‘malignant’ nature ofthe epidemic among young women.

Graph 5 illustrates a study doneby the Reproductive Health ResearchUnit (RHRU) and further highlights

the vulnerability of teenage girls andyoung women compared to boys andmen. The study reveals a commonfinding whereby teenage girls getinfected much more rapidly and theiroverall prevalence is much higherthan the boys in similar populationgroups. As HIV is generally a poorlytransmitted virus (see below), it istherefore clear that these girls mustbe acquiring HIV from older men,and in many situations these men areconsiderably older. Teenage girls andyoung female adults living in sociallydisadvantaged situations are highlyvulnerable to the sexual exploitationof older men (men who are alsosocially dislocated or displaced). Thissocial phenomena sets up high preva-lence levels in young women and thisin turn provides an artificial boost tothe epidemic (young adults beingmost sexually adventurous). Transac-tional sex may be one of the mostimportant determinants of highprevalent epidemic and moreresearch is needed in this context.

Men tend to get infected at a rela-tively older age compared to womeni.e. the peak prevalence in women isin the 25-29 year age band and inmen it tends to be in the 30-34 yearband. Graphs 6-106 below illustratethe following epidemiological fea-tures in South Africa

• HIV is invariably higher amongcontract employees compared topermanent employees. This vulner-ability is likely to be due to socialinstability and issues relating tomigrancy and possibly also to edu-cation and literacy levels. Contractemployees in South Africa in themain tend to be of a lower skilllevel and often include security,cleaners, canteen workers andunskilled and semi-skilled labour.

Graph 44:

Graph 55:



• HIV prevalence is higher amonglower income or skill groups andlower in the higher income groups.This linear relationship is well illus-trated in Graph X i.e. a prevalencestudy of over 6000 employeesacross 8 operations in a manufac-turing company

• Low income or contract womenemployees tend to be more vulnera-ble than their male counterparts

• Seasonal employees similar to con-tract employees are also highly vul-nerable suggesting that migrationand mobility are important deter-minants of risk

• Employees living in hostel accom-modation – often single sex hostelsin South Africa, are also likely to bemore vulnerable to HIV infection.

HIV is generally a poorly trans-mitted virus compared to otherpathogens. It is generally acceptedthat the risk of HIV transmission ona single sexual exposure to HIV isvery low i.e less than 1% and consid-erably less in most circumstances.The lack of such knowledge has bothpositive and negative implications.On the positive side, if people believeHIV is more infectious they are lesslikely to chance their luck. However,if most people believe HIV is veryinfectious (which most do indeedbelieve) then most people in highprevalent countries believe that theymust have acquired HIV. This stemsfrom the fact that in these circum-stances there must be a very highprevalence of multiple partner sexualactivity. As such the natural conclu-sion of most is that they probablyhave acquired HIV. Believing one hasHIV can be a very disempoweringprocess whereby one may not listento preventive messages or not believe

Graph 6:

Graph 7:

Graph 8:



there is any point in HIV prevention,and for many this is a belief in a‘hopeless life situation’ or a ‘deathsentence’. Avoidance of HIV testingfor fear of finding out the worst pre-vents many from having an HIV testand in fact finding out that they areactually HIV negative. This latterfinding would help promote moreresponsible sexual behaviour or inthe very least make people morereceptive to HIV prevention educa-tion and awareness. It is thereforecritical that individuals in groupssuch as workplaces, educational insti-tutions, schools, etc know the pre-vailing HIV prevalence and the

Graph 9:

Graph 10:

meaning of this prevalence in termsof their own risk.

The nature of the HIV virus andthe disease lends itself to myths andmisconception, unfounded claims oftreatment success or reasons why theprevalence is higher or lower in dif-ferent areas or communities or coun-tries. Sexually transmitted diseaseshave always been associated withstigma and or cultural myth or pun-ishment or ancestral spirits. HIV alsofinds a home in various religious atti-tudes and beliefs. Vested economic orcommercial interests also have theirimpact. Media portrayal also formscommunity perceptions and attitudes

and in South Africa the politicalinfluence has been very damagingand misleading. It is therefore imper-ative that the epidemiological fea-tures and aspects of this epidemic areclearly appreciated and understood.

Research in this context is imper-ative even if it means unravelling epi-demic determinants which are embar-rassing or unpopular or which pointto deep fault lines in the society.However, unless these determinantsare revealed, and placed in the publicdomain and debate, the epidemic islikely to rage on for many moredecades.

——————1 Hypothetical epidemic curve of the first

20-25 years of an HIV epidemic as typi-cally seen in a Southern African country

2 HIV prevalence among pregnantwomen attending public health servicesin South Africa 1990-2004. Depart-ment of Health South Africa 2004

3 HIV prevalence among pregnantwomen in South Africa – Provincialprevalence. Department of HealthSouth Africa 2004

4 HIV prevalence among pregnantwomen in South Africa – Age specificHIV prevalence 2000-2004. Depart-ment of Health South Africa 2004

5 National HIV and Sexual Behavior Sur-vey of 15-24 year old South AfricanYouth, Reproductive Health ResearchUnit, University of Witwatersrand 2003

6 HIV prevalence studies done in work-places in various corporations in South-ern Africa by Author (C. Evian 2000-2005)


Introduction

Since AIDS first appeared in thecountry in 1982 there have beennumerous good policy documentswritten by successive South Africangovernments—yet the epidemicshows little sign of abating. Thispaper demonstrates that successiveSouth African governments havedefined the policy problem in differ-ent ways: moving from a moralisticto a biomedical approach, the mostrecent public policy response hasbeen to (discursively at least) viewthe epidemic as a developmentaland human rights-based problem.

However, despite the drafting ofbroadly inclusive and well-conceptu-alised policies, the previous as well asthe current South African govern-ments suffer from a crisis of imple-mentation. This is the result of a fail-ure on the part of South Africangovernments to consistently and cor-rectly define the AIDS policy problemitself. This has resulted in a contestedpolicy environment, particularly interms of the appropriate policyresponses required. As a conse-quence, the initial close relationshipbetween the new South African gov-ernment and AIDS civil society hasbeen badly eroded. Civil society hasturned to a strategy of bypassing thenational government altogether, byappealing to the courts in an effort toensure the implementation of AIDSpolicies.

The paper concludes that, unlesspublic policy makers address thestructural drivers of the AIDS epi-

demic (race relations, sexual violenceand cultural factors), South Africanswill continue to suffer the ravages ofthe epidemic, nullifying some recentsuccesses of provinces and local gov-ernments in demonstrating some pol-icy implementation capacity.

A very political epidemic

According to the Joint UnitedNations Programme on HIV andAIDS (UNAIDS 2004), more than5.3 million South Africans were HIV-positive at the end of 2003; AIDS iskilling the population at a rate ofbetween 600 and 1,000 people eachday; the country will have aroundtwo million AIDS orphans by 2010;and between 1,400 and 2,000 addi-tional South Africans are becominginfected daily.

The sad irony is that AIDS waslate in arriving in South Africa. In1990 only 0.1 per cent of all SouthAfricans were HIV-positive; a mere10 years later this number had cata-pulted to 11.7 per cent, with almost25 per cent of all pregnant womentested for the HI virus at antenatalclinics having sero-converted(Dorrington & Johnson 2002:34).Clearly, the relative isolation result-ing from apartheid initially shieldedmany of us from the vectors of infec-tion, whilst at the same time insidi-ously creating a fertile breedingground for a future South Africanepidemic.

South Africans are living in an alltoo visible killing field. If UNAIDSstatistics are to be believed, we are

dying of AIDS at a rate equivalent ofmore than one 11 September 2001attack on South Africans every threedays, 365 days a year—and this num-ber is steadily increasing. Yet theSouth African government has notdeclared AIDS a national emergency,and (to take the analogy even further)for some years now President ThaboMbeki has been casting doubt on theexistence of the terrorist aeroplanesthemselves. More than a decade intothe democratic South African politi-cal dispensation, the government isstill prevaricating on the rollout ofanti-retroviral drugs (ARVs) to peo-ple living with the virus, despite courtaction on more than one occasionordering the state to provide thesedrugs as a basic human right tohealth.

Since AIDS first made its appear-ance in this country in 1982, SouthAfrica’s policy response to HIV andAIDS has been ineffectual, despite theformulation and ostensible introduc-tion of several public policy HIV andAIDS interventions by consecutivegovernments. Analysts are in agree-ment that national infection rates willonly stabilise after 2006—this willnot be on account of effective poli-cies, however, but rather as a conse-quence of the natural maturation ofthe epidemic. However, stabilisationdoes not mean that the impact ofHIV and AIDS in South Africa willdecrease: at the household level fami-lies will have to cope with the ongo-ing tragedy of losing loved ones,whilst the economy will continue tosuffer under the impact of the epi-demic. By this year (2006), in theabsence of effective treatment HIVand AIDS are expected to infect morethan 600,000 people every year inSouth Africa, and since these peopleare—in the absence of ARVs—sure to

The Political Management of the AIDS Epidemic in South Africa

Dr Pieter FourieDepartment of Politics & Governance, University of Johannesburg



die within a few years, the imperativeto effectively implement an appropri-ate public programmatic response isclear.

Some commentators have claimedthat AIDS has become one burdentoo many for the democratic SouthAfrican government; that its failureto respond effectively to the epidemicis due to the fact that, given thesocio-economic and cultural riskenvironment within which we liveand the structural variables that needto be addressed in order to turn thesituation around, HIV and AIDShave served as cruel indicators of thestate’s impotence in dealing with acrisis of this scale.

Rather than focusing on the tech-nical contents of actual AIDS publicpolicy documents (which since 1992have not been contentious) the mainfocus of this paper is the environmentand the process of policy making andimplementation itself. It is the aim ofthis paper to identify the reasons forthe failure of public HIV and AIDSpolicies in South Africa. In order toimprove on the process that is policymaking (identification of the problem,setting the policy agenda, formulat-ing, implementing and evaluatingprogrammatic responses) one shouldevaluate the instances of public policymaking on AIDS in the past as well asin the present. This should be done inan effort to ascertain which inappro-priate or erroneous policies were for-mulated in the past, and why. Armedwith such systematically gatheredinformation, one would be betterplaced to improve the quality of pub-lic policy making on this issue. This isdone to find some answers to a num-ber of questions:

• Has the public policy response toHIV and AIDS in South Africasince 1982 been effective?

• What public policies have been for-mulated to combat the disease?

• What—if any—were the gaps in thepolicy formulation and implemen-tation process?

• What structural impediments wereand remain present that might haveand continue to sabotage the suc-cessful implementation of appropri-ate policies?

• How should public policy on thisissue be conceptualised, formu-lated, implemented and evaluateddifferently in an effort to make suchpolicies more effective?

The phase/stage approach topolicy making

The problem identification stage ofthe policy making process on HIVand AIDS in South Africa is at theheart of the current as well as previ-ous governments’ difficulties in theappropriate implementation of stateresponses to the epidemic. Policymaking and implementation is aniterative process, which means thatthere is a continual re-evaluation ofthe appropriateness and accuracy of

preceding stages in the policyprocess. This is the analytical ideal,namely that the policy processremains a generic process, where onestage in the process is not completedand left behind before moving on andexploring the next phase—there is acontinual re-conceptualisation andreshaping of the policy response toany public problem. However, theproblem identification stage, since itis the motive force for the entire pol-icy process, is a particularly seminalstep along the way.

