Monetary History of Mughal India as Reflected in Silver Coin Hoards

IAROSTA

MONETARY HISTORY OF MUGHAL INDIA

AS REFLECTED

IN SILVER COIN HOARDS

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MONETARY HISTORY OF MUGHAL INDIAAS REFLECTED

IN SILVER COIN HOARDS

JAROSLAV STRNAD

Contents

Contents v

Graphs viii

Tables ix

INTRODUCTION 1

PART ONE : CHARACTER OF DATA 7

1. Coin Hoards, Treasure Troves and Hoard Inventories 7

2. Approaches to Statistical Processing of Mughal Silver Coins 8

The Method of Aziza Hasan 8

The Method of Shireen Moosvi 11

The Method Based on Data Derived from Hoards 15

3. The Filters 18

Filter I: Coins Circulating - Coins Hoarded 21

Filter II: Coins Hoarded - Coins Recovered in Modern Times 25

Filter III: Coins Recovered in Modern Times -

Coins Entered into Treasure Trove Reports 26

Filter IV: Coins Inspected and Entered into Treasure Trove Reports -

Written Evidence of Dispersed Coins 30

4. Types of Hoards 31

Long-term Savings Hoards 31

Composite Hoards 33

Emergency Hoards 33

Other Hoards 34

v

PART TWO : STRUCTURE OF HOARDS 37

1. Chronology of Hoards 37

2. Spatial and Temporal Distribution of Hoards 40

3. Sizes of Hoards 43

4. Structure of Hoards 49

Temporal Structure 50

1. Akbar 52

2. Jah€ng…r 54

3. Sh€hjah€n 56

4. Aurangzeb 58

5. Sh€h ³lam I. and FarruÇsiy€r 60

6. Muhammad Sh€h 61

PART THREE : THE MINTS 63

1. Preliminary 63

2. Mints of the Akbar… Period (1556-1605) 65

Three Great Akbar… Mints 71

Ahmadabad 71

Thatta 73

Lahore 76

3. The Regnal Period of Jah€ng…r (1606-1627) 81

Qandahar 1606-1622 84

4. The Era of Sh€hjah€n (1627-1658) 88

Multan 90

Surat 93

Patna 100

5. Mints During the Reign of Aurangzeb (1658-1707) 102

Surat 105

The Rise of Central Mints 109

6. The Period 1707-1760 117

7. Peculiarities in Dispersal Patterns of Coins Minted in the Area of the U.P. 121

8. Mughal Silver Coin Stock, 1560-1760 123

CONCLUSION 130

Bibliography 141

vi

APPENDIX I 147

1. Basic Statistics of Silver Coin Hoards of the U.P. 149

2. Mughal Silver Coin Hoards 1536-1760 with Percentual Shares of Coins

of Different Regnal Periods 153

3. Hoards 1760-1942 159

APPENDIX II 163

1. Hoards Arranged by Districts 165

2. Hoards Arranged by Districts - Summary by 50-year Periods 181

APPENDIX III 183

1. Mughal Silver Mints 185

2. Incidences of Silver Coins with Monthly Dates from the Ahmadabad,

Lahor and Tatta mints (Akbar and Jahangir) 200

vii

GraphsFig. 1. Coin incidences in museum catalogues and in hoards of the U.P. compared 10Fig. 2. Hypothetical growth of Mughal silver coin stock

computed by two different methods of increment assessment and different estimates of the basic coin stock (1595=100) 15

Fig. 3. Coin hoards of the U.P. registered by the State Museum, Lucknowin the years 1882-1979 26

Fig. 4. Accumulation periods of Mughal silver coin hoards 36Fig. 5. Mughal coin hoards of the U.P., 1560-1760 38Fig. 6. Sizes of Mughal silver hoards of the U.P. (1556-1942) 45Fig. 7. Percentual shares of silver coins of different regnal periods in hoards,

1556-1760 51Fig. 8. Average percentages of Akbar… silver coins in hoards deposited

in the area of U.P. in the years 1556-1700 53Fig. 9. Average percentages of Jahang…r… silver coins in hoards deposited

in the area of U.P. in the years 1605-1735 55Fig. 10. Average percentages of Sh€hjah€n… silver coins in hoards deposited

in the area of U.P. in the years 1628-1760 57Fig. 11. Average percentages of Aurangzeb… silver coins in hoards deposited

in the area of U.P. in the years 1660-1760 59Fig. 12. Average percentages of Sh€h ³lam… and FarruÇsiy€r… silver coins

in hoards deposited in the area of U.P. in the years 1707-1760 61Fig. 13. Average percentages of Muhammad Shah’s silver coins in hoards

deposited in the area of U.P. in the years 1719-1760 62Fig. 14. Incidence of Mughal silver coins minted in the years 1556-1605

in coin hoards deposited in the area of the U.P. and recoveredin the years 1882-1979 65

Fig. 15. Incidence of Ahmadabadi silver coins minted in the years 1573-1760in coin hoards deposited in the area of the U.P. 72

Fig. 16. Fluctuations in the monthly output of the Ahmadabad mint, based onhoards containing Akbar… (38.-50. r.y.) and Jah€ng…r… (1.-12. r.y.) coins 73

Fig. 17. Incidence of silver coins minted in the mint of Thattain the years 1556-1740 in coin hoards deposited in the area of the U.P. 74

Fig. 18. Fluctuations in the monthly output of the Thatta mint, based onhoards containing Akbar… (38.-50. r.y.) and Jah€ng…ri (11.-22. r.y.) coins 75

Fig. 19. Incidence of Lahori silver coins minted in the years 1556-1760in coin hoards deposited in the area of the U.P. 77

Fig. 20. Fluctuations in the monthly output of the Lahore mint (based on hoardscontaining Akbar… and Jah€ng…r… coins) 78

Fig. 21. Incidence of Mughal silver coins minted in the years 1606-1627/28in coin hoards deposited in the area of the U.P. and recoveredin the years1882-1979 82

viii

Fig. 22. Incidence of Qandahari silver coins in coin hoards depositedin the area of the U.P. 85

Fig. 23. Incidence of Mughal silver coins minted in the years 1627-1660in coin hoards deposited in the area of the U.P. and recoveredin the years 1882-1979 89

Fig. 24. Incidence of Multani silver coins in coin hoards depositedin the area of the U.P. 92

Fig. 25. Incidences of Jah€ng…r… and Sh€hjah€n… silver coins minted at Suratin hoards of the U.P. 95

Fig. 26. Incidences of silver coins minted in Patna in the years 1556-1760in coin hoards deposited in the area of the U.P. 100

Fig. 27 Incidence of Mughal silver coins minted in the years 1660-1707in coin hoards deposited in the area of the U.P. 103

Fig. 28 Incidences of silver coins minted at Surat in the years 1660-1760in coin hoards deposited in the area of the U.P. 107

Fig. 29. Incidences of coins from major central mints minted in the years1680-1760 in coin hoards deposited in the area of the U.P. 110

Fig. 30. Trends in the development of the Bengal trade of the E.I.C. and V.O.C.compared to the trend in silver coin incidences from the centraland eastern mints 113

Fig. 31. Incidence of Mughal silver coins minted in the years 1708-1760in coin hoards deposited in the area of the U.P. and recoveredin the years 1882-1979 118

Fig. 32. Total of all incidences of Mughal silver coins minted in the years1556-1760 in coin hoards deposited in the area of the U.P. 124

Fig. 33. Hypothetical growth of north Indian Mughal silver coin stock(values of yearly increments identical with observed incidencesof coins minted in the respective year) adjusted for variousyearly rates of coin loss 127

TablesTab. 1. Distribution of Akbar…, Jah€ng…r…, Sh€hjah€n… and Aurangzeb… silver coins

in hoards deposited in the area of U.P. in the years 1560-1942 13Tab. 2. Factors of hoarding and subsequent recovering of coins 20Tab. 3. Gold, silver and copper in U.P. hoards containing Mughal coins

inventoried in the years 1882-1978/79 28Tab. 4. Mughal silver coin hoards classified as emergency and short-term

savings accumulations 35Tab. 5. Spatial and temporal concentrations of hoards 42Tab. 6. Sizes of hoards containing more than 100 coins 48Tab. 7. Estimate of gold and silver imports in Surat by the V.O.C. 98

ix

Preface

The genesis of this book was in a doctoral dissertation, Mughal Silver Coin Hoards of UttarPradesh, 1560-1760, submitted to the Charles University, Prague in 1999. I must expressmy gratitude to the Foreign and Commonwealth Office and the University of London for awardingme in 1991 the T. G. Masaryk Scholarship which enabled me to visit the School of Oriental andAfrican Studies in London and to use its splendid library. My great thanks are due to the Librarianat SOAS, Miss Barbara Burton, who was most helpful in making my soujourn there as productiveand comfortable as possible. I must thank to doc. dr. Miloslav Vošvrda, DrSc. from the UTIA,Academy of Sciences of the Czech Republic who was always ready to advise me on the moreintricate problems of statistical evaluation of the numismatic material. Mr Deepak Bhojwani,the Minister at the Indian Embassy, Prague, invested a great deal of personal energy into arrangingmy trip to India in 1999 during which I was able to consult the problems concerning theinterpretation of coin hoards with Indian historians and numismatists. I am particularly gratefulto Prof. Dr. Dietmar Rothermund from the South Asia Institute of Heidelberg University and toDr. Lakshmi Subramanian from the University of Calcutta who read the whole manuscript andencouraged me to go ahead with its publication; to Pratip Kumar Mitra, Keeper in the StateArchaeological Museum of West Bengal, Calcutta and to prof. B. N. Mukherjee from theUniversity of Calcutta who recommended me to visit the Indian Institute of Research inNumismatic Studies (IIRNS) in Anjaneri. Its Director, Mr. Amiteshwar Jha and the staff of thelibrary were most helpful in making available to me not only all the relevant literature but alsothe detailed reports of coin hoards found in Maharashtra. My greatest thanks are due to thefounder of this admirable institution, Shri K. K. Maheshwari for his personal commitmentwhich made possible the publication of the book in the present form. For any mistakes andshortcomings of this work, of course, the responsibility is solely mine.

Jaroslav Strnad Prague, October 2000

xi

1

Money, in the form of metallic coins as well as bills of exchange, formed an essential partof Mughal economic system from its formative phase in the second half of the 16th centurytill its demise in the second half of the 18th.1 Keeping in mind the recent criticism oftraditional notions of the Mughal state as the single and sovereign organizer of the earlymodern Indian economic and political system, I still feel that, at least in the present context,it is reasonable to use the term „Mughal“ not only in its more general sense referring to aparticular period of Indian history, but as a designation with specific content characterizingseveral essential attributes of the political and economic system. One can hardly imaginethe late medieval Indian economy without Mughal administrative, fiscal and monetaryreforms. In all these three areas the Mughal state managed to push its power and influencefarther than any of its predecessors. Still, Mughal control in the political and economicsphere was never total: at all times the Mughal state was a product of a number ofcompromises between imperial aspirations (often presented by contemporary chroniclersas actual facts) and resistant forces of the Indian environment.

This combination of prescriptive policy and realistic accommodation to forces perceivedas lying beyond the possibilities of imperial control was apparent also in the sphere of theimperial currency system. Here the Mughal state kept always close watch over the qualityof coins minted in numerous imperial mints2 (only state-controlled mints were allowed tooperate on Mughal territory) and was largely successful in keeping unified and almostunchanging standard of currency all over its dominions for a period of nearly two centuries- an achievement which very few states or empires could match. One should ask why itshould have been so. Monetary stability was certainly not a prominent feature of greatAsian empires in this period. Ottoman Empire, for example, was in the 17th century besetby a series of fiscal and monetary crises which led in the period of 1580 to 1640 to anexceptional instability of the silver akçe and to closing of many mints. One of the causes ofthese adverse developments appears to lie in the increasing difficulties the Ottoman

1 The most recent and very thorough study is S. Moosvi´s The Economy of the Mughal Empire: c. 1595.A Statistical Study. Delhi 1987. Mughal monetary system and policy is a subject of several articles. See, e.g., I.Habib, Currency System of the Mughal Empire (1556-1707). Medieval India Quarterly IV, 1-2 (1960); O.Prakash, On Coinage in Mughal India. IESHR XXV, 4 (1988), pp. 475-491 and collection of papers edited byJ. F. Richards, The Imperial Monetary System of Mughal India. Delhi 1987, esp. the contributions of. J. S.Deyell, M. H. Martin and I. Habib.

2 List of all Mughal gold, silver and copper mints was compiled by M. P. Singh, Town, Market, Mint andPort in the Mughal Empire, 1556-1707. (An Administrative-cum-economic Study). New Delhi 1985, AppendixA, pp. 237-256, supplemented by extensive bibliographic note.

Introduction

Monetary History of Mughal India2

government was having with locating sufficient supplies of silver.3 There are clear indicationsthat a great deal of silver coming from the West into the territories controlled by the Ottomanauthorities, tended to leave them again by eastern routes, drawn away mostly by the livelyIndian trade.4 Apart form the balance of payments the role of the state in the process ofmonetary circulation and redistribution of monetized wealth has also to be considered.Sophisticated and efficient methods of revenue collection, underpinned by a permanentlymobilized mansabdari military system, made the Mughal state the biggest creditor in thecountry. Being in the position of the single most important recipient and spender of coins,the omnipresent Mughal fiscal apparatus could easily set and enforce its monetary stand-ards in every part of the empire.5 The state was therefore eminently interested in maintaininga stable currency; thanks to the constantly active balance of payments on the one hand andsuccessful integration of newly conquered territories into its unified monetary system onthe other, it was also able to enforce it.

Whereas the control of the Mughal state over the form and quality of circulating coinswas quite strict and effective, the quantity of coins in circulation and exchange rates betweengold, silver and copper coins were left to spontaneous economic developments and self-regulating mechanisms of the market. Everybody could have his monetary metals minted,at a moderate price and in any requested quantity, in official mints, into fresh gold muhrs,silver rupees or copper d€ms. These, and their fractions, were the only monetary mediaallowed to circulate within the boundaries of the Mughal empire. The fact that these coinswere (with only small and temporary exceptions) also in actual practice the only acceptableones everywhere in the vast Mughal domains, testifies to the dominant position of theMughal state in the economic and financial affairs of the country.

The interest of the Mughal state in the quality of circulating coins was reflected ineven more detailed regulations than was the precious metal content of each minted coin.Newly struck coins (called sikk€) fetched a certain premium over coins minted in the previousyears of the same regnal period (the so called calan…) and these latter were in turn countedas of slightly higher value than coins struck during the previous reign (called Çaz€n€) orthose of foreign origin which were considered simply as bullion. Reminting of old andworn-out coins, carefully cultivated by this well-designed system of premiums and discounts6,

3 H. Inalcik and D. Quateret (eds.), An Economic and Social History of the Ottoman Empire. Volume Two:1600-1914. Cambridge 1994, pp. 961-2 in Part V, Money in the Ottoman Empire, 1326-1914 by Şevket Pamuk.

4 The role of Indians in the eastern trade is acknowledged but so far little studied by historians of theOttoman Empire. For a short overview by Suraiya Faroqhi, see ibid., p. 524-5.

5 Redistributive capacity of Mughal tax system was by any standard quite extraordinary and at the sametime heavily biased towards numerically very small elite of imperial mansabd€rs (holders of official ranks tiedto service in the army or administration). The overwhelming bulk of financial transactions (in terms of theirvalue) must have taken place in the sphere of its operation. See, S. Moosvi, op. cit., pp. 191-295 on the Akbar…period and A. J. Qaisar, Distribution of Revenue Resources of the Mughal Empire among the Nobles. Proceedingsof the Indian History Congress, 1965, pp. 237-242 on the times of Sh€hjah€n.

6 The system is described i.a. by I. Habib in his article on the currency system (see note no. 1 above) andby M. H. Martin, The Reforms of the Sixteenth Century and Akbar’s Administration: Metrological and MonetaryConsiderations. In: J. F. Richards (ed.), op. cit., pp. 68-99.

3Introduction

helped to keep silver in the monetary sphere and discouraged their owners from hoardingit: the longer the coins were laying idle in their coffers the more they lost of their initialvalue and buying power.

On the other hand, there was no way the Mughal state could exercise effective controlover the supply of monetary metals; in the 16th and 17th centuries neither gold nor silver wasmined in any significant quantity anywhere in its vast and otherwise wealthy domains.7 Therewere several copper mines, but their production lagged far behind the strong and apparentlygrowing demand. Nearly all new gold and silver that backed the gradual built-up of thisimpressive currency system came from two main sources: either from plunder and dishoardingof old precious metals stocks (this was true especially in the initial stages of the rapid imperialexpansion) or from foreign trade. Gold and especially silver were the main commoditiesdemanded by Indian merchants in exchange for their export products - in the 16th and 17thcenturies mainly textiles and spices. There is a general agreement among historians that forgreater part of the Mughal period silver and gold imports, containing large element of Americanorigin, constituted by far the most important source of monetary metals. Most of the importedstock probably remained in India; unknown amounts were re-exported to pay mainly for highquality horses purchased regularly for the Mughal army in the countries of Near East andCentral Asia.8 Quantitative characteristics and modes of payments prevailing in the trade withCentral Asia certainly constitute a promising field for future study.

This continuing influx of precious metals into the Indian subcontinent puzzled Europeancontemporaries, worried the directors of East India Companies and continues to occupy mindsof modern historians; one has to ask not only about causes of the apparently insatiable Indiandemand for silver, but also about actual quantitative aspects of their imports and, last but notleast, about their long-term effects on the internal stability and general well-being of theMughal imperial structure. Recent studies attempting to set these economic developments incomparative perspective and broader contexts of Eurasian or world history suggest that inthe long run these effects might not be as unequivocally benign as the admirable stability ofthe Mughal monetary system, considered in isolation, might lead us to believe. Abundantsupply of silver might have led to a general rise of prices and so to cause effects similar tothe so-called price revolution in Europe; the long debate over possible effects of importedsilver on the general price level is, however, still inconclusive. Reasons for this are to besought not only in the critical lack of hard evidence, but also in different methodologicalapproaches and theories applied to the explanation of this phenomenon.9

7 F. R. Allchin, Upon the Antiquity and Methods of Gold Mining in Ancient India. JESHO V (1962),pp.195-211; J. S. Deyell, Living Without Silver: The Monetary History of Early Medieval North India. Delhi1990, Appendix A, Medieval India’s Precious Metal Resources, pp. 249-252.

8 For the estimates of value of the horse trade and other imports in the Mughal period, see S. Moosvi, op.cit., pp. 376-381.

9 It is not necessary to recapitulate here the long debate on the thesis formulated by E. J. Hamilton in hisbook on American silver. Two recent studies on the Indian incarnation of the problem are J. J. Brennig, Silver inSeventeenth Century Surat: Monetary Circulation and the price Revolution in Mughal India. In: J. F. Richards(ed.), Precious Metals in the Later Medieval and Early Modern Worlds. Durham (N.C.) 1983, pp. 474-496, and


Recently, several scholars turned their attention to problems that the relatively abundantsilver might cause in the political sphere. Money, flowing more and more into channels overwhich the state authority exercised only limited or no control, might contribute to internaldestabilization and eventual political disintegration of the Mughal empire. Parallel and similarprocesses of erosion of traditional political structures are observed in the 18th century inseveral states of the Middle East and Southeast Asia. Here too, their gradual integration intothe sphere of international trade and money flows is sensed as a major force behind theirpolitical and social crises and transformations.10

Another, much older theory, stresses the often observed propensity to hoarding amongwealthier classes of the Indian population. According to this theory, much of the silverimported into the subcontinent was used unproductively for hoarding either in the form ofhidden treasures or ornaments of gold and silver. Some authors even suggested that it mighthave been just this proclivity to hoarding that lay behind the huge Indian demand for preciousmetals.11 It should be noted that at the present time the majority of historians specializing inmedieval and early modern Indian history pursue the former two approaches while the lastmentioned one is still influential among scholars of universal history. Here, hoarding isoften silently accepted as a last cause, a sort of „black box“ where no further explanation ofmotives is necessary. Taken to extreme, the idea of silver laboriously extracted out of thebowels of the earth in America and transferred half a globe away only to be buriedunderground again in India is manifestly absurd.

Nevertheless, we have no reason to disbelieve the observations of foreign travellersand other contemporaries that in pre-colonial India hoarding was a widespread phenomenonand saving one of important functions of money. But how common was this habit? Was it

I. Habib, A System of Trimetallism in the Age of the „Price Revolution“: Effects of the Silver Influx on theMughal Monetary System. In: J. F. Richards (ed.), The Imperial Monetary System, pp. 137-170. A bold attemptat quantification of the phenomenon is S. Moosvi, The Silver Influx, Money Supply, Price and Revenue Extractionin Mughal India. JESHO XXX (1987), pp. 47-94. Her methodological approach will be dealt with in Part One,pp. 11-14 of the present work.

10 Concise statement of this position has been formulated by C. A. Bayly, Imperial Meridian. The BritishEmpire and the World 1780-1830. London, New York 1989, esp. chapter two, pp. 35-74. Methodologicalaspects of the study of increasing use of money and its impact on the transformation of political structures havebeen highlighted by F. Perlin, Precolonial South Asia and Western Penetration in the Sixteenth to NineteenthCenturies: A Problem of Epistemological Status. Review IV, 2 (1980), pp. 267-306. See also his Money Use inLate Pre-colonial India and the International Trade in Currency Media. In: J. F. Richards (ed.), The ImperialMonetary System, pp. 232-373.

11 The remark of 17th century English traveller W. Hawkins that „India is rich in silver, for all nationsbring coin, and carry away commodities for the same; and this coin is buried in India and goeth not out“ hasbecome almost classic; it was approvingly quoted, among others, by the great authority in the field of medievalIndian economic history, W. H. Moreland, in his influential book From Akbar to Aurangzeb. A Study in IndianEconomic History. London 1923, p. 53. A. H. Lloyd in his Hoarding of the Precious Metals in India, JNSI XXIII(1961), repr. from the Transactions of the International Numismatic Congress, London 1936, went so far as to seein the precious metals coins’ suitability for hoarding „perhaps even a prior influence upon the introduction andearly spread of coinage in India“ (ibid., p. 127). In recent times hoarding is seen as an important factor e.g. by I.Wallerstein in his Modern World System, vol. I., New York 1974, p. 41 or vol. II., New York 1980, pp. 108-109.

5Introduction

typical for wealthy classes only or was it widespread among broader strata of population?Were the buried treasures predominantly large or rather small? Can we say anything aboutthe period of their accumulation? Was this activity habitual or was it restricted mainly toperiods and areas of unrest or warfare? To what extent was the unabating demand formonetary metals stimulated by slow velocity of circulation? Was not a rationally motivatedsaving, formation of necessary cash-reserves by temporary withholding and subsequentslow and gradual releasing of coins one of the more important factors in this? Attempts toanswer these and similar questions may bring us nearer to understanding actual role ofhoarding in the late medieval India. To obtain the much needed information in this so farlittle explored field, we shall have to turn in the first place to the hoards themselves.

Apart from throwing some light on these questions and problems, the hoards, if properlyexamined, can yield interesting information about structure of currency of certain metal (inour case silver) in a certain period and about its changes in time. Here the historian canwork with three types of data: if he is extremely lucky, he can inspect the hoards themselves,if he is less so, he is able to see the reports and inventories kept in official archives andmuseums and work with data and numbers contained in them. As a first approximation andin the case when these original reports are beyond his or her reach, however, he may contenthimself with abstracts containing reliable summaries of these hoards reports. In India, theNumismatic Society and several state museums have published such abstracts, thus makingseries of important data available to broader scholarly community.12

Unfortunately, these abstracts are not of equally informative value, as they reflectstrongly varying standards applied in compiling of the original Treasure Trove Reportsthemselves.13 This makes direct comparisons of certain types of data from different regionsdifficult or impossible. Probably the best abstract available is the detailed list of „Coin Hoardsof Uttar Pradesh“ edited by A. K. Srivastava and published by the State Museum in Lucknow in1980. This work lists a total of 1141 hoards registered and described by museum officialsbetween the years 1882 and 1978/79. From the early stages of Indian history, the area of present-day Uttar Pradesh (coextensive with United Provinces of former British India) gave birth toimportant supra-regional states and empires and often formed their inner core. As can be expected,such area yields also rich harvest of hoards ranging from the Indo-Sassanian to the late Mughaland British periods. Of the total number, 530 hoards contain Mughal coins and can be thereforedated to Mughal or British periods. This represents a quantity where an attempt at statisticalprocessing may not be out of place, especially when the data offered are relatively detailed and

12 Besides Coin Hoards of Uttar Pradesh mentioned in the text there are several other lists of this typecovering the vast area of northern and central India. P. L. Gupta published Coin Hoards from Gujarat State,Varanasi 1969 and Coin Hoards from Maharashtra, Varanasi 1970. H. K. Prasad published Coin Hoards fromBihar, Indian Numismatic Chronicle VIII, 1-2 (1970), pp. 45-109 and Coin Hoards from Orissa, ibid., VI, 2(1967-69), pp. 63-71.

13 The data from Gujarat, for example, are sadly incomplete when compared with the much superior listof U.P. coin hoards. Reasons for this are differing administrative practices and rules applied in the formerUnited Provinces on the one hand and in Gujarat (part of the former Bombay Presidency) on the other. Comparethe prefaces of A. K. Srivastava and P. L. Gupta to their respective lists.


reliable. Unfortunate is the absence of information on the number of doubles in hoards whichdebars us from computing exact percentages of coins of each type in each hoard and forces usto restrict our investigation to broader categories such as regnal periods or incidences. Theincidences approach, however, has certain advantages of its own which should place it amonglegitimate methods of statistical enquiry.

One should, however, constantly bear in mind that units (hoards or coins) we are dealingwith do not constitute classical random samples demanded by rigorous statistical theory. Problemsof evaluation and methods applied to the processing of these data form the subject of Part One.Part Two summarizes findings obtained by application of these procedures and presents them inconvenient tabulated or graphic form. In the concluding part I shall try to set these results intowider contexts and - without trying to construct, on this rather limited basis, any grand hypothesis- contribute to the current debate on the silver influx, money use and hoarding in Mughal India.Finally, the Appendices contain the full list of all datable Mughal hoards described in Srivastava’sinventory, arranged by their latest coins, and the data on which graphs included in the main textof the book are based. All through this study hoards are identified by their serial numbers usedby A. K. Srivastava; these are supplemented by the slash and abbreviation UP in order to setthem clearly off from other types of numerical data.

7

For ages, old coins have drawn the attention of antiquarians, museums as well as privatecollectors as valuable objects endowed by historic, aesthetic and - especially in the case ofgold and silver - metallic value. Since the 19th century coins have been systematically used asan important source for determining regnal years, establishing relative or absolute chronolo-gies and compiling dynastic tables. All these purposes were served well by well-preservedand easily legible specimens of coins datable on the basis of either their own internal (dates oncoins) or external (circumstances of their finds) evidence. The structure of coin collections ofmost museums (including the Indian ones) reflects this attitude: until recently museums havecontented themselves mostly with keeping only a few specimens of each coin type, disposingof the rest of a hoard by sale, exchange, etc. In many countries, however, hoards were regis-tered and more or less detailed inventories of their content made before their dispersal.

It is only relatively recently that such reports began to be appreciated as valuablesources of their own, offering economic and monetary historians new possibilities of inter-pretation. This widening range of interest has led in the last fifty years to the preparationand publication of coin hoard inventories covering territories of many European and othercountries. (Several Indian inventories are mentioned in the Introduction). The aim of thefirst part of the present study is to draw attention to several important methodological prob-lems involved in evaluating hoard evidence for the purpose of economic history.

1. Coin Hoards, Treasure Troves and Hoard Inventories

To avoid possible terminological misunderstandings, it seems appropriate to explain at thispoint the sense in which the term hoard is used in this work. The Oxford English Dictionarydefines hoard as „an accumulation or collection of anything valuable hidden away or laid by forpreservation or future use; a stock, store, esp. of money; a treasure.“1 It appears from this defi-nition that hoards are looked upon as results of conscious activity, as intentional accumulationshidden with some purpose. In English (and also Indian English) numismatic terminology, how-ever, the term hoard is often used for any discovered accumulation of valuables, intentional ornot. This usage is reflected also in the titles of published inventories: e.g. Inventory of BritishCoin Hoards, Coin Hoards of Uttar Pradesh, which contain, apart from genuine hoards, alsounintentional losses, stray coins, etc. It is in this broader sense that the term hoard is used in thisstudy. The alternative term „treasure trove“, stressing the aspect of hoard as something hidden

1 The Oxford English Dictionary, vol. V., Oxford 1933, p. 312.

Part One : Character of Data


and subsequently discovered, is a fixed collocation that cannot be easily modified to designatespecifically finds of coins; in this sense, the term „coin finds“ is more explicit2 but may be takenas designating finds of single coins or coins unrelated to each other. In view of the fact that it isoften difficult or impossible to discern intentional accumulations from unintentional, the termcoin hoard in its more general sense seems to be in no way less appropriate than the otheralternatives.

Like coins, hoards too can be studied either as single units or in a wider series of findsbelonging to certain period and place. Studied as single units, hoards are classified as inten-tional or unintentional, stray finds, hoards proper, excavation finds, etc.3 Information of thiskind can be obtained from find reports but is, in the Indian case, lacking in the publishedinventories. Finds that are physically available for inspection can be further studied from thepoint of view of metrology, average metallic content of coins, etc. Needless to say, theseprocedures are more or less regularly applied only to recently discovered (and therefore notyet dispersed) finds; their results usually do not find their way into published inventories.

Statistical methods form an integral part of these investigations; it is when hoards canbe studied in series, however, that the role of statistics becomes especially prominent. Inthis field attention paid to methodological aspects of data processing and interpretation is,as far as I am aware, not as thorough and detailed as these problems would deserve.4 In thisstudy I shall focus my attention primarily on two sets of questions which hoards may pos-sibly answer: the first concerns hoards as sources for study of the hoarding behaviour of agiven population in a given area and its changes in time, the second the much more intricateproblem of the relationship between the number and structure of hoards on the one hand,and the quantity and structure of currency circulating in a given period of time on the other.

2. Approaches to Statistical Processing of Mughal Silver Coins

The Method of Aziza HasanAziza Hasan was probably the first Indian historian who tried to draw conclusions for eco-nomic history from the evidence of Mughal coins. She realized the possibilities of utilization

2 German, Danish and Czech terminology prefers to stress this aspect of discovered accumulations: e.g.the German inventories bear in their titles terms „Münzfunde“ or „Schatzfunde“, Danish have „skattefund“,Czech „nálezy mincí“.

3 General principles of classification of coin finds are laid down in several textbooks and introductions tothe field. See, e.g., P. Grierson, Numismatics. London etc. 1975, pp.124-139. For the Indian context usefulsummary is found in J. S. Deyell, Living Without Silver, pp. 272-291.

4 Exceptional in this respect and methodologically stimulating are the monographs of German numisma-tists and historians P. Ilisch, H. Eichhorn and J. Schüttenhelm, listed in the bibliography at the end of this book.Several questions and methods of statistical processing and interpretation of hoard series in the Indian contextare discussed in two papers in: A. K. Jha (ed.), Coinage, Trade and Economy. 3rd International Colloquium,January 8th-11th, 1991. Anjaneri 1991. They are P. Berghaus, Coin Hoards: Methodology and Evidence, pp.16-19 and J. S Deyell, Numismatic Methodologies Which Answer Questions Economists Might Ask, pp. 1-15.

9

of Mughal coins for statistical analysis that present themselves thanks to happy coincidence ofthree factors: 1. the Mughal coins kept uniform standard of weight and high purity of preciousmetal through most of the Mughal period and can be therefore looked upon, for an extendedperiod of time, as mutually commensurable units fit for statistical processing; 2. they bear thedate and name of the mint of their issue and can be therefore exactly localized on the spatialplane as well as on the temporal axis; and 3. the system of Mughal coinage was free, i.e. open toeverybody who brought his own silver to mint to have allowed to circulate within Mughalimperial boundaries - a rule where the theory and practice almost totally coincided.5 These factsled A. Hasan to a not unreasonable presupposition, that changes in coin output of various mintsover time must be reflected also in greater or smaller quantity of coins which have survived intothe present day. She then chose as an indicator of the strength of particular coin populations theevidence of major coin collections built up by important museums and private individuals andfrom the totals of incidences of particular types of coins represented in them, constructed dataseries of changing output of mints spanning from the late 1560s to the death of Aurangzeb in1707. This pioneering and ingenious approach led to interesting insights and trend curves (whichare, as will be shown later in this section, in their basic shape similar to those arrived at in thepresent study). The method, however, suffered from and has been criticized for several flawswhich cast doubts on the reliability of her results.

As has been remarked by A. Hasan’s critics, museum collections are samples withstrong inherent biases. Coins collected by museums have been selected with one mainobjective - to build up, as far as possible, a complete collection of all known coin types(coins of particular date, place, weight, execution, etc.), each being represented by one ortwo specimens: what can be gleaned from the catalogues are not quantities of actuallyfound and registered coins but frequency of incidences of their particular types in the se-lected coin collections. This in itself is not necessarily a drawback - quantities too (esp.when analysed without regard to their hoard context) can contain serious biases and as amaterial for study of mint output are not necessarily superior to incidences. The problemwith A. Hasan’s method lies, in the opinion of the present author, not in the - perhapsinadvertent - selection of the incidences approach but rather in the type of source fromwhich the incidences data have been drawn. Museums and private collectors always strivefor completeness and they often exchange among themselves redundant specimens to fillthe gaps in their collections. However, if we decide to use the incidences method for anassessment of mint output, we should consider both the gaps and incidences as of equalsignificance. „Smoothing out“ of the sample by filling out the gaps cannot but distort theevidence.

Approaches to Statistical Processing of Mughal Silver Coins

5 “Currency Output in the Mughal Empire and the Extension of the ‘Price Revolution’ to India.” (Summary).In: Proceedings of the Indian History Congress, Mysore Session, December 1966, pp. 235-36. “Mints of the MughalEmpire: A Study in Comparative Output.” In: Proceedings of the Indian History Congress, Patiala Session - part I,1967, pp. 314-345. „The Silver Currency Output of the Mughal Empire and Prices in India during the 16th and 17thCenturies“, IESHR VI, 1 (1969), pp. 85-116; subsequent critique of O. Prakash and J. Krishnamurty, ibid., VII (1970),pp. 139-150 and A. Hasan’s reply ibid., pp. 151-160. J. S. Deyell returned to the theme several years later in his article„Numismatic Methodology in the Estimation of Mughal Currency Output“, ibid., XIII,3 (1976), pp. 393-401.


0

20

40

60

80

100

120

963

967

971

975

979

983

987

991

995

999 40 44 48 2 6 10 14 18 22 4 8

1049

1053

1057

1061

1065

1069

1073

1077

1081

1085

1089

1093

1097

1101

1105

1109

1113

1117

years (in A.H.; form 1001 to 1047 A.H. datation expressed in regnal years of Akbar, Jahangir and Shahjahan)

num

ber o

f inc

iden

ces

No. of coins in catalogues (A.Hasan)

Total of all coin incidences in hoardsIlahi months on coins

Fig. 1. Coin incidences in museum catalogues (A. Hasan) and in hoards of the U.P. compared

There is still another, probably more serious distortion of evidence based on catalogueincidences: catalogues contain relatively greater number of coins of the same year if thesediffer from each other even by a single distinctive feature, e.g. the month of mintage. Formuseum collectors, coins of different months of the same year represent different types andare therefore sought after and incorporated into their collections. Years when the Il€h… monthlydating prevailed as a general standard are consequently numerically strongly over-repre-sented in comparison with coins marked in accordance with the standard Islamic yearlydating. Comparison of curves constructed from the data collected by A. Hasan on the onehand, and from incidences of coins minted in the same year and found in hoards of the U.P.(an altogether different type of sample; the principle of counting incidences of years, notmonths in hoards has been strictly adhered to) collected by the present author on the other,will perhaps show the point.

The fact that both curves fluctuate mostly in the same range of tens of incidences (anaccidental feature) makes their quick comparison easier. Generally, long-term fluctuationsof both curves correlate surprisingly well;6 more significant discrepancies occur only in theperiod of Il€h… dating when months of minting formed a regular part of the coin legend.Incidences extracted from coin catalogues, while following, during this period, the samegeneral trend as incidences from hoards, are regularly twice as numerous as those com-

6 Correlation coefficients of both curves for particular regnal periods: Akbar 0,923; Jah€ng…r 0,852;Sh€hjah€n 0,785; Aurangzeb 0,719.

11

puted from the evidence of registered coin hoards: the collectors’ interest in every month’sissue raised the total number of coins belonging to an Il€h… year and is thus responsible forthe observed bias. This fact, although not so graphically obvious, can be noticed on closerinspection of the catalogue entries themselves. If this bias is not filtered away, the incidences- understood to be in direct relation to silver influx - create, for the last quarter of the 16thand first third of the 17th century, a false impression of very dramatically fluctuating and attimes very massive imports of silver. It should be expected that abrupt changes in silverimport trends of such magnitude would have left their trace in other types of evidence too.As far as the present author is aware, no such evidence is available.

The Method of Shireen MoosviAnother attempt at quantitative evaluation of Mughal coins was made in an extended arti-cle by another Indian historian of the Aligarh school, Shireen Moosvi.7 When approachingthe problem, S. Moosvi was aware of the criticisms and objections that had been raisedagainst the methodology of A. Hasan. Accepting A. Hasan’s conclusions based on the threegeneral characteristics of Mughal currency as valid, S. Moosvi tried to escape the biasesinherent in the catalogue method by resorting directly to Treasure Trove Reports whichcould be reasonably expected to be free of distortions of this kind. Irrespective of theirhoard context, she calculated quinquennial totals of all datable Mughal silver rupees regis-tered in the Reports, first for each region of the Empire (Gujatrat, North-west etc.) and thenfor all north India; on these data she constructed a quinquennial histogram designed on themodel of graph published earlier by A. Hasan.8

Comparing both graphs, S. Moosvi noticed that, apart from numerous correspondences,both graphs differ in representation of quantities of Akbar… silver coins. Lower profile of A.Hasan’s Akbar… period was explained away as being due to a particular type of negative bias- the fact that fewer silver mints operated in Akbar’s time than, for example, in the regnalperiod of Aurangzeb and the Akbar… coinage is consequently less rich in coin variants (inter-esting for coin collectors) than the coinage of later Mughal emperors. This may be partly true- although comparison of A. Hasan’s data with mine presented in the graph above does notsuggests that this is the case. In fact, closer inspection reveals that in this particular case thebias may be hidden in the data (and therefore in the method) of S. Moosvi.9

Great quantity of extant coins struck in a certain period may be caused by at least threepossible factors: first, by a more intensive hoarding activity in the respective period - if thisis the case, greater number of extant coins may be due to a greater number of contemporary

7 S. Moosvi, “The Silver Influx, Money Supply, Prices and Revenue Extraction in Mughal India“, JESHOXXX (1987), pp. 47-94 and Chapter 15 of her synthetic study The Economy of the Mughal Empire, c.1595. AStatistical Study. Delhi 1987, pp. 351-374.

8 S. Moosvi, The Silver Influx, p.53.9 Unfortunately, S. Moosvi did not publish her data as a series of yearly sums but only in the more

compressed form of quinquennial totals. It is therefore not possible to compare details of trends arrived at by hermethod with the hoards incidences curve in the same way as has been done above with the data of A. Hasan.



hoards containing them; second, the absolute numbers of coins are so small that one or twobig hoards composed predominantly of one particular coin type may seriously distort theoverall relative quantitative proportions between different periods - greater number of coinsmay be the result of a purely accidental fact that an extremely big hoard was uncovered andregistered in modern times; the third possible cause of more frequent occurrences of coinsof certain dates in hoards is, of course, greater output of mints supplied with greater quantitiesof silver - acquired either by reminting of the older coin stock or by imports. Only in the lastcase, and after elimination of all the other factors enumerated above, can the quantity ofextant coins of particular type (date, etc.) be understood as reflecting, more or less accurately,the changes in the volume of coin stock. Moreover, historian should be aware of the factthat what he or she tries to reconstruct is not the volume of coin stock of all Mughal Indiabut only of that part of its territory in which the extant coins under study have been buriedand subsequently found - in our case of the area of the present-day Uttar Pradesh.

In fact, the first of the three factors enumerated above, the hoarding activity factor, cannotbe easily filtered away. And it need not be, if the tacit assumption behind S. Moosvi’s method ofassessment of the coin stock, namely that a more widespread and/or more intense activity ofsaving and hoarding is primarily a result of expanding money supply, is correct. This may ormay not be the case. The problem is that the relation between the volume of the past coin stockon the one hand and numbers of its coins which have survived to the present day in museumcollections or Treasure Trove Reports on the other, is not so direct and straightforward. It iscomplicated by circumstances which determine both the formation of hoards and their survivalto the present day. It is obvious that these circumstances are not necessarily directly related tocoin stock volumes. Attempts to relate quantities of extant coins to past coin stock volumesshould therefore take into account the hoard factor - this, in turn, can be done only when thehoard context of the respective coins has been taken seriously into account. An attempt to distin-guish two main motives for hoarding will be found in the second part of this work10 .

As far as Mughal silver coin hoards from the U.P. (the source of data for S. Moosvi’sstatistics) are concerned, a bias of the second type mentioned above (the influence of bighoards) can be proved to have affected just the part of data that relate to quantities of Akbar…coins. The following tables should demonstrate this fact.

Comparison of coin totals of the four Mughal emperors shows that Akbar… coins greatlyoutnumber those of the other three Great Mughals. S. Moosvi has interpreted this fact as areflection of massive silver imports in the last twenty years of Akbar’s reign.11 In this particular

10 See below, Part Two, pp. 40-48.11 S. Moosvi, The Silver Influx, pp.51-55. Quantities of coins assigned to the four emperors in her study differ

from the numbers in the tables above. S. Moosvi saw the Treasure Trove Reports of the years 1880-1968, whereasSrivastava’s book, on which my calculations are based, includes new material and ends in 1978/79. Moosvi alsoeliminated all coins from the Deccan mints and converted silver coins of smaller denominations as well as slightlyheavier Jah€ng…r… rupees into standard rupee units. In this study the latter recalculation was not possible owing toincomplete information on the number of particular types of coins in Srivastava’s inventory. However, the proportionsare similar: Moosvi counted 2653 Akbar…, 1109 Jah€ng…r…, 1678 Sh€hjah€n… and 1942 Aurangzeb… coins. Hoard 426/UP datable to 1614/15 was discovered in 1907/08 and therefore must have found its way into Moosvi’s statistics.

13

A. Akbar…

NO. OF HOARD NO. AKBAR¸ COINS PER CENT OF ALL HOARDS IN HOARD AKBAR¸ COINS

1 426/UP 1201 26,16

1 975/UP 556 12,11

1 450/UP 484 10,54

1 203/UP 207 4,51

1 530/UP 200 4,36

1 973/UP 162 3,53

1 972/UP 135 2,94

1 742/UP 127 2,76

115 1 519 33,09

123 4 591 100

B. Jah€ng…r…

NO. OF HOARD NO. JAH³NG¸R¸ COINS PER CENT OF ALL HOARDS IN HOARD JAH³NG¸R¸ COINS

1 972/UP 347 17,70

1 203/UP 284 14,49

1 426/UP 186 9,49

1 742/UP 117 5,97

108 1026 52,35

112 1960 100

C. Sh€hjah€n…

NO. OF HOARD NO. SH³HJAH³N¸ COINS PER CENT OF ALL HOARDS IN HOARD SH³HJAH³N¸ COINS 1 465/UP 435 13,70

1 302/UP 180 5,67

1 74/UP 144 4,53

1 344/UP 131 4,13

1 68/UP 106 3,34

119 2179 68,63

124 3175 100

Tab. 1. Distribution of Akbar…, Jah€ng…r…, Sh€hjah€n… and Aurangzeb… silver coins inhoards deposited in the area of U.P. in the years 1560-1942 (ctd. on the next page)



D. Aurangzeb…

NO. OF HOARD NO. AURANGZEB¸ COINS PER CENT OF ALL HOARDS IN HOARD AURANGZEB¸ CONS 1 465/UP 477 13,14

1 129/UP 322 8,87

1 1101/UP 290 7,98

1 624/UP 174 4,79

1 969/UP 150 4,13

1 546/UP 143 3,94

1 319/UP 119 3,28

139 1956 53,87

146 3631 100

Tab. 1. (ctd.) Distribution of Akbar…, Jah€ng…r…, Sh€hjah€n… and Aurangzeb… silver coinsin hoards deposited in the area of U.P. in the years 1560-1942

case, such straightforward conclusion is probably misleading. As our table of distributionof Akbar… coins clearly shows, more than one quarter of all Akbar… coins registered in U.P.Treasure Trove Reports comes from a single source - the hoard no. 426/UP which is, inci-dentally, one of the biggest Mughal hoards ever registered in the area of U.P. Publishedabstracts of the U.P. hoards do not contain information which would allow us to form ahypothesis about possible origin of this hoard. Nevertheless, the fact that somebody lost orhid huge amount of money which somebody else discovered and reported to the authoritiesthree hundred years later, is not in itself in any direct relation to silver imports. The circum-stances which led to the formation and especially to the loss of this hoard were probablyextraordinary. If we eliminate this extraordinary case from further statistical processing,the total number of Akbar… coins descends to the level of Sh€hjah€n… and Aurangzeb… quan-tities (3390 Akbar… compared to 3175 Sh€hjah€n… and 3631 Aurangzeb… coins).

In this context it should be also noted that two thirds of all Akbar… coins come from 8big hoards with 100 or more coins whereas the remaining 33 per cent is distributed between115 smaller hoards. This distribution pattern is restricted to Akbar… coins only: as the tableshows, in the case of the other three Mughal emperors the proportion of coins from bighoards to the total number of all registered coins never raises above 50 per cent.

As a result of this bias, the size of the Akbari coin stock computed by S. Moosvi on thebasis of the coin evidence appears to be grossly overestimated - the more so that S. Moosvi,in order to get the base-figure for the 1595 coin stock (an initial value for which the indexis 100), totalled up all rupee coins for the years 1556 to 1595 without taking into accountyearly deductions for coin losses. This inflates the basic 1595 stock still further. Yearlyincrements added up to this base raise its initially high level only slowly, although thecurrent loss rate is set to 1 per cent only. A different method of estimation of the coin stock,

15

based on numbers of incidences of particular coin types, has been delineated in the nextsub-section and applied to the existing hoard material in Part Two. The graph comparingthe results of both approaches shows marking similarities in the reconstructed developmentof the coin stock, especially in the decades after 1650 - on the condition that the basic, 1595silver stock arrived at by the incidences method is multiplied by three. The remaining dis-crepancy between the two trends is then due to initial huge increments in the Akbari stockin the decade 1595-1605 in S. Moosvi’s curve.

Fig. 2. Hypothetical growth of Mughal silver coin stock computed by two different methods ofincrement assessment and different estimates of the basic coin stock (1595=100).

To sum up: accidental factors (such as one or few extraordinary huge hoards) and spe-cific patterns of hoarding which may have varied in both longer and shorter time spans invali-date absolute numbers of (extant) hoarded coins, taken out of their hoard contexts, as relevantdata for reliable estimates of coin output and consequently, of silver imports too. As necessarycorrectives at least, hoards should always form an important part of quantitative investiga-tions. This said, it should be noted that certain basic features of the coin stock curves, arrivedat by three different approaches discussed here, are surprisingly similar.

The Method Based on Data Derived from HoardsThe method developed in this work tries to eliminate the biases involved in the previoustwo approaches. While accepting the fact that evidence derived from hoards too contains itsown biases, the method presented and developed on the following pages tries to identifyand, if possible, to eliminate them. The present author believes that data analysed consistently

100

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1595

1600

1605

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1615

1620

1625

1630

1635

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1645

1650

1655

1660

1665

1670

1675

1680

1685

1690

1695

1700

1705

Inde

x

Index, S.Moosvi, 1% loss rate

Index, hoards incidences, 1% loss rate

idem, coin stock 1595 tripled



in their proper hoard context can ultimately yield more reliable results than the two previousapproaches - probably the best we can have, given the character and general availability ofsources standing at historian’s disposal. Evaluating the evidence of hoards, the present authorhas been constrained by the necessity to content himself with published abstracts of TreasureTrove Reports of the Uttar Pradesh (the reports are stored in the archive of the State Museum,Lucknow.) Compared to published hoards abstracts covering other states of the Indian Union(Gujarat,12 Maharashtra13 ), the inventory dealing with the U.P. is far more detailed and inevery respect superior. Nevertheless, it does not contain information about numbers of dou-bles (coins of identical dates and mints) and thus does not allow us to utilize the material tothe fullest possible extent. Even with this limitation, however, the abstract contains vast amountof important data suitable for statistical processing.

First step of the analysis concerns the hoards themselves. Each hoard has been datedby the latest coin found in it; hoards dated by this method are then located on time axis;concentrations around particular dates or long-term trends have been noted and taken intoconsideration in later stages of analysis.

Next, percentual shares of coins minted in the regnal period of each Mughal emperor(from Akbar to ³lamg…r II, a period covering the years 1556-1760) have been computed foreach hoard which contains more than five coins and which can be assigned an exact date bythe latest coin method. Percentual shares of coins of each emperor, grouped into five-yearperiods (pentads), have been then ordered on the time axis and the resulting curves havebeen interpreted. The very fact that they follow a consistent, logical and expectable pattern,is considered to be a definitive proof that hoards indeed are valuable, though in some re-spects biased, samples of the coin stock structure of the past.

The problem inherent in this approach lies in the often very small number of hoardsbelonging to some of the forty five-year periods chosen as basic units for computing aver-ages: each single hoard (after the so-called long-term and emergency hoards have beenexcluded as biased) can sway the final result of a pentad more than would have been thecase if sufficient number of hoards were available. In other words, number of hoards be-longing to a certain period (indicating perhaps the level of hoarding activity at that time)can affect the exactness of the results but does not constitute an inherent bias which wouldconsistently distort the data in one particular direction.

Next, all datable hoards have been scrutinized for all incidences of coins struck in aparticular year in a particular mint. At this place, an explanation of few terms used in thistext is necessary. Each occurrence of a particular type of coin in a hoard is called an inci-dence; there can always be only one incidence of any type of coin in any one hoard. Type ofcoin is defined by the coin’s metallic composition (but not denomination: this type of infor-mation is unfortunately not included in the published hoard inventory; hence, all silver

12 Gupta, P. L., Coin-Hoards from Gujarat State. (The Numismatic Society of India, Numismatic Notesand Monographs, No.15). Varanasi 1969.

13 Gupta, P. L., Coin-Hoards from Maharashtra. (The Numismatic Society of India, Numismatic Notesand Monographs, No. 16). Patna 1970.

17

coins are understood as equal units), year (but not month) of mintage and the name of themint. As the information on numbers of doubles is missing from the published abstract,counting of incidences has been the only possibility to extract information about mintsfrom the available material.14 This method is similar to that used by A. Hasan; samplesfrom which the incidences have been drawn are, however, not museum collections withtheir own biases but hoards themselves. More than two hundred hoards, including the small(1 to 5 coins), emergency and long-term ones, form a sufficiently wide base for results ofthe analysis to be considered representative.

There is one possible bias which has to be taken into account: as coins of a certain datetend to occur more frequently in hoards formed in time close to or slightly later than thisparticular date, greater number of hoards concentrated in a certain period might result inoverrepresentation of coin incidences contained in them in comparison with incidencesdrawn from hoards belonging to “poorer” times. Fortunately, the accumulation period (i.e.time-spans between the earliest and the latest coin in hoard) of most of the analysed hoardsis longer than twenty years; accumulation periods of fifty years or more are no exceptions.Stronger populations of coins are therefore given the opportunity to show up even in rela-tively late hoards; such coin populations can thus „collect“ more incidences than wouldhave been the case if the accumulation period of hoards would have been only a few years.

The principle of one incidence per hoard irrespective of actual number of specimens ofa particular coin type in a hoard keeps various biases stemming from peculiarities in compo-sition of different types of hoards at the lowest possible level. It must be admitted, however,that while the incidences approach described above can serve well in smoothing out the ef-fects of short-term fluctuations in the numbers of hoards, it is less effective in comparisons ofcoin incidences belonging to two longer periods with different general longer-term levels ofhoarding activity. Here consistently higher quantity of hoards will generate generally highernumbers of coin incidences. A question must be asked about causes of this higher level ofhoards incidence. Was it caused by easier availability of silver money or by generally higherlevel of insecurity and violence in the area under investigation? In interpreting all long-termtrend curves of coin incidences these two possibilities have to be constantly borne in mind.

Finally, sums of incidences of coins minted in all Mughal mints in each year from1556 to 1760 have been summarized in a graph which, if the three presuppositions of A.Hasan and S. Moosvi are correct, reflects the overall activity of Mughal silver mints in aperiod spanning for nearly two hundred years. An attempt has been made to interpret basicfeatures of the resulting graph and subsequently to construct on its basis a curve representingthe growth and quantitative development of north Indian Mughal silver coin stock; as one

14 Knowing numbers of doubles would be fine; however, one should be aware that direct counting of coinnumbers might introduce a bias stemming from a possibly peculiar composition of big hoards (or better, hoardswith great number of particular coin doubles). This would be the same type of bias that lays hidden in the dataof S. Moosvi discussed above; translating absolute numbers into percentages could partly eliminate it. This stepcan be undertaken only after close inspection of the full version of the evidence, i.e. the Treasure Trove Reports.In the future, this may form another step of the present investigation.



important constant, the yearly attrition of the existing coin stock, remains unknown, severalalternative curves have been offered, each of them based on a different possible yearly rate ofattrition. The results, although not translated into absolute numbers of metric tons of mintedsilver (a problematic and in the present context probably unnecessary exercise), neverthelesscan - with the above-mentioned caveats in mind - throw some light on the question of long-term development of the volume of silver coin-stock and connected problems with the as-sessment and interpretation of the rise or stability of prices in Mughal India. This has been thefinal aim and last step in the laborious and occasionally somewhat complicated analysis.

All these procedures have been based on the conviction that hoards, with all theirbiases, still form probably the most reliable and most important source for Mughal mon-etary history that stands at the disposal of historians. Hoards, their biases and “filters”, or“sieves” through which they have to pass before they reach the hands of modern historians,therefore form the first part of the present study.

3. The Filters

As suggested above, the main difficulty inherent in any study of past monetary systems bythe (sole) means of extant coins or - better - coin hoards is that hoards are not independentrandom samples drawn for the purpose of historical analysis in conformity with the rigor-ous demands of statistics. The number, size and structure of these samples was determinedby subjects whose motivation is itself a subject of scholarly debate15 and factors over whichthe contemporary historian can exercise no control. It is therefore very important that heshould be, as far as possible, fully aware of their existence and influence on the formationof the sample. At this preparatory stage, the central question is to what extent and in whichdirections do these distorting factors create biases in the extant evidence, which make itstructurally different from the hypothetical ideal random sample. Each hoard may have itsown particular bias or a combination of biases.

The situation is often further complicated by occasionally missing data on one or morevariables (due to, for example, lack of exact identification of coins as far as their denomina-tion, metallic composition or date of minting are concerned) or by systematic exclusion ofone variable from the published evidence (in the case of U.P. hoards, systematic omissionof number of doubles in hoards).

It should be stressed that in a situation where particular samples, typically of greatlyunequal size, are results of different types of sampling processes, distributed unequally inspace and along the temporal axis, they cannot be processed as a single mass (in caseswhere this could be both suitable and convenient) and cannot be subjected to certain types

15 See, e.g. the discussion of German numismatists on main motives and incentives for hoarding in thepast societies, summarized in: P. Ilisch, Münzfunde und Geldumlauf in Westfalen in Mittelalter und Neuzeit.Numismatische Untersuchungen und Verzeichnis der Funde in den Regierungsbezirken Arnsberg und Münster.Münster 1980, p. 3.

19

of analysis (e.g. testing) devised for evaluating independent random samples.16 The diversemass of hoards made available for historical analysis therefore has to be divided and groupedinto several categories defined by specific structural features and amounts of data (i.e. bythe same number of categories of variables in each group). It is these smaller, internallymore homogeneous groups that should be subjected to quantitative analysis and used forformulating specific questions.

When we try, for example, to form an idea about the age structure of coin stock circu-lating in a certain period of the past, we shall have to limit our sample not only to hoardsformed in the period concerned, but shall also try to exclude from this limited number long-term saving hoards which contain, from the point of view of circulating coin-stock, unchar-acteristically high proportion of old coins, and also the so-called emergency hoards madeup from homogeneous blocks of freshly minted coins drawn not out of circulation but takenmore or less directly from the mint. Both would distort our results: the first type wouldmake the age structure of the coin-stock look older, the second would exercise a bias dis-torting the results in the opposite direction. Both these types, however, form specific groupsworth of study in their own right in their appropriate contexts.

The method chosen here for identifying and defining these groups is to describe andanalyse „filters“ or „sieves“ through which hoards, understood as samples of coins, have topass before they finally reach, in more or less biased and incomplete form, the hands ofmodern historian. On the following pages we shall look more closely at these „filters“ andtry to understand the way they distort these original (mostly also biased) samples.

Recently, an ingenuous analysis of the hoard formation was made by P. Sarvas.17 Sarvasdistinguishes five phases through which hoards have to pass before they reach the handsand eyes of the numismatist: 1. thesauration, 2. burying, 3. forgetting, 4. recovery, and 5.scholarly publication. Each of these phases is characterized by certain formative conditionswhich are arranged in a synoptic table; each factor is assigned a particular mathematicalsymbol that is subsequently made part of an equation expressing the total number of hoardsavailable to scholars.18

The equation is F = (x5f1f2f3)(x4w1w2)(x3v1v2v3)(x2n1n2x1t1t2C+n1n2C), where F representsthe total number of hoarded coins available to the modern research and C the total number ofcirculating coins of those types that are represented in the hoards. Although none of the sym-bols used in this equation can be assigned exact numerical value, P. Sarvas’s table is valuableas a heuristic device: in synoptic form it presents all those factors which influence, in greateror lesser degree, the structure of our numismatic evidence. Some of his suggestions aredebatable: for example, wars and general upheavals are entered as factors conducive to bury-ing but not to the thesauration itself. This may be correct in most, but not necessarily all cases.

16 Inapplicability of certain statistical procedures to non-standard samples is pointed out by e.g. R. Floud,An Introduction to Quantitative Methods for Historians. London 1979, p. 188.

17 P. Sarvas, Münzschätze und Münzschatzfunde. In: T. Fischer, P. Ilisch (eds.), Lagom. Festschrift fürPeter Berghaus zum 60. Geburtstag am 20. November 1979. Münster 1981, pp. 3-10.

18 Ibid., p. 8.

The Filters


Besides, the dividing line between thesauration and burying may be sometimes rather in-distinct.

The concept of filters introduced in this study differs somewhat from that of P. Sarvas.My filters have been defined with the single intention of localizing qualitative distortionsand quantitative changes in the hoard material as it passed along the temporal axis. Thelabels „constant“ and „need of capital“ used in Sarvas´ classification, for example, are notdirectly relevant to this purpose. If we are interested in describing factors that make hoardedmaterial structurally different from the circulating currency, it may be advantageous todescribe them under the heading of a filter or transformatory stage. Viewed from this angle,phase III of the table should read „non-forgetting“; in my description it is made part of filterII. On the other hand, it seemed appropriate to insert another stage, that of registration,between recovery and publication. This is relevant especially in cases where the publishedversion draws on authentic Treasure Trove Reports, but selects from them only certain data(variables), leaving out others. Original treasure trove reports may get lost or destroyedtogether with a lot of important data. This is especially unfortunate when the hoards areregularly dispersed (with coins distributed to museums, sold out or returned to finders)shortly after their registration - as is the case in India.

The filters introduced in this work are therefore different from the categories chosenby P. Sarvas for his table; they are situated in the interstices between links of chain circula-tion - hoarding - recovery - registration - printed edition.

SROTCAFSESAHP

noitaruasehT.I

gniyruB.II

gnittegroF.III

gnirevoceR.VI

noitacilbuP.V

tnatsnoC.1 x1

x2

x3

x4

x5

latipacehtfodeeN.2 t1

noitalfnI.3 t2

raW.4 n1

v1

slavaehpulareneG.5 n2

v2

scimedipE.6 v3

ytivitcagnidliub,gniwolP.7 w1

*ssentcaxE.8 w2

noitacudefoleveL.9 f1

swalevorterusaerT.01 f2

srotcellocfoytivitcA.11 f3

*Probability for an accidentally uncovered hoard (during ploughing, bulldozing , transfers of greater volumesof earth, rubble etc.) to be noticed by people.Tab. 2. Factors of hoarding and subsequent recovering of coins (according to P. Sarvas)))))

21

Filter I: Coins Circulating - Coins HoardedThe first filter concerns the original composition of the sample: this only rarely exactlyreflects the quantitative and qualitative characteristics of currency circulating in the placeand time to which it belongs. Hoards are most conveniently dated by their latest coins:however, the time span between the oldest and latest datable coin is sometimes very large(one hundred years or more) and, especially when the majority of coins is distributed ratherevenly between the two terminal dates, one has to assume that the formation of the sumeventually hoarded was a relatively long process extending for more than one genera-tion.19 Special cases are composite hoards containing two clearly separate parts belongingto different epochs of Indian history - e.g. Indo-Sassanian, {•alj… or Tughlaq coins to-gether with Mughal silver rupees. The older part was probably a hoard discovered in thepast and added by its new owner to his own savings. In the U.P. records such hoards arerare20 : however, they remind us of the fact that every hoard has its own peculiar history andtherefore a kind of „personal bias“.

Similar bias has to be taken into account when we turn to the examination of places oforigin or mints of coins that made up the hoard. Strictly speaking, hoards discovered in acertain area should be understood as samples of coin stocks prevailing in the past in thisarea; for example, hoards found on the area of Uttar Pradesh can throw light on the struc-ture and development of coin stock of the central part of the Mughal empire; the dataextracted from them should not be generalized so as to represent the empire as a whole. Thetotal coin stock cannot be assumed to have been perfectly homogeneous, especially whenthe area of its operation at times covered greater part of the Indian subcontinent. In differ-ent regions, coins of local mints may be heavily over-represented in relation to other coinpopulations which were perhaps more numerous in absolute terms but were produced bysome distant mint. Non-homogeneity should be understood as a constant property of re-gional coin stocks too. Many coins, esp. those of gold and silver, came into circulation in„bunches“, being released by the mints at the order of some owner of bullion - a merchant,a banker, an aristocrat etc. It is reasonable to suppose that these homogeneous „bunches“were kept for some time together, travelled with their owners for some-times long dis-tances and later were as a whole or in part hoarded and hidden.

These temporal and spatial biases of individual hoards cannot be eliminated: at best,they can to certain extent lose their weight when submerged into a larger mass of datacoming from other hoards of a given period and area. Thus the picture we try to make of thestructure of circulating currency will be always to a greater or lesser extent blurred. Theabove biases can be better guides for our understanding of hoarding patterns and habits ofthe moneyed part of the population.

19 For a more detailed discussion of long-term hoards, see below, pp. 31-33.20 Examples drawn from the corpus of Mughal hoards described in Srivastava´s inventory include nos.

66/UP (Indo-Sassanian and Mughal), 807/UP ({•alj… and Mughal) where both components are silver. Morefrequent are composite copper hoards or copper parts of mixed silver and copper hoards: e.g. nos. 184/UP, 540/UP, 868/UP (Tughlaq and Mughal) and several others.

The Filters


The same can be said about another type of bias - the conscious decision on the part ofhoarder to select certain coins or certain metal as most appropriate for hoarding and conserva-tion of wealth.21 In India, the traditional hoarding metals were gold and silver. Copper wasundoubtedly an important monetary metal used not only for lower-value transactions butalso, until the end of the 16th century, as the official accounting unit of the Mughal fiscalapparatus (revenue demands of the Akbar… administration were stated always in copper dams)and therefore most probably also for the overwhelming mass of financial operations of thattime. It is true that up to the end of the 16th century copper often appears in hoards; still, itspercentual share hardly adequately represents its importance as the basic monetary unit.22

And, of course, hoards are totally silent about widespread use of cowries (kau±…s), small shellsused in wide areas of Mughal India for everyday low-value financial transactions.

Gold is a very special case: it was, in the first place, an ideal medium for conservationof wealth. It may, therefore, seem strange that in Mughal hoards it is almost absent. Astrong negative bias seems to have been at work: this, however, tends to distort not so muchthe evidence on the real position of gold as circulating metal (higher value payments weremade mostly in silver) as on the size of its stock in relation to silver, and especially on itsimportance as the medium most suitable for saving and hoarding. This bias was most prob-ably not due to a conscious decision of original owners of gold, but rather to the behaviourof its later happy finders who regularly failed to report and hand over gold coins to theauthorities. It is therefore more appropriate to treat it as part of filter three.

Hoarders’ preferences do not limit themselves necessarily only to certain monetarymetals at the expense of others. In each metal, coins of certain provenience, nominal valueor age may be more desirable objects of hoarding than others. Again, main criterion seemsto be the factor of value. European monarchs often tried to overcome frequent shortages ofmoney by diluting, more or less perceptibly, the precious metal content of their coins.Older, less debased coins were therefore considered more valuable and - in compliancewith the Gresham’s law - gradually disappeared from circulation. The reverse side of thisprocess is their greater incidence in hoards. Taken as samples of circulating coins, suchhoards then acquire a temporal bias that makes them, and the coin stock they are supposedto represent, look on the average older than they actually are.23

In Mughal India the situation was rather different. The Mughal silver rupee kept itsstandard weight and silver content all through the second half of the 18th century. Moreo-ver, official regulations specifying special discounts on older coins raised artificially thevalue of freshly minted coins by several per cent, and thus discouraged people from keep-ing coins of older mintage.24 One could perhaps even speculate about a reverse bias: older

21 A conveniently short term for this type of bias would perhaps be „hoarding factor“ - a translation of theaccepted German term „Hortungsfaktor“. See, e.g., J. Schüttenhelm, Der Geldumlauf im südwestdeutschenRaum vom Riedlinger Münzvertrag 1423 bis zur ersten Kipperzeit. Stuttgart 1987, pp. 99-100.

22 Percentual shares of gold, silver and copper coins in Mughal hoards are summarized in Tab. 3 on p. 28.23 J. Schüttenhelm, op. cit., p. 100.24 For a detailed treatment of the Mughal system of discounts and remintings of old coins, see M. Martin,

23

coins in long-term savings might be the most natural candidates for spending before theirvalue decreased to the level of silver bullion.

Concerning the qualitative biases, mention should be made of silver fractions of Mughalrupees. These began to be minted during the reign of Akbar and, sooner or later, must havefound their way into hoards. If the printed inventory records faithfully all occurrences ofsmall silver coins in hoards (as seems to be the case)25 , their role in hoarding - and incirculation probably too - was only marginal.26

Few words should be said on two basically opposite theories of conditions conduciveto hoarding. According to the first, hoarding is symptomatic of growing wealth and relativeabundance of money; in the Middle Ages and in the early modern era savings banks wereunknown and depositing of precious objects and coins in safe and secret places was nothingunusual or unnatural. According to the other, hoarding activity increases especially in timesof wars, uprisings and general insecurity - an assumption which found its way also into P.Sarvas’ table reproduced above. On the general level, it can be said that these two theoriesare not necessarily mutually exclusive. If the hoarding of money rose to higher levels intimes of distress, the material necessary for this purpose must have been already there inthe first place. Political and military upheavals would yield fewer hoards in poorer regionsthan in wealthy and monetized areas. One should take into account also the opposite proc-ess - the recovering of previously hidden hoards and other precious objects. It can be as-sumed that under relatively stable political and economic conditions most of these buriedaccumulations would be dishoarded, spent and therefore dispersed. Even if such accumula-tions were numerous, today we have little material proof of their past existence. Completeloss of information about the location or even about the very existence of hoards probablyoccurred more frequently in dramatic and unusual circumstances: the memory may havebeen obliterated by sudden death or expulsion of the owner or his relatives. (This aspect isbetter dealt with as part of our filter II). Such situations occur typically in times of wars,uprisings or other violent upheavals which themselves constitute important motive for for-mation of new hoards. That is why we have typically more hoards from times of wars thanfrom periods of peace.27 Hoarding activity and the numbers of extant hoards (and conse-

The Reforms of the Sixteenth Century and Akbar’s Administration: Metrological and Monetary Considerations.In: J.F. Richards (ed.), The Imperial Monetary System of Mughal India. Delhi 1987, pp. 68-99, esp. pp. 88-93.