In a society like South Africa,where the policy problem of AIDSfirst made it onto the public agendain the early 1980s, the identificationof the policy problem was particu-larly important given the duration ofthis problem. The challenge of HIVand AIDS did not appear on thescene more than two decades agoonly to be challenged by a singlevalue set or normative policy envi-ronment which then drafted aresponse to that policy problem.Rather, HIV and AIDS remained afeature of the policy environment andcontinue to exist to this day. This fact

Gwyn Prins and Pieter Fourie.



has important implications for themanner in which South African soci-ety can and have been responding tothis epidemic since 1982—throughconflict, ideological strife, value shiftsand immense socio-political change.By way of analogy: in the stage pro-duction of HIV and AIDS in SouthAfrica the main variable (the epi-demic) has remained and even wors-ened, but at the same time the décoragainst which it operated (the socio-political policy environment) experi-enced radical changes. This has hadan immense impact on the manner inwhich the state (through differentgovernments) has defined the verypolicy problem of AIDS itself.

Deadly dialectics: apartheidand the evolution of the SouthAfrican epidemic

During the National Party (NP) gov-ernment’s handling of the epidemic(1982-1994) HIV and AIDS was firstdefined as a moral issue. This led toan unwritten policy response steepedin a moralist discourse: the real prob-lem that needed to be addressed wasnot so much a biomedical responsecombating a virus, rather theimmoral actions of homosexuals,intravenous drug users, commercialsex workers and black migrant work-ers were blamed for the spread of theepidemic. Legal measures wereenacted to punish these four groupswithin the rest of ‘normal’ SouthAfrican society. As AIDS made itsway into normal society, however, theidentification of the policy problemshifted: as more and more SouthAfricans became the victims of AIDS,the growing epidemic becameincreasingly identified with the blacksector of society. This served toracialise and politicise the epidemic,with the apartheid government using

AIDS as an excuse to exclude foreignmine workers and in some instancesblaming liberation movements forinfiltrating South African societywith AIDS as a new weapon.

As AIDS entered white SouthAfrican society, the state increasinglymade use of biomedical discourse tocounter its effects. Rather than to dis-mantle the legal and social infrastruc-ture of apartheid, which com-

pounded the sexual risk factors forall South Africans, the governmentgradually reconceptualised AIDS as abiomedical problem, creating medicalbodies and legislation to facilitate abiomedical response to the growingepidemic. As political changesoccurred in the late 1980s, thismoral-biomedical response policyenvironment and problem conceptu-alisation also shifted: by the early1990s it was clear that radical consti-tutional changes were afoot, and thisled the government to allow greaterroom for human rights-based per-spectives on the epidemic to enter thepolicy discourse. As social valueswere changing on the high politicallevel, so too did the response impera-tives of the executive branch of gov-ernment. The latter’s status in SouthAfrican politics had to accommodatepreviously excluded sectors of society:the liberation movements and AIDScivil society embraced the new human

rights approach to politics and eco-nomics in the country, and appliedthis new and evolving value set to theconceptualisation of a response toHIV and AIDS in South Africa. Thispolitical evolution culminated in theNational AIDS Co-ordinating Com-mittee of South Africa (NACOSA)process of 1992-1994, whichentrenched the view that AIDS was tobe a developmental and human rightsissue or problem in South Africa, andled to the drafting of the democraticNational AIDS Plan (NAP) of 1994with these values in mind.

The discursive policy environ-ment and problem identificationmould thus shifted from blaming andtargeting infected carriers of the HIVvirus to the conceptualisation of abiomedical response in the late 1980sto the entrenchment of a humanrights-based approach in the 1990s.By the time the Mandela governmenttook office in 1994, this value set wasdeeply entrenched, not only as thehigh political value underpinning themanner in which AIDS would be seenby the government, but also in termsof the programmatic response thatwas drafted in 1994. However, theNAP was morally and programmati-cally over-ambitious: it assumed thepresence of sufficient resources andcapacity to rapidly and effectivelycounter the epidemic. When this didnot happen, the Mandela govern-ment quickly reverted to a biomed-ical conceptualisation of the AIDSpolicy problem. The search was onfor a quick fix for AIDS, which wasonly one policy problem amongmany. Medical science held thepromise for such a rapid solution,and in its haste to resolve the AIDSpolicy problem, the Mandela govern-ment erred, and erred again.

The Virodene debacle (1997),

The NAP was morally and

programmatically over-ambitious: it

assumed the presence of sufficient

resources and capacity to rapidly

and effectively counter the

epidemic.



coupled with the obduracy resultingfrom the government’s mishandlingof the Sarafina II scandal (1996)effectively corrupted the AIDS policyenvironment to this day: in a desper-ate attempt to embrace the promiseof medical science, and in failing todo so, the Mandela governmentreconceptualised the AIDS policyproblem yet again. This reconceptu-alisation was not, however, madeexplicit: whilst maintaining thehuman rights discourse surroundingthe epidemic, the government in1998 abandoned its intentions ofsupplying rape survivors with ARVs,clearly backtracking on a humanrights orientation in the process. Thetension that this created between thegovernment and the South AfricanAIDS civil society soon became a gulfwhen the state in 1999 exacerbatedthe policy problem by reneging on itsintention not to declare AIDS a med-ically notifiable disease. The scale ofthe AIDS epidemic and the reality ofthe pragmatism required to respondeffectively and appropriately becameone burden too many for the newSouth African government.

This has remained the situationsince the Mbeki government tookoffice in 1999. Mbeki has made thesituation worse by questioning thefundamental tenets of medical sci-ence, forcing politics to enter the bio-medical domain and obduratelyrefusing to make a graceful exit. Akey feature of Mbeki’s handling ofthe AIDS policy problem has been hisreconceptualisation of the problem asa monetary issue: blaming large phar-maceutical companies and the profitmotive, the Mbeki government hasused paranoid language in an effortto deflect the responsibility for anappropriate treatment response to theepidemic away from the state. The

confusion in the policy environmentthat this has created is made worseby the fact that Mbeki and his healthministry seem to be increasingly iso-lated within the broader governingalliance: the African National Con-gress (ANC’s) own governing part-ners and the ANC provincial AIDSmanagers are acting in contraventionof the national government’s pre-scriptions. A tacit alliance has beendeveloping from below, with mem-bers of South Africa’s AIDS civil soci-ety working with sub-national(provincial) governments in an effortto ensure the rollout of treatmentstrategies.

Within this context, HIV andAIDS has become probably the mostpoliticised issue in South Africansociety. What should be a relativelysimple response, namely the defini-tion of the policy problem in biomed-ical terms and the response emanat-ing from a human rights perspective,was not implemented. Instead, thepublic sector in this country remainsfor all intents and purposes at warwith itself. Mbeki and his seniorhealth technocrats continue to phrasethe AIDS policy problem in discoursethat run counter to the rest of SouthAfrican and international society. Thevery policy problem remains an areaof contention.

The continued controversy sur-rounding the conceptualisation of theAIDS policy problem itself has ren-dered the other stages of the policymaking environment a web of indeci-sion, resulting in ineffective as well asinconsistent policy implementation. Ifthere is no certainty as to what thepolicy problem is, then it becomesimpossible for the public sector torespond coherently and consistently.Answers to the questions ‘Who/whatis the enemy?’, ‘Who should take

responsibility to respond?’, ‘Whatshould this response look like?’, ‘Whois to be held accountable?’ and so onremain unanswerable—and (in a dis-cursive environment caught betweenracism and political correctness) ulti-mately closed to real discourse.Rather, the AIDS policy environmentdegenerates—as it has in this coun-try—into a political arena for blameand efforts at auto-exculpation.

Significantly, the public gaps thatthis situation creates have been filledby actors for the most part outside ofgovernment. Under the NP govern-ment the absence of a coherent andappropriately conceptualised policyresponse led to the mobilisation ofthree key sets of other policy actors:the private sector (the mining indus-try in particular), the biomedicalcommunity and the legal fraternitycame to be important actors andagents in the policy environment.Even within the public sector, seg-ments of the health institutionsresponded to contradict the erro-neous or ineffective responses of thenational government. Under the suc-cessive ANC governments, this situa-tion has continued: most recentlyprovincial ANC governments havebeen mobilising in an effort to getlocalised treatment responses off theground, whereas the South AfricanAIDS civil society increasingly hasbeen making use of legal strategies toforce the government into action.This has led to a situation where thegovernment has actually beenbypassed: civil society has taken theAIDS fight straight to the courts,which then use constitutional mea-sures to get the government to fulfilits constitutional obligations in termsof the provision of health measures.

Gradually then the policy envi-ronment seems to be shifting towards



the operationalisation of the NAPand the Strategic Plan for the rolloutof ARV drugs (which remain couchedin the human rights approach estab-lished in the early 1990s). Althoughthis is creating greater effectiveness inthe achievement for the rights of PWAs,there still is no great rapprochementbetween the high levels of nationalgovernment on the one hand, and thebroader AIDS civil society on theother. The result has been some suc-cesses in the rollout of treatment forPWAs, but the reality remains onewhere these advances come onlyslowly and intermittently. Althoughthe South African government hasnow been forced by the courts toimplement the terms of the StrategicPlan for the rollout of ARV drugs, thepolicy agenda regarding HIV andAIDS remains as contested as ever.The Treatment Action Campaign(TAC) in 1998 entered the policy envi-ronment as a key policy entrepreneur,but the chasm between itself and thegovernment remains as wide as ever.

Ironically, actual policy formula-tion has gone relatively smoothlysince the NACOSA process of 1992-1994, which led to the formulation ofthe NAP of 1994. The iterativeprocess of such formulation andreformulation has been successful onmore than one occasion—first withthe National Health Review in 1997,which established the GovernmentAIDS Action Plan (GAAP) in 1998,and then again with the drafting ofthe Strategic Plan in 1999/2000. Keyto the success of these processes ofreformulation has been the fact thatthey were so inclusive of all sectors ofthe South African AIDS community.However, the inclusiveness of the pol-icy formulation and adoption phaseshas never been followed through atthe level of policy implementation.

Time and again the South Africangovernment acts on a proclivity towant to monopolise such implemen-tation, and when this fails, it revertsto casting blame on extra-govern-mental forces. Instead of allowing theexplicit bottom-up implementationof these appropriate policy docu-ments, the government has insistedon a top-down approach. This cre-ates a situation where the rest of theSouth African AIDS community isnot only virtually excluded fromimplementation; it also excuses thesepotential policy agents from account-ability of the policies’ contents.

The result is inevitable failure onthe part of the government to imple-ment plans effectively, which opens itto attack from AIDS civil society.And soon this context recreates thepatterns of the past: counter-attack,blame, the invocation of racist poli-tics, and a total breakdown in anypossible constructive engagement inthe policy environment. This alsomeans that the policy evaluationphase becomes deeply flawed, withthe government refusing to acknowl-edge regular benchmarks for policysuccess or failure, such as biomedicalpeer review, statistical measures andso on. In embracing the latter, theSouth African AIDS civil societyeffectively places itself in a differentevaluatory paradigm to that of thegovernment, who then defensivelyaccuses civil society of Eurocentrismor blatant racism. Again it is worthnoting that this environment ofstrong policy contestation does notreflect the contents of the actual poli-cies; rather, the manner in whichthese policies are or are not imple-mented become the arena for contes-tation—and all of this is the result ofantagonistic definitions of the actualAIDS policy problem itself.