25 In hoards no. 319/UP, 320/UP, 613/UP, 742/UP silver coins of one and the same regnal period aredivided into two groups described separately. Criterion for this division is nowhere explained; we can onlyguess that they refer to two different types of silver coins, perhaps rupees and half-rupees or annas. In othercases - e.g. nos. 780/UP, 802/UP, 837/UP fractions are identified even in cases of their very small numbers orsingle occurrences in hoards.

26 Several hoards contain fractional pieces of the Akbar… rupee that are said to be known only from literaryevidence. 1/16th of rupee, the anna, was minted in some quantity in the reign of Sh€hjah€n, but according tocontemporary testimony, was „rare“. The same seems to hold good, more or less, for the nis€r, a quarter-rupeestruck by Jah€ng…r, Sh€hjah€n, Aurangzeb and FarruÇsiy€r. I. Habib, The Currency System, p. 7; P. L. Gupta,Coins. New Delhi 1969, p. 125.

27 Examples supporting this thesis can be probably drawn from any area with at least partly monetizedeconomy afflicted by some violent disturbance. The example of hoards registered in Bohemia and published by E.

The Filters


quently of extant coins too) are two separate phenomena which certainly are mutually re-lated but the relation is not simple and straightforward one: more coins from more hoardsdo not necessarily mean greater volume of circulating money in the respective period. Itwould be too risky to conclude on the basis of hoard evidence that greater number of sur-vived coins is an indication of expanding money supply.

In the context of the present analysis, questions about relationship between the phenom-enon of hoarding and its motives on the one hand and numbers of actually uncovered hoardsand coins on the other are not of purely theoretical interest. Quantitative analysis of Mughalcoins and hoards must be preceded by an attempt to identify factors responsible for observedunevenness in the temporal and spatial distribution of hoards registered in the area of the U.P.Investigation of this unevenness undertaken in Section 2 of Part II of the present study sug-gests that in the case of Mughal India too, higher incidence of hoards in certain periods andareas correlates broadly with periods of unrest, wars, raids and general insecurity; areas livingin peace and relative prosperity, on the other hand, yield very few hoards even when theprocess of monetization there (in areas close to the Mughal capital of Sh€hjah€n€b€d, forexample) was most probably in no way less advanced than in some other areas with higherincidence of hoards. In sum, in the Mughal case too, higher incidence of hoards appears to bedue in the first place to specific events; for the study of more general economic processeswhich form necessary conditions for the very possibility of saving and hoarding of silvermoney, however, straightforward quantitative methods do not constitute an appropriate tool.

Nohejlová-Prátová (red.), Nálezy mincí v Èechách, na Moravì a ve Slezsku, vols. I-IV, Praha 1955-58 is veryinstructive in this respect: two very prominent peaks in hoarding activity coincide with Hussite wars of 1420’s and1430’s and with the Thirty Years’ War of the 17th century. See ibid., vol. IV, p. 82. Causes of hoard formation aredealt with in a lengthy article of A. Blanchet, Les rapports entre les dépots monétaires et les événements militaires,politiques et économiques. Revue Numismatique XXXIX(1936), Ser. 4, pp. 1-70, 205-270. This article reads morelike a list of hoards formed in response to wars, military campaigns and local power struggles. Some of theexamples, drawn from two millennia of European history are speculations and more or less convincing guesses.However, his main thesis is beyond doubt. Apart from political upheavals there were also relatively minor distur-bances of local and temporarily limited character: these too could induce people to hide their property. As a goodexample in this respect may serve the so called Lohe hoard discovered in Stockholm in 1937 and subsequentlyanalyzed by B. Thordemann in a model study The Lohe Hoard: A Contribution to the Methodology of Numismat-ics. Numismatic Chronicle, vol. VIII (1948), Ser.6, pp. 188-204. Formation of this huge emergency hoard wastraced to particular political crisis in Stockholm in 1743. Thorough study of local historical sources was necessaryto identify the situation that led to formation of this hoard. Another example, this time known only from narration,is description left by Samuel Pepys in his diary of his own precautionary measures taken in the summer of 1667 inresponse to the danger of Dutch attack on London. J. Warrington (ed.), The Diary of Samuel Pepys. London, NewYork 1953, vol. II, pp. 481-2, 488 and vol. III, pp. 80-81. We have also a rare literary description of such a localcrisis from Mughal India - an account left by a jeweller Ban€ras…d€s from Jaunpur about violence and extortioncommitted by the Mughal governor Qul…j {•€n. R.Ch. Sharma, The Ardha-Kath€nak. A Neglected Source ofMughal History. Indica, vol. VII, no.1 (1970), p. 58. Hoards formed in this type of local crisis may be chronologi-cally isolated and their testimony of some political disturbance may be deciphered only after careful study of localsources. Thordemann’s thesis that „series of chronologically proximate deposits indicate periods of war or otherpolitical disturbance, while chronologically isolated finds do not allow of any such conclusion“ (The Lohe Hoard,p.193) is formulated in this respect perhaps too sharply. For the German debate and subsequent empirical research(confirming the thesis stated above), see P. Ilisch, op. cit., p. 3-5.

25

Here, the analysis of internal evidence of each hoard-sample (temporal structure of the coincontent of the accumulation, provenance of coins included, their material composition, fabricand weight), may yield more reliable results than simple counting of their numbers.

Filter II: Coins Hoarded - Coins Recovered in Modern TimesNot all hoards hidden and forgotten in the past have been discovered in the modern era;some still lay hidden in the ground, others were found accidentally in the pre-modern pe-riod. The fact that such discoveries occurred from time to time is attested not only bylegends, tales and folklore in general, but also by certain type of the existing hoards them-selves. As mentioned earlier in this chapter, several U.P. hoards registered and described inmodern times contain two clearly separate parts belonging to two totally different periods.Old hoard uncovered in the past was sometimes lumped together with contemporary sav-ings and subsequently buried together with them. We can speak with confidence about twooriginally separate hoards when the time distance between them (the period represented byno coins in the hoard) is relatively great and therefore clearly evident. However, there areprobably also composite hoards whose parts are, on the temporal axis, not very far fromeach other: such hoards cannot be easily distinguished from hoards accumulated more orless continually for a longer period of time.

We have no means of estimating the rate of attrition of the original hoard stock due tothese pre-modern discoveries. Generally, the more distant the date of hoard is from the present,the greater is the probability of its discovery in the past. As far as the frequency of hoards isconcerned, owing to this filter older hoards are numerically underrepresented in comparisonto those of more recent origin. The rate of attrition was probably not even through the centu-ries and millennia: the rate of discovery must have been increasing steadily together withgrowing population density and, especially in the more recent times, with transport of greatmasses of earth in the intensive building of infrastructure, new houses, etc.

Finally, we should not forget that a number of hoards was later reclaimed by their ownersor their informed relatives; these are hoards whose existence never disappeared from thememory of local inhabitants. Here the „sieve“ is likely to be much more dense in periods ofpeace, which ensured greater continuity of habitation and tradition passing from one genera-tion to the next. The „sieve“ is understandably looser in times of wars, migrations, distur-bances, etc. This, together with greater hoarding activity, is the reason why periods of war andunrest are better represented in hoard statistics than periods of peace.

The existence of the quantitative bias due to long-term attrition should be kept in mindparticularly in comparisons of quantities of hoards belonging to different epochs; it is notexactly quantifiable. The period of two hundred years (1560-1760) which is under discussionhere is perhaps too short for this bias to distort in a serious way the quantitative evidence.Fluctuations in the number of hoards over shorter periods, on the other hand, may be, forreasons stated above, quite strong - this should be borne in mind especially in attempts torelate the number of hoards to the volume of currency in circulation. There is no bias thatcould affect qualitative aspects (internal structure) of hoards passing through this filter.

The Filters


Filter III: Coins Recovered in Modern Times - Coins Entered intoTreasure Trove ReportsNot all coins recovered in modern times (defined for our purposes as the period whenmuseums systematically register hoards and collect and catalogue old coins) have beenentered into official museum inventories. From the total number of hoards recovered inmodern times - in the case of U.P it is since 1882 when hoards reported to the authoritiesbegan to be registered and described in Treasure Trove Reports - only a fraction came to thenotice of government officials or found its way into state museums. It is impossible to sayhow large - or rather, how small - this fraction actually was. According to an estimate of J.S.Deyell28 up to 95 per cent of the hoards or even more may escape the attention of the stateauthorities and go unreported into private hands. Only a part of this mass of coins goes intoprivate collections, whereas the great majority is melted down and sold on the silver marketas bullion.

We may ask whether hoards of Mughal coins have had in the last hundred years al-ways equal chance to get into the possession of museums, or whether there was, at times, aselective bias affecting their share in all hoards registered in a given time-span in a givenarea. To get an idea about possible trends or fluctuations, the mass of data from the U.P.,available for the period of 1882-1979 (total of 1141 hoards) has been divided into five-yearperiods and summarized in the following graph.

Fig. 3. Coin hoards of the U.P. registered by the State Museum, Lucknow in the years 1882-1979.

0

20

40

60

80

100

120

140

160

1881

-85

1886

-90

1891

-95

1896

-00

1901

-05

1906

-10

1911

-15

1916

-20

1921

-25

1926

-30

1931

-35

1936

-40

1941

-45

1946

-50

1951

-55

1956

-60

1961

-65

1966

-70

1971

-75

1976

-80

num

ber o

f hoa

rds

HOARDS WITH MUGHAL COINS

ALL HOARDS

28 J.S. Deyell, Living Without Silver, p. 279.

27

Basically, two interpretations of this graph are possible. According to one, the percent-age of loss of hoards due to laxity in law enforcement would bee seen as a constant, and thedecline of registered hoards, noticeable since the fourth pentad of this century, would beexplained by the decline of absolute numbers of all hoards found in this area. This declinewould be explained as being due to the simple fact that the total quantity of all hoardsburied in the past gets gradually exhausted, and the decreasing trend noticeable in the graphsimply reflects this fact. Another explanation might point to factors 8 to 10 of the list of P.Sarvas reproduced here on p. 28 above. Use of machines capable of turning and transport-ing large masses of earth may destroy uncovered hoards or disperse them so that their partsor single coins easily escape human attention. Level of education may be perhaps lessimportant than the opportunity to sell coins for metal on the bullion market or to privatecoin collectors. This last factor seems to be, particularly in the second half of this century, ofgrowing importance, and may go a long way towards explaining the post-war declining trend.

Apart from these more or less general factors operating in many other countries of theworld (numbers of finds registered in European countries show the same declining trend),there are several other features characteristic to the U.P. Even in the U.P., with its excep-tionally high standard of treasure trove record keeping, the quality of registering and subse-quent storing of records has been quite uneven.29 As A. K. Srivastava informs us in hisintroduction to the published volume, complete evidence of coin finds based on the originalTreasure Trove Reports is available for the years 1898-1918, 1939-1956/57 and 1965-1979(the time of compilation of the inventory). The evidence from the intervening years isincomplete and has to be reconstructed, as far as possible, from other archival material. Thesituation is especially bad in the case of the late thirties, when the description of a hoard isoften restricted to laconic statement „Mughal“ and „disposition not known“. Such finds canbe drawn only into the most elementary statistics about the total number of Mughal hoards.It is not improbable that unknown number of hoards was dropped completely. The faultdoes not seem to be in incompetent registration but rather in the later handling of the records.

Summary description of some hoards may create the impression that their whole con-tent is made up of only one type of coin (of single mint and year), a characteristic feature ofthe so-called emergency hoards. To avoid the inadvertent bias possibly inherent in this typeof defective evidence, all hoards registered in the years 1934-1938 have been excludedfrom processing of this aspect of hoard-formation.

As far as the share of hoards containing Mughal coins in the total number of all regis-tered hoards is concerned, there does not seem to be any bias either in favour or against

29 The fact that U.P. has probably the best inventory of hoards available anywhere in India, is due to noaccident. Making a unique arrangement, in 1899 the Government of U.P. constituted a small Treasure TroveCommittee from persons interested in numismatics who subsequently examined and reported on the finds of theprovince. The extant Treasure Trove Reports belonging to the years prior to 1899, however, show equal level ofprofessionalism: perhaps similar committee assisted the officials in less formal way since the early 1880s.Beside the central position of the area of U.P. in the Mughal empire, this is another factor that makes its hoardsespecially worth of historian’s attention and careful study.

The Filters


Mughal finds: their share in the total fluctuates mostly between forty and fifty five per cent(with two exceptions in the pentads of 1886-90 and 1946-50, when their share sinks tounder thirty per cent).30

Turning to possible qualitative distortion, it is highly probable that in India this filterstops a greater proportion of gold coins than coins of any other metal. Gold is little affectedby corrosion and its constantly high price on the market makes it ideal for conservation ofvalue. Its original proportion in hoards was therefore probably higher than its share inhoards registered in the Treasure Trove Reports of the U.P.

pieces per cent per cent of all coins in terms of value

Gold 139 0,24 3,6 Silver 44 057 76,3 95,13 Copper 13 509 23,4 1,27 Other 36 0,06 TOTAL 57 741 100 100

Tab. 3. Gold, silver and copper in U.P. hoards containing Mughal coins inventoried in theyears 1882 - 1978/7931

The relatively low percentages of copper are due to the general prevalence of silver asthe main and relatively accessible monetary metal whose higher intrinsic value made itmore suitable for hoarding than the cheaper copper. Apart from the effects of this „hoardingfactor“, specific provisions of the Treasure Trove Law also played a considerable role (seebelow). On the other hand, the causes of the relatively very low percentage of gold, a metalmost suitable for hoarding, must have been very different. In this case, small numberssuggest that gold coins, instead of being duly reported and handed over to the authorities,tended to disappear into private pockets.32 In comparison to silver and copper, gold is, inofficial reports and collections, most probably seriously underrepresented.

Of considerable interest in this context are the Treasure Trove Laws regulating theprocedures of registration and disposal of hoards, as well as the remuneration for the honest

30 Average share of Mughal hoards in the total is 44.64 per cent (pentads 1881-85, 1961-65 and 1971-75have been excluded), standard deviation from the mean is 10.22. The Mughal share in the two exceptionalpentads is 23.38 and 28.00 per cent respectively.

31 From the numbers have been excluded 535 gold coins of no. 763/UP (Treasury of Kunwarpur) as wellas 2851 silver, 787 copper and 245 silver alloy coins of no.1060/UP (Treasury of Rampur). As these coins wereinventoried by state officials directly on the spot, filter III in these two cases did not intervene. In all, coins from528 hoards have been included. Percentual shares of gold, silver and copper expressed in terms of their relativevalue have been calculated on the basis of gold to silver rate1:12 and copper to silver rate 23:1. The rates areaverages calculated for the period of 1560-1760 from data published by I. Habib in his article A System ofTrimetallism in the Age of the „Price Revolution“: Effects of the Silver Influx on the Mughal Monetary System.In: J. F. Richards (ed.), The Imperial Monetary System of Mughal India. Delhi 1987, pp. 148-150.

29

finder.33 The first such law, Regulation 5, was passed in 1817. This was superseded by ActVI of 1878 which, supplemented with a minor amendment in 1891, remained in force untilthe end of British rule and was subsequently inherited unchanged by the independent India.

In its substance the Act is very liberal, but the accompanying procedures are verylengthy and cumbersome; this has deterring effect on any finder - if he happens to knowabout the existence of the Act at all. His duty is to report and hand over the hoard to districtofficer who shall, by way of public notification, give a chance to potential owners of thefind to raise their claim. If no such person appears in the stipulated time, the hoard is, afterinspection, returned to the finder. The collector, however, may acquire the hoard, or part ofit, for the government and pay to the persons entitled thereto a sum equal to the value ofmaterials of the treasure. (In fact, it was only in 1884 that provincial governments wereadvised to issue instructions to collectors that all coins of non-British mintage should beinvariably acquired for the government). If a claimant appears, the case is to be settled by aCivil Court. The final verdict and the sum to be payed is reported to be usually quite long incoming - four or five years are no exception. Moreover, few people are aware of the realcontent of this Act and many, including police officials, wrongly believe that hoards are theproperty of the state. This state of affairs has had two unfortunate results: finders try to hidetheir finds and police, on receiving notice, often tend to behave in an unduly harsh way. P.L.Gupta, an eminent Indian numismatist with lifelong experience in the field, believes thathoards which come to the notice of the government constitute hardly five to ten per cent ofall hoards found.34

The Act contains also one provision that has worked as a kind of filter holding backcopper hoards. Section 4 exempts from the application of the Act objects of value of lessthan ten rupees. Even at the beginning of the 1960s this sum could cover a hoard of fivehundred copper coins. This may partly explain the fact that the Mughal copper hoards areapparently underrepresented, especially in the hoard profile of the second half of the 16thcentury.

However, if we concentrate on a single metal (in this case on silver), the quality of oursample should not be affected by this filter - except perhaps by the loss of such rarities asthe „zodiacal“ coins of Jah€ng…r sought after by every private or public collector. As theMughal rupees kept an almost unchanging standard of weight for long periods of time,there is no reason for the existence of any serious qualitative bias. Quantitative attritioncaused by this filter, on the other hand, must have been extremely heavy.

32 J. S. Deyell reports about private collections containing rare gold coins coming undoubtedly from suchunreported hoards. „Even academics appear embarrassed by questions about their source of gold coin photo-graphs.“ Living Without Silver, p. 281.

33 Competent summary of the history of treasure trove laws in India, the present situation and completetext of the Treasure Trove Act in force gives P. L. Gupta, Treasure Troves Laws in India - A Review. Journal ofthe Numismatic Society of India XXV (1963), p. 137-151.

34 Ibid., p. 147.

The Filters


Filter IV: Coins Inspected and Entered into Treasure TroveReports - Written Evidence of Dispersed CoinsToday’s historians have at their disposal for visual inspection only a small percentage of thetotal of all registered and described coins. In India, state museums select only a limitednumber of specimens suitable for completing their own collections and distribute the rest toother museums or sell them on the market. Hoards are therefore usually soon dispersed andthe historian is left only with written records. A lot of very useful information about coinsthat is available only after their careful visual inspection (composition, exact weight, wear,dies used, etc.) is either irretrievably lost or, if the coin is inspected after the hoard has beendispersed, taken out of its original context. In addition, there may be mistaken identifica-tions or simple typographical errors that cannot be corrected when the original is no longeravailable.

Moreover, many historians may not have ready access to the original Treasure TroveReports and have to make do with the published inventories. In the ideal case, these shouldbe in the form of reprints of the original reports, supplemented with the necessary criticalapparatus. However, not all published inventories fulfil these requirements. For example,the published inventory of the U.P. hoards that has supplied data for this study is at least inone important respect incomplete. Its compiler leaves out information about the number ofduplicates in hoards; these data are important for statistical processing of year and mintfrequencies. There are some obvious errors in dating which can be in most cases corrected35 ;the less obvious ones could be eliminated only after careful comparison with the originalreports. On close inspection, however, these errors appear to be marginal. We should notexpect them to constitute any bias that would distort the data systematically in one direction.

As far as the Mughal coin hoards are concerned, it seems, therefore, that if we concen-trate on a single metal (silver), understand the sheer quantities of hoards and coins con-tained in them primarily as indicators of past hoarding activities rather than of quantities ofcoins in circulation and study the coins always in their hoard context, we can to a greatextent escape the qualitative distortions inherent in the material. An attempt to escape, asfar as possible, the bias exercised by uneven number of hoards on the coin evidence hasbeen made in Part Two of the present work: the method of counting incidences of particulartypes of coins instead of their sheer numbers is explained in the second part of Section 4dealing with the structure of Mughal silver hoards.

35 Most coins are dated by both the regnal year and also by the year of hijra. It is relatively easy todiscover instances where these two dates do not tally. There are two possible explanations of these errors: themaster of the mint did not change at the appropriate time the dies for the obverse and reverse side of the coin -in this case the later date should be taken as valid; or the discrepancy is due to wrong identification of thesometimes hardly legible dates on worn or damaged coins. In this work, if the two dates on a coin do not tally,the later one has been selected as the probably correct one. In other dubious cases where this solution has notbeen possible, a question mark has been appended.

31

4. Types of HoardsAs has been stated above, hoards are analysed mainly to answer two broad sets of questionsconcerning the role and use of money in the past ages. The first set concerns the hoardsthemselves and sees them as a source for study of hoarding behaviour of the population (ora segment of it) inhabiting a certain area in a certain period of time and tries to understandits motivation and social background. The second approach tries to utilize the data con-tained in hoards for a reconstruction of past coin stock in its qualitative as well as quantita-tive aspects. In this case, coin hoards are looked upon as samples of past coin stocks. Itmust be stressed again that these are not independent random samples as defined by themodern science of statistics. Apart from biases affecting differently the quantities of differ-ent types of hoards, there are also factors which influence the internal composition of hoards.Unintentional coin finds or coin accumulations may have different internal structure thanintentional hoards built up by their owners with a particular type of selection criteria inmind. There are several types of hoards and, from the point of view of reconstruction ofpast coin stocks, not all are of equal importance. Unintentional loss of a purse with recentlyacquired coins will have different internal structure and will reflect different aspect of moneyuse than a saving hoard accumulated gradually by two or more generations of owners. In sofar as hoards keep the information about their origin coded in their internal structure, theyshould be, as far as possible, divided into several structurally distinct groups.

Analysis of the hoard content should be supplemented, wherever possible, by circum-stantial evidence: exact location of the find, receptacle, if any, etc. Facts of this kind shouldform an integral part of Treasure Trove Reports. Unfortunately, in published inventories ofIndian coin hoards this information is regularly omitted. This omission debars the researcherfrom distinguishing certain types of intentional and unintentional hoards and from identifyingsome rather special cases - e.g. accumulations of coins motivated not by economic but ritualbehaviour. Under these conditions, an analysis of internal structure of hoards is our sole tool.

Long-term Savings HoardsThe first group of hoards identifiable on the basis of analysis of their content consists oflong-term hoards. Typically, such hoards include significant percentage of relatively oldcoins (relatively to the date of the latest coin in the hoard); the temporal distance betweenthe oldest and latest coin may be one hundres years or even more. This broad temporalrange is usually covered by more or less continuous series of coins from the oldest to thelatest. (Hoards containing one or two old coins isolated by a long temporal gap from a morecompact group of later coins constitute a special category that will be dealt with furtherbelow.) Inclusion of a hoard into this category must take into account broader context ofother hoards belonging to the time and place under consideration.

If all or great majority of other hoards show this same or very similar temporal struc-ture, it has to be assumed that they constitute a more or less reliable sample of coin stockcirculating at the time fixed by their latest coins. Large share of old coins compared to the

Types of Hoards


number of those of later mintage then reflects, first of all, weak influx of monetary metalinto the economy and probably also a relatively slow monetary circulation: the quicker thecirculation, the more rapid is the attrition of the coin stock due to various kinds of losses.Greater stability of the coin stock indicates its slower velocity.36

If, on the other hand, hoards of this type are in a minority and stand in contrast toprevailing hoards of considerable younger temporal structure (as is the case of Mughalhoards), they can be interpreted as a long-term saving hoards in the proper sense of theword: as accumulations formed gradually by greater number of smaller additions to theexisting stock, made sometimes by two or more generations of owners.37 There is no uni-versal time-limit that could be taken as a clear dividing line between such long-term savinghoards and the more common shorter-term accumulations; average time-span of contem-poraneous „ordinary“ hoards should constitute the main basis for comparison and classifi-cation. Higher percentage of these long-term saving hoards in the corpus of all extant hoardsbelonging to a certain period and area may be seen as an indication that hoarding was ahabitual activity and one of the more prominent functions of money.

For the purposes of analysis attempted in the present study, following criterion hasbeen formulated: if the share of coins minted during past regnal period(s) is in a givenhoard larger than the average share of coins of this type in hoards belonging to two preced-ing pentads, it is highly probable that this hoard does not reflect the state of stock circulat-ing at the time of its concealment but belongs to the category of long-term savings hoards.

J. Schüttenhelm has formulated a hypothesis that coins of different mints and differentminting dates should be better mixed in these „archaic“ hoards or hoard components (desig-nated in German numismatic literature by the term „Altbarschaften“) than in hoards whoseperiod of accumulation was shorter.38 If the term (inter)mixed should refer to the result ofmixing in circulation, i.e. before the coins were hoarded, this statement may not be necessar-ily true. If, at an earlier date, coins were taken out of circulation and picked out for saving andhoarding under similar circumstances as later coins were at a later date (i.e. the same selectionprocess was at work), then, other factors being equal, no such difference between older andnewer coins, as far as the degree of their inter-regional mixing is concerned, should ever arise.Greater diversity of older components of hoards is better explained by longer process ofgradual addition of newly acquired coins to the already existing hoarded material. In Europe,where the gradual debasement of coins was a common phenomenon and a fact constantlypresent in the minds of hoarders, older, less debased coins were naturally preferred to more

36 This seems to be the case e.g. of Novgorod in the second half of the 9th and second half of the 10thcentury: see, В. Л. Янин, Денежно-весовые системы русского средневековья. Домонгольский период.Москва 1956, p. 67.

37 V. L. Janin, op. cit., p. 63 recommends, rightly, to restrict the term „long-term accumulations“(кладыдлительного накопления) exclusively to this second type of long-term hoards.

38 J. Schüttenhelm, op. cit., p. 157: „Grundsätzlich unterscheidet sich die Altbarschaft aber von derNeubarschaft dadurch, daß die einzelnen Münzen der Altbarschaft einem wesentlich größeren Zeitraumentstammen und deshalb stärker durchmischt sind, d.h. ein größeres Spektrum an Prägestätten und Münzartenaufweisen als die Neubarschaft.“

33

recent ones as the money most suitable for conservation of value. This criterion of selectionnaturally „drew into the pot“, in the first place, heavier coins including those of more distantmints and times. The apparent diversity thus might arise only „in the pot.“

There is one sense, however, in which Schüttenhelm´s statement is valid for the circu-lating coin stock too: namely, when it should refer explicitly to the ever present componentof older coins remaining in circulation and gradually depleted by natural losses andremintings. Here the process of inter-regional mixing is generally more advanced than inthe case of more recent coins; as will be demonstrated on the case of Qandahari coins ofJah€ng…r’s time further on, study of these older components may yield interesting results.39

Composite HoardsThis is a peculiar type of hoard that, on superficial inspection, can be classified as a long-term savings accumulation, but constitutes in fact a separate category; it contains two dis-tinct components separated from each other by a longer chronological gap. Such gap mayreflect the fact that the hoard consists of two separate hoards put together by their lastowner.40

When interpreted with an eye on the analysis of hoarding behaviour, these compositehoards (never very numerous) may be seen as forming a separate category, demonstratingperhaps the human tendency to keep, as far as possible, lump sums intact. If, however, thefocus is on the study of hoards as samples of a past coin stock, such hoards have to bebroken into their two constituent components; these should be analysed separately as twodistinct hoards.

Emergency HoardsThe name of this type of hoards seems to imply rather dramatic circumstances of hoardformation: hasty concealment of money in time of imminent danger. Main characteristicfeature of this hoard type is its very short period of accumulation (mostly one to threeyears) and, in the Mughal case, small number of mints: in extreme cases all coins belong tosingle mint and single year. It seems that circumstances leading to formation of such hoardsmust have been exceptional; it is not very probable that, under normal circumstances, peo-ple would get their bullion converted with certain expense into freshly minted coins whichwould (at least in the Mughal case) bear a premium on the market, only to bury themimmediately underground.

Apart from the extreme case (single mint and single mint year) that can be inter-preted in the way suggested above, there are hoards with coin dates concentrated in avery narrow time span (up to three to four years) and very small number of mints. Forsuch accumulations, containing often no more than thirty silver coins, different interpre-tation has to be found. Hoards of this type may have been formed e.g. as short-term

39 See below, Part Three, pp. 84-88.40 Another, at least theoretically possible explanation would be an erroneous registration of two separate

finds, possibly from the same locality, but belonging to two different ages, as one single hoard.

Types of Hoards


savings of peasants who sold their agrarian produce on the market and were paid by newcoins minted in a nearby mint.41 Violent events may have supplied the impulse for theirultimate concealment.42

There is always the possibility that some of the hoards belonging to this group areresults of unintentional irretrievable losses rather than of intentional hoarding activity. Suchcases can be identified only on the basis of unambiguous circumstantial evidence - forexample, when the “hoard” was found in the riverbed - and are probably rather exceptional.(Printed hoard inventory which serves as a base for this study does not contain informationof this kind.). As far as the U.P. coin inventory is concerned, one should not totally discountthe unpleasant possibility that an accumulation which looks like a fine example of emer-gency hoard is in fact only inadequately described ordinary hoard. In most cases, numbersof unidentified coins in a hoard are clearly stated; problematic in this respect appear onlyfew hoards registered and described in the 1930s.

In the context of the present study, identifying emergency hoards is necessary whenhoards are used as samples of currency in circulation. While the old-savings hoards wouldtend to represent the coin stock as older than it actually was at the time of their conceal-ment, the emergency hoards would distort the evidence in the opposite direction. It is there-fore necessary to exclude these emergency accumulations from the set of hoards used assamples of the circulating coin stock. Two main criteria have been used in identifying theemergency hoards: an accumulation has been interpreted as a genuine emergency hoard if:1. the number of mints represented in it is not higher than two and 2. the period of accumu-lation is not longer than two years. To this narrowly defined group have been added short-term savings hoards with period of accumulation up to five years and coins issued by max.three mints. In some cases, such short-term saving blocks seem to form a part of a largerhoard containing variety of other mints and mint-years. These hoards have been treated asshort-term accumulations only if such blocks form substantial part of the whole. Lastly,there are few other exceptional hoards that contain coins with dates spanning two decadesbut minted in a single mint. These too appear to be products of a very peculiar process ofselection. For easier reference these hoards have been arranged in a table.

Other HoardsSystematic observation of time spans between oldest and latest coin in hoards will showthat long periods of accumulation (80 years or more) are not very frequent except in genu-ine old-saving hoards. Distributions of particular accumulation periods are presented in thefollowing graph.

41 J. Schüttenhelm, op. cit., p. 15642 German numismatic terminology using the more general term “Neubarschaft” does not face this prob-

lem. J. Schüttenhelm, ibid., characterizes these hoards as containing “eine große Zahl prägefrischer, noch nichtim Geldumlauf eingemischter Münzen, zumeist verbunden mit einer Konzentration auf eine bestimmtePrägestätte.” In the analysis of concrete numismatic material, more exact definition criteria have to be formu-lated to mark this category off from the mass of “ordinary” hoards; see further below in the main text.

35

Identification Latest coin Number Share ofnumber of Ag regnal Accumulation period Number of

coins periods (only Ag coins) mints

a) emergency hoards (accumulation period max. 2 years and max. 2 mints)

373/UP 1629 110 86,36% Jah 2? (Sh 2) 2 (Sh 1)779/UP 1705/06 91 100% Aur 2 11041/UP 1713/14 9 100% FS 2 1869/UP 1722/23 23 100% MSh 2 1712/UP 1724/25 19 100% MSh 2 1895/UP 1729 56 100% MSh 1 1894/UP 1744/45 109 100% MSh 1 1

b) short-term saving hoards (max. three mints)

890/UP 1623/24 15 100% Jah 3 3 265/UP 1628/29 42 76,19% Sh 32 (Sh 2) 5 (Sh 3)920/UP 1644/45 9 100% Sh 5 2 838/UP 1716/17 24 95,83 FS9 (23FS: 4; 21Itawa: 3) 3 86/UP 1717 39 100% FS 5 1 921/UP 1728 8 100% MSh 3 2 290/UP 1732 6 100% MSh 5 1 757/UP 1740/41 38 100% MSh 5 3 847/UP 1750/51 19 52,63% AhSh 4 2 683/UP 1756/57 47 100% ³lam. 3 1

c) other exceptional hoards

575/UP 1738/39 23 100% MSh 18(not emerg. but untyp.:) 1429/UP 1741 23 100% MSh 20 1516/UP 1742/43 47 100% MSh 16 1

Tab. 4. Mughal silver coin hoards classified as emergency and short-term savings accumulations

It can be seen that accumulation periods usually do not exceed one hundred years;majority of them have periods not longer than sixty years. This seems to tally with theobservation of contemporary French traveller J.B. Tavernier who informs us that in mon-etary transactions one frequently encounters coins whose age may be even forty years.

This brings us to the question to what extent can be the observed temporal structure ofhoards interpreted as reflecting real historical processes and facts. We shall be probably notfar off the mark when we understand hoards with these most common accumulation peri-ods as more or less representative samples of currency circulating at the time of final stageof their formation (ascertained by the date of latest coin). Our relative method describedabove will add to their number several other hoards containing small proportion of olderissues but otherwise similarly structured. On the other hand, old savings hoards should not

Types of Hoards


0

20

40

60

80

100

120

1

21-4

0

61-8

0

101-

120

141-

160

181-

200

221-

240

261-

280

301-

320

341-

360

381-

400

421-

440

461-

480

period of accumulation (years)

num

ber o

f hoa

rds

Frequency of accumulation periods: periods from 1 to 40 years

0

1020

30

40

1 4 7 10 13 16 19 22 25 28 31 34 37 40period of accumulation (years)

num

ber o

f hoa

rds

be used as samples of currency circulating in a particular time: as samples they wouldrepresent the coin stock older than it actually was. Hoards of this type should be betterunderstood as indicators of particular hoarding behaviour, the long-term saving. Similarly,the so-called emergency hoards, esp. if showing certain local and temporal concentrations,should raise questions about certain type of hoarding behaviour and its probable causes. Inshort, for the purposes of investigation of particular questions, one should form particularsubsets from the total number of available Mughal silver coin hoards - subsets definedalways by common structural features and identical sets of data.

Fig. 4. Accumulation periods of Mughal silver coin hoards

37

Published inventory of U.P. hoards allows us to ask questions about their chronological andspatial distribution and to some extent also about their internal structure. From the latestcoin in hoard we can establish the terminus ante quem; the date of earliest coin in the samehoard determines period of accumulation. It is unfortunate, however, that the inventorydoes not contain information about the number of doubles of each type of coin - these, esp.in big hoards, are often numerous. As almost every silver coin bears the name of mint anddate of minting, complete inventory would allow us to compute percentual shares of coinsof different mints and years in hoards - these could provide another set of data for anassessment of varying output of mints over time. The present author hopes to complete thislaborious task later when opportunity will present itself to work with the original TreasureTrove Reports. For the present, he has to content himself with data available in the printededition - summaries of coin numbers by regnal periods and incidences of different cointypes. However, phenomena such as the apparently dominant position of Ahmadabad mintin the time of Akbar, extraordinary output of Qandahar mint between the years 1612-1622or increasing role of inland mints during the reigns of Aurangzeb and his successors emergeclearly even from the incomplete evidence.

1. Chronology of Hoards

From the inventory of hoards it is readily apparent that hoards continued to be formed andhidden long after 1760, the terminal date of our investigation. Reason of the choice of the year1760 has been purely technical: during the sixth decade of the 18th century the East IndiaCompany took over several North Indian Mughal mints and began to strike their own coins inthem. At first, these were mainly imitations that differed only little from their genuine Mughalpredecessors: in their form these were still the known Mughal rupees with the traditionalinscriptions and name of the ruling emperor. The English, however, discontinued the oldMughal practice of exact dating and used the same dies (i.e. dies with one and the same date)for greater number of years or even decades.1 Owing to this practice many coins are datableonly approximately within rather broad time-limits.2 These coins make exact dating of hoards

1 For a detailed account of types of coins issued by British-managed mints of Calcutta, Murshidabad, Patna,Dacca etc., see the general but very informative overview by P. L. Gupta, Coins. New Delhi 1969, pp. 153-168.

2 Examples of coins minted for greater number of years with fixed dates include Murshidabad, regnal year(r.y.) 19 whose several varieties were produced between the years 1777-1834: Banaras, r.y. 17 with the name of

Part Two : Structure of Hoards


impossible. This new feature of the late Mughal or Anglo-Mughal coins makes the identifica-tion of short-term trends in hoarding impossible; it even stands in the way of an attempt toascertain with greater degree of precision the time when the habit of hoarding of coins beganto fall out of use. Decisive change in this respect occurred probably in the twenties or thirtiesof the 19th century: hoards datable to 1840s or later decades are already very rare (from thetotal of 530 hoards investigated here only 17 hoards belong to the period of 1840-1942).

For the sake of easier graphic presentation, all hoards which could be dated by the latestcoin have been grouped into five-year periods. Dates on coins are mostly in years of the hijra;and as the beginnings of Christian and Muslim years seldom coincide, most dates when con-verted into Julian (till 1582) or Gregorian calendar, have to be defined by two adjacent years.In the graphs which follow, if the latest hijr… date covers parts of fourth and fifth year of adecade, the hoard has been included into the first pentad of the respective decade: if the datecovers the fifth and sixth year or happens to coincide exactly with the fifth, the hoard has beenassigned to the second pentad. The same rule has been followed in the case of dates at the endof decades3 and also in conversion of dates from the Il€h… system of dating.

Fig. 5. Mughal coin hoards of the U.P., 1560-1760.

Sh€h ³lam II, minted with slight modifications from the year 1775 until 1819: and Farrukhabad, r.y. 45, mintedbetween the years 1805 and 1834. Individual variants of each type can be dated within narrower limits: how-ever, these too span one or more pentads or even decades. Ibid., pp. 161-163.

3 The conversion was carried out with the aid of F. Wüstenfeld, E. Mahler, Vergleichungs-Tabellen zurmuslimischen und iranischen Zeitrechnung. 3. Ed., rev. von J. Mayr and B. Spuler, Wiesbaden 1961. Persianmonths that appear regularly on silver rupees of Akbar since the 35th year of his reign, intermittently on sometypes of Jah€ng…r… and early Sh€hjah€n… rupees were not taken into account in the conversion.

0

2

4

6

8

10

12

14

16

18

1555

-60

1570

-75

1585

-90

1600

-05

1615

-20

1630

-35

1645

-50

1660

-65

1675

-80

1690

-95

1705

-10

1720

-25

1735

-40

1750

-55

num

ber o

f hoa

rds

only Ag coins only Cu coins Ag and Cu coinsAg, Cu and Au Ag and Au coins only Au coins

39

Several hoards had to be eliminated at the outset from further statistical processing. Insome cases only small percentage of coins in a hoard has been identified: if the unidentifiedcoins ran into tens of per cent, dating of the respective hoard on the basis of such defectiveevidence appears to be problematical. There are several other cases when the date can bedetermined but a more detailed inventory of coins of a hoard is incomplete or lacking. Suchhoards have been included into the statistics of hoards but had to be excluded from the analy-sis of hoard content. In all, there are about 15 such hoards.4 One hoard seems to have beenentered twice under two different serial numbers (839/UP identical with 855/UP): it has beencounted as one unit. Small mistakes which could be discovered in the printed inventory havebeen, where necessary, corrected at the appropriate place in the index at the end of this study.

Dating by latest coin is, in the great majority of cases, the most reliable way of fixing theage of hoards, but it is not necessarily absolutely exact. Several years may have intervenedbetween the date of minting of the latest coin and the date of burying of the hoard: period ofthree or four years probably would not be unusual. Owing to this time lag, unknown number ofhoards in the following statistics will appear in earlier pentad than that into which they actuallybelong. This irreducible margin of error should lead us to greater restraint about relating this orthat particular hoard to a certain known political or military event. General long-term trends inhoard frequencies are far less affected by this phenomenon than short-term fluctuations.

The graph of Mughal coin hoards incidences shows not only temporal distribution ofparticular types of hoards but also the role of the three monetary metals in hoarding. Thefirst feature that strikes the eye is a marked predominance of purely silver hoards, esp. fromthe second half of the 17th century, and decreasing number of gold, copper and mixedhoards in the same period. (Since even single finds have been included in the category ofhoards, gold finds, often consisting of single gold coin, are perhaps visually somewhatover-represented.5) In spite of the fact that copper has become a victim of biased negativeselection (due to workings of filter IV), in early Mughal hoards it is still prominent enoughto demonstrate its importance in the formative stage of the Mughal monetary system. Sil-ver is certainly more suitable for hoarding than copper; lack of prominence of silver inhoards testifies to its relative scarcity in circulation. All three silver hoards belonging to thepentad of 1560-65 contain large shares of pre-Mughal Sˆr… silver coins. In the followingdecades these Sˆr… coins gradually disappeared from hoards in whose silver component thenewly minted Akbar… rupees began to predominate.

4 See Appendix I at the end of the book.5 Definition of hoard in terms of number of coins is to some extent arbitrary procedure. Authors of Danish

inventory of hoards, for example, chose to define a treasure hoard as „two or more coins which were lost ordeposited together“. J. S. Jensen et al., Danmarks middelalderlige skattefund, c.1050-c.1550. Del 1, København1992, p. 119. (K. Grinder-Hansen). Hansen is nevertheless aware of problems inherent in this decision: owingto its inherent metallic value even single gold coins constituted a small „treasure“, more valuable than many„genuine“ hoards consisting of small copper coins. In India, one gold muhr might be worth ca 140 copper dams(computed on the basis of long-term averages of exchange rates between the monetary metals - see fn. 31 on p. 28above; copper dam was twice as heavy as gold muhr). It seemed unjust, therefore, to exclude single gold coinsfrom the statistics.

Chronology of Hoards


From the point of view of history of silver in Mughal India, the important turningpoint seems to have been the year 1573 when Akbar’s army conquered and annexed Gujaratand opened thereby an important corridor to the Indian Ocean and its lucrative trade for therapidly expanding but still landlocked empire. From the 1580s, silver in hoards graduallyreplaces copper and maintains its dominant position until the very end of the period exam-ined here (and, in fact, until the very end of hoarding in the U.P.).

Whereas the interpretation of the rising share of silver in hoards presents little prob-lem, great fluctuations in the numbers of hoards themselves over time are less easy toexplain. Hoard frequency appears to have reached a generally higher level after the death ofAurangzeb. Should we ascribe this rise to a generally easier availability of silver moneycaused by stronger silver influx or to deteriorating security and generally higher level ofviolence? In the first case, numbers of hoards, of coin incidences and also of coins them-selves would more or less faithfully reflect the expanding volume of coin stock. In thesecond, numbers of hoards (and consequently also coin incidences and coins) formed insuch disturbed period are not in the same proportion to the coin stock from which they hadbeen drawn are those less numerous hoards which were formed in periods of relative stabil-ity. In the context of quantitative analysis aimed at an estimation of volume of coin stock,this would mean that violence - if conducive to more intensive hoarding and hoard-forget-ting - has to be understood and taken into account as a distorting factor.

2. Spatial and Temporal Distribution of Hoards

As numbers of hoards grouped in pentads are often small, effects of purely accidental fac-tors unconnected in any way with the past processes of hoarding and hoard-forgetting (e.g.points 7 and 8 in the list of P. Sarvas reproduced above) cannot be ruled out. Still, it isimportant to try and discern forces which stand behind changes in the frequencies of hoardincidences in the short as well as long-term perspective and also in their spatial distributionon the area of the U.P. As a first step at this stage of hoard analysis, hoards have beendivided into groups by districts in which they were found. Next, they have been arranged,by dates of their latest coins, into five sub-groups spanning a period of fifty years each. Thefirst group covers the years 1560-1610 and corresponds broadly with the regnal period ofAkbar; the second lasts for the next half-century 1610-1660 and coincides almost exactlywith the reigns of Jah€ng…r and Sh€hjah€n; the third, covering the years 1660-1710, coin-cides with the era of Aurangzeb; the fourth period beginning in 1710 and ending in 1760(the terminal date of this study), is characterized by a process of imperial decentralizationand formation of new regional centres of power and affluence. The last, post-1760 period,includes all hoards which contain Mughal coins even when they belong into the second orthird decade of the 19th century and covers, therefore, more than the standard 50 years. Asthe dating of hoards in the post-1760 period is very uncertain, it is impossible to say exactlyhow many hoards were formed after the formal final date of this last period, i.e. after 1810.

41

A significantly higher quantity of hoards which fall into this last sub-group in comparisonto previous periods may be due to some extent to this factor. Similar procedure has beenadopted in the case of the first group: this includes also those Mughal silver hoards whichwere formed before 1560: in all, there are only eight such hoards belonging each to adifferent district, so that the possible distortion is minimal.

Next step in the analysis consists in identifying striking or extraordinary concentra-tions of hoards on a small area (a district) within a short time-span of one to three years. Thisprocedure is based on the assumption that extraordinary events (raids, plunders, epidemics,natural catastrophes) are often limited to short time-spans of one or two years. It must beadmitted that some of such hoard concentrations may be purely accidental and mutually un-connected; if, however, such concentrations or hoard-clusters occur in certain periods with asignificantly higher frequency than in others, the possible influence of extraordinary eventson the overall higher incidence of hoards belonging in the respective period should be takenseriously into account. The ratio of the total number of hoards grouped in such hoard-clustersto the total number of all hoards falling into the respective fifty-year period may broadlyindicate the role of extraordinary or catastrophic events in the processes of hoard-formationand, even more importantly, of hoard-forgetting. The pattern in which great number of hoardsare grouped in short-term hoard-clusters, can be interpreted as a sign of a series of adverseevents or generally unsettled circumstances; in this case, higher incidence of hoards probablyreflects, in the first place, this „catastrophic factor“ rather than an expanding volume of coinstock. If, on the other hand, the hoard incidences are more or less evenly distributed over timeand over the area under investigation, and their rise is more gradual and general, one caninterpret higher number of hoards as reflecting primarily more widespread use of money andtheir generally easier availability - as the number of people or families which formed hoardswas rising, so was also the number of hoards which were subsequently forgotten and left inthe ground until modern times; in this case, the long term ratio of hoard-forming to hoard-forgetting would remain the same.

Data on the distribution of hoards and coins in districts and in fifty-year periods havebeen arranged in a synoptic table6 which contains, apart from respective absolute numbersof hoards and coins, also their percentual shares in the total of all hoards and coins found onthe area of the state in the respective half-century. Closer attention has been paid to districtswhich show higher percentual shares of hoards not only when compared to other districts inthe same period, but appear to limit this higher percentage to a single period - the compari-son should be synchronous as well as diachronous. Hoards whose exact dating is not quitecertain (in the general list of all hoards their date fixed by the latest identified coin isfollowed by a question mark) have been left out of consideration. Districts showing in oneor several of the fifty-year periods exceptional concentrations of hoards are listed in Tab. 5.

The basic statistics included in the first column of the table shows that numbers ofhoards falling into the first three periods are roughly at the same level: 61 hoards in the

6 See Appendix II at the end of the book.

Spatial and Temporal Distribution of Hoards


period ending in 1610, 69 hoards in the second, covering the years 1610-1660, and 64 in theperiod 1660-1710. Many hoards of the first, Akbar… period either contain some coppercoins or are composed exclusively of copper d€ms or other copper coins. As we have seenabove7, the treasure trove evidence contains a selective negative bias against copper coinsand copper hoards; it is therefore not improbable that, if copper hoards had the same chanceto get into the official evidence as those hoards which are composed of silver coins, theirnumbers, especially in the Akbar… period, would have been higher. In the Akbar… period,there are also problems with exact dating of certain hoards; this applies, in particular, tothree hoards formed probably in the 1580s and found on the area of the district of Sultanpur.At least some of the six Akbar… hoards found in the Sultanpur district may be components ofanother one or two hoard-clusters. Thus the fact that in the whole period there is only a

Districts with highshare of hoards or

with hoard-clusters(in italic)

Period Hoard-clusters, if present

7 Part I, Filter III.

Tab. 5. Spatial and temporal concentrations of hoards

1560-1610 Bara Banki 348/UP (1591/92); 51/UP (1591/92); 359/UP (1592/93) hoards: total 61, Ag 39 Sultanpur

1610-1660 Agra hoards: total 69, Ag 63 Jhansi 973/UP (1614); 426/UP (1614-15); 418/UP (1615/16)

Mainpuri 265/UP (1628/29); 282/UP (1629/30)

1660-1710 Allahabad 740/UP (1701); 929/UP (1703) hoards: total 64, Ag 64 Banda

Bulandshahr 465/UP (1684/85); 1016/UP (1684/85)Jhansi 1097/UP (1687/88); 602/UP (1688)SaharanpurSitapur 653/UP (1700/01); 553/UP (1702/03)

1710-1760 Aligarh 575/UP (1738/39); 139/UP (1740); 212/UP (1741/42) hoards: total 120, Ag 115 Allahabad 1. 650/UP (1737/38); 778/UP (1737/38)

2. 757/UP (1740/41); 497/UP (1742/43)Banda 502/UP (1743); 473/UP (1745/46)Bijnor 1. 577/UP (1748); 1015/UP (1750)

2. 224/UP (1759/60); 374/UP (1759/60)Fyzabad 1021/UP (1721/22); 346/UP (1722/23)Gorakhpur 392/UP (1716/17); 966/UP (1718)Jalaun 1. 960/UP (1710/11); 370/UP (1712/13)

2. 128/UP (1739/40); 206/UP (1741/42)Jhansi 1. 705/UP (1723/24); 13/UP (1725)

2. 791/UP (1756/57); 773/UP (1757/58)LakhnauMathura 1139/UP (1748); 1138/UP (1749/50) - two parts of one hoard?Moradabad 516/UP (1742/43); 894/UP (1744)Unnao 814/UP (1724/25); 891/UP (1726/27)

43

single hoard-cluster with three hoards - a bare 4,9% of all hoards of the period - may be dueto the combined effects of anti-copper biases and uncertain dating. The following two peri-ods covering together most of the 17th century contain nearly the same numbers of hoardsand also share similar pattern of hoard distribution. In the period 1610-1660 we have twohoard-groups with five hoards - 7,2% of the total, in 1660-1710 there are four groups witheight hoards, 12,5% of all hoards of this period.

The post-Aurangzeb… era, on the other hand, appears to be different. Not only is thetotal number of hoards twice as high as in the previous periods, but the number of hoardgroups is also significantly higher: while the number of hoards doubled, hoard-clustersnearly quadrupled. 15 - or, if the Mathura group consisting possibly of two separately in-ventoried parts of an originally single hoard is excluded - 14 hoard-groups with 31 (29)hoards amount to 25,8% (24,2%) of all hoards falling into this fifty-year period. This rise ofthe share of hoards occurring in groups by 12% is too great to be dismissed as insignificantor due to accidental factors. In ideal case, an attempt should be made to trace each hoard-group to a particular event to verify the hypothesis of the violence factor formulated above.In the present circumstances this has not been possible. To establish probable connectionsbetween violence and particular groups of hoards, a great amount of written sources onlocal history of the „suspected areas“ will have to be studied and evaluated. Until thislaborious task has been done, statistical evidence is the only means to show that conditionswhich determined the frequency of hoard-forgetting may have changed in the period after1700. As a rough estimate, about 13% of the total hoard incidences in the period 1710-1760may be attributed to higher level of violence. All attempts to establish long-term trends inthe development of silver coin stock on the basis of hoard or coin incidences should takethis factor into account and downgrade the results for the 1710-1760 period accordingly.

3. Sizes of Hoards

In the context of analysis of hoard incidences and their distribution it will not be withoutinterest to look at the sizes of hoards - typical size may tell us something about typicalhoarders. In different context, part of this question was touched in Part I above in connec-tion with the possible distortion of sample owing to untypical sizes of hoards.8 However,sizes of hoards should not be assessed solely on the basis of purely formal criteria - quantityand type of coins making up the treasure; the intrinsic worth of the respective monetarymetal at the time of formation of the hoard in question should be also taken into account.Assessment of purchasing power of hoarded sums acquires special importance when stud-ies of hoarding patterns and habits are concerned with longer periods of time and are usedfor comparisons and broader generalizations.

Unfortunately, it is extremely difficult to make reliable assessments of changes inpurchasing power of silver in Mughal India during the 16th and 17th centuries. The data on

8 See the tables on the pp. 13 and 14 above.

Sizes of Hoards


prices of basic commodities are relatively few and far between and cannot be used forconstruction of price curves for any commodity except gold and to some extent copper andindigo. (This is also a great obstacle to all serious efforts to evaluate real impact of silverimports on prices and subsequently to draw comparisons between India and Europe con-cerning the so-called „price revolution“). However, gold and copper were no ordinary com-modities but, in the first place, monetary metals and as such cannot be used as typicalindicators of long-term changes in (consumer) prices. Indigo was a typical export com-modity and its price tended to fluctuate in response to developments at sometimes fairlydistant markets. If we follow the so far largely undisputed assessments and conclusions ofI. Habib, we see that at the end of the 17th century silver declined to somewhere betweentwo thirds and one half of the worth it had had in 1595.9 These estimates should be kept inmind when reading the following graph.10

9 Any reliable price curve for ordinary commodity should fulfil these basic requirements: 1. as the pricelevel varied greatly from region to region and from town to town (owing mainly to transport difficulties in pre-modern times), each particular series should be constructed from data of only one chosen locality; 2. as the pricesof esp. agricultural commodities depended closely on results of harvests, they fluctuated widely even in short-termperiods. To be able to distinguish such short-term fluctuations from longer-term trends, the statistician shouldwork with greater quantity of data covering rather densely the period under study; and 3. ideally, the data shouldbe supplemented by contemporary evidence about harvests: esp. famines and droughts should be taken into ac-count. In the case of Mughal India such strict conditions cannot be fulfilled. This should be kept in mind whilewondering at the large margins of error contained in I. Habib’s assessment that „if the price-level expressed insilver was 100 at the time of the ³’…n [i.e. in ca. 1595], it should have risen to over 150 in the twenties of the [17th]century; another ascent in the fifties and sixties put it somewhere between 178 and 276. Thereafter, it fell a littleand stood between 145 and 200 by the end of the century.“ I. Habib, The Agrarian System of Mughal India (1556-1707). Bombay 1963, p.89. Although the estimation was made on the basis of only few basic commodities (wheat,gram, mash, mung, moth, gh… and few others) in Agra and Lahore in few mutually distant years, this is probablystill the best rough assessment we have. See also his „A System of Trimetallism in the Age of the „Price Revolu-tion“: Effects of the Silver Influx on the Mughal Monetary System. In: J. F. Richards (ed.), The Imperial MonetarySystem of Mughal India. Delhi 1987, pp. 137-170 and J. J. Brennig, Silver in Seventeenth-Century Surat: Mon-etary Circulation and the Price Revolution in Mughal India. In: J. F. Richards (ed.), Precious Metals in the LaterMedieval and Early Modern Worlds. Durham (N.C.) 1983, pp. 477-496. Brennig corrects Habib’s calculations ofprices of Biana indigo, but agrees with him in description of the overall trend: „Price increases occurred but theperiods of increase were short and were followed by longer periods of relative stability. The most decisive increaseoccurred in the 1620s, for the price level achieved at the end of this period, even if occasionally surpassed, wasgenerally maintained throughout the remainder of the century. The dramatic increase of the mid-1650s and 1660s,although remarkable, was too brief to be significant.“ Ibid., p. 491.

10 It is not possible and probably not necessary to collect and interpret in this place all the data about pricesfrom which the conclusions quoted in the foregoing footnote were made. However, to make a basic idea aboutpurchasing power of one silver rupee (10,9 g of pure silver during the reign of Akbar) the following pricesprevailing in Lahore (then the capital city) in 1595 were selected from the long list compiled by Akbar´s courtchronicler Abˆl Fazl in his ³’…n-i Akbar…, vol. I, ³’…n 27.

Basic articles of food (kg per 1 rupee):wheat 84.0 lentils 84.0 moth (Phaseolus aconitifolius) 84.0 barley 125.6rice (ordinary) 50.0 millet168.0 sheep 1.5 r. per head oil 12.55brown sugar 17.92 gh… 9.56 duck 1 r. per head salt 46.76curds 55.8 milk 40.0 goat 0.75-1 r. per head

45

Fig. 6. Sizes of Mughal silver hoards of the U.P. (1556-1942) 11

Few words should be added on the possible biases and distortions due to the filtersconsidered in the previous chapter. Bias against exceptionally big hoards exceeding in valueone l€kh rupees was, as we saw earlier, eliminated in 1878. As our sample begins in 1882(date of first recorded hoard), there is no real possibility for this factor to influence ourstatistics. More serious effect may have had the Section 4 of the Act of 1878 that exemptsobjects of value of less than 10 Rupees from the application of the Act. It is probable thatdue to this regulation unknown number of copper and small silver hoards escaped the atten-tion of numismatists. Small amounts of silver coins are also more easily concealed anddisposed of by the finder without anybody else’s taking notice. Real share of small hoardsmay be therefore somewhat higher than shown in Fig. 6.

In this graphic presentation, hoards have been divided into six groups defined by numberof silver coins in hoard. The published inventory does not state explicitly which types ofMughal silver coins make up the hoard; these could be either rupees or their fractions(heavy silver coins worth several rupees were always rare). As the silver rupee was by farthe commonest silver coin, for practical purposes it has been chosen as the most likely cointype described by the term „silver“ or „silver coin“, whenever this is used in the Mughalhoard context. In fact, however, certain percentage of silver coins counted as rupees is ofsmaller denominations. In the graphic presentation the correction of this error would, there-

11 The hoard inventory does not specify the exact type of silver coins found in hoards. Beside the mostcommon rupees hoards may have included unspecified number of their fractions. Here, each coin had to becounted as one unit.

Sizes of Hoards

0

10

20

30

40

50

60

1-20 21-40

41-60

61-80

81-100

100andmoresize of hoard (number of silver coins in hoard)

perc

ent o

f all

hoar

ds d

epos

ited

durin

g th

e ru

le

AKBARI HOARDS JAHANGIRI HOARDS SHAHJAHANI HOARDS

AURANGZEBI HOARDS HOARDS 1708-1760 HOARDS 1760-1942


fore, mean increase of percentual shares of groups with smaller hoards at the expense ofthose which contain bigger accumulations.

Long-term changes in hoarding patterns can be highlighted by division of hoard groupsdefined by hoard sizes into several periods which can be subsequently mutually compared.One possible criterion for such temporal division is a regnal period. It is true that regnalperiods of the four Great Mughals are not of equal length. Akbar ruled for 49 years (1556-1605), Jah€ng…r for 22 years (1605-1627), Sh€hjah€n for 30 years (1628-1658) and Aurangzebfor 49 years (1658-1707). However, regnal periods of Akbar and Aurangzeb happen to be ofalmost exactly the same duration and are therefore mutually comparable. The interveningperiod is divided by two reigns of unequal duration; taken together, however, Jah€ng…r… andSh€hjah€n… eras lasted for 52 years - a time span roughly comparable to the other two periods.Their separate graphic presentation will show certain mutual similarities as well as differ-ences. The period beginning with the death of Aurangzeb and ending with the accession ofSh€h ³lam II on the Mughal throne includes several regnal periods but still has some internalunity: this was the time of gradual weakening and dissolution of the central administrativeand military structures and territorial shifts of centres of political and economic power. As faras the last period is concerned, even the only more or less approximate dating (a defect causedby confused dating of coins) shows quite clearly that in the second half of the thirties of the19th century the era of hoarding was over: about 90 per cent of hoards hidden after 1760belong to some date before 1835. The second half of the thirties is very poor in hoards andunless we suppose some rather sharp fall-off in hoarding in the middle of thirties, we canassign most of the late hoards to tens or twenties. The last period then, although formallylongest, has most of its hoards concentrated in a time span not longer than, say, 50 to 60 years.

The general pattern of hoarding is obvious at the first glance: relatively, and in the caseof Akbar… and Jah€ng…r… periods, even absolutely, most numerous are smaller hoards withless than 20 silver coins. Quantities of hoards belonging to higher categories graduallydecline; only the last category of accumulations with more than 100 coins shows an obvi-ous percentual increase. It must be pointed out, however, that the quantitative span of thislast category is much broader than of all the previous ones taken together: the smallesthoard in this category counts exactly 100 coins, the biggest, 5610 silver coins. On thewhole, the smallest hoards on the one hand and the biggest ones on the other seem to formtwo poles of certain general pattern and as such deserve somewhat closer scrutiny.

In the first group, the most marked trend is a gradual long-term decrease of its percentualshare of the total. This decrease appears to be matched to some extent by correspondingincrease in the next group of hoards containing 21 to 40 coins. It is difficult to resist thetemptation to explain this phenomenon by easier availability of silver coin in general. Typi-cal hoarder then seems to have been a man of rather moderate means hiding his smallfortune either in response to some direct threat or in anticipation of some possible futurecrisis (scarcity and dearth, weddings etc.).

C. A. Bayly enumerates several types of hoarding used by pre-modern Indian merchantand peasant families as a form of insurance against future needs. Merchant families always

47

laid great stress on the necessity to avoid risky and speculative investments.12 The availablecapital therefore should not be all invested in a single enterprise even when this mightappear to be highly profitable but rather divided in several parts managed separately. Onlyone portion should be invested in trade; another should be lent out at interest (with thegenerally high interest rates, a profitable, but not completely risk-free allocation of money);another part should be used to buy jewellery which could fulfil the function of movable anduniversally acceptable form of capital. Moreover, in accordance with the prevailing Hinduinheritance systems, it could be owned and inherited by women and used as an insurance forwife after the death of her husband. Finally, one portion should be hoarded in the form ofcoin. Bayly quotes a characteristic mnemonic formula designed to teach children of merchantfamilies the proper course one should follow in building up a household and conductingbusiness: the formula is based on the first letters of the Devan€gar… alphabet, each letterstanding for one basic activity: ka = k€m, work; kha = kh€n€, food; ga = g€±n€, to hoard (lit.to hide, bury in the ground); ghar = house etc. Such hoard served as family’s basic reservewhich could be drawn upon in case of a sudden and unexpected demand to honour anobligation etc. Moneychangers and moneylenders had to keep constantly certain sum ofready money simply to be able to conduct successfully their business. Peasants, at least themoderately prosperous ones, felt the need to keep a reserve for the eventuality of bad harvestsor natural calamities. Building such reserves can be hardly called an irrational activity,„hoarding“ with the pejorative tinge. Amounts of ready money kept as a „first reserve“ canbe expected to be of a rather moderate size, adjusted to clearly defined set of circumstances;crises and expenses of greater magnitude were to be met with the help of non-monetary silverand gold reserves, jewellery, etc. As we have seen, by far the greatest part of silver Mughalhoards uncovered on the area of the U.P. are accumulations not exceeding 60 silver coins -many of them possibly first cash reserves of cautious and prudent householders.

The group of big hoards is in no way less interesting. Here the general trend seems tobe gradual increase of the share of big hoards in the total; high percentages of Jah€ng…r… andSh€hjah€n… hoards of this group are, on this interpretation, exceptional and seem to antici-pate future trends. In this large group we can expect great differences in sizes: it can beargued that hoards containing 100 coins should be looked upon as belonging to a differentcategory than hoards with 500 or even thousands of silver coins. It seemed, therefore, con-venient to divide these hoards into three sub-groups, as is shown in the following table.Mutual comparisons of the sub-groups of each period will reveal interesting trends andpatterns in hoarding behaviour in the central part of Mughal empire.

12 This paragraph is heavily indebted to Ch. Bayly’s discussion of various functions hoarding had infamily enterprises in the 18th century north India. See his Rulers, Townsmen and Bazaars. North Indian Societyin the Age of British Expansion, 1770-1870. Cambridge 1983, pp. 396 and 401-404. In a list of various types ofmonetary and non-monetary hoarding Bayly mentions also a distress hoarding, „common in the late eighteen-century in the old imperial cities. It was a technique for survival and should not be confused with hoarding thatoccured as part of the regular running of businesses.“ Ibid., p. 402. Our hoard evidence confirms that this is thecase of Allahabad, Lakhnau and, to a lesser extent, Agra. Bayly’s interesting but rather short remark obviouslytouches a phenomenon which would deserve closer investigation.

Sizes of Hoards


The first thing that strikes the eye is the particular distribution of Akbar… and Jah€ng…r…hoards. No silver hoard of the first class has survived from the era of Akbar and only onefrom the regnal period of Jah€ng…r. This absence or near absence of big silver hoards, expli-cable partly by widespread use of copper for hoarding, contrasts with relatively high per-centages of hoards of this class in the later periods and is at the same time underscored bylack of Akbar… hoards in the group of 81-100 coins and similar absence of Jah€ng…r… hoardsin the group 61-80. Akbar… and Jah€ng…r… hoards seem to be rather sharply polarized: we cansee high percentages of small hoards, few fairly huge accumulations and several medium-size hoards in between. Can this phenomenon be interpreted as an effect of the greatredistributive power ascribed generally to the Mughal fiscal apparatus? In the 16th centurysilver was still rather uncommon monetary metal; great part of it was introduced into circu-lation by dishoarding of the non-monetary silver and by plunder - which means that it hadto pass through official hands. Wealth accumulated by the state was subsequently distrib-uted via the manbsabd€r… system whose selectivity and biases are well known. The Akbar…and perhaps also Jah€ng…r… pattern of hoarding may reflect this highly unequal access ofvarious strata of population to silver money: although the percentages of small hoards arehigh, absolute numbers are quite small.

Akbar (1556-1605) 0 = 0% 1 = 50% 1 = 50% 2 = 100% Jah€ng…r (1605-1627) 1 = 16.67% 1 = 16.67% 4 = 66.67% 6 = 100% Sh€hjah€n (1628-1658) 7 = 77.78% 2 = 22.22% 0 = 0% 9 = 100% Aurangzeb (1658-1707) 6 = 66.67% 2 = 22.22% 1 = 11.11% 9 = 100% 1708-1760 13 = 65% 6 = 30% 1 = 5% 20 = 100% 1761-1942 23 = 48.94% 15 = 31.91% 9 = 19.15% 47 = 100%

Tab. 6. Sizes of hoards containing more than 100 coins

This pattern continues during the reign of Jah€ng…r but changes abruptly during the ruleof Sh€hjah€n. There is relatively higher percentage of Sh€hjah€n… medium-size hoards (twogroups with 61-100 hoards); in the last group, big hoards of the first class (100-199 coins)clearly predominate while hoards with 400 coins or more are totally lacking. Similar patternseems to characterize the regnal period of Aurangzeb. During his rule silver had penetrateddeep into the networks of local trade and Mughal economy in general. Relatively more evendistribution of hoards in the particular size groups seems to reflect this fact.

There had always been one important social group that could be, and actually wasexpected to be hoarding money in a big way - the Mughal aristocracy. Official schedulesspecifying their salaries graded according to their mansabs or ranks testify to the extremelyunequal distribution of the state income among the ruling class. However, even the fewextremely wealthy mansabd€rs living at the apex of this strictly hierarchical system fell

100-199 COINSIN HOARD

200-399 COINSIN HOARD

400 AND MORECOINS IN HOARDPERIOD TOTAL

49

often in debt: the state looked to it that the allotted money was duly spent on the mainte-nance of the prescribed number of cavalry units (men, horses, pack animals, servants etc.);besides, the aristocrat was expected to maintain large household, live in a style imitatingthe air and manners of the royal court and, at specified occasions to present to the emperorexpensive gifts. Moreover, Mughal emperors looked upon the members of the militaryaristocracy as on their own servants and considered their property as belonging ultimatelyto the state treasury. This applied not only to j€g…rs, or assignments of land, but also to thatpart of movable property which an aristocrat accumulated during his service for the state.Widows and children had to content themselves with minor or even symbolic sums. Thispractice of rigorous enforcement of this so called „law of escheat“ (an established, butsomewhat misleading term) had been vividly described by Dutch merchant Francisco Pelsaertwho mentions in his account cross-examinations and even torture of the servants of thehouse as methods used by the state officials in order to extort information about propertyhidden by the deceased aristocrat.13 The hoard evidence would suggest that early dishoardingof large accumulations, in themselves certainly less numerous than small household hoards,was perhaps not an uncommon phenomenon.