Quo vadis AIDS policy in SouthAfrica?

Three clusters of issues in particularrequire further enquiry—both in thecontext of HIV and AIDS in SouthAfrica as well as in the context ofother policy issues:

Firstly, in terms of policy imple-mentation specifically, the problemidentification phase has been demon-strated to be an essential and under-valued step in the process of AIDSpolicy making. Further enquiryshould explore manners in whichpolicy actors can and should attainsufficient consensus on the conceptu-alisation of HIV and AIDS as a policyissue. Only in identifying a commonconception of a policy problem is theappropriate and effective formula-tion, adoption, implementation andevaluation of policies assured.

HIV and AIDS have becomeemblematic in South Africa as anarea of contention in the specific caseof bringing policies to fruitionthrough implementation. The break-down between policy and implemen-tation needs further exploration. His-tory has taught us that a bottom-upapproach to policy implementationhas led to the greatest effectiveness ofpolicies—even in spite of oppositionfrom central government. Furtherresearch needs to be done on howpolicy actors in- and outside of gov-ernment can co-operate in an effortto make policy implementation moreeffective. This is the case particularlywhen evaluating the role of provin-cial and local governments, as well asmembers of civil society (NGOs andCBOs in particular).

The second cluster of issues relateto the relationship between the gov-ernment and other policy actors andagents. Since the mid-1990s a chasmhas appeared between the govern-



ment’s and AIDS civil society’srespective perspectives on the mostappropriate way forward for AIDSpolicy design: the government hasbeen pushing for the continual draft-ing of AIDS prevention strategies,whereas the TAC in particular hasbeen emphasising the importance oftreatment strategies. Increasinglyanalysts are in agreement that thesetwo strategies (AIDS prevention andAIDS treatment) should not be seenin zero-sum, but rather in comple-mentary terms. This is an under-researched area in terms of the litera-ture on AIDS policy formulation inSouth Africa.

The use of litigation and legisla-tion strategies to combating AIDShas proven to be extremely successfulin operationalising the principlesunderpinning appropriate AIDS poli-cies. Litigation in particular willprobably continue to be used as avector to implement AIDS policies.This strategy is profoundly under-researched. Successive South Africangovernments have used anti-intellec-tual discourses in an effort to protectthemselves from blame within thehigh political environment of publicpolicy making on HIV and AIDS.Research needs to be conducted intothe socio-political structures whichenable the political application of thisas a delay strategy in the implementa-tion of policies.

The third cluster of issues refersto the broadly identified discursiveenvironment that should be furtherresearched. Paradoxically, the statehas used anti-intellectual argumentsby applying highly technical dis-courses in an effort to exclude non-state policy actors from exercisingthe right to make statements on anddefine the very problem of AIDS poli-cies themselves. Research should be

conducted to explore manners inwhich technical knowledge and dis-courses can be democratised in aneffort to preclude such abuse of cer-tain epistemologies.

AIDS has become a metaphor forthe entire gamut of societal ills facingSouth Africa. There is significantscope for exploring these metaphorsin an effort to enable social learningor insight from HIV and AIDS. Inthis manner the epidemic might actu-ally lead to some national introspec-tion about the deeper structural orsystemic issues that plague our soci-ety. Also, sex and morality are at thecentre of the South African AIDS epi-demic. Research on the interplay andostensible tensions between sexualrelations and the context of moralityshould continue.

AIDS has been demonstrated tobe an event that is the result of socialpatterns of sexual and political inter-action. Politically, apartheid has cre-ated a context of risk for all SouthAfricans. Socially, however, politi-cians and other policy actors andagents appear steadfast in their reti-cence to address the structural vari-ables upon which these patterns ofinteraction rest: the impact of culture,and the history of racism andexploitative gender relations.Research should be conducted toexplore manners in which SouthAfrica as a society can overcome shy-ing away from these issues.

Recent developments—and the road ahead…

After the April 2004 elections, Presi-dent Mbeki reappointed Dr MantoTshabalala-Msimang for a secondterm as the Minister of Health. Thisexplicit approval of the Minister’srecord from the Office of the Presi-dency was immediate slammed by the

official opposition in the SouthAfrican Parliament as a ‘slap in theface’ of PWAs (Washington Post 29April 2004). The TAC also expresseddisappointment with the President’sdecision, citing the Minister’s recordof tardy implementation of HIV andAIDS policies.

If newspaper reports are to bebelieved, such opposition to Mbeki’sdecision to reappoint Tshabalala-Msimang also came from within theNational Department of Health itself,with the Head of the government’sAIDS Directorate, Dr Nono Similela,resigning within weeks of Mbeki’sannouncement (Mail & Guardian 4June 2004). Within the first month ofthe Minister’s reappointment, her his-torical difficulties in relating to SouthAfrica’s AIDS civil society and thebroader medical community contin-ued: her Department had to face twolegal challenges from medical bodiesrepresenting South African healthcare workers, who were unhappywith the directives coming from theHealth Department regarding jobspecifications with regards to the dis-tribution of drugs.

Any hopes of a rapprochementbetween the Minister and AIDS civilsociety were dashed during the 15th

International AIDS Conference,which was held in Bangkok, Thai-land, in July 2004. Tshabalala-Msi-mang reacted badly to suggestionsfrom UN Secretary-General KofiAnnan’s Special Envoy on HIV andAIDS in Africa, Dr Stephen Lewis,that the South African governmentwas ‘dragging its feet’ on the roll-outof ARVs (Reuters NewMedia 16 July2004). The Minister accused Lewis—despite his numerous visits to SouthAfrica—of being ignorant about theSouth African epidemic (SundayTimes 18 July 2004).



This context of animosity at theBangkok conference was made worseby the Minister’s continued question-ing of the efficacy and safety of theuse of the ARV Nevirapine for thepurpose of preventing mother-to-child transmission (MTCT). Despiteevidence to the contrary, the Ministerrepeated her oft-stated claims thatthe drug was toxic, and that its appli-cation for MTCT prevention wasirresponsible (Sunday Herald 18 July2004). The public spat between theMinister and the TAC over this issuedominated the rest of the Bangkokconference. The situation was exacer-bated when the Minister—citing offi-cial obligations in South Africa—decided to leave Bangkok afterattending the conference for only oneday. This led to members of SouthAfrica’s AIDS civil society again ques-tioning Tshabalala-Msimang’s com-mitment to the fight against the epi-demic.

Since the Bangkok conference, thebattle between the Health Depart-ment and the TAC has heated up.The latter has—since the announce-ment of the government’s TreatmentPlan in November 2003—been strug-gling to get access to the govern-ment’s timetable for the actual imple-mentation of this latest policy

venture. Citing the government’s fail-ure to implement its stated intentionsto have 53,000 HIV-positive SouthAfricans on ARV treatment byMarch 2004 (the government has byOctober 2004 only succeeded inrolling out such treatment to 15,000PWAs [TAC 2004: Internet source]),the TAC in November 2004 has onceagain turned to the Courts to forcethe government to make public itsproposed treatment schedule. Thistime the TAC hopes to invoke theOpen Democracy Act, which guaran-tees South Africans the right to viewthe contents of all public (govern-ment) documents. At the time ofwriting, this latest fracas was stillcontinuing (News24.com 14 Decem-ber 2004).

President Mbeki has also comeunder fire for his continued silence onthe AIDS epidemic. In October 2004the Parliamentary opposition’sspokesperson on health, Ryan Coet-zee, during official question time inParliament asked Mbeki whether thegovernment was not concerned thatthe high incidence of rape in SouthAfrica is fuelling the AIDS epidemic.Mbeki refused to answer the ques-tion, instead attacking Coetzee andthe official opposition in a thinlyveiled attempt to (once again)

emphasize the fact that racism was abigger problem for South Africans.Mbeki has since then come undersome criticism from the media andother policy actors, who accuse thePresident of once again attempting tomonopolise the right to determine thepublic policy agenda (Cape Times 22October 2004).

In addition, Archbishop DesmondTutu was in late November 2004involved in a public spat with thePresident after the Archbishop ques-tioned what he saw as the culture ofsycophancy within the ruling party,and Mbeki’s reticence to answer ques-tions regarding AIDS (amongst otherissues). This has led to some acrimo-nious exchanges between Tutu andANC spokespeople, as well as directlywith the President (Jack 2004:9).Mbeki has also been criticised for notowning up to South Africa’s bad trackrecord on sexual violence—in Octo-ber the President launched a scathingattack on journalist Charlene Smithand UNAIDS’s Deputy Director, DrKathleen Cravero, for emphasisingthe need in the country to address theissue of rape. Such emphases were, inMbeki’s analysis, really just racistattempts to discredit the new SouthAfrica.

In December 2004 elementswithin the ANC also repeated theirearlier attacks on the TAC, namelythat the organisation is in bed withlarge pharmaceutical companies,using poor South Africans as guineapigs in a ploy to distribute toxicdrugs to the indigent (ANC Today 17December 2004). The TAC hit backby pointing out that the governmentis trying to detract attention from thefact that, by the end of 2004, fewerthan 20,000 people in the public sec-tor were on ARV therapy while morethan 45,000 people in the private sec-

The Gordon’s Bay workshop, April 2005.




tor have access to ARVs: ‘Those of uswho can afford to have the chance tolive, while poor and mainly blackpeople die because of bureaucraticneglect. A section of the ANC leader-ship frequently misuses the allegationof racism to cover up mistakes or lies’(News24.com 18 January 2005).

To drive their point home, thegovernment around the same timepointed out that the South AfricanNational Blood Service (SANBS) wasstill applying outdated racist criteriain deciding which blood donations toaccept (Sunday Independent 12December 2004; Mail & Guardian10-16 December 2004). The SANBSuntil early 2005 was excluding theserum of black people, since suchblood had been found to contain highlevels of HIV. The vitriol that resultedfrom this revelation of racial profilingin the health services eventually led tothe institution of a more expensivebut racially blind system to make theSouth African blood supply safer.This positive outcome was, however,clouded by the re-racialising of theissue of the national blood supply,providing the government with anopportunity to deflect attention fromtheir slack roll-out of ARV treatment.A year later, however, we once againseem to have fallen prey to the ‘onestep forward, two steps back’ syn-drome: the SANBS in January 2006indicated that (as it was 21 yearsbefore, under apartheid) blood fromgays would be excluded—despite thefact that the South African epidemic isan eminently heterosexually transmit-ted one. Plus ça change…

In January 2005 this context ofcontestation became even more polit-ical when the head of the CatholicBishops Conference in SouthernAfrica, Cardinal Wilfred Napier, crit-icised the government for promoting

condoms in the fight against HIV andAIDS ‘when it’s clearly not working’(News24.com 24 January 2005).Confusing theology with sociology,the Catholic Church used the mostrecent AIDS fracas in an attempt todrive their own anachronistic andmoralistic agenda—at the expense oftried and tested methods for prevent-ing the spread of HIV.

By the end of January 2005 theHealth Department admitted thattheir ARV roll-out programme waslagging. The National Department ofHealth’s new Director for HIV andAIDS, Dr. Nomonde Xundu,reported that only 33,000 peoplewith full-blown AIDS were receivingfree drugs by the end of January.Xundu noted that the Department’sbiggest challenge was to get thehuman resources capacity up to thelevel where it needs to be—theHealth Department set a goal of hir-ing 220 doctors by March 2005, butonly 111 had been found. Also, outof the 271 pharmacists needed tohelp roll out the ARV treatment pro-gramme, only 90 were hired, and 64of the 136 dieticians required werehired. Members of AIDS civil societyreacted to this admission by sayingthat missed targets were rooted in alack of political will from a govern-ment whose leader has in the pastopenly shown his scepticism over theneed to make the fight against theAIDS epidemic a priority(News24.com 14 March 2005).Responding to the 2005-06 nationalbudget allocation to health, theseactivists also criticised the govern-ment for not keeping up with infla-tion or with health practitioners’salaries, and for focusing so exclu-sively on the expansion of healthinfrastructure that inadequate plan-ning goes into expanding the actual

delivery of services where they areneeded (Mail & Guardian 25 Febru-ary to 3 March 2005).

Perhaps the most significantrecent development in the world ofHIV and AIDS in South Africaoccurred in February 2005, when theSouth African Medical ResearchCouncil announced national mortal-ity figures for the country. The datashowed that deaths amongst adultshad risen by around 60 per centbetween 1997 and 2003, and theresearchers concluded that the under-reporting of deaths related to AIDSwas the greatest cause for thisincrease (News24.com 18 February2005; Sunday Independent 20 Febru-ary 2005). An editorial in the emi-nent international journal Lancet (12February 2005) used this informationto lambast the Mbeki government forits continued denialism and foot-dragging on the roll-out of ARVdrugs:

Social stigma associated withHIV/AIDS, tacitly perpetuatedby the government’s reluctanceto bring the crisis out in theopen and face it head on, pre-vents many from speaking outabout causes of illness anddeaths of loved ones and leadsdoctors to record uncontrover-sial diagnoses on death certifi-cates… The South African gov-ernment needs to stop beingdefensive and show backboneand courage to acknowledgeand seriously tackle theHIV/AIDS crisis of its people.The progress in provision of[ARV] treatment to all peoplewith advanced HIV has beenpainfully slow since the Gov-ernment’s first report of aplanned programme in August,2003.



Despite this potentially explosiveinformation, the government seemsto be continuing its intransigent posi-tion on ARVs, and continues to pre-varicate on the roll-out of ARV treat-ments. In fact, if recent media reportsare to be believed the government(with the blessing of Mbeki himself)has in recent years been acting sur-reptitiously to establish a dissidentAIDS activist organisation to serve asa counterweight to the TAC (Mail &Guardian 24-31 March 2005).

Reviewing these events since thesecond Mbeki administration cameto power in April 2004, it is clearthat the negative patterns of publicrhetoric and actions on HIV andAIDS established during 1999-2004seem to be continuing. Negativeaspects centre around the fact thatMbeki and his Minister of Healthseem to be continuing their policy ofneglect and foot-dragging on ARVroll-out. The approach from the topcontinues to include the questioningof medical science, casting doubt onany data demonstrating the afford-ability and imperative of life-savingdrugs, or the negative impact thatAIDS is having on national mortalityand morbidity levels.

However, not all is lost. There areclear signals in and around govern-ment that some positive forces are atwork to undo some of the damagedone under the Mbeki government.These positive aspects include:

• A greater willingness from the Min-istry of Finance to provide the capi-tal to improve the roll-out of ARVtreatment;

• Some provinces and local authori-ties have demonstrated an increasein their capacity to provide essentialservices;

• AIDS civil society in South Africaseems to be succeeding in bypassingthose at the very top of govern-ment, using the courts to forcethrough legal sanctions to createthe programmatic infrastructure forfuture success, and

• Inside the National Department ofHealth a number of newlyappointed officials seem to have agenuine desire to speed up thedelivery of essential services tocombat AIDS: Dr Nomonde Xunduand Deputy Minister of HealthNozizwe Madlala-Routledge aredriving real efforts to integrate HIVinto the areas of healthcare andAIDS treatment. Importantly, Mad-lala-Routledge also seems moreamenable that her Minister to seethe TAC and other members ofAIDS civil society as allies, ratherthan as foes (Sunday Times 13March 2005).

One hopes that these develop-ments will in the not too distantfuture create an institutional tippingpoint to change the AIDS policy land-scape in this country. For unless thegovernment (particularly at theprovincial and local levels) and civilsociety work together and stop view-ing prevention and treatment strate-gies as mutually exclusive, all ofSouth Africa will lose in the long run.But in order to get there, it is impera-tive that we find a way of addressingthe real vectors underpinning thespread of HIV in this country: per-versely unequal and violent genderrelations, cultural practices that act tolubricate the spread of the virus in oursociety, and government denial aboutthe impact (and very existence) of thehorror that is AIDS. The bottom lineis that we should learn to take indi-vidual responsibility for our own sex

lives—and not defer that questionableprivilege to the state. In order toachieve all of this, we need to becomea society that is unafraid to speak thetruth to power, wherever it may lurk.

As for the government, thispaper’s central message to ThaboMbeki is that his administration’s his-tory of denial, prevarication andobfuscation regarding HIV and AIDSmight postpone or temporarily hidesome ad hoc consequences, butunless the lessons of AIDS areheeded, generations hence will judgeyou harshly. Soon the dividendsearned from the apartheid strugglewill seem distant to the leaders andopinion shapers coming to the fore;AIDS is the new arena of the struggle.Denial and an anti-intellectual stancewill only take you so far, for solong—as the warning goes, ‘Thisfence around your garden won’t keepthe ice from falling’.1

Bibliography

ANC Today, 17-23 December 2004.Nevirapine, drugs and African guineapigs 4(50).

Cape Times, 22 October 2004.

Dorrington, R. and Johnson, L. 2002.Epidemiological and demographic.Impacts and interventions: The HIV andAIDS epidemic and the children of SouthAfrica, eds. J. Gow and C. Desmond.Pietermaritzburg: University of NatalPress.

Jack, E. 2004. Mbeki ‘like PW on Tutuissue’, www.news24.co.za, accessed on 2December.

Jack, E. 2004. Mbeki ‘like PW on Tutuissue’, www.news24.co.za, accessed on 2December.

Lancet 2005. South Africa needs to facethe truth about HIV mortality365(9459), 12 February.


Mail & Guardian, 10-16 December2004.

Mail & Guardian, 24-31 March 2005.

Mail & Guardian, 25 February to 3March 2005.

Mail & Guardian, 4 June 2004.

News24.com 2005. Condoms clearlydon’t work, www.news24.com,accessed on 24 January 2005.

News24.com 2005. Death stats cometo life,http://www.news24.com/News24/South_Africa/0,,2-7-659_1664609,00.html,accessed on 21 February 2005.

News24.com 2005. HIV/AIDS carelagging in SA, www.news24.com,accessed on 14 March 2005.

News24.com 2005. TAC slams ANC’sAIDS stance, www.news24.com,accessed on 19 January 2005.

Reuters NewMedia, 16 July 2004.

Sunday Herald, 18 July 2004.

Sunday Independent, 12 December2004.

Sunday Independent, 20 February2005.

Sunday Times, 13 March 2005.

TAC. 2004. Why the TAC is going tocourt tomorrow and holding country-wide demonstrations, www.tac.org.za,accessed on 2 December.

TAC. 2004. Why the TAC is going tocourt tomorrow and holding country-wide demonstrations, www.tac.org.za,accessed on 2 December.

UNAIDS. 2004. Report on the globalAIDS epidemic. Switzerland: UNAIDS.

Washington Post, 29 April 2004.

1 The Silver Mt. Zion MemorialOrchestra & Tra-la-la Band, Constel-lation (2003).

This paper will give a background onthe Religious Leaders (RLs) Initiativelaunched by the UNDP, HIV/AIDSregional programme in the ArabStates (HARPAS) and the ethicaldilemmas that it provoked from itsvery start, as well as what is thoughtof the lessons learned in this process.The initiative was launched in April2004, a peak event was its Cairoregional colloquium, in December2004 where 80 first rank Muslim andChristian leaders representing alldenominations came together to dis-cuss the rising threat of theHIV/AIDS to the region and establisha basis for responding to it. Theresult was the Cairo Declaration,described as revolutionary by some,as well as a Muslim and a ChristianManual of religious lessons tacklingstigma, discrimination againstHIV/AIDS and providing a platformfor a human rights-based response tothe issues. The action plan laid downin Cairo involved 5 sub-regionalworkshops for leaders and a struc-tured national response to train andmotivate religious leaders. All theworkshops were carried out and thisplan has led to the mobilization ofthousands of Muslim Imams andChristian Ministers to date. The ethi-cal issues raised here start fromwhether to involve RLs or not in theresponse, what are the ethical prob-lems relating to the concept of God’spunishment, protected sex, vulnera-ble groups and women rights.

The Background: Why InvolveReligious Leaders?

Years of experience have shown usthat any effective response toHIV/AIDS can not stop at the healthapproach, it must involve many sec-tors of the society in a concerteddevelopmental effort. HIV/AIDS pro-vokes deep ethical issues and dilem-mas. A developmental approachimplies empowering ordinary peopleto do extraordinary things; dealingwith the ethical dilemmas relevant toHIV/AIDS is an essential part of suchempowerment. People thinking thatHIV/AIDS is God’s punishment uponthe wicked are probably less likely torespect and promote the rights ofpeople living with HIV/AIDS(PLWHA), let alone reach out tothem or support vulnerable groups.Dealing with sexuality, with a taboomentality, may lead to less inclinationto talk about HIV/AIDS and itsmodes of transmission and effectivepreventive measures.

The issue in the Arab worldbecomes more complicated if weexamine cultural and developmentalchallenges. Globalization has led toparadoxical rise offundamentalism/terrorism in theregion, which may be partlyexplained as an attempt to maintainidentity against the overwhelmingcultural, economical and politicalimpacts of globalization. Disenchant-ment with “western culture” mayprovide a basis for doubt of any

“UNDP/HARPAS Religious Leaders Initiative onHIV/AIDS in The Arab Region: the Ethics of a

Developmental approach”

Khadija Moalla, Ehab El Kharrat, Sayed El Zenari



experience exchange from other areasof the world, particularly if it toucheson issues like “sexual morality” and“religious interpretations of majorevents”. Far from being absoluteterms of references, human rights areenclosed with marked ambiguity inthe minds and sentiments of most ofthe region’s population. The wholeprogress toward a democratic societyis at best in an embryonic stage inmost of the Arab states. Access toinformation is hindered by a long listof political, cultural and ideologicalconcerns and the gaps in womenrights are still enormous.

Compassion, breaking the silence,overcoming denial and a proactivestance can be challenged by moralconcerns about modesty, chastity,avoiding undue alarming of the pub-lic and a conviction that there areother priorities towards which weshould direct the limited resourcesavailable.

There are views that call foravoiding involving religious leaders(RL) in the Arab region, claimingthat they are hopelessly reactionary,

too rigid or close minded and thatworking with them may backfire.Another concern is that involvingreligious leaders may actually hinderthe process of democratization in theregion. UNDP/HIV AIDS RegionalProgramme in the Arab States(HARPAS) endorsed a view that RLsare key-players in the region, theyhave enormous impact on people’svalues and attitudes, avoiding themwould lead to isolating developmen-tal efforts from the public and that itis both possible and worthwhile towin their support to proven andhuman rights based responses to theepidemic.