4. Structure of Hoards

The available treasure trove reports contain data:1. on the place of find of the hoard; the name of locality is supplemented by name of

the respective district, sometimes also th€na, pargana or tahs…l;2.on the number of gold, silver and copper coins found in the hoard;3. on the number of coins belonging to particular regnal period (e.g. silver 51: Akbar

14, Jah€ng…r 3, Sh€hjah€n 24, Aurangzeb 10);4. on the presence, and, esp. in descriptions of big hoards, on the number of coins of a

particular mint;5. on the presence, but not exact number of coins minted in a particular year; data are

presented in the form found on the coins - most often in regnal years, frequently combinedwith the respective years of hijra. In his 37th regnal year Akbar introduced the so calledIl€h… calendar based on the solar year; from this year till the tenth regnal year of Sh€hjah€nwhen the Islamic lunar calendar was reintroduced again, coins are dated in Il€h… regnalyears, supplemented sometimes (during the reign of Jah€ng…r and Sh€hjah€n) with years ofhijra and and sometimes with name of respective Il€h… month. In the latter case, the datecan be fixed with great exactness - e.g. coin bearing the inscription „Akbar, Ahmadabad, 38³b€n“ was minted in Ahmadabad at some time between 23rd of October and 21st of No-vember 1593. The system of regular yearly dating of silver and gold coins was adhered tountil 1760 when the East India Company began to issue, first in the name of the reigning

13 W. H. Moreland, P. Geyl (ed., tr.), Jahangir’s India. The Remonstrantie of Francisco Pelsaert. Cam-bridge 1925, pp. 54-55.

Structure of Hoards


Mughal emperor, their own coins and gradually abolished this practice. Therefore, hoardscontaining such post-1760 coins can not be exactly dated and are consequently of lesservalue for statistical processing based on chronological ordering of samples.

6. Having been inventoried by members of the Coin Committee, hoards were eitherreturned to their finders, dispersed (coins sent to other museums) or sold on the bullionmarket. Each entry in the inventory contains information about the final disposition of therespective hoard and reference to its treasure trove report.

These data, available for most of the total of 530 Mughal coin hoards, can be used for theanalysis of temporal structure of hoards as well as for the study of the origin of coins con-tained in them. Study of the value structure (shares of coins of different metals and differentnominal and real values), the third topic recommended by quantitative numismatics, had to beleft out owing to serious biases mentioned in the previous chapter.14 The first two aspects ofthe hoard evidence, however, esp. if studied in broader time span (in our case, two hundredyears) can yield interesting and important information on changes in structure and, to someextent also on changing volume, of Mughal silver coin stock between 1560 and 1760.

Temporal Structure

Hoards which can be, on the evidence of latest coin contained in them, located with relativeprecision on the temporal axis and whose coins can be assigned to particular regnal periods,can be, under certain conditions, understood also as more or less representative samples ofcoin stock prevailing on the area and at the time of their formation. In order to keep variousbiases at the minimum, three types of coin finds should be eliminated from further process-ing: old savings hoards and emergency hoards for reasons explained above,15 and in addi-tion, finds containing less than five coins (too small to deserve the designation of hoard)where one or two coins may make up for a share of 50 or even 100 per cent; in this case,number of coins may be too small to reflect actual structure of coin stock. Of the rest,percentual shares of coins (calculated for each hoard separately) minted in a particularregnal period, can be assumed to roughly indicate their percentual shares in the coin stockcirculating in the area and time of formation of the respective hoard. Hoards may be groupedinto five-year periods; this will enable us to calculate average shares for each pentad. Asnumbers of hoards in pentads vary from one (or, in exceptional cases, even zero, if oldsavings and emergency hoards are excluded) to ten and more, the averages for pentads havenot all the same degree of reliability - a drawback that can not be eliminated. Results can beconveniently summarized in form of a graph.16

14 See the reasons for negative selective biases operating in the case of gold and copper coins, described inthe section Filter III in Part One above.

15 See, Part One, Section 4: Types of hoards, p. 31 sq.16 For classification of individual hoards and percentual shares of coins of different regnal periods - data

on which this graph is based - see Appendix I at the end of this study.

51

Despite several gaps in the sequence of data and, in several cases, their small number(for more details, see further on), general pattern of gradual alteration of Mughal silvercoin stock over time stands out quite clearly. At the beginning of a new regnal period thepercentual share of coins marked with the name of the previous emperor reaches its maxi-mum (Akbar… coins in the pentad of 1600-05, Sh€hjah€n… coins in 1655-60, coins ofMuhammad Sh€h in the pentad of 1745-50) or level very close to it (Jah€ng…r 1625-30,Aurangzeb 1705-10, FarruÇsiy€r 1715-20).17 After the accession of a new emperor, sharesof these coins gradually decline; the rate of their decline is in direct proportion to the rate ofexpansion of coins minted in the new regnal era. After several decades these coins vanishfrom the hoard evidence.

Fig. 7. Percentual shares of silver coins of different regnal periods in hoards, 1556-1760 (oldsavings and emergency hoards excluded)

It seems that despite relative scarcity of samples, the picture they convey has an innerlogic and conforms to a surprising degree to our logical expectations - to an ideal model ofchanges in the structure of coin stock over time. Apparently, coin hoards are samples which,despite their various individual biases, reflect more or less faithfully an important aspect of

17 The fact that peaks in the graph do not coincide exactly with the pentad in which the change on thethrone took place, can be explained (esp. in the case of Jah€ng…r… coins) by extreme scarcity of data - when theold savings hoards, emergency hoards and accumulations containing five coin or less are excluded, we aresometimes left with only one or two hoards. In these circumstances we can hardly expect exact results; the otherpossibility, i.e. to take into account all hoards of the pentad (including the old savings, emergency and smallhoards) would not yield more reliable results. Besides, it is desirable to apply the same exclusion criteria to thewhole corpus of hoards; as in the later pentads numbers of hoards increase, advantages of the exclusion methodbegin to prevail.

Structure of Hoards

0,0010,0020,0030,0040,0050,0060,0070,0080,0090,00

100,00

1555

-60

1565

-70

1575

-80

1585

-90

1595

-00

1605

-10

1615

-20

1625

-30

1635

-40

1645

-50

1655

-60

1665

-70

1675

-80

1685

-90

1695

-00

1705

-10

1715

-20

1725

-30

1735

-40

1745

-50

1755

-60

Akbar 1556-1605 Jahangir 1605-1627 Shahjahan 1627-1659Aurangzeb 1659-1707 Shah Alam I. 1707-1712 Farrukhsiyar 1712-1719Muhammad Shah 1719-1748 Ahmad Shah 1748-1754 Alamgir II. 1754-1760


development of past coin stock; this property of Mughal hoards can be utilized fully only ifthese samples are studied in context of larger temporal series rather than in mutual isolation.

At the same time, one should be aware of limits of this approach. It is perhaps notnecessary to emphasize that the percentual shares are not direct indexes of absolute quantitiesof coins of a particular type. If the absolute volume of coin stock grows rapidly due to stronginflux of new silver from abroad, relative shares of older coins may decline rapidly but abso-lute quantities of these coins in circulation may decline at much slower rate than that indi-cated by the graph; conversely, if the influx of new metal would be weak, percentual shares ofthe old stock would remain high even if its attrition (or loss rate) would be high. However, wemay suppose that the loss rate (although impossible to determine exactly) was more or lessconstant over long periods of time; and if this was the case, the more gradual or, in the possi-ble opposite case, markedly rapid percentual decline of older components in the hoards prob-ably reflects weaker, or in the latter case, stronger influx of minted silver into circulation.Again, translation of this varying tempo of structural changes in the coin stock into absolutenumbers is not feasible; these relative indications, however, can be confirmed or disproved byresults arrived at by a different method based not on computing of percentual shares but oncounting and summarizing incidences of particular types of coins in hoards;18 that will allowus to draw more exact picture of changes in the volume of coin stock as well.

It is necessary to look at the data which constitute each series (Akbar…, Jah€ng…r…, etc.coin stocks) more closely and to try and interpret, one after another, each of the curvespresented synoptically in the Fig. 7.

1. AkbarThe main problem of reconstructing the growth and decline of the Akbar… silver coin stocklies in the relative scarcity of data. As we have already seen, the quantity of hoards belong-ing to the second half of the 16th century is rather small and not all hoards contain silvercoins. Of those which do, hoards containing 5 or less coins had to be excluded for reasonsexplained above and few others on account of their incomplete description in the inven-tory.19 Those which remain, however, convey fairly consistent picture of an expansion ofAkbar… silver coin stock.

The observed rapid percentual increase of Akbar’s silver currency in the early yearsof his reign has to be ascribed to the fact that relatively few silver coins circulated in northIndia before this time: silver rupee had been introduced by Sher Sh€h Sˆr in the 1540s butthe overall quantity of minted silver was small and the most common medium in financialtransactions was copper - in fact, even the revenue statistics and claims in the ³’…n-i Akbar…,

18 On the method of counting coin incidences, see the introductory note to Part Three, further below onpp. 63-64.

19 E.g. in the case of mixed hoards no. 943/UP, 1027/UP and 974/UP containing silver and copper coinsthe inventory does not specify their exact numbers. These and several other reasons for exclusion of hoards arestated in the list of all registered hoards in the Appendix I.

53

composed in the 1590s, are stated in copper dams. Steep increase in percentual shares ofAkbar… silver coins in hoards of this period therefore may not necessarily indicate any dra-matic influx of silver from abroad: dishoarding and minting of silver acquired as a tribute orbooty during the early phase of Mughal territorial expansion probably sufficed to create thiseffect. As will be shown further on, provenance of coins, as far as it could be ascertained,confirms this conclusion: most coins minted until the 1570s were issued from mints of Malwa,Rajasthan and central parts of the emerging empire. It was only in the last quarter of the 16thcentury that the contribution of Gujarati mints raised the Akbar… share to a level approximat-ing 100 per cent - an indication that the silver-stock was now growing also in absolute terms.

At this place it is necessary to point out that the basis for estimation of the pentad1585-90 is extremely weak: we are left with a single hoard containing only seven coins, allof them Akbar…. Pentads 1575-80 and 1580-85 with two hoard each, are in this respect onlyslightly better. The fact nevertheless is that in no hoard formed in the quarter of centurybetween the years 1580 and 1605 does the Akbar… share sink under 90 per cent - a level notattained by any other later emperor’s coin stock, not even Aurangzeb’s whose regnal periodwas of comparable length; on the other hand, while Akbar started virtually from the scratch,Aurangzeb’s share had to „struggle“ against an already existing large stock of Sh€hjah€n…silver rupees. In the Akbar… period, coins of the current reign could achieve a dominantshare with a smaller absolute volume of silver than coin populations of later periods.

Fig. 8. Average percentages of Akbar… silver coins in hoards deposited in the area of U.P. in theyears 1556-1700 (excluding emergency hoards, old savings hoards and accumulations with fivecoins or less)

Structure of Hoards : Akbar

0

10

20

30

40

50

60

70

80

90

100

1555

-60

1560

-65

1565

-70

1570

-75

1575

-80

1580

-85

1585

-90

1590

-95

1595

-00

1600

-05

1605

-10

1610

-15

1615

-20

1620

-25

1625

-30

1630

-35

1635

-40

1640

-45

1645

-50

1650

-55

1655

-60

1660

-65

1665

-70

1670

-75

1675

-80

1680

-85

1685

-90

pentad

per c

ent


The curve representing proportional decline of Akbar… coin stock after the emperor’sdeath is smooth even when constructed on quite small amount of data. The rise in 1645-50 isin fact percentual share of hoard no. 313/UP, a single, if big hoard of the pentad. The yearswhen Akbar… coins gradually petered out are covered by greater number of hoards than theperiod of their prevalence: we can follow their declining share up to the mid 1680s - 75 yearsfrom Akbar’s death - when they finally disappear from the hoard evidence. Over this longtime-span, the decline proceeded at a fairly stable rate of ca. 4 per cent per year; relative half-life - i.e. the period during which the share of a coin population in circulation falls to a halfof its highest level reached at the end of the his regnal period - is approximately 18 years.20

2. Jah€ng…rWhen Jah€ng…r ascended the Mughal throne in 1605, he ordered that the weight of both goldand silver coins be increased by 20 per cent; in the case of silver it meant increase in weightfrom 178 to 213,6 grains. In the fourth year of his reign he ordered to increase the weight stillfurther by another five per cent. This reform of coinage was soon found to be inconvenient forbusiness transactions and on requests of people (probably mainly from the business commu-nity long used to the Akbar… standard) the old weight of gold and silver coins was restored inthe sixth year of his reign (1611/12). It could be expected that after the return to the old weightstandard these heavier coins would tend, in conformity to the Gresham’s law, to disappearfrom circulation to become favourite pieces for hoarding. If things worked this way, onewould expect these coins to be relatively over-represented in hoards. However, the actualevidence of incidences of different types of coins does not confirm the expectation that own-ers of heavy Jah€ng…r… coins would considered them in any way „better“ or more suitable forhoarding than the normal lighter coins: in U.P. hoards, both of the Jah€ng…r… and later periods,these heavy Jah€ng…r… coins are extremely rare. It seems that silver coins were saved (hoarded)primarily with view to their use as ready money, a necessary reserve for the eventuality ofunexpected cash payments rather than as bullion with certain intrinsic metallic value. Thislatter aspect, important for the purpose of long-term conservation of value, was better repre-sented by non-monetary silver and gold (jewellery, etc.).

In the next quinquennium we are left with four hoards (if we exclude hoard no. 462/UP,most probably an emergency hoard), all of them containing low shares of new coins - theaverage of 7 per cent is in fact somewhat lower than that of the preceding pentad. This maybe due partly to the peculiar composition of two hoards no. 973/UP and 1079/UP. The firstcontains an uncharacteristically large share (32 per cent) of non-Mughal Sˆr…, ³dil Sh€h…and Bengali coins; even if these are excluded, however, the Jah€ng…r… share measured solely

20 Perhaps it should be stressed that the half-life introduced here is not the same value as the half-life of coins incirculation used as an index of absolute loss rate; if, after Akbar’s death, the coin stock grew in absolute terms, thehalf-life of the percentual share was bound to be shorter than the half-time of the physical volume of the stock. Theactual value of the latter is for the Mughal period a great unknown. If e.g. the loss rate amounted to 2 % a year, thehalf-life of coins in circulation would be 35 years. For a detailed exposition, see C. C. Patterson, Silver Stocks andLosses in Ancient and Medieval Times. The Economic History Review, 2nd ser., vol. XXV (1972), no. 2, pp. 205-208.

55

against that of Akbar would raise to just 8,6 per cent. The second hoard contains just 9silver coins, none of them Jah€ng…r… and is dated to the year 1611/12 on the evidence of thehuge copper component (1011 coins) of the hoard. Neither recalculation (in the case of thefirst hoard) nor exclusion or independent dating of the silver component (possibly in thecase of the second) would raise the proportion of average Jah€ng…r… component for thispentad much higher. As we shall see later, number of incidences of coins minted in the firstdecade of Jah€ng…r’s reign is also markedly low; causes of low Jah€ng…r… shares, esp. in thesecond pentad, are therefore to be sought either in the relatively low level of minting activ-ity or in the low preference for hoarding of heavy coins; possibly both factors were at play.

Fig. 9. Average percentages of Jah€ng…r… silver coins in hoards deposited in the area of U.P. inthe years 1605-1735 (excluding emergency hoards, old savings hoards and accumulations withfive coins or less)

In the next pentad we have single hoard with 38 per cent share of Jah€ng…r… coins.Single hoard is certainly a very weak ground on which to build convincing estimates; wemust content ourselves with the observation that it fits well into an ascending trend culmi-nating in the decade of 1620-1630 when all the four hoards available for analysis contain inthe average about 65 per cent of Jah€ng…r… coins. This level seems to have been reached inthe first half of this decade, the second being characterized by stagnation on the existinglevel. Analysis of coin incidences attempted below21 will show a sudden and sharp, if short,upsurge of production of the north-western mints, particularly those of Qandahar and La-hore, lasting from about 1615 till 1622 and following upon a barren period extending fromthe death of Akbar till the end of the first decade of the 17th century. Thereafter, a very

21 See the analysis of coin incidences of the regnal period of Jah€ng…r in the next section, pp. 81-88.

Structure of Hoards : Jah€ng…r

0

10

20

30

40

50

60

70

80

90

100

1600

-05

1610

-15

1620

-25

1630

-35

1640

-45

1650

-55

1660

-65

1670

-75

1680

-85

1690

-95

1700

-05

1710

-15

1720

-25

1730

-35

pentad

per c

ent


marked decline followed, caused most probably by war over Qandahar and subsequent lossof this important commercial and strategic point to the Persians. As this falling-off was notmade up by increase in mint activity in other parts of the empire, the existing ratio betweenthe old Akbar… and newer Jah€ng…r… coins could hardly change. However, after a slow be-ginning in the first two Jah€ng…r’s pentads, the level reached at the end of his 22 years longreign does not seem to be low - esp. when we keep in mind that his coins were added to analready existing and not inconsiderable stock of Akbar… coins.

The decline of Jah€ng…r… stock after 1627 can not be reconstructed with any degree ofcertainty: the period of 1630-35 is covered by a single hoard of just 15 coins, two thirds of themJah€ng…r…. Next pentad has only one old-saving hoard with high proportion of Akbar… coins (no.784/UP) and another one of 140 coins, 50 of them described as „defaced“ and therefore uniden-tifiable (no. 807/UP). As the possible margin of error could amount in this case up to 36 per cent,computing percentages of the rest seems to be a rather problematic exercise. Two hoards avail-able for the pentad of 1640-45 show the Jah€ng…r… shares already at a low level of less than 10 percent; this low and slowly declining share continuing until the mid-1670 is broken only in theperiod 1645-50 when single hoard (no. 313/UP) contains 37 per cent of Jah€ng…r’s silver coins.In contrast to 1615-20 however, value of this single piece of evidence as a coin stock sample isput in doubt by other data in the same chronological series. Moreover, the incidences evidenceshows a very marked increase in the production of north-western, Gujarati and central mints inthe opening years of Sh€hjah€n’s reign followed by a less massive but nevertheless significantcoin production lasting until the beginning of 1650s. The silver influx which supported thisminting activity must have considerably augmented the Sh€hjah€n… stock. The hoard no. 313/UP is therefore probably not representative of the state of the coin stock of the pentad; itsstructure makes it look more like an old-saving hoard.

By the middle of the 1670s, i.e. ca. fifty years after Jah€ng…r’s death, his coins seem tohave disappeared from circulation. Generally, the data on Jah€ng…r… coin stock are too scarceto allow exact estimates of the relative half-life and loss rate. From the graph we can inferthat the former value could not have been much higher than ten years, the second appears tocome close to 5 per cent per year - both indicating more rapid relative decline of stock thanwas the case of the stock of Akbar… coins. There can be little doubt that this relatively higherloss rate had been caused to a large extent by a selective reminting campaign initiated bySh€hjah€n shortly after his accession to the Mughal throne.

3. Sh€hjah€nThe problems stemming from insufficient amount of data that prevent us from forming amore exact assessment of Jah€ng…r… coin stock in the decades of 1630 to 1650 are mirroredin difficulties we face while reconstructing the ascending phase of the silver coin stock ofSh€hjah€n. We can only repeat that, for reasons stated above, the relatively high share ofhis coins attested by just two extant hoards for the pentad of 1640-45 seems to be closer toreality than the much lower value represented by a single hoard in the next quinquennium.

57

We are in a somewhat better position in the next six pentads: hoards which fall intothis period are not very numerous but follow a relatively consistent pattern. Characteristicfeatures are not only high percentages of Sh€hjah€n… coins in the last two pentads of hisreign (Sh€hjah€n… coins continued to be minted in certain mints up to the year 1660 whenother, more centrally located ones had already began to issue Aurangzeb… rupees) but alsotheir massive presence in all hoards formed before the end of the 1670s. Such a slow initialdecline has no parallel among trend curves reconstructed for coin stocks of other emperorsand seems to indicate a relatively low output of Mughal mints in the first thirty years ofAurangzeb’s reign. Lower output, in turn, may have been caused by weaker influx of newsilver coming to India from abroad. Graph of coin incidences presented in the next section22

corroborates this hypothesis: behind erratic short-term fluctuations a long-term decliningtrend is clearly visible. This phenomenon shall be dealt with in more detail in the sectiondiscussing coin incidences; what is perhaps worth stressing here is the fact that data arrivedat by two different approaches tend to support each other.

Until 1680, the reconstructed Sh€hjah€n… coin stock shows a very low rate of declineof 0,86 per cent per year. In fact, 1680 appears to be a turning point after which much morerapid decline of about 5 per cent a year can be observed. Graph of incidences will showreversal of the above mentioned declining trend at the end of 1670s, followed by a steepincrease lasting into the third pentad of the 18th century. The initially massive Sh€hjah€n…

Fig. 10. Average percentages of Sh€hjah€n… silver coins in hoards deposited in the area of U.P.in the years 1628-1760 (excluding emergency hoards, old savings hoards and accumulationswith five coins or less)

22 See below, Fig. 27 in Part Three, Mints During the Reign of Aurangzeb (1658-1707), p. 103.

Structure of Hoards : Sh€hjah€n

100

0

10

20

30

40

50

60

70

80

90

100

1620

-25

1625

-30

1630

-35

1635

-40

1640

-45

1645

-50

1650

-55

1655

-60

1660

-65

1665

-70

1670

-75

1675

-80

1680

-85

1685

-90

1690

-95

1695

-00

1700

-05

1705

-10

1710

-15

1715

-20

1720

-25

1725

-30

1730

-35

1735

-40

1740

-45

1745

-50

1750

-55

1755

-60

pentad

per c

ent


stock was now quickly losing its dominant position to a rapidly expanding Aurangzeb…coinage; it seems, however, that at least initially this decline was really of relative sharerather than of absolute numbers of Sh€hjah€n… coins. These vanish from the hoard evidenceonly after 1730, seventy years after the emperor’s death. The zero share in 1690-95 is due todefects in the evidence - we are again left with single hoard, composed exclusively ofAurangzeb… coins. As in the next three pentads the coins of Sh€hjah€n are relatively wellrepresented, this sudden fall-off is hardly representative. After 1710 their low share musthave reflected their quickly diminishing numbers - hoards containing no Sh€hjah€n… coinsgrow in number but until 1730 this feature is still not universal.

In view of such a long survival, comparable only to that of Akbar… coin stock, the suspi-cion that the Sh€hjah€n… coins perhaps became victims of massive reminting campaigns thatwould speed up the process of substitution of new Aurangzeb… coins for those of previousemperors does not seem to be well-founded. It has to be at least considered, however, as oneof theoretically possible explanations for the peculiar monetary developments (massive out-put of central, inland mints) reflected in the hoard evidence from 1690 onward.

4. AurangzebAfter a slow start - we do not possess a single hoard dated to the long period before 1680 thatwould contain more than 36 per cent of Aurangzeb… coins - the curve turns, almost abruptly,upwards and reaches in another ten or fifteen years a respectable level of 80 per cent. Again,relative scarcity of data forces us to limit ourselves to such general observations. The improb-able 100 per cent in the pentad 1690-95 is due to the same single hoard 839/UP (probablyidentical with no. 855/UP) which brought the Sh€hjah€n… share in the same pentad to anequally improbable zero. Data furnished by three hoards of the previous pentad of 1685-90nevertheless suggest that by this time the Aurangzeb… coin stock must have been alreadyclearly dominant. From the last twenty years of Aurangzeb’s reign we have five hoards whichcannot be classified as emergency accumulations and still consist exclusively of Aurangzeb’scoins. It would be probably wrong to suppose that on such a large area as the present-dayUttar Pradesh the coin stock was at all times mixed so well as to constitute a homogeneousmass. Fluctuations of percentual shares of coins of different age in hoards belonging to thesame pentad, for instance, may have been caused not only by peculiar individual histories ofeach hoard but also by peculiar monetary characteristics of the place which supplied all ormost of coins to it. The 100 per cent Aurangzeb… hoards should be therefore considered asupper limits of a broader range beginning somewhere near 75 per cent. 80 to 90 per centseems to be a reasonable estimate for the turn of the century - a time documented by uncom-monly high number of six hoards, all with high proportions of Aurangzeb… coins.

Evidence derived from the calculation of incidences of coins of particular years andmints broadly supports these observations. From the beginning of 1690s till the end ofAurangzeb’s rule, the number incidences is approximately double compared to the lean1660s and 1670s. As we shall see later on, the Mughal monetary system had experienced

59

similar floods of silver at least two times before, in the 1610s and 1630s; in contrast to theseearlier waves, caused mainly by coins of north-western or Gujarati provenience, this lastone, apart of being of longer duration, was sustained mainly by massive production ofcentrally located mints - a feature that appeared as a riddle to other scholars dealing withthe same subject before.23 Supported by intensive mint activity, the observed high percent-ages of Aurangzeb… coins in hoards cannot be interpreted as only relative to previous stocksalready depleted by gradual and natural attrition; it is equally impossible to ascribe thiswave to a consistent policy of reminting older coins into new - quantities of new coins (asfar as they can be inferred from the incidences) are too huge and the declining curve ofSh€hjah€n… coins too gradual for this hypothesis to be plausible. Central mints thereforecould not but be fed mainly by new silver imported from abroad. I shall reserve myexplanation of this phenomenon for the next section24 and concentrate my attention on thefate of Aurangzeb’s coin stock in the decades following his death in 1707.

Fig. 11. Average percentages of Aurangzeb… silver coins in hoards deposited in the area of U.P.in the years 1660-1760 (excluding emergency hoards, old savings hoards and accumulationswith five coins or less)

23 A. Hasan, Mints of the Mughal Empire. A Study in Comparative Currency Output. Proceedings of theIndian History Congress, Patiala Session - Part I. Patna 1967, p. 327, correctly observes that such a hugeincrease cannot be ascribed solely to a recoinage of bullion and suggests as possible explanations a dispersal ofminting establishment decreed as administrative measure or a rise of numerous medium size commercial cen-tres in the inland region during this period. However, she feels that this is not the whole story and leaves theproblem as a task for future research. S. Moosvi, The Silver Influx, pp. 73-74 explains this phenomenon bygreater efficiency or more attractive terms offered by the inland mints in comparison to those of Bengal. This isprobably the correct explanation - only the reasons of the difference in terms between the Bengali and inlandmints would deserve a more detailed elaboration.

24 See below in Part Three, The Rise of Central Mints, pp. 109-117.

100

16,67

0

10

20

30

40

50

60

70

80

90

100

1655

-60

1660

-65

1665

-70

1670

-75

1675

-80

1680

-85

1685

-90

1690

-95

1695

-00

1700

-05

1705

-10

1710

-15

1715

-20

1720

-25

1725

-30

1730

-35

1735

-40

1740

-45

1745

-50

1750

-55

1755

-60

pentad

per c

ent

Structure of Hoards : Aurangzeb


In the first pentad after Aurangzeb’s death (1710-15) his stock was able to hold its ownagainst the coins of his immediate successor Sh€h ³lam I. In part it was due to poor perform-ance of mints in Sh€h ³lam’s fifth regnal year and their almost complete inactivity in thesixth. Supply of silver was apparently restored after the accession of FarruÇsiy€r and in thenext twenty years (1715-35) the share of Aurangzeb’s coins fell approximately by 70 per centto bare 14 per cent - a huge relative loss of nearly 10 per cent per year. Relative half-life is thenbetween 13 and 15 years; last coins disappeared from the circulation around 1750, some 43years after Aurangzeb’s death. This relatively short time-span is comparable only to the ap-proximately 50 years long life-time of Jah€ng…r… coins which, of course, had formed muchsmaller coin stock. As we have seen, the decline of Jah€ng…r… coin stock was greatly acceler-ated by forced remints of Nˆrjah€n… and zodiacal coins after the accession of Sh€hjah€n. It ispossible that similar policy of remintings of older coin stock during the reign of FarruÇsiy€rcontributed to a more rapid decline of Aurangzeb… silver coins.

It should be noted, however, that the final phase of the Aurangzeb… coin stock comes veryclose to 1760, the terminal date of our investigation. After this date it is impossible, for rea-sons stated above, to date extant hoards with exactness necessary for the subsequent identifi-cation and elimination of emergency and old savings hoards. It is therefore possible thatAurangzeb’s coins would appear in small quantities in standard hoards (i.e. those not classi-fied either as old savings or emergency hoards) even for some time after 1760. However,this possible vanishing trace could hardly change the overall picture: the rapid proportionaland since 1740 at least, also physical decline of this once massive stock. The process mayhave been accelerated by more intensive reminting than was usual in the seventeenth century.

5. Sh€h ³lam I. and FarruÇsiy€rBoth Sh€h ³lam I. (1707-1712) and FarruÇsiy€r (1712-1719) ruled for short periods duringwhich their coin stock could not develop into a mass comparable to stocks of precedingemperors. Despite the fact, however, that these two men ruled for almost identical length oftime, curves of their coin stock differ greatly. That of Sh€h ³lam rose to 12,5 per cent duringthe period 1705-10, a fairly steep increase esp. when we keep in mind that the year of hisaccession lies in the middle of the pentad. Graph of incidences will show corresponding steepincrease in the years immediately after Aurangzeb’s death followed by even steeper fall in 1712.

What is somewhat surprising is the relatively long survival of Sh€h ³lam… coins inhoards of the following three pentads: it seems as if the rapidly growing share of FarruÇsiy€r…coins expanded at the expense of those of Aurangzeb, leaving the stock of Sh€h ³lam moreor less intact. We have noted the extraordinarily high loss rate of Aurangzeb… stock in the sameyears; it appears to be mirrored by an equally extraordinary initial increase of FarruÇsiy€r’sshare - a rise by nearly 30 per cent in his second pentad. The peculiar character of these threecurves in the first quarter of the 18th century can be perhaps best explained by possible selec-tive reminting of older Aurangzeb… coins during FarruÇsiy€r’s reign - a process which appar-ently left the newer and in any case not very numerous coins of Sh€h ³lam aside.

61

We can see simultaneous and rapid decline of both Sh€h ³lam’s and FarruÇsiy€r’scoin stock after 1730 when the coins of Muhammad Sh€h reduced their shares to a levelwell under ten per cent. Again, such a rapid decline can be interpreted as a result of areminting campaign during the pentad of 1730-35. Sporadically, these coins appear in hoardsuntil 1760 - only slightly longer than the once much more numerous coins of their immedi-ately preceding Aurangzeb… stock.

6. Muhammad Sh€hThe regnal period of Muhammad Sh€h (1719-1748) was of duration comparable to that ofSh€hjah€n; at the end of their regnal periods coin stocks of both culminated with a share ofapproximately 90 per cent of all coins then in circulation. Behind these overt similarities,however, there must lay hidden important differences. Sh€hjah€n’s coins acquired quicklywide currency thanks to spectacular output of north-western and Gujarati mints which main-tained high rate of production till the end of 1630s. Subsequent steep decline soon levelledoff at a still respectable level and declined thereafter only slowly. Muhammad Sh€h, incontrast, ascended the Mughal throne at a time when the heightened activity of the centralmints had come to a rather abrupt end and continued - if the evidence of coin incidencesreflects the actual situation - at a more modest level. The total coin stock accumulated at thebeginning of Muhammad Sh€h’s reign may have been greater than it was in 1628 whenSh€hjah€n began to issue his coins. If the final share of both stocks was very nearly thesame, the coinage of Muhammad Sh€h must have been helped on its way to overwhelming

2 8 ,7 2

0,001,041,72

6,11

3,370,56

14,10

7,31

15,45

10,7112,90

0,00

11,7 3

3 5 ,8 5

3 0 ,6 2

0 ,0 00 ,14

5 ,7 63 ,2 3 1,8 1

1,110 ,0 00,00

5,00

10,00

15,00

20,00

25,00

30,00

35,00

40,00

1700

-05

1705

-10

1710

-15

1715

-20

1720

-25

1725

-30

1730

-35

1735

-40

1740

-45

1745

-50

1750

-55

1755

-60

pentad

per c

ent

Shah Alam I.

Farrukhsiyar

Fig. 12. Average percentages of Sh€h ³lam… and FarruÇsiy€r… silver coins in hoards depositedin the area of U.P. in the years 1707-1760 (excluding emergency hoards, old savings hoards andaccumulations with five coins or less)

Structure of Hoards : Muhammad Sh€h


dominance in the late 1740 by greater attrition of older stock. This may have been dueeither to increased outflow of silver abroad (the invasion of N€dir Sh€h in 1739 may haveplayed a part) or to systematic reminting of older coins.

The terminal date of 1760 does not allow us to follow the development of MuhammadSh€h’s coin stock in its declining phase; its ascent, on the other hand, is documented bygreater number of hoards than is the case of any of his predecessors. These hoards, as far astheir percentual shares are concerned, follow a peculiar pattern: their dispersal around themean is low in the initial two pentads, grows very wide in the middle period (third andfourth pentad) and decreases again significantly in the last decade of the reign.

This feature may not be purely accidental. It can be assumed that at the end of a regnalperiod, particularly a longer one, the share of coins minted during it would be uniformly large- in this respect the coin stock was homogeneous and its coins predominating everywhere.Hoards tend to reflect this fact and the dispersal of percentual shares in them is low.

100 100

0

10

20

30

40

50

60

70

80

90

100

1715

-20

1720

-25

1725

-30

1730

-35

1735

-40

1740

-45

1745

-50

1750

-55

1755

-60

pentad

per c

ent

Fig. 13. Average percentages of Muhammad Sh€h’ssilver coins in hoards deposited in the area of U.P. inthe years 1719-1760 (excluding emergency hoards,old savings hoards and accumulations with five coinsor less)

On the other hand, the processwhen the growing stock of the currentlyruling sovereign gradually replacescoins of his predecessor (the middlepentads), seems to make the total coinstock (again in respect of percentualshares) far less homogeneous: the in-termixing of new coins with the oldstock was a relatively slow processthat advanced at various places andregions with different speed - veloc-ity of circulation was undoubtedly anim-portant factor in this. As the ve-locity of circulation is in itself one ofthe more important characteristics ofmo-netary systems (and one quantityin the Fisher’s equation summarizinghis quantitative theory of money), itwould be worthwhile to try and assessit by the means of analysis of disper-sal observed for coins of particulardates and mints in the available hoardevidence. For this type of analysis,

however, we would need to know exact numbers of coins of particular year and mint presentin a hoard - a type of data which has been denied us by the abbreviated format of the publishedinventory. Computation of percentual shares of coins issued by a particular mint in eachsuccessive year and a subsequent analysis of this more detailed set of data hidden in theoriginal treasure trove reports, however, might yield more exact results.

63

During the long existence of the Mughal empire many mints were established; they mintedgreater or smaller quantities of coins and after longer or shorter period of time not few ofthem went out of operation to be substituted by other mint-towns which, for various reasons,served better the needs of their regions or were better located on the shifting streams ofprecious metals flowing through the vast Mughal territories. Coins issued by Mughalemperors bear, in the overwhelming majority of cases, not only more or less exact dates ofmintage but also names of the respective mints. These two sets of data allow us, if collectedsystematically and for longer periods, to reconstruct life-times and changes in productivityof particular mints.

1. Preliminary

We can attempt to investigate these processes with the help of hoards, proceeding from theassumption that strong populations of coins will occur in hoards more frequently than smallones. We can register incidences of a particular coin population in hoards - i.e. the fact thata coin minted in the town x in the year y is present in a particular hoard, quantity of therespective type of coin playing no role. Numbers of incidences for each mint can be thenpresented in form of a graph which will show fluctuations of its activity over time; addingup data on a group of mints located in a particular region will reveal this region’s importanceas a supplier of precious metals to the area under investigation (in our case the area of theU.P.); and finally, totals of all incidences of all mints for every year of the whole period of1556 to 1760 will constitute a data series of varying coin incidences reflecting, with severalimportant qualifications, the changing overall output of all Mughal mints. A graph constructedon this series can then serve as a basis for assessment of relative and changing scale ofsilver imports over time, and, in combination with analysis of subtotals for particular regions,can help to pinpoint the contribution of different regions - i.e. to identify major routes ofsilver imports and their changes in the time span of two centuries.

It should be stressed at the outset that one can interpret these data properly only if oneconstantly keeps the appropriate historical context in mind. Systematic comparing of resultsobtained by this type of quantitative analysis with relevant historical events for such a longperiod can be attempted in this work only in the barest outlines; this method can serve i.a. asa heuristic device for systematic collection of additional relevant data scattered in the vastcorpus of available historical sources - data which would form a solid ground for the assessment

Part Three : The Mints


of validity of the present attempt. Of special relevance in this context is the necessity to takeinto account occasional selective reminting campaigns (the most important being probablythe administratively enforced remints of certain types of Jah€ng…r… coins in the beginning ofthe reign of Sh€hjah€n) which could, and most probably did, distort the relationship betweenthe original strength of the affected coin population and its representation in the hoard evidence.

Another requirement is methodological in the strict sense of the word: as was the casein all previous steps, one has to be aware of biases inherent in the sources of data and oftheir possible distorting effects on eventual results. Before accepting the thesis that particularcoin incidences reflect more or less faithfully the actual strength of their respective coinpopulations, we have to make sure that observed numbers of coin incidences are related tonumbers of actually minted coins (i.e. to the actual strength of particular coin populations)rather than to numbers of hoards belonging to a period contemporaneous with or slightlylater than the coin population in question.

As we have seen above1, the most common period of accumulation of Mughal silverhoards is 20 to 40 years and there are still more than twenty hoards whose accumulationtime span lies between 80 and 100 years These time limits are sufficiently broad to allowthe incidences representing a strong coin population of a date relatively remote from theterminal year of the hoard (the year of its latest coin) to manifest its real strength. Thiscapacity of great number of hoards to include even relatively old coins can to some extentoffset the possible bias caused by a particular circumstance when the time of prevalence ofa strong coin population (i.e. the time when its coins were „young“ and therefore leastaffected by natural attrition) happened to coincide with a period which was relatively poorin hoards. This phenomenon can be illustrated by the case of a strong population of Jah€ng…r…silver coins from Qandahar which are only poorly represented in Jah€ng…r… hoards but occurfrequently not only in hoards dated in the regnal periods of Sh€hjah€n and Aurangzeb butalso in those formed during the first quarter of the 18th century. Working with coin incidencesyields, in this particular type of investigation, more reliable results than counting of actualnumbers of coins representing a particular coin population in each hoard; in this latter case,uneven numbers of hoards belonging in different periods may seriously distort the evidence.This is not to say that the former approach eliminates the bias completely; the inevitabledistortion is, however, considerably reduced by the fact that the relationship between thenumber of hoards belonging to a certain period on the one hand and incidences of coinsminted in it on the other is much looser than the relationship between hoards and survivingquantities of particular coin types. There can be always only one incidence of a particularcoin type in a hoard, no matter whether the actual number of such coins in the same hoardis high (as is often the case in hoards formed in the time when the respective coin populationwas still strong) or low - frequent occurrences of single representatives of an old coinpopulation in much later hoards are very significant because they reflect its long life-time;long life-time of a coin population, in turn, is a sign of its great original strength.

1 See Part I, Fig. 4., showing the distribution of accumulation periods of Mughal silver coin hoards.

65

2. Mints of the Akbar… Period (1556-1605)

It is hardly surprising that incidences of coins from the beginning of Akbar’s reign are rareand limited to few inland mints (Delhi, Narnol). Their number rises steadily from thebeginning of 1560s; this steady growth is temporarily interrupted only at the beginning ofthe 1580s. This progress reflects three parallel processes which were at work in the northernpart of the subcontinent in the second half of the 16th century: first was the territorialexpansion of the Mughal empire that gradually brought under its sway north-western India,Gujarat and part of the north Deccan, and Bengal with Orissa in the east. Second was theeconomic stabilization accompanied by sound monetary policy; this last would have beenfar less successful if at the same time the third process, the steady and growing influx ofsilver, mainly of American provenance, had not created favourable conditions for monetaryconsolidation and expansion.

The graph presents interesting information on relative contributions of different regionsto the overall growth of the Akbar… coin stock. Until the mid-1570s this increase was aresult almost exclusively of the activity of mints located in the central regions of northIndia - areas of the present-day Uttar Pradesh, parts of Madhya Pradesh and Rajasthan. Wemay safely assume that most of the silver used during these early phases of monetary

Fig. 14. Incidence of Mughal silver coins minted in the years 1556-1605 in coin hoards depositedin the area of the U.P. and recovered in the years 1882-1979

Mints of the Akbar… Period

0

5

10

15

20

25

30

35

40

45

1556

1558

/59,

155

9

1561

/62,

156

2

1564

/65,

156

5

1567

/68,

156

8

1570

/71,

157

1

1573

/74,

157

4

1576

/77,

157

7

1579

/80

1582

, 158

2/83

1585

1587

/88,

158

8

1590

/91,

159

1

1594

, 159

4/95

1597

, 159

7/98

1600

, 160

0/01

1603

, 160

3/04

year of m intage

num

ber o

f hoa

rds

cont

aini

ng c

oin(

s) o

f par

ticul

ar

year

NORTHWESTGUJARAT AND SINDHMALWA AND RAJASTHANCENTRALEASTDECCANURDU (ZAFAR QARIN)TOTAL


expansion for minting of Akbar… rupees was obtained by dishoarding of silver accumulatedin the treasure vaults of conquered rulers. The graph suggests, however, that possibilities toexpand the supply of precious metals by these means alone were limited. It was only whendirect contacts with the broader world of Indian Ocean and Near Eastern commercial circuitshad been established after the conquest of Gujarat in 1573 and north-western frontier hadbeen stabilized in the 1590s that silver generated by active trade balance of India began topenetrate the north Indian interior.

Even before the great conjuncture of the 1590s set in, however, the stagnation at thelevel reached toward the end of 1560s was temporarily interrupted by significant increasein the second half of the 1570s. For the interpretation of this rise two points seem to be ofspecial importance: first, the increase was caused mainly by a sharply increased activity ofcentral mints: more detailed scrutiny will show that from 1576 to 1578 Agra and Delhiwere the main contributors, whereas in the second phase, from 1578 to 1581, massiveoutput of the mint in Fatehpur Sikri overshadowed the production of all other mints of thecentral area; indeed, Fatehpur Sikri appears to have been, for this short period, the mostproductive mint in the whole empire.2 The second point to be made concerns the markedcoincidence of this phenomenon with the duration of the so called karo±… experiment startedby Akbar in his 19th regnal year (1574/75) and abandoned five years later.

The nature of this experiment was described differently by different chroniclers ofAkbar’s time; only limited attention has been paid to it by modern scholars. Irfan Habib,for example, interprets Abˆl Fazl’s relatively short description of this reform as a generalcadastral survey the main aim of which was to standardize collection of land revenue,make it more rational and bring more land under the plough.3 The territory of the empirewas divided into large blocks, each yielding revenue amounting to one karo±, i.e. ten

2 Niz€mudd…n Ahmad mentions in his Tabaq€t-i Akbar… a large reservoir in the courtyard of the palace atthe capital of Fatehpur which Akbar ordered to be filled with gold, silver and copper coins. This treasureequivalent to twenty karo±s of tankas was during the subsequent three years distributed among his nobility, thepoor, the holy and the learned. H. M. Elliot, J. Dowson, The History of India as Told by its Own Historians.Vol. V., London 1873, p. 409. It is highly probable that at least part of this generously distributed moneyconsisted of silver coins currently minted in the local mint. Fatehpuri silver coins from the years 1579-1582found in the hoards of the U.P. may have been originally distributed from this pool.

3 I. Habib, The Agrarian System, pp. 214, 221, 251, 324. This evaluation accords with the main theme ofthis extensive monograph which deals with political reforms and development of political structure of theempire mainly from the viewpoint of historian of agrarian system. Niz€mudd…n Ahmad, op. cit., p. 383 describesthe reform in similar terms. The best summary still appears to be P. Saran, The Provincial Government of theMughals 1526-1658. Bombay etc. 1973 (2nd ed.), pp. 275-6. Latest synthesis, The Mughal Empire by J. F.Richards (The New Cambridge History of India I.5), Cambridge 1993, pp.84-85 mistakenly places the beginningof the experiment to 1580, the year when it actually came to its inglorious end. According to Richards, Akbar re-established the j€g…r system after five years of direct administration. i.e. (on his own wrong dating) in 1585when „the state achieved its end“, having instituted the new revenue system based on the new cadastral surveyand the zabt assessment. In fact, the j€g…r system was re-instituted by Sh€hb€z {•€n who was put in charge ofthe administration during Akbar’s expedition against M…rz€ Muhammad H€kim in the spring of 1581. See, D.Streusand, The Formation of the Mughal Empire. Delhi 1989, pp. 164-165.

67

million copper d€ms per year. Important part of this measure was a general resumption ofall j€g…rs (temporary assignments of land given in lieu of salaries to Mughal militaryaristocrats and officials) and their return into Ç€lsa (lands under direct administration ofthe crown). Only the recently conquered provinces (Gujarat, Bihar, Bengal) were to beexempted from this general reform.

It is important to keep in mind the broader context of these measures. 1570s were theyears of intensive searching on the part of Akbar and his ministers for the most effective(which to them meant as centralized as possible) form of government suitable foradministration of vast, recently conquered territories. Institution of the first form of themansabd€r… system and of the branding regulations (d€û) all fall into this period and bearthe stamp of Akbar’s top Persian bureaucrats Muzaffar {•€n Turbat… and Sh€h MansˆrSh…r€z…. All these measures were probably meant as parts of a grand plan of building acentralized imperial system in which all military aristocrats and civil officials would beturned into obedient servants living on the salary paid directly from the imperial treasuryand would thus become completely dependent on the imperial will. Political andadministrative reforms were supplemented by an offensive on ideological front wheredisputes with orthodox Muslim ulam€ in 1579 prompted Akbar to issue the so called mazhar,a decree that gave the emperor the right to pass final verdict in all disputes relating toIslamic faith - an arrangement rather uncommon in the Islamic world.

Conditio sine qua non for such general reform to succeed was, of course, the generalavailability of monetary means that would cover the vastly increased monetary transactionswhich had now to supplant completely the j€g…r system. Great volumes of metallic currencymedia were needed; the heightened activity of the three most important central mints had tomeet these needs. If the testimony of coin incidences is correct, Gujarat’s coin productionin these years, if compared with the level reached around 1575, stagnated or even declined.North-western routes still brought to the subcontinent only insignificant, if any, quantitiesof silver - at least this is what the absence of coins from north-western mints in hoardsclearly suggests. Requirements of great quantities of silver needed for the production ofnew coins were therefore to be met by tapping local sources - perhaps minting of the imperialsilver reserves and systematic reminting of the older Sˆr… coins. The graph of Akbar… coinstock (see Fig. 8., p. 53 above) shows significant increase of the share of Akbar… coins inhoards in the period 1580-85, compared with the previous pentad; percentages of around orabove 90 per cent common form the 1580 onwards indicate that substitution of old andnon-Mughal coins was by that date more or less complete.

In the period 1575-78 the most active mints were those of Agra and Delhi; in 1579and 1580 the minting activity appears to have been concentrated into the imperial capital ofFatehpur Sikri. Earliest coins issued by this mint are dated by the year 985 A.H. (1577/78A. D.), when Akbar together with his ministers decided to carry out a general reform ofcurrency. According to Abu’l Fazl4, on 2nd ³z€r of the 22nd regnal year (13.11. 1577),

4 Abu’l Fazl All€m…, Akbarn€ma. (Tr. by H. Beveridge).Vol. III, Calcutta 1904, p. 320-21.



Akbar held council with his leading financial experts Muzaffar {•€n Turbat…, R€ja TodarM€l and {•w€j€ Sh€h Mansˆr Sh…r€z… and decided to put the mints under stricter centralcontrol. Mints which had been so far under the charge of chaudhur…s (probably locallyappointed mint-masters), were now put under charge of highest officials of the empirenominated by the emperor. Six mints are mentioned in this connection by Abu’l Fazl:Fatehpur, Lahore, Bengal, Jaunpur, Gujarat and Patna. This list, however, does not tallywith mint names found on coins in the U.P. hoards. The absence of Bengali coins from thehoard evidence may be perhaps explained by low output of the Bengali mint and, particularlyin the years 1579-81, by the fact that during the great revolt the whole province was for atime outside of imperial control. More difficult to explain is the relative frequency in hoardsof coins minted in Agra, Delhi, Narnol and several issues struck in Urdˆ zafar qar…n („thevictorious camp“), mint names absent form Abu’l Fazl’s list. Perhaps the list should not beunderstood as a complete enumeration of all mints - the mints mentioned by the chroniclerare all associated with one of the leading personalities of Akbar’s court; the names of othermints put under charge of lesser officials may have been omitted. Or perhaps the responsibilityfor the operation of the other mints was added to the charge of one of the six officialsmentioned by Abu’l Fazl. Striking of square coins (the so called jal€l… rupees) during thisreform was only a short-lived experiment; generally improved outward appearance of goldand silver coins, on the other hand, was to become a lasting feature of Mughal imperialcoinage. It was no accident that administration of the mint in the imperial capital of Fatehpurwas entrusted to {•w€j€ Abdus Samad, an eminent calligrapher at Akbar’ court.

Activity of all imperial mints except those at Agra and Ahmadabad abruptly endedwith the year A.H. 989 (1581/82). By this time the karo±… experiment had been abandoned,probably in consequence of a widespread uprising of Akbar’s nobility which broke out in1580 as a violent reaction to the widely resented reforms. During the next year Akbarsucceeded in crushing the revolt and pacifying most of the turbulent regions but at the sametime realized that continuation of his administrative and fiscal experiments might againdestabilize the situation; in 1581, perhaps as a visible sign of change in his political course,he had one of the architects of his reforms, Sh€h Mansˆr Sh…r€z…, put to death, probably onfabricated charges of alleged conspiracy.5 Fall in the output of central mints reflected insharp decline of coin incidences in 1581 and 1582 is most probably related to thesedevelopments. Evidence from coin hoards thus appears to reveal an interesting monetaryaspect of Akbar’s reforms.

5 The suspicion that Sh€h Mansˆr fell victim to Akbar’s effort to conciliate critics of his reforms in hisown camp is strengthened by Abˆl Fazl’s relation in the Akbarn€ma: according to the chronicler, Sh€h Mansˆr„did not read the signs of the times, and did not distinguish between the season of conciliation and that ofstrictness. ... The appreciative monarch often uttered with his pearling tongue, ,From that day the market ofaccounts was flat and the thread of accounting dropped from the hand.’“ Akbarn€ma,. vol. III, pp. 503-4.Niz€mudd…n Ahmad, op. cit., p. 426 expressly mentions Akbar’s regret of {•w€j€’s death after an investigationinto this case showed the compromising letters to be forgeries. A good analysis of these events and of theresulting „imperial compromise“ is to be found in D. Streusand, The Formation of the Mughal Empire. Delhi1989, pp. 154-172.

69

In the decade after 1582 the production of the central mints seems to have been verylow, perhaps as a consequence of exhaustion of local reserves of bullion; for the second halfof the 1580s striking of new coins was limited almost completely to the mint in Ahmadabadwhose output was now after a temporary stagnation in the second half of the 1570s steadilygrowing. By the beginning of 1590s, a period of a general monetary conjuncture appears tohave set in: the flow of precious metals imported into the Mughal empire by the maritimeroute through the Gujarati ports and minted in Gujarat’s capital was now in increasingmeasure supplemented by silver brought from the Middle East by land routes and turnedinto Mughal silver coins in the mint of Lahore. Another important centre profiting from theexpansion of commerce was Thatta in Sindh whose coins, dated to the second half of the1590s, are markedly well represented in hoards of the distant U.P.

Important role in the monetary expansion of the early 1590s seems to have been played bysilver rupees whose mint name was recorded as „urdˆ zafar qar…n“ („victorious camp“ or „campassociated with victory“) and whose date was expressed by the letter alif representing the number1000. As the Mughal chronicler Bad€’ˆn… informs us, these coins were meant to serve as remindersof the Islamic millennium; according to Bad€’ˆn…, the year 1000 A.H. had to be the terminal dateof the Islamic faith, at least for Akbar and his court circle. The life-span of Islam being nowcompleted, Akbar „felt at liberty to embark fearlessly on his design of annulling the statutes andordinances of Islam, and of establishing his own cherished pernicious belief [in their stead].6

This „pernicious belief“ was no doubt his new cult known as d…n-e il€h…. The problem withBad€’ˆn…’s account is that it dates this new departure to Akbar’s twenty-seventh regnal year,which corresponds with the year A.H. 990/991 (A.D. 1582/83); this agrees with the beginningsof the new cult, but not with the date represented by the letter alif on coins. This difficulty can beperhaps solved if we understand the letter alif as representing not the last year but the last decadeof the first millennium. If the chronicler’s account and its interpretation presented here are bothcorrect, coin incidences marked by the letter alif (and invariably also by the inscription „urdˆzafar qar…n“) should be distributed between all years of the decade 1582/83-1591/92. In ourgraph, the sharp peak coinciding with the latter date (the A.H. 1000) would then disappear andthe curve representing the total of all incidences would ascend less sharply.

The distribution of incidences of coins of this type to particular years is a matter forconjecture. In his report on the events of the thirty-seventh year, i.e. the year of the millennium,Bad€’ˆn… states that the „Dirhams and Dinars which had been coined with the stamps offormer Emperors were to be melted down and sold for their value in gold and silver, and notrace of them was to be left of them in the world.“7 This can be interpreted as a massivereminting campaign during which the rests of hitherto circulating Sˆr… and other non-Mughalcoins were drawn from the circulation and converted into Akbar’s rupees, d€ms and muhrs.The sharp increase of incidences around the year of the millennium could then be understoodas reflecting, more or less closely, actual monetary developments. Evidence of copper d€ms,

6 ‘Abdu’l Q€dir Bad€’ˆn…, MuntaÇabu-t-taw€r…Ç. Calcutta, Vol. II (tr. by W.H. Lowe) 1884, p. 310.7 Ibid., p. 393.



where the „urdˆ zafar qar…n“ issues were marked not solely by the letter alif but sometimes byregnal years, seem to support this interpretation. All copper d€ms dated by this more exactway were struck in regnal years 35 to 38, i.e. between the years A.H. 998 and 1002 (A.D.1590-1594); coins bearing the dates of r.y. 42 and 48 are perhaps exceptional cases.8

As far as silver is concerned, „urdˆ zafar qar…n“ with its alif coins was by no means thesingle mint in operation at this time. Ahmadabad, Lahore, Multan and Delhi continuedstriking their own coins dated by regnal years and months or, less frequently, by the hijr…date. Isolated specimens bearing the hijr… date 1000 are available for Jaunpur, Dogaon,Fatehpur, Ujjain, Narnol and Bangala mints. „Urdˆ zafar qar…n“ probably should not beidentified with any of them - its identity remains unknown. One can perhaps guess that amobile mint accompanied Akbar on his journey to Kashmir and back to Lahore in thesecond half of 1592 and that it might bear this name; however, it is improbable that it wouldhave been able to produce, in short period of five months,9 coins in such huge quantity as issuggested by the significant number of incidences in our hoard record.

The conjuncture whose beginning in the 1590s coincides with the urdˆ zafar qar…n issuesmaintained itself, on the hoard evidence, until 1605 and appears to have been caused bysimultaneous outbursts of heightened minting activity of just three great imperial mints -Ahmadabad, Thatta and Lahore. Whereas the number of incidences struck in Ahmadabadrises gradually from the early 1580s and culminates in the middle of 1590s, declining againslowly afterwards, the incidence curves for both Lahore and Thatta show much sharper turns.Both these mints appear to have expanded their output virtually from zero (in the case ofThatta explicable by its lying outside of the Mughal empire until 1593), and in a short intervalof two or three years. Whereas the rise of the Ahmadabad mint could have been caused, atleast to some extent, by direct imports of precious metals from Europe, the location of bothLahore and Thatta suggests another immediate source of silver - the Safavid Persia, undergoinga process of internal consolidation under the energetic Sh€h Abb€s the Great (1587-1629).Already by the end of the 16th century, there must have existed at least a rudimentary networkof Indian merchants resident in Persia who stood behind the expanding Indo-Persian tradeand repatriated their profits, converted into silver, to their homes in Gujarat, Multan orRajasthan. Their numbers and influence in Iran reached their apogee by the middle of the 17thcentury when they appear to have achieved absolute dominance in the Indo-Persian trade andserved as main suppliers of capital to capital-starved Persian economy.10

8 R. B. Whitehead, Catalogue of Coins in the Panjab Museum, Lahore. Vol. II. Coins of the MughalEmperors. Oxford 1914, p. 80: copper coins no. 592 (r.y. 35), 593 (r.y. 36), 594 (r.y. 37), 595 (r.y. 38), 596 (r.y.42) and 597 (r.y. 48, struck from an inverted die). H. N. Write, Catalogue of the Coins in the Indian MuseumCalcutta. Vol. III. Mughal Emperors of India. Oxford 1908, p. 313 (Chronological Index), has two coppercoins, with the date of r. y. 36 (no. 528) and r.y. 37 (no. 529). See also H. N. Wright’s note on the Urdˆ zafarqar…n mint in his introduction to the catalogue, pp. lxxxi-lxxxii.

9 If the dates given in the Akbarn€ma are correct, Akbar set out from Lahore on or around 22nd of July,1592 and returned to the capital on 29th of December of the same year. Abˆ’l Fazl All€m…, The Akbarn€ma ofAbu-l-Fazl. Tr. by H. Beveridge. Calcutta, Vol. III. 1910-1921, pp. 943 and 966.

10 S.F. Dale, Indian Merchants and Eurasian Trade, 1600-1750. Cambridge 1994, pp. 66-75.

71

It should be stressed that such massive transfers of silver were made possible, in thefirst place, by steadily increasing production of American silver mines, increasing importsof silver into Europe and subsequently further to the east (as S. Moosvi rightly points out)11.As far as India is concerned, however, another factor of perhaps equal importance has to betaken into account - the general security of long-distance trade (or lack of it) which followedclosely the turns in relations between Mughal India, Safavid Iran and the Uzbek empire.Operation of the Lahore mint, described in greater detail below, will illustrate this fact.Greater amount of relevant data on Lahore, Ahmadabad and Thatta enable us to take acloser look at their activity in the late Akbar… and early Jah€ng…r… period - an attempt justifiedby their importance in the formation of the Mughal silver coin stock.

Three Great Akbar… MintsStarting from 1593/94 (his 38th regnal year), Akbar abandoned the Islamic calendar andchose as a basic unit of periodization his regnal years (introducing the so called Il€h… era)12

which, from this time on, supplanted hijr… dates on his coins; in many cases, the Il€h… yearwas supplemented by the name of Il€h… month in which the respective coin was struck. Thepractice of including the Il€h… months was continued by various mints for varying numberof years during the reign of Jah€ng…r and, much less consistently, into the sixth or seventhyear of the reign of Sh€hjah€n.

In the case of Ahmadabad, Thatta and Lahore, three great mints of Akbar’s and Jah€ng…r’stime whose coins are represented in our hoard evidence by greater number of specimens, itis possible to summarize incidences of coins minted over greater number of years in thesame month of the year and thus to attempt to reconstruct seasonal fluctuations in themints’ yearly output.

AhmadabadAhmadabad, the capital of the independent sultanate of Gujarat, was incorporated into theexpanding Mughal empire by Akbar in 1573 (A.H. 980); first coins struck in the local mintare dated by this year. From the middle of the seventies, the output (reflected by frequentincidences in hoards) was growing rapidly until a peak was reached in the middle of 1590s.During the last twenty years of Akbar’s reign Ahmadabad was by far the most productivemint in the Mughal empire. Until 1610, the year when a new mint was opened in Surat,Ahmadabad was the single mint establishment in the whole sˆbah of Gujarat - all silver imports

11 S. Moosvi, Silver Influx, pp. 59-62.12 Particulars on the introduction of the Il€h… calendar are to be found in Abu’l Fazl’s Akbarn€ma, (transl.)

vol. II., pp. 15-24; shorter account is given in his ³’…n-i Akbar…, vol. II. (tr. by H.S. Jarrett), Calcutta 1894, p. 30.Unfortunately, Abu’l Fazl’s description of the new calendar is not systematic: it leaves out important details onthe length of Il€h… months. Last word on this question is probably the discussion contained in: M. A. Alvi, A.Rahman, Fathullah Shirazi, a Sixteenth Century Indian Scientist. New Delhi 1968. As far as our statisticalanalysis is concerned, however, the differences in the lengths of months are too small to be of any practicalimportance.

Mints of the Akbar… Period : Ahmadabad


carried by trade to the Gujarati ports (the most important during Akbar’s time being Khambayatand later Surat) had to be turned into Mughal silver currency in this hinterland city. Relativeabundance of silver coins struck in this mint in the Il€h… era when most coins were dated byIl€h… year and month, makes an attempt at quantitative evaluation possible and worthwhile.

Fig. 15. Incidence of Ahmadabadi silver coins minted in the years 1573-1760 in coin hoardsdeposited in the area of the U.P.

In the case of the Ahmadabad mint, the fluctuation in monthly output is very prominentand also easily explicable. Characteristic is the peak in the mint’s activity in the autumn andwinter period from October to January, which corresponds well with the seasonal rhythm ofmaritime traffic determined by the monsoon cycle. From the end of May till the end ofAugust the ports on the Indian cost had to remain closed due to strong monsoon winds thatmade the sea traffic virtually impossible. When the seas calmed, it was the time for shipsselling Indian wares in the Red Sea and Persian Gulf area to come home and unload theircargo, important part of which regularly consisted of precious metals, especially silver. Ittook some time to have the goods cleared through the customs and to transport the silver tothe mint: in Akbar´s time Ahmadabad was the only mint in the whole Gujarat.

Generally, heightened activity of the Ahmadabad mint appears to have coincided withthe main sailing season in the Arabian Sea that lasted from December to March.13 With theearly spring, the time came for ships to depart with winter monsoon winds in their sails; by

0

2

4

6

8

10

12

14

16

18

20

1556

1562

/63,

156

3

1569

/70,

157

0

1576

/77,

157

7

1583

1589

/90,

159

0

1597

, 159

7/98

1604

, 160

4/05

1611

/12

1618

, 161

8/19

1625

, 162

5/26

1632

, 163

2/33

1638

/39,

163

9

1645

/46,

164

6

1652

, 165

2/53

1659

, 165

9/60

1666

, 166

6/67

1673

, 167

3/74

1679

/80,

168

0

1686

, 168

6/87

1693

, 169

3/94

1700

, 170

0/01

1707

, 170

7/08

1714

/15,

171

5

1721

, 172

1/22

1728

, 172

8/29

1735

, 173

5/36

1742

, 174

2/43

1748

, 174

8/49

1755

, 175

5/56

year of mintage

num

ber o

f hoa

rds

cont

aini

ng c

oin(

s) o

f par

ticul

ar y

ear

13 Shipping seasons and time-schedules for departures and arrivals of vessels plying the Indian Ocean routeshave been described by many authors. For comprehensive treatment, see the excellent synthesis by J. Deloche,Transport and Communication in India Prior to Steam Locomotion. Vol. II: Water Transport. Delhi 1994, p. 209-219.

73

this time the mint had already processed most of the metal accumulated during the rush autumnmonths. The output from March till September then is barely half of the maximum level. There isa slight rise in June and July, caused by pre-monsoon arrivals from the Gulf14 and possibly bycaravans arriving by the overland routes from the north-west.

Fig. 16. Fluctuations in the monthly output of the Fig. 16. Fluctuations in the monthly output of the Fig. 16. Fluctuations in the monthly output of the Fig. 16. Fluctuations in the monthly output of the Fig. 16. Fluctuations in the monthly output of the Ahmadabad mint, based on hoardsAhmadabad mint, based on hoardsAhmadabad mint, based on hoardsAhmadabad mint, based on hoardsAhmadabad mint, based on hoardscontaining containing containing containing containing Akbar… (38.-50. rAkbar… (38.-50. rAkbar… (38.-50. rAkbar… (38.-50. rAkbar… (38.-50. r.y.y.y.y.y.) and Jah€ng…r… (1.-12. r.) and Jah€ng…r… (1.-12. r.) and Jah€ng…r… (1.-12. r.) and Jah€ng…r… (1.-12. r.) and Jah€ng…r… (1.-12. r.y.y.y.y.y.) coins.) coins.) coins.) coins.) coins

The resulting curve summarizes two sets of data: coin incidences of Akbar´s time andincidences belonging to the regnal period of Jah€ng…r, each covering a period of twelve years.Trends shown by both are nearly identical - a fact that speaks in favour of hypothesis that coinincidences do reflect real changes in the output of mints: the evidence of Ahmadabad, consistentand logical, appears to be clear and unambiguous. (The data for Ahmadabad, Thatta and Lahoreare summarized in the last part of the Appendix III at the end of the book.)

ThattaSituated in the Indus delta, Thatta had long been an important commercial centre of the westernpart of the Indian Ocean. The city, connected by sea lanes with ports of Gujarat, Persian Gulf andthe Red Sea, joined the maritime world to overland caravan routes leading via Khuzdar, Kalat andQuetta to Qandahar and then further west and north to the Near East and Central Asia. Anotherfrequented route followed the course of Indus, itself an important waterway with busy traffic, up toMithankot and then turned along Chinab and Ravi to Multan and Lahore.15

0

5

10

15

20

25

30

35

40

45

50

Fa M

ar/A

pr

Ar A

pr/M

ay

Kh M

ay/J

un

Ti J

un/J

ul

Am J

ul/A

ug

Sh A

ug/S

ep

Mi S

ep/O

ct

Ab O

ct/N

ov

Az N

ov/D

ec

Di D

ec/J

an

Ba J

an/F

eb

Is F

eb/M

ar

month of mintage

num

ber o

f hoa

rds

cont

aini

ng c

oin(

s) o

f pa

rtic

ular

mon

th

14 S. F. Dale, op. cit., p. 46.15 Ibid., pp. 46-55; J. Deloche, op. cit., Vol. I.: Land Transport. Delhi 1993, pp. 24-29.

Mints of the Akbar… Period : Thatta


Apart from serving as an important entrepôt on the intersection of long distance traderoutes, Thatta offered a variety of locally produced textiles exported to Persian and Arabianmarkets. First Europeans who took notice of Thatta’s wealth were the Portuguese who plunderedthe city in 1556. Later, in slightly more peaceful pursuit of the spice monopoly, they sold herethis commodity with good profit which was subsequently invested in purchases of textilesexported to Persia. However, both English and Dutch sources suggest that this maritime tradewas not very brisk; its volume did not seem to be so great as to convince the English andDutch East India Companies to make substantial investments in it; both Companies limitedthemselves to harassing the Portuguese rather than directly competing with them.16

Fig. 17. Incidence of silver coins minted in the mint of Thatta in the years 1556-1740 in coinhoards deposited in the area of the U.P.

In the present context it is perhaps interesting to note that in 1634 the VOC director inIran saw possible profits in this area if the existing substantial trade of Thatta with Irancould be diverted from the overland to sea routes frequented by Dutch ships: the possibleprofit was estimated at Fl. 1.011.500.17 This idea never materialized. Overland trade and theprofits derived from it were and remained fully in the hands of local merchants and merchantcommunities who felt no need to ask for a European participation. Gradual decline of Thattawhich in the latter part of the 17th and in the 18th century was caused by silting up of thearm of Indus which joined the city with the sea; in 1758 the river changed its course and

16 W. Floor, The Dutch East India Company’s Trade with Sind in the 17th and 18th Centuries. MoyenOrient et Océan Indien, XVIe-XIXe siècles, vol. III (1986), p. 111.