The History of the ReligiousLeaders Initiative in the ArabStates

Mapping and a technical meeting:The RLs initiative started in April2004, and involved a mapping of theMuslim and Christian ReligiousLeaders existing efforts in response toHIV/AIDS in the region as well as arelevant review of the literature doneby two consultants in preparation fora technical Meeting held in Damas-

cus (28th June – 1st July 2004),attended by thirty RLs, many ofwhom had previous experience withHIV/AIDS.

Initial Endorsement: This was fol-lowed by an “Endorsement Phase”where person to person as well asgroup meetings were held with somekey RLs including the scholars of theSyrian Kaftaro Institute, the EgyptianSheikh of El Azhar ( considered bysome the most influential Sunni insti-tute in the world), as well as the Cop-tic Pope, in Tunisia. Scholars of theZeitouna University endorsed the ini-tiative and in Sudan the Chief ofUllama as well as the Sudan Councilof Churches did the same. The initia-tive was also endorsed by prominentleaders in Morocco including theReligious Advisor of the King.

The Major Regional Colloquium:This set the ground for the majorCairo Colloquium, which was heldunder the auspices of the Arab leagueand involved 80 top Muslim andChristian leaders from 19 differentArab countries, including Sunni,Shia, Orthodox, Catholic and Protes-tant leaders. They produced a pro-gressive Declaration. Described asrevolutionary by reporters coveringthe story, the event received intensivemedia coverage by more than 40agencies, including major newspapers and regional TV stations.

The Cairo Declaration empha-sizes the urgency of responding to theHIV/AIDS epidemic, calling forawareness campaigns, outreach tovulnerable groups, treatment andcare for those infected and affectedby the virus. It even explicitly sup-ports a woman’s right not to beinfected, implying a possible reviewof the age-old power imbalance ofgendered sexual relations in theregion.

Andy Mogotlane, Col. A.J. Loubser, and Bob Mtonga at the Mabula workshop, June 2004.



Penal views explaining away theepidemic as an expression of “God’swrath upon the unrighteous” are eas-ily subscribed to in this region andelsewhere, but after the courageousstance of the Cairo RLs Declaration,these views became more difficult.The declaration says: “(AIDS)Patients are our brothers and sisters,and we stand by them seeking God’shealing for each one of them…Peopleliving with HIV/AIDS and their fami-lies deserve care, support, treatment,and education, whether or not theyare responsible for their illness”.

Another important ethical break-through came with the Declarationstatement: “We emphasize the impor-tance of reaching out to vulnerablegroups... including commercial sexworkers and their clients, injectingdrug users, men having sex with men,and those who are involved in harm-ful practices”. Here members of thesegroups were named and recognizedas “real people” and, perhaps for thefirst time in this region, religiousleaders did not call for the most sternpunishment for them.

The heated ‘harm reduction’debate in the colloquium ended upwith the following statement in thedeclaration “We reiterate that absti-nence and faithfulness are the twocornerstones of our preventive strate-gies but we understand the medicalcall for the use of different preventivemeans to reduce the harm to oneselfand others”.

Another outcome of the Cairomeeting was the two HIV/AIDS man-uals written by and for Muslim andChristian religious leaders; these con-tain suggested material for sermonsand religious lessons on HIV/AIDS-related issues, which integrate fact-based messaging from not only themedical but also the broader develop-

ment perspective, and a human rightsbased approach based on referencesfrom the Koran and Hadith, or theBible and its scriptures.

An action plan was laid down inthe colloquium that involved the for-mation of a steering committee,printing of the kits, sub-regional andnational training workshops andpreparation for a network of RLs inresponse to HIV/AIDS.

The Steering committee: 12 Reli-gious Leaders (8 Muslim and 4 Chris-tian) met for the first time in Cairo,May 2005 and prioritized the actionplan items, reviewed the final versionof the Religious Kit and decided thenext steps in the region. They alsoprovided an initial plan for sustainednetworking and facilitation of futureactivities. A significant outcome ofthis meeting was the detailed plan forholding five sub-regional trainingworkshops to promote the kits.

Sub-regional Training workshops:The five workshops (40-50 mid-levelRL participants in each workshop)were organized by UNDP’s HARPASbetween July and September 2005,and national initiatives mushroomedas a result in almost every Arab coun-try, creating a regional transforma-tion The declaration has thus beenendorsed by thousands and probablytens of thousands of Muslim Imams

and Christian Ministers in the region.A remarkable moment came when apoor former sex worker shared hertestimony in one of the workshops.Following the AIDS-stricken lady’sstory, a hard-line Imam fromMorocco tried to comment, hiswords were choked by tears whileother Imams asked the lady to forgivethem and to pray for them. Inanother UNDP workshop, in Damas-cus, a prominent Imam from Syriavolunteered to undergo the HIV testfollowing a doctor’s explanation ofthe test and its meanings. Tens ofChristian and Muslim leaders enteredhand in hand, to the huge CaftaroMosque in Syria where a LebaneseShiite Imam, a Palestinian OrthodoxPriest and a first rank Azhar scholarall shared messages about HIV/AIDS.The night before, all religions wererepresented in a major church meet-ing in the village of Sahnaya to dis-cuss HIV/AIDS. The leaders sharedlaughter and sincere words as theyenjoyed the magic of this Syrian vil-lage hospitality after the services inthe presence of the area Bishop.

These workshops go beyond thetears and laughter they evoked, toaction, transformation, and commit-ment. A dynamic Imam from one ofthe biggest Mosques in Cairo wenthome from the workshop to deliverthe Friday sermon to 6,000 wor-shipers which he dedicated toHIV/AIDS. He then proposed a planto the minister of Awqaf to share thetraining he received with tens of hispeers. A prominent Imam fromMorocco started without any fund-ing a training scheme aiming at tenImams from each of the 14 gover-norates, his own leaders developedthis to an ambitious plan to train allthirty thousand Moroccan Imamsand they secured the funding and

Years of experience have shown

us that any effective response

to HIV/AIDS can not stop at the

health approach, it must involve

many sectors of the society in a

concerted developmental effort.



expertise for this enormous task.All leaders understand the role of

health specialists in providing provenmethods in HIV prevention; someagree to endorse the use of condomswhile others are still reluctant andprefer to speak about abstinence andfaithfulness only. But the issue hascertainly been recognized, high riskbehavior including unprotected sexand intravenous drug use are franklydiscussed and effective methods todeal with these behaviors are sug-gested. Facing HIV/AIDS provokeseither rigidity or open mindednessand compassion. RLs in the Arabregion are moving in the right direc-tion, and this may have long termrepercussions in their reactions tomany developmental issues includingwomen rights, governance and accessto knowledge. All of these aspects areessential components in any effectiveresponse to HIV/AIDS.

Lessons Learned

The lessons learned from the promis-ing results of this initiative includethe value and methods of buildingtrust, the importance of an empa-thetic and motivational approach, theeffectiveness of RLs in either promot-ing or hindering developmentalapproaches, the gradual nature of themechanisms of transformation andthe possibility of discovering newmeanings of virtue and spiritual val-ues even among the most conserva-tive circles.

The Process of Change: The changeof heart individually among religiousleaders takes place not only throughsharing accurate information but alsothrough religious leaders meetingface to face with People Living withHIV and AIDS. Participants also ben-efit from a package of leadershipdevelopment exercises which encour-

age them to go beyond statistics andintellectual arguments, in order todevelop an empathetic understandingof the issues that surroundHIV/AIDS.

A Pluralistic Society Possible: Thegreatest challenge faced was to holdthe colloquium at all. Inviting reli-gious leaders from all denominationsand religions within the Arab Statesto a colloquium that would discusssensitive issues such as sex andHIV/AIDS was extremely difficult.Thus the Colloquium Organizersstarted by adopting the followingmotto: “Responding to theHIV/AIDS pandemic requires ahuman accord that surpasses all reli-gious and denominational variation.It must be an accord that derivesfrom spiritual heritage and createscourageous responses to the prob-lems posed by the pandemic. It is anaccord that inspires somethinggreater and deeper than any chal-lenge!” As a symbol of such humanaccord, the organizers took as a logoa mosaic decoration of unknown ori-gin; it could equally be taken fromeither a mosque or a church. Theexperience of this initiative may teachus that a pluralistic society is achiev-able in this part of the world, asSunni, Shiite, Orthodox, Catholics,and Protestants all convenedtogether. Some were conservatives,others more liberal. The accord tookplace not through doctrinal dialoguebut through an honest confrontationof developmental challenges in awarm and humane atmosphere.

Lack of trust in the UN and conspir-acy theories: How is the UN relatedto the United States of America?Does Israel export HIV/AIDS to theArabs? These were two of the firstquestions asked by some religious

leaders at the Damascus gatheringbefore the event started. Other theo-ries were also voiced, such as thenotion that discussion of HIV/AIDSwas being imposed on them by theWest to distract them from focusingon their real problems. These con-cerns were addressed through the factthat all the participants were Arabs.Even the UN organizers of the Collo-quium were Arabs. The workshopsalso demonstrated the hazardous sit-uation within the Arab World – asevident by the constant increase inthe number of newly infected people.

The initiative belonged to the reli-gious leaders in that they voiced theirviews liberally. The UN did notimpose any ideas on them, directly orindirectly. The atmosphere allowedall participants to express their viewsand remarks freely. The RegionalProgramme ensured this atmosphereby not allowing journalists or mediapersonnel to attend any of the ses-sions except for the inaugural andclosing sessions.

Providing a Safe and Warm Environ-ment: Extra care was given to showrespect for all ideas and to incorpo-rate the results of deliberations with-out bias within the outcomes of eachevent. By listening, allowing space,and showing respect to the religiousleaders throughout the workshopstrust was gradually built, even in ashort time frame.

Dealing with Denial: Silence anddenial are prevailing phenomenawithin the Arab region both in gen-eral, and relating to HIV/AIDS inparticular. The roots of such phe-nomena in the case of HIV/AIDS maybe found in the lack of informationand may also be ascribed to the pre-vailing notion that only particulargroups are vulnerable to HIV/AIDS



that these are the true principlescalled for by every heavenly religion.

Empathetic and Motivationalapproaches: not telling the leaderswhat to do; rather providing the plat-form for them to explore the issues ina safe and warm environment andtrust that they will find the rightanswers.

The meanings of Virtue: ConnectingHIV/AIDS to committing adulteryprovokes a certain type of zeal forvirtue. With the rise in awareness ofthe facts comes the realization thatconfronting HIV/AIDS requiresavoiding labeling and condemna-tions. A call for love and compassionin action toward vulnerable groupsand PLWHA emerges and a sensethat since all human beings are sin-ners (obviously the notion of sin iscentral to both Islam and Christian-

and that such groups are far removedfrom mosque and church congrega-tions. Moreover, the notion may evengo as far as to suggest that suchgroups are non-existent in some Arabstates. It is indeed often believed thatfaith-oriented societies are not vul-nerable to the fatal pandemic. Whenpeople know very little about a dis-ease related to sex, death and shame,fear becomes the dominant emotion,and the easiest way to deal with suchfear is completely to avoid discussingthe matter, to deny that the pandemicexists within society or to try tounderestimate the volume of theproblem. This problem was resolvednot only through providing the par-ticipants with accurate informationbut through the testimonies ofPLWHA from the Arab World whichserved to give a human face toHIV/AIDS.