17 Ibid., p. 112.

0

2

4

6

8

10

12

14

16

18

20

1556

1563

/64,

156

4

1571

/72,

157

2

1579

/80

1586

/87,

158

7

1595

, 159

5/96

1603

, 160

3/04

1611

/12

1619

, 161

9/20

1627

, 162

7/28

1635

, 163

5/36

1642

/43,

164

3

1650

, 165

1

1658

, 165

8/59

1666

, 166

6/67

1674

1681

, 168

2

1689

, 168

9/90

1697

, 169

7/98

1705

, 170

5/06

1713

/14,

171

4

1721

, 172

1/22

1729

, 172

9/30

1737

, 173

7/38

1744

/45,

174

5

1752

, 175

2/53

year of mintage

num

ber o

f hoa

rds

cont

aini

ng c

oin(

s) o

f par

ticul

ar y

ear

75

bypassed Thatta and its port Lahori Bandar completely. In the 19th century the role of themain commercial entrepôt in the lower Sindh was taken over by Karachi.18

Thatta was conquered by Akbar in 1593; the oldest extant silver rupee minted in thenewly established Mughal mint bears the date of Farwardin, r.y. 38 (March/April 1593).19

From this date till the end of Akbar’s reign, coins issued from this mint occur relativelyfrequently in U.P. hoards; all of them are dated by regnal years and Il€h… months.

Fig. 18. Fluctuations in the monthly output of the Thatta mint, based on hoardscontaining Akbar… (38.-50. r.y.) and Jah€ng…r… (11.-22. r.y.) coins

The relative importance of the overland caravan routes for the trade of Thatta can beillustrated by the same type of data which was used in the case of Ahmadabad. In contrastto the Ahmadabad mint, monthly incidences of coins from the Thatta mint show twoprominent peaks instead of one - the first in May/June and the second in October/November.The former, more prominent culmination of May/June, corresponds with the smaller increasein the Ahmadabad mint activity preceding the onset of the monsoon and is to be attributedprobably to the same cause; as the journey from the Gulf to Thatta was shorter than to portsin Gujarat and more ships could make it before the monsoon arrived here, the influx ofsilver imported by Indian merchants was greater. The latter peak in October/November, onthe other hand, can not be ascribed to any significant intensification of sea traffic in thispart of the year - from September to November the seas remained rough and wind velocities

0

5

10

15

20

25

30

Farw

ardi

n(M

ar/A

pr)

Ardi

bihi

sht

(Apr

/May

)

Khur

dad

(May

/Jun

)

Tir (

Jun/

Jul)

Amar

dad

(Jul

/Aug

)

Shah

rew

ar(A

ug/S

ep)

Mih

r(S

ep/O

ct)

Aban

(Oct

/Nov

)

Azar

(Nov

/Dec

)

Dai

(Dec

/Jan

)

Bahm

an(J

an/F

eb)

Isfa

ndar

(Feb

/Mar

)

month of mintage

num

ber o

f hoa

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cont

aini

ng c

oin(

s) o

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mon

th

18 J. Deloche, op. cit., Vol. II.: Water Transport. Delhi 1993, p. 53 and map on the page 54.19 In the hoard no. 426/UP. Coin of the same month and year is registered also by H. Nelson Wright in his

Catalogue of the Coins in the Indian Museum Calcutta. Vol. III, Oxford 1908, cat. no. 256.

Mints of the Akbar… Period : Thatta


unsteady20. In this part of the subcontinent, the autumn months were marked by greateractivity on the land routes. At the end of October, Afghan nomadic tribes, known collectivelyas powindahs, descended from their summer pasturage areas in the highlands beyond theSulaiman range to the Indus plain and brought with them products from Afghanistan andCentral Asia. They also hired out their camels to traders or their agents who then travelledto their destinations in India through the dangerous zone of Baluchi mountains with thetribe and in relative security. This seasonal migration played an important part in thecommercial contacts between the Indus Valley and the north-west of the subcontinent aslate as the nineteenth century.21 Coin evidence seems to be in harmony with this interpretationand to show clearly the importance of overland trade for this city, classified primarily as animportant port of the western Indian Ocean.

As in the case of Ahmadabad, the curve is again build on two sets of data covering thesame length of time - the last twelve years of Akbar’s rule and second half of the reign ofJah€ng…r.22 Again, both sets of data are in marked agreement - a fact which points to theexistence of clearly defined trading seasons and minting rhythms. One exception seems tobe an increase of coins minted in January/February which is limited to the Akbar… periodand is not caused by any sudden increase in one or two years. It may be due to similarfactors as the parallel rise in the output of Ahmadabad mint noticeable in the same month -resurgence of maritime traffic in the early spring.

LahoreLahore, the imperial capital in the years 1585-1598, is situated at the banks of the river Raviwhich enabled seasonal riverine traffic with Kashmir to the north and cities of Multan andSind to the south. Indus joined Lahore with the distant coast of Arabian Sea. The importanceof this connection is testified i.a. by the name of the southernmost port in the Indus deltaand important point in the long distance trade network in the Indian Ocean - Lahori Bandar,the port of Lahore. At the same time, the city was located at the „Long Walk“, so oftendescribed by European travellers, or „Great Trunk Road“ (as the British preferred to call it),an important land route connecting the major cities of the Doab with Panjab and continuingfarther north-west via the Khyber pass to Kabul where it met with caravan routes to Persiaand Central Asia.

Earliest Akbar… coins from the Lahore mint attested by our hoard evidence come fromthe middle 1560s and until 1581 occur in U.P. hoards only sporadically. The coin collectionof the Lahore museum (well supplied with coins of local origin) has an almost uninterruptedseries of silver coins spanning the years A.H. 971 = A.D. 1563/64 to A.H. 989 = A.D.

20 J. Deloche, op. cit., Vol. II., p. 216.21 S. F. Dale, op. cit., pp. 52-53; J. Deloche, op. cit., Vol. I., pp. 252-254.22 In the case of Thatta, the data relating to the first part of Jah€ng…r’s reign are too scarce to serve as a basis

for this type of graph; this is the only reason of using the incidences from regnal years 11 to 22 instead of 1 to12 (as has been done in the case of Ahmadabad).

77

1581.23 In the next ten years, from 1582 to 1591, the Lahore mint, on the evidence of both coinhoards and the Lahore museum catalogue, was either shut down or minted only insignificantnumber of coins. This seems somewhat strange, esp. when we remind ourselves that from1585 this city served as the imperial capital with huge official establishment and therefore acentre of considerable commercial and financial activity. It should be pointed out, however,that primarily it was Akbar’s growing concern about the developments in north-western partsof his empire that led him to the decision to shift his capital city to Lahore. The 1570s saw aconsolidation and continuous expansion of Uzbek power: in 1572/73 Abdull€h {•€n Uzbekseized Balkh, in 1584 occupied Badakhshan and his units begun making incursions into theMughal territory in Afghanistan. In 1587 he invaded and subsequently annexed Khurasan.These developments must have adversely affected security of roads and trade in general, esp.when the Afghan tribes in the Swat and Bajaur area north of the Kabul-Peshawar route rose inopen revolt. Slowly and gradually, Akbar was able to consolidate the Mughal position in thenorth-west: the suggestion made by Abdull€h {•€n Uzbek to Akbar to invade jointly theSafavid empire and to divide it between themselves were rejected but in 1587 a pact wasconcluded fixing the Hindukush as the boundary between the Mughal and Uzbek dominions.The Uzbek ruler also made it known that he would respect the Mughal interest in Persian-heldQandahar and would not object if the Mughals took it.24 This they did, without armed struggle

Fig. 19. Incidence of Lahori silver coins minted in the years 1556-1760 in coin hoards depositedin the area of the U.P.

23 Two years of this period are missing from the series in the Lahore collection: A.H. 979 = A.D. 1571/72and A.H. 982 = A.D. 1574/75. They are not represented in the hoard evidence either.

24 Riyazul Islam, Indo-Persian Relations. A Study of the Political and Diplomatic Relations Between theMughul Empire and Iran. Teheran 1970, pp. 51-55.

0

2

4

6

8

10

12

1556

1569

/70,

1570 15

83

1597

,15

97/9

8

1611

/12

1625

,16

25/2

6

1639

/40,

1640

1653

,16

53/5

4

1667

,16

67/6

8

1680

,16

81

1694

,16

94/9

5

1708

,17

08/0

9

1722

,17

22/2

3

1736

,17

36/3

7

1749

,17

49/5

0

year of mintage

num

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f hoa

rds

cont

aini

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ear

Mints of the Akbar… Period : Lahore


in 1595. In the same year Mughals conquered eastern Baluchistan and thus rounded their conquestof the westernmost parts of the subcontinent begun in 1591 by annexation of lower Sindh and ofthe important port of Thatta two years later. Simultaneously, in a series of energetic campaigns,the Afghan insurgency was temporarily put down and the main roads opened to peaceful traffic.

This consolidation probably has to do with the great increase in Lahore silver coinincidences from the second half of 1591; in the next decade, Lahore together with Ahmadabadand Thatta belonged to a small group of mints which supplied the Mughal empire withmost of its coined silver. Coins dated by a regnal year and Il€h… month began to be issuedfrom the 35th regnal year of Akbar (A.D. 1589-90) and continued to be minted until the11th regnal year of Jah€ng…r. In Jah€ng…r’s twelfth year the Lahore mint supplanted the Il€h…month with the year of the Islamic era. For the construction of monthly output of the Lahoremint coins minted from the 35th to the 50th regnal year of Akbar and from the 6th to the11th year of Jah€ng…r have been used.25 The total quantity of incidences used for the graph(188) is slightly greater than that of Thatta (151) and smaller than that of Ahmadabad (238).

The monthly rhythm of coin output of the inland Lahore mint is very different fromthe rhythms of both Ahmadabad and Thatta, connected more directly with the maritime

25 The first five years of Jah€ng…r’s reign, i.e. the period of the early Jah€ng…r… „slump“ are represented inthe hoard evidence by only two incidences belonging to the second and fourth regnal year, both lacking thename of the month.

Fig. 20. Fluctuations in the monthly output of the Lahore mint (based on hoardscontaining Akbar… and Jah€ng…r… coins)

0

2

4

6

8

10

12

14

16

18

20

22

Fa M

ar/A

pr

Ar A

pr/M

ay

Kh M

ay/J

un

Ti

Jun/

Jul

Am J

ul/A

ug

Sh A

ug/S

ep

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ep/O

ct

Ab O

ct/N

ov

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ec

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an

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ar

m onth of m intage

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Akbar,35.-41.r.y.Akbar,42.-50. r.y.Jahangir, 6.-11. r.y.

79

routes in the Indian ocean, and is also more difficult to interpret. To begin with, in theperiod covered by the Il€h… coins, the Lahore mint appears to have made two shifts betweentwo very different patterns of minting activity. In the first pattern, prevailing between the35th and 41st regnal year of Akbar (1590/91 to 1596/97) and, with slight variation, betweenthe 6th and 11th regnal year of Jah€ng…r (1611/12 to 1616), the mint activity is spread outmore or less evenly, with relatively minor fluctuations, throughout the year, with gradualincrease in the months of Bahm€n and Isfand€rmuz (February-March). In the second,covering Akbar… regnal years 42 to 49 (1597-1604), the mint seems to have been standingalmost completely idle in the six months between October and March, compensating forthis long inactivity by massive coin output in the half-year between April and September.

Attempts at explanations of these patterns and their shifts must be, owing to our limitedknowledge of detailed history of the area, more speculative than in the case of Ahmadabador Thatta. The first Akbar… and the Jah€ng…r… pattern seems to reflect the pivotal role of thecity as an important political, industrial and trading centre at the cross-roads of two greatcommercial arteries: first, the „great trunk road“ connecting the Ganga-Yamuna Doab withPanjab and continuing farther north-west across the Indus to Kabul and then either to Iranor to Central Asia, and second, the route connecting the Indian north to Sindh and thewestern parts of the Indian Ocean. The rivers of Panjab and the Indus, navigable on greatstretches of their courses for greater part of the year, have always borne a lively down- andup-river traffic and besides, were also supplemented by parallel land routes.26 Supplied bysilver coming by these different routes, the mint can be expected ho have been maintainingits coin production at a relatively stable level throughout the year.

The second pattern, on the other hand, is marked by heavy concentration of productionin the warmer half of the year; moreover, the change to this rhythm seems to have beenachieved, at least partly, at the expense of, rather than by simple addition to the old mintingpattern. This may signify a shift of commercial traffic from one route to another at sometime in 1597. We know that in 1595 Mughals took Qandahar, a very important city on thelong-distance route connecting India to Persia; subsequent consolidation, including atemporary suppression of the Raushan€… insurgency along the Khyber pass route in 1596,meant also greater degree of security, always an important factor in development of tradeand trading networks. In the same year, as Abu’l Fazl informs us in his chronicle, an orderwas given for levelling the Khyber road27 - another measure that might have helped toattract the commercial traffic to it. Journey from Qandahar to the Indian plains was, ofcourse, limited to spring and summer months when higher parts of the routes (either viaPisin and Dera Ghazi Khan to Multan and then by the Ravi to Lahore or via Ghazni or

26 See, J. Deloche, op. cit., Vol. II., pp. 14-17 for a description of the Panjab river network and pp. 174-177 fora discussion of the pace of river transport and travelling times. From attached table of average duration of voyagebetween selected localities along the rivers one can derive approximate length of journey upriver from the sea toVazirabad on the Chanab (by its length and general conditions comparable to the journey to Lahore): according toseason, on low or high water: on low water the journey took around 111 days, on high water 74,5 days.

27 Abu’l Fazl All€m…, Akbarn€ma, vol. III, (tr.), p. 1052.

Mints of the Akbar… Period : Lahore


Kabul to Bhera and Lahore)28 were without snow. This northern route to Lahore was perhapspreferable to the southern, more time-consuming journey along the rivers. Such shift ofpreferences on the part of trading caravans could explain the observable shift in the rhythmof the Lahore mint.

The shift back to the first pattern occurred already in the 50th year of Akbar; thisreversal to the pre-1597 situation appears to last into the Jah€ng…r… years covered by theIl€h… coins. Significantly, this change coincides exactly with renewed Mughal-Persianhostilities around Qandahar in 1604/05 when the Mughal garrison had to repulse an organizedPersian attack in the area. Another bid for the coveted stronghold was made by the Persiansimmediately after the accession of Jah€ng…r on the Mughal throne; this attempt was repulseddefinitively only in 1607 when the Mughals reinforced significantly their troops in andaround the city.29 Change on the Mughal throne or internecine conflict among members ofthe dynasty (such as Prince {•usraw’s revolt against Jah€ng…r in 1605-06 or rebellion ofPrince {•urram in 1622) was always seen by the Persians as a welcome opportunity to tryand capture this important fort.

Unfortunately, we do not possess data in sufficient quantity that would enable us toconstruct similar monthly output curves for other mints of the empire. However, the threecases presented here demonstrate clearly the fact that the output of every mint was governedby particular and unique production rhythm which was determined, to a great degree, byparticular environmental circumstances. Apart from this monthly rhythm, production ofeach mint was influenced, in the longer horizon of years and decades, by political events,shifts in the intensity of traffic along different branches of trade routes network etc. andmay have fluctuated quite sharply from one year to the other. This complex set of variousdeterminants makes all attempts at absolute quantification of silver output on the basis ofcombination of relative data (derived by the method of A. Hasan, S. Moosvi or this author)on the one hand and known output of a particular mint in a short interval of time on theother, extremely problematic. This scepticism applies also to the ingenuous attempt of S.Moosvi to derive an absolute constant on the basis of a piece of information on the Suratmint. From the fact that English factors in Surat in 1634 and 1636 were able to obtain fromthe local mint 8000 to 9000 rupees daily, S. Moosvi has concluded that this quantity was anaverage for the whole year; and proceeding on the assumption that this average daily quantityof 8000 rupees was turned out by the mint 365 days a year and that the known number ofcoins recovered from hoards is in constant relation to the production, she has come to thenumber of 253 913 silver rupees representing each one rupee found in the hoards. Equalratio is then applied to other mints in the empire.30

Monthly fluctuations in the output of Ahmadabad, Lahore and Thatta mints show thatreliable estimates of average yearly output cannot be made on the sole basis of data relatingto a short period of one or a few months in a year. Both Ahmadabad and Thatta show very

28 See, J. Deloche, op. cit., Vol. I., the map on the p. 26.29 Riyazul Islam, op. cit., pp. 68-69.30 S. Moosvi, The Silver Influx, pp. 56-57.

81

sharp monthly fluctuations and there is every reason to suppose that the profile of Surat,another mint supplied mainly by maritime trade, would be similar. To calculate average outputof a mint on the basis of isolated daily output figures (which may be perhaps understood astypical of a particular part of the year, a season etc.) in fact means to accept a very largemargin of error. Besides, one has to take into account the possibility that the percentage offresh, imported silver turned into new coins may have been greater in the mints on the peripheryof the empire than in the inland mints where more significant part of the silver bullion mayhave been obtained by melting of older Mughal coins brought for remint. Moreover, reportsof English factors make it clear that the Surat mint did not operate 365 days a year but wassubject to not infrequent closures lasting sometimes for whole months. Such irregularitieswere certainly not limited to Surat; quantitative output estimates based on short-term productiondata are problematical if applied to any Mughal mint. Unless other, unambiguous evidence onthe production of mints appears (which is not very probable), historians would perhaps dobetter to content themselves with series of relative data without trying to transform them, withthe help of an absolute constant, into absolute numbers31.

3. The Regnal Period of Jah€ng…r (1606-1627)

Immediately after the accession of Jah€ng…r, very sharp decline in the number of coinincidences of virtually all mints in the empire is clearly visible in the graphical presentationof our evidence. The total of all incidences that fluctuates slightly below the number 40 inthe last decade of Akbar’s reign, plummets suddenly to 11 and less in the years 1606-1611.Then, equally suddenly it soars as high as 36 in 1612/13 and keeps rising to a total of 46incidences two years later. It would be probably a great mistake to interpret such deep andnarrow gap in the coin evidence solely in terms of a universal slump in the output of Mughalmints. There is no evidence of an internal or external crises which could, by effectivelyinterrupting the argentiferous trade routes, explain this strange feature. Although very clearlydefined, this „depression“ is too long to be explicable in terms of confused dating of coinsor other similar purely formal distortions of evidence.

On closer investigation one striking coincidence emerges that can help to solve thisriddle. Immediately after his accession Jah€ng…r ordered to increase the weight of gold andsilver coins by 20 per cent so that the silver rupee now weighed 212 grains instead of

31 M. P. Singh in his Town, Market, Mint and Port in the Mughal Empire 1556-1707 (An Administrative-cum-Economic Study), New Delhi 1985, pp. 255-256 has chosen a different method of estimating the capacityof mints: a Dastˆr-ul camal of Aurangzeb’s time gives an annual revenue obtained from the mint of Surat; thisamount is known to be identical with minting charges, fixed at 5,2% of the rupees coined in the year. From thesenumbers one can easily calculate the yearly and daily output of the mint (exceeding, in this particular case, 5000rupees per day). However, to get a meaningful series of data one would have to work with dastˆr figures forgreater number of consecutive years. Apparently, these are not available; and M. P. Singh himself rightlyreminds his readers of all the possible pitfalls connected with hasty generalizations of isolated pieces of data.

Mints of the Jah€ng…r… Period


traditional 176 or 177. In the fourth year the emperor (motivated perhaps by relative plentyof silver available for minting coins?) raised the weight of the rupee still further by another5 per cent to 222 grains.32 However well meant this reform might have been, it caused greatinconvenience to all participants in financial transactions conducted by means of silvermoney: as the value of the rupee was determined strictly by its real silver content, issuingnew heavy money brought with it an unpleasant necessity of recalculating prices or adjustingvolumes, quantities etc. of all goods and payments to the new standard.

At the same time, it was not feasible to terminate instantly the validity of the hugemass of „light“ rupees - and the coexistence of two standards complicated the situation stillfurther. Jah€ng…r states in his memoirs that people explained to him the inconvenienceswhich this reform caused in mercantile transactions; and „as in all affairs the contentmentand ease of the people are to be looked to“, he issued an order that from the 11th of Ard…bihishtof the 6th regnal year (i.e. beginning of May, 1611) all mints in the empire should revert tothe old standard.33

Evidence of the coin catalogues shows that this order was implemented gradually asmints received the new instructions and adjusted their production process in accordance

Fig. 21. Incidence of Mughal silver coins minted in the years 1606-1627/28 in coin hoardsdeposited in the area of the U.P. and recovered in the years 1882-1979

32 A. Rogers, H. Beveridge (transl.), The Tˆzuk-i-Jah€ng…r…. Vol. I. 2nd ed., Delhi 1968, pp. 10-12.33 Ibid., p. 197.

0

5

10

15

20

25

30

35

40

45

50

1605

, 160

5/06

1606

, 160

6/07

1607

, 160

7/08

1608

, 160

8/09

1609

, 160

9/10

1610

, 161

0/11

1611

/12

1612

/13

1613

/14

1614

1614

/15

1615

1615

, 161

6

1616

, 161

7

1617

, 161

8

1618

, 161

8/19

1619

, 161

9/20

1620

, 162

0/21

1621

, 162

1/22

1622

, 162

2/23

1623

, 162

3/24

1624

, 162

4/25

1625

, 162

5/26

1626

, 162

6/27

1627

, 162

7/28

year of m intage

num

ber o

f hoa

rds

cont

aini

ng c

oin(

s) o

f par

ticul

ar y

ear

NORTHWESTGUJARAT AND SINDHMALWA AND RAJASTHANCENTRALEASTDECCANTOTAL

83

with them. Probably the first extant coin minted under the new regulation is a silver rupeestruck in the capital of Lahore in the month of Amard€d in the 6th year (July/August 1611).Other mints followed suit, the more distant ones with considerable delay (mint at Qandahar,for example, issued heavy rupees as late as in the 7th year, A.H. 1021 (1612/13).34

Now, when the old standard had been restored, what happened to the heavy rupees? Ona traditional explanation, heavier and therefore more valuable pieces should disappear fromthe circulation and be kept as savings or go into hoards. Our evidence suggests that at least inJah€ng…r’s India this was not the case: coins seem to have been saved (or hoarded) primarilyfor their capability to serve as money rather than for their silver content. It is neverthelesspossible that these coins were turned into bullion, jewels etc. and thus hoarded in demonetizedform or used as material for silver embroidery or other „industrial“ purpose. Another, lessspeculative explanation of the fate of these heavy coins is suggested by our evidence: from1611/12 till 1618 coin incidences indicate higher level of activity of central mints. As most ofthe newly imported silver was probably turned into Mughal currency in mints situated in theborder areas (Gujarat, Afghanistan, Panjab), at least part of the material which sustained theproduction of the central mints may have been obtained by reminting these impracticable,heavy coins. Of course, there is no reason to suppose that the reminting activity was limited tothe central, inland mints; the observed universal and significant increase of incidences(reflecting higher output) in the second decade of the 17th century may have been helped, toan unknown degree, by general reminting of these heavy Jah€ng…r… rupees.

Concluding the discussion of this early Jah€ng…r… slump, it should be pointed out thatthis fall in coin incidences must not be necessarily caused solely by factors reconstructed inthe preceding paragraphs. Temporary decline in silver imports can not be completely ruledout as a contributing factor - production of Gujarati mints, for example, seems to have beenfalling already in the last years of Akbar’s reign. In general, however, institution of new,heavier standard of currency would not seem to be a logical reaction to any really seriousscarcity of the minting metal - indeed, the contrary situation can be imagined as a moreprobable background for such decision.35

Quick return of the incidence curve to the pre-1605 level after the currency reformexperiment had been wound up suggests that any possible decline in silver imports could

34 R. B. Whitehead, Catalogue of Coins in the Panjab Museum, Lahore. Vol. II., Oxford 1914, p. 146. cat.no. 1036. The same catalogue has under its cat. no. 1076 a rupee from Kashmir dated also to A.H. 1021.

35 S. Moosvi in her Silver Influx, pp. 62-65 does not take these possible effects of changing standards onsurvival chances of particular coin types into account and ascribes the observed decline in number of extantrupees from Gujarat (reflecting according to her interpretation lower level of mint output) to an assumedcontraction in the amount of silver entering Spain from America that in its turn affected adversely the total silveroutflow from Europe to the East. Her use of ten-year totals (in this case the decades of 1605-15 and 1616-25)blurs the sharp temporal limits of the slump, clearly visible when the data series is constructed on yearlyintervals. This can partly explain her failure to see parallel decline in the case of north-western mints: between1611 and 1615 coin incidences (and most probably numbers of extant coins) representing these mints showsharp increase which would, in ten-year total, to a great extent even out the pronounced fall of the first five yearsin the decade. Glance at the data will show that different method of counting (number of extant coins versusnumber of coin incidences in hoards) would, in this case, play only marginal role.

Mints of the Jah€ng…r… Period


have been of only short duration. As far as the shares of particular regions in the total outputare concerned, however, comparison with the 1590s will reveal one significant change:restoration of the number of incidences to the pre-1605 level was due, to a considerableextent, to increased activity of two north-western mints, Lahore and Qandahar. Whereas theLahore curve can be interpreted simply as a return to its „normal“ level, the case of Qandaharwas different. Judged by U.P. hoards incidences of Qandahari coins minted during Jah€ng…r’sreign, the output of its mint must have been phenomenal; it therefore deserves closer scrutiny.

Qandahar 1606-1622Through the Middle Ages Qandahar had been one of the most important commercial andstrategic points situated in the area of contact between the Indic and Middle Eastern culturaland political worlds. Its excellent fort and location at the important overland trade routeconnecting cities of north-west India with Herat, Khurasan and the great centres of Islamiccivilisation further west on the one hand and with flourishing cities along the Silk Road incentral Asia on the other, made it almost inevitably an area of conflicting interests of Indianand Persian empires. At the beginning of the 16th century Qandahar had got into thepossession of B€bur and was subsequently under Mughal control until 1558 when it waslost to the Persians. In 1595 Akbar recovered the city without single shot by bribing thecommander of its fort to surrender. The city was in Mughal hands until 1622 when it wasconquered by the Persians. In 1638 the Persian commander, again unable to resist the powerof Mughal silver, changed sides and handed over the city to Sh€hjah€n’s army. Finally, in1649 the Persians snatched Qandahar from Mughal hands by military force and were ableto hold it against three successive Mughal sieges (1649, 1652, 1653).36

On the basis of available evidence, it seems that Akbar did not institute a mint inQandahar after he had got into the possession of the city in 1595. The only Akbar… mintsoperating in the area were located in Kabul and Peshawar;37 low profile of their coins inU.P. hoards is to be explained by the dominant position of Lahore whose mint seems tohave had in this time an almost complete monopoly in minting the silver which arrived intoIndia by north-western overland routes.

This situation changed dramatically during the first decade after Akbar´s death. Jah€ng…rinstituted mint in Qandahar probably in the year 1606/07.38 For the first five years of itsexistence, however, the mint’s activity had been either intermittent or limited to minting onlylow quantities of silver, probably mainly for the local market: its coins are almost completelyabsent from U.P. hoards. Abrupt change occurred in 1611/12: this and all the subsequent yearsuntil the end of Mughal rule in Qandahar in 1622 are abundantly represented in U.P. hoards.It is highly probable that the increasing activity of Qandahar mint in these years is closely

36 For a detailed account of the Mughal-Persian struggle over Qandahar in the broader context of Indo-Persian relations, see Riyazul Islam, op. cit., pp. 57-70, 78-145.

37 Peshawar is not included in the list of Mughal mints compiled by M. P. Singh in his book Town, Market,Mint and Port in the Mughal Empire, 1556-1707. (An Administrative-cum-economic Study). New Delhi 1985, pp.239-252 but the activity of its mint is documented (unless it is an error) by one coin in hoard no. 418/UP.

38 This is the date of the oldest Qandahari coin, found in the hoard no. 74/UP.

85

related to rapidly deteriorating security situation further south in the Persian Gulf and westernpart of the Indian Ocean generally. During these years, coastal Arabs intensified their attackson merchant ships, retaliating in this way against the equally brutal attempts of the Portugueseto regulate the maritime trade by their system of passes (the so-called cartazes). This state ofaffairs bordering on permanent war still worsened in 1614-15 with the Persian conquest of thePortuguese port of Gombroon (Bandar Abbas) and simultaneous Persian blockade of PortugueseHormuz. Traders reacted immediately and shifted their routes further to the north. The rise ofimportance of Qandahar, connected with the revitalization of the overland route, wascorroborated by several contemporary observers, English and Portuguese.39 Relatively lowerlevel of coin incidences from Ahmadabad and Thatta in the 1610s and 1620s suggests that thecontemporaneous growth of the north-western inland mints was due to massive shifts oftraffic on the main trade routes connecting India to the Middle East.

Fig. 22. Incidence of Qandahari silver coins in coin hoards deposited in the area of the U.P.

02468

101214161820

1556

1573

/74,

1574

1590

/91,

1591

1609

,16

09/1

0

1627

,16

27/2

8

1644

/45,

1645

1662

,16

62/6

3

1679

/80,

1680

1697

,16

97/9

8

1715

,17

15/1

6

1733

,17

33/3

4

1750

,17

50/5

1

year of mintage

num

ber o

f hoa

rds

cont

aini

ng c

oin(

s) o

f pa

rtic

ular

yea

r

39 See the classic study of Niels Steensgaard, Carracks, Caravans and Companies. The Structural Crisisin the European-Asian Trade in the Early 17th Century. København 1973, esp. pp.206-207 for the new role ofQandahar. In 1615 English merchant Steele commented on the situation in and around Qandahar: „By reason offrequent passage of Caravans it is much enlarged lately, that the Suburbs are bigger then the Citie. For withinthis two yeare, that the way of Ormus is stopped up by the wars betwixt the Persians and Portugals, all Caravanswhich passe betwixt India and Persia, must of necessitie goe by this place. And here they doe hire Camels to gointo India, and at their returne for Persia... Trade it yeelds not of it selfe, but accidentally by the meeting ofIndian, Persian and Turkie Merchants, which are not willing to travel further at twentie per Cento profit.“Purchas IV, 272-3, quoted by R. Ferrier in: The Cambridge History of Iran. Vol. 6.: The Timurid and SafavidPeriods. Ed. by P. Jackson and L. Lockhart. Cambridge 1986, p. 475.

Mints of the Jah€ng…r… Period : Qandahar


Another fact that deserves to be noted is the time lag between the increased output ofQandahari mint on the one hand and the incidence of Qandahari coins in the U.P. hoards onthe other. During the years of the mint’s operation, the percentage of its coins in the total ofall coins buried in the area of the present-day Uttar Pradesh is never higher than slightlyover 5 per cent; on the other hand, in hoards dated to the second half of the 17th or to the18th and 19th centuries, the percentages of Qandahari coins climb to as high as 50 per centand sometimes even more of all Jah€ng…r… coins found in these „late“ hoards.40

There seems to be only one possible explanation of this peculiar trend: huge quantitiesof imported silver minted in Qandahar in the second decade of the 17th century and up to1622 stayed for a long time in the north-western periphery of the Mughal empire andpenetrated only gradually into its central parts. The process of thorough mixing of Qandaharicoins into the silver stock circulating in the Mughal sˆbas of Delhi and Ilahabad seems tohave lasted for thirty to fifty years. This process of slow inflow of Qandahari coins wasaccompanied by a parallel process of gradual disappearance from the current hoard horizonof coins which had been issued by the less productive mints - with the general and gradualdisappearance of older coins only their most frequent types (or strongest populations) wereable to hold themselves in circulation and therefore also in the more recent hoard profiles:they were becoming increasingly isolated reminders of past times. High percentages of theQandahari coins in later Mughal hoards are therefore not directly representative of theactual share which these coins had in the total silver stock circulating in the Mughal empire(or, more exactly, in its central parts) at the death of Jah€ng…r: these high percentages in latehoards are to some extent inflated by a disappearance at this time of other, less prolificmints from later hoard horizons. From the total number of 28 Jah€ng…r… silver mintsdocumented by U.P. hoards, names of only few recur constantly in the hoards of late 17thand 18th century: most prominent are the coins of Qandahar, followed by those of Lahore,Thatta and Patna.41

Two preliminary conclusions can be drawn from the above observations. First, thecase of Qandahar again clearly shows close correspondence between mint activity on theone hand and incidence of its coins in the available hoard evidence on the other. In caseswhen the mint was located in greater distance from the area in which hoard samples havebeen taken, this correspondence may become visible, owing to an apparently slow velocityof circulation and consequent slower tempo of intermixing of the current minted stock,only after the lapse of several decades. Qandahar’s production shows the test of time to be

40 As the hoard inventory does not contain information about the number of doubles, all calculations areonly more or less exact approximations. Inspection of the original Treasure Trove Reports could remedy thisdefect.

41 The list of Jah€ng…r… silver mints compiled by M. P. Singh, op. cit., pp. 239-252 includes 28 localities;it does not tally with the list of mints documented in the U.P. hoard evidence: here the mints of Jalesar, KatakBanaras and Peshawar are totally absent. M. P. Singh, on the other hand, does not include the mints of Akbarpur(documented by the hoard no. 426/UP), Bairat (426/UP, 203/UP), Bangala (418/UP), Islamabad (= Chittagong,997/UP), Jalnapur (= Jalapur?, 371/UP, 426/UP, 972/UP, 1035/UP) and Muhammadabad (15/UP). Urdˆ zafarqar…n (203/UP) may correspond to Urdˆ of M. P. Singh’s list.

87

of great importance. In fact, this mint is a good test case: the rise of its importance and tradeis documented by independent written evidence which corroborates the picture derived fromhoard statistics. This may strengthen our confidence in the general reliability of the applicationof statistics to hoard evidence - perhaps even in those cases where additional independentinfor-mation is either not at hand or is in itself not strong enough to prove the case.42

Second, systematic registration of time-lags in mixing of silver, newly arriving fromthe peripheries of the empire (mints of Gujarat, Sindh, the Nort-west, Deccan, Bengal) intothe older stock already circulating in the central parts, might serve as another guide forassessment of the velocity of circulation of coined silver at the supra-regional level.Complementary and of equal interest should be the study of dispersal at the peripheries ofcoins minted in the core region of the empire (in the mints of Delhi, Agra, Ilahabad andcertain others). The still rather general picture of monetary flows from the peripheries tothe centre and (to a lesser extent?) vice versa, driven to a great extent by the Mughal revenuesystem, would thus obtain more concrete contours.

The fall of Qandahar into Persian hands in 1622 was not only a serious setback forMughal strategic positions in the north-west and a blow to their prestige but, as our graph ofincidences clearly shows, was also a cause of serious disruption of the flourishing long-distance trade passing through this area. After 1622 the number of incidences of north-western coins falls quite abruptly to the half of the previous level. The eclipse of Qandaharwas not compensated by a comparable increase of output of other mints in the area; theLahore mint, instead of regaining the dominant position it had held before the rise ofQandahar, appears to have been hit, for most of the 1620s, by a temporary slump too.Disruption of the trading networks in the area between the Safavid and Mughal empiresappears to have outlasted the fall of Qandahar by almost a whole decade. Neither Ahmadabadnor the recently established mint in Surat were able to compensate for this north-westerndrop-off - security problems on the maritime routes were by no means over. Keeping inmind the fate of the early Jah€ng…r… coinage, one has to ask - was the slump of the late1620s real, i.e. caused by a real decline of silver imports from abroad or does it exist only inthe hoard evidence distorted by another official manipulation of the existing coin stock?

Influence of the last-mentioned factor cannot be ruled out. From the 13th regnal yearto the end of Jah€ng…r’s rule (i.e. from 1618/19 to 1627), the Agra and Ahmadabad mintsissued, on the orders of the emperor, the celebrated zodiacal coins. As soon as Sh€hjah€nascended the Mughal throne in 1627, he forbade, under the death penalty, the use of thesecoins and ordered that they should be returned to the mint and melted down. This order, ifimplemented consistently, might artificially reduce the numbers of coins struck during thelast Jah€ng…r… decade; apart from this distortion one has to take into account possible effectsof filter III, described above:43 Zodiacal coins always were and still are highly prized

42 The importance of supporting evidence independent of the hoards in the interpretation of their evidencehas been rightly stressed e.g. by J. Werner, Münzschätze als Quellen historischer Erkenntnis. Jahrbuch fürNumismatik und Geldgeschichte, vol. 2 (1950/1951), pp. 137-138.

43 See, Part I, pp. 36-41.

Mints of the Jah€ng…r… Period : Qandahar


collectors’ items, fetch nice price at the market and are therefore more likely to disappear intoprivate pockets and collections than other, more „ordinary“ rupees. In fact, there is a markeddecline of coin incidences of the Agra and Ahmadabad mints that coincides with the period ofzodiacal coins. The performance of Ahmadabad had been, for the whole Jah€ng…r… period, farfrom spectacular: in general, this had probably more to do with conditions in the western partof the Indian Ocean. The fact, however, that for the years 1623/24 to 1627/28 there is notavailable in the U.P. hoards a single Ahmadabadi silver coin, is striking and the influence ofSh€hjah€n’s order can not be ruled out. The record of Agra is similar: from the short period1619/20 to 1622/23 there are no silver coins and from the years immediately following wehave in the hoard evidence only one or two incidences per year.

The pressure of Sh€hjah€n’s monetary policy on coin populations of the late Jah€ng…r…period was intensified by another order by which he banned the use of all coins bearing thename of Jah€ng…r’s wife Nˆrjah€n. These coins began to be issued by greater number ofmints44 in 1624/25 and continued to be struck until the end of his reign. These coins too hadto be melted down and their continuing use punished by death. It is therefore possible thatthis reminting campaign to some extent distorts our evidence: what appears in the 1620s asa stagnation, might have been actually a recovery; this may apply particularly to the secondhalf of the decade. It is probable that a dramatic increase in coin incidences at the verybeginning of Sh€hjah€n’s reign would appear more gradual if the zodiacal and Nˆrjah€n…coins had been left to their natural fate. Relatively rapid decline of the volume of Jah€ng…r…coin stock in the era of Sh€hjah€n45 seems to corroborate the reminting hypothesis.

4. The Era of Sh€hjah€n (1627-1658)

The beginning of Sh€hjah€n’s reign is marked by steep increase of incidences from severalmajor mints of the empire - Lahore, Ahmadabad, Surat and especially Agra. Sh€hjah€n’sorder to draw out of circulation all zodiacal and Nˆrjah€n… coins and to melt them downseems to offer an explanation of this sudden upsurge in minting activity; it is probably noaccident that all of the above mentioned mints had supplied, in the Jah€ng…r… era, the localmoney markets with Nˆrjah€n… coins. These coins, drawn on the order of Sh€hjah€n fromcirculation, supplied these mints with abundant material for massive production of newSh€hjah€n… issues.46 Return to more orthodox, Islamic model of coinage was completed atthe end of the first decade of Sh€hjah€n’s rule when the Islamic lunar calendar was re-

44 P. L. Gupta, Coins, p.122, has a list of mints which issued Nˆrjah€n… coins: Agra, Ahmadabad, Akbarnagar,Allahabad, Kashmir, Lahore, Patna, Surat. This list includes all of the major mints of the empire - selectivereminting affecting these most productive mints could therefore seriously distort the overall production estimatesarrived at by the incidences method.

45 See above, Part II, pp. 56-57.46 Another aspect of monetary policies of Islamic monarchs deserves to be mentioned: valued as marks of

regnal sovereignty, coins struck in the name of new monarch at the time of his accession fulfilled also animportant symbolic function.

89

instituted and the former practice of using the names of Il€h… (ancient Persian) months onthe coins gradually abandoned.

It is possible that at the beginning of Sh€hjah€n’s reign the Nˆrjah€n… and zodiacaltypes of coin were still found in greatest concentrations in regions supplied with coins ofthese major mints; if this was the case, Agra, Ahmadabad, Surat and Lahore naturally gotthe greatest share of these coins for remint. In fact, the incidences show that the period from1628 to 1632/33 represented for the Ahmadabad mint the last „fat years“ in its history: fromthe middle of 1630 this once important mint was eclipsed by the mint of Surat.

It was this recently founded mint establishment that stood, together with the mints ofLahore and Multan, behind the so far unparalleled rise of coin incidences observed in thefirst decade of Sh€hjah€n’s reign. And, for the first time, the eastern mints located in Patnaand Rajmahal joined the general trend and appear to have contributed in a more significantway to the general expansion of the Mughal silver coin stock. Reminting of late Jah€ng…r…coins may have been important in the first few years of Sh€hjah€n’s reign; intensive activityof greater number of mints lasting for a whole decade can not be explained away as havingbeen due mainly to forced reminting of the older coin stock.

Analysed from the perspective of regions, the importance of the north-western mintsfed by the overland trade with the Middle East and Central Asia is indisputable. Competing


Mints of the Sh€hjah€n… Period

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with Lahore, which recovered from its temporary decline caused by the loss of Qandaharin 1622 and subsequent disruption of trade, the most active mint in the 1630s appears tohave been located in Multan - a new name in the list of the Mughal mint cities. Multan wasa terminal point of a long distance trade route connecting, via Qandahar and Farrah, north-western India with Isfahan, Mashad and other important cities in Persia. The revival ofIndo-Persian trade appears to have taken place in the second year of Sh€hjah€n’s rule (1629-30) and to have culminated in his eighth year (1635/36); after the Mughals recaptured thecity of Qandahar in 1638, mint was re-established there but its production, although notinsignificant, never reached the levels of Jah€ng…r’s times: Multan was able to maintain itsposition as the second most important mint of the north-western region.

Nevertheless, the end of the 1630s constitutes a major turning point for the north-western overland trade in general: from this time onwards, the number of incidences - andpresumably the intensity of minting and trade which brought the silver bullion - shows aslow, long-term declining trend interrupted only by a temporary revival in the last twentyyears of the seventeenth century. In 1641/42 the total output of mints supplied by maritimetrade routes of the western part of the Indian Ocean (Surat, Ahmadabad, Thatta) rises abovethe level reached by the north-western mints; the port cities, among which Surat was by farthe most important, then maintain their position as the most important suppliers of silvercoins until the spectacular rise of central mints in the late 1680s. When the incidencescomputed for each region are added up, the resulting curve shows stagnation or slight declinethat follows after the first, „rich“ Sh€hjah€n… decade and lasts until the beginning of 1660.Thereafter, more pronounced decline is noticeable. Even if we take into account the possibledistorting influence of remints on the output curve at the beginning of Sh€hjah€n’s rule, theimport of new silver coming in the first decade of his reign from virtually all directions -including even the usually rather sleepy Bengal - must have led to considerable expansionof the silver coin stock. Analysis of the Sh€hjah€n… coin stock attempted in the precedingsection confirms this conclusion.47

MultanConsidering the substantial expansion of Indo-Persian overland trade that begun in the lateAkbar… period and continued well until the middle of the 17th century, the relatively laterise of the Multan mint to prominence is difficult to explain. Located at the intersection ofthe overland route to Qandahar and Iran with the riverine route connecting Panjab andKashmir with Sindh and the Arab Sea, Multan was also an important textile manufacturingcentre and a seat of a wealthy and influential business community. Traders, merchants andbankers known abroad under the general designation of Multanis, had formed, and duringthe 17th century vastly expanded, a wide trading network covering most of the important

47 See above in Part Two, pp. 56-58.48 For basic information on Multanis, see S. F. Dale, op. cit., pp. 55-64 and chapters 5 and 6 of the same

work for the so far little known activities of this Indian community in Russia.

91

Persian cities and reaching as far north as Astrachan.48 According to a contemporary estimateof an Indian merchant trading in Russia, in the second half of the 1640s the Indian communityin Iran numbered perhaps as much as 10 000 merchants.49 The Astrachan community wasan offshoot of the sizeable Iranian network. Indian merchants conducting their business inIran and Russia traded mainly in Indian textiles which had to be paid in silver and engagedalso in money-changing, money lending and other financial operations - in all these activitiesthey were reputed to be unrivalled masters. Profits from these manifold activities were thenremitted back to their home bases in India. By 1631 an English observer in Iran remarkedthat „Silver and Gould ... is transported yearely from hence into India in great quantities bymerchaunts of these parts“.50 J. B. Tavernier, a French jeweller generally well informedabout precious stones, metals and connected matters, estimated that imports of silver intoIndia fetched, if the customs house was bypassed, between 7 and 8 per cent of profit. By the1670s the continuing drain of silver toward the east already caused such a shortage of thismonetary metal that the Persian authorities were forced to issue an order prohibiting itsexport from the country. This ban caused some discomfort to the merchants but soon thetrade continued, often with the connivance of Persian port officials. 51

Taking into account the indisputable importance of Multan and Multanis in the Indo-Persiantrade, one may wonder at the relatively low profile of Multani coins in existing coin collections.52

However, a look at the graph of incidences of coins struck in the Multan mint shows that theimpression derived from the coin catalogues is not entirely correct. It is true that until 1629Multani coins are almost completely absent from the hoard evidence. This may have severalcauses. Before the 1590s, the trade on the north-western overland routes was, on the hoardevidence, very limited: the few pieces from the Lahore mint, which represent in the hoardevidence its activity between the middle sixties and middle eighties of the 16th century, arehardly more than isolated reminders that the Lahore mint existed at all. Analysis of the seasonalfluctuations in the output of the Lahore mint attempted above has shown that soon after theresurgence of Indo-Persian trade in the early nineties the traffic was deflected to the northern,closely guarded and levelled road through the Khyber Pass to Lahore. When the traffic intensifiedstill further in the second decade of Jah€ng…r’s reign (owing to insecurity of the sea lanes), theQandahar mint, now firmly in Mughal hands, was able to process most of the imported silver.

49 Ibid., p. 66-67 and p. 89. Dale refers to a passage in a petition addressed to Russian authorities by Indianmerchant Sutur in 1647 and published in: К. А. Антонова, Н. М. Гольдберг, Т. Д. Лавренцова (отв. ред.),Русско-индийские отношения в ХVІІ в. Сборник документов. Москва 1958, с. 85. The relevant passagereads: „[...] многие индейцы в шаховых городех живут безвыходно, есть де их 10 000 индейцов, живутбез выезду.“ Interpreting these words, one should perhaps take into account the possibility that the number 10000 stands simply for „a great number of“. This, of course, does not invalidate Dale’s argument; the point ratheris that the expression perhaps should not be taken too literally. In the preceding paragraph Sutur complains thatIndian merchants residing in Iran are subject to frequent harassment and extortion by Safavid officials. Thegolden time of Indian commerce in Iran seems to have been nearly over - an impression more or less corroboratedby the slowly declining trend of the north-western coin incidences.

50 Cit. by R. Ferrier in The Cambridge History of Iran, vol. 6., p. 484.51 Ibid., p. 485.52 S. F. Dale, op. cit., p. 43.

Mints of the Sh€hjah€n… Period : Multan


Fig. 24. Incidence of Multani silver coins in coin hoards deposited in the area of the U.P.

It was only after the loss of Qandahar and subsequent resurgence of traffic in the areaat the end of the 1620s that Multan started striking coins in greater quantity. The task tosupply arriving merchants with Mughal currency, fulfilled previously by the Qandahar mint,was now transferred to Multan, the next Mughal city on the route. In fact, the output of theMultan mint in the 1630 matches, and occasionally even surpasses that of Qandahar twodecades earlier. The year 1635/36 can be taken, on the hoard evidence, as a culminatingpoint in the overland trading: population of these coins represented by 20 incidences (secondhighest number ever attested for any Mughal mint) appears relatively frequently in thecontemporary hoards horizon and single coins are occasionally found even in hoards formedon the territory of the U.P. one and half century later.

Gradual decline of the importance of the Multan mint, apparent in the hoard recordfrom the 1640 onwards, may not have been due solely to a weakening intensity of theoverland commercial traffic between India and Persia, although the repeated and unsuccessfulMughal campaigns to recover Qandahar certainly disrupted traffic in these areas and areundoubtedly responsible for the visible gap in the Multan incidence record in 1649 and1650. The „natural“ factors responsible for the decline of Multan since the middle of the17th century were noticed by Tavernier in his description of the route from Isfahan to Agra;in the present context the passage is worth quoting : „[...] from Kandahar to Agra [...] thereare only two routes via Kabul or Multan respectively. The latter is shorter than the other byten days, but the caravan scarcely ever takes it, because from Kandahar to Multan it is adesert country almost all the way, and because one must march sometimes for three or fourdays without meeting water. Hence the most common and beaten track is by Kabul. [...]Multan is a town where quantities of calicoes are made, and they used to be all carried to

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93

Tatta before the sands had obstructed the mouth of the river; but since the passage has beenclosed for large vessels they are taken to Agra, and from Agra to Surat, as are also some ofthe goods which are made at Lahore. As this carriage is very expensive, but few merchantsgo to make investments either at Multan or Lahore, and indeed many of the artisans havedeserted; this has much diminished the revenues of the Emperor in these provinces. Multanis the place from whence all the Banians migrate who come to trade in Persia, where theyfollow the same occupation as the Jews, [...] and they surpass them in their usury.“53

Comparison of coin incidences for Multan and Thatta indeed shows a parallel gradualdecline that began in the early 1660s and led, in the first decade of the 18th century, to analmost complete disappearance of coins struck in these two once important cities from thehoard evidence. Apart from natural causes, political factors probably also played a role.Not only was the Mughal north-west a less secure region in the late 17th century than in itsfist half, but the long-distance caravan trade along the transcontinental Silk road also suffereddue to political fragmentation and consequent turmoil which lasted until the middle of the18th century. Overland trade shifted partly to the north, deeper into the Russian territory,and partly was redirected to the south to join and strengthen the increasingly busy maritimetraffic.54 This trend, alluded to also in the passage quoted above, resulted around 1640 in theemergence of Gujarati mints as the most important suppliers of monetary silver to theMughal empire. This second rise of Gujarat to prominence (the first occurred, as we haveseen, in the last quarter of the sixteenth century) was to last until the middle of 1680s whenthe central mints located in the area of the present-day U.P. took over as as the most importantproduction centres of silver coins. From the point of view of the U.P. hoard evidence, thesecond hegemony of Gujarat, or, to be more exact, of Surat, lasted for about 45 years. In theU.P. hoards, coins from this mint are abundant, if not dominant, until the early 1720s.Measured by the number of incidences, Surat emerges as the most important mint of theSh€hjah€n… period.

SuratConsidering the importance of maritime trade routes connecting the commercial centres ofthe Middle East with production centres in western India, the career of the mint located inSurat, the „bandar mub€rak“ (blessed port), as the Mughals used to call it, appears to havestarted surprisingly late. During the first period of intensive commercial activity (attestedby numerous incidences of coins of Gujarati provenience) in the last two decades of Akbar’sreign, the only mint in Gujarat was located in the capital of Ahmadabad. Khambhat (spelledKhamb[h]ayat on coin legends), the most important port in the area and one of the mostimportant trading centres in the Indian Ocean area in general, got its mint only during the

53 J. B. Tavernier, Travels in India. Tr. by V. Ball. 2nd ed., vol. I., New Delhi 1995, pp. 73-74.54 See, M. Rossabi, The „decline“ of the central Asian caravan trade. In: J. Tracy (ed.), The Rise of Merchant

Empires. Long-distance Trade in the Early Modern World, 1350-1750. Cambridge, 1990, pp. 351-370. The parenthesesin the title of the article may be slightly misleading: the decline is described as long-term and real.

Mints of the Sh€hjah€n… Period : Surat


reign of Sh€hjah€n (earliest Khambhayati coins found in the U.P. hoards date to his 21stregnal year, i.e. 1647/48) when its time of prominence had been long over. By this time, Suratappears to have been, at least on the evidence of coin incidences, the city with the single mostproductive mint in the whole empire. Although it was itself never an important manufacturingcentre, Surat took over from Khambhayat its role of a provider of all sorts of commercialservices necessary for the smooth functioning of export-oriented production of the Gujaratihinterland. Its career was, of course, made possible by its port capable of accommodatingeven large ocean-going ships. For Mughals, the city was important not only as a source ofrevenue from custom tolls and duties and as a gate through which increasing quantities ofprecious metals passed in order to feed the ever silver-hungry Mughal monetary system, butalso as a place of embarkation for ships carrying every year Muslim pilgrims to Mecca.55

The first, still isolated specimens of Surati silver coinage found in U.P hoards arestamped with the date of the 5th year of Jah€ng…r (1610-1611). However, until the beginningof 1620s, the operation of the mint appears to have been intermittent at best; between 1615and 1618 the striking of coins seems to have come to a complete standstill.56 More or lessregular minting began only in 1619/1620; however, low number of incidences struck in theSurat mint in the 1620s in U.P. hoards point to low coin production - sharp increase isnoticeable only after the accession of Sh€hjah€n to the Mughal throne. It was perhaps noaccident that the mint was re-established shortly after the English East India Company andthe Dutch Oost Indische Compagnie obtained in 1617 imperial farm€ns allowing them toestablish their factories in Surat.57 However, the services of the newly opened mint were,for some unstated reason, found by the English factors unsatisfactory and the representativesof the Company tried hard to obtain permission to transport their silver rials of eight inlandand to have them converted into rupees in the Ahmadabad mint. They succeeded in November1621, after the aversion of the Governor to their request was removed by another farm€n.58

Reasons for this unpopularity of the Surat mint can be to some extent reconstructedfrom scattered remarks in the correspondence of the English and Dutch factors. It seemsthat the mint, formally supervised by a Mughal official, the d€roûa, was - perhaps from thestart - controlled by a body of local moneychangers, the notorious sarr€fs (or „shroffs“ asthe English regularly spelled this term) who were interested first of all in their own profit.

55 For general descriptions of the life of the city, its population and its sometimes turbulent history, see,B. G. Gokhale, Surat in the 17th Century. A Study in Urban History of pre-modern India. London/Malmö 1978;A. B. Radwan, The Dutch in Western India 1601-1632 - A Study of Mutual Accommodation. Calcutta 1978, esp.chap. 7; and A. Das Gupta’s excellent Indian Merchants and the Decline of Surat: c. 1700-1750. Wiesbaden 1979.

56 Afzal {•€n, the d…w€n of Prince Khurram, reminded in a letter, dated 13.7. 1618, the governor of Suratthat earlier he had written him „to take Coja Arab’s house for the Prince, being anciently his mint-house“ - aremark which seem to imply that at the time of writing the house did not serve as a mint. W. Foster (ed.), TheEnglish Factories in India 1618-1621. Oxford 1906, p. 36.

57 The Dutch got their farm€n in 1617, only slightly later in the same year when sir Thomas Roe succeededin obtaining this privilege for the English E.I.C. A. B. Radwan, op. cit., pp. 36 and 123.

58 W. Foster, op. cit., vol. I, pp. 213, 238, 251, 292, 323. Revocation of the prohibition was announced ina letter by Th. Rastell to the Company, dated 7.11. 1621. Ibid., p. 325 and 331.

95

In order to force the Companies to use their help and services, they first - it seems thatsuccessfully - tried to make a direct access of the Companies to the mint difficult andunattractive and so to compel the Europeans to sell their imported bullion to them - inexchange for freshly minted coins in their possession. For this service the factors had to payto the sarr€fs a charge; besides, it seems that the moneychangers who controlled the mintwere by a privilege exempted from the obligation of paying the regular minting charges tothe imperial treasury.59 Initial hurdles and misunderstandings were finally overcome andthe system appears to have been working rather smoothly, as a report by an English factor,dated 1636, suggests: „Concerning the coyneing of your gould and silver into the species ofthis country, [it] is free for us, though not safe. Wee should have to doe with such dangerouspeople in the mint that wee dare not adventure; nor will the most cunning merchants ofthese parts upon any occasion, but sell all to the sharoffes, to whom it is most proper and arein that particular content with very small profitt; or if they should in anything beeunreasonable, wee have presente recourse unto the Governor, who will command speedyredresse, whereof wee have not long since had experience.“60

59 In 1661 Mustafa {•€n, the mutassad… of Surat, informed the emperor Aurangzeb that if the productionof the mint were put under direct control of the state, it could yield an extra revenue amounting to Rs. 100 000per year. The exact results of the ensuing conflict between the Governor and Surati financiers are not known;forty years later, however, the production of the mint was still controlled by the local sarr€fs. H. W. van Santen,De Verenigde Oost-Indische Compagnie in Gujarat en Hindustan, 1620-1660. Meppel 1982, p. 80.

60 Francis Breton at Surat to the Company, April 29, 1636. W. Foster, op. cit., vol. I., p. 255.

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In the first decade of the existence of the Surat mint the quantities of silver importedby the Companies were probably not very large. According to T. Raychaudhuri (quoted byA. Radwan), during a nineteen-year period between 1605 and 1624, the Dutch sent to westernIndia a total of fl. 575 317 - a sum lower than the amount sent in 1629 or 1632/33 alone.61

The exact data on the E.I.C. trade that could be compared with the Dutch ones are notavailable, but other evidence suggests that in the 1620s their involvement in the Gujarattrade did not match that of the Dutch.62 As far as the Indian trade was concerned, the insecurityof the seas during this period (mentioned above in the section on Qandahar) led to a generalshift to overland caravan routes - and consequently to a rise in the output of the north-western mints, particularly that of Qandahar. Contemporaneous decline of Jah€ng…r… coinincidences from Ahmadabad (strengthened, admittedly, by the Sh€hjah€n’s order to removefrom circulation all zodiacal and Nˆrjah€n… coins) suggests that the relatively poorperformance of Surat mint in the 1620s was not due primarily to its possible initial lack ofpopularity among the merchants but had more general causes.

The sudden increase in coin incidences in the first year of Sh€hjah€n (1628/29) - 12cases compared to a single one for the immediately preceding year - probably signals therevitalization of commercial traffic in the western part of the Indian Ocean and marks thebeginning of a generally ascending trend of coin incidences that culminates in the late1640s; in the first year of Sh€hjah€n’s reign, however, the influence of massive remintingcampaign which had to destroy all Nˆrjah€n… coins, has to be taken into account. From 11Jah€ng…r… incidences struck in Surat between the years 1624 and 1627, 10 were issuedeither in the name of Nˆrjah€n or in the names of both Jah€ng…r and his wife. It seems,therefore, that fulfilling Sh€hjah€n’s order meant, in the case of Surat at least, remintingalmost all the silver coin stock issued by this mint in the last four years; much of it probablystill remained within the region served by the mint. The relative decline to a lower level thatcharacterises the output in the following six years confirms this suspicion.

As in the case of other mints located at the periphery of the empire, quantities of rupeesstruck in the Surat mint can be, with a great degree of certainty, understood as related to volumesof silver currently imported from abroad - with the exception of relatively short and identifiableperiods when the above-mentioned reminting of older coins formed a significant part of theproduction of the mint. In contrast to north-western mints, however, where detailed informationis relatively scarce, operation of Surat mint was from time to time commented upon by English

61 A. B. Radwan, op. cit., pp. 98 and 124. In 1629 the V.O.C. sent to Surat fl. 612 560 and in 1632/33 fl. 700 000.62 One indicator of the strength and activity of both Companies in Asia is the number of vessels each of

them had in the Indian Ocean; between 1621 and 1627 the number of ships of the E.I.C reached in the averageone third of the number sailing under the flag of the V.O.C. Ibid., p. 73. The English factors often complainedabout the continuous shortage of ready money that stood in the way of further commercial expansion. See, forexample, W. Foster, op. cit., 1624-29, pp. 201, 295-96, 300, 306, 307, 329, 331 for requests for shipments ofmore ready cash in order to pay debts to Indian creditors. In a letter of December 7, 1626, the President andfactors in Surat complained that after paying off debts, providing goods for the southward voyages and purchasingprovisions for the ships, the remaining cash will only suffice for lading home one vessel, although „the merchandizeof India doth produce in England more then silke or ought you send from Persia.“ Ibid., pp. 163-164.

97

and Dutch factors; their reports show that at least some of the irregularities in the mint’s output(reflected by strongly fluctuating numbers of incidences) were caused by organizational problemsor political events affecting the city or its immediate hinterland rather than by fluctuations in theinflux of silver from abroad. The actual quantity of coins minted in a particular year must havebeen a result of several factors whose weight may have been changing from year to year.Unfortunately, the available data are not sufficient to make a systematic analysis of these varioussets of factors feasible; they can, however, serve at least as informative examples.

A recurring complaint of the English factors in the 1630s concerned the slow working ofthe mint whose capacity seems to have been insufficient for the vastly increased quantities ofincoming silver.63 In the 1630s the English seem to have been unable to get from the mintmore than 6000 rupees per day: in 1634 we are informed that „It was once brought to 9000;but since the Dutch became competitors, they have 3000 daily and our number is now discendedto 5000;...“64 Two years later the situation was still the same: „...we must attend diverse moneths,if we have any competitors, or, if wee have the mint alone, we doe not receive above 6000rupees dayly.“65 Not all the English silver had to be converted into rupees in the Surat mint:since the E.I.C. had now the permission to carry their uncoined bullion inland, its factors atAhmadabad and Baroda could be supplied with reales of eighth or rixdaalers and convertthem in the Ahmadabad mint where they could expect „suddaine dispatch“.66 It is impossibleto say to what extent were these „bottlenecks“ in Surat caused by organizational incapabilityof the mint establishment and to what degree were these problems created artificially with theintention to force the merchants - at least the European ones - to seek the services of the localmoneychangers and bankers. In this context it should be stressed that the role of these financialexperts was not limited to exchange operations: both the English and the Dutch used theservices of native brokers and financiers to transfer greater sums of money (tens of thousandsof rupees) by bills of exchange (the so called hund…s) from one part of India to another -characteristically from port cities to production centres located deep in the interior of thecountry. Not small part of the money invested in purchases of commodities was borrowedfrom the local bankers; these debts too could run into hundreds of thousands of rupees.67

63 See, W. Foster (ed.), op. cit., vol. IV, p. 103 (Letter of President Rastell and Council, dated at Surat25.11. 1630 to the factors at Cambay containing i.a. the complaint about „the slow dispatch of quoinage in themint“); vol. V, p. 68 (Letter of President Methwold and others to the Company, dated in Surat 29.12. 1634complaining again that „Our greatest trouble, and no small losse (yet unavoidable) is the slowness of themint...“);similar problems are reported later in 1636 - vol. V, p. 218 and 1642 - see vol. VII, p. 17.

64 Ibid., vol. V, p.68.65 Ibid., vol. V, p. 218.66 Ibid., and R. Maloni, European Merchant Capital and the Indian Economy. A Historical Reconstruction

Based on Surat Factory Records 1630-1668. New Delhi 1992, pp. 160, 182, 258.67 The debts of the English E.I.C. to Virji Vohra, the most prominent merchant of Surat, were said to

amount to Rs. 30 000 in 1628 and Rs. 6 000 000 in 1669. B. G. Gokhale, op. cit., p. 141. The Dutch facedsimilar problems of liquidity: the time of arrival of the cash, often in insufficient quantities, was determined bythe sailing season when prices of commodities were at their highest level and purchases had to be made underthe least favourable conditions. By 1631 the debt of the V.O.C. to a wealthy merchant in Surat was said to be fl.500 000 (approx. Rs. 670 000). A. B. Radwan, op. cit., pp. 95-96.



Borrowing on the local financial markets was but one way the Companies tried out tomaximize their purchasing power and at the same time keep the imports of precious metalsat the absolutely necessary minimum. Another strategy, pursued with great degree of successesp. by the Dutch, was to pay for the exports by imports of commodities rather than bycash. For the Dutch, Gujarat together with Coromandel was important as a source of relativelycheap textiles which could be exchanged in the Indonesian archipelago for spices sold inturn with great monopoly profits in India, Middle East and Europe.

1628-29 560 ? 1642-43 632 78%1635-36 660 ? 1643-44 863 ?1636-37 450 ? 1644-45 961 71%1637-38 411 ? 1645-46 538 69%1638-39 823 ? 1647-48 217 35%1639-40 1000 ? 1650-51 519 53%1640-41 707 70% 1655-56 474 40%1641-42 1148 84% 1656-57 321 30%

Tab. 7. Estimate of gold and silver imports in Surat by the V.O.C. (Source: H. W. van Santen,De Verenigde Oost-Indische Compagnie in Gujarat en Hindustan, 1620-1660, p. 37.)

Both the Dutch and the English soon realized the great opportunity which presenteditself when the Spain after the end of the Twelve years’ truce in 1621 imposed embargo on theimports of American indigo and thus substantially raised its price on European markets.68 TheSarkhej and Biana indigo was now worth purchasing directly with cash; and the imports ofsilver consequently grew. The Dutch, who were able in the second half of the 1630s to gainaccess to Japanese silver, were in a much better position than the English. Until the middle ofthe 1640s they financed 70 to 80 per cent of their purchases in Gujarat with imported silver.Only from the second half of the 1640s did they return to their original policy of exchanginggoods for goods - and with great deal of success, as we shall see. H. W. van Santen was ableto reconstruct from Dutch sources the imports of goods and precious metals by V.O.C. in theyears 1628/29 to 1659/60 to Surat.69 The totals of imported gold and silver, relevant to thetheme pursued here, have been extracted from a more detailed table and presented in a simplifiedform above. It should be perhaps added that in the years 1638-39, 1640-41 and 1641-42 theshare of Japanese silver in the total gold and silver imported into Surat (separate data for goldand silver are not available) reached approximately 86%.

Unfortunately, we don’t have comparable set of data for the precious metals importedin the same period by the E.I.C. (the data collected by K. N. Chaudhuri in his monograph ofthe East India Company begin only in 1660) and, of course, none for silver imported byIndian merchants on their own ships from the Middle East in exchange for Indian textiles

Total of imported silverand gold (in thousands

of guldens)

Per centof all

imports

Total of imported silverand gold (in thousands

of guldens)

Per centof all

imports

68 J. Israel, The Dutch Primacy in the World Trade. Oxford 1989, p.178.69 H. W. van Santen, op. cit., p. 37.

99

and other commodities. I have been able to find one isolated piece of information on thispoint, contained in a letter written by English factors at Surat to the Company in January1642. The letter says, i.a. that „Some daies before your ships brought these [rials and 6 4821/2 „rex dollars“], upwards of 1 700 000 r[ial]s were landed from the junkes returned fromMocha“; for Indian merchants this must have been a successful season. By coincidence, in thesame year the Dutch imports of precious metals reached their peak, the silver from Japanamounting to nearly one million guldens. The sharp increase of coin incidences from Surat inthe year 1641/42 may be due to this coincidence. J. J. Brennig was able to put together data onsilver imports into Surat in the season of 1643/44, extracted from the V.O.C. records. In thisyear the total imports of silver by Asian merchants, the Dutch and the English are stated tohave amounted to 1 071 246 rials (i.e. 26 795 kg of silver) - substantially less than the importsby Indian merchants alone two years before reported above.70 Interestingly, the number ofcoin incidences struck in 1643/44 is considerably lower than of those minted in 1641/42 - 7pieces of the latter date compared to 12 of the former. We may only guess that the peak shownby the incidences record in 1647/48 was perhaps due to similar coincidence - however, as thedata in the table show, at this time the Dutch contribution would have been much smaller. Theoutput of the Surat mint in the 1650s, i.e. in the last decade of Sh€hjah€n’s rule, appears tohave been relatively stable. On the other hand, decline in the number of incidences from theAhmadabad suggest that this mint was quickly losing its former importance; similar, althoughslower decline is noticeable in the case of Thatta. Surat now emerged as a single most importantmint in western India and together with Lahore and Multan supplied most of the new silverinfused in the form of rupees into the Mughal monetary system.