Stigmatization, condemnation, lackof information and misconceptions:We need to realize that the roots ofcondemnation lie in the attempt tosustain the principled majority, andlikewise the purity of the moral code.Undoubtedly, embarrassment ofappearing lenient, morally loose andliberal played a crucial role in creat-ing exaggerated rigidity and unbal-anced viewpoints. Stigmatization andcondemnation have their causeswithin the conscience of religiousleaders. Yet, when there is moreroom to uncover the truth, and whenpeople are not competing to provethemselves the greatest defenders ofvirtue, the atmosphere changes toone of mercy and compassion. Hav-ing consulted religious texts exhort-ing mercy and compassion towardthe sick, the religious leaders inde-pendently reached the conclusion

Participants at the Gordon’s Bay workshop, April 2005.



ity) the compassion and forgivenessof God is to be sought for and by all.This may fall short of the aspirationsof some humanists, but it is definitelya huge step forward for PLWHA andmembers of vulnerable groups.

Steps forward while maintaining abalanced stance: Doctrinal anddenominational diversity as well asnational and ethnic diversity wereevident in all workshops and eventsof the initiative. Another source ofpressure came from UN human rightspositions which sometime differ andconflict not only with the RLs normsbut with each other. All this and thesensitivity of the issues at hand madeprogress very difficult, but it was pos-sible in the end.

What cannot be fully attained is notto be totally left out: Some wouldargue that not advocating homosexu-ality as a lifestyle in the Cairo Decla-ration is a violation of the rights ofmen who have sex with men. How-ever, these people are currently killedor imprisoned in many and harshlycondemned in all Arab states. There-fore, the mere fact that they were rec-ognized and not called upon to beharshly punished is a huge step for-ward. Similar arguments are applica-ble to intravenous drug users andcommercial sex workers. The factthat direct mention of the condomwas avoided in the Declaration waslamented by some AIDS activists,however, the use of the term “all sci-

entifically proven measures” can defi-nitely be interpreted as inclusive ofcondoms and is a decisive step for-ward again.

The challenge of hard work mayresult in a more gratifying meeting:Long hours, intensive work but agrowing bond and a gratifyingresponse were observed in the sub-regional workshops repeatedly.

The declaration and kits are essentialbut not enough: The leading RLsprogressive views were not automati-cally endorsed by mid-level leaders.The process had to be repeated, someeven retreated from previouslyattained positions.

The process of change needs consis-tent action to be maintained: Toassume that a one-time effort willachieve constant change is unrealis-tic. Facing HIV/AIDS provokes eitherrigidity or open mindedness andcompassion. Religious leaders in ourregion are moving in the right direc-tion. This may have long-term reper-cussions in their reactions to manydevelopmental issues includingwomen’s rights, governance andaccess to knowledge. All of theseaspects are essential components inany effective response to HIV/AIDS.

Issues and questions callingfor further Study

In the current situation, the pro-gramme is trying to convince reli-gious leaders to talk to and learn

from scientists. But there is a need forresearch on the role of religion indemocratisation. The hope is that theacknowledgment of the existence of apluralistic Arab society could act as afirst step towards the freedom ofthought and the freedom of science.

Further questions on harmful tra-ditional practices (including FemaleGenital Mutilation) and new kinds ofmarriage, the roots of models of sexu-ality in religious ethics, the religiousapproach to harm reduction and otherissues need to be further studied.

The experience is likely to berepeatable in other regions of theworld but further studies on how itmay evolve in different contexts arealso called for.

The Future of this Initiative

The next step is to hold another majorregional conference in order to createa regional network of all the RLs whoactually started action within theircommunities conveying the messagesagreed upon and implementing theprinciples of this initiative.

The Arabic first letters of thewords that mean: “Network of FaithBased Agencies Working in the FieldOf AIDS”, form a word that soundslike “Chahama.” In Arabic this wordis difficult to translate, but it doescarry the meanings of generosity,courage and gallantry. These aresome of the ethical values the Arabworld needs in order to face theHIV/AIDS pandemic.


In 2005, the Russian Pugwash Committee, along withthe world-wide international scientific and non-gov-ernmental community, marked the 50th anniversary of

the Russell-Einstein Manifesto. The Organizing Commit-tee for jubilee events was headed by Academicians Nicko-lay Plate and Yuri Ryzhov, and Professor Sergey Kapitza,Alexander Nikitin, and Alexander Ginzburg. Meetingswere sponsored by the Russian Academy of Sciences(RAS), Russian Foundation for Basic Research and theInternational Federation for Peace and Conciliation.

With deep grief, Committee members learned of thedeath of Sir Joseph Rotblat on August 31, 2005. He wasour good friend and colleague. On October 4 we orga-nized a memorial service “The Russell-Einstein Manifestoand the Legacy of Sir J. Rotblat”. Famous scientists,including member of the Pugwash Council Prof. F.Calogero, gave talks in memory of Jo. Participants at thismemorial decided to organize an annual Russian Rotblatmemorial lecture series in the future.

A scientific session of the RAS Presidium titled “Inter-national Security, Non-Proliferation and Social Responsi-bility of Scientists” was held on November 29, 2005 as themain jubilee event inRussia of the Russell-Ein-stein 50th anniversary. Inhis opening addressChairman of the RussianPugwash Committee andmember of the PugwashCouncil Academician Yu.Ryzhov stressed that sci-entists bear high moraland professional author-ity and therefore canexercise unbiased influ-ence on politics. In hisview Russia now faces anenormous problem ofdialogue between thegovernment and society –

in this case the gap is almost as great as in the income ratesof the rich and the poor. Such gaps are fraught with unpre-dictable consequences, and Pugwash must pay attention tothis problem.

Vice President of the RAS, Academician N. Plate,noted the lack of global ideas in world affairs which couldgather the support of the entire international community.To help fill this need, Pugwash should seek new dynamicsin the aspiration for the resolution of global problems,especially the problems of terrorism and extremism. Healso mentioned that the Russian Academy of Sciences andthe Russian scientific community must expand the partici-pation in Pugwash of high levels of scientific and moralleadership.

Professor S. Kapitza touched on the crucial differencesbetween the scientific community and political elites whenanalyzing the relations between these two groups. Scien-tists possess a freedom of action and opinion not availableto political leaders, which is one reason that politicians donot always want, or are able, to acknowledge the impor-tance of the advice and recommendations of scientists.Accordingly, Pugwash must continue to play a key role insupporting high-level and positive dialogue between scien-

tists and political leaders. Other Committee

meetings celebrating the50th anniversary of theRussell-Einstein Mani-festo were held at theFederation for Peace andConciliation (Moscow),University for AerospaceInstrumentation (St.Petersburg), and ObninskCenter for Science andTechnology (KalugaRegion). More then 100participants attendedthese meetings to discussscientific cooperation and

The Russian Pugwash Committee

Mikhail Lebedev

N A T I O N A L P U G W A S H G R O U P S

Kirill Babievsky, Alexander Ginzburg, Mikhail Lebedev, Yuri Ryzhov


terrorism counter-measures, as well as the development ofnew technologies in Russia.

On November 10-14, 2005, I visited Grozny, the capi-tal of Chechnya. This visit was sponsored by the GroznyState Oil Institute, which bears the name of AcademicianM. Millionshchikov, Chairman of the Soviet PugwashCommittee in 1964–1973. Discussions with members ofthe Government of Chechnya and leaders of science andeducation were characterized by the necessity for recon-struction of the Republic’s economy, educational system,and society. Murders, kidnappings, government corrup-tion and the slow process of the reconstruction ofdwellings and industry are very serious problems forChechnya. Especially valuable would be the creation ofcivil society organizations and special programs for therehabilitation of Chechen youth. In spite of a painful

impression after my visit to destroyed Grozny, I have a‘prudent pessimism’ that Russian and Chechen leaders cancarry the newly-started peace process to its conclusion.

Finally, we are pleased to announce that the RussianPugwash Committee has started its own scientific andmedia internet project in Russian and English atwww.pugwash.ru, and that the Russian Pugwash Commit-tee will organize a series of event and publications in 2007to commemorate the 50th anniversary of the PugwashConferences.

Mikhail LEBEDEV is Executive Secretary of the RussianPugwash Committee and Head of the Program on Interna-tional Security, Cooperation and Regional Problems of theInternational Federation for Peace and Conciliation,Moscow

B O O K S

The Russian Military: Power and Policy, edited bySteven E. Miller and Dmitri Trenin (MIT Press, 2004).

Statehood and Security: Georgia after the RoseRevolution, edited by Bruno Coppieters and RobertLegvold (MIT Press, 2005).

The Physics of Space Security, David Wright, LauraGrego, and Lisbeth Gronlund (American Academy ofArts and Sciences, 2005).

United States Space Policy: Challenges andOpportunities, George Abbey and Neal Lane(American Academy of Arts and Sciences, 2005).

Russian and Chinese Responses to U.S. Military Plansin Space, Pavel Podvig and Hui Zhang (AmericanAcademy of Arts and Sciences, forthcoming).

The Minimum Means of Reprisal: China’s Search forSecurity in the Nuclear Age, Jeffrey G. Lewis (MITPress, forthcoming).

The Russian Military

Power and Policy

Steven E. Miller and Dmitri Trenin, editors

Statehood and Security

Georgia after the Rose Revolution

Bruno Coppieters and Robert Legvold, editors


Report byJuan Pablo Pardo-Guerra

During the first half of 2006, International Stu-dent/Young Pugwash engaged in several activitiesthat resulted in an increase of both the size and

scope of our community and, in addition, to the fosteringof a closer relation with senior Pugwash.

In late April 2006, Aleksandra Dzisiow, BenjaminRusek and Juan Pablo Pardo-Guerra had the uniqueopportunity to attend the conference “Iran’s nuclearenergy program: policies and prospects” in Tehran, Iran.Jointly organized by the Pugwash Conferences on Scienceand World Affairs and the Center for Strategic Research inTehran, this event allowed the three international studentsto analyze in closer detail the elements that comprise thenuclear issue in the region. But, just as importantly, thisevent allowed existing members of the student Pugwashcommunity to meet with some of their peers, in particular,graduate students in social and political studies in Iran.Hopefully, this encounter will become the first of manysuch interactions between students from the Middle Eastand the broader ISYP community.

Then, from the 14-16 June 2006, 23 students andyoung professionals from various countries participated inthe ISYP workshop on “New Challenges to Human Secu-rity” in Wageningen, The Netherlands. Organized by thelocal senior and student/young Pugwash groups under theauspices of the Netherlands Ministry of Foreign Affairs,the workshop allowed the participants to go beyond thetraditional core topics of the Pugwash movement and viewthe multifarious threats confronted by humankind from adifferent, yet interesting, perspective. In particular, theworkshop presented students the possibility to adopt amultidisciplinary perspective on the causes of conflict, thusgoing beyond the perceptions that prevail both in acade-mia and the political sphere. A selection of the articles sub-

mitted by conference participants as well as by keynotespeakers will be published in future issues of the ISYPJournal on Science and World Affairs at www.scienceand-worldaffairs.org.

In parallel to these events, the Executive Board of ISYP,in close collaboration with Karim Kadry (Egypt) and othermembers of the local organizing committee, has continuedthe preparations for the 2006 ISYP Conference, which willtake place on the 9th and 10th of November 2006 in Cairo,Egypt. As an event that will join new and existing mem-bers of the student Pugwash community with senior Pug-washites, the 2006 ISYP Conference will serve as an idealvenue to discuss the interconnected themes of conflict, pol-itics, science, technology and development with a focus onthe Middle East.