The data on Dutch silver imports in the second part of 1640s and in the 1650s do notform a continuous series; however, they suffice to show a clearly declining trend in the preciousmetals imports and growing share of imports of goods. This trend culminated in the secondhalf of the 17th century when the V.O.C., thanks to her successful sales of goods, became a netexporter of silver from Surat (silver which usually ended up in Bengal and therefore did notleave the Mughal monetary system).71 Even when we take into account the growing involvementof the English E.I.C., it seems evident that behind the stable and relatively high output of theSurat mint in this period must be seen the commercial networks and generally active tradebalance of indigenous Surati merchants.72 Not only the bare number of incidences but alsotheir temporal distribution - their presence in hoards formed long after Sh€hjah€n’s death, infact up to the end of the first third of the 18th century, testifies to the extraordinary numericalstrength of coin population issued in Surat during the regnal period of Sh€hjah€n.73

70 J. J. Brennig, Silver in Seventeenth-century Surat, p. 480.71 H. W. van Santen, op. cit., p. 38.72 J. J. Brennig, op. cit., pp. 481-482. According to Brennig, the expansion of Asian trade (i.e. trade conducted

by non-European merchants) in the second half of the 17th century reduced the European share of silver imports toSurat from a possible 50 % in the 1640s to mere 17 % at the beginning of the 18th century. The case of Surat seemsto be different from that of Bengal, where the European silver imports grew in relative as well as absolute terms.

73 See the synoptic table of Sh€hjah€n… coins in hoards in Appendix III at the end of the book.



Patna First coins from the Patna mint which occur in the U.P. hoards are dated, interestingly, tothe turbulent years of 1579/80 and 1580/81 when Akbar had to fight hard in Bihar to suppressthe uprising of part of his aristocracy. On the evidence of earliest Patna silver coins registeredin museums’ catalogues it can be inferred with some confidence that the mint was establishedin 1574 or 1575; this event was probably related to the Mughal conquest of Bengal, aprocess which was well under way in the same years.74 During the rest of Akbar’s reign theactivity of this mint appears to have been low and intermittent. In later times Patna was animportant intermediate point connecting core regions of the empire and its importantconsumption centres with the trade and production areas of Bengal; as long as the situationin Bengal remained unsettled, the intermediary role of Patna was weakened.

It is therefore hardly accidental that higher frequency of incidences of Patna coins inhoards coincides with consolidation of Mughal power in Bengal during the reign of Jah€ng…r.Indeed, authors of both the Lahore and Calcutta coin catalogues conclude, on the evidenceof the number of Jah€ng…r… coins from Patna in the possession of these two museums, thatthe mint under Jah€ng…r must have been very active.75 Both were led to this conclusion by

74 H.N. Wright, Catalogue of the Coins in the Indian Museum, Calcutta, p. lxxii.75 Ibid., and R.B. Whitehead, Catalogue of Coins in the Panjab Museum, Lahore, p. lxii. Whitehead

appears to have taken over most of the statements made by Wright on Patna verbatim into his own overview.

Fig. 26. Incidences of silver coins minted in Patna in the years 1556-1760 in coin hoards depositedin the area of the U.P.

0

2

4

6

8

10

12

1556

1564

/65,

156

5

1573

/74,

157

4

1582

, 158

2/83

1590

/91,

159

1

1600

, 160

0/01

1609

, 160

9/10

1618

, 161

8/19

1627

, 162

7/28

1636

, 163

6/37

1644

/45,

164

5

1653

, 165

3/54

1662

, 166

2/63

1671

, 167

1/72

1679

/80,

168

0

1688

, 168

8/89

1697

, 169

7/98

1706

, 170

6/07

1715

, 171

5/16

1724

, 172

4/25

1733

, 173

3/34

1742

, 174

2/43

1750

, 175

0/51

1759

, 175

9/60

year of mintage

num

ber o

f hoa

rds

cont

aini

ng c

oin(

s)

of p

artic

ular

yea

r

101

the fact that Patna silver coins from the era of Jah€ng…r outnumber silver coins issued by thismint in the ruling period of any other Mughal emperor. In the Lahore collection, for example,there are 15 Jah€ng…r… coins compared to bare 9 Sh€hjah€n…, 11 Aurangzeb… and 9 FarruÇsiy€r…;Calcutta museum owned 31 Jah€ng…r… rupees (including those issued in the name of Nˆrjah€n),but only 20 Sh€hjah€n…, the same number of Aurangzeb… and 7 FarruÇsiy€r… silver coins. Onsuch evidence, one can easily conclude that the golden period of the Patna mint has to beplaced into the regnal period of Jah€ng…r, in the 1610s and 1620s. However, the evidencedrawn from hoards, even though it too reflects the mint’s ascendancy during these years,conveys a fairly different overall picture: the mint seems to have been most active during thereign of Sh€hjah€n, went through a period of relative depression in the era of Aurangzeb andintensified its activity again in the short period from 1705 to 1715. This is a rather differentpicture from that presented by A. Hasan who based her research on museum catalogues.76 Thereason of this difference is the more varied coinage of Jah€ng…r: the Il€h… dating makes fromevery month’s issue a distinct coin population whose specimens are sought after by museumsas well as private collectors. With these selection criteria, relatively uniform coinages of latermonarchs are at a significant disadvantage.77

In contrast to Surat, our knowledge of the operation of the Patna mint, derived fromEuropean published written sources, is practically nil.78 Patna was a centre of a wider areaspecializing in weaving cotton textiles for export and also an important market for saltpetreproduced in the adjacent region. The Dutch began to buy and export this strategicallyimportant substance after they had been granted a farm€n allowing them to trade in thisstrategic commodity in 1638. By the middle of the 17th century the English joined themand Bihar became a main supplier of saltpetre for the apparently insatiable European market.79

In 1675-76, for example, saltpetre amounted to 38% of the total value of cargo exported bythe Dutch V.O.C. from Bengal to Holland, the total value of all V.O.C. exports from thisregion in that year being fl. 318 000.80

* * *If silver coin incidences are more or less reliable indicators of the output of the Patna mint,however, we have to conclude that there is no direct positive relation between the growingEuropean interest in the region in the second half of the century on the one hand and coinproduction of the Patna mint on the other. Indeed, the contrary seems to be the case - ourcoin evidence shows the last third of the 17th century to be a period of relative decline of

76 A. Hasan, Mints of the Mughal Empire, pp. 338-339.77 For more detailed discussion of this point, see the section dealing with various approaches to statistical

processing of Mughal silver coins in Part One of this study.78 Some information may be contained in letters of Dutch and English factors residing in Patna to their

superiors; for the period in question, however, one can hardly expect more than few incidental remarks. Forpublished correspondence containing several passages on Patna, see W. Foster (ed.), The English Factories inIndia, vols. dealing with the years 1620-21, 1655-60, 1661-64, 1665-67 and 1668-69 (in the intervening yearsa permanent E.I.C. factory in Patna did not exist).

79 K.N. Chaudhuri, The Trading World, p. 337 an O. Prakash, The Dutch East India Company, pp. 58-60.80 O. Prakash, ibid., p. 200.

Mints of the Sh€hjah€n… Period : Patna


the mint. Unless new evidence becomes available, we may live with the hypothesis that longer-term fluctuations in the Patna mint output were caused by a changing intensity of the Bengaltrade (and consequent fluctuating intensity of silver imports) in so far as this was under directcontrol of Indian merchants and perhaps also by factors of administrative and organizationalnature; direct involvement of European companies in the saltpetre production that wouldrequire shipments of E.I.C. or V.O.C. silver into the region, is not very probable. It was onlyin the Sh€hjah€n… era and in a brief period during the reign of Sh€h ³lam I. and FarruÇsiy€rthat the output of the Patna mint contributed in a more significant way to the formation of thecurrent coin stock. Even in the early Sh€hjah€n… period, marked by a general increase of coinoutput, the number of incidences of coins from Patna mint is considerably lower than thenumber of coins struck in the more distant Lahore or Surat.

Despite the growing commercial importance of Bengal and increasing European silverimports into this region from the middle of the 17th century, in the U.P. hoards horizon thecoins from eastern mints are never dominant. In fact, as the 17th century drew to an end, theirreal share in the total Mughal coin output decreased: at its close it was hardly more than 10%while in the 1620s and 1630s it may have been twice as much. Moreover, it is possible thatreal overall shares may have been even somewhat lower - the structure of coin stock of theU.P. reconstructed with the help of hoards deposited in this area (where coins from local ornearby mints are possibly over-represented) may not have been identical with the - necessarilyaverage - total coin stock structure of the much larger Mughal empire.

5. Mints During the Reign of Aurangzeb (1658-1707)

As far as the history of the Mughal silver coin stock is concerned, the long era of the reignof Aurangzeb can be divided roughly in two periods of unequal length and marked by twomutually opposing tendencies in the overall activity of silver mints. In the first, lasting untilthe middle of the 1670s, the stagnation characteristic of the middle and late years of theSh€hjah€n… period changes into a more perceptible decline - at least this is what the incidencesevidence shows us. The turning point when this trend was reversed appears to have beenreached in 1674 or 1675; from then on, numbers of incidences grow - at first, until themiddle of 1680s, rather slowly and hesitatingly; around the middle of Aurangzeb… era theyjump suddenly upwards and then fluctuate around a level twice as high as that which prevailedin the 1660s and 1670s. This increase appears to have been accompanied by a marked shiftin the coin output of different regions of the empire - our hoard evidence shows a phenomenalincrease in the incidences of coins struck in central mints and simultaneous decline ofincidences from the more distant regions. This development, noticeable both in absoluteand relative terms, calls for an explanation.

The long-term stagnation of coin production characterizing the later Sh€hjah€n… periodand a possible overall decline of the activity of the mints in the first fifteen years of theAurangzeb… era may have led to a general stagnation or even a decline of the volume of the

103

Mughal silver coin stock. A method of estimating the development of the total coin stockvolume will be introduced in a later section; at this place a mention should be made of apeculiar commercial activity of the Mughal government in the last Sh€hjah€n… decade andfirst two years of Aurangzeb. Studying the reports of the Dutch V.O.C. factors based atSurat, H. W. van Santen discovered an interesting piece of information concerning an officialMughal involvement into the trade with the Middle East. According to a report written bythe V.O.C. director at Surat, in 1651 Sh€hjah€n ordered to build ten or twelve big shipswhich had to transport Indian goods to Persia and Mokha and possibly to monopolize thecarrying trade to these areas. To make his move more effective, Sh€hjah€n forced themerchants to send their goods on his ships to the Middle East markets even when the profitthey earned by this was only marginal. The factor explained the motives standing behindthis policy in the following words: „His aim is to sell cotton goods produced in Hindustanand Gujarat (in which profession most of his subjects have to make a living) and thus attractan enormous sum of Spanish pieces of eight and ducats to his realm (the Mughal empirehaving no gold or silver mines of its own).“81

Fig. 27. Incidence of Mughal silver coins minted in the years 1660-1707 in coin hoards depositedin the area of the U.P.

81 H. W. van Santen, Trade between Mughal India and the Middle East, and Mughal Monetary Policy,c. 1600-1660. In: K.R. Haellquist (ed.), Asian Trade Routes: Continental and Maritime. London 1991, p. 93.

Mints of the Aurangzeb… Period

0

5

10

15

20

25

30

35

40

45

50

55

60

65

70

1660

, 166

0/61

1662

, 166

2/63

1664

, 166

4/65

1666

, 166

6/67

1668

, 166

8/69

1670

, 167

0/71

1672

, 167

2/73

1674

1676

1677

/78,

167

8

1679

/80,

168

0

1681

, 168

2

1683

, 168

3/84

1685

, 168

5/86

1687

, 168

7/88

1689

, 168

9/90

1691

, 169

1/92

1693

, 169

3/94

1695

, 169

5/96

1697

, 169

7/98

1699

, 169

9/00

1701

, 170

1/02

1703

, 170

3/04

1705

, 170

5/06

1707

, 170

7/08

year of mintage

num

ber o

f hoa

rds

cont

aini

ng c

oin(

s) o

f par

ticul

ar y

ear



Accepting this explanation, van Santen asks about possible reasons of the timing ofthis new official policy. Was this measure, resembling the contemporary monetarist policiesof some European states, a reaction to the steadily declining Dutch imports of gold andsilver? And was its abandonment in the early 1660s a sign of what he calls „the big „push“(i.e. return to higher silver imports) in the 1650s? Stressing the fact that so far too little isknown about Mughal policy and Indian economy, he does not offer any definitive answer.The author of these lines feels little confidence to overstep the limits of this publicly statedmodesty; what can be offered here, is only an attempt to see the Mughal policy in thecontext of monetary developments suggested by our graph. If we take the coin incidencesas an indicator of silver imports, in the last decade of Sh€hjah€n’s reign the expandingMughal economy may have indeed faced a shortage of monetary metals caused by weakersilver influx; our evidence shows, however, that this stagnation was due more to the gradualdecline of north-western mints rather than those of Gujarat. Moreover, as we have seen, theDutch imports formed only a part, even though an important one, of the whole picture.Closer study of the Middle Eastern markets in the third quarter of the 17th century couldperhaps help answer the question whether the stagnation was due solely to internal Indiandevelopments or whether there were other, external causes.

As far as the apparent decline of the north-western mints is concerned, internaldevelopments in the region can go a long way towards explaining this adverse trend. From thesecond half of the 1660s the north-west frontier region was again in a turmoil caused by anAfghan uprising started by the Yˆsufz€… tribe early in the 1667. Mughal authorities werequick in restoring order but the peace did not last long. In 1672 the conflict flared up again,this time on a much greater scale. The Afr…d… and Khattak clans joined their forces and forthree years blocked the Khyber pass and repulsed successfully all Mughal military expeditionssent into the area. In 1674 the situation became so alarming that Aurangzeb himself feltcompelled to proceed to Peshawar to direct in person the military operations.82 Thesedevelopments must have affected unfavourably the trade along the routes passing throughthis area. Another factor which may have influenced unfavourably the commercial exchangebetween India and Persia was the deteriorating security situation in the latter country whichaffected, if we are to believe a contemporary report, the members of the expatriate Indianbusiness community.83 Around the end of the first half of the 17th century the golden age ofthe overland Indo-Persian trade seems to have been over; trading continued but had to copewith greater risks and more frequent occurrence of unpredictable situations than before.

However, the lower output of the north-western mints, very pronounced especially inthe 1660s and 1670s, should not itself serve as a sufficient explanation of the decliningoverall trend. In a period of trading conjuncture in the 1620s and 1630s, even serious inter-ruptions of trade due to wars did not affect significantly the generally high level of com-mercial exchange: as we have seen, trade shifted from insecure or dangerous routes to safer

82 R. C. Majumdar (gen. ed.), The Mughul Empire. (The History and Culture of the Indian People, Vol. 7.)Bombay 1974, pp. 230-232.

83 S. F. Dale, Indian Merchants and Eurasian Trade, p. 94.

105

ones - a development observable in the sudden increases of incidences of the north-westernmints in the decade 1612-1622 which at that time obviously compensated for the temporaryslump of the mints fed by silver from the maritime trade. The sudden increase of Suratiincidences in 1667, the year of the first Afghan rebellion, may be perhaps understood as tobe due, at least partly, to a temporary shift of the overland commerce to the maritime route.In the first half of 1670s, however, the trend shown by Gujarati incidences does not appearto include an element of compensation for the declining north-west. As we shall presentlysee, Gujarat and Surat, its first commercial centre, too were afflicted with serious securityproblems and disruptions of trade.

The two more dramatic short-term slumps in the overall trend in 1662/63 and 1668/69appear to have been caused by sudden falls of Gujarati coin incidences, or, to be more exact,of those of Surat. As will be shown further below, both were in all probability effects of twoShivaji’s sacks of Surat in 1664 and 1670. And it was Surat again that was able to push, by itsstrongly increased minting activity in the second half of the 1660s, the overall trend curve inthe upward direction. As its subsequent decline in the first half of the 1670s was not compensatedby increases in the activity of other regions, the net result appears to have been an overalldecline of Mughal coin output. Again, Surat deserves a closer look.

SuratActivity of the Surat mint in the era of Aurangzeb, reflected by numbers of incidences inhoards of the U.P., shows, esp. in the first twenty years of his rule, more dramatic fluctuationsthan in the preceding and apparently more stable era of Sh€hjah€n. Attempts at interpretationof the now more jagged curve of Surati incidences have to take into account a new factor -the military situation in the Deccan and a lower degree of security which the Mughal powerwas now able to guarantee to the city and its hinterland. Whereas in the 1620s the problemswhich the Gujarati commerce had to face lay in the declining security of the sea-lanes in thewestern part of the Indian Ocean, in the 1660s the greatest danger to Gujarati prosperitycame from its own hinterland. In the first half of the 1660s and again in the 1670 thegreatest security problem in the area was the Maratha insurgency led by Shiv€j…: against thehit-and-run tactics of his highly mobile bands the Mughal military machine seemed to benearly powerless.

As far as Surat was concerned, the first period of Shivaji’s activity culminated in thefour days from 6th to 10th of January 1664 when the Maratha raiders attacked andsubsequently completely looted the city, totally unprepared for such eventuality and unableto put up any effective resistance.84 Shivaji’s booty was estimated at ten million rupees85 -this is the assessment of English factors which includes also the evaluation of great numberof precious stones, pearls and gold coins. As far as silver rupees are concerned, Anthony

84 For a description of the raid see, e.g. J. Sarkar, Shivaji and his Times. Calcutta 1952, pp. 92-100. Moredetailed eyewitness accounts by the English factors can be found in W. Foster (ed.), The English Factories inIndia 1661-1664. Oxford 1923, pp. 296-316.

85 Ibid., pp. 303, 307.

Mints of the Aurangzeb… Period : Surat


Smith estimated in his account their quantity at 2 or 2,5 million, great number of themlooted in the house of Virji Vohra, the first merchant in the city: „When hee came away, heecould not [but] guess, by the mony heaped up in tow great heapes before Sevagee his tent,than that hee had plundered 20 or 25 lack of rupees: that the day when hee came away in themorning there was brought in neere upon 300 porters, laden each with 2 baggs of rupees,and some hee guessed to be gold: that thay brought in 28 sere of large pearle, with manyother jewells, great diamonds, rubies and emeralds ... and these, with an increedable quantetyof mony, they found at the house of the reputed richest marchant in the wourld (his name isVerge Vora, his estate haveing beene esteemed to bee 80 lack of rupees): that they were still,every hower while hee was there, bringing in loods of mony from his house. His disire ofmony is soe great that he spares noe barbour[ou]s cruelty to extort confessions from hisprisoners; whips them most cruely, threatens death, and often executeth it, if thay doe notproduce soe much as hee thinks they may or disires they should; at least cutts off one hand,sometymes both.“86 Another report assessed the booty to be „above a million and halfe ofmony“, adding by way of explanation, „Suratt not haveing been soe rich, not in manyyeares before“.87

The accounts leave us with the impression that the looting was so thorough and effectivethat very little or perhaps no money of other objects of value were left in the burning andnearly deserted city. Graph of incidences shows that the financial crisis, although short, musthave been acute. In all the hoards of the U.P. there is not a single incidence of a rupee struckin Surat in A.H. 1073 (i.e. between 16.8. 1662 and 4.8. 1663) and a single one bearing the date1074 (5.8. 1663 to 24.7. 1664) - in „normal“ years five to ten incidences are quite common. Infact, in a century between 1619 and 1723 our graph registers only two cases of a total absenceof Surati coins from U.P. hoards: the first in 1628, caused most probably by massive remintingof Nˆrjah€n… coins (discussed above) and the second in 1662/63. Shivaji appears to havecarried away the total output of the Surat mint from the preceding 18 months that still remainedin the city. In the previous section a remark was made on the practice of local moneychangersto keep in reserve greater quantities of fresh coins which could be subsequently offered, at amore or less acceptable rate, to merchants importing silver bullion from abroad and trying toescape the long delays caused by the slow operation of the mint. These reserves now appear tohave been carried away together with other movable wealth of Virji Vohra - this may havebeen the second largest treasury of the empire. The fact that nothing or almost nothing of thishuge amount of money found its way to the north of course does not mean that it disappearedaltogether: only an analysis of silver coin hoards from Maharashtra could help us follow thepath of this immense booty. It is possible that at least part of it left, for longer time if not forever, the Mughal monetary system.

The commercial activity of the city soon turned to normal as did the general securitysituation when the treaty of Purandar in 1665 put a temporary stop on the Maratha raiding

86 Ibid., pp. 308-309.87 Ibid., p. 306.

107

and plundering activities. Overseas trade was not adversely affected and the years 1665 and1666 appear to have been quite successful for the unhappy city. Surati merchants, workinghard to recoup their losses, did not realize that they were just saving wealth and money foranother Maratha looting expedition against the city that was to take place on the 3rd ofOctober 1670. This time, the booty was reported to be somewhat less - around 66 l€khs ofrupees (6.6 million) in cash, pearls and other precious articles.88 Cash, uncoined preciousmetals and other objects of high value (precious stones, pearls) appear to have formed aregular part of portfolios of Indian merchants; the strategy of diversifying assets was a wayof insuring against losses in commerce which could ultimately ruin the merchant and hisfamily and lead to a fatal loss of credit.

Fig. 28. Incidences of silver coins minted at Surat in the years 1660-1760 in coin hoards depositedin the area of the U.P.

After two thorough plunders of Surat in six years, when it became obvious that Shivaji’smen could loot without encountering any opposition from the imperial troops, it was in thefirst place the Mughal government who lost a great deal of its credit as effective provider ofsecurity - and of course, a great deal of prestige too. In 1666 and again in 1667, inhabitantsof Surat, alarmed at the news of Shivaji’s escape from the Mughal court, were twice at thepoint of leaving the city in expectation of another raid.89 In 1672, citizens of Surat wereprepared to pay a chauth which Shivaji demanded in exchange for leaving the city alone.

0

2

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14

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, 166

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, 166

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168

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, 169

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, 169

9/00

1704

, 170

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, 170

9/10

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, 171

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, 172

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, 172

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1734

, 173

4/35

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, 173

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, 174

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8/59

year of mintage

num

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artic

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r

88 J. Sarkar, op. cit. pp. 170-175.89 W. Foster, The English Factories in India 1665-1667. Oxford 1925, pp. 171, 172, 176, 268-269.

Mints of the Aurangzeb… Period : Surat


The reason the necessary amount was not paid out in the end was the conviction of themerchants that the money would be embezzled by the Mughal governor who was to act asan intermediary in this business.90

Frequent alarms had a very adverse effect on the position of Surat in the long-distancetrade as well as in the local commercial network connecting the city with production centresin the hinterland.91 J. Sarkar enumerated, after close study of the Surat Factory Records,several waves of panic which effectively disrupted the trade and financial prosperity ofSurat in the 1670s: November and December 1670, February, June and October 1672,September 1673, October 1674, December 1679.92 A glance at the graph of Surat incidencesin the 1670s confirms this gloomy picture: the activity of the mint appears to have been ata very low ebb, comparable only to the meagre output in first half of the 1620s. In contrastto this earlier period, however, now the danger was not hidden beyond the blue horizon ofthe Arabian Sea but loomed large all the time just behind the poor fortification walls of thecity itself.

In the middle of the 1670s, the low level of coin incidences is typical not only for Suratbut applies, as we have already seen, to the sum total of all coin incidences from all mints inthe empire. At this time the English factors at Surat reported a general scarcity of money inthe whole of India. The great scarcity of rupees in Surat was ascribed to wars and ill-government, to a bad commercial season which failed to bring sufficient quantities of silverfrom Mocha, Basra and Persia and also to Dutch exports of silver coins from Surat toBengal which, as far as the Dutch were concerned, gradually rose to a position of the mostimportant trading region in the whole of Asia.93 It is obvious that few bad seasons in thewestern part of the Indian Ocean together with Surat’s problems with Shiv€j… could not bythemselves bring about a general, all-Indian scarcity of silver currency. For this to happen,there must have been a long-term deficit in imports, too low to cover losses due to naturalattrition of the coin stock, exports and hoarding (in the form of coins and perhaps evenmore in the form of ornaments and other precious objects). Both the long-term stagnationof the incidences curve characterising the later years of Sh€hjah€n… period and a declinevisible in the first fifteen years of Aurangzeb’s reign suggest that the net result may havebeen a gradual decline in the total volume of the Mughal silver coin stock.

90 J. Sarkar, op. cit., pp. 187-188.91 J. Sarkar, op. cit., p. 174 describes the position of Surat after the second raid in these words: „The trade

of this, the richest port of India, was practically destroyed. For several years after Shivaji’s withdrawal from it,the town used to throb with panic every now and then, whenever any Mar€tha force came within a few day’smarch of it, or even at false alarms of their coming. On every such occasion the merchants would quicklyremove their goods to the ships, the citizens would flee to the villages, and the Europeans would hasten toSwally. Business was effectually scared away from Surat, and inland producers hesitated to send their goods tothis the greatest emporium of Western India.“

92 Ibid., p. 175.93 K. N. Chaudhuri, The Trading World of Asia and the English East India Company 1660-1760. Cambridge

1978, p. 179. For the Dutch exports of silver from Surat to Bengal, see also H. W. van Santen, De VerenigdeOost-Indische Compagnie in Gujarat en Hindustan, 1620-1660, p. 38.

109

According to K.N. Chaudhuri, this financial crisis of 1675 may have induced theimperial and provincial treasuries to release their accumulated gold stocks - a move whichmay have brought about a sudden fall in the silver price of gold one year later.94 Unfortunately,our hoards are not the right type of source to answer this question. As far as silver is concerned,however, starting with 1675 our evidence suggests a somewhat increased activity of thecentral mints (the mint in Delhi/Shahjahanabad appears to have contributed with the greatestshare of coins), an activity which lasts until 1679 and thus creates an impression of a real,if temporal, change in the coin output levels rather than of a mere accidental fluctuation.Interestingly, the incidences of coins from central mints return to their previous lower levelin 1680, the same year when the number of Gujarati incidences rises again after the turbulent1670s were over: relieved of the constant danger of Maratha raids after the death of Shivajiin 1680 and of the subsequent Mughal offensive against the Maratha forces, Surat mintnow returns to its older pattern of generally high output marked by strong year-to yearfluctuations. Behind these fluctuations a gradual, long-term declining trend is noticeable,then, in 1723 came a sudden end: Surati coins struck in this and the following years arealmost totally absent from the U.P. hoards record; as far as central parts of the empire areconcerned, coins struck in Surat after 1723 must have been rarities. As the mint in Suratcontinued to issue coins, possibly in not small quantities, even after this date95, the causesfor their abrupt disappearance from the north Indian hoard evidence have to be sought inthe political sphere: first of all in the fact that in this year Gujarat was irretrievably lost tothe disintegrating Mughal empire. This, together with general insecurity of roads connectingthis maritime province with the north Indian hinterland, apparently led to an abrupttermination of established fiscal ties and possibly even to a breakdown of direct commercialcontacts between the two regions.

The Rise of Central MintsThe time span between the late 1670s and the late 1680s can be interpreted as a period ofmoderate commercial conjuncture that brought more silver to Gujarati and to a lesser extentalso to north-western mints; on the other hand, the developments of the periods whichfollow are much more difficult to interpret. In the second half of the 1680s, we can observe

94 Ibid., pp. 178-179.95 Even after the mid-1720s, Surat mint continued its operation, often clogged by incoming silver. See,

A. Das Gupta, Indian Merchants and the Decline of Surat, 1700-1750. Wiesbaden 1978, pp.47-49. Coinsminted in Surat after 1723 can be found also in coin catalogues of major coin collections: in the catalogues ofthe museum of Lahore, Calcutta and British Museum in London, for example, there are specimens of Suratisilver coins struck even after the fifth year of Muhammad Sh€h’s rule. Compared with the early years of hisreign and also with regnal periods of his predecessors, these coins do not constitute a continuous time series.Regnal years 9,11, 13, 14 or 15, 16, 18 or 19, 21 to 25, 28 and 29 are absent from all three collections. Moreover,these catalogues do not contain any Surati silver coins minted in the regnal periods of Ahmad Sh€h and ³lamg…rII. Either the production of the mint in Surat really declined considerably after 1750 or perhaps the collectionsof the three museums mentioned above were supplied predominantly with coins found in north Indian hoards.

Aurangzeb… Period : The Central Mints


a sharp increase of coin incidences from the central mints: in the period 1689-1710 thisincrease appears to have been due mainly to a prodigious output of the newly establishedmint in Itawa, supplemented by a less spectacular but nevertheless significant expansion ofthe production of mints in Agra/Akbarabad and Delhi/Shahjahanabad. After the death ofAurangzeb, numbers of incidences from the Itawa mint gradually decline and the mint ofShahjahanabad rises to a position of absolute dominance which was to last until the end ofthe period under investigation, i.e. 1760. Coins minted until about 1720 in the more distantmajor mints of Surat, Lahore or Patna still appear in the U.P. hoards; after this date they areeither very rare or completely absent from the U.P. hoard horizon. Their place was takenover by coins issued by the newly established mints of Bareli, Lakhnau, Kora, Banaras andFarrukhabad.

Fig. 29. Incidences of coins from major central mints minted in the years 1680-1760 in coinhoards deposited in the area of the U.P.

It was A. Hasan who, for the first time, drew attention to the apparently strangephenomenon of a huge increase in the number of issues from central mints in the late yearsof Aurangzeb’s reign.96 She pointed out, quite correctly as it seems, that this increase cannotbe explained solely in terms of some massive reminting campaign - increases are observablenot only in the numbers of coins but also in the number of mints. It would be indeed hard to

96 A. Hasan, Mints of the Mughal Empire, p. 327.

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, 168

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, 172

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, 172

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, 172

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, 173

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ShahjahanabadBareli

111

believe that all these new mints were fed solely or mostly by older silver coins brought toremint. Moreover, as our own analysis of hoards shows, even in the era of predominance ofthe central mints, older issues of the major „frontier“ mints do not disappear altogether:they are not infrequently found even in late hoards. Obviously, at the time of their formation,certain quantity of these older coins must have still formed part of the circulating coinstock. Aurangzeb… coins from Surat, for example, are present in 8 hoards (one of them beingan old-savings hoard) out of 14 formed in the pentad 1710-15; in 6 hoards (including oneold-savings hoard) out of 12 formed in the pentad 1715-20; in 7 hoards (including two old-savings hoards) out of 14 hoards formed in the years 1720-25; in 6 (including 3 old-savingshoards) out of 11 buried in the pentad 1725-30; even as late as 1740-45 these coins appearin 4 hoards (one old savings hoard in this number) out of the total of 19. In short, olderSurati issues do not appear solely in the old-savings hoards where their presence is quitenatural (but, of course, not representative of the structure of the current stock). What isperhaps equally significant, late hoards contain not only specimens of once undoubtedlyhuge coin populations from the most active mints in the empire but also pieces from lessermints - Multan, Khambayat, Rajmahal/ Akbarnagar and others. This relatively longpersistence of older coins does not make a hypothesis of a massive and systematic remintingpolicy very plausible. As we have seen, there certainly were reminting campaigns (apartfrom the „normal“ remints motivated by the desire to get rid of worn or otherwise devaluedcoins, affecting hardly more than one or two per cent of the current stock per year)97 - butthese appear to have been rather selective and of short duration.

Therefore, the huge increase in coin incidences after 1680 must have been causedmainly by influx of new silver from abroad, silver which, for some reason, evaded themints located at the periphery of the empire and was converted into coins only after it hadreached the central parts of the empire. Supplies of silver could be in form of payments forgoods purchased there and subsequently exported to other regions, if the trade balance ofthe central region was active; some silver was certainly remitted to the central imperialtreasury in the course of operation of the established imperial revenue system. Where, then,did the silver come from? Certainly not from the north-west whose trade with the CentralAsia and Middle East via the overland routes was marked by a long-term decline; Gujaratdoes not seem to be a suitable candidate either. The trade conducted by Indian merchantsfrom this port recuperated after the turbulent 1670s were over and the main scene of the

97 A. Hasan, in her Silver Currency Output, p. 100, has calculated the remintage at 2,5% (at the inversecompound rate) of coins in circulation per year, while S. Moosvi, in The Silver Influx, p.76-77 argues in favourof a more conservative estimate of mere 1% per year at a simple rate. On the basis of available evidence - onecoin inventory - and a relatively low number of hoards included in it is not possible to arrive at a reliable value;the margin of error would be too great. This introduces an inevitable distorting element in all attempts at anestimation of the volume of the coin stock; this can be to some extent corrected by inclusion of the „normal“ or„regular“ losses by remints into the total loss rate: this can be set at, for example, one, two, three, four or five percent per year. Application of different rates will then result in alternative curves expressing the development ofthe total coin stock volume. These alternative curves can do no more than show basic long-term trends and theirpossible changes. See, Fig. 33 on p. 127 below.



Mughal-Maratha conflict temporarily shifted farther to the south; but the European Companiesgradually redirected the focus of their activities to other areas. The Dutch V.O.C. now shiftedits attention to Bengal which gradually became its single most important factory in Asia,supplying the ever hungry European textile market with Bengali textiles and raw silk.98 Silverearned by the Company in the intra-Asian trade was now used for financing the expandingBengali trade - one effect of this policy was also the export of silver coins from Surat toBengal.99 Is it then to Bengal that we have to turn our attention if we are to understand thegrowth of the output of central mints? Statistics of the Bengali trade compared with the curveof coin incidences from the central mints suggest that Bengal may have become the main, andsoon the sole supplier of fresh silver to the increasingly isolated north Indian hinterland.

The growing importance of Bengal may be illustrated by data of the V.O.C. exports oftreasure to Bengal in the years 1663 to 1717, made available by O. Prakash.100 Unfortunately,no directly comparable data of this kind concerning the English E.I.C. were accessible tothe author at the time of writing of this book; as a substitution, a data series of Englishimports from Bengal (paid mostly in silver), available for the period of 1660-1760, may beoffered here for comparison.

Of the two series, it is the V.O.C. data of silver imports which stands in closer relationto the incidences curve: it appears to be fairly closely related not only by the rate of growthbut also by timing. English expansion started somewhat later and is marked by greaterfluctuations; values of actual quantities of silver imported into Bengal to pay for the goodsare not known but must have been somewhere below the green line. If we exclude remintingas a main source for the apparently high and constant output of the mint in Shahjahanabadand to a lesser extent also those located in Itawa and Agra, silver imports from Bengal seemto supply the only possible explanation.

It is necessary to set these movements of silver into the known context of the economicand social developments in Bengal and north India at this time. From the sixteenth century,Bengal was undergoing a process of steady expansion of the agricultural base mainly throughclearing of the forests in the eastern parts of the delta. The agricultural boom was accompaniedby a demographic expansion; this in turn, together with low price of foodstuffs aided theexpansion of manufacturing sector. Relatively cheap and high-quality cotton and silk textilesattracted merchants not only of the East India Companies but also of traders from all partsof Asia. Most of their purchases were paid for by silver.101

98 O. Prakash, The Dutch East India Company and the Economy of Bengal, pp. 65-71 and 201-212.99 See above, p. 108 and H. W. van Santen, De Verenigde Oost-Indische Compagnie, p. 38.100 O. Prakash, op. cit., pp. 66-67.101 This is a very short summary of R. M. Eaton’s excellent exposition of the role of ecological factors in

the development and concomitant islamization of eastern parts of Bengal. See, R. M. Eaton, The Rise of Islamand the Bengal Frontier, 1204-1760. Berkeley 1993, pp. 194-207. The analysis of the role of trade in theeconomic growth of Bengal, using standard notions of economic theory, is to be found in O. Prakash, TheDutch East India Company, pp. 234-240. Expositions of both authors supplement each other and recreate apicture of Bengal as probably the most dynamically developing region in India.

113

Fig. 30. Trends in the development of the Bengal trade of the E.I.C. and V.O.C. compared to thetrend in silver coin incidences from the central and eastern mints

The questions to be answered of course are, first, which mechanism brought this silverin such massive quantities as far north-west as Agra, Itawa and Delhi/Shahjahanabad andsecond, why, before being exported, the silver was not turned into Mughal rupees in theBengal mints of Murshidabad or Rajmahal/Akbarnagar. Revenues from the Ç€lsa remittedfrom the increasingly wealthy province to the central treasury seem to be the obvious answerto the first question. In 1582 the ³’…n-i Akbar… fixed the amount of revenue to be extractedfrom the province at 6,34 million rupees. In the middle of the 17th century this sum wasincreased to 8,76 million and remained unchanged until the fiscal reforms of Mursh…d Qul…{•€n at the beginning of the 1720s when the amount was revised upwards again to the sumof 10,96 million. Apart from this Ç€lsa component, another, but smaller part of the totalrevenue (approximately one half of the Ç€lsa sum) was assigned to persons who heldj€g…rs in Bengal; if these j€g…r-holders were posted outside of the province, the moneycollected in their j€g…rs left Bengal too.102 However, these additional outflows, augmentedby frequent illegal transfers of money by high-ranking mansabd€rs, were a constantphenomenon and do not appear to increase significantly toward the end of the century. Thetiming of increases in the Ç€lsa sum also do not correspond with the increasing influx ofsilver to the central regions of the empire suggested by our incidences curve. One possibleexplanation might perhaps be a change in the ways the payments were made. As long asthere was no real scarcity of ready money in the inland north Indian parts of the empire, the

102 O. Prakash, op. cit., pp. 255-256.


0

100000

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1700

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U.P

E.I.C. imports f rom Bengal in pounds(Chaudhuri, The Trading World, pp.508-510)V.O.C. exports of treasure to Bengal:value in pounds (O.Prakash, The DutchE.I.C., pp.66-67)Coin incidences: central and easternmints


local bankers could offer their help in transmitting from Bengal the money due to the centraltreasury by the means of the bills of exchange (hund…s). Coins brought to the imperial treasurywould then be mostly of types current in north India, i.e. sums paid out would reflect thecomposition of the north Indian coin stock; under these circumstances, payments from Bengaldid not necessarily mean physical transfers of coins of the Bengali provenance. This hypothesismight perhaps help explain the apparently strange fact that Bengali coins, despite the relativecloseness of the province to the central region, and its political and economical consolidation inthe second and third part of the 17th century, are so poorly represented in the U.P. hoards: whencompared to incidences of coins struck in Surat, a commercial centre of another economicallyand commercially active but more distant region, the difference is especially striking.

In the middle of the 1670s’, however, we are informed about general scarcity of rupees allover India. We have already seen that this crisis coincides with the lowest point in the coinincidences trend - and should remind ourselves that this trend would reflect the development ofthe volume of the north Indian coin stock (or, to be more exact, of the coin stock existing in thepast in the area of the present-day Uttar Pradesh). If this scarcity of coin experienced by thenorth Indian inland region was relatively more acute than in regions at the periphery of theempire (a real possibility if the silver imported via the Gujarati ports was increasingly deflectedfrom its previous destination in north India to the new imperial centre in Deccan), it may havebeen difficult for Indian bankers to transfer yearly remittances of the Bengal revenue to thecentral treasury in Delhi/Shahjahanabad by means of bills of exchange. Long-term monetarybalance between the two regions would be also affected if the ability of the central region toattract and keep silver money by active trading was, in the long term, lower than that of Bengal- a not improbable development. Transfers of large sums of money due to the imperial treasuryas the Ç€lsa revenue of Bengal then had to be realized increasingly in the form of transports ofcoined or uncoined silver.

We are informed that this mode of money transfers prevailed in the 1720s and 1730s whenthe Nawabs of Bengal, „Murshid Quli Khan and Shuja Khan were said to have paid an annualtribute of Rs. 10,000,000. In part the remittance was made by bills of exchange drawn by thegreat Murshidabad bankers, the Jagat Seths, on their house in Delhi. It was presumably possiblefor the bankers to dispose of bills for such large sums because of the great volume of Bengaltextile exports to the cities of northern India. But it seems that bullion was also shipped awayfrom Bengal. An English observer noted that every year ‚almost all the silver, coined or uncoined,which comes into Bengal‘ was sent off to Delhi, so that ‚there is hardly currency enough left inBengal to carry on any trade or even go to market for provisions and necessaries of life, till thenext shipping arrives to bring a fresh supply of silver.‘“103 Numbers of coin incidences of thenorth Indian provenance - and simultaneous continuing scantiness of Bengali rupees in U.P.hoards - suggest that this pattern of payments may have developed already in the second half ofthe 1680s.

103 P. J. Marshall, Bengal: The British Bridgehead. Eastern India 1740-1828. Cambridge 1987, pp. 51-52.The English observer quoted in the passage is J. Steuart, The Principles of Money Applied to the Present Stateof the Coin of Bengal (1772), pp. 62-63.

115

The answer to the second and connected question - why the Bengali silver was not transportedin the form of Bengali rupees but rather as bullion (or perhaps coins treated as bullion) whichwas made into coins only in the inland mints - is to be sought in the peculiar features of theMughal monetary system. Mughal coins of the same denomination did not possess all exactlythe same value: coins issued in the current year were called sikk€ and enjoyed a premium of ca.2 per cent over those struck in the preceding years of the same reign, called calan…. These, inturn, had a premium of 1 to 3 per cent over the so-called Çaz€n€ coins, i. e. those issued duringthe previous reign. Moreover, it seems that the exact rate of premium a particular coin enjoyeddid not depend solely on its age (and, of course, on the degree of its physical wear) but also onactual balance between supply of and demand for money at a particular place and time. In thewords of K. N. Chaudhuri, „the rate of premium charged for freshly minted coins in fact reflectedthe commercial demand for money supply and therefore the market price of bullion silver. Anunduly high rate would obviously cause bullion or the old worn coins to be taken to the mints forrecoinage.“104 I. Habib mentions in his article on the Mughal currency system just two caseswhen a temporary rise or fall in the value of specie reflected its currently felt scarcity oroversupply.105 If the imbalance between demand and supply was a longer-term feature whichdistinguished one region from another, then it might be profitable, especially when large-scaletransfers of money, remittances of taxes etc. had to be made, to turn the bullion into coins at aplace where the payer/supplier of silver could realize higher premium, i.e. in a mint located in aregion afflicted by a relative scarcity of metallic currency. We still lack hard evidence whethersuch imbalance existed between Bengal and the inland central regions of the empire; however,there is evidence that rates were different even in two different maritime regions: thanks to areport of English factors at Hugli, we know that in the 1670s different rates prevailed in Bengaland Surat: whereas in Bengal for 100 rix-dollars one obtained 205-210 rupees, in Gujarat theexchange rate was 211 to 214 rupees.106 It is perhaps not unreasonable to expect that the inlandmints, lacking direct access to imported silver - an advantage enjoyed by Gujarat and in steadilyincreasing measure by Bengal - were ready to offer similar, if not better terms than Surat.107

104 K. N. Chaudhuri, The Trading World, p. 176.105 The two cases adduced as examples are a temporary rise in the value of silver coin relative to bullion in

Bengal in 1675 due to insufficient turnout of the mint; and a fall in the price of gold muhrs in Ahmadabad in1628 when the supply of gold exceeded market requirements. I. Habib, The Currency System of the MughalEmpire (1556-1707). Medieval India Quarterly, vol. IV (1960), Pt. 1-2, p. 4, note 1. As far as the author of theselines is aware, a study that would collect scattered data on these changing rates in different parts of the empireand in different periods has not yet been written. The explanation put forward above is therefore only speculative.

106 K. N. Chaudhuri, op. cit., p. 184.107 Small popularity of Bengal mints among the bullion importers has been commented upon by S. Moosvi in

her article The Silver Influx, Money Supply, Prices and Revenue-extraction in Mughal India. JESHO, vol. XXX(1987), pp. 73-74. Indeed, she has been the first historian explaining the presumed imports of silver into the inlandregions by differences in the exchange rates: „When the ‚exchange‘ rose owing to large payments made from Bengalto Agra and the Court, it would have been immaterial to the merchants whether they took bullion or minted rupees;and they would have preferred the former course if the Bengal mints were not efficient or not offering sufficientlyattractive terms in comparison with the inland mints. This seems the only persuasive explanation of the low level ofoutput of the Bengal mints compared to the large quantities of silver imported into the region.“



From the second decade of the 18th century another new factor may have contributedto the practice of transporting bullion inland and converting it into coins at the place of its„final“ destination: in different parts of the Mughal India the same sikk€ coins did not enjoythe same premium, as one would expect, but were valued differently depending on whetherthey were issued by the local mint - in this case they earned the full premium - or by a mintof a different region. In 1712 the English factors in Bengal complained that „the siccas ofall other mints though belonging to the King don’t go at the same batta [i.e. premium] asthose coined in Bengal, the Surat pass but at 10 per cent batta, the siccas of Dacca, Patna,and Cuttack though of same weight and fineness with those at Muxadavad go at 2 or 3 percent less at Hugly and the same in other places where not coined, each place takes theKing’s revenues in the coin of that mint to encourage it.“108 Even if the seigniorage was aslow as 2 1/2 per cent109, minting or reminting of substantial volumes of silver could bringsignificant profits to local mints and treasuries.

Even when compared with peak years of the Multan and Qandahar mints in the 1620sand 1630s, the steadily ascending number of incidences from the central mints looks veryimpressive and seems to imply a truly massive influx of silver into the inland regions. It isnevertheless probable that coins issued in greater quantities by central mints will be tosome extent over-represented in the local coin stock and consequently also in local coinhoards. Over-representation in this context means that these incidences cannot be assumedto be in the same proportion to mint output as the incidences of Gujarati or north-westernmints. It would be only natural that coins issued by active local mints would achieve aregional dominance more easily than coins issued in the same quantity by a more distantmint. Consequently, the output of the local mints would appear somewhat higher than itactually was. It is impossible to say how serious this distortion actually is; in any case, fromthe turn of the 17th century the evidence of incidences cannot serve any more as a basis forestimates of changing relative volumes of silver coin stock in the U.P. What can be statedwith a degree of certainty is a growing dependence of central parts of the empire on importsof silver from Bengal in a situation when imports from other parts of the empire steadilydecreased. It is however highly probable that this process was a bit less dramatic than the

108 Abstract of Letters Received from Coast and Bay, 7 January 1712, vol.2, para.52, p. 337, cit. in: K. N.Chaudhuri, The Trading World of Asia, p. 183. Exclusive rights of local mints to supply their respective regionalmoney markets with their own coins were recognized as legitimate as late as 1801 when the Banaras MintCommittee recommended in its Account of the working of this mint, written for the Fort William Mint Committee,to keep the Banaras mint in operation; it was pointed out, among other things, that the Calcutta mint was unableto meet the requirements of both the Bengal and Banaras areas and that a Permanent Settlement had beenreached with the zam…nd€rs of the Banaras region that they had to pay their taxes in Banarasi coins. At the sametime, the Committee had assayed a sample of 500 Banarasi rupees struck between 1776 and 1802 and found outthat „even though coined without the supervision of an European officer“, their deviation from the weight andpurity standard set by the Calcutta mint never exceeded one per cent. Q. Ahmad, An Unpublished Report on theFunctioning and Scope of the Banaras Mint, 1801. Journal of the Numismatic Society of India (JNSI), vol.XXIV, 1962, pp. 115-129 and id., Banaras Mint and the Zari Industry. JNSI, vol. XXV, 1963, pp. 87-92.

109 I. Habib, The Currency System, p.3, note 5.

117

evidence of coin incidences, considered out of context, would indicate. Growing dependenceon silver from Bengal means, in the context of steadily expanding commercial activities ofthe English and Dutch East India Companies in this region, a growing dependence on directEuropean silver imports. Only now was a dominant part of silver coin stock, circulating inthe central part of the Mughal empire, supplied by European commerce. English and Dutchsilver imports into Gujarat were at times certainly substantial but so was the contribution ofIndian merchants. As far as the north-western overland branch of long-distance trade wasconcerned, the share of Indians was clearly dominant. In Bengal, on the other hand, althoughIndian merchants and shippers were able to hold their own against European Companies,they could hardly compete with them in imports of precious metals.110

6. The Period 1707-1760

In the last period under study, marked by accelerating processes of imperial decentralizationand disintegration, the trends which had emerged in the latter part of Aurangzeb’s reigncontinue to characterize the situation in the central parts of the waning empire: in fact, thepredominance of coins of local provenance is even more pronounced than in the previousperiod. Coins from Thatta, minted at this port city after the death of Aurangzeb, practicallydisappear from the U.P. hoards record, as do the coins struck in Surat after 1723. In the caseof Surat, at least, it cannot be maintained that this absence was caused by some dramaticdecline in Surat’s overseas trade or closure of its mint. After the mid-twenties too, the mintin Surat continued its operation and was, as A. Das Gupta writes,111 at times even cloggedby incoming silver. The nearly total absence of post-1723 Surati silver coins in U.P. hoardshas to be explained rather by an abrupt and almost total loss of effective political controlover Gujarat on the one hand and severing of commercial contacts between the inlandregions of the empire and Gujarat in consequence of advancing Maratha power in the northernDeccan and Malwa on the other.

Until 1722, Gujarat, standing under firm central control, was one of the betteradministered provinces of the empire. In that year, however, Haidar Qul… {•€n, the newlyappointed governor, begun to manoeuvre for a more independent position for himself. Hisscheme failed and he was promptly replaced. His successor, the powerful Niz€m-ul Mulk,however, was hardly a better choice; after his breach with the Emperor in 1723, he too wasrecalled. The acting deputy governor Shuj€’at {•€n then had to face an open revolt ofHam…d {•€n, his predecessor in this office, who was supported covertly by Niz€m-ul Mulkand openly by Maratha military aid. In a regular battle Ham…d {•€n prevailed, killed Shuj€’at{•€n and took all parts of the administration of the province in his own hands. In the

110 See, O. Prakash, The Dutch East India Company, pp. 221-234 for a rather conservative assessment ofa displacement effect of the V.O.C. activities on the trade carried on by Indian merchants and pp. 67 and 234-35for the role of the Company as an outstanding importer of precious metals into the region.

111 A. Das Gupta, Indian Merchants and the Decline of Surat: c. 1700-1750. Wiesbaden 1978, pp. 47-49.

Mints of the Period 1707-1760


present context, it is his seizure of all revenue records as well as Ç€lsa lands and j€g…rs thatis of special importance. The power of d…w€n, designed by the Mughal system to serve as acounterbalance to the executive branch of the administration, was thus practically destroyed.It can be taken for certain that all revenue payments to the central treasury were henceforwarddiscontinued. Sarbuland {•€n, the new governor sent to Gujarat by the emperor, was ablein 1725 to dislodge the rebel; to stop the advance of the Marathas, however, proved to bebeyond his strength. Continuous raiding and campaigning must have made the roads throughMalwa extremely unsafe; this, in turn, must have further impeded communication betweenthe western maritime and hinterland areas of the empire.


Once firmly in power, Sarbuland {•€n took collection of tributes from the localzam…nd€rs into his own hands; from huge sums accumulated by him, nothing had beenremitted to the central treasury.112 R€j€ Abhay Singh, who took over the office from Sarbuland{•€n in 1730, further reduced the still remaining powers of the d…w€n and made the provincefiscally almost completely independent of the centre.

Silver coming in ever smaller quantities from the north-west (from the beginning ofthe 1720s the Lahore mint is represented only sporadically and in most cases by a single

112 Z. U. Malik, The Reign of Muhammad Sh€h 1719-1748. Bombay 1977, pp. 216-217.

05

1015202530354045505560657075808590

1708

, 170

8/09

1710

, 171

0/11

1712

/13,

171

3

1714

/15,

171

5

1716

, 171

6/17

1718

, 171

8/19

1720

, 172

0/21

1722

, 172

2/23

1724

, 172

4/25

1726

, 172

6/27

1728

, 172

8/29

1730

, 173

0/31

1732

, 173

2/33

1734

, 173

4/35

1736

, 173

6/37

1738

, 173

8/39

1740

, 174

0/41

1742

, 174

2/43

1744

1745

/46,

174

6

1747

/48,

174

8

1749

, 174

9/50

1751

, 175

1/52

1753

, 175

3/54

1755

, 175

5/56

1757

, 175

7/58

1759

, 175

9/60

year of m intage

num

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f hoa

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cont

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119

coin per year) could not lessen the now almost complete dependence of the imperial heartlandon Bengali silver, minted or reminted almost exclusively in central mints. Punjab during thereign of Muhammad Sh€h certainly belonged, under the leadership of two able governors,Abdul Samad {•€n and his son Zak€riya {•€n, among the better administered provinces ofthe empire.113 However, its economic prosperity must have been negatively affected by thecollapse of the Safavid empire in 1722 and the following disorder and internecine warfareamong various contenders for the Persian throne in the second and third quarter of the 18thcentury.114 As we have already seen, endemic warfare and consequent insecurity of roadsusually had a direct and immediate effect on the intensity of the long distance trade passingthrough the respective area. The declining number of Lahori coin incidences evident in theU.P. hoard record from the beginning of 1720s therefore seems to have been due, at leastpartly, to similar causes as the already mentioned simultaneous decline and then abruptdisappearance of Gujarati coins. In Punjab in the 1720s however, there were neither openseparatist tendencies of independent-minded governors nor were the overland routes connectingthe province to the centre blocked by a hostile power. It is more probable that in case ofLahore the small numbers of incidences reflect declining productivity of its mint afflicted bya diminishing influx of silver from the Middle East. In 1720, Abdul Samad {•€n apologisedto the Mughal emperor for his inability to aid him militarily in the battle at Hasanpur againstthe Sayyid brothers. The governor explained that he had no money to pay the salaries of hissoldiers.115 Was this only an empty excuse which had to cover up the governor’s unwillingnessto take sides in the struggle for imperial succession? In better times, the lack of 400 000rupees necessary for this purpose would have hardly served as credible apology.

After the Mughal disaster in 1739, parts of the territory of the province were annexedto N€dir Sh€h’s empire, while their direct administration was left in the hands of Zak€riya{•€n who was obliged to remit annually two million rupees into the Persian treasury.116

The period following the devastating invasion of N€dir Sh€h was marked by a widespreadchaos and anarchy in the province. Mughal power was too weak to curb effectively thegrowing ambitions of Sikhs and local zam…nd€rs ravaging the countryside. Coin incidencesseem to reflect these changes in the political and military constellation in distant Persia andsubsequently also in the province itself.

Having lost the substantial financial contributions of Punjab and Gujarat, for greater partof the 17th century the two most important suppliers of silver coins, the centre was nowalmost completely dependent on shipments of silver from Bengal. In the late 17the centuryBengal gradually emerged as a single most important Asian trading partner of the Dutch andEnglish East India Companies. Massive imports of silver, the almost only import article whichwas in constant demand in Bengal, were the main means of settling the trade balances.

113 Ibid., pp. 249-256.114 P. Jackson, L. Lockhart, The Cambridge History of Iran. Vol. 6: The Timurid and Safavid Periods.

Cambridge 1986, pp. 324-330 (The Last Safavids by H.R. Roemer).115 Z. U. Malik, op., cit., p. 251 and fn. 3.116 Ibid., p. 253.

Mints of the Period 1707-1760


Moreover, until Al…vard… {•€n’s usurpation of the governorship of the province in 1740,Bengal’s loyalty to the centre under Mursh…d Qul… {•€n (1715-1727) and his successorswas truly exemplary. The fact that Mursh…d Qul… {•€n established in his province a rule ofa virtual family oligarchy was compensated by meticulous remittances of tribute andoccasional extra payments to the money-starved central treasury. The average paymentsent regularly every year by Mursh…d Qul… {•€n to the emperor was stated to have amountedto 10 474 705 rupees.117 His son-in-law an successor to the governorship of Bengal, Shuj€’-ud d…n Muhammad {•€n (1728-1739), continued the policy of appeasing the centre withmoney which in Bengal were not in the short supply anyway. (Regular shipments ofsubstantial amounts of silver out of Bengal further inland, mentioned by J. Steuart andquoted above, may have helped to keep the price inflation in the province at a low leveldespite the huge silver imports from abroad.) At his accession, Shuj€’-ud d…n remitted tothe imperial treasury an extra payment of 15 million rupees and then continued sending theusual yearly sums of regular revenue: it has been computed that in the ten and half years ofhis service he remitted to the central exchequer a total of 113 140 338 rupees.118 The probablemechanism of physical silver transfers inland was described above and, if correct, musthave applied in the same if not still greater degree to the post-Aurangzeb… period too.

This almost idyllic coexistence came to a sudden end with the invasion of N€dir Sh€hand subsequent further weakening of the central government. Al…vard… {•€n seized theopportunity, killed in a regular battle the officially appointed governor and took thegovernorship by force in his own hands. Loss of loyal representative in the most prosperousprovince of the crumbling empire must have looked from the perspective of Shahjahanabadas a real catastrophe. Al…vard… {•€n tried to soften the indignation of the emperor by sendingas a present 5 400 000 rupees at his accession and another ten million as a regular taxremittance. However, he did not comply with the emperor’s order to deliver the treasure ofthe previous governor and to pay the arrears of previous two years. This question was neversettled and led to an increasing tension between Al…vard… {•€n and the emperor.119 Therelation between Muhammad Sh€h and the governor of Bengal took another turn for theworse in 1742 when the emperor sent to Bengal Bal€j… B€j… R€o, the peœva of Marathas,ostensibly to protect Al…vard… {•€n before the incursion of another Maratha leader, Raghuj…Bhonsle; the governor however felt that the real objective of this move was to put pressureon him. Moreover, from this time on the governor of Bengal was under constant militaryand financial pressure of the Marathas, a development which culminated in 1751 by grantingthe chauth of Bengal and Bihar to R€j€ Sh€hˆ.120

No reliable evidence exists on the question of remittances of money from Bengal tothe imperial treasury after 1743. Although there are complete accounts of remittances sentby previous governors (registered in the Persian Revenue Records of Bengal), no such

117 Ibid., p. 235.118 Ibid., p. 239.119 Ibid., p. 241.120 Ibid., p. 245.

121

evidence on payments made to the central treasury by Al…vard… {•€n seems to exist. It wasprobably this absence of any positive evidence which led Charles Stewart in his History ofBengal to the conclusion that no money was sent at all. According to others (James Grant), thegovernor of Bengal reduced, owing to Maratha raids, the annual payment to half of the previoussum, i.e. to 5 million rupees. This would correspond well with the evidence of our incidencesrecord in the last twenty years before the terminal date of 1760. From 1744, a substantialdecline of incidences of coins struck in central and eastern mints is noticeable in the U.P.hoards record. It is however impossible to ascertain to what extent is this decline due todecreasing supply of silver from Bengal and to what extent is the available evidence distortedby possibly massive remints after 1760 - a year after which coins and consequently hoardstoo, cannot be dated with the necessary exactness. Moreover, the number of hoards in whichcoins of later dates can occur is naturally smaller than of those which may contain coins ofearlier regnal periods; for example, whereas Sh€hjah€n… coins can appear, albeit as isolatedexamples, in hoards formed several decades after this emperor’s death (and thus add few pointsto their respective incidences record), coins of Muhammad Sh€h, and in still greater degreethose of Ahmad Sh€h and ³lamg…r II., do not possess this opportunity in an equal degree.Therefore, although the observed trend in the frequency of incidences appears to conform withdevelopments known from other sources, the evidence is, in this particular case, not conclusive.

7. Peculiarities in Dispersal Patterns of Coins Minted in the Area of the U.P.

One of characteristic features of monetary developments in the later Aurangzeb… and post-Aurangzeb… period is the proliferation of mints located in the central area of the empire.Apart from old mints in Shahjahanabad, Agra and Ilahabad which stepped up their productionsignificantly (the last-mentioned appears to have been active only intermittently), perhapsin order to process the increasing flow of silver from the east, new mints were establishedin Lakhnau, Bareli and Itawa. Second wave of new mint establishments dates to the 1720s:Banaras, Farrukhabad, Kora and Qanauj.121 It is not without interest that five of these mintcities - Banaras, Ilahabad, Kora, Itawa and Agra - are located on the main route whichconnected Bengal with the Mughal capital of Shahjahanabad. Were these mints establishedin order to process increasing quantities of silver imported from Bengal? Prevailing flowsof silver, as far as they could be reconstructed with the help of available evidence, wouldsuggest that it may have been so. Only detailed research focusing on the history of each

121 In the absence of explicit evidence, an approximate date of establishment of a new mint can be estimatedon the basis of its earliest extant coins. In this case too, hoard evidence appears to be superior to data inpublished coin catalogues. Occurrences of earliest coins from the more important Aurangzeb… and post-Aurangzeb…mints are summarized in the following table. (Regnal years, if available, follow the date of hijra and are separatedby hyphen). For the sake of completeness, isolated earliest coins from Lakhnau, Itawa and Kora (possiblywrong identifications of dates?) found in hoards, have been included in the last column.

Dispersal Patterns of Coins Minted in the Area of the U. P.


particular mint and on the merchant community based in the city or town in which therespective mint was located could supply a more definite answer. The analysis of availablehoard material can supply at least some hints pointing to the existence of trading networkswhich carried coins of a particular provenance to a particular destination or area, leavingout completely other tracts or cities, even when these were sometimes geographically closerto the mint in question.

With the available hoard evidence it is possible to count incidences of coins struck inmints located in the area of U.P. between the years 1675-1760 and present in hoards buriedin in each of its districts after 1675. Of course, numbers of hoards registered in each districtand relevant to this analysis differ widely: whereas the district of Jhansi registers 14 hoardscontaining coins minted in the area of the U.P. between these two dates, Agra lists 11 andLakhnau 10 hoards, Banaras has only 3, Itawa 2 and Jaunpur, for example, despite therelatively high total number of 14 Mughal hoards discovered in its area, none: all of thembelong to pre-1675 period. In some regions, smaller number of hoards may be due, at leastpartly, to a more restricted availability and circulation of money - this was probably thecase of the sub-Himalayan districts of Garhwal, Almora and Nainital. In others, higherincidence of hoards esp. when concentrated in a narrower time span, may have been causedby greater insecurity and turbulence - this is possibly the case of districts which fell withinthe range of operation of Bundela chiefs in the late 17th and first half of the 18th century(Jhansi, Hamirpur, Banda, Ilahabad). Results arrived at by counting of incidences aretherefore not directly quantifiable; still, several mints show certain patterns of coin dispersalwhich do not seem to be accidental. In the district of Gorakhpur, for example, coins of the

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most productive but also quite distant mint of Shahjahanabad are present in 6 hoards out oftotal of 9 belonging in the post- 1675 period, whereas in the district of Ilahabad (8 hoards)they were found in only one. The much closer mint of Banaras, on the other hand, isrepresented in only one of Gorakhpur’s 9 hoards. Banarasi coins are relatively scarce (thelocal mint was obviously not a big one) but dispersed over a wide area of central andwestern U.P.: in the district of Bulandshahr (1 hoard of total of 3), Merath (1 of 6), Rampur(1 of 3), Mathura (1 of 5) and Budaun (1 of 7). In the much closer Basti with 7 hoards, onthe other hand, they are not represented at all.122 The district of Gorakhpur appears to havebeen a favourite destination not only of coins minted in Shahjahanabad but also of thosestruck in Agra and Itawa. In contrast, coins from the Qanauj mint, not very numerous, donot appear to have penetrated to the east of this town and to have remain restricted toRuhelkhand and few of the southern districts of the U.P. (Kanpur, Banda, Hamirpur, Jalaun,Jhansi, each with a single incidence.) The range of the Farrukhabad mint is very similar.Except of two incidences in Lakhnau and one in Unnao, its coins appear only in the westernpart of the state. It seems that commercial communities, settled in the above mentionedmint cities and perhaps operating the mints themselves, specialized in trading and financialtransactions with particular regions or cities of north India. The exact nature and extent ofthese ties might constitute an exciting subject of a separate study.

8. Mughal Silver Coin Stock, 1560-1760

On the preceding pages we have analysed coin incidences of selected mints, ordered alongtemporal axis and reflecting, more or less accurately, changes in their coin output. Theresult of summation of data on all Mughal mints represented in U.P. hoards is a graphicalrepresentation showing changing numbers of the total of all incidences relating to all mintsand every year in the period of two centuries from 1556 to 1760. This graph, shown in Fig.32 below, presents a synoptic view of totals for each regnal period, introduced separately inthe incidences section above. A general overview presents an opportunity for more generalobservations.

The time series represented on the graph by a jagged line appears to be formed by twotypes of influence: there are clearly visible short-term fluctuations and behind them longer-term trends lasting for several decades; in the span of the two Mughal centuries the generaltrend underwent three clearly discernible reversals: the first one, which occurred in themiddle of the 1630s, broke the initial long-term growth and sent the trend line on a downward

122 The dispersal pattern of Banarasi silver coins in western parts of the U.P. corresponds well withC. A. Bayly’s description of Banaras as an important money market and mercantile centre maintaining livingcommercial contacts with western parts of north India. See his Rulers, Townsmen and Bazaars, pp. 229-232.For interesting and valuable details on the structure and functioning of the Banaras mint establishments, see thetwo studies by Q. Ahmad listed in the Bibliography. Unfortunately, similar detailed studies of other importantmints are not available.

Mughal Silver Coin Stock, 1560 - 1760


course until another turning point was reached in the middle of the 1670s. Then follows asteep rise in registered incidences culminating around the year 1715; after this date a declinesets in, which lasts until 1760. Both the short-term fluctuations and longer-term trends maybe caused in each instance by a different type of factor. It will be therefore correct to dealwith each instance separately.

As far as the shorter-term fluctuations are concerned, influences appear to be of twotypes. Two major drops in the numbers of incidences at the beginning and end of Jah€ng…r’srule appear to have been caused primarily not by any dramatic shortage of silver for mintingbut rather, in the former case, by conscious manipulations of the established system of coinweights, or by an officially decreed and highly selective remintings of parts of the existingcoin stock in the latter. Both these remintings have left a deep mark in the incidences recordwithout changing in any significant way the overall volume of the silver coin stock: steepincreases in coin incidences following immediately after rejecting of the unsuitable part ofthe coin stock suggest that greater part of the increased activity of mints was devoted torecoining of parts of the existing stock. In such cases, neither the decrease nor the increasein coin incidences can be interpreted as a sign of declining or growing volume of the silvercoin stock. After an elimination of the remint factor, the dramatic fluctuations of coinincidences would be to a great extent evened out.

Fig. 32. Total of all incidences of Mughal silver coins minted in the years 1556-1760 in coinhoards deposited in the area of the U.P.

05

101520253035404550556065707580859095

100

1556

1560

/61,

156

115

65/6

6, 1

566

1570

/71,

157

115

75/7

6, 1

576

1580

/81

1585

1589

/90,

159

015

95, 1

595/

9616

00, 1

600/

0116

05, 1

605/

0616

10, 1

610/

1116

15, 1

616

1620

, 162

0/21

1625

, 162

5/26

1630

, 163

0/31

1635

, 163

5/36

1639

/40,

164

016

44/4

5, 1

645

1649

, 165

016

54, 1

654/

5516

59, 1

659/

6016

60, 1

660/

6116

65, 1

665/

6616

70, 1

670/

7116

7516

79/8

0, 1

680

1684

, 168

4/85

1689

, 168

9/90

1694

, 169

4/95

1699

, 169

9/00

1704

, 170

4/05

1707

, 170

7/08

1712

/13,

171

317

17, 1

717/

1817

22, 1

722/

2317

27, 1

727/

2817

32, 1

732/

3317

37, 1

737/

3817

42, 1

742/

4317

46/4

7, 1

747

1751

, 175

1/52

1756

, 175

6/57

year of mintage

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year

125

Another type of short-term fluctuation has its origin in genuine disruptions of the trad-ing networks or commercial activity in general due to violent events or natural disasters.Two obvious examples of this type are the total absence in the U.P. hoard evidence of Suratisilver coins struck in the year 1662/63 caused by Shiv€j…’s sack of Surat in January 1664and similar gap in incidences of Lahori silver coins in 1649/50 caused no doubt by fall ofQandahar into Persian hands in 1649 an accompanying disruptions along the north-westernroutes. This type of fluctuation certainly reflects sudden changes in the output of the re-spective mint and is therefore relevant in estimations of coin stock volumes. If such disrup-tions were of only short duration (few months or one year), their influence was only mar-ginal; if, however, the security problems were of longer duration and the consequent dis-ruptions of economic life and mint activity became a common phenomenon - as was thecase of Surat in the 1670s - the impact of diminished coin production on the level of circu-lating coin stock could have been considerable, especially when the afflicted city housedone of the most productive mint in the whole empire.