Finally, the Executive Board of ISYP has continued itssearch for an organizational arrangement better suited todeal with the fluid nature of the student community andwith the renewed relationship of ISYP with senior Pug-wash. Many challenges lay ahead in this respect, althoughcreative solutions are being sought that will ensure thehealthy development of ISYP as well as a constructivepartnership with the senior Pugwash community.

International Student/Young Pugwash

I S Y P

ISYP participants in Hiroshima, July 2005.


Iwao Ogawa, a Japanese physicist, Professor Emeritus ofRikkyo University (St. Paul University) in Tokyo and a

participant in the First Pugwash Conference held at Pug-wash, Nova Scotia, Canada in 1957, died on June 13,2006 in Tokyo at the age of 84.

Born in Tokyo in August 1921, as a small child he metoften with his uncle Hideki Yukawa, a signatory of theRussell-Einstein Manifest in 1955 and a Nobel Prize Lau-reate in physics in 1949. After graduation from the Uni-versity of Tokyo in 1943, Iwao Ogawa became a teacherof mechanics at the Naval Academy located at Edajima,16 km south from Hiroshima.

On August 6, 1945 at the grounds of the Academy hewas shocked by a sudden flash, then a blast. He observeda mushroom cloud growing in the north sky. It was theatomic bomb explosion over Hiroshima. His place washowever so far from the hypocenter of the explosion thathe was not injured by the heat rays and radioactivity.

After World War II he became an associate professor atthe University of Tokyo and in 1955 he moved to the Fac-ulty of Science, Rikkyo University, where he later held theposition of Director, Institute for Atomic Energy. His

works included the analyses of the mechanism of instru-ments measuring radioactivity and its improvements.

In those days there were many atmospheric nuclearweapon tests by the USA, the Soviet Union and the UK. Asa result, the atmosphere in the world, especially in thenorthern hemisphere, was polluted by radioactivity.Ogawa and the Rikkyo group measured and analysed theradioactive materials contained in the air.

Ogawa was one of three Japanese participants, alongwith Prof. Yukawa and Prof. S. Tomonaga, at the firstconference in Pugwash, Nova Scotia, 1957, and he thenattended more than 10 subsequent Pugwash workshopsand conferences over the next four decades, including the40th anniversary symposium held at Thinker’s Lodge inJuly 1997. He also attended the Nobel Peace Prize cere-mony for the Pugwash Conferences and Joseph Rotblat inOslo, Norway in December 1995.

With a frank personality and a wide intellectual curios-ity, Ogawa wrote and lectured widely about Pugwash top-ics and nuclear disarmament.

—Michiji Konuma, Pugwash Japan

Iwao Ogawa(1921–2006)

Robert (Bob) Reford, a longtime member of the Cana-dian Pugwash group, died on May 9, 2006 at his

home in Nova Scotia at the age of 85. Born in 1921 in London, to Canadian parents, Robert

was educated at Winchester College and New College,Oxford, and later served with the Irish Guards from 1940-1946 with the rank of Captain, seeing action as an intelli-gence officer in France, Germany and Malaysia.

After the war, he began a career in journalism, andthen joined the staff of the United Nations Institute forTraining and Research as special assistant to the director.In 1971, he was appointed Executive Director of theCanadian Institute of International Affairs, where heserved until 1978.

A prolific writer, he edited and wrote several books,notably Canada and Three Crises, on Canada’s foreign

policy during the international crises of the offshoreislands of China, Suez and Cuba.

Robert had a lifelong involvement in the PugwashConferences on Science and World Affairs, attending hisfirst conference in 1973 in Finland, and seven morethrough the 1992 annual conference in Berlin. He and hiswife Stephanie also played an important part when Hali-fax and Pugwash, Nova Scotia hosted the 53rd PugwashConference in July 2003.

An avid bird-watcher, he was also an excellent golferand skier. With his exceptional height and full head ofwhite curly hair, Bob was a striking figure wherever hetravelled. Even after a stroke diminished his mobility, histwinkle and charm never left him and he often bested hisfriends and family with his repartee and wordplay.

—Stephanie Reford, Pugwash Canada

Robert William Reford(1921–2006)

O B I T U A R I E S


Italian Pugwash GroupINTERNATIONAL SCHOOL ON DISARMAMENT AND RESEARCH ON CONFLICTS

Founded in 1966

20th Winter Course“Terrorism, Counter-terrorism, and Human Rights”

ANDALO (TRENTO) – ITALY14–21 JANUARY 2007

ISODARCO has organized residential courses on global security since 1966, primarily in Italy but also in

China, Germany and Jordan with the generous support of private foundations and International and National

Institutions and Organizations. The courses are intended for those who would like to play a more active and

technically competent role in the field of international conflicts as well as those who already have a pro-

fessional interest and experience in this field. The courses are intensive, interactive and interdisciplinary in

focus. The subject matters span not only the technical and scientific dimensions of these problems but also

their sociological and political implications.

PRINCIPAL LECTURERS:

Alexei Arbatov, Carnegie Moscow Center, Moscow, Russia;

Nadia Arbatova, Institute of the World Economy and International Relations, Moscow, Russia;

Sergey Batsanov, Pugwash Conferences on Science and World Affairs, Geneva, Switzerland;

Gary Chapman, University of Texas, Austin TX, USA;

Christopher Chyba, Princeton University, Princeton NJ, USA;

Giovanni Ercolani, Nottingham Trent University and University of Urbino, Italy

Virginie Guiraudon, European University Institute, Florence, Italy;

Mary Fainsod Katzenstein, Cornell University, Ithaca NY, USA;

Peter Katzenstein, Cornell University, Ithaca NY, USA;

Catherine McArdle Kelleher, Watson Institute, Brown University, Providence RI, USA;

Maati Monjib, Universitéé Moulay Ismail, Meknèès, Morocco;

Alexander Nikitin, Russian Political Science Association, Moscow, Russia.

Deborah Pearlstein, Human Rights First, Washington DC, USA

Robert Nurick, Monterey Institute of International Studies, Washington DC, USA;

For more information, contact:

Prof. CARLO SCHAERFDepartment of Physics

University of Rome “Tor Vergata”Via della Ricerca Scientifica 1, 00133 Rome, Italy

Tel.: (+39) 06 72594560/1 — Fax: (+39) 06 2040309E-mail: [email protected]

I S O D A R C O



Amb. (ret.) Ochieng Adala, of the AfricaPeace Forum (APFO) in Nairobi, Kenya,is former Permanent Representative ofKenya to the United Nations in NewYork, former Deputy Secretary/Directorfor Political Affairs, Ministry of ForeignAffairs and International Cooperation,and former Ambassador of Kenya to theArab Republic of Egypt, the Kingdom ofMorocco, Algeria and Tunisia; APFO,P.O. Box 76621, Tel.: (++254-2)574092/6, Fax: (++254-2) 561357,E-mail: [email protected]

Dr. Jeffrey Boutwell is Executive Directorof Pugwash Conferences on Science andWorld Affairs, former Associate Execu-tive Officer at the American Academy ofArts and Sciences in Cambridge, and for-mer Staff Aide at the National SecurityCouncil in Washington, DC; PugwashConferences, 2029 P St., NW, Suite 301,Washington, D.C. 20036, Tel. (++1-202)478-3440, Fax: (++1-202) 238-9604,Email: [email protected]

Prof. Francesco Calogero is Professor ofTheoretical Physics at the University ofRome “La Sapienza”. Formerly, he wasSecretary-General of Pugwash (1989-1997), Chair of the Pugwash Council(1997-2002), and a member of the Gov-erning Board of SIPRI (1982-1992); Pug-wash Conferences, via della Lungara 10,I-00165 Roma, Italy, Tel. (++39-06) 687-2606, Fax: (++39-06) 687-8376, E-mail:[email protected] /[email protected] (pleaseuse BOTH)

Col. (ret.) Pierre Canonne is a Lecturer inDisarmament and Arms Control issues atthe Univ. Marne-la-Vallés/Paris, formerHead of TDB at the Organization for theProhibition of Chemical Weapons in TheHague, former Senior Staff in the Strate-gic Affairs Department of the FrenchMinistry of Defense, and former Negotia-tor, Chemical Weapons Convention; 29Avenue Danton, 43300 Langeac, France,Tel./Fax: (++33-4) 71 77 24 57, E-mail:[email protected]

Mr. Chen Jifeng is Convener of the Pug-wash Group of China; Vice President ofthe China Arms Control and Disarma-ment Association; Executive Vice Presi-

dent of the China Association for Promo-tion of International Science and Peace;he was formerly Secretary General of theChinese People’s Association for Peaceand Disarmament (CPAPD) in Beijing,and Council Member of the ChineseAssociation for International Understand-ing; CPAPD, PO Box 188, 15 WanshouRd., Beijing, China 100036, Tel.: (++86-10) 6827-1736 or 6821-4433 (ext.8586), Fax: (++86-10) 6827-3675,E-mail: [email protected]

Prof. Paolo Cotta-Ramusino is SecretaryGeneral of Pugwash Conferences (sinceAugust 2002; Professor of MathematicalPhysics at the University of Milan; Direc-tor of the Program on Science, Technol-ogy and International Security, LandauNetwork – Centro Volta, Como; and for-mer Secretary General of the Union ofItalian Scientists for Disarmament(USPID); Department of Physics, Univer-sity of Milan, Via Celoria 16, 20133Milan, Italy, Tel.: (**39-02) 5031 7277,Fax: (**39-02) 5031 7480, E-mail:[email protected]

Dr. Lynn Eden is Associate Director forResearch and Senior Research Scholar atthe Center for International Security andCooperation (CISAC) at Stanford Univer-sity in California, and co-chair of the USPugwash Committee; CISAC, EncinaHall, 2nd floor, Stanford University, Stan-ford, California 94305-6165, Tel.: (++1-650) 725 5369, Fax: (++1-650) 7245683, E-mail: [email protected]

Prof. Galia Golan-Gild is Professor Gov-ernment, Interdisciplinary Center (IDC),Herzliya, Israel, and Professor Emerita ofthe Department of Political Science,Hebrew University of Jerusalem. She wasformerly the Darwin Professor of Sovietand East European Studies, and Chair,Department of Political Science, HebrewUniversity of Jerusalem; E-mail:[email protected]

Dr. Karen Hallberg is Professor of Physicsat the Instituto Balseiro (Bariloche,Argentina), Research Fellow at theArgentine National Council of Scienceand Technology, a member of the Boardof the Argentine Physical Association,and a member of the Bariloche Group for

Science and World Affairs; Centro Atom-ico Bariloche, 8400 Bariloche, Argentina,Tel.: (++54-2944) 445170, Fax: (++54-2944) 445299, E-mail:[email protected]

Prof. Pervez Hoodbhoy is Professor ofNuclear Physics at Quaid-e-Azam Univer-sity in Islamabad; Chairman of MashalBooks; an independent maker of docu-mentary films for popularising science inPakistan; and an activist for peace andsocial reform; E-mail:[email protected]

Gen. (ret.) Dr. Mohamed Kadry Said isHead of the Military Studies Unit andTechnology Advisor at the Al-AhramCenter for Political and Strategic Studies,Al-Ahram Foundation in Cairo, Egypt;Professor of Missile Mechanics of Flightat the Military Technical College (MTC)in Cairo; Member of the Committee ofStrategic Planning of the Egyptian Coun-cil of Space Science and Technology; Al-Ahram Center for Political and StrategicStudies, Al-Galaa St., Cairo, Egypt, Tel.:(++20-2) 770-5630, Fax: (++20-2) 578-6037, E-mail: [email protected]

Prof. Saideh Lotfian is Associate Profes-sor of Political Science at the Faculty ofLaw and Political Science at the Univer-sity of Tehran, Deputy Director of theCenter for Middle East Strategic Studiesin Tehran, and the former Director of theMiddle East Program at the Center forStrategic Research; Faculty of Law &Political Science, University of Tehran,Enghelab Ave., Tehran, Iran, Tel.: (++98-21) 611-2546, Fax: (++98-21) 896-9565,E-mail: [email protected]

Prof. Anne McLaren is PrincipalResearch Associate at WellcomeTrust/Cancer Research UK, Institute ofCell and Developmental Biology; a Mem-ber of the British Pugwash Group; Mem-ber of the European Commission’s LifeSciences Group and European Group onEthics; and former Foreign Secretary ofthe Royal Society; Tel.: (++44-1223) 334088, E-mail: [email protected]

Dr. Steven Miller is Director of the Inter-national Security Program of the BelferCenter for Science and InternationalAffairs at Harvard University’s Kennedy

Pugwash Council for the 2002–2007 Quinquennium



School of Government, Editor-in-chief ofthe quarterly International Security, andCo-chair of the US Pugwash Committee.Formerly, he was a Senior Research Fel-low at the Stockholm International PeaceResearch Institute (SIPRI), and taughtdefense and arms control studies in thePolitical Science Department at the Mass-achusetts Institute of Technology; CSIA,J.F. Kennedy School of Government, Har-vard University, 79 JFK Street, Cam-bridge, Massachusetts 02138, Tel. (++1-617) 495-1411, Fax: (++1-617)495-8963, E-mail: [email protected]

Prof. Marie Muller is Chair of the Pug-wash Council, and Dean of the Faculty ofHumanities and Director of the Centrefor International Political Studies at theUniversity of Pretoria. She is also aCouncil Member of the Academy of Sci-ence of South Africa, and Chair of thePugwash South Africa Group; Universityof Pretoria, Pretoria 0002, Republic ofSouth Africa, Tel.: (++27-12) 420-2318,Fax: (++27-12) 420 4501, E-mail:[email protected]

Dr. Götz Neuneck is a physicist workingon international security issues. He iscurrently Senior Fellow at the Institutefor Peace Research and Security Policy(IFSH) in Hamburg; Member of theCouncil of the German Physical Society(DPG), and Deputy Chairman of theWorking Group “Physics and Disarma-ment” in the DPG; IFSH, Falkenstein 1,D-22587 Hamburg, Germany, Tel.:(++49-40) 866077-21, Fax: (++49-40)866-3615, E-mail: [email protected]

Dr. Alexander Nikitin is Director of theCenter for Political and InternationalStudies (CPIS); Vice Chairman of theRussian Pugwash Committee of Scientistsfor Disarmament and International Secu-rity; Professor at Moscow State Institutefor International Relations; First Vice-President of the Russian Political ScienceAssociation; and Board Member of theRussian Academy of Political Sciences;CPIS, Prospect Mira 36, Moscow, Russ-ian Federation 129010, Tel. (++7-095)280-3441, Fax: (++7-095) 280-0245, E-mail: [email protected]

Prof. Hitoshi Ohnishi is Professor ofInternational Relations and Deputy Presi-dent at Tohoku University in Sendai,

Japan; former President of the PeaceStudies Association of Japan; and formerCouncil Member of the Japanese PoliticalScience Association; School of Law,Tohoku University, Kawauchi, Aoba-ku,Sendai 980-8576, Japan, E-mail:[email protected]

Gen. Pan Zhengqiang is Professor at theInstitute of Strategic Studies at theNational Defense University, PLA, China,a retired Major General in the ChinesePeople’s Army, and former Director of theInstitute of Strategic Studies; Institute ofStrategic Studies, National Defense Uni-versity, PLA, China, Tel/Fax: (++86-10)8283-1159, E-mail: [email protected]

Senator Douglas Roche, O.C., is a mem-ber of The Senate of Canada; former Vis-iting Professor at the University ofAlberta in Edmonton; Chairman of theCanadian Pugwash Group; Chairman ofthe Middle Powers Initiative; and formerCanadian Ambassador for Disarmament;University of Alberta, Edmonton,Alberta, Canada, Tel.: (++1-780) 466-8072, Fax (++1-780) 469-4732, E-mail:[email protected] (or)[email protected]

Acad. Yuri Ryzhov is President of theInternational Engineering University inMoscow; Chair of the Russian PugwashGroup; Academician of the RussianAcademy of Sciences; former Member ofthe Presidential Council of the RussianFederation; and former AmbassadorExtraordinary and Plenipotentiary ofRussia to France; 6 Leninsky pr.,Moscow, Russia, Tel.: ++7-095) 236-5066 / 9761, Fax: (++7-095) 236-1469,E-mail: [email protected]

Air Commodore Jasjit Singh, AVSM,VrC, VM, a former veteran fighter pilotand Director of Operations of the IndianAir Force, is currently Director of theCentre for Strategic and InternationalStudies; he was Director of the Institutefor Defence Studies and Analyses (IDSA)in New Delhi (1987-2001), and a Mem-ber of the National Security AdvisoryBoard; he has published extensively onstrategic and security issues; 18/803, Her-itage City, Mehrauli Road, Gurgaon-122002, India, Tel.: (++91-124) 891-7701, E-mail: [email protected] (or)[email protected]

Prof. Ivo Slaus, a Member of the Croat-ian Parliament, is Chairman of the Parlia-mentary Subcommittee on Science,Higher Education & Technology, Presi-dent of Croatian Pugwash, a Member ofthe Club of Rome, a Fellow of the WorldAcademy and Academia Europea, formerProfessor of Physics at Rudjer BoskovicInstitute, and former Foreign Secretary ofthe Croatian Academy of Sciences &Arts; Rudjer Boskovic Institute, Bijenicka54, P.O. Box 1016, 10000 Zagreb, Croa-tia, Tel.:(++385-1) 46 80 202, Fax:(++385-1) 46 80 239, E-mail: [email protected]

Prof. Fernando de Souza Barros is Profes-sor Emeritus at the Physics Institute of theFederal University of Rio de Janeiro inBrazil; Physics Institute, UFRJ, Tel.:(++55-21) 2562-7337, Fax: (++55-21)2562-7368, E-mail: [email protected]

Dr. Mark Byung-Moon Suh, a SouthKorean political scientist, is a SeniorResearcher in the Department of PoliticalScience at the Free University of Berlin inGermany and President of the KoreanPugwash Group. He was formerly thedirector of the Korean InternationalPeace Research Institute (KIPRI) in Seoul,and a member of the Advisory Councilon Peaceful and Democratic Unificationof Korea; Schlieperstr. 12, D-13507Berlin, Germany, Tel.: (++49-30) 433-8574, Fax: (++49-30) 433-2896, E-mail:[email protected]

Prof. M.S. Swaminathan is a renownedagriculture scientist. Considered the sci-entific leader of the Green Revolution, hisapproach in pioneering “ever-green revo-lution” is at the heart of what is nowcalled sustainable agriculture. He is apast recipient of the World Food Prize,the Honda Award, the RamonMagsaysay Award, the UNESCO GandhiPrize, and the Indira Gandhi Prize forPeace, Disarmament and Development.He chaired the International Commissionon Peace and Food, and is UNESCOChair in Ecotechnology, and Chairman ofthe MS Swaminathan Research Founda-tion in Chennai, India; MS SwaminathanResearch Foundation, 3rd Cross Street,Taramani Institutional Area, Chennai-600 113, India, Tel.: (++91-44) 254 2790/ 1698, Fax: (++91-44) 254 1319, E-mail:[email protected]

Calendar of Future Pugwash Meetings

7–8 June 2006 Pugwash Meeting no. 320: Pugwash Workshop on Nuclear Amsterdam, The Netherlands Non-Proliferation and Disarmament: The role of Europe

16–18 June 2006 Pugwash Meeting no. 321: Pugwash Netherlands Workshop onWageningen, The Netherlands New Challenges to Human Security

25–28 September 2006 ISODARCO Meeting Xiamen, Fujian Province 10th PIIC Beijing Seminar on International Security:China Harmony Makes the World Stable and Secure

10–15 November 2006 56th Pugwash Conference on Science and World Affairs:Cairo, Egypt A Region in Transition: Peace and Reform in the Middle East

14–21 January 2007 20th ISODARCO Winter Course: Terrorism, Counterterrorism, Andalo, Italy and Human Rights

2007

5–7 July 2007 Pugwash 50th Anniversary Workshop: Pugwash, Nova Scotia Revitalizing Nuclear Disarmament

October 2007 57th Pugwash Conference on Science and World Affairs:Bari, Italy The Fiftieth Anniversary of Pugwash

Pugwash Conferences on Science and World Affairs

President Professor M.S. Swaminathan

Secretary-General Professor Paolo Cotta-Ramusino

Executive Director Dr. Jeffrey Boutwell

Pugwash Council

Chair Professor Marie Muller

Members Ambassador Ochieng Adala

Professor Fernando de Souza Barros

Dr. Jeffrey Boutwell

Professor Francesco Calogero

Dr. Pierre Canonne

Professor Paolo Cotta-Ramusino

Dr. Lynn Eden

Professor Galia Golan-Gild

Professor Karen Hallberg

Professor Pervez Hoodbhoy

Mr. Chen Jifeng

Maj. Gen. Mohamed Kadry Said

Prof. Saideh Lotfian

Pugwash Executive Committee

Chairman Professor Paolo Cotta-Ramusino

Members Dr. Jeffrey Boutwell

Prof. Saideh Lotfian

Professor Marie Muller

Amb. Miguel Marin-Bosch

Professor Anne McLaren

Dr. Steven Miller

Dr. Götz Neuneck

Dr. Alexander Nikitin

Professor Hitoshi Ohnishi

Maj. Gen. (ret.) Pan Zhenqiang

Senator Douglas Roche

Academician Yuri Ryzhov

Air Commodore Jasjit Singh

Professor Ivo Slaus

Dr. Mark Byung-Moon Suh

Professor M.S. Swaminathan

Professor M.S. Swaminathan

Maj. Gen. (ret.) Pan Zhenqiang

Geneva Office16 rue de la Voie-Creuse1211 Geneva, SwitzerlandPhone: **41-22-919-7920Fax: **41-22-919-7925E-mail: [email protected]

Washington, DC Office1111 19th Street NW12th FloorWashington, DC 20036Phone: **1-202-478-3440Fax: **1-202-238-9604E-mail: [email protected]

London OfficeFlat A Museum Mansions63A Great Russell StreetLondon WC1B 3BJ, EnglandPhone: **44-20-7405-6661Fax: **44-20-7831-5651E-mail: [email protected]

Rome OfficeAccademia Nazionale de Linceivia della Lungara, 10I-00165 Rome, ItalyPhone: **39-06-6872606Fax: **39-06-6878376E-mail: [email protected]

N E W S L E T T E R - Pugwash Conferences on Science and ...

Documents

Transcript of N E W S L E T T E R - Pugwash Conferences on Science and ...