In sum, the reliability of coin stock estimates based on the evidence of incidencesdepends to a great extent on our ability to identify correctly the real causes of observedfluctuations or, at least, to filter away those cases which reflect the effects of past remintingcampaigns. In the case of Jah€ng…r… coinage this is relatively easy; it is much more difficultin the case of suspected remintings of older coins during the reign of FarruÇsiy€r andMuhammad Sh€h. In the absence of positive written evidence, more intensive reminting ofcoins struck during the reigns of previous emperors can be inferred from the relativelyrapid decline of percentual shares of these coins after the accession of the two emperorsmentioned above. If the melting and recoining of older coins was not directed against anynarrowly defined coin population and did not, therefore, leave a distinct mark in the evi-dences record, it is difficult or even impossible to distinguish its effects from a longer-termtrend of decline caused by altogether different set of causes. An uncertainty regarding theextent of recoinage during the reign of FarruÇsiy€r and especially Muhammad Sh€h makesthe application of the incidences method in the post-Aurangzeb… period less reliable than inthe previous epoch.

It is impossible to explain each of the numerous short-term fluctuations of incidenceswhich are so typical of virtually all Mughal mints; in a number of cases - especially those ofsmaller mint establishments - purely accidental factors must have distorted the evidence.Accidental factors, however, can be assumed to exercise no particular bias which wouldconsistently tilt the results in a particular direction. The line presented in Fig. 32 whichsummarizes the activity of all registered mints is based on greater number of incidenceswhere accidental, random factors have lesser weight - this should hold true especially forlonger-term trends.

Does this mean that longer-term trends are free of all types of biases? Not completely.As has been explained above, longer-term higher level of incidences may be due to generallyhigher numbers of hoards. This would not be a problem if this higher quantity of hoardsmeans simply easier availability and greater volumes of coined silver. We have seen that



apart from this factor, greater incidence of hoards in the 18th century is most probablyrelated also to a generally higher level of violence; in the post-Aurangzeb… period, hoardsformed or forgotten as a result of more frequent violent events may have increased thehoard numbers by ten per cent or more. This increase would be in no relation to coin stockvolume; from the point of view of coin stock estimates, this is a distorting factor.

In the last decades before 1760 another bias influencing the data in opposite direction wasat work. This period was relatively close to the time in the first third of the 19th century when thehabit of forming and burying hoards gradually disappeared. The narrower was the intervalseparating a year of the late Mughal period from the time when hoards ceased to be formed, thesmaller is the number of hoards formed between the two dates. Smaller number of hoards ofcourse means smaller number of incidences. This natural bias, strengthened possibly by moreintensive remintings after 1760, may have distorted, in the late Mughal decades, the frequencyof incidences so as to make the coin stock look dwindling away. It is very difficult to assesscorrectly the net result of mutually opposite biases influencing the incidences record in the post-Aurangzeb… period. Any serious effort to do this should be not be based solely on the numismaticevidence, but should be supplemented by a careful study of other types of sources.

As far as the earlier period is concerned, we may proceed on the assumption that thechanging number of incidences corresponds broadly with changing output of Mughal mints.The volume of coin stock in the year n is then understood to be equal to yearly accretion ofnewly minted coins, represented by numbers of incidences in this year in hoards, plus thevolume of stock of the preceding year n-1, which is in turn defined as a sum of volumes andaccretions of the preceding years. Before adding the value of new accretion to the oldercoin stock, it is necessary to subtract from it a certain percentage covering the naturalattrition of the stock in consequence of natural losses, wear, etc. and also of export of coinsabroad. The rate of loss is not known; informed estimations put the yearly attrition rate forthe Middle Ages between one and two per cent (without taking into account the exports ofcoins to pay for imported commodities).123

Working on these assumptions, we can construct several curves which would representthe development of the Mughal silver coin stock between 1556 and 1760 with the yearlyrates of attrition equalling alternatively to 1, 2, 3, 4, and 5 per cent. Apart from the naturalloss rate of one or two per cent per year we should take into account an export of silver cointo pay for imports. Probably the most important import item during the whole Mughalperiod were the superior Persian and Central Asian horses hold in high esteem and in constantdemand by the Mughal army. An analysis of Central Asian (Uzbek) hoards and coinage ingeneral might throw some light on this aspect of this branch of the long-distance trade. Andfinally, an unknown share of imported silver was demonetized and turned into jewellery,silver utensils and other objects serving mainly as a means for a long-term storing of value.A not negligible quantity of silver was used for manufacture of silver threads weaved into

123 C. C. Patterson,,,,, Silver Stocks and Losses in Ancient and Medieval Times. The Economic HistoryReview, 2nd ser., vol. XXV(1972), no. 2, pp. 205-233.

127

fine cloth pieces.124 We should keep in mind the fact that most of the imported silver was inthe first place turned into coins in order to pay for the commodities acquired for export.Taking all these factors into consideration, we will probably err on the conservative side ifwe estimate the total yearly loss of silver coins at three per cent of the existing silver coinstock. We may envisage a situation when the total stock is so large that regular imports ofsilver from abroad are absorbed just to cover this relatively moderate loss rate. Indeed, thismight be the mysterious „bottomless pit“ of contemporary observes wondering about thefate of all those huge quantities of precious metals imported every year into India.

There are several features of the hypothetical coin stock curves which call for a comment.The two temporary interruptions in the initial steady growth of stock, marking the beginningand end of Jah€ng…r’s reign, are due to the two remintings mentioned above and in all probabilityhave nothing to do with coin stock volumes; if these two influences are filtered away, the riseof the coin stock volume will appear more even and, until the middle of the 1630s, remarkablysteady. This growth reflects the initial build-up of Mughal silver coinage during the reign ofAkbar, augmented in the beginning by dishoarding of treasures acquired by conquest andfrom the 1570s increasingly by silver flowing into the subcontinent in consequence of India’spermanently active balance of payments in the expanding long-distance trade.

Fig. 33. Hypothetical growth of north Indian Mughal silver coin stock (values of yearlyincrements identical with observed incidences of coins minted in the respective year) adjustedfor various yearly rates of coin loss

124 Q. Ahmad, Banaras Mint and the Zari Industry. Journal of the Numismatic Society of India, vol. XXV(1963), pp. 87-92. The manufacturers, a large group of 1200 workmen, who turned silver bullion into thread,were subordinated to the chief, or D€roû€, of the Mint. This arrangement was looked upon as a guarantee thatthe silver would not be debased in the process of the manufacture. That the trustworthiness of the Banaras mintwas well founded was proved beyond any doubt by a British control in 1802 of weight and purity of Banarasicoins. See also, footnote 108 on p.116 above.


0

500

1000

1500

2000

2500

3000

3500

los s rate=5% per y earlos s rate=4% per y earlos s rate=3% per y earlos s rate=2% per y earlos s rate=1% per y ear


The increase culminates around the middle of the 1630s after eight years of a paralleland substantial growth of output of practically all major mints in the empire. This growthmay have been fed partly by reminting of the Jah€ng…r… stock but this cannot serve as a fullexplanation. The phenomenal activity of the newly opened mint in Multan points to asignificant expansion of the north-western trade which must have brought to India substantialamounts of silver from Persia and other countries of the Middle East. As we have seen,around this time the Persian empire faced a problem of massive outflows of silver in theeastern direction; efforts on the part of Persian officials to stop this drain appear to have metwith only limited success.125 Unfortunately, the evidence of percentual shares cannot beused to corroborate or disprove this interpretation - the data for the first three pentads ofSh€hjah€n’s reign are either too scarce or completely missing.126

As far as the trends in the following half century are concerned, we are in a somewhatbetter position. Our graph shows either a stagnation or, with higher rates of losses, even adecline of the silver coin stock volume lasting until the beginning of the 1680s. The period1660-1680 appears to have been especially poor in fresh coins. The declining trend shownby numbers of incidences is confirmed by the evidence of percentual shares. We have seenthat the Sh€hjah€n… coins maintain high percentual shares long after this emperor’s demiseand that percentual shares of Aurangzeb… coins remain at an uncommonly low level untilthe 1680s when the trend is finally reversed, thanks to an increasing activity of the centralmints. The fact that the data of percentual shares and data of incidences, each arrived at bya different method of processing of the hoard record, both agree in representing a stagnatingor even declining coin stock, perhaps justifies our conclusion that this stagnation was real.Known political events (Shivaji’s guerrilla war in the Deccan disrupting the trade of Suratand of Gujarat in general and contemporaneous blockade of the north-western trade routesby a large-scale uprising of Afghan tribes) can be drawn into the picture to supply concretehistorical data in support of the present interpretation.

The ascending trend beginning at the end of the 1670s and lasting till the beginning ofthe 1720s may be explained in its initial phase partly by a revival of the activity of Gujaratiand, to a lesser extent, of the north-western mints. Increasingly, however, the sustainedupward trend appears to be due to a greatly expanding production of the central mints. Onthe preceding pages an attempt has been made to relate this phenomenon to massive importsof uncoined silver from Bengal which, apart of being free of the kind of security problemsthat plagued Gujarat and north-west in the 1670s, gradually rose to a position of a singlemost important trading partner of the expanding Dutch and English East India Companies.This, however, is only one part of the story. Analysis of the motives of hoarding behaviour,attempted in part Two, Sec. 2 of the present work, suggests that in the period 1710-1760 tenper cent or slightly more of the total number of all extant hoards may have been related to

125 P. Jackson, L. Lockhart (eds.), The Cambridge History of Iran. Vol. VI.: The Timurid and SafavidPeriods. Cambridge 1986, pp. 484-485.

126 As shown in the attempt at a reconstruction of the Sh€hjah€n… coin stock on pp. 56-58 and Fig. 10 onp. 57 above.

129

a higher level of violence characterizing the late Mughal era. This factor would necessitatean appropriate downward adjustment of incidence numbers and consequently also of thecoin stock curve. Moreover, a steep ascent and an equally steep decline of the FarruÇsiy€r…coin stock and similar steep rise of Muhammad Sh€h… coin shares in hoards in the pentad of1730-35 should alert us to the possibility of increased rate of reminting of coins of olderdates. As this rate and the duration of these probable reminting campaigns is impossible toassess with any degree of certainty, the proper shape of the coin stock volume curve in thisperiod remains unclear - we can limit ourselves to a general statement that the growth inthis period was actually slower and the coin stock volume lower than represented by thecurve in the graph.

The situation is even more complicated in the two or three decades preceding theterminal date of our investigation. Hoards dated into the post-1760 period have been includedinto the incidences evidence; however, it is impossible to date them exactly and also toassess the impact of monetary reforms introduced by the British on the structure of hoardsformed in this late period. Also the number of hoards, which remain in this late phase aspossible sources of pre-1760 incidences, is naturally lower than the number which maycontain, for example, Aurangzeb… coins.

In short, the trend curve representing the development of coin stock volume (and let usemphasize once more, north Indian coin stock volume) can be understood, with severaladjustments for the known biases, as showing the general longer-term trends with a sufficientdegree of reliability until the end of the 17th century. Its continuation into the 18th centuryshown on the graph should be seen only as a basis, marked by several types of biases, forfurther study and interpretation; for this, thorough search for additional, non-numismaticsources of data will be necessary.


130

In 1961 Parameshwari Lal Gupta, the doyen of Indian numismatics, closed his survey ofIndian numismatography with critical words on the present state of the discipline and abroad delineation of tasks for the future: „ ... it would not be wrong to say that whateverwork has been done so far in the Medieval Indian numismatography, it is primarily confinedto the bringing of coins into light. Little has been done to present them in the form of thesource material for history. Most likely for this reason, the historians never took interest inthis subject and the interest, in the absence of private coin collectors, is fading day by dayand hardly any new generation of numismatists is coming up to take up further work in thisbranch. It is therefore essential that we should pause for a while and assess the value of allthe numismatic material that we have before us as material for history, and focus the attentionof historians to their importance. Once the historians realise the value of the coins for theirstudy, the medieval Indian numismatics is bound to take new turn.“1

In 1961, similar judgement could be passed on the state of numismatic studies in othercountries as well. As far as Mughal India is concerned, it has been mainly thanks to twoIndian historians of the medieval Indian history, Aziza Hasan and Shireen Moosvi, that themedieval Indian numismatics took new turn envisaged by P. L. Gupta. Both historians havebeen prompted to innovative approaches by two basic considerations: first, that the study ofmonetary history can yield important data for the economic history of the late medievalIndia (silver imports, money supply, the problem of the so called „price revolution“ etc.),especially when other, written sources are extremely scarce or non-existent. And second,that the character of Mughal coinage makes it possible to apply statistical methods forprocessing of the coin material covering a period of one and half century. Apart from exactdating and localization made possible by explicit data on most types of coin legends, Mughalsilver coins maintained a stable weight and precious metal purity standards for more thantwo centuries; this makes them almost ideal, mutually comparable units suitable for statis-tical processing and a subsequent reconstruction of long term trends.

This long term stability of coinage, a rather uncommon phenomenon in the world ofpre-modern monetary systems, calls for few comments. In Europe, creeping or even overtdevaluation of coins by decreasing their weight or precious metal content or both was oftenresorted to by emperors, kings or other sovereigns as a measure which was to ease theirfrequent financial problems. In Mughal India the situation was different and one has to askwhether this was so only because the emperors, reigning over a country with permanently

1 P. L. Gupta, A Survey of Indian Numismatography (Muhammadan Coinage). Journal of the NumismaticSociety of India, vol. XXIII (1961), p. 73.

Conclusion

131Conclusion

active trade balance and controlling an efficient system of taxation, did not feel the need toresort to such methods.

Silver rupees conforming to imperial models but struck by independent or semi-inde-pendent potentates during the second half of the 18th century too maintain the high imperialstandards of weight and purity. Indeed, this conformity to the long established standardsmakes the distinguishing between Mughal and post-Mughal coinages often an arbitraryprocedure. Perhaps the degree of control which the Indian ruler exercised over the taxationsystem supplies a part of the answer: a recipient of taxes collected in cash will take adifferent attitude towards monetary standards than a sovereign desperately needing moneyto pay his mounting debts to his creditors and mercenary armies. In Mughal India the inter-ests of rulers appear to have coincided with those of creditors rather than debtors.

Moreover, the scrupulous maintaining of established coin standards does not appear tohave been limited to Mughal period characterized by, among other things, relative plenty ofprecious metals. J. S. Deyell discovered similar attitude in pre-Islamic medieval Indianbillon coinage, particularly the Gujarati gadhaiy€ coins and the dirhams issued by the Sh€h…dynasty in the Indian north-west.2 Both these coinages, apart from serving as monetarymedia in their own political domains, were also used in the long distance trade. Localcurrencies of other states situated at a greater distance from the two main long distancetrade routes (the maritime one joining in Gujarat the road leading north into Doab and theoverland route connecting north India via Panjab and Afghanistan with central Asia and theMiddle East) underwent some debasement over time but this gradual process can be inter-preted, according to Deyell, by slow decline in the local silver stock on the one hand and anecessity to keep in circulation a certain volume of coined currency on the other. It seemsthat a stable currency was one of basic tenets of the Indian commercial world.

A combination of these three characteristic features - long term conformity to fixedweight an purity standards, data on place and year of minting - make it possible to study theMughal silver coinage with methods that could not be applied to European coin material. Onthe other hand, the great drawback of the Indian numismatic evidence is the habit of museums(formed probably to a great extent by the existing laws regulating the disposition of coinfinds) to disperse coin hoards after their registration and description and to keep only fewspecimens of each type for their numismatic collections. This debars the historian from theopportunity to inspect the mass of physical coins that make up a hoard and to measure exactlysome of their important characteristics (exact weight and metallic composition, wear, detailsof the dies, necessary for the die-count analysis, etc.). Historian studying, for example, het-erogeneous coinages of the pre-Islamic period has often to search for hoards in private pos-session to obtain the data necessary for a more detailed study. With the unified and relativelywell documented Mughal coinage the situation is somewhat different and a meaningful analysiscan be undertaken on the basis of written evidence of hoards, the Treasure Trove Reports orhoard inventories written and kept in the numismatic departments of Indian museums.

2 J. S. Deyell, Living Without Silver., pp. 238-241.


For a historian attempting to reconstruct, on the basis of extant coin material, qualitativeor quantitative aspects of money use in the past, the surviving coins and hoards serve as a kindof statistical samples which - if processed correctly - allow him to formulate more generalconclusions. It is obvious that extant coins or coin hoards are not standard statistical samplesdrawn in conformity with the established rules of modern statistics. In their present form,hoards contain various inherent biases, qualitative as well as quantitative, accumulated dur-ing the process of their formation, forgetting, recovery and final registration. Most of coinswhich survived to the present day were originally parts of hoards and are therefore affected bythese biases. Identification and correct assessment of these biases should form an integral partof each study attempting at a historical interpretation of numismatic material.

Discussion of biases that affect the U.P. hoard evidence forms the subject of first partof the present study. There are still other biases which gain their importance when the hoardrecord is disregarded and statistical procedures are applied directly to coins - as is the caseof the approach chosen by S. Moosvi - or the basic context in which the coin material isembedded are not hoards but other units - for example, museum catalogues in the case ofmethod used by A. Hasan. Biases inherent in these two approaches have been discussed inintroductory subsections of the first, methodological part.

There seem to be two ways of processing numismatic data supplied by the availablehoard record: a method which processes incidences of particular types of coins in greaternumber of hoards (one hoard - one incidence) and a method based on counting of frequenciesof particular coin types in each hoard (one hoard - n incidences). For both approaches thehoard context is of cardinal importance; for the full utilization of the latter, a detailed descrip-tion of hoard content is required. In the case of the present study, such description was notavailable. What was at hand were, apart from the inventory of coin types, the data on numbersof coins issued by each Mughal emperor and present in each hoard. However, even suchbroadly defined types have supplied a sufficient base for an approximate reconstruction ofrelative sizes of coined silver stocks built up by successive Mughal emperors; the result con-forms very closely to logical expectations and can be looked upon, inter alia, as a first basictest of the source and a proof that the hoard material in question, if appropriately ordered andprocessed, represents a set of samples that do contain a meaningful and important informa-tion and reflect, more or less accurately, monetary developments of a past age.3

It must be said, however, that each of the two approaches has its own inherent biases.The numbers of incidences are, in the last analysis, dependent on the numbers of hoardsfrom which they have been collected. This is all right if the relation of numbers of hoards tothe volume of the respective coin stock is in the long term constant. As I tried to showabove, in the case of U.P. hoards this requirement is probably met in the period up to thebeginning of the 18th century. In the following period the situation is more complicated:the generally higher level of incidences in the first part of the 18th century is due to agenerally greater quantities of hoards; these, in turn, are probably only partly attributable to

3 See, J. S. Deyell’s remark on the necessity to apply deductive reasoning in hoard analysis; op. cit., p. 288.

133Conclusion

a greater volume of silver in circulation. As the evidence of temporally and spatially de-fined hoard groups suggests, higher level of violence and catastrophic events may haveraised the quantity of hoards by as much as ten percent or even more. It is therefore prob-ably reasonable to desist from direct comparison of incidences levels reconstructed for the17th century with those of the 18th.

Counting coin type frequencies in each hoard selected for this kind of analysis, or - asS. Moosvi has done - coin type frequencies in the total mass of extant coins irrespective oftheir hoard context, introduces another type of bias: one or a small number of big hoards ofa very specific and untypical composition may seriously distort the qualitative as well asthe quantitative characteristics of the resulting picture. This drawback could be minimizedby conversion of absolute quantities into percentual shares, as has been done in the case ofreconstruction of the successive emperors’ coin stocks mentioned above. This labour wouldbe certainly worth the effort and could yield more exact results than simple counting ofincidences. This task can be undertaken when the original Treasure Trove Reports contain-ing complete information on quantities of all coin types present in each hoard are availablefor study. The printed inventory is not detailed enough for this purpose.

What then can the data extracted from the mass of hoards, with the help of the methodsdescribed above, tell us about history of money in Mughal India? First of all, any closerexamination of the sizes and contents of the 530 Mughal hoards, found on the area of thepresent-day Uttar Pradesh and inventoried by the officials of the State Museum in Lucknow,clearly shows that hoarding of massive quantities of coined silver was not a typical featureof money use in Mughal India. It is true that hoards containing several hundreds of silvercoins are proportionately more frequent in the Akbar… and to a lesser extent in the Jah€ng…r…era than in later periods; in absolute terms, however, they are by no means numerous andhoards containing more than one thousand silver rupees are extremely rare. By far thegreatest number of hoards contains less than one hundred silver coins (i.e. less than 1 kg ofpure silver). Old savings hoards with great share of old coins have been identified, but theydo not predominate. Most of the analyzed hoards would fit well into the category of a „firstcash reserve“ kept by local merchants, moneylenders and perhaps also better-off peasantfamilies, for the eventuality of occasional unexpected outlays coming up from time to timein the course of their everyday activities.4 Also a near absence in hoards of heavy silverJah€ng…r… coins, more suitable for longer-term conservation of value but less practicable inordinary transactions, suggests that these accumulations were meant primarily as currentsavings destined for clearly defined types of occasions.

We do not know exactly how large is the percentual share of the extant hoards in thetotal of all hoards formed, buried and subsequently recovered in the area of the U.P. -informed observers put it somewhere between five and ten percent. If this assessment is

4 A more differentiated picture of hoarding behaviour could perhaps emerge if the available hoard evidencecontained particulars about the circumstances and exact location of the finds; this could also help in distinguishingintentional hoards from unintentional losses.


correct, the habit of saving coins may have been quite widespread - we should take intoaccount also those hoards or accumulations which were never completely forgotten andwere dispersed still in the pre-modern era. Thus, this type of hoarding - saving would prob-ably be a better designation - appears to be an understandable, rational behaviour. It alsocorresponds well with a description, offered by C. Bayly, of saving habits current amongthe better-off classes of the population.

As far as the Mughal aristocracy is concerned, the financial position of its memberswas very specific. On the one hand, the Mughal military aristocrats, the mansabd€rs, paideither from the yields of j€g…rs or directly from the imperial treasury, received often verysubstantial amounts of money; on the other hand, they were forced by the system to spendmost of their salaries on the maintenance of military units and on an expensive living style.As their position and rank within the system was not hereditary and their movable propertywas subject to a specific form of escheat after their death, they often tended to hoard andhide part of their wealth to insure their families against poverty in the future. As the reportof F. Pelsaert shows, the law of escheat was sometimes enforced with a considerable degreeof brutality.5 Even when it was not, the possibility of the memory of a hidden propertybeing completely lost in the usually large aristocratic household was practically nil.6 Thechances of survival and recovery of such aristocratic hoards are therefore very small.

Hoards accumulated in imperial treasure vaults by several Mughal emperors anddishoarded by their successors represent, of course, an altogether different case. These impe-rial cash reserves, kept partly in the central treasury in the imperial capital and partly inprovincial treasuries and managed by the provincial d…w€ns, were used especially in emer-gency situations such as an urgent need to put together quickly a military expedition force,mobilize the army, etc. According to two contemporary sources, at the time of Akbar’s deathin 1605, the imperial treasury included, apart from other precious objects, also 100 millionsilver rupees.7 During his 22 years long reign Jah€ng…r expended between 85 and 90 per centof this accumulated treasure8 so that Sh€hjah€n, having found at his accession the treasury

5 F. Pelsaert, Jahangir’s India, pp. 54-55. Aurangzeb mitigated somewhat this harsh rule in 1666 by aspecial order but there is ample evidence the practice continued more or less in the same way as before. A. Ali,The Mughal Nobility under Aurangzeb. London 1966, pp. 63-68.

6 From contemporary accounts we learn that at least the mansabd€rs holding higher ranks had quite largehousehold staffs including also small financial departments with their own treasurers and accountants wholooked after keeping the accounts, transferring money from j€g…rs to the j€g…rd€r’s headquarters, etc. A. Ali, op.cit., pp. 161-162.

7 S. Moosvi, The Economy of the Mughal Empire, p. 198. The sources quoted are F. Pelsaert and thechronicler Muhammad Q€sim Firishta.

8 Ibid. The data on the size of the imperial hoard at the end of Jah€ng…r’s reign - ten million rupees - havebeen taken over from the contemporary historian Am…n Qazw…n…. It is probably impossible to assess with anydegree of exactness the percentual share of these imperial reserves in the total volume of coined silver. S. Moosviin her attempt at quantification of the silver influx and money supply has estimated the size of the Akbari imperialhoard in 1605 at one-ninth to one-seventh of the total coined silver stock. S. Moosvi, The Silver Influx, pp. 81-82,fn. 81. If in the following twenty two Jah€ng…r… years this hoard was gradually dissolved and the silver put backinto circulation, our coin stock curves would need only a slight correction in the upward direction.

135Conclusion

almost empty, had to make a special effort to build up the imperial reserves anew. In this hewas successful: during his 30 years long reign he accumulated reserves worth 95 millionrupees, half in coin and half in other precious objects.9 This wealth, together with the contentsof provincial treasuries and personal holdings of numerous nobles and high officials, wasdisgorged again during the bloody succession war in 1658-59.10 This huge injection of silvermoney, predominantly, if not exclusively, of Sh€hjah€n… coinage, may have temporarily raisedthe volume of coined silver stock - and also the proportion of Sh€hjah€n… coins in circulationduring the first decade of Aurangzeb’s reign. Owing to this dishoarding factor, the real declineof the total stock in the 1660s may have been somewhat less pronounced than indicated by thegraph of percentual shares of Sh€hjah€n… and Aurangzeb… stocks and by the incidences record.At his death, Aurangzeb left to his successor a treasure totaling 240 million rupees in coinedand uncoined silver - again to be spent on costly succession wars that broke out after 1707. Itseems, therefore, that from the point of view of the circulating coin stock, this type of hoard-ing did not cause a definitive and irreversible loss of the monetary metal: we could perhapssee it as constituting a second circuit in which the silver money circulated at a much slowerrate - and in a less regular rhythm - than in the first one, driven by everyday commercialtransactions, payments and demands of the increasingly monetized revenue system.

Another problem connected with this periodical built-up of imperial reserves is the ques-tion about the rationale for this type of behaviour. The Mughal tax system, supported by apermanently mobilized imperial military machine, supplied the ruling elite with enormousfinancial resources, four-fifths of which were redistributed in an extremely unequal way amongthe Mughal military aristocracy.11 The main task of this group was, of course, to keep inconstant readiness the prescribed number of military units necessary for the maintenance ofthe Mughal order in the vast imperial domains and for external expansion and conquest.

The Mughals did not rule over a peaceful, demilitarized society. As a recent study ofD. Kolff has shown12, in the pre-modern period there existed in India a vast market of freemilitary labour, ready to be hired and used by those who had the means to pay for it. For theMughals it was therefore important not only to have enough resources to keep this poten-tially disruptive force permanently at bay but also to ensure that its potential paymasters,the local rajas and zam…nd€rs, had as little means as possible for the built-up of their ownmilitary power. A maxim recorded by the 14th century chronicler Zia-ud-d…n Baran… sum-marizing this experience appeared to possess equal validity two centuries later: „Moneyand strife; strife and money - that is the two things are allied to each other.“13

9 J. F. Richards, The Mughal Empire, p. 139.10 Ibid., p. 163.11 Reconstruction of imperial budget and expenditure on the Akbar… military establishment has been

attempted by S. Moosvi in her monograph The Economy of the Mughal Empire c. 1595. A Statistical Study.Delhi 1987, pp. 224-247.

12 D. H. A. Kolff, Naukar, Rajput and Sepoy. The ethnohistory of the military labour market in Hindustan,1450-1850. Cambridge 1990.

13 Zia-ud-d…n Baran…, Later Kings of Delhi or T€r…Ç-i F…roz Sh€h…. [From] The History of India As Told by itsOwn Historians. The Posthumous Papers of the Late Sir H.M. Elliot. Ed. by J. Dowson. 2. ed., Calcutta 1953, p. 64.


Under such circumstances, withdrawing from the circulation of „superfluous“ money- i.e. money that could be used for organizing power bases independent of or directly hos-tile to the state - may have been a part of security policy of the imperial government. Theavailable numismatic material does not allow us to tackle the problem of imperial hoards;its more detailed treatment would go beyond the scope of the present study. At this place itshould be only said that one should not resort to sweeping judgments about „irrationalhoarding“ without taking into account the wider political, social and societal ramificationsof this type of money use.14

As far as saving in the form of demonetized silver is concerned, our coin hoards cansupply no answer. Testimonies of European observers suggest that the use of silver forpersonal ornaments and embroideries was very popular and that large amounts of silverwere used for these purposes. A British report written in 1801 on the functioning of theBanaras mint confirms this picture. According to the report, only the class of manufacturersof gold and silver threads, connected with the mint, consisted of 1200 workmen. Thesethreads were used in the so called zar… industry producing primarily embroidery works onclothes with threads made out of flattened gold and silver.15 Banaras was perhaps the mostimportant center of this industry in the whole of India but certainly not the single one: near-by Patna had its own flourishing zar… manufactures too.16 The phenomenon of hoarding ofnon-monetary silver would certainly deserve a separate study based on a different type ofsource material than that used in the present work. Until a clearer picture of the accumula-tion and possible uses of this non-monetary silver emerges, we should at least take it intoaccount while assessing the percentage of natural coin loss: apart from the natural attrition,converting of silver coins into precious objects appears to have played an important role. Itis therefore probably not unreasonable to add one or two percentual points to the basis ofone per cent estimated for the inadvertent losses.

As far as the reconstruction of the coined silver stock is concerned, several points haveemerged from the preceding analysis. First, a more or less continuous rise of the Mughal coinstock lasting for nearly seven decades and culminating in the middle of the 1630s, appears tohave changed from the mid-1640s into a stagnation or even a decline - depending on theactual coin loss rate - that was reversed only at the beginning of the 1680s. Then followed arise again that lasted until the 1720s. This phase and the last one, characterized by a stagnation

14 A very clear and concise formulation of this requirement has been recently advanced by S. Subrahmanyam:„It is possible ... to argue that the demand for money must be posed in a far larger framework, in which socialgroups and institutions choose portfolio assets (including money), basing themselves on a variety ofconsiderations, including liquidity, rate of return, levels of risk, as well as the information/degree of controlthey have over these factors. Since many of these variables, as well as the preferences over them, are behaviouralin nature, they would tend to vary from society to society, as well as over historical time.“ S. Subrahmanyam,Precious Metal Flows and Prices in Western and Southern Asia, 1500-1750: Some Comparative and ConjuncturalAspects. In: S. Subrahmanyam (ed.), Money and the Market in India 1100-1700. Delhi 1994, pp. 217-218.

15 Q. Ahmad, Banaras Mint and the Zari Industry. Journal of the Numismatic Society of India, vol. XXV(1963), pp. 87-88.

16 Ibid., pp. 91-92.

137Conclusion

and decline and lasting until 1760, is however much more difficult to interpret as the coinstock curve may be affected to a greater degree than before by various biases. The plateaushowed by the incidences record in the third quarter of the 17th century, on the other hand,appears to reflect a real stagnation of the coin stock volume. It should be noted that themethods of A. Hasan and S. Moosvi, although partly objectionable, have discovered the samephenomenon.

Our evidence shows that this stagnation or decline cannot be ascribed to a single cause.Part of the explanation is certainly to be sought in the shift of the East India Company fromsilver imports to those of gold. Huge imports of silver in the 1630s and lesser, but stillsubstantial, influx in the 1640s led to a depreciation of silver in terms of gold from the ratio1 : 10 in 1620 to 1 : 16 or even 1 : 17 in 1660s and early 1670s.17 In this situation it appearedprofitable to make payments in India in gold rather than in silver - in fact, between 1660and 1690 a substantial portion of the treasure sent by the E.I.C. to India consisted of gold. Inthe period 1660-1675 the percentual share of gold represented slightly more than 50 percent of all precious metals exported by this Company to India.18

The Dutch Oost Indische Compagnie pursued similar tactics. The Dutch acquiredtheir precious metals mainly in the intra-Asian trade, especially in their active trading withJapan. In 1668, however, the Japanese government, fearing an uncontrolled drain of silverout of the country, imposed a ban on its export. This led to an immediate shift of foreigntraders’ demand to Japanese gold. For the Dutch who financed their Indian trade with theJapanese precious metals, this shift represented no handicap - on the contrary, given thegold to silver ratio prevailing in India, import of gold fetched a good profit.19

This situation was dramatically reversed in 1676 when the Indian money marketsexperienced a sudden crash in the price of gold: in this year the price of the gold muhr fellfrom Rs. 15.25 to Rs. 11. Although the price of gold recovered somewhat in the followingfew years, reaching the ratio 1 : 13, the time of massive substitution of gold for silver wasover. In the 1680s and 1690s, the proportion of silver in the total precious metals imports ofboth companies reached again 70 to 75 per cent.20

These monetary developments, certainly of great importance for the understanding ofcommercial strategies of the Dutch and English East India Companies, can hardly serve asa sufficient explanation of the stagnation or decline of the silver coin stock noted above. Wecan assume that in the 17th century Indian merchants still played an important role in thelong-distance trade and in the precious metals imports. They certainly dominated the over-land north-western branch of the trade with the Middle East and had an important share inthe Indian Ocean trade of Surat.21 On the other hand, we are not informed whether these

17 See, K. N. Chaudhuri, The Trading World, pp.162-163, Tab. A.4. Gold and silver price ratios.18 Ibid., p. 177 and S. Moosvi, The Silver Influx, p. 67.19 O. Prakash, The Dutch East India Company, pp.128-130. Whereas the silver shipped to Bengal be-

tween 1669 and 1671 was disposed at a loss, imports of the Japanese gold kobans in the same period affordeda profit as high as 37 per cent. Ibid., p. 130.

20 K. N. Chaudhuri, op. cit., p. 177, S. Moosvi, The Silver Influx, p. 67 and O. Prakash, op. cit., p. 67, fn. 36.21 The data on Surat’s Indian Ocean Trade found in the annual List of Arrivals in the Dutch dagregister,


merchants reacted to the changing gold to silver ratio in the same way as did the EuropeanCompanies - one may even ask whether they had the same degree of free choice of doingso. Until these questions are answered, the role of the changing gold to silver ratios in thecoin stock formation should not be overestimated.

Careful reading of the incidences record, reconstructed for major Mughal mints andunderstood as an index of their output, suggests that the general level of security along thetrade arteries played a not negligible role in the intensity of trading and precious metals flows.Classical examples are the relative decline of Gujarati mints in the second and third decade ofthe 17th century and the simultaneous compensating rise of the Qandahar mint, suggesting amajor shift in the long-distance trade with the Middle East from maritime to overland routes;sharp decline of the incidences of the north-western mints at the end of 1640s due to the warover Qandahar; sudden fall in the incidences of Surati coins with dates corresponding to theyears 1663 and 1664, caused no doubt by the first Shivaji’s raid and thorough plunder of thiscity; uncommonly low incidences levels of coins struck at the same mint in the 1670s, afterthe second plunder of Surat when the city lived in constant fear of another raid. It should bepointed out that this time the troubles afflicting the trade of Gujarat did not lead to a shift tooverland routes as was the case forty years earlier. The fall of Qandahar into Persian handscould play a role but can be hardly accepted as a sufficient explanation: in the 1650s theactivity of the north-western mints increased in spite of disruptions caused by repeated andunsuccessful Mughal attempts to regain the city. The very pronounced decline of incidencesof the north-western mints, dating from the beginning of the 1660s and lasting until the late1680s, corresponds to observations of declining intensity of the overland Indo-Persian tradein this period;22 actual causes of this decline would deserve closer investigation and probablyare to be sought, at least partly, on the Persian side. In any case, volumes of precious metalssupplies appear to have been closely related to concrete violent events and to a level of vio-lence along the trade routes and in or around important commercial centers in general. Thisfact became especially manifest in the 18th century when the north Indian hinterland, cut offfrom Gujarat by the Maratha expansion and from the north-western approaches by Sikhs andAfghans, became absolutely dependent on the silver supplies from Bengal, the last prosper-ous and loyal province of the crumbling empire.

If we accept the stagnation or even decline of the coined silver stock as a featurecharacterizing the monetary developments in the greater part of the 17th century, the ab-sence of the so called „price revolution“ on the European model will cause little surprise.23

published by A. Das Gupta in his Indian Merchants and the decline of Surat, c. 1700-1750. Wiesbaden 1979,pp. 290-291, show that between the years 1713 and 1741 (a period for which the data are available) Indianvessels constituted on the average 70 per cent of all ships arriving each year at the port of Surat. See also theauthor’s explanation of the nature of this data, ibid., pp. 280-289.

22 P. Jackson, L. Lockhart (eds.), The Cambridge History of Iran. Vol. 6.: The Timurid and Safavid Periods.Cambridge 1986, pp. 462 and 470.

23 Data available for the 17th century, most of which show no inflationary trends, have been summarized by S.Subrahmanyam in Money and the Market, pp. 186-218. He argues that „Overall, then, the Indian evidence suggeststhat price inflation was at best sporadic, and limited to specific regions and specific commodities ...“ Ibid., p. 209.

139Conclusion

The increase of prices in its first two decades tallies well with rapidly increasing quantitiesof circulating silver in the same period. The following stability of prices, as far as it can bepostulated on the basis of the still fragmentary evidence, appears to have been based on thelonger-term stability of the silver coined stock volume. For the Sh€hjah€n… and Aurangzeb…periods we can perhaps draw into the picture still other type of evidence than the incom-plete price series. As A. Ali has shown in his monograph on the Mughal nobility in the timeof Aurangzeb, the salaries of Mughal mansabd€rs during the reigns of Sh€hjah€n andAurangzeb were decreased in absolute terms by several administrative measures24 - thispolicy would be hardly feasible if in the same period money underwent a process of devalu-ation caused by inflation.

From the beginning of the 1680s, the incidences curve turns upward again. It can bemaintained with great degree of certainty that this rise was caused by the influx of silverfrom Bengal, imported into this maritime province in increasing quantities by the Englishand Dutch East India Companies. As the 18th century wears on, however, the exact volumeof these silver imports into the central areas of the empire is increasingly more difficult toassess. New biases (higher level of hoarding, probability of more frequent remints, de-creasing number of hoards of late dates) begin to influence the quantity of incidences andmake the results qualitatively different from those that have been built on data collected inhoards of the 17th century. Moreover, the relative scarcity of coins of Bengali proveniencein north Indian hoards is puzzling. The hypothesis advanced here is that minting of silver ininland regions, which suffered from a relative scarcity of money and therefore offeredhigher premium on freshly minted coins, was for the remitters more profitable than sendingcoins minted in Bengal or transferring the payments by means of bills of exchange. Todecide whether the minting activity of the central mints - especially of the mint establish-ment located in Shahjahanabad - was really as extraordinary as is suggested by the inci-dences record, we should have an idea about the dispersal of these coins in a broader regionadjoining the area of the present-day Uttar Pradesh.

This brings us to the last, but not least important, point that deserves our attention. Allthe observations made above apply, strictly speaking, to the core area of the Mughal em-pire. This was certainly a very important but probably also a specific region: the flow oftaxes from the peripheries to the centre may have created a very specific pattern of mon-etary circulation with a relatively high rate of intermixture of coins of diverse origin. Toform a more exact picture of the monetary flows, degrees and rates of intermixture of coinsin different regions of the empire, we would need more case studies based on hoard mate-rial from other states of India as well as from Pakistan and Bangladesh: the primary silverimporting regions of Gujarat, Panjab and Bengal are among the most important ones. Someof these states have published their own treasure trove inventories, which are, however, far

24 A. Ali, The Mughal Nobility under Aurangzeb. London 1966, p. 53. According to the author, „It would,therefore, appear that the net income of the nobles in the time of Sh€hjah€n and Aurangzeb definitely declined,though it is difficult to form a precise idea of the extent of the decline.“ For a description of the complicated systemof salary tables and month-scales used for exact computation of a mansabd€r’s salary, see ibid., pp. 38-73.


less detailed than the inventory published by the State Museum in Lucknow. It seems thatIndian historians, numismatists and museum officials have paid so far only little attentionto hoards as primary historical sources containing a great deal of important data, otherwiseunavailable to historical scholarship. One of the more important conclusions that may bedrawn from the present study should therefore concern the desirability of a more system-atic approach to acquiring, description and publication of coin hoards.

141

A. General

1. Methodological

Banderet, A., Application de la statistique mathematique a l´étude d´une trouvaille.Schweizer Münzblätter, vol. 17 (1967), no. 67, pp. 94-97.Berghaus, P., Coin Hoards: Methodology and Evidence. In: P.L. Gupta, A.K. Jha (eds.),Numismatics and Archaeology. 2nd International Colloquium. Nasik 1987, pp. 16-19.Blanchet, A., Les rapports entre les dépots monétaires et les événements militaires, politiqueset économiques. Revue Numismatique, vol. 39 (1936), ser. 4., pp.1-70, 205-270.Cole, T., The Lifetime of Coins in Circulation. Numismatic Chronicle, ser.VII, vol.XVI(1976), pp. 201-218.Deyell, J.S., Numismatic Methodologies Which Answer Questions Economists Might Ask.In: A.K. Jha (ed.), Coinage, Trade and Economy. January 8th-11th, 1991. 3rd InternationalColloquium. Anjaneri 1991, pp.1-15.Grierson, P., The Interpretation of Coin Finds. I. Numismatic Chronicle, vol. 5(1965),ser.7., pp. i-xiii. II. Ibid., vol. 6 (1966), ser. 7., pp. i-xxi.Grierson, P., Numismatics. London 1975.Macdonald, G., Coin Finds and How to Interpret Them. Proceedings of the RoyalPhilosophical Society of Glasgow, vol. 34 (1903), pp. 282-300.Metcalf, D.M., Statistische Analyse bei der Auswertung von Münzfundmaterialien.Jahrbuch für Numismatik und Geldgeschichte, vol. 9 (1958), pp. 187-196.Patterson, C.C., Silver Stocks and Losses in Ancient and Medieval Times. The EconomicHistory Review, 2nd ser., vol. XXV (1972), no. 2, pp. 205-233.Pflaum, H.G., L´importance des trésors pour la numismatique et l´histoire. Cercle d´étudesnumismatiques. Bulletin trimestriel, vol. 14 (1977), no.1, pp. 1-10.Potin, V., Systematisierung der Münzfunde und ihre Bedeutung für die numismatischeForschung. In: Actes du 8éme Congrès International de Numismatique: New York-Washington, Septembre 1973. Paris 1976, pp. 13-23.Sarvas, P., Münzschätze und Münzschatzfunde. In: T. Fischer, P. Ilisch (eds.), Lagom.Festschrift für Peter Berghaus. Münster 1981, pp. 3-10.

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147

APPENDIX I

Hoards arranged by latest coin

149

1: Basic statistics of silver coin hoards of the U.P.

A. 1536-1605:Type Hoards Coins*,O,E,E/O 29 13761-5 Ag coinsunspecified, <5 Ag coins 6 18no Ag coins 20 0

55 1394B. 1605-1760:Type Hoards Coins* 103 8901O 58 3764E 20 746E/O 6 2491-5 Ag 25 65unspecified, <5 Ag coins 38 2613no Ag coins 12 0

262 16338C. 1760-1942:Type Hoards Coins1-5 Ag coins 19 61rest 185 28970

204 29031no particulars 6 ?

210 29031D. only „Mughal“:Type Hoards Coinsonly „Mughal“, 0 Ag coins 3 01-5 Ag coins 5 11rest 17 1113

25 1124

TOTAL A+B+C+D 552 47887

Types of hoards:* current savings hoardO old savings hoardE emergency hoard

Appendix I.1 : Basic Statistics of Silver Coin Hoards of the U.P.


2. Hoards of the U.P. with a share of unidentified coins

LATEST REFERENCE AG UNIDENTIFIED PER CENTCOIN COINS OF THE TOTAL

1562 48/UP 50 35 701585 141/UP 14 9 64,291639 807/UP 140 65 46,431658 183/UP 200 186 931676 768/UP 45 36 801683 39/UP 15 1 6,671691 1030/UP 119 2 1,681701 1039/UP 7 1 14,291710 164/UP 248 219 88,311744 783/UP 156 94 60,26

3. Hoards described as „Mughal“, coins unidentifiedREFERENCE RECOVERED COINS METAL DESCRIPTION

IN HOARD219/UP 1900-01 261 Ag 43 exam:13 Mughal, 30 Awadh255/UP 1901-02 48 Ag 9 Mughal, 39 [?] Awadh268/UP 1902-03 48 Ag 9 Mughal, 39 Awadh339/UP 1904-05 106 Cu Mughal & Awadh354/UP 1905-06 275 Ag 259 Mughal, 16 Awadh470/UP 1911-12 2 Ag 1 Mughal, 1 Awadh548/UP 1913-14 95 Cu Mughal561/UP 1913-14 13 Ag Mughal681/UP 1921-22 5 Ag Mughal687/UP 1921-22 19 Ag Mughal703/UP 1923-24 101 Ag Mughal725/UP 1924-25 2 Ag Mughal733/UP 1925-26 1 Ag Mughal756/UP 1926-27 33 Ag Mughal769/UP 1927-28 1 Ag Mughal822/UP 1931-32 98 Ag 6 Mughal, 92 Adivaraha827/UP 1931-32 52 Cu Mughal850/UP 1933-34 23 Ag Mughal900/UP 1936-37 96 Ag Mughal901/UP 1936-37 15 Ag Mughal902/UP 1936-37 14 Ag Mughal903/UP 1936-37 8 Ag Mughal919/UP 1937-38 14 Ag Mughal977/UP 1945-46 13 Ag Mughal979/UP 1945-46 34 Ag Muhammad Shah 24; Mughal 10

151

4. Hoards with unspecified subtotals of coins minted in particular regnal periodsLATEST COIN REFERENCE RECOVERED AG COINS1612 915/UP 1937/38 131623 821/UP 1931/32 1401626 881/UP 1935/36 301647/48 856/UP 1933/34 171658? 194/UP 1899 891670/71 861/UP 1934/35 1081703 929/UP 1939/40 301712/13 717/UP 1924/25 371716/17 857/UP 1933/34 24Muhd.Shah 694/UP 1922/23 2871723/24 690/UP 1921/22 111723/24 705/UP 1923/24 761726/27 891/UP 1936/37 651732/33 709/UP 1924/25 1011738 888/UP 1936/37 731757(?) 706/UP 1923/24 461760 863/UP 1934/35 255

5. Hoards with approximate dating of the latest coinLATEST COIN REFERENCE RECOVERED AG COINSAkbar 217/UP 1900 25Akbar 369/UP 1905/06 6Akbar 840/UP 1932/33 0Akbar 868/UP 1934/35 0Jahangir 271/UP 1902/03 11Jahangir 477/UP 1911/12 9Jahangir 581/UP 1914/15 2Jahangir 619/UP 1915/16 21Jahangir 832/UP 1932/33 4Shahjahan 38/UP 1888 48Shahjahan 412/UP 1907/08Shahjahan 515/UP 1913/14 1Shahjahan 523/UP 1913/14 3Shahjahan 997/UP 1949/50 80Shahjahan 183/UP 1898 200Aurangzeb 244/UP 1901/02 48Aurangzeb 1105/UP 1967/68 7Shah Alam I. 349/UP 1905/06 8Shah Alam I. 15/UP 1886 148Shah Alam I. 1141/UP 1978/79 17Muhd.Shah 193/UP 1899 9Muhd.Shah 694/UP 1922/23 287

Appendix I.1 : Basic Statistics of Silver Coin Hoards of the U.P.

Appendix I.2 : Mughal silver coin hoards, 1536-1760 with percentual shares of coins of different regnal periods153

Appendix 1.2.: Mughal silver coin hoards, 1536-1760 with percentual shares of coins of different regnal periods

1536/37 79/UP 16 16 1891 16 1891 BAHLAWARA (Banger, HARDOI)1536/37 952/UP 114 114 1941/42 TEWAR LALPUR (Auraiya, ETAWAH)1540/41 713/UP 10 10 1924/25 GAURIPUR (Biswan, SITAPUR)1545? 762/UP 2 2 1927/27 MALLANPUR (SITAPUR)1548/49 858/UP 21 21 1934/35 SANDAHA (RAE BARELI)1550? 767/UP 14 14 1927/28 BHILWAL (Haidergarh, BARABANKI)1551 862/UP 9 9 1934/35 RATSAND (Garwar, BALLIA)1551/52 609/UP 13 13 1915/16 JUNGLE BETWA (GORAKHPUR)1552/53 397/UP 14 14 1906/07 MIRZAPUR (MIRZAPUR)1554/55 615/UP 24 24 1915/16 QASIMPUR (PILIBHIT)1554? 403/UP 2 2 1906/07 SALEMPUR (Aligarh, FARRUKHABAD)1561/62(?) 48/UP 50 50 1889 only 15 exam. KOMRI (Hathras, ALIGARH)1562/63 172/UP 11 11 1897 * 54,55 FARIDPUR (Khodaganj Road, BAREILLY)1562/63 642/UP 17 17 1916/17 * 17,65 MARIAHU (JAUNPUR)1564/65 704/UP 1 1 1923/24 PIRPUR (KHERI)1566/67 122/UP 1 1 1895 BIJNOR (BIJNOR)1567/68(?) 337/UP 933 933 1904/05 no dates: 243 DURGAPUR (Ramsanehighat, BARABANKI)1568/69 943/UP 194 19 175 1940/41 Ag/Cu=? NAGAL (Najibabad, BIJNOR)1572/73 906/UP 98 98 1937/38 BUDAUN (BUDAUN)1573-81(?) 492/UP 547 547 1911/12 98X = 1573-1581 UNCHGAON (BENARES)1573-81(?) 228/UP 564 564 1900/01 98X = 1573-1581 FATEHPUR (FATEHPUR)1575/76 1058/UP 249 249 1956/57 BHADBA (Fatehpur, FATEHPUR)1576/77 679a/UP 8 8 1919/20 NAUNER (Bhogaon, MAINPURI)1577/78 484/UP 5 5 1911/12 KULPAHAR (HAMIRPUR)1579/80(?) 793/UP 30 23 1929/30 * 86,96 no dates: 4 Akbari KASRAWAN (Amethi, SULTANPUR)1579/80(?) 786/UP 34 32 2 1928/29 * 31,25 no dates: 3 Akbari ORAI (JALAUN)1580-81 249/UP 39 1 38 1901/02 illegible 6 BAMMIPUR/BAWANIPUR (Kishni, MAINPURI)1580/81(?) 1027/UP 102 6 96 1954/55 no dates: 56; Ag/Cu=? NETHLA (Baghpat, MEERUT)1581 138/UP 56 56 1895 * 91,07 BRAHMANPUR (Mongra, JAUNPUR)1581 961/UP 12 12 1943/44 * 100,00 HATTIA (Phulpur, ALLAHABAD)1581(?) 1065/UP 1050 1050 1966/67 others 128 BHIKANPUR (Akbarpur, KANPUR)1581 867/UP 79 79 1934/35 E 100,00 RAIPUR PHULWARI (Amethi, SULTANPUR)1584 550/UP 40 40 1913/14 BHADEORA (Gola, KHERI)1585/86(?) 184/UP 11 1 10 1898 2 c. without dates SULTANPUR (SULTANPUR)1585/86(?) 141/UP 14 14 1895 no dates: 9 (undeciph.:6) SHAHGARH (SULTANPUR)1586/87 160/UP 7 7 1897 * 100,00 BIJNOR (BIJNOR)1591/92 153/UP 29 billon 1896 SONDI KALAN (Garwara, Machlishahr, JAUNPUR)1591/92 51/UP 5 5 1889 KHAURANDESH NAGAR (Rudauli, BARABANKI)1591/92 641/UP 4 4 1916/17 LAKHANPUR (KHERI)1591/92(?) 505/UP 56 56 1911/12 * 96,43 illegible 34 KACHERA (Sangrapur, PRATAPGARH)1591/92(?) 348/UP 53 53 1905/06 41 exam.,illeg.26 HASANPUR (Haidergarh, BARABANKI)1592/93 359/UP 50 50 1905/06 * 100,00 BARABANKI (BARABANKI)1593 530/UP 291 290 1 1913/14 O? 68,97 BHARPUR (Bindachal, MIRZAPUR)1593/94 673/UP 6 6 1918/19 E 100,00 RAMWANPUR (Captanganj, BASTI)1594 621/UP 21 21 1915/16 * 90,48 NEWADA (JHANSI)1594 770/UP 6 6 1927/28 E 100,00 DEORAJPUR (Kadipur, SULTANPUR)1595/96 974/UP 223 17 206 1944/45 Ag/Cu=? GHANGORA (DEHRADUN)1599(?) 1072/UP 36 36 1966/67 no dates: 11 PHARAULI (Kasganj, ETAH)1601? 450/UP 484 484 1908/09 * 100,00 illegible 452?! FATEHPUR (Fatehpur, BARABANKI)1602 1106/UP 32 32 1967/68 GAHI (Miranpur, MUZAFFARNAGAR)1602 538/UP 15 15 1913/14 * 100,00 BANSGAON/BAMHANGAON (Nizamabad,AZAMGARH)1602 720/UP 8 8 1924/25 * 100,00 ANNI BAIJAL (SULTANPUR)1602 864/UP 272 272 1934/35 INGOTHA (Sunapur, HAMIRPUR)1603/04(?) 520/UP 55 55 1913/14 illegible 24 FARRUKHABAD (FARRUKHABAD)1603(?) 1064/UP 1774 1774 1966/67 „useless“ 109 KANPUR (KANPUR)1605 975/UP 556 556 1944/45 * 100.00 0.00 AWAZIPUR (FATEHPUR)

LATEST C. REF. AGIN HOARD (Srivastava)TOTAL AG AU CU RECOVERED TYPE AKB JAH SHAH AUR ShAl JAHD FARS MuSh AhSh ALAM NOTE LOCALITY (tahsil, DISTRICT)


1605/06 946/UP 20 20 1941/42 * 95.00 5.00 KIRTHUA MUHAMMADPUR (Shikohabad, MAINPURI)Akbar 868/UP 448 448 1934/35 no dates given no dates given ABDULLAHPUR (Soraon, ALLAHABAD)Akbar 217/UP 25 25 1900 no dates given no dates given MOHRARA/MOHATARA (BANDA)Akbar 369/UP 6 6 1905/06 no dates given no dates given DILAWALPUR (Mirza Murad, BANARES)Akbar 840/UP 1 1 1932/33 no dates given no dates given KHERI (KHERI)1606/07 371/UP 96 96 1905/06 * 79.17 20.83 PRATAPGARH (PRATAPGARH)1611/12 (Cu!) 1079/UP 1011 9 1002 1966/67 * 88.89 0.00 QABOOLPURA (BUDAUN)1612 222/UP 21 21 1900/01 * 90.48 9.52 BAREILLY (BAREILLY)1612 915/UP 13 13 1937/38 subtotals unspecified subtotals unspecified HARDOI (HARDOI)1613 462/UP 20 20 1909/11 E 30.00 70.00 AGRA (AGRA)1614 973/UP 259 259 1944/45 * 62.55 5.41 NAIBASTI (JHANSI)1614-15 426/UP 1388 1388 1907/08 * 86.53 13.40 1044-29:corrected to1024-9 JHANSI (JHANSI)1614/15 111/UP 1 1 1894 BANDA (BANDA)1615/16? 418/UP 42 42 1907/08 * 52.38 38.1 *1023-10 corrected to 1024-10 JHANSI (JHANSI)1617 283/UP 2 2 1902/03 MAINPURI (MAINPURI)1617/18 808/UP 1 1 1930/31 AZAMPUR (BIJNOR)1620 972/UP 482 482 1944/45 * 28.10 71.99 1042,1066:MISPRINT JHANSI (JHANSI)1620-21 203/UP 491 491 1900 * 42.16 57.84 Az1029-15 or 1031-16 DANDWALA/DUNDWALA (Kashipur, NAINITAL)1620/21(?) 563/UP 89 89 1913/14 illegible 67 NEWARNA (UNNAO)1621 307/UP 21 21 1904/05 O 95.24 4.76 RAE BARELI (RAE BARELI)1621 657/UP 1 1 1917/18 UNNAO (UNNAO)1622/23 522/UP 34 34 1913/14 O 79.41 20.59 MUCHWA KHERA (Ratiajunair, FATEHPUR)1622/23 358/UP 11 10 1 1905/06 E/O 0.00 100.00 JAUNPUR (JAUNPUR)1623 821/UP 144 140 4 1931/32 subtotals unspecified subtotals unspecified BASTI (BASTI)1623/24 890/UP 15 15 1936/37 E 0.00 100.00 ALLAHABAD (ALLAHABAD)1624/25 698/UP 38 38 1923/24 BARWA (Naraini, BANDA)1625 248/UP 18 18 1901/02 O 72.22 27.78 0.00 RAE BARELI (RAE BARELI)1626 881/UP 30 30 1935/36 subtotals unspecified subtotals unspecified MAJAURA (BASTI)1626 1008/UP 16 16 1952/53 * 37.50 62.50 0.00 BHUARPUR (Saidpur, GHAZIPUR)1627/28 43/UP 3 3 1889 MATHURA (MATHURA)Jahangir 243/UP 287 287 1901/02 no dates given TAJGANJ (AGRA)Jahangir 271/UP 11 11 1902/03 no dates given no dates given RAMPUR (Khaga, FATEHPUR)Jahangir 581/UP 2 2 1914/15 no dates given no dates given MALAK PINGA (Sirathu, ALLAHABAD)Jahangir 619/UP 21 21 1915/16 no dates given no dates given BAMBRI/BAMBIA (BANDA)Jahangir 832/UP 4 4 1932/33 no dates given no dates given BIRHAT (Rath, HAMIRPUR)Jahangir 477/UP 9 9 1911/12 no dates given no dates given SINGKUGHAT (FYZABAD)1628 742/UP 252 252 1926/27 O 52.05 47.95 1.98 contam.by 3 coins from 1910 KHERA MAUZKOT (Firozabad, AGRA)1628/29 265/UP 44 42 2 1902/03 E 4.76 19.05 76.19 RAIS (Karbal, MAINPURI)1629 373/UP 110 110 1905/06 E 0.00 86.36 13.64 SURIAWAN (Shahganj, MIRZAPUR)1629/30 620/UP 7 7 1915/16 O 85.71 0.00 14.29 RAMPUR KHAMAUNA (BENARES)1629/30 282/UP 71 71 1902/03 * 29.58 66.20 4.23 BHAIPUR (Post Mustafabad, MAINPURI)1630 710/UP 4 4 1924/25 FATEHGANJ (RAE BARELI)1630/31 391/UP 6 6 1906/07 O 50.00 33.33 16.67 RAMPURA (Kotwali, GORAKHPUR)1632-40 802/UP 73 73 1929/30 104X = 1631-1640 104X = 1631-1640 ITMADPUR (AGRA)1633 419/UP 3 3 1907/08 NATHAIPUR (Phulpur, BENARES)1634/35 780/UP 15 15 1928/29 * 20.00 66.67 13.33 GUDRA (Kadipur, SULTANPUR)1635/36 784/UP 183 183 1928/29 O 43.17 39.89 16.39 lunar;1636/37 if solar SEMARA (Kiraoli, AGRA)1638/39(?) 807/UP 140 140 1930/31 defaced 50;1639/40sol. defaced .50;1639/40 if solar BASTI (BASTI)1640 264/UP 8 8 1902/03 O 12.50 62.50 25.00 BAREILLY (BAREILLY)1640/41 837/UP 107 107 1932/33 * 30.84 3.74 64.49 1641/42 if solar.;contam.by 1 KANNAUJ (Kannauj, FARRUKHABAD)1641/42 679/UP 1 1 1919/20 1642/43 if solar 1642/43 if solar SALEMPUR (Amroha, MORADABAD)1643/44 1038/UP 10 9 1 1954/55 * 0.00 11.11 88.89 LACHHAGIR (Handia, ALLAHABAD)1644/45? 920/UP 9 9 1937/38 E 0.00 0.00 100.00 latest:1032[sic!]-18.r.y. JAUNPUR (JAUNPUR)1647/48 856/UP 17 17 1933/34 subtotals unspecified subtotals unspecified SAMDHA (Purwa, UNNAO)1648/49 313/UP 110 110 1904/05 * 27.27 37.27 35.45 FARIDPUR (BAREILLY)1650 679b/UP 9 9 1919/20 * 22.22 11.11 66.67 PILIBHIT (PILIBHIT)1653 446/UP 12 12 1908/09 * 8.33 8.33 83.33 KATAHA (Ikarauna, BAHRAICH)



1654 309/UP 20 19 1 1904/05 * 0.00 5.26 94.74 AGRA (AGRA)1656/57 953/UP 37 37 1941/42 * 5.41 16.22 75.68 CHHANGAPUR (Rampur, JAUNPUR)1656/57 764/UP 30 30 1927/28 * 6.67 0.00 93.33 GHUNGCHAI (Puranpur, PILIBHIT)1656/57 846/UP 14 14 1933/34 O 21.43 7.14 71.43 SHAHPUR SAIDAN (Pindarwara, Shahabad, HARDOI)1656/57 1007/UP 124 124 1951/52 O 12.98 38.71 48.39 BANDA (BANDA)1657 836/UP 132 132 1932/33 O 47.73 12.88 38.64 SAMADHA (Purwa, UNNAO)1657 667/UP 71 71 1917/18 * 16.90 12.68 70.42 PURA BAGH RAI (SULTANPUR)1657/58 829/UP 18 18 1932/33 * 0.00 0.00 100.00 ARJUNAPURA (Bah, Pinhat, AGRA)1657/58 918/UP 50 50 1937/38 * 0.00 0.00 100.00 BASTI (BASTI)1658 1035/UP 16 16 1954/55 O 25.00 31.25 43.75 NAWABGANJ (Soraon, ALLAHABAD)1658? 194/UP 89 89 1899 subtotals unspecified subtotals unspecified ALIGARH (ALIGARH)1659 616/UP 45 45 1915/16 * 0.00 0.00 100.00 NAUGAON (PILIBHIT)Shahjahan 38/UP 48 48 1888 no dates given no dates given BAHRAICH (BAHRAICH)Shahjahan 412/UP 1 1 1907/08 no dates given no dates given ZAIDPUR (BARABANKI)Shahjahan 515/UP 1 1 1913/14 no dates given no dates given MORADABAD (MORADABAD)Shahjahan 997/UP 80 80 1949/50 no dates given no dates given KANPUR (KANPUR)Shahjahan 183/UP 200 200 1898 no dates;identif.14/200 no dates;identif.14/200 SIKANDARABAD (BULANDSHAHR)Shahjahan 523/UP 3 3 1913/14 no dates given no dates given NARAINI (Hasua, FATEHPUR)1660/61 451/UP 31 31 1909/11 * 9.68 9.68 77.42 3.23 RAE BARELI (RAE BARELI)1660/61 320/UP 154 154 1904/05 O 13.64 13.64 70.13 0.65 BAREILLY (BAREILLY)1662/63 735/UP 18 18 1925/26 * 0.00 5.56 88.89 5.56 RAHI (SITAPUR)1662/63 540/UP 669 13 656 1913/14 * 0.00 7.69 76.92 15.38 DUNGSIL (NAINITAL)1664/65 937/UP 14 14 1940/41 * 0.00 7.14 85.71 7.14 GHALAULI (Rampur, SAHARANPUR)1665/66 262/UP 25 25 1902/03 O 16.00 24.00 52.00 8.00 NAINITAL (NAINITAL)1667/68 68/UP 128 128 1890 * 1.56 6.25 82.81 9.38 BABARPUR (Auraiya, ETAWAH)1667/68 303/UP 145 145 1904/05 O 24.83 20.69 51.72 2.76 PUDAN (Handia, ALLAHABAD)1667/68(?) 464/UP 22 22 1909/11 * 13.64 4.55 68.18 9.09 1076-10 impossible CHORAHA (Goshaiganj, LUCKNOW)1670/71 66/UP 69 59 10 1890 * 0.00 0.00 64.11 35.89 2 HOARDS IN 1 HARDWAR (SAHARANPUR)1670/71 861/UP 108 108 1934/35 subtotals unspecified subtotals unspecified JAHANGIRABAD (SITAPUR)1671/72 1006/UP 121 121 1951/52 * 4.96 1.65 80.99 12.40 PERA (HARDOI)1671-73(?) 39/UP 15 15 1888 O 13.33 6.67 40.00 33.33 !?1083[1672/73]-14[1671/72] KHERI (KHERI)1676 967/UP 63 63 1943/44 O 0.00 14.29 68.25 15.87 MANGLAUR (SAHARANPUR)1677 296/UP 16 16 1903/04 * 0.00 0.00 75.00 25.00 MADANAPUR (Bilaspur, PILIBHIT)1677(?) 768/UP 45 45 1927/28 examined 9 from 45 examined 9 from 45 MUKHBAR (Itmadpur, AGRA)1678 675/UP 1 1 1918/19 BANDA (BANDA)1679 422/UP 15 15 1907/08 * 13.33 0.00 60.00 26.67 NAGROL (Kulpahar, HAMIRPUR)1679 525/UP 51 51 1913/14 O 27.45 5.88 47.06 19.61 PATAI TAPPA ROBRAR (Meja, ALLAHABAD)1680 601/UP 6 6 1914/15 O 16.67 33.33 33.33 16.67 BEWAL (Salon, RAE BARELI)1682-84(?) 257/UP 19 19 1901/02 O 0.00 0.00 73.68 26.32 !?1095[1683/84]-26[1682/83] SAHASWAN (BUDAUN)1684/85 465/UP 926 926 1909/11 * 0.11 0.11 46.98 51.55 PAHASU (BULANDSHAHR)1684/85 1016/UP 21 21 1952/53 O 0.00 4.76 80.95 14.29 AGHAR PAHASU (Khurja, BULANDSHAHR)1685/86 344/UP 295 295 1905/06 O 8.47 10.85 44.41 28.81 KANWARA (BANDA)1685/86 420/UP 3 3 1907/08 PATNI (BALLIA)1686 892/UP 9 9 1936/37 * 0.00 0.00 0.00 100.00 ETAH (ETAH)1686/87 302/UP 242 242 1903/04 O 7.85 7.02 74.38 10.74 GHATIA (Azamkhar Digra, AGRA)1686/87 305/UP 23 23 1904/05 O 4.35 0.00 73.91 21.74 SHAHPUR SAIDAN (MUZAFFARNAGAR)1686/87 934/UP 19 19 1940/41 O 10.53 10.53 63.16 15.79 BISALPUR (PILIBHIT)1687/88 1097/UP 12 12 1966/67 * 0.00 8.33 25.00 66.67 MAHRAUNI (JHANSI)1688 602/UP 7 7 1914/15 O 0.00 14.29 14.29 71.43 RAGAULI (Gaothe, JHANSI)1689/90 782/UP 65 65 1928/29 * 0.00 0.00 18.46 81.54 MORADABAD (M0RADABAD)1690/91839/UP=855/UP 52 52 1932/33 * 0.00 0.00 0.00 100.00 identical with 855/UP FATEHPUR (FATEHPUR)1691/92 1030/UP 119 119 1954/55 O 3.36 11.76 58.82 24.37 GANGAPUR (Subeha, BARABANKI)1694/95(?) 716/UP 61 61 1924/25 subtotals unspecified;1106[1694/95]-29[1685/86] !?1106[1694/95]-29[1685/86] MADHNIPUR+KASIA (GORAKHPUR)1695 677/UP 1 1 1918/19 FARRUKHABAD (FARRUKHABAD)1695/96(?) 165/UP 18 18 1897 * 0.00 0.00 27.78 72.22 !?1107[1695/96]-37[1693/94] HAMIRPUR (HAMIRPUR)1696(?) 300/UP 28 28 1903/04 O 0.00 7.14 57.14 35.7 1 !?1107[1695/96]-*60;40[96/7] MADANAPUR (Bilaspur, PILIBHIT)1696/97 1052/UP 54 54 1956/57 O 0.00 0.00 59.26 38.89 BAZAR DEWAN (MORADABAD)



1699/00 215/UP 23 23 1900 O 4.35 0.00 34.78 60.87 GONDA (GONDA)1699/00 633/UP 10 10 1916/17 * 0.00 0.00 0.00 100.00 UNNAO (UNNAO)1699/00 1048/UP 28 28 1955/56 * 0.00 0.00 28.57 71.43 BHEDAUHA (Menhdaval, BASTI)1700/01 653/UP 12 12 1917/18 * 0.00 0.00 0.00 100.00 BISWAN (SITAPUR)1701 671/UP 5 5 1918/19 AZAMGARH (AZAMGARH)1701 740/UP 16 16 1926/27 * 0.00 0.00 18.75 81.25 GHURHAT (Karchana, ALLAHABAD)1701 741/UP 18 18 1926/27 * 0.00 5.56 16.67 77.78 GORAKHPUR (GORAKHPUR)1701/02 1039/UP 7 7 1954/55 defaced 1 of 7 defaced 1 of 7 MOHAMMADABAD (AZAMGARH)1702/03 553/UP 85 85 1913/14 * 0.00 0.00 0.00 100.00 GANGAPUR (Misrikh, SITAPUR)1702/03 565/UP 43 43 1913/14 * 0.00 0.00 0.00 97.67 DANYALPUR (Nawabganj, BARABANKI)1702/03 744/UP 14 14 1926/27 O 0.00 7.14 35.71 57.14 ALIGARH (ALIGARH)1703 236/UP 16 16 1900/01 O 0.00 0.00 43.75 56.25 LOHRAULI (Mehdawal, BASTI)1703 611/UP 22 22 1915/16 O 9.09 0.00 63.64 22.73 GARHIA/KURHAIYA (KHERI)1703 929/UP 30 30 1939/40 subtotals unspecified subtotals unspecified AKBARPUR (ALLAHABAD)1703/04 421/UP 34 34 1907/08 * 0.00 0.00 26.47 73.53 GAND (Kulpahar, HAMIRPUR)1705/06 779/UP 91 91 1928/29 E 0.00 0.00 0.00 100.00 ETAH (ETAH)1706/07 1042/UP 31 31 1954/55 O 25.81 16.13 35.48 22.58 PURAINA (Bansi, BASTI)1706/07 210/UP 58 58 1900 O 20.69 3.45 34.48 32.76 PRATAPGARH (PRATAPGARH)Aurangzeb 244/UP 48 48 1901/02 no dates given no dates given PAILANI (BANDA)Aurangzeb 1105/UP 7 7 1967/68 no dates given no dates given SAMBHALA HAIRA (Miranpur, MUZAFFARNAGAR)1707/08 682/UP 2 2 1921/22 BANDA (BANDA)1708/9(?) 447/UP 31 31 1908/09 * 0.00 0.00 6.45 80.65 12.90 r.y.2; Lakhnau s.a. SATAON (Surba Khoh, RAE BARELI)1710? 1141/UP 17 17 1978/79 ShAl coins undated MAJHORA (Fakharpur, BAHRAICH)1710/11 85/UP 28 28 1891 * 0.00 0.00 0.00 96.43 3.57 CHITA (Kheragarh, AGRA)1710/11 960/UP 15 15 1943/44 * 0.00 0.00 0.00 86.67 13.33 DHUTA (Rampur, JALAUN)1710/11(?) 164/UP 248 248 1897 identif.29 out of 248 identif.29 out of 248 KHERI (KHERI)1711/12 413/UP 25 25 1907/08 * 0.00 0.00 0.00 76.00 24.00 KHAULIJAR (Sumerpur, Lalpur, HAMIRPUR)Shah AlamI 15/UP 148 148 1886 no date given;Srinagari 7 no date given;Srinagari 7 BANDA (BANDA)Shah AlamI 349/UP 8 8 1905/06 no date given no date given KAROORI/KARONI (Behari, BAREILLY)1712 281/UP 1 1 1902/03 NAWADIA (Faridpur, BAREILLY)1712/13 370/UP 101 99 1 1 1905/06 * 0.00 0.00 3.03 86.87 8.08 1.01 1.01 HARKHAULI/HARAULI (Jalaun, JALAUN)1712/13 717/UP 37 37 1924/25 subtotals unspecified subtotals unspecified ISHARPURA (Ruderpur, GORAKHPUR)1713/14 233/UP 199 199 1900/01 O 2.51 10.05 47.74 35.68 1.01 0.50 2.01 LOHRAULI (Khalilabad, BASTI)1713/14 279/UP 22 22 1902/03 * 0.00 4.55 0.00 81.82 4.55 4.55 4.55 ALIGARH (ALIGARH)1713/14 1041/UP 9 9 1954/55 E 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 100.00 POLICE MALA KHANA (LUCKNOW)1714/15 560/UP 1 1 1913/14 RASULPUR (Paisarampur, BASTI)1715/16 1101/UP 442 442 1967/68 * 0.00 0.45 6.33 65.61 17.19 2.94 7.47 BANGAR (Binawar, BUDAUN)1715/16 311/UP 11 11 1904/05 * 0.00 0.00 18.18 54.55 9.09 0.00 18.18 SAMANDPUR (Sagri, AZAMGARH)1716/17 594/UP 102 102 1914/15 * 0.98 1.96 7.84 43.14 34.31 0.98 10.78 MUNDIARI/MUNDICHARA (Ramgaon, FYZABAD)1716/17 838/UP 24 24 1932/33 E 0.00 0.00 0.00 4.17 0.00 0.00 95.83 SHAHJAHANPUR (SHAHJAHANPUR)1716/17 857/UP 24 24 1933/34 subtotals unspecified;identical with 838/UP? subtotals unspecified;=838/UP? MANPUR SANVAT (Banda, SHAHJAHANPUR)1716/17 392/UP 15 15 1906/07 O 0.00 6.67 0.00 33.33 0.00 20.00 40.00 GAJPUR (Amargaon, GORAKHPUR)1717 86/UP 39 39 1892 E 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 100.00 PAURI GARHWAL (PAURI GARHWAL)1717/18 1047/UP 75 75 1955/56 O 0.00 0.00 0.00 76.00 8.00 2.67 13.33 EONI (Lachhuri, Mau, JHANSI)1718 966/UP 30 30 1943/44 * 0.00 0.00 3.33 30.00 16.67 0.00 50.00 PACHOHI/PACHUA (Hato, Deoria, GORAKHPUR)1718/19 259/UP 9 9 1902/03 * 0.00 0.00 0.00 33.33 0.00 0.00 66.67 MISRIPUR MAKAIA (Sahaswan, BUDAUN)1719 14/UP 1 1 1886 LALITPUR (JHANSI)1719 361/UP 1 1 1905/06 DEORA (Raipur, SULTANPUR)1721 1088/UP 125 125 1966/67 O/E 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.60 0.00 0.00 96.80 0.80 RUDRAPRAYAG (PAURI GARHWAL)1721 481/UP 70 70 1911/12 * 0.00 0.00 0.00 5.71 12.86 4.29 52.86 20.00 CHAUMA BEGAMPUR (Misrikh, SITAPUR)1721/22 1021/UP 28 28 1953/54 O 0.00 3.57 10.71 35.71 14.29 3.57 28.57 3.57 JURKHANPUR (Tanda, FYZABAD)1721/22 1122/UP 31 31 1975/76 O 0.00 6.45 25.81 19.35 19.35 0.00 22.58 6.45 CHITRAKUT (Karwi, BANDA)1722(?) 285/UP 3 3 1902/03 Ramsingh 2 Jaipur PILIBHIT (PILIBHIT)1722/23 869/UP 23 23 1934/35 E 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 100.00 MUKARIMNAGAR (Lucknow, LUCKNOW)1722/23 656/UP 18 18 1917/18 * 0.00 0.00 0.00 22.22 5.56 0.00 11.11 33.33 PILIBHIT (PILIBHIT)1722/23 346/UP 13 13 1905/06 * 0.00 0.00 15.38 38.46 0.00 0.00 30.77 15.38 TIHAITPUR (Birhas, FYZABAD)1723/24 705/UP 76 76 1923/24 subtotals unspecified s ubtotals unspecified RAKHWASA (Hardaura, JHANSI)



1723/24 512/UP 37 37 1913/14 * 0.00 0.00 0.00 21.62 10.81 8.11 48.65 8.11 CHAMARPURA (Gurmau, BADAUN)1723/24 690/UP 11 11 1921/22 subtotals unspecified subtotals unspecified BENARES (BENARES)1724/25 625/UP 25 25 1916/17 E/O 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 96.00 4.00 ETAWAH (ETAWAH)1724/25 712/UP 19 19 1924/25 E 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 100.00 GARHI (Amroha, MORADABAD)1724/25 814/UP 2 2 1930/31 RAUSHANABAD (Bangarmau, UNNAO)1725 13/UP 12 12 1886 * 0.00 0.00 0.00 33.33 16.67 0.00 25.00 25.00 LALITPUR (JHANSI)1725/26 536/UP 250 250 1913/14 * 0.00 0.00 0.40 27.20 18.40 4.00 34.00 12.40 MAJHAWANPUR (BASTI)1725/26 636/UP 49 49 1916/17 * 0.00 0.00 6.12 28.57 8.16 0.00 38.78 12.24 HARPUR (Bansgaon, Dhuriapur, GORAKHPUR)1726 668/UP 84 76 8 1917/18 O 0.00 0.00 0.00 40.79 13.16 3.95 17.11 22.37 ETAH (ETAH)1726/27 319/UP 181 181 1904/05 O 0.00 0.55 0.00 65.19 17.13 1.10 10.50 4.42 HAS RAI/HABURAS (Thimadpur, AGRA)1726/27 891/UP 65 65 1936/37 subtotals unspecified subtotals unspecified UNNAO (UNNAO)1727/28 321/UP 97 97 1904/05 O 8.25 4.12 27.84 37.11 4.12 3.09 10.31 5.15 NOTA (Mau, JHANSI)1728 921/UP 8 8 1937/38 E 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 100.00 BAKHTIYAR NAGAR (Malihabad, LUCKNOW)1729 895/UP 56 56 1936/37 E 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 100.00 RAE BARELI (RAE BARELI)1729(?) 33/UP 52 52 1887 E 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 90.38 „others 5“ ETAWAH (ETAWAH)1729/30 1134/UP 3 3 1977/78 KOTWALI (RAMPUR)1730/31 841/UP 27 27 1933/34 O 0.00 0.00 0.00 18.52 18.52 14.81 29.63 14.81 GOHANNA (Ramsanehighat, BARABANKI)1730/31 666/UP 22 22 1917/18 * 0.00 0.00 0.00 31.82 4.55 0.00 13.64 50.00 NAGLA BHARON (AGRA)1731/32 624/UP 344 344 1916/17 O 0.87 0.29 2.62 50.58 15.12 3.49 18.90 8.14 ALAMGANJ (FATEHPUR)1732 290/UP 6 6 1903/04 E 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 100.00 GARHIA (Jalalabad, SHAHJAHANPUR)1732/33 709/UP 101 101 1924/25 subtotals unspecified subtotals unspecified PASAI (Mehdawal, BASTI)1732/33(?) 202/UP 219 219 1900 * 0.00 0.00 0.00 4.11 1.37 0.46 3.65 89.95 illegible dates 147 BAKANIA (Gudarpur, NAINITAL)1734/35 724/UP 8 8 1924/25 * 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 100.00 SEMARA (Madiaon, LUCKNOW)1736 569/UP 22 22 1913/14 O 4.55 4.55 18.18 36.36 0.00 0.00 0.00 27.27 DALCHHAPUR (Tarayasujan, GORAKHPUR)1736/37 379/UP 5 5 1906/07 HARSAULI (Fatehpur, BARABANKI)1737(?) 613/UP 18 18 1915/16 * 0.00 0.00 0.00 5.56 0.00 0.00 0.00 94.44 date gone 2 MAHOLARA (BARABANKI)1737/38 318/UP 40 40 1904/05 * 0.00 0.00 0.00 15.00 7.50 5.00 10.00 60.00 MATHURA (MATHURA)1737/38 650/UP 43 43 1917/18 * 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 6.98 0.00 11.63 81.40 ALLAHABAD (ALLAHABAD)1737/38 708/UP 32 32 1924/25 * 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 100.00 PACHEURA (Haveli, Chunar, MIRZAPUR)1737/38 778/UP 19 19 1928/29 O 5.26 10.52 15.79 57.89 5.26 0.00 0.00 5.26 JAGDISHPUR al.PURACHANDA (Soraon, ALLAHABAD)1738 888/UP 73 73 1936/37 subtotals unspecified KANPUR (KANPUR)1738/39 575/UP 23 23 1914/15 E/O 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 100.00 DARYAPUR (Hathras, ALIGARH)1738/39(?) 1078/UP 139 139 1966/67 * 0.00 0.00 0.00 25.90 5.76 1.44 12.95 51.08 no dates 41;undecipher.2 ARNOTHA (Pinhat, Bah, AGRA)1739/40 627/UP 25 25 1916/17 O 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 36.00 56.00 MEERUT (MEERUT)1739/40 128/UP 9 9 1895 O 0.00 0.00 0.00 55.56 0.00 0.00 0.00 44.44 DAKAR (JALAUN)1740 139/UP 18 18 1895 * 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 11.11 0.00 0.00 72.22 ALIGARH (ALIGARH)1740/41 752/UP 117 116 1 1926/27 * 0.00 0.00 0.00 6.89 5.17 0.00 8.62 77.59 SHAHBAZPUR (BUDAUN)1740/41 757/UP 38 38 1926/27 E 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 100.00 SORAON (ALLAHABAD)1740/41 676/UP 5 5 1918/19 BIJNOR (BIJNOR)1741 429/UP 23 23 1908/09 E/O 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 100.00 SIRSIA (Bhinga, BAHRAICH)1741 246/UP 15 15 1901/02 * 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 100.00 SIKANDARABAD (BULANDSHAHR)1741/42 355/UP 126 126 1905/06 * 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.79 0.00 7.94 91.27 DERAJAKAT/TERAJAKAT (Gursahaiganj, FARRUKHABAD)1741/42 212/UP 89 89 1900 O 7.87 2.25 79.78 8.99 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.12 ALIGARH (ALIGARH)1741/42 206/UP 7 7 1900 O 0.00 0.00 0.00 28.57 0.00 14.29 28.57 28.57 JALAUN (JALAUN)1742/43 497/UP 115 115 1911/12 * 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.74 2.61 0.00 0.87 94.78 SHAHGANJ (ALLAHABAD)1742/43 516/UP 47 47 1913/14 E/O 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 100.00 MASELI (Rasulpur, MORADABAD)1742/43 456/UP 19 19 1909/11 O 0.00 0.00 0.00 5.26 0.00 0.00 21.05 68.42 PIPPIGANJA (Hargaon, GORAKHPUR)1743 517/UP 10 10 1913/14 * 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 100.00 WAOHSTA HANS RAM (SHAHJAHANPUR)1743 502/UP 71 71 1911/12 * 0.00 0.00 0.00 14.08 1.41 0.00 7.04 77.46 THANAIL/TARAHUWAN (Hadausa, BANDA)1744 894/UP 109 109 1936/37 E 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 100.00 MORADABAD (MORADABAD)1744 527/UP 48 48 1913/14 * 0.00 0.00 0.00 16.67 0.00 0.00 12.50 70.83 RAGAULI/RAGSAULI (Garotha, JHANSI)1744/45 783/UP 156 156 1928/29 * 0.00 0.00 0.00 4.49 1.28 0.00 1.92 32.05 PIRAUNA (Konchi, JALAUN)1744/45 510/UP 32 32 1913/14 * 0.00 0.00 0.00 3.13 0.00 0.00 3.13 93.75 SULTANPUR (ETAH)1744/45 1032/UP 6 6 1954/55 * 0.00 0.00 0.00 16.67 0.00 0.00 0.00 83.33 BHOGNIPUR (KANPUR)1745/46 1104/UP 35 34 1 1967/68 * 0.00 0.00 2.94 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 97.06 JANSATH (Jansath, MUZAFFARNAGAR)1745/46 473/UP 29 29 1911/12 * 0.00 0.00 3.45 3.45 3.45 0.00 6.90 82.76 RITHAI/RIWAI (Karvi, BANDA)1745/46 697/UP 7 7 1923/24 * 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 100.00 PILIBHIT (PILIBHIT)



1745/46 1136/UP 3 3 1978/79 KHODARI (Dakpathar, DEHRADUN)1746/47 962/UP 10 10 1943/44 * 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 100.00 SIKHRAWA (Bisauli, BUDAUN)1747/48 199/UP 34 34 1900 * 0.00 0.00 0.00 2.92 0.00 0.00 0.00 97.06 SULTANPUR (SULTANPUR)1748 1139/UP 20 20 1978/79 * 0.00 0.00 0.00 5.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 90.00 5.00 SADABAD (MATHURA)1748 843/UP 17 17 1933/34 * 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 94.12 5.88 HANUAN BINAIKA (Mau, BANDA)1748 577/UP 16 16 1914/15 * 0.00 0.00 0.00 6.25 0.00 0.00 6.25 87.50 NAGINA (BIJNOR)1748 649/UP 5 5 1916/17 DETAI (MEERUT)Muhd.Shah 193/UP 9 9 1899 no dates given no dates given BAROI (SULTANPUR)Muhd.Shah 694/UP 287 287 1922/23 date,subtotals unspecif. date,subtotals unspecif. MUNDIA HEM SINGH (KHERI)Muhd.Shah? 1126/UP 2428 2428 1976/77 MSh undated;“useless2083" SHAHBAZPUR (Sahaswan, BUDAUN)1749/50 1138/UP 63 63 1978/79 * 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.59 1.59 0.00 3.17 88.89 4.76 SADABAD (MATHURA)1750 1015/UP 32 32 1952/53 * 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 3.13 0.00 0.00 71.88 25.00 GANGA RAMWALA (Barha, Nagina, BIJNOR)1750/51 847/UP 19 19 1933/34 E 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 47.37 52.63 RANIPUR (Mau, JHANSI)1752 1120/UP 243 243 1975/76 * 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.41 92.59 6.17 BHONAKPUR (Milak, RAMPUR)1753/54 988/UP 157 157 1946/47 O 0.00 0.00 0.64 8.92 0.00 0.00 8.92 77.71 3.82 BHOGAON (Harsaun, ALIGARH)1754 950/UP 12 10 2 1941/42 E 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 100.00 AKORHIA SALIMPUR (Salon, RAE BARELI)1755/56 340/UP 26 26 1904/05 * 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 65.38 23.08 11.54 NUQURAPUR (Nighaura, FYZABAD)1755/56 191/UP 6 6 1899 O 0.00 0.00 0.00 16.67 0.00 0.00 33.33 33.33 0.00 16.67 LUCKNOW (LUCKNOW)1756 739/UP 22 22 1925/26 O 4.55 0.00 0.00 9.09 0.00 0.00 0.00 50.00 13.64 22.73 REONI (ALMORA)1756/57 683/UP 47 47 1921/22 E 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 100.00 BHALWA (Jansath, MUZAFFARNAGAR)1756/57 791/UP 6 6 1929/30 E/O 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 66.67 33.33 JHANKI (Lalitpur, JHANSI)1757(?) 706/UP 48 46 2 1923/24 subtotals unspecified subtotals unspecified SUPA (Kulpahar, HAMIRPUR)1757/58 773/UP 14 14 1927/28 * 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 14.29 85.71 JHANSI (JHANSI)1757/58(?) 603/UP 1352 1352 1915/16 PIHANI (HARDOI)1758(?) 108/UP 18 18 1894 O 11.11 5.56 0.00 66.67 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 11.11 PURA (Gurotha, JHANSI)1758/59 453/UP 12 12 1909/11 RAE BARELI (RAE BARELI)1759/60 224/UP 73 73 1900/01 * 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 56.16 12.33 31.51 NAJIBABAD (BIJNOR)1759/60 297/UP 27 27 1903/04 O 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 3.70 0.00 3.70 0.00 7.41 85.18 NAKHA (Lakhimpur, KHERI)1759/60 374/UP 3 3 1905/06 MIRANPUR (Mandawar, BIJNOR)Alamgir II 1128/UP 14 14 1976/77 * 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 64.29 21.43 14.29 no dates given THAKURAN (Badapur, BIJNOR)Alamgir II 19/UP 6 6 1887 O 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 16.67 16.67 16.67 16.67 0.00 33.33 no dates given AZAMGARH (AZAMGARH)1759/60(?) 205/UP 14 14 1900 * 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 21.43 21.43 57.14 Alamgir II: r,y.7 [sic!] FYZABAD (FYZABAD)1760 863/UP 255 255 1934/35 subtotals unspecified subtotals unspecified UTRAITHIA (LUCKNOW)

TOTAL 306 30265 17633

* current savings hoardO old savings hoardE emergency hoard


Appendix I.3 : Hoards 1760-1942 159

Appendix 1.3.: Hoards 1760-1942

1760-19 226/UP 20 20 RAGHU RAM PATTI (JAUNPUR)1760-19 74/UP 296 296 MIRZAPUR (MIRZAPUR)1760-34 372/UP 84 84 MIRPUR (FYZABAD)1760-34 539/UP 37 37 RANBIRPUR (AZAMGARH)1760-62 192/UP 26 26 LUCKNOW (LUCKNOW)1760/61 571/UP 114 114 LUMB (Chaprauli, Bagpat, MEERUT)1760/61 587/UP 13 10 BENGALI TOLA (BENARES)1761 1000/UP 291 291 KITCHA (NAINITAL)1761-63 211/UP 26 26 LUCKNOW (LUCKNOW)1762-64 312/UP 20 20 MAU (JHANSI)1762-64 1011/UP 35 35 CHAKWARA (Raunahi, FYZABAD)1762/63 606/UP 193 193 DEWAL (KHERI)1763-65 1040/UP 12 12 SISWA (Mau Aima, Soraon, ALLAHABAD)1763/4? 524/UP 24 24 BALA SHAHI MANDI (ALLAHABAD)1763/64 362/UP 70 70 RADHAN (Firozabad, AGRA)1763/64 912/UP 28 28 AMROHA (MORADABAD)1764/65 250/UP 71 PILIBHIT (PILIBHIT)1764/65 284/UP 135 135 BENARES (BENARES)1764/65 479/UP 77 77 HAMIRPUR (HAMIRPUR)1764/65 665/UP 20 20 FATEHPUR SIKRI (AGRA)1764/65 853/UP 10 10 KHAR KARI (Purandarpur, GORAKHPUR)1766-8 234/UP 100 100 NAGINA (BIJNOR)1766/67 278/UP 37 37 KESOPUR (Sikandararao, Hasayau, ALIGARH)1766/67 591/UP 96 96 QAZIPUR (GORAKHPUR)1766/67 1013/UP 37 37 BATESAR (AGRA)1767-9? 911/UP 59 59 MEERUT (MEERUT)1767/68 381/UP 115 115 KURWA (Deoband, SAHARANPUR)1768/69 1098/UP 21 21 KARIKALWARI (Akbarpur, KANPUR)1768/9? 500/UP 1500 1500 NAYALA LAKE (Faizpur, ETAH)1770/71 235/UP 58 58 BAMRAULI/BHAMAULI (Jalalabad,SHAHJAHANABAD)1771-73 252/UP 5 5 BAREILLY (BAREILLY)1771/72 771/UP 87 87 BITHRA (Neoria, PILIBHIT)1771/72 914/UP 19 19 SHERPUR (Jhalotar, UNNAO)1772-74 544/UP 107 107 TIKARI (RAE BARELI)1772/73 684/UP 22 22 NATTHAI PATTI (Yarpi, Akbarpur, FYZABAD)1774/75 876/UP 70 70 DUNDHPUR (Purwa, UNNAO)1776/77 747/UP 225 225 NAUKUND (PILIBHIT)1777/78 983/UP 1 NAWABGANJ (RAE BARELI)1778/79 978/UP 26 26 MALKHANA (LUCKNOW)1779 1071/UP 45 45 MALIHABAD (LUCKNOW)1780 635/UP 114 114 BAHADURGANJ (ALLAHABAD)1780-2? 887/UP 192 192 ALIGARH (ALIGARH)1780/81 719/UP 199 199 SONATI (Mowana, MEERUT)1780/81 860/UP 519 519 MIAN SARAI (Sambhal, MORADABAD)1781-83 570/UP 7 7 MATHURA (MATHURA)1781/82 407/UP 14 14 MUZAFFARNAGAR (MUZAFFARNAGAR)1782/83 878/UP 66 66 FARIDPUR (Rampur, AZAMGARH)1783-85 813/UP 31 31 RAE BARELI (RAE BARELI)1783-85 819/UP 37 37 SARENDHI (Jagner, Agra)1783-85 378/UP 14 14 INDAURA (Malihabad, LUCKNOW)1783/84 269/UP 1 1 GANGAPUR (Bihar, PRATAPGARH)

LATEST COIN REF. ALL AGIN HOARD (Srivastava) COINS COINS LOCALITY (tahsil, DISTRICT)


1783/84 584/UP 70 70 DHANDAR BUZURG (Jhansi, JHANSI)1783? 142/UP 16 16 PAHARIYA/PIPARIYA (AGRA)1783? 57/UP 50 50 BAHRAICH (BAHRAICH)1783? 93/UP 57 57 GULARIA (Burhapur, BIJNOR)1783? 760/UP 487 487 KHAGA (FATEHPUR)1784-86 118/UP 129 129 AJODHIA (Ajodhya, FYZABAD)1784/85 100/UP 21 21 GANGA RAMPUR (Bilgram, HARDOI)1784/85 140/UP 21 21 KURWAR (SULTANPUR)1784/85 295/UP 20 20 JAUNPUR (JAUNPUR)1785/86 1074/UP 94 94 ALLAHABAD (ALLAHABAD)1787-89 766/UP 296 296 RAHAK (Rath, HAMIRPUR)1787-89 999/UP 182 182 BHILLA (Mahroni, JHANSI)1787/88 424/UP 6 0 SALEMPUR (Dataganj, BUDAUN)1787/8? 532/UP 3 0 GHAZIPUR (GHAZIPUR)1788-90 196/UP 14 14 JHANSI (JHANSI)1788-90 922/UP 13 13 MORADABAD (MORADABAD)1791-93 806/UP 37 37 AGRA (AGRA)1792-94 652/UP 299 299 KANPUR (KANPUR)1793/94 629/UP 18 18 RATSAU (Salon, RAE BARELI)1793/94 926/UP 61 61 MUZAFFARNAGAR (MUZAFFARNAGAR)1794/95 137/UP 5 5 ISMAILGANJ (LUCKNOW)1794/95 463/UP 20 20 CHANDEPUR (Machhali Shahr, JAUNPUR)1795/96 404/UP 45 45 HANBIRPUR/HANSKHERA (Sidhauli, Mahmudabad,

SITAPUR)1795/96 105/UP 230 230 BINAULI (Sardhana, MEERUT)1796-98 449/UP 535 21 RATH (HAMIRPUR)1796-98 678/UP 37 37 JAMRAHI KHURD (Kunch, JALAUN)1796/97? 1029/UP 53 53 DHAKPURVA (Rasulabad, Derapur, KANPUR)1796/97 129/UP 370 370 KUNCH (Kunch, JALAUN)1796/97 750/UP 36 36 SAFIPUR (UNNAO)1796/97 651/UP 2173 2173 BANGARMAU (UNNAO)1797/8? 623/UP 35 35 TANDA KALAN CHAMUNDA (BENARES)1797/98 47/UP 49 49 MALLAVAN (HARDOI)1797/98 648/UP 21 21 ALLAHABAD (ALLAHABAD)1797/98 743/UP 397 397 BIJAIPUR (Kulpahar, HAMIRPUR)1797/98 1096/UP 26 26 BILKHI (Srinagar, HAMIRPUR)1798-00 353/UP 5 5 GHUNGCHAI (Katrapuranpur, PILIBHIT)1798/99 718/UP 296 294 AKRAPURA (Kanauj, Indergarh, FARRUKHABAD)1800/01 441/UP 26 26 DULLAPUR (Puranpur, PILIBHIT)1800/1? 546/UP 218 218 RAE BARELI (RAE BARELI)1801/02 112/UP 1 1 ANUPSHAHR (BULANDSHAHR)1801/02 445/UP 1407 1405 MUHAMMADPUR (MORADABAD)1801/02 692/UP 24 24 BARIPUR/BEERPUR (Maniather, MORADABAD)1801/2? 240/UP 79 79 KHIZRAPUR (Kaiserganj, BAHRAICH)1801-3? 509/UP 29 29 MIDHAKAUR (AGRA)1802/03 364/UP 2 2 NAWABGANJ (BARABANKI)1803/04 417/UP 32 32 PALAI (SHAHJAHANPUR)1803/04 444/UP 16 16 DULLAPUR (Puranpur, PILIBHIT)1803/04 729/UP 71 71 BIDAULI/BARAULI (Chhata, MATHURA)1803/04 272/UP 818 818 TANDA (FYZABAD)1803/04 195/UP 2 2 BAREILLY (BAREILLY)1803/04 845/UP 63 63 BHANPUR (Bisauli, BUDAUN)1803/04 1095/UP 1 1 EYE HOSPITAL (KANPUR)1803/4? 483/UP 52 51 RUDHAN (Firozabad, AGRA)


Appendix I.3 : Hoards 1760-1942 161

1803/4? 513/UP 42 42 FATEHPUR (Bilari, MORADABAD)1803-05 154/UP 14 14 ALLAHABAD (ALLAHABAD)1804/05 315/UP 8 8 HAREOLI (Afzalgarh, BIJNOR)1804/05 350/UP 10 10 NIHTAUR (Dhampur, BIJNOR)1804/05 427/UP 12 12 KHERI (KHERI)1804/5? 393/UP 12 12 DEOBAND (SAHARANPUR)1804/5? 831/UP 147 147 KARAWAN (Alamnagar, Shahabad, HARDOI)1805/06 478/UP 16 16 GORDHANPUR-NABKA (BIJNOR)1805/06 1051/UP 50 50 LOHA (Milak, RAMPUR)1805/06 402/UP 17 17 NAGARBALA (Sehramau South, SHAHJAHANPUR)1805/06 298/UP 73 73 SAURIKH (Terwa, FARRUKHABAD)1805/6? 501/UP 829 829 TANDI (PILIBHIT)1805-19 749/UP 84 84 SHAHABAD (HARDOI)1805-34 56/UP 100 100 GARHI PURA (ETAWAH)1805-34 734/UP 15 15 BHATPURA (Pawagan, SHAHJAHANPUR)1805-34 777/UP 170 170 MUKARABPUR (Hasanpur, MORADABAD)1805-34 787/UP 25 25 GOPAMAU/GARHIPUR (HARDOI)1805-34 805/UP 4 4 ALLAHABAD (ALLAHABAD)1805-34 809/UP 14 14 KANPUR (KANPUR)1805-34 647/UP 382 382 BELAGHAT (GORAKHPUR)1805-34 280/UP 1 1 AGRA (AGRA)1805-34 287/UP 16 16 DEBAI (Kerakat, JAUNPUR)1805-34 945/UP 15 15 USAWAN (Usehal, BUDAUN)1805-34 1062/UP 5610 5610 NARENDRANAGAR (TEHRI GARHWAL)1805-34 440/UP 64 64 SURJAPUR (Tilhar, SHAHJAHANPUR)1805-34 485/UP 4 4 MUNDIA BITHERA (Bisalpur, PILIBHIT)1805-34 97/UP 30 30 KERATPUR (BAREILLY)1805-34 590/UP 16 16 SAIDPUR (GHAZIPUR)1805-34 955/UP 10 10 KILA BAZAR SAFIPUR (UNNAO)1806 05/UP 27 27 KALINJAR (BANDA)1806/07 314/UP 56 56 JAUNPUR (JAUNPUR)1806/07 169/UP 25 25 JAUNPUR (JAUNPUR)1806/07 631/UP 157 157 RAGHAULI (BANDA)1806/07 277/UP 82 82 SAHLAMAU (Malihabad, LUCKNOW)1806? 396/UP 9 9 LAKHIMPUR (KHERI)1806-34 416/UP 27 27 SULTANPUR (SHAHJAHANPUR)1806-34 1075/UP 174 174 DULLAPUR (Tanda, FYZABAD)1807/08 289/UP 33 33 FYZABAD (FYZABAD)1807/8? 132/UP 17 17 HARDOI (HARDOI)1808/09 1028/UP 20 20 MUKALANPUR (Miranpur,Jansath, MUZAFFARNAGAR)1810? 585/UP 140 140 BARUA SAUGAR (JHANSI)1811? 155/UP 14 14 ALLAHABAD (ALLAHABAD)1811? 317/UP 38 38 JAKHAULI (Bilsar, BARABANKI)1811-34 232/UP 9 9 BASTI (BASTI)1812 490/UP 2 2 PILIBHIT (PILIBHIT)1812 558/UP 13 13 GOLAGANJ (Vazirganj, LUCKNOW)1813 395/UP 93 93 MOTIPUR (Lakhimpur, KHERI)1813 531/UP 18 18 SAIDPUR (GHAZIPUR)1813/14 88/UP 5 5 NIABAS/NAYABAS (Fatehabad, AGRA)1813/14 382/UP 8 8 AGGAR KHURD (KHERI)1813/14 414/UP 2 2 PIRANPATTI (JAUNPUR)1813/14 688/UP 6 LUCKNOW (LUCKNOW)1813? 723/UP 24 24 BAROODKHANA (Daulatganj, LUCKNOW)1813-34 871/UP 708 700 GORAKHPUR (GORAKHPUR)



1813-34 306/UP 133 132 GUDANPUR (Gauriganj, SULTANPUR)1813-34 935/UP 60 60 DOKARI (Sonwan, BAHRAICH)1814/15 299/UP 10 10 SOOJIKUNDA (Dhaurahia, KHERI)1815/16 213/UP 7 7 FARIDPUR (BAREILLY)1815-34 351/UP 21 21 AZAMGARH (AZAMGARH)1816/17 225/UP 24 24 BAKHAR (Kudepur, SULTANPUR)1816/17 377/UP 39 39 RAJAURA (Gola, KHERI)1816/17 566/UP 17 16 PATEHRI (Gola, KHERI)1816/17 322/UP 31 31 BANKATWA (Balrampur, GONDA)1817/18 263/UP 24 24 MAHAUNRA (Itaunja, LUCKNOW)1817/18? 261/UP 64 64 BARAGAON (Post Kakori, LUCKNOW)1818/19 59/UP 49 49 KANKAR GHAT (Shahabad, HARDOI)1818/19 133/UP 6 6 BILGRAM (HARDOI)1818/19 386/UP 24 24 RUDAULI (Ramsanehighat, BARABANKI)1818/19 661/UP 132 132 GULLUPUR (RAE BARELI)1819/20 146/UP 43 43 BHODWANA/BHARWAN (LUCKNOW)1819/20 727/UP 14 14 TERHA (Purwa, UNNAO)1819-33 336/UP 11 10 GOBINDPUR (Mustafabad, MAINPURI)1819-33 794/UP 54 54 BANKPUR (Baheri, BAREILLY)1819-33 387/UP 30 30 KUSERU/KUSUMKHOR (Kanauj, FARRUKHABAD)1819-33 852/UP 24 24 BAREILLY (BAREILLY)1819-33 508/UP 55 55 SIKANDRARAO (ALIGARH)1822/23 400/UP 3 3 TILAKPUR (Ramnagar, BARABANKI)1823? 187/UP 62 9 LUCKNOW (LUCKNOW)1824/5? 521/UP 3 3 HATHGAON (Khaga, FATEHPUR)1825? 388/UP 198 198 BHEND (JALAUN)1827/8? 830/UP 96 96 TIROLI (Bah, AGRA)1830-34 152/UP 6 6 MASIRAH (Malihabad, LUCKNOW)1833/34 488/UP 5 5 TAPPEPUR (JAUNPUR)1833-34 145/UP 35 35 KURSI (Deva, Nawabganj, BARABANKI)1834-? 559/UP 51 51 BISHWASPUR (RAE BARELI)1834-? 572/UP 128 128 KATHGAM (Chail, ALLAHABAD)1835 954/UP 28 28 KALINJAR (Naraini, BANDA)1835-37 971/UP 90 90 SAIDPUR (Khair, ALIGARH)1837? 772/UP 77 77 SEMRA (Kichi, AGRA)1840 957/UP 46 46 JASOBAR (ETAWAH)1840 969/UP 202 202 KOTWALA ALAMPUR (Salon, RAE BARELI)1840 1002/UP 209 209 KANPUR (KANPUR)1840 1107/UP 60 60 GHANSAULI (Saheswan, BUDAUN)1840? 1060/UP 3883 2851 TREASURY (RAMPUR)1841 286/UP 163 163 LUCKNOW (LUCKNOW)1844 185/UP 5 5 SULTANPUR (SULTANPUR)1845 828/UP 26 26 JHARIA (HAMIRPUR)1855 844/UP 31 31 HARBANS MOHAL (RAMPUR)1855 958/UP 18 18 PAKHRAULI (Kotwali, SULTANPUR)1856? 586/UP 154 154 KOTI (Mau, JHANSI)1861 1034/UP 99 99 CHURARI (Mau, JHANSI)1869? 763/UP 535 KUNWARPUR (SITAPUR)1894 638/UP 30 30 JHANSI (JHANSI)1904 1127/UP 12 12 KAJAPURA (Akbarpur, FYZABAD)1919 1010/UP 330 148 NANHAI (Mauranipur, JHANSI)1942 1116/UP 13 5 HOSPITAL BUILDING (HARDOI)TOTAL 210 hoards 31461 29031


Appendix 2: Hoards arranged by districts 163

APPENDIX II

Hoards arranged by districts


AGRA1560-1610 0 01610-1660 565 6Jahangir 287 243/UP TAJGANJ (AGRA)1613 20 20 462/UP AGRA (AGRA)1628 252 252 742/UP KHERA MAUZKOT (Firozabad, AGRA)1632-40 73 73 802/UP ITMADPUR (AGRA)1635/36 183 183 784/UP SEMARA (Kiraoli, AGRA)1654 20 19 309/UP AGRA (AGRA)1657/58 18 18 829/UP ARJUNAPURA (Bah, Pinhat, AGRA)1660-1710 287 21677(?) 45 45 768/UP MUKHBAR (Itmadpur, AGRA)1686/87 242 242 302/UP GHATIA (Azamkhar Digra, AGRA)1710-1760 370 41710/11 28 28 85/UP CHITA (Kheragarh, AGRA)1726/27 181 181 319/UP HAS RAI/HABURAS (Thimadpur, AGRA)1730/31 22 22 666/UP NAGLA BHARON (AGRA)1738/39(?) 139 139 1078/UP ARNOTHA (Pinhat, Bah, AGRA)after 1760 505 13Later Mugh 78 29 241/UP AGRA (AGRA)1763/64 70 70 362/UP RADHAN (Firozabad, AGRA)1764/65 20 20 665/UP FATEHPUR SIKRI (AGRA)1766/67 37 37 1013/UP BATESAR (AGRA)1783-85 37 37 819/UP SARENDHI (Jagner, Agra)1783? 16 16 142/UP PAHARIYA/PIPARIYA (AGRA)1791-93 37 37 806/UP AGRA (AGRA)1801-3? 29 29 509/UP MIDHAKAUR (AGRA)1805-34 1 1 280/UP AGRA (AGRA)1803/4? 52 51 483/UP RUDHAN (Firozabad, AGRA)1813/14 5 5 88/UP NIABAS/NAYABAS (Fatehabad, AGRA)1827/8? 96 96 830/UP TIROLI (Bah, AGRA)1837? 77 77 772/UP SEMRA (Kichi, AGRA)

ALIGARH1560-1610 50 11561/62(?) 50 50 48/UP KOMRI (Hathras, ALIGARH)1610-1660 89 11658? 89 89 194/UP ALIGARH (ALIGARH)1660-1710 14 11702/03 14 14 744/UP ALIGARH (ALIGARH)1710-1760 309 51713/14 22 22 279/UP ALIGARH (ALIGARH)1738/39 23 23 575/UP DARYAPUR (Hathras, ALIGARH)1740 18 18 139/UP ALIGARH (ALIGARH)1741/42 89 89 212/UP ALIGARH (ALIGARH)1753/54 157 157 988/UP BHOGAON (Harsaun, ALIGARH)after 1760 374 41766/67 37 37 278/UP KESOPUR (Sikandararao, Hasayau, ALIGARH)1780-2? 192 192 887/UP ALIGARH (ALIGARH)1819-33 55 55 508/UP SIKANDRARAO (ALIGARH)1835-37 90 90 971/UP SAIDPUR (Khair, ALIGARH)

ALMORA1560-1610 0 01610-1660 0 0

Latest coin Total of Ag Ag Reference Localityin hoard all coins coins hoards


1660-1710 0 01710-1760 22 11756 22 22 739/UP REONI (ALMORA)

after 1760 0 0

ALLAHABAD1560-1610 12 11581 12 12 961/UP HATTIA (Phulpur, ALLAHABAD)Akbar 448 868/UP ABDULLAHPUR (Soraon, ALLAHABAD)

1610-1660 42 4Jahangir 2 2 581/UP MALAK PINGA (Sirathu, ALLAHABAD)

1623/24 15 15 890/UP ALLAHABAD (ALLAHABAD)1643/44 10 9 1038/UP LACHHAGIR (Handia, ALLAHABAD)1658 16 16 1035/UP NAWABGANJ (Soraon, ALLAHABAD)

1660-1710 242 41667/68 145 145 303/UP PUDAN (Handia, ALLAHABAD)1679 51 51 525/UP PATAI TAPPA ROBRAR (Meja, ALLAHABAD)1701 16 16 740/UP GHURHAT (Karchana, ALLAHABAD)1703 30 30 929/UP AKBARPUR (ALLAHABAD)

1710-1760 215 41737/38 43 43 650/UP ALLAHABAD (ALLAHABAD)1737/38 19 19 778/UP JAGDISHPUR alias PURACHANDA

(Soraon, ALLAHABAD)1740/41 38 38 757/UP SORAON (ALLAHABAD)1742/43 115 115 497/UP SHAHGANJ (ALLAHABAD)

after 1760 425 91763-65 12 12 1040/UP SISWA (Mau Aima, Soraon, ALLAHABAD)

1763/4? 24 24 524/UP BALA SHAHI MANDI (ALLAHABAD)1780 114 114 635/UP BAHADURGANJ (ALLAHABAD)1785/86 94 94 1074/UP ALLAHABAD (ALLAHABAD)1797/98 21 21 648/UP ALLAHABAD (ALLAHABAD)1805-34 4 4 805/UP ALLAHABAD (ALLAHABAD)1803-05 14 14 154/UP ALLAHABAD (ALLAHABAD)1811? 14 14 155/UP ALLAHABAD (ALLAHABAD)1834-? 128 128 572/UP KATHGAM (Chail, ALLAHABAD)

AZAMGARH1560-1610 15 11602 15 15 538/UP BANSGAON/BAMHANGAON

(Nizamabad,Gambhirpur,AZAMGARH)1610-1660 0 01660-1710 12 21701 5 5 671/UP AZAMGARH (AZAMGARH)1701/02 7 7 1039/UP MOHAMMADABAD (AZAMGARH)

1710-1760 17 21715/16 11 11 311/UP SAMANDPUR (Sagri, AZAMGARH)Alamgir II 6 6 19/UP AZAMGARH (AZAMGARH)

after 1760 124 31760-34 37 37 539/UP RANBIRPUR (AZAMGARH)1782/83 66 66 878/UP FARIDPUR (Rampur, AZAMGARH)1815-34 21 21 351/UP AZAMGARH (AZAMGARH)

BAHRAICH1560-1610 0 01610-1660 60 2Shahjahan 48 48 38/UP BAHRAICH (BAHRAICH)



1653 12 12 446/UP KATAHA (Ikarauna, BAHRAICH)1660-1710 0 01710-1760 40 21710? 17 17 1141/UP MAJHORA (Fakharpur, BAHRAICH)1741 23 23 429/UP SIRSIA (Bhinga, BAHRAICH)after 1760 189 31783? 50 50 57/UP BAHRAICH (BAHRAICH)1801/2? 79 79 240/UP KHIZRAPUR (Kaiserganj, BAHRAICH)1813-34 60 60 935/UP DOKARI (Sonwan, BAHRAICH)

BALLIA1560-1610 9 11551 9 9 862/UP RATSAND (Garwar, BALLIA)1610-1660 0 01660-1710 3 11685/86 3 3 420/UP PATNI (BALLIA)1710-1760 0 0after 1760 0 0

BANDA1560-1610 25 1Akbar 25 25 217/UP MOHRARA/MOHATARA (BANDA)1610-1660 146 31614/15 1 1 111/UP BANDA (BANDA)Jahangir 21 21 619/UP BAMBRI/BAMBIA (BANDA)1624/25 38 698/UP BARWA (Naraini, BANDA)1656/57 124 124 1007/UP BANDA (BANDA)1660-1710 494 51678 1 1 675/UP BANDA (BANDA)Aurangzeb 48 48 244/UP PAILANI (BANDA)1685/86 295 295 344/UP KANWARA (BANDA)1707/08 2 2 682/UP BANDA (BANDA)Shah AlamI 148 148 15/UP BANDA (BANDA)1710-1760 148 41721/22 31 31 1122/UP CHITRAKUT (Karwi, BANDA)1743 71 71 502/UP THANAIL/TARAHUWAN (Hadausa, BANDA)1745/46 29 29 473/UP RITHAI/RIWAI (Karvi, BANDA)1748 17 17 843/UP HANUAN BINAIKA (Mau, BANDA)after 1760 212 31806 27 27 05/UP KALINJAR (BANDA)1806/07 157 157 631/UP RAGHAULI (BANDA)1835 28 28 954/UP KALINJAR (Naraini, BANDA)

BARA BANKI1560-1610 553 41550? 14 14 767/UP BHILWAL (Haidergarh, BARABANKI)1567/68(?) 933 337/UP DURGAPUR (Ramsanehighat, BARABANKI)1591/92 5 5 51/UP KHAURANDESH NAGAR (Rudauli, BARAB.)1592/93 50 50 359/UP BARABANKI (BARABANKI)1591/92(?) 53 348/UP HASANPUR (Haidergarh, BARABANKI)1601? 484 484 450/UP FATEHPUR (Fatehpur, BARABANKI)1610-1660 0 0Shahjahan 1 412/UP ZAIDPUR (BARABANKI)1660-1710 162 21691/92 119 119 1030/UP GANGAPUR (Subeha, BARABANKI)



1702/03 43 43 565/UP DANYALPUR (Nawabganj, BARABANKI)1710-1760 50 31730/31 27 27 841/UP GOHANNA (Ramsanehighat, BARABANKI)1736/37 5 5 379/UP HARSAULI (Fatehpur, BARABANKI)1737(?) 18 18 613/UP MAHOLARA (BARABANKI)

after 1760 102 51802/03 2 2 364/UP NAWABGANJ (BARABANKI)1811? 38 38 317/UP JAKHAULI (Bilsar, BARABANKI)1818/19 24 24 386/UP RUDAULI (Ramsanehighat, BARABANKI)

1822/23 3 3 400/UP TILAKPUR (Ramnagar, BARABANKI)1833-34 35 35 145/UP KURSI (Deva, Nawabganj, BARABANKI)

BARELI1560-1610 11 11562/63 11 11 172/UP FARIDPUR (Khodaganj Road, BAREILLY)

1610-1660 139 31612 21 21 222/UP BAREILLY (BAREILLY)1640 8 8 264/UP BAREILLY (BAREILLY)1648/49 110 110 313/UP FARIDPUR (BAREILLY)

1660-1710 162 21660/61 154 154 320/UP BAREILLY (BAREILLY)Shah AlamI 8 8 349/UP KAROORI/KARONI (Behari, BAREILLY)

1710-1760 1 11712 1 1 281/UP NAWADIA (Faridpur, BAREILLY)

after 1760 122 61771-73 5 5 252/UP BAREILLY (BAREILLY)1819-33 54 54 794/UP BANKPUR (Baheri, BAREILLY)1819-33 24 24 852/UP BAREILLY (BAREILLY)1803/04 2 2 195/UP BAREILLY (BAREILLY)1805-34 30 30 97/UP KERATPUR (BAREILLY)1815/16 7 7 213/UP FARIDPUR (BAREILLY)

BASTI1560-1610 6 11593/94 6 6 673/UP RAMWANPUR (Captanganj, BASTI)

1610-1660 360 41623 144 140 821/UP BASTI (BASTI)1626 30 30 881/UP MAJAURA (BASTI)1638/39(?) 140 140 807/UP BASTI (BASTI)1657/58 50 50 918/UP BASTI (BASTI)

1660-1710 75 31699/00 28 28 1048/UP BHEDAUHA (Menhdaval, BASTI)1703 16 16 236/UP LOHRAULI (Mehdawal, BASTI)1706/07 31 31 1042/UP PURAINA (Bansi, BASTI)

1710-1760 551 41713/14 199 199 233/UP LOHRAULI (Khalilabad, BASTI)1714/15 1 1 560/UP RASULPUR (Paisarampur, BASTI)1725/26 250 250 536/UP MAJHAWANPUR (BASTI)1732/33 101 101 709/UP PASAI (Mehdawal, BASTI)

after 1760 9 11811-34 9 9 232/UP BASTI (BASTI)

BENARES1560-1610 0 01573-81(?) 547 492/UP UNCHGAON (BENARES)



1610-1660 10 21629/30 7 7 620/UP RAMPUR KHAMAUNA (BENARES)1633 3 3 419/UP NATHAIPUR (Phulpur, BENARES)1660-1710 0 01710-1760 11 11723/24 11 11 690/UP BENARES (BENARES)after 1760 180 31760/61 13 10 587/UP BENGALI TOLA (BENARES)1764/65 135 135 284/UP BENARES (BENARES)1797/8? 35 35 623/UP TANDA KALAN CHAMUNDA (BENARES)

BIJNOR1560-1610 26 21566/67 1 122/UP BIJNOR (BIJNOR)1568/69 194 19 943/UP NAGAL (Najibabad, BIJNOR)1586/87 7 7 160/UP BIJNOR (BIJNOR)1610-1660 1 11617/18 1 1 808/UP AZAMPUR (BIJNOR)1660-1710 0 01710-1760 143 61740/41 5 5 676/UP BIJNOR (BIJNOR)1748 16 16 577/UP NAGINA (BIJNOR)1750 32 32 1015/UP GANGA RAMWALA (Barha, Nagina, BIJNOR)Alamgir II 14 14 1128/UP THAKURAN (Badapur, BIJNOR)1759/60 73 73 224/UP NAJIBABAD (BIJNOR)1759/60 3 3 374/UP MIRANPUR (Mandawar, BIJNOR)after 1760 191 51766-68 100 100 234/UP NAGINA (BIJNOR)1783? 57 57 93/UP GULARIA (Burhapur, BIJNOR)1804/05 8 8 315/UP HAREOLI (Afzalgarh, BIJNOR)1804/05 10 10 350/UP NIHTAUR (Dhampur, BIJNOR)1805/06 16 16 478/UP GORDHANPUR-NABKA (BIJNOR)

BUDAUN1560-1610 0 01572/73 98 906/UP BUDAUN (BUDAUN)1610-1660 9 11611/12 1011 9 1079/UP QABOOLPURA (BUDAUN)1660-1710 19 11682-84(?) 19 19 257/UP SAHASWAN (BUDAUN)1710-1760 577 41715/16 442 442 1101/UP BANGAR (Binawar, BUDAUN)1718/19 9 9 259/UP MISRIPUR MAKAIA (Sahaswan, BUDAUN)Muhd.Shah? 2428 1126/UP SHAHBAZPUR (Sahaswan, BUDAUN)1740/41 117 116 752/UP SHAHBAZPUR (BUDAUN)1746/47 10 10 962/UP SIKHRAWA (Bisauli, BUDAUN)after 1760 138 31787/88 6 424/UP SALEMPUR (Dataganj, BUDAUN)1805-34 15 15 945/UP USAWAN (Usehal, BUDAUN)1803/04 63 63 845/UP BHANPUR (Bisauli, BUDAUN)1840 60 60 1107/UP GHANSAULI (Saheswan, BUDAUN)

BULANDSHAHR1560-1610 0 0



1610-1660 200 1Shahjahan 200 200 183/UP SIKANDARABAD (BULANDSHAHR)

1660-1710 947 21684/85 926 926 465/UP PAHASU (BULANDSHAHR)1684/85 21 21 1016/UP AGHAR PAHASU (Khurja, BULANDSHAHR)

1710-1760 15 11741 15 15 246/UP SIKANDARABAD (BULANDSHAHR)

after 1760 1 11801/02 1 1 112/UP ANUPSHAHR (BULANDSHAHR)

DEHRADUN1560-1610 17 11595/96 223 17 974/UP GHANGORA (DEHRADUN)

1610-1660 0 01660-1710 0 01710-1760 3 11745/46 3 3 1136/UP KHODARI (Dakpathar, DEHRADUN)

after 1760 0 0

ETAH1560-1610 0 01599(?) 36 1072/UP PHARAULI (Kasganj, ETAH)

1610-1660 0 01660-1710 100 21686 9 9 892/UP ETAH (ETAH)1705/06 91 91 779/UP ETAH (ETAH)

1710-1760 108 21726 84 76 668/UP ETAH (ETAH)1744/45 32 32 510/UP SULTANPUR (ETAH)

after 1760 1500 11768/9? 1500 1500 500/UP NAYALA LAKE (Faizpur, ETAH)

ETAWAH1560-1610 0 01536/37 114 952/UP TEWAR LALPUR (Auraiya, ETAWAH)

1610-1660 0 01660-1710 128 11667/68 128 128 68/UP BABARPUR (Auraiya, ETAWAH)

1710-1760 77 21724/25 25 25 625/UP ETAWAH (ETAWAH)1729(?) 52 52 33/UP ETAWAH (ETAWAH)

after 1760 146 21840 46 46 957/UP JASOBAR (ETAWAH)1805-34 100 100 56/UP GARHI PURA (ETAWAH)

FARRUKHABAD1560-1610 2 11554? 2 2 403/UP SALEMPUR (Aligarh, FARRUKHABAD)

1603/04(?) 55 520/UP FARRUKHABAD (FARRUKHABAD)1610-1660 107 11640/41 107 107 837/UP KANNAUJ (Kannauj, FARRUKHABAD)

1660-1710 1 11695 1 1 677/UP FARRUKHABAD (FARRUKHABAD)

1710-1760 126 11741/42 126 126 355/UP DERAJAKAT/TERAJAKAT (Gursahaiganj,F.)



after 1760 397 31798/99 296 294 718/UP AKRAPURA (Kanauj, Indergarh, FARR.) 1805/06 73 73 298/UP SAURIKH (Terwa, FARRUKHABAD)1819-33 30 30 387/UP KUSERU/KUSUMKHOR (Kanauj, FARR.)

FATEHPUR1560-1610 556 11573-81(?) 564 228/UP FATEHPUR (FATEHPUR)1575/76 249 1058/UP BHADBA (Fatehpur, FATEHPUR)1605 556 556 975/UP AWAZIPUR (FATEHPUR)1610-1660 48 3Jahangir 11 11 271/UP RAMPUR (Khaga, FATEHPUR)1622/23 34 34 522/UP MUCHWA KHERA (Ratiajunair, FATEHPUR)Shahjahan 3 3 523/UP NARAINI (Hasua, FATEHPUR)1660-1710 104 21690/91 52 52 839/UP FATEHPUR (FATEHPUR)1690/91 52 52 855/UP PARSHADEPUR (Bindki, Khajuha, FATEHPUR)1710-1760 344 11731/32 344 344 624/UP ALAMGANJ (FATEHPUR)after 1760 490 21783? 487 487 760/UP KHAGA (FATEHPUR)1824/5? 3 3 521/UP HATHGAON (Khaga, FATEHPUR)

FYZABAD1560-1610 0 01610-1660 9 1Jahangir 9 9 477/UP SINGKUGHAT (FYZABAD)1660-1710 0 01710-1760 169 41716/17 102 102 594/UP MUNDIARI/MUNDICHARA (Ramgaon, FYZ.)1721/22 28 28 1021/UP JURKHANPUR (Tanda, FYZABAD)1722/23 13 13 346/UP TIHAITPUR (Birhas, FYZABAD)1755/56 26 26 340/UP NUQURAPUR (Nighaura, FYZABAD)after 1760 1385 101760(?) 14 14 205/UP FYZABAD (FYZABAD)1761(?) 64 64 223/UP FYZABAD (FYZABAD)1760-34 84 84 372/UP MIRPUR (FYZABAD)1762-64 35 35 1011/UP CHAKWARA (Raunahi, FYZABAD)1772/73 22 22 684/UP NATTHAI PATTI (Yarpi, Akbarpur, FYZ.)1784-86 129 129 118/UP AJODHIA (Ajodhya, FYZABAD)1803/04 818 818 272/UP TANDA (FYZABAD)1806-34 174 174 1075/UP DULLAPUR (Tanda, FYZABAD)1807/08 33 33 289/UP FYZABAD (FYZABAD)1904 12 12 1127/UP KAJAPURA (Akbarpur, FYZABAD)

GARHWAL1560-1610 0 01610-1660 0 01660-1710 0 01710-1760 164 21717 39 39 86/UP PAURI GARHWAL (PAURI GARHWAL)1721 125 125 1088/UP RUDRAPRAYAG (PAURI GARHWAL)after 1760 5610 11805-34 5610 5610 1062/UP NARENDRANAGAR (TEHRI GARHWAL)



GHAZIPUR1560-1610 0 01610-1660 16 11626 16 16 1008/UP BHUARPUR (Saidpur, GHAZIPUR)

1660-1710 0 01710-1760 0 0after 1760 34 21787/8? 3 532/UP GHAZIPUR (GHAZIPUR)1805-34 16 16 590/UP SAIDPUR (GHAZIPUR)1813 18 18 531/UP SAIDPUR (GHAZIPUR)

GONDA1560-1610 0 01610-1660 0 01660-1710 23 11699/00 23 23 215/UP GONDA (GONDA)

1710-1760 0 0after 1760 31 11816/17 31 31 322/UP BANKATWA (Balrampur, GONDA)

GORAKHPUR1560-1610 13 11551/52 13 13 609/UP JUNGLE BETWA (GORAKHPUR)

1610-1660 6 11630/31 6 6 391/UP RAMPURA (Kotwali, GORAKHPUR)

1660-1710 79 21694/95(?) 61 61 716/UP MADHNIPUR+KASIA (GORAKHPUR)

1701 18 18 741/UP GORAKHPUR (GORAKHPUR)1710-1760 172 61712/13 37 37 717/UP ISHARPURA (Ruderpur, GORAKHPUR)

1716/17 15 15 392/UP GAJPUR (Amargaon, GORAKHPUR)1718 30 30 966/UP PACHOHI/PACHUA (Hato, Deoria, GOR.)

1725/26 49 49 636/UP HARPUR (Bansgaon, Dhuriapur, GOR.)1736 22 22 569/UP DALCHHAPUR (Tarayasujan, GORAKHPUR)1742/43 19 19 456/UP PIPPIGANJA (Hargaon, GORAKHPUR)

after 1760 1188 41764/65 10 10 853/UP KHAR KARI (Purandarpur, GORAKHPUR)

1766/67 96 96 591/UP QAZIPUR (GORAKHPUR)1805-34 382 382 647/UP BELAGHAT (GORAKHPUR)1813-34 708 700 871/UP GORAKHPUR (GORAKHPUR)

HAMIRPUR1560-1610 5 11577/78 5 5 484/UP KULPAHAR (HAMIRPUR)1602 272 864/UP INGOTHA (Sunapur, HAMIRPUR)

1610-1660 4 1Jahangir 4 4 832/UP BIRHAT (Rath, HAMIRPUR)

1660-1710 67 31679 15 15 422/UP NAGROL (Kulpahar, HAMIRPUR)1695/96(?) 18 18 165/UP HAMIRPUR (HAMIRPUR)1703/04 34 34 421/UP GAND (Kulpahar, HAMIRPUR)

1710-1760 71 21711/12 25 25 413/UP KHAULIJAR (Sumerpur, Lalpur, HAMIRPUR)1757(?) 48 46 706/UP SUPA (Kulpahar, HAMIRPUR)

after 1760 843 6



1764/65 77 77 479/UP HAMIRPUR (HAMIRPUR)1787-89 296 296 766/UP RAHAK (Rath, HAMIRPUR)1796-98 535 21 449/UP RATH (HAMIRPUR)1797/98 397 397 743/UP BIJAIPUR (Kulpahar, HAMIRPUR)1797/98 26 26 1096/UP BILKHI (Srinagar, HAMIRPUR)1845 26 26 828/UP JHARIA (HAMIRPUR)

HARDOI1560-1610 16 11536/37 16 16 79/UP BAHLAWARA (Banger, HARDOI)1610-1660 27 21612 13 13 915/UP HARDOI (HARDOI)1656/57 14 14 846/UP SHAHPUR SAIDAN (Pindarwara, Shahabad, H.)1660-1710 121 11671/72 121 121 1006/UP PERA (HARDOI)1710-1760 0 01757/58(?) 1352 603/UP PIHANI (HARDOI)after 1760 403 91784/85 21 21 100/UP GANGA RAMPUR (Bilgram, HARDOI)1797/98 49 49 47/UP MALLAVAN (HARDOI)1805-19 84 84 749/UP SHAHABAD (HARDOI)1805-34 25 25 787/UP GOPAMAU/GARHIPUR (HARDOI)1804/5? 147 147 831/UP KARAWAN (Alamnagar, Shahabad, HARDOI)1807/8? 17 17 132/UP HARDOI (HARDOI)1818/19 49 49 59/UP KANKAR GHAT (Shahabad, HARDOI)1818/19 6 6 133/UP BILGRAM (HARDOI)1942 13 5 1116/UP HOSPITAL BUILDING (HARDOI)

JALAUN1560-1610 32 11579/80(?) 34 32 786/UP ORAI (JALAUN)1610-1660 0 01660-1710 0 01710-1760 286 51710/11 15 15 960/UP DHUTA (Rampur, JALAUN)1712/13 101 99 370/UP HARKHAULI/HARAULI (Jalaun, JALAUN)1739/40 9 9 128/UP DAKAR (JALAUN)1741/42 7 7 206/UP JALAUN (JALAUN)1744/45 156 156 783/UP PIRAUNA (Konchi, JALAUN)after 1760 605 31796-98 37 37 678/UP JAMRAHI KHURD (Kunch, JALAUN)1796/97 370 370 129/UP KUNCH (Kunch, JALAUN)1825? 198 198 388/UP BHEND (JALAUN)

JAUNPUR1560-1610 73 21562/63 17 17 642/UP MARIAHU (JAUNPUR)1581 56 56 138/UP BRAHMANPUR (Mongra, JAUNPUR)1591/92 29 153/UP SONDI KALAN (Garwara, Machlishahr, JAUN.)1610-1660 56 31622/23 11 10 358/UP JAUNPUR (JAUNPUR)1644/45? 9 9 920/UP JAUNPUR (JAUNPUR)1656/57 37 37 953/UP CHHANGAPUR (Rampur, JAUNPUR)1660-1710 0 01710-1760 0 0



after 1760 164 81760-19 20 20 226/UP RAGHU RAM PATTI (JAUNPUR)1784/85 20 20 295/UP JAUNPUR (JAUNPUR)1794/95 20 20 463/UP CHANDEPUR (Machhali Shahr, JAUNPUR)1805-34 16 16 287/UP DEBAI (Kerakat, JAUNPUR)1806/07 56 56 314/UP JAUNPUR (JAUNPUR)1806/07 25 25 169/UP JAUNPUR (JAUNPUR)1813/14 2 2 414/UP PIRANPATTI (JAUNPUR)1833/34 5 5 488/UP TAPPEPUR (JAUNPUR)

JHANSI1560-1610 21 11594 21 21 621/UP NEWADA (JHANSI)

1610-1660 2171 41614 259 259 973/UP NAIBASTI (JHANSI)1615/16? 42 42 418/UP JHANSI (JHANSI)1614-15 1388 1388 426/UP JHANSI (JHANSI)1620 482 482 972/UP JHANSI (JHANSI)

1660-1710 19 21687/88 12 12 1097/UP MAHRAUNI (JHANSI)1688 7 7 602/UP RAGAULI (Gaothe, JHANSI)

1710-1760 365 91717/18 75 75 1047/UP EONI (Lachhuri, Mau, JHANSI)1719 1 14/UP LALITPUR (JHANSI)1723/24 76 76 705/UP RAKHWASA (Hardaura, JHANSI)1725 12 12 13/UP LALITPUR (JHANSI)1727/28 97 97 321/UP NOTA (Mau, JHANSI)1744 48 48 527/UP RAGAULI/RAGSAULI (Garotha, JHANSI)

1750/51 19 19 847/UP RANIPUR (Mau, JHANSI)1756/57 6 6 791/UP JHANKI (Lalitpur, JHANSI)1757/58 14 14 773/UP JHANSI (JHANSI)1758(?) 18 18 108/UP PURA (Gurotha, JHANSI)

after 1760 857 91762-64 20 20 312/UP MAU (JHANSI)1783/84 70 70 584/UP DHANDAR BUZURG (Jhansi, JHANSI)

1787-89 182 182 999/UP BHILLA (Mahroni, JHANSI)1788-90 14 14 196/UP JHANSI (JHANSI)1810? 140 140 585/UP BARUA SAUGAR (JHANSI)1856? 154 154 586/UP KOTI (Mau, JHANSI)1861 99 99 1034/UP CHURARI (Mau, JHANSI)1894 30 30 638/UP JHANSI (JHANSI)1919 330 148 1010/UP NANHAI (Mauranipur, JHANSI)

KANPUR1560-1610 0 01581(?) 1050 1065/UP BHIKANPUR (Akbarpur, KANPUR)1603(?) 1774 1064/UP KANPUR (KANPUR)

1610-1660 80 1Shahjahan 80 80 997/UP KANPUR (KANPUR)

1660-1710 0 01710-1760 79 21738 73 73 888/UP KANPUR (KANPUR)1744/45 6 6 1032/UP BHOGNIPUR (KANPUR)

after 1760 597 61768/69 21 21 1098/UP KARIKALWARI (Akbarpur, KANPUR)



1792-94 299 299 652/UP KANPUR (KANPUR)1796/97? 53 53 1029/UP DHAKPURVA (Rasulabad, Derapur, KANPUR)1805-34 14 14 809/UP KANPUR (KANPUR)1803/04 1 1 1095/UP EYE HOSPITAL (KANPUR)1840 209 209 1002/UP KANPUR (KANPUR)

KHERI1560-1610 4 11564/65 1 704/UP PIRPUR (KHERI)1584 40 550/UP BHADEORA (Gola, KHERI)1591/92 4 4 641/UP LAKHANPUR (KHERI)Akbar 1 840/UP KHERI (KHERI)1610-1660 0 01660-1710 37 21671-73(?) 15 15 39/UP KHERI (KHERI)1703 22 22 611/UP GARHIA/KURHAIYA (KHERI)1710-1760 562 31710/11(?) 248 248 164/UP KHERI (KHERI)Muhd.Shah 287 287 694/UP MUNDIA HEM SINGH (KHERI)1759/60 27 27 297/UP NAKHA (Lakhimpur, KHERI)after 1760 380 81762/63 193 193 606/UP DEWAL (KHERI)1804/05 12 12 427/UP KHERI (KHERI)1806? 9 9 396/UP LAKHIMPUR (KHERI)1813 93 93 395/UP MOTIPUR (Lakhimpur, KHERI)1813/14 8 8 382/UP AGGAR KHURD (KHERI)1814/15 10 10 299/UP SOOJIKUNDA (Dhaurahia, KHERI)1816/17 39 39 377/UP RAJAURA (Gola, KHERI)1816/17 17 16 566/UP PATEHRI (Gola, KHERI)

LAKHNAU1560-1610 0 01610-1660 0 01660-1710 22 11667/68(?) 22 22 464/UP CHORAHA (Goshaiganj, LUCKNOW)1710-1760 54 51713/14 9 9 1041/UP POLICE MALA KHANA (LUCKNOW)1722/23 23 23 869/UP MUKARIMNAGAR (Lucknow, LUCKNOW)1728 8 8 921/UP BAKHTIYAR NAGAR (Malihabad, LUCKNOW)1734/35 8 8 724/UP SEMARA (Madiaon, LUCKNOW)1755/56 6 6 191/UP LUCKNOW (LUCKNOW)after 1760 825 161760 255 255 863/UP UTRAITHIA (LUCKNOW)1760-62 26 26 192/UP LUCKNOW (LUCKNOW)1761-63 26 26 211/UP LUCKNOW (LUCKNOW)1778/79 26 26 978/UP MALKHANA (LUCKNOW)1779 45 45 1071/UP MALIHABAD (LUCKNOW)1783-85 14 14 378/UP INDAURA (Malihabad, LUCKNOW)1794/95 5 5 137/UP ISMAILGANJ (LUCKNOW)1806/07 82 82 277/UP SAHLAMAU (Malihabad, LUCKNOW)1812 13 13 558/UP GOLAGANJ (Vazirganj, LUCKNOW)1813/14 6 688/UP LUCKNOW (LUCKNOW)1813? 24 24 723/UP BAROODKHANA (Daulatganj, LUCKNOW)1817/18 24 24 263/UP MAHAUNRA (Itaunja, LUCKNOW)1817/18? 64 64 261/UP BARAGAON (Post Kakori, LUCKNOW)



1819/20 43 43 146/UP BHODWANA/BHARWAN (LUCKNOW)1823? 62 9 187/UP LUCKNOW (LUCKNOW)1830-34 6 6 152/UP MASIRAH (Malihabad, LUCKNOW)1841 163 163 286/UP LUCKNOW (LUCKNOW)

MAINPURI1560-1610 21 21576/77 8 679a/UP NAUNER (Bhogaon, MAINPURI)1580-81 39 1 249/UP BAMMIPUR/BAWANIPUR (Kishni, MAINPURI)1605/06 20 20 946/UP KIRTHUA MUHAMMADPUR (Shikohabad, M.)

1610-1660 115 31617 2 2 283/UP MAINPURI (MAINPURI)1628/29 44 42 265/UP RAIS (Karbal, MAINPURI)1629/30 71 71 282/UP BHAIPUR (Post Mustafabad, MAINPURI)

1660-1710 0 01710-1760 0 0after 1760 10 11819-33 11 10 336/UP GOBINDPUR (Mustafabad, MAINPURI)

MATHURA1560-1610 0 01610-1660 3 11627/28 3 3 43/UP MATHURA (MATHURA)

1660-1710 0 01710-1760 123 31737/38 40 40 318/UP MATHURA (MATHURA)1748 20 20 1139/UP SADABAD (MATHURA)1749/50 63 63 1138/UP SADABAD (MATHURA)

after 1760 78 21781-83 7 7 570/UP MATHURA (MATHURA)1803/04 71 71 729/UP BIDAULI/BARAULI (Chhata, MATHURA)

MERATH1560-1610 6 11580/81(?) 102 6 1027/UP NETHLA (Baghpat, MEERUT)

1610-1660 0 01660-1710 0 01710-1760 30 21739/40 25 25 627/UP MEERUT (MEERUT)1748 5 5 649/UP DETAI (MEERUT)

after 1760 602 41760/61 114 114 571/UP LUMB (Chaprauli, Bagpat, MEERUT)1767-9? 59 59 911/UP MEERUT (MEERUT)1780/81 199 199 719/UP SONATI (Mowana, MEERUT)1795/96 230 230 105/UP BINAULI (Sardhana, MEERUT)

MIRZAPUR1560-1610 304 21552/53 14 14 397/UP MIRZAPUR (MIRZAPUR)1593 291 290 530/UP BHARPUR (Bindachal, MIRZAPUR)

1610-1660 110 11629 110 110 373/UP SURIAWAN (Shahganj, MIRZAPUR)

1660-1710 0 01710-1760 32 11737/38 32 32 708/UP PACHEURA (Haveli, Chunar, MIRZAPUR)



after 1760 296 11760-19 296 296 74/UP MIRZAPUR (MIRZAPUR)

MORADABAD1560-1610 0 01610-1660 1 11641/42 1 679/UP SALEMPUR (Amroha, MORADABAD)Shahjahan 1 1 515/UP MORADABAD (MORADABAD)1660-1710 119 21696/97 54 54 1052/UP BAZAR DEWAN (MORADABAD)1689/90 65 65 782/UP MORADABAD (MORADABAD)1710-1760 175 31724/25 19 19 712/UP GARHI (Amroha, MORADABAD)1742/43 47 47 516/UP MASELI (Rasulpur, MORADABAD)1744 109 109 894/UP MORADABAD (MORADABAD)after 1760 2201 71763/64 28 28 912/UP AMROHA (MORADABAD)1780/81 519 519 860/UP MIAN SARAI (Sambhal, MORADABAD)1788-90 13 13 922/UP MORADABAD (MORADABAD)1801/02 1407 1405 445/UP MUHAMMADPUR (MORADABAD)1801/02 24 24 692/UP BARIPUR/BEERPUR (Maniather, MOR.)1805-34 170 170 777/UP MUKARABPUR (Hasanpur, MORADABAD)1803/4? 42 42 513/UP FATEHPUR (Bilari, MORADABAD)

MUZAFFARNAGAR1560-1610 0 01602 32 1106/UP GAHI (Miranpur, MUZAFFARNAGAR)1610-1660 0 01660-1710 30 2Aurangzeb 7 7 1105/UP SAMBHALA HAIRA (Miranpur, MUZAFF.)1686/87 23 23 305/UP SHAHPUR SAIDAN (MUZAFFARNAGAR)1710-1760 81 21745/46 35 34 1104/UP JANSATH (Jansath, MUZAFFARNAGAR)1756/57 47 47 683/UP BHALWA (Jansath, MUZAFFARNAGAR)after 1760 95 31781/82 14 14 407/UP MUZAFFARNAGAR (MUZAFFARNAGAR)1793/94 61 61 926/UP MUZAFFARNAGAR (MUZAFFARNAGAR)1808/09 20 20 1028/UP MUKALANPUR (Miranpur, Jansath, MUZAFF.)

NAINITAL1560-1610 0 01610-1660 491 11620-21 491 491 203/UP DANDWALA/DUNDWALA (Kashipur, NAIN.)1660-1710 38 21662/63 669 13 540/UP DUNGSIL (NAINITAL)1665/66 25 25 262/UP NAINITAL (NAINITAL)1710-1760 219 11732/33(?) 219 219 202/UP BAKANIA (Gudarpur, NAINITAL)after 1760 291 11761 291 291 1000/UP KITCHA (NAINITAL)

PILIBHIT1560-1610 0 01554/55 24 615/UP QASIMPUR (PILIBHIT)1610-1660 84 3



1650 9 9 679b/UP PILIBHIT (PILIBHIT)1656/57 30 30 764/UP GHUNGCHAI (Puranpur, PILIBHIT)1659 45 45 616/UP NAUGAON (PILIBHIT)

1660-1710 63 31677 16 16 296/UP MADANAPUR (Bilaspur, PILIBHIT)1686/87 19 19 934/UP BISALPUR (PILIBHIT)1696(?) 28 28 300/UP MADANAPUR (Bilaspur, PILIBHIT)

1710-1760 25 21722(?) 3 285/UP PILIBHIT (PILIBHIT)1722/23 18 18 656/UP PILIBHIT (PILIBHIT)1745/46 7 7 697/UP PILIBHIT (PILIBHIT)

after 1760 1194 81764/65 71 250/UP PILIBHIT (PILIBHIT)1771/72 87 87 771/UP BITHRA (Neoria, PILIBHIT)1776/77 225 225 747/UP NAUKUND (PILIBHIT)1798-00 5 5 353/UP GHUNGCHAI (Katrapuranpur, PILIBHIT)

1800/01 26 26 441/UP DULLAPUR (Puranpur, PILIBHIT)1805-34 4 4 485/UP MUNDIA BITHERA (Bisalpur, PILIBHIT)

1803/04 16 16 444/UP DULLAPUR (Puranpur, PILIBHIT)1805/6? 829 829 501/UP TANDI (PILIBHIT)1812 2 2 490/UP PILIBHIT (PILIBHIT)

PRATAPGARH1560-1610 152 21591/92(?) 56 56 505/UP KACHERA (Sangrapur, PRATAPGARH)

1606/07 96 96 371/UP PRATAPGARH (PRATAPGARH)1610-1660 0 01660-1710 58 11706/07 58 58 210/UP PRATAPGARH (PRATAPGARH)

1710-1760 0 0after 1760 1 11783/84 1 1 269/UP GANGAPUR (Bihar, PRATAPGARH)

RAE BARELI1560-1610 21 11548/49 21 21 858/UP SANDAHA (RAE BARELI)

1610-1660 43 31621 21 21 307/UP RAE BARELI (RAE BARELI)1625 18 18 248/UP RAE BARELI (RAE BARELI)1630 4 4 710/UP FATEHGANJ (RAE BARELI)

1660-1710 68 31660/61 31 31 451/UP RAE BARELI (RAE BARELI)1680 6 6 601/UP BEWAL (Salon, RAE BARELI)1708/9(?) 31 31 447/UP SATAON (Surba Khoh, RAE BARELI)

1710-1760 66 21729 56 56 895/UP RAE BARELI (RAE BARELI)1754 12 10 950/UP AKORHIA SALIMPUR (Salon, RAE BARELI)1758/59 12 453/UP RAE BARELI (RAE BARELI)

after 1760 759 71772-74 107 107 544/UP TIKARI (RAE BARELI)1777/78 1 983/UP NAWABGANJ (RAE BARELI)1783-85 31 31 813/UP RAE BARELI (RAE BARELI)1793/94 18 18 629/UP RATSAU (Salon, RAE BARELI)1800/1? 218 218 546/UP RAE BARELI (RAE BARELI)1834-? 51 51 559/UP BISHWASPUR (RAE BARELI)



1818/19 132 132 661/UP GULLUPUR (RAE BARELI)1840 202 202 969/UP KOTWALA ALAMPUR (Salon, RAE BARELI)

RAMPUR1560-1610 0 01610-1660 0 01660-1710 0 01710-1760 246 21729/30 3 3 1134/UP KOTWALI (RAMPUR)1752 243 243 1120/UP BHONAKPUR (Milak, RAMPUR)after 1760 2932 31805/06 50 50 1051/UP LOHA (Milak, RAMPUR)1840? 3883 2851 1060/UP TREASURY (RAMPUR)1855 31 31 844/UP HARBANS MOHAL (RAMPUR)

SAHARANPUR1560-1610 0 01610-1660 0 01660-1710 136 31664/65 14 14 937/UP GHALAULI (Rampur, SAHARANPUR)1670/71 69 59 66/UP HARDWAR (SAHARANPUR)1676 63 63 967/UP MANGLAUR (SAHARANPUR)1710-1760 0 0after 1760 127 21767/68 115 115 381/UP KURWA (Deoband, SAHARANPUR)1804/5? 12 12 393/UP DEOBAND (SAHARANPUR)

SHAHJAHANPUR1560-1610 0 01610-1660 0 01660-1710 0 01710-1760 64 41716/17 24 24 838/UP SHAHJAHANPUR (SHAHJAHANPUR)1716/17 24 24 857/UP MANPUR SANVAT (Banda, SHAHJAHANPUR)1732 6 6 290/UP GARHIA (Jalalabad, SHAHJAHANPUR)1743 10 10 517/UP WAOHSTA HANS RAM (SHAHJAHANPUR)after 1760 155 51803/04 32 32 417/UP PALAI (SHAHJAHANPUR)1805/06 17 17 402/UP NAGARBALA (Sehramau South, SHAHJAH.)1805-34 15 15 734/UP BHATPURA (Pawagan, SHAHJAHANPUR)1805-34 64 64 440/UP SURJAPUR (Tilhar, SHAHJAHANPUR)1806-34 27 27 416/UP SULTANPUR (SHAHJAHANPUR)

SITAPUR1560-1610 10 11540/41 10 10 713/UP GAURIPUR (Biswan, SITAPUR)1545? 2 762/UP MALLANPUR (SITAPUR)1610-1660 0 01660-1710 223 41662/63 18 18 735/UP RAHI (SITAPUR)1670/71 108 108 861/UP JAHANGIRABAD (SITAPUR)1700/01 12 12 653/UP BISWAN (SITAPUR)1702/03 85 85 553/UP GANGAPUR (Misrikh, SITAPUR)1710-1760 70 11721 70 70 481/UP CHAUMA BEGAMPUR (Misrikh, SITAPUR)



after 1760 45 11795/96 45 45 404/UP HANBIRPUR/HANSKHERA (Sidhauli,

Mahmudabad, SITAPUR)1869? 535 763/UP KUNWARPUR (SITAPUR)

SULTANPUR1560-1610 131 61579/80(?) 30 23 793/UP KASRAWAN (Amethi, SULTANPUR)1581 79 79 867/UP RAIPUR PHULWARI (Amethi, SULTANPUR)1585/86(?) 11 1 184/UP SULTANPUR (SULTANPUR)1585/86(?) 14 14 141/UP SHAHGARH (SULTANPUR)1594 6 6 770/UP DEORAJPUR (Kadipur, SULTANPUR)

1602 8 8 720/UP ANNI BAIJAL (SULTANPUR)1610-1660 86 21634/35 15 15 780/UP GUDRA (Kadipur, SULTANPUR)1657 71 71 667/UP PURA BAGH RAI (SULTANPUR)

1660-1710 0 01710-1760 44 31719 1 1 361/UP DEORA (Raipur, SULTANPUR)Muhd.Shah 9 9 193/UP BAROI (SULTANPUR)1747/48 34 34 199/UP SULTANPUR (SULTANPUR)

after 1760 200 51784/85 21 21 140/UP KURWAR (SULTANPUR)1813-34 133 132 306/UP GUDANPUR (Gauriganj, SULTANPUR)

1816/17 24 24 225/UP BAKHAR (Kudepur, SULTANPUR)1844 5 5 185/UP SULTANPUR (SULTANPUR)1855 18 18 958/UP PAKHRAULI (Kotwali, SULTANPUR)

UNNAO1560-1610 0 01610-1660 149 21620/21(?) 89 563/UP NEWARNA (UNNAO)1621 1 657/UP UNNAO (UNNAO)1647/48 17 17 856/UP SAMDHA (Purwa, UNNAO)1657 132 132 836/UP SAMADHA (Purwa, UNNAO)

1660-1710 10 11699/00 10 10 633/UP UNNAO (UNNAO)

1710-1760 67 21724/25 2 2 814/UP RAUSHANABAD (Bangarmau, UNNAO)

1726/27 65 65 891/UP UNNAO (UNNAO)after 1760 2322 61771/72 19 19 914/UP SHERPUR (Jhalotar, UNNAO)1774/75 70 70 876/UP DUNDHPUR (Purwa, UNNAO)1796/97 36 36 750/UP SAFIPUR (UNNAO)1796/97 2173 2173 651/UP BANGARMAU (UNNAO)1805-34 10 10 955/UP KILA BAZAR SAFIPUR (UNNAO)1819/20 14 14 727/UP TERHA (Purwa, UNNAO)

HOARDS IN DISTRICTS 527UNDATABLE („MUGHAL“) 25

TOTAL OF ALL HOARDS 552


Appendix 2: Hoards Arranged by Districts181

Hoards by districts: summary by 50-year periods 1560-1610 1610-1660 1660-1710 1710-1760 after 1760

DISTRICT Ag Ag % of all % of all Ag Ag % of all % of all Ag Ag % of all % of all Ag Ag % of all % of all Ag Ag % of all % of allcoins hoards Ag coins Ag hoards coins hoards Ag coins Ag hoards coins hoards Ag coins Ag hoards coins hoards Ag coins Ag hoards coins hoards Ag coins Ag hoards

AGRA 0 0 0,00% 0,00% 565 6 10,81% 9,52% 287 2 7,43% 3,13% 370 4 5,88% 3,48% 505 13 1,72% 6,28% ALIGARH 50 1 2,39% 2,56% 89 1 1,70% 1,59% 14 1 0,36% 1,56% 309 5 4,91% 4,35% 374 4 1,27% 1,93% ALMORA 0 0 0,00% 0,00% 0 0 0,00% 0,00% 0 0 0,00% 0,00% 22 1 0,35% 0,87% 0 0 0,00% 0,00% ALLAHABAD 12 1 0,57% 2,56% 42 4 0,80% 6,35% 242 4 6,26% 6,25% 215 4 3,42% 3,48% 425 9 1,45% 4,35% AZAMGARH 15 1 0,72% 2,56% 0 0 0,00% 0,00% 12 2 0,31% 3,13% 17 2 0,27% 1,74% 124 3 0,42% 1,45% BAHRAICH 0 0 0,00% 0,00% 60 2 1,15% 3,17% 0 0 0,00% 0,00% 40 2 0,64% 1,74% 189 3 0,64% 1,45% BALLIA 9 1 0,43% 2,56% 0 0 0,00% 0,00% 3 1 0,08% 1,56% 0 0 0,00% 0,00% 0 0 0,00% 0,00% BANDA 25 1 1,20% 2,56% 146 3 2,79% 4,76% 494 5 12,79% 7,81% 148 4 2,35% 3,48% 212 3 0,72% 1,45% BARA BANKI 553 4 26,45% 10,26% 0 0 0,00% 0,00% 162 2 4,19% 3,13% 50 3 0,79% 2,61% 102 5 0,35% 2,42% BARELI 11 1 0,53% 2,56% 139 3 2,66% 4,76% 162 2 4,19% 3,13% 1 1 0,02% 0,87% 122 6 0,42% 2,90% BASTI 6 1 0,29% 2,56% 360 4 6,89% 6,35% 75 3 1,94% 4,69% 551 4 8,76% 3,48% 9 1 0,03% 0,48% BENARES 0 0 0,00% 0,00% 10 2 0,19% 3,17% 0 0 0,00% 0,00% 11 1 0,17% 0,87% 180 3 0,61% 1,45% BIJNOR 26 2 1,24% 5,13% 1 1 0,02% 1,59% 0 0 0,00% 0,00% 143 6 2,27% 5,22% 191 5 0,65% 2,42% BUDAUN 0 0 0,00% 0,00% 9 1 0,17% 1,59% 19 1 0,49% 1,56% 577 4 9,17% 3,48% 138 3 0,47% 1,45% BULANDSHAHR 0 0 0,00% 0,00% 200 1 3,83% 1,59% 947 2 24,51% 3,13% 15 1 0,24% 0,87% 1 1 0,00% 0,48% DEHRADUN 17 1 0,81% 2,56% 0 0 0,00% 0,00% 0 0 0,00% 0,00% 3 1 0,05% 0,87% 0 0 0,00% 0,00% ETAH 0 0 0,00% 0,00% 0 0 0,00% 0,00% 100 2 2,59% 3,13% 108 2 1,72% 1,74% 1500 1 5,11% 0,48% ETAWAH 0 0 0,00% 0,00% 0 0 0,00% 0,00% 128 1 3,31% 1,56% 77 2 1,22% 1,74% 146 2 0,50% 0,97% FARRUKHABAD 2 1 0,10% 2,56% 107 1 2,05% 1,59% 1 1 0,03% 1,56% 126 1 2,00% 0,87% 397 3 1,35% 1,45% FATEHPUR 556 1 26,59% 2,56% 48 3 0,92% 4,76% 104 2 2,69% 3,13% 344 1 5,47% 0,87% 490 2 1,67% 0,97% FYZABAD 0 0 0,00% 0,00% 9 1 0,17% 1,59% 0 0 0,00% 0,00% 169 4 2,69% 3,48% 1385 10 4,72% 4,83% GARHWAL 0 0 0,00% 0,00% 0 0 0,00% 0,00% 0 0 0,00% 0,00% 164 2 2,61% 1,74% 5610 1 19,12% 0,48% GHAZIPUR 0 0 0,00% 0,00% 16 1 0,31% 1,59% 0 0 0,00% 0,00% 0 0 0,00% 0,00% 34 2 0,12% 0,97% GONDA 0 0 0,00% 0,00% 0 0 0,00% 0,00% 23 1 0,60% 1,56% 0 0 0,00% 0,00% 31 1 0,11% 0,48% GORAKHPUR 13 1 0,62% 2,56% 6 1 0,11% 1,59% 79 2 2,05% 3,13% 172 6 2,73% 5,22% 1188 4 4,05% 1,93% HAMIRPUR 5 1 0,24% 2,56% 4 1 0,08% 1,59% 67 3 1,73% 4,69% 71 2 1,13% 1,74% 843 6 2,87% 2,90% HARDOI 16 1 0,77% 2,56% 27 2 0,52% 3,17% 121 1 3,13% 1,56% 0 0 0,00% 0,00% 403 9 1,37% 4,35% JALAUN 32 1 1,53% 2,56% 0 0 0,00% 0,00% 0 0 0,00% 0,00% 286 5 4,55% 4,35% 605 3 2,06% 1,45% JAUNPUR 73 2 3,49% 5,13% 56 3 1,07% 4,76% 0 0 0,00% 0,00% 0 0 0,00% 0,00% 164 8 0,56% 3,86% JHANSI 21 1 1,00% 2,56% 2171 4 41,53% 6,35% 19 2 0,49% 3,13% 365 9 5,80% 7,83% 857 9 2,92% 4,35% KANPUR 0 0 0,00% 0,00% 80 1 1,53% 1,59% 0 0 0,00% 0,00% 79 2 1,26% 1,74% 597 6 2,04% 2,90% KHERI 4 1 0,19% 2,56% 0 0 0,00% 0,00% 37 2 0,96% 3,13% 562 3 8,93% 2,61% 380 8 1,30% 3,86% LAKHNAU 0 0 0,00% 0,00% 0 0 0,00% 0,00% 22 1 0,57% 1,56% 54 5 0,86% 4,35% 825 16 2,81% 7,73% MAINPURI 21 2 1,00% 5,13% 115 3 2,20% 4,76% 0 0 0,00% 0,00% 0 0 0,00% 0,00% 10 1 0,03% 0,48% MATHURA 0 0 0,00% 0,00% 3 1 0,06% 1,59% 0 0 0,00% 0,00% 123 3 1,96% 2,61% 78 2 0,27% 0,97% MERATH 6 1 0,29% 2,56% 0 0 0,00% 0,00% 0 0 0,00% 0,00% 30 2 0,48% 1,74% 602 4 2,05% 1,93% MIRZAPUR 304 2 14,54% 5,13% 110 1 2,10% 1,59% 0 0 0,00% 0,00% 32 1 0,51% 0,87% 296 1 1,01% 0,48% MORADABAD 0 0 0,00% 0,00% 1 1 0,02% 1,59% 119 2 3,08% 3,13% 175 3 2,78% 2,61% 2201 7 7,50% 3,38% MUZAFFARNGR. 0 0 0,00% 0,00% 0 0 0,00% 0,00% 30 2 0,78% 3,13% 81 2 1,29% 1,74% 95 3 0,32% 1,45% NAINITAL 0 0 0,00% 0,00% 491 1 9,39% 1,59% 38 2 0,98% 3,13% 219 1 3,48% 0,87% 291 1 0,99% 0,48% PILIBHIT 0 0 0,00% 0,00% 84 3 1,61% 4,76% 63 3 1,63% 4,69% 25 2 0,40% 1,74% 1194 8 4,07% 3,86% PRATAPGARH 152 2 7,27% 5,13% 0 0 0,00% 0,00% 58 1 1,50% 1,56% 0 0 0,00% 0,00% 1 1 0,00% 0,48% RAE BARELI 21 1 1,00% 2,56% 43 3 0,82% 4,76% 68 3 1,76% 4,69% 66 2 1,05% 1,74% 759 7 2,59% 3,38% RAMPUR 0 0 0,00% 0,00% 0 0 0,00% 0,00% 0 0 0,00% 0,00% 246 2 3,91% 1,74% 2932 3 9,99% 1,45% SAHARANPUR 0 0 0,00% 0,00% 0 0 0,00% 0,00% 136 3 3,52% 4,69% 0 0 0,00% 0,00% 127 2 0,43% 0,97% SHAHJAHANPUR 0 0 0,00% 0,00% 0 0 0,00% 0,00% 0 0 0,00% 0,00% 64 4 1,02% 3,48% 155 5 0,53% 2,42% SITAPUR 10 1 0,48% 2,56% 0 0 0,00% 0,00% 223 4 5,77% 6,25% 70 1 1,11% 0,87% 45 1 0,15% 0,48% SULTANPUR 131 6 6,26% 15,38% 86 2 1,65% 3,17% 0 0 0,00% 0,00% 44 3 0,70% 2,61% 200 5 0,68% 2,42% UNNAO 0 0 0,00% 0,00% 149 2 2,85% 3,17% 10 1 0,26% 1,56% 67 2 1,07% 1,74% 2322 6 7,92% 2,90%

TOTAL Ag 2091 39 100% 100% 5227 63 100% 100% 3863 64 100% 100% 6291 115 100% 100% 29335 207 100% 100% TOTAL ALL HOARDS 61 69 64 120 213 avg. Ag coins per Ag hoard 53,615 82,968* 60,359 54,704 141,71* if the extraordinarily big hoard no. 426/UP with its 1388 silver coins is excluded, the average comes down to 62 coins per hoard

Appendix 3: Mughal Silver Mints 183

APPENDIX III

Mughal Silver MintsRepresented in Hoards


AKBARI SILVER MINTSmint found in one mint found in one

hoard only: hoard only:

Agra Gwalior 975/UPAhmadabad Hisar Firoza 426/UPAhmadnagar 203/UP IlahabadAjmer JaunpurAkbarnagar (=Rajmahal) 975/UP KabulAkbarpur Tanda Kalpi 975/UPAlwar Katak Banaras (=Katak)Anhilwada Patan 426/UP Khairpur(?)Anwala (=Anola) LahorBairat Lahori Bandar 74/UPBalapur 426/UP LakhnauBandhu Malpur 975/UPBangala MultanBankapur NarnolBareli 172/UP PatnaBerar Pattan 975/UPBhakkar 426/UP Peshawar 418/UPBurhanpur Saharanpur 975/UPChittor 975/UP Saimur 953/UPChunar Sarhind 138/UPDelhi ShergarhDewal Bandar SitpurDogaon SrinagarEllichpur Surat 484/UPFathpur ThattaGadraula 426/UP Udaipur 138/UPGobindpur 975/UP UjjainGorakhpur 975/UP Urdu

Urdu zafar qarin

Surat mints represented in hoards of the U.P.Shergarh mints not represented in hoards of the U.P.

but included in the M.P. Singh’s list of mintsUdaipur mints represented in hoards of the U.P.

but not included in list of mints published by M.P. Singh(M.P. Singh, Town, Market, Mint and Portin the Mughal Empire 1556-1707. New Delhi 1985,pp. 239-252)


SHAHJAHANI SILVER MINTS

mint found in 1 hoard onlyAgra (=Akbarabad)AhmadabadAhmadnagarAjmer 667/UPAkbarnagar (=Rajmahal)Aurangabad (=Khujista bunyad)AurangnagarBhakkarBhelsaBihar 39/UPBurhanpurDaulatabadFathpurGolkonda (=Gulkanda)IlahabadJahangirnagar (=Dacca)JunagadhKabulKashmirKatak Banaras (=Katak)KhambayatLahorLakhnau 837/UPMultanNagorPatandeo (=Somnath)PatnaPeshawarQanauj(=Shahgarh)QandaharShahjahanabad (=Delhi)SuratThattaUjjainUrdu zafar qarinZafarabad (=Bidar)Zafarnagar (=Zafarpur) 464/UP

JAHANGIRI SILVER MINTS

mint found in 1 hoard onlyAgraAhmadabadAhmadnagarAjmerAkbarnagar (=Rajmahal)Akbarpur 426/UPBairatBerar 742/UPBurhanpurDelhiEllichpurFatehnagar 742/UPFathpurIlahabadIslamabad (=Chittagong)JahangirnagarJalnapurJalesarKabulKashmirKatak Banaras (=Katak)LahorMuhammadabadPanjnagar 972/UPPatnaPeshawarQandaharRohtasSuratThattaUjjain 68/UPUrduUrdu zafar qarin 203/UPUrdu dar rah-i Dakhin 972/UPZafarnagar (=Zafarpur) 358/UP

Surat mints represented in hoards of the U.P.Peshawar mints not represented in hoards of the U.P.Islamabad mints represented in hoards of the U.P., not listed by M.P.Singh


AURANGZEBI SILVER MINTSmint found in one

hoard onlyAdoni (=Imtiyazpur)Agra (=Akbarabad)AhmadabadAhmadnagarAjmerAkbarnagar (=Rajmahal)Alamgirpur (=Bhilsa)AlamgirnagarAurangabad (=Khujista B.)Azamnagar (=Belgaum)AzimabadBankapurBareliBhakkarBhelsaBijapurBurhanpurChennapatan (=Mailapur)EllichpurGokakGolkonda (=Gulkanda)GorakhpurGulbargaGutiGwalior 602/UPHaidarabadHokeri 929/UPIlahabadIslamabad (=Chittagong or Mathura?)*Islam Bandar (=Rajapur)IslamnagarItawaJahangirnagar (=Dacca)Jaunpur 782/UPJunagarhKabulKanchiKankurtiKarpaKarimabadKashmirKatak Banaras (=Katak)KhairnagarKhambayatKurnool (=Qamarnagar)Lahor

mint found in onehoard only

LakhnauMachlipatan 1101/UPMahmud BandarMailapur (=Chennapatan)MathuraMuazzamabad (in Awadh?)* 839=855/UPMuhammadabadMultanMuradabadMurshidabad (=Makhsusabad)NarnolNasirabad (=Dharwar)Nasratabad (=Sagar) 1122/UPNusratgadh (=Jinji or Dharwar?)*PatnaPeshawarPhondaPoonaPoonamaliPoonchPurbandarPurendaRanthambhor 1101/UPSaharanpur 319/UPSambhar (=Sambhal) 839=855/UPSangamnerSarhindShahjahanabadSholapurSikakalSikandraSuratThattaToragal 1088/UPUdgirUjjainZafarabad (=Bidar)Zafarnagar (=Zafarpur) 1101/UP

Itawa mints represented in U.P. hoardsGokak mints not represented in U.P. hoardsHokeri mints represented in U.P. hoards, not

listed by M.P. Singh

* See, A. Hasan, Mints of the Mughal Empire, pp.322, 343-344.


MINTS OF SHAH ALAM I MINTS OF JAHANDAR

mint found in one minthoard only

Ajmer 682/UP AhmadabadAhmadnagar 1101/UP AjmerAkbarabad AkbarabadAkbarnagar AkbarnagarAzimabad ArkatBareli BareliBijapur 1078/UP BurhanpurBurhanpur ElichpurHaidarabad 1101/UP GwaliarChinapattan ItawaIlahabad KhambayatItawa Khujista B.Jahangirnagar LahorKarimabad LakhnauKatak 1101/UP ShahjahanabadKhambayat SuratKhujista bunyadKora 318/UPLahorLakhnauMalapur 279/UPMuazzamabad 783/UPMultan 1078/UPMurshidabadNusratabad 1101/UPShahjahanabadSurat


MINTS OF FARRUKHSIYAR MINTS OF RAFI-UD-DARJAT

mint found in one minthoard only

Ahmadabad 279/UP AkbarabadAkbarabad AlamgirpurAkbarnagar 650/UP BareliArkat ItawaAzimabad KoraBareli LahorBijapur 129/UP LakhnauBurhanpur MurshidabadFarrukhabad ShahjahanabadGulkanda 13/UPGwaliarHaidarabad 1060/UPChinapattanIlahabadIslamabad 752/UPItawaJahangirnagar 1101/UPKarimabad 536/UPKhambayat 1088/UPLahorLakhnauMirth 560/UPMuazzamabadMultan 594/UPMurshidabadSarhind 318/UPShahjahanabadSuratUjjain


MINTS OF MUHAMMAD SHAHmint found inone hoardonly:

Ahmadabad 570/UPAjayur 105/UPAjmerAkbarabadAkbarnagarAktharnagar Awadh 199/UPAlamgirpur 705/UPArkatAwadhAzimabadBalwantnagar (=Jhansi) 947/UPBanarasBareliBundelkhand 624/UPBurhanpur 536/UPFarrukhabadFatehpur 13/UPGwaliarChinapattan 624/UPIlahabadImtiyazgarh 105/UPIslamabadItawaJahangirnagar 284/UPJaipurKarimabad 536/UPKashmir 105/UPKhujista bunyadKoraLahorLakhnauMuhammadabad BanarasMurshidabadQanauj (=Shahabad)Sararabad 128/UPSarhindShahabad (=Qanauj)ShahjahanabadSironj 705/UPSuratTatta 105/UP

MINTS OF AHMAD SHAHmint found in one

hoard only

Ahmadabad 105/UPAhmadnagar (=Farrukhabad) 105/UPAkbarabadArkatAzimabadBalwantnagarBanarasBareliFarrukhabad 739/UPGwaliar 479/UPIlahabadIslamabadKoraLahor 606/UPMurshidabadMuhammadabad BanarasSarhind 606/UPShahjahanabad

MINTS OF ALAMGIR II.Ahmadnagar (=Farrukhabad)AkbarabadBalwantnagarBanarasBareliFarrukhabadIlahabadImtiyazgarh 105/UPIndrapur 105/UPJahangirnagar 999/UPJaipur 606/UPKora 706/UPLahorMuhammadabad Banaras 205/UPMuradabadMurshidabad 105/UPNajibabadSarhind 606/UPShahjahanabadSurat 971/UP


MINTS OF MUHAMMAD SHAH

mint found inone hoardonly:

Ahmadabad 570/UPAjayur 105/UPAjmerAkbarabadAkbarnagarAktharnagar Awadh 199/UPAlamgirpur 705/UPArkatAwadhAzimabadBalwantnagar (=Jhansi) 947/UPBanarasBareliBundelkhand 624/UPBurhanpur 536/UPFarrukhabadFatehpur 13/UPGwaliarChinapattan 624/UPIlahabadImtiyazgarh 105/UPIslamabad Itawa

Jahangirnagar 284/UP mintfound in one

hoard only:

JaipurKarimabad 536/UPKashmir 105/UPKhujista bunyadKoraLahorLakhnauMuhammadabad BanarasMurshidabadQanauj (=Shahabad)Sararabad 128/UPSarhindShahabad (=Qanauj)ShahjahanabadSironj 705/UPSuratTatta 105/UPItawa mints represented in hoards

deposited before 1760

Jaipur mints represented only in hoardsdeposited after 1760


MINTS OF AHMAD SHAH MINTS OF ALAMGIR II.

mint found in one mint found in onehoard only hoard only

Ahmadabad 105/UP Ahmadnagar (=Farrukhabad)Ahmadnagar (=Farrukhabad) 105/UP AkbarabadAkbarabad BalwantnagarArkat BanarasAzimabad BareliBalwantnagar FarrukhabadBanaras IlahabadBareli Imtiyazgarh 105/UPFarrukhabad 739/UP Indrapur 105/UPGwaliar 479/UP Jahangirnagar 999/UPIlahabad Jaipur 606/UPIslamabad Kora 706/UPKora LahorLahor 606/UP Muhammadabad Banaras 205/UPMurshidabad MuradabadMuhammadabad Banaras Murshidabad 105/UPSarhind 606/UP NajibabadShahjahanabad Sarhind 606/UP

ShahjahanabadSurat 971/UP

Bareli mints represented in hoards deposited before 1760Lahor mints represented only in hoards deposited after 1760

Appendix 3: Mughal Silver Mints193

Hoards with silver coins from Akbari mints deposited in the area of U.P. in the years 1560-1760 (by pentads) NORTHWEST GUJARAT AND SINDH MALWA AND RAJASTHAN CENTRAL EAST DECCAN

Pentad Srinagar Kabul Lahor Multan Sitpur Thatta Ahmad- Ujjain Ajmer Bairat Alwar Narnol Delhi Agra Fathpur Ilahabad Dogaon Jaunpur Patna Akbarpur Bangala Burhan- Berar Ellichpur abad Tanda pur

1560-65 642/UP 642/UP 1565-70 1570-75 1575-80 786/UP 793/UP 793/UP 793/UP 793/UP

786/UP 1580-85 138/UP 138/UP(?) 138/UP 138/UP 138/UP 249/UP 961/UP 138/UP 138/UP 867/UP 138/UP(?)

138/UP961/UP

1585-90 160/UP 141/UP 1590-95 530/UP 505/UP 530/UP 505/UP 530/UP 530/UP 530/UP

641/UP 530/UP530/UP673/UP621/UP

1595-1600 974/UP 1072/UP 1072/UP 974/UP 974/UP 1072/UP 974/UP1072/UP

1600-05 450/UP 450/UP 450/UP 538/UP 450/UP 450/UP 450/UP 720/UP538/UP 538/UP 538/UP 538/UP

1605-10 946/UP 946/UP 946/UP 946/UP 975/UP 975/UP 975/UP 975/UP 975/UP 975/UP 975/UP 975/UP 946/UP 975/UP 975/UP 946/UP 946/UP975/UP 371/UP 975/UP 371/UP 975/UP 371/UP 975/UP371/UP 371/UP

1610-15 426/UP 973/UP 426/UP 973/UP 1079/UP 426/UP 426/UP 462/UP 1079/UP 973/UP 426/UP 973/UP 973/UP 426/UP 973/UP 426/UP 973/UP 426/UP462/UP 426/UP 222/UP 426/UP 973/UP 426/UP 462/UP 426/UP 426/UP426/UP 973/UP 426/UP 426/UP

462/UP426/UP

1615-20 418/UP 418/UP 418/UP 418/UP 418/UP 418/UP 418/UP 418/UP 418/UP 418/UP 1620-25 203/UP 203/UP 203/UP 203/UP 203/UP 203/UP 203/UP 203/UP 972/UP 972/UP 203/UP 203/UP 972/UP 972/UP

972/UP 972/UP 307/UP 972/UP 972/UP 307/UP 972/UP522/UP 522/UP 307/UP 522/UP

522/UP 1625-30 742/UP 620/UP 1008/UP 742/UP 742/UP 248/UP 248/UP 742/UP 742/UP 742/UP 742/UP 248/UP 742/UP 742/UP 248/UP 742/UP

742/UP 742/UP 742/UP 742/UP 620/UP 742/UP620/UP 265/UP 282/UP 282/UP 282/UP282/UP 282/UP

1630-35 780/UP 710/UP 802/UP 710/UP 391/UP 802/UP 802/UP 802/UP802/UP 802/UP

780/UP 1635-40 807/UP 784/UP 784/UP 784/UP 784/UP 807/UP 784/UP 784/UP 807/UP 784/UP 784/UP

807/UP 807/UP 807/UP 807/UP 1640-45 837/UP 837/UP 264/UP 837/UP 837/UP

837/UP 1645-50 313/UP 856/UP 313/UP 313/UP 313/UP 856/UP 1650-55 679b/UP 679b/UP 446/UP 1655-60 953/UP 1035/UP 836/UP 667/UP 667/UP 667/UP 764/UP 667/UP 1007/UP 667/UP

667/UP 836/UP 836/UP 1007/UP 836/UP846/UP 1007/UP1007/UP1035/UP


1665-70 464/UP 262/UP 262/UP 303/UP 303/UP 303/UP 303/UP303/UP 303/UP 464/UP

303/UP 1670-75 1006/UP 861/UP 1006/UP

1006/UP39/UP

1675-80 525/UP 525/UP 422/UP 768/UP525/UP

1680-85 601/UP465/UP

1685-90 344/UP 344/UP 302/UP 934/UP 344/UP 302/UP 344/UP344/UP 302/UP

344/UP 1690-95 1030/UP 1695-1700 1700-05 611/UP 611/UP 1705-10 1042/UP 210/UP 1042/UP 1710-15 15/UP 15/UP

233/UP 1715-20 594/UP 1720-25 1725-30 321/UP 321/UP 321/UP 321/UP 321/UP 1730-35 624/UP 1735-40 569/UP 778//UP 1740-45 212/UP 212/UP 212/UP 212/UP 1745-50 1750-55 1755-60 108/UP 108/UP


Hoards with silver coins from Jahangiri mints deposited in the area of U.P. in the years 1605-1760 (by pentads) NORTHWEST GUJARAT AND SINDH MALWA AND RAJASTHAN CENTRAL EAST DECCAN

Pentad Kashmir Kabul Qandahar Lahor Thatta Surat Ahmad- Ujjain Bairat Ajmer Delhi Agra Ilahabad Patna Akbar- Akbar- Jahangir- Ahmad- Burhan- Berar Ellichpur Jalnapur abad pur nagar nagar nagar pur

1605-10 371/UP 371/UP 1610-15 462/UP 222/UP 462/UP 973/UP 915/UP 222/UP 426/UP 426/UP 426/UP 973/UP 973/UP 973/UP 426/UP 426/UP

111/UP 426/UP 462/UP 426/UP 426/UP 426/UP426/UP 426/UP

1615-20 418/UP 418/UP 418/UP 418/UP 418/UP 418/UP 418/UP 418/UP 418/UP 418/UP808/UP 283/UP

1620-25 972/UP 203/UP 972/UP 972/UP 972/UP 972/UP 972/UP 203/UP 972/UP 972/UP 203/UP 203/UP 972/UP 972/UP 203/UP 972/UP 972/UP 972/UP 972/UP203/UP 203/UP 203/UP 890/UP 203/UP 203/UP 203/UP 358/UP 203/UP 203/UP 358/UP 358/UP 203/UP

522/UP 522/UP 307/UP 522/UP 890/UP 358/UP358/UP 522/UP

358/UP890/UP

1625-30 742/UP 282/UP 248/UP 881/UP 742/UP 248/UP 742/UP 742/UP 43/UP 742/UP 1008/UP 1008/UP 1008/UP 248/UP 742/UP 742/UP742/UP 742/UP 881/UP 742/UP 742/UP 742/UP 742/UP 881/UP265/UP 265/UP 742/UP 282/UP 373/UP 373/UP 742/UP282/UP 265/UP 282/UP

282/UP 1630-35 802/UP 802/UP 391/UP 802/UP 802/UP 780/UP 710/UP 802/UP 802/UP 802/UP 780/UP

780/UP 802/UP 780/UP 780/UP 802/UP 780/UP780/UP

1635-40 784/UP 784/UP 784/UP 784/UP 784/UP 807/UP 784/UP 784/UP 784/UP 784/UP 784/UP 784/UP807/UP 807/UP 807/UP 807/UP 807/UP 807/UP 807/UP 807/UP 807/UP 807/UP

1640-45 264/UP 264/UP 264/UP 264/UP 837/UP1038/UP 837/UP

1645-50 313/UP 313/UP 313/UP 313/UP 313/UP 856/UP 313/UP 856/UP313/UP

1650-55 953/UP 446/UP 953/UP 679b/UP 309/UP953/UP

1655-60 1007/UP 1007/UP 667/UP 836/UP 836/UP 1007/UP 836/UP 667/UP 836/UP 836/UP 667/UP 667/UP 1007/UP 667/UP 1035/UP836/UP 1007/UP 1007/UP 1007/UP 1007/UP 836/UP 1035/UP 836/UP846/UP 1007/UP 1007/UP1007/UP1035/UP

1660-65 320/UP 320/UP 320/UP 451/UP 451/UP 320/UP 320/UP 320/UP320/UP 320/UP 540/UP 735/UP937/UP

1665-70 262/UP 303/UP 262/UP 262/UP 262/UP 68/UP 303/UP 262/UP 303/UP 303/UP 303/UP 68/UP464/UP 68/UP 68/UP 68/UP 303/UP68/UP 303/UP 303/UP303/UP

1670-75 861/UP 1006/UP 861/UP39/UP 1006/UP

1675-80 967/UP 525/UP 768/UP 525/UP 768/UP 525/UP 1680-85 601/UP 601/UP

465/UP1016/UP

1685-90 934/UP 302/UP 302/UP 302/UP 302/UP 302/UP302/UP 1097/UP

1690-95 1030/UP 1030/UP 1030/UP 1030/UP 1030/UP716/UP

1695-1700 300/UP 300/UP 1700-05 741/UP 744/UP 929/UP 1705-10 1042/UP 1042/UP

210/UP 210/UP 1710-15 233/UP 233/UP 233/UP 233/UP 279/UP 233/UP 233/UP 233/UP 233/UP 1715-20 1101/UP 594/UP 1101/UP

392/UP 1720-25 1122/UP 1021/UP 1122/UP 1725-30 319/UP 321/UP 321/UP 321/UP 1730-35 624/UP 1735-40 569/UP 778/UP

778/UP 1740-45 212/UP 1745-50 1750-55 1755-60


Hoards with silver coins from Shahjahani mints deposited in the area of U.P. in the years 1628-1760 (by pentads) NORTHWEST GUJARAT AND SINDH MALWA & RAJASTHAN CENTRAL EAST DECCAN

Pentad Kashmir Kabul Qanda- Lahor Multan Bhakkar Thatta Juna- Patan- Khambh- Surat Ahmad- Ujjain Ajmer Bhelsa Delhi Agra Lakhnau Ilahabad Patna Bihar Akbar- Jahangir- Katak Ahmad- Burhan- Daulat- Gol- har gadh deo ayat abad nagar nagar Banaras nagar pur abad konda

1625-30 265/UP 742/UP 742/UP 742/UP 373/UP 265/UP282/UP 620/UP 282/UP 265/UP

282/UP 1630-35 419/UP 391/UP 780/UP 419/UP 710/UP

780/UP 419/UP 1635-40 784/UP 784/UP 784/UP 784/UP 784/UP 784/UP 784/UP 784/UP 807/UP 784/UP 784/UP 784/UP 784/UP 784/UP

807/UP 807/UP 807/UP 1640-45 1038/UP 837/UP 837/UP 264/UP 837/UP 837/UP 837/UP 837/UP 264/UP 837/UP 837/UP 837/UP 837/UP 920/UP 837/UP

1038/UP 837/UP 1038/UP 920/UP 837/UP 1038/UP 1645-50 313/UP 856/UP 856/UP 313/UP 313/UP 856/UP 313/UP 313/UP 856/UP 856/UP 313/UP 856/UP 313/UP 313/UP

313/UP 313/UP 313/UP 313/UP 1650-55 446/UP 679b/UP 446/UP 446/UP 679b/UP 446/UP 309/UP 446/UP 309/UP 446/UP 309/UP 309/UP 446/UP 309/UP

309/UP 309/UP 309/UP 1655-60 1007/UP 616/UP 953/UP 667/UP 616/UP 953/UP 953/UP 836/UP 953/UP 953/UP 953/UP 667/UP 1007/UP 764/UP 953/UP 836/UP 667/UP 953/UP 667/UP 667/UP 667/UP 667/UP 667/UP

667/UP 764/UP 667/UP 846/UP 667/UP 667/UP 836/UP 616/UP 1007/UP 667/UP 846/UP 836/UP 764/UP 764/UP 836/UP 764/UP 836/UP764/UP 836/UP 764/UP 764/UP 764/UP 918/UP 764/UP 846/UP 1035/UP 1007/UP 829/UP836/UP 846/UP 846/UP 836/UP 836/UP 616/UP 836/UP 1007/UP 829/UP 616/UP1007/UP 1007/UP 1007/UP 846/UP 846/UP 1007/UP 829/UP 616/UP829/UP 918/UP 918/UP 1007/UP 1007/UP 616/UP 1035/UP918/UP 1035/UP 616/UP 829/UP 616/UP 616/UP616/UP 616/UP 918/UP

1035/UP616/UP

1660-65 320/UP 320/UP 320/UP 451/UP 320/UP 320/UP 451/UP 451/UP 320/UP 451/UP 451/UP 937/UP 320/UP 451/UP 451/UP 735/UP 451/UP735/UP 735/UP 735/UP 320/UP 735/UP 320/UP 320/UP 320/UP 320/UP 735/UP 320/UP 320/UP

937/UP 937/UP 735/UP 540/UP 735/UP 937/UP 540/UP 540/UP937/UP 937/UP 540/UP 937/UP 937/UP

937/UP 1665-70 303/UP 68/UP 262/UP 262/UP 464/UP 464/UP 464/UP 262/UP 68/UP 68/UP 68/UP 68/UP 68/UP 303/UP 262/UP 262/UP 464/UP 262/UP 68/UP

464/UP 464/UP 68/UP 68/UP 68/UP 303/UP 303/UP 303/UP 68/UP 68/UP 303/UP68/UP 68/UP 303/UP 303/UP 303/UP 303/UP 303/UP303/UP 303/UP

1670-75 861/UP 66/UP 66/UP 66/UP 66/UP 1006/UP 66/UP 861/UP 1006/UP 66/UP 66/UP 861/UP 39/UP 66/UP 1006/UP 1006/UP 861/UP 861/UP1006/UP 861/UP 861/UP 1006/UP 1006/UP 861/UP 1006/UP 1006/UP 1006/UP 861/UP 1006/UP 1006/UP

1006/UP 1006/UP 1006/UP 1006/UP39/UP

1675-80 967/UP 967/UP 241/UP 967/UP 525/UP 967/UP 967/UP 525/UP 967/UP 967/UP 967/UP 768/UP 296/UP296/UP 768/UP 525/UP 296/UP 296/UP 525/UP 296/UP 241/UP 525/UP422/UP 296/UP 241/UP 525/UP 241/UP 525/UP525/UP 422/UP 241/UP 241/UP241/UP 525/UP

241/UP 1680-85 601/UP 257/UP 465/UP 465/UP 465/UP 465/UP 465/UP 257/UP 465/UP 465/UP 465/UP 465/UP 257/UP 601/UP 465/UP 257/UP 465/UP 465/UP 465/UP

465/UP 465/UP 1016/UP 465/UP 465/UP 465/UP 465/UP1016/UP 1016/UP

1685-90 344/UP 302/UP 344/UP 344/UP 344/UP 302/UP 344/UP 344/UP 344/UP 302/UP 344/UP 344/UP 302/UP 344/UP 344/UP 344/UP 302/UP 344/UP 302/UP 305/UP302/UP 934/UP 302/UP 302/UP 302/UP 302/UP 302/UP 302/UP 302/UP 302/UP 302/UP 782/UP 302/UP 305/UP 934/UP

782/UP 305/UP 934/UP 305/UP 305/UP 782/UP 305/UP934/UP 782/UP782/UP

1690-95 1030/UP 1030/UP 1030/UP 1030/UP 1030/UP 1030/UP 1030/UP 1030/UP 1030/UP 1030/UP 1030/UP716/UP 716/UP

1695-00 215/UP 300/UP 300/UP 215/UP 1052/UP 300/UP 300/UP 300/UP 300/UP 300/UP 300/UP 215/UP 1052/UP 1052/UP 1052/UP215/UP 1052/UP 1048/UP 215/UP 1052/UP 1052/UP 1052/UP1052/UP 1052/UP 1048/UP 1048/UP1048/UP 1048/UP

1700-05 671/UP 740/UP 236/UP 421/UP 740/UP 671/UP 236/UP 740/UP 611/UP 611/UP611/UP 611/UP 741/UP 611/UP 741/UP

421/UP 611/UP 236/UP744/UP 611/UP421/UP 744/UP

421/UP 1705-10 1042/UP 1042/UP 210/UP 1042/UP 210/UP 1042/UP 1042/UP 1042/UP 1042/UP

210/UP 210/UP447/UP

1710-15 233/UP 233/UP 370/UP 233/UP 233/UP 233/UP 233/UP 233/UP 233/UP 233/UP 233/UP233/UP

1715-20 1101/UP 1101/UP 1101/UP 1101/UP 1101/UP 1101/UP 1101/UP 1101/UP 1101/UP 594/UP 1101/UP594/UP 311/UP 594/UP311/UP 966/UP

1720-25 1122/UP 1021/UP 346/UP 1122/UP 346/UP 1725-30 636/UP 321/UP 321/UP 636/UP 321/UP 321/UP 321/UP 536/UP

321/UP 1730-35 624/UP 624/UP 624/UP 1735-40 569/UP 569/UP 569/UP 778/UP 569/UP 1740-45 1745-50 473/UP 1750-55 988/UP 1755-60


Hoards with silver coins from Aurangzebi mints deposited in the area of U.P. in the years 1660-1760 (by pentads) NORTHWEST GUJARAT AND SINDH MALWA AND RAJASTHAN CENTRAL EAST

Pentad Kashmir Kabul Lahor Multan Bhakkar Thatta Juna- Khamb- Surat Ahmad- Ujjain Alamgir- Ajmer Narnol Sarhind Shahja- Bareli Akbar- Ilahabad Lakh- Itawa Patna Azim Akbar- Murshid- Jhngr- Islam- Katakgarh ayat abad pur hanabad abad nau abad nagar abad nagar aba0 Banaras

1660-65 937/UP 735/UP 451/UP 540/UP 1665-70 68/UP 68/UP 68/UP 303/UP 303/UP 262/UP

68/UP 1670-75 66/UP 66/UP 1006/UP 861/UP 66/UP 1006/UP 39/UP 861/UP 39/UP 861/UP 66/UP 66/UP

1006/UP 1006/UP 66/UP39/UP

1675-80 525/UP 967/UP 768/UP 967/UP 296/UP 967/UP 768/UP 967/UP 422/UP 422/UP 967/UP 422/UP296/UP 525/UP 296/UP 525/UP 525/UP675/UP525/UP

1680-85 465/UP 465/UP 465/UP 465/UP 465/UP 465/UP 601/UP 465/UP 465/UP 465/UP 257/UP 465/UP 465/UP 465/UP 465/UP 465/UP 465/UP1016/UP 257/UP 465/UP 1016/UP

1105/UP 1016/UP465/UP

1685-90 782/UP 782/UP 602/UP 892/UP 305/UP 782/UP 1097/UP 420/UP 892/UP 782/UP 782/UP 305/UP 420/UP 782/UP 782/UP 344/UP 302/UP302/UP 782/UP 782/UP 782/UP 302/UP 782/UP 305/UP 344/UP 302/UP 934/UP 934/UP 344/UP344/UP 344/UP 302/UP 302/UP 934/UP 782/UP 1097/UP

1097/UP 302/UP 782/UP602/UP 344/UP782/UP302/UP

1690-95 1030/UP 1030/UP 839=855 839=855 839=855 839=855 839=855 839=855 1030/UP 1030/UP 839=855/UP 839=855/UP 839=855/UP677/UP 1030/UP 1030/UP 1030/UP 1030/UP 1030/UP

1695-00 1052/UP 633/UP 1052/UP 300/UP 165/UP 300/UP 633/UP 300/UP 215/UP 300/UP 215/UP 165/UP 1052/UP 165/UP 633/UP1052/UP 1052/UP 300/UP 1048/UP 1048/UP 1048/UP 1052/UP 1048/UP

215/UP 1052/UP 1052/UP1048/UP1052/UP

1700-05 741/UP 611/UP 565/UP 653/UP 611/UP 421/UP 741/UP 741/UP 741/UP 671/UP 740/UP 653/UP 653/UP 671/UP 1039/UP 741/UP744/UP 421/UP 740/UP 421/UP 1039/UP 929/UP 929/UP 236/UP 236/UP 740/UP 421/UP

741/UP 611/UP 553/UP 553/UP 741/UP236/UP 744/UP 565/UP 565/UP 611/UP611/UP 421/UP 421/UP 929/UP744/UP 421/UP421/UP

1705-10 210/UP 210/UP 210/UP 1042/UP 210/UP 1042/UP 1042/UP 447/UP 779/UP 210/UP210/UP 210/UP 447/UP447/UP 447/UP

1710-15 85/UP 279/UP 413/UP 370/UP 349/UP 85/UP 85/UP 413/UP 85/UP 85/UP 85/UP 1141/UP 164/UP 85/UP 233/UP 233/UP413/UP 960/UP 233/UP 370/UP 349/UP 233/UP 1141/UP 413/UP 85/UP 279/UP 717/UP233/UP 349/UP 233/UP 413/UP 413/UP 370/UP 960/UP279/UP 1141/UP 279/UP 370/UP 233/UP 279/UP 349/UP

413/UP 233/UP 1141/UP370/UP 279/UP 370/UP233/UP 279/UP279/UP

1715-20 1101/UP 594/UP 594/UP 311/UP 1101/UP 594/UP 594/UP 1101/UP 594/UP 966/UP 1101/UP 594/UP 594/UP 1101/UP 594/UP 1047/UP 594/UP 838/UP 594/UP 1101/UP 1101/UP 1101/UP 1101/UP 1101/UP392/UP 1047/UP 1101/UP 1047/UP 311/UP 1101/UP 1047/UP 1101/UP 259/UP 966/UP 311/UP 594/UP 1101/UP1047/UP 1101/UP 1101/UP 259/UP 1101/UP 392/UP 1101/UP 1047/UP 392/UP1101/UP 966/UP 1047/UP 966/UP

1047/UP 1101/UP 1047/UP1101/UP 1101/UP

1720-25 512/UP 481/UP 1122/UP 705/UP 481/UP 512/UP 1021/UP 1021/UP 1021/UP 481/UP 705/UP 481/UP1021/UP 705/UP 346/UP 1021/UP 656/UP 1088/UP 1122/UP 1122/UP 656/UP

512/UP 1122/UP 705/UP 656/UP656/UP 512/UP 512/UP705/UP346/UP512/UP

1725-30 668/UP 536/UP 636/UP 319/UP 536/UP 668/UP 536/UP 319/UP 668/UP 536/UP 536/UP 536/UP 536/UP 536/UP 536/UP 536/UP 536/UP 536/UP 536/UP 536/UP 536/UP319/UP 321/UP 668/UP 321/UP 891/UP 668/UP 319/UP 668/UP 668/UP 668/UP 319/UP 319/UP 319/UP 319/UP 319/UP321/UP 319/UP 319/UP 319/UP 319/UP 319/UP 321/UP 636/UP

321/UP 891/UP 321/UP 636/UP 321/UP 636/UP13/UP 321/UP 13/UP 13/UP636/UP 13/UP 636/UP 636/UP

1730-35 624/UP 624/UP 666/UP 666/UP 624/UP 624/UP 666/UP 624/UP 624/UP 624/UP 666/UP 624/UP 624/UP 624/UP 624/UP 624/UP624/UP 624/UP 202/UP 624/UP 841/UP 624/UP

841/UP 202/UP 841/UP 1735-40 778/UP 569/UP 1078/UP 1078/UP 128/UP 318/UP 569/UP 569/UP 318/UP 318/UP 569/UP 569/UP 569/UP 613/UP 778/UP 778/UP

318/UP 1078/UP 1078/UP 318/UP 778/UP 778/UP 778/UP 1078/UP1078/UP 1078/UP 1078/UP 128/UP 1078/UP

128/UP 1740-45 212/UP 502/UP 752/UP 212/UP 212/UP 212/UP 752/UP 456/UP 527/UP 752/UP 206/UP 212/UP 212/UP 502/UP

783/UP 497/UP 206/UP 497/UP752/UP 502/UP 502/UP 502/UP

752/UP 510/UP 527/UP752/UP 1032/UP

783/UP752/UP

1745-50 473/UP 1139/UP 199/UP577/UP1138/UP

1750-55 241/UP 988/UP 241/UP 988/UP 988/UP 241/UP988/UP 950/UP223/UP 223/UP

1755-60 108/UP 108/UP 108/UP 108/UP 108/UP 108/UP 191/UP 108/UP 739/UP 108/UP 739/UP108/UP 108/UP


Hoards with silver coins from Shah Alami mints deposited in the area of U.P. in the years 1707-1760 (by pentads) NORTHWEST GUJARAT & SINDH RAJASTHAN CENTRAL EAST DECCAN Pentad Multan Lahor Surat Khamb- Ajmer Shahja- Akbar- Ilahabad Itawa Bareli Kora Lakhnau Akbar- Murshid- Jahangir- Katak Azim- Burhan- Bijapur Haidar- China- Ahmad- Karim- Khujista

ayat hanabad abad nagar abad nagar Banaras abad pur abad pattan nagar abad bunyad

1705-10 682/UP 447/UP 447/UP 1710-15 164/UP 960/UP 413/UP 960/UP 164/UP 413/UP 164/UP 413/UP 85/UP 413/UP 413/UP

370/UP 413/UP 370/UP 370/UP 370/UP233/UP

1715-20 1101/UP 1101/UP 1101/UP 1101/UP 1101/UP 1101/UP 1101/UP 1101/UP 1101/UP 594/UP 1101/UP 1101/UP 1101/UP 1101/UP 594/UP 1101/UP 1101/UP594/UP 966/UP 594/UP 594/UP 594/UP 594/UP 1047/UP 594/UP 594/UP966/UP 1047/UP 966/UP 966/UP1047/UP 1047/UP

1720-25 1122/UP 512/UP 481/UP 481/UP 512/UP 481/UP 1021/UP 1122/UP 1021/UP1122/UP 1021/UP656/UP 1122/UP

1725-30 536/UP 668/UP 536/UP 536/UP 636/UP 13/UP 536/UP 536/UP 536/UP 536/UP 536/UP 636/UP 319/UP 536/UP 536/UP 13/UP319/UP 319/UP 668/UP 668/UP 536/UP 636/UP 668/UP 668/UP 668/UP 536/UP 319/UP 319/UP321/UP 319/UP 319/UP 536/UP 321/UP 668/UP 321/UP

668/UP 319/UP319/UP

1730-35 624/UP 624/UP 624/UP 624/UP 841/UP 841/UP 841/UP 624/UP 624/UP 624/UP 624/UP 624/UP202/UP 666/UP 624/UP 624/UP

624/UP 1735-40 1078/UP 650/UP 778/UP 1078/UP 1078/UP 650/UP 318/UP 318/UP 318/UP 1078/UP

1078/UP 627/UP 1078/UP 650/UP 1740-45 497/UP 752/UP 139/UP 355/UP 139/UP

783/UP 497/UP 497/UP502/UP

1745-50 473/UP 1138/UP 1750-55 1015/UP

?223/UP 1755-60 297/UP

Hoards with silver coins from Jahandar‘s mints deposited in the area of U.P. in the years 1712-1760 (by pentads)NORTHW. GUJARAT RAJASTH.&MALWA CENTRAL EAST DECCAN

Pentad Lahor Surat Khamb- Ahmad- Ajmer Gwaliar Shahja- Akbar- Itawa Bareli Lakhnau Akbar- Elichpur Burhan- Arkat Khujista ayat abad hanabad abad nagar pur bunyad

1710-15 233/UP 370/UP 281/UP279/UP

1715-20 1101/UP 392/UP 1047/UP 1101/UP 1101/UP 1101/UP594/UP 392/UP1047/UP

1720-25 512/UP 481/UP 481/UP 512/UP 481/UP 1021/UP512/UP

1725-30 536/UP 668/UP 536/UP 536/UP 536/UP 321/UP 536/UP 536/UP 668/UP668/UP 321/UP319/UP321/UP


1735-40 318/UP 1078/UP 318/UP 1740-45 206/UP 1745-50 1750-55 1755-60


Hoards with silver coins from Farrukhsiyari mints deposited in the area of U.P. in the years 1712-1760 (by pentads) NORTHWEST GUJARAT MALWA & RAJASTHAN CENTRAL EAST DECCAN

Pentad Lahor Multan Surat Khamb- Ahmad- Mirth Ujjain Gwaliar Sarhind Farrukh- Bareli Shahja- Akbar- Itawa Ilah- Lakhnau Azim- Akbar- Mursh- Jahangir- Islam- Burhan- Gul- China- Arkat Muazz- Karim- ayat abad abad hanabad abad abad abad nagar idabad nagar abad pur kanda pattan amabad abad

1710-15 279/UP 560/UP 233/UP 233/UP 1041/UP 1715-20 259/UP 594/UP 1101/UP 1047/UP 259/UP 1101/UP 1101/UP 1101/UP 838/UP 966/UP 594/UP 1101/UP 1101/UP 1101/UP 966/UP

392/UP 838/UP 311/UP 838/UP 594/UP 966/UP 392/UP 594/UP 311/UP966/UP 86/UP 966/UP 1047/UP 259/UP 259/UP

594/UP 966/UP 966/UP392/UP 1047/UP1047/UP

1720-25 512/UP 481/UP 1088/UP 1021/UP 481/UP 481/UP 481/UP 481/UP 481/UP 481/UP 481/UP 481/UP 512/UP 481/UP1088/UP 512/UP 1122/UP 1021/UP 1021/UP 1122/UP 1021/UP 1021/UP 1021/UP 512/UP656/UP 656/UP 1122/UP 512/UP 512/UP 512/UP512/UP 346/UP 346/UP 625/UP

512/UP 512/UP 1725-30 668/UP 13/UP 636/UP 536/UP 636/UP 13/UP 636/UP 536/UP 536/UP 636/UP 636/UP 319/UP 13/UP 319/UP 319/UP 536/UP 536/UP

636/UP 668/UP 668/UP 536/UP 636/UP 536/UP 321/UP 319/UP 536/UP 536/UP 321/UP536/UP 321/UP 668/UP 536/UP 668/UP 321/UP 319/UP 668/UP319/UP 668/UP 319/UP 319/UP

319/UP321/UP

1730-35 841/UP 666/UP 841/UP 841/UP 624/UP 841/UP 841/UP 666/UP 841/UP 624/UP 624/UP 202/UP666/UP 624/UP 624/UP 624/UP 624/UP 624/UP 624/UP 624/UP624/UP 202/UP

1735-40 1078/UP 1078/UP 318/UP 318/UP 318/UP 1078/UP 650/UP 650/UP1078/UP 1078/UP627/UP

1740-45 752/UP 752/UP 752/UP 752/UP 752/UP 752/UP 497/UP 502/UP 752/UP527/UP 456/UP 456/UP 456/UP 206/UP 527/UP

206/UP 502/UP 355/UP502/UP 527/UP 527/UP

783/UP 1745-50 473/UP 1138/UP 473/UP 1750-55 988/UP 1120/UP 988/UP 988/UP 988/UP

223/UP 223/UP 1755-60 191/UP 191/UP

Hoards with silver coins from mints of Rafi-ud-darjat (only 1131-ahd=1719)found in hoards deposited in the area of U.P. since the year 1719

Lahor Shahja- Akbar- Itawa Bareli Kora Lakhnau Alamgir- Murshid- s.l.hanabad abad pur abad

361/UP 1719 ahd 481/UP 1721 1131-ahd 1131-ahd 705/UP 1723/24 ahd 636/UP 1725/26 1131-ahd 1131-ahd 536/UP 1725/26 1131-ahd 1131-ahd ahd ahd 668/UP 1726 1131-ahd 841/UP 1730/31 1131-ahd 202/UP 1732/33 ahd 569/UP 1736 ahd 318/UP 1737/38 1131-ahd 1078/UP 1738/39 1131-ahd 456/UP 1742/43 ahd 1120/UP 1752 1131-ahd 108/UP 1758(?) [ahd] 863/UP 1760? 1131-ahd 372/UP 1131-ahd 845/UP 1131-ahd 1060/UP [ahd]


Hoards with silver coins from Muhammad Shah’s mints deposited in the area of U.P. in the years 1719-1760 (by pentads) NORTHW. GUJARAT MALWA CENTRAL EAST

Pentad Lahor Surat Gwaliar Sarhind Bareli Shahja- Akbar- Itawa Qanauj Shahabad Awadh Lakhnau Kora Ilahabad Banaras Muham- Azim- Akbar- Murshid- Khujista Arkathanabad abad madabad abad nagar abad bunyad

1720-25 656/UP 481/UP 481/UP 481/UP 481/UP 481/UP 1021/UP656/UP 1088/UP 656/UP 625/UP 869/UP 1122/UP

1122/UP 814/UP 656/UP512/UP 346/UP712/UP

1725-30 536/UP 13/UP 636/UP 536/UP 536/UP 319/UP 536/UP 668/UP 13/UP 636/UP 536/UP 636/UP 668/UP668/UP 321/UP 536/UP 668/UP 319/UP 321/UP 921/UP 636/UP 668/UP

321/UP 319/UP 33/UP 536/UP921/UP 321/UP 321/UP

895/UP1134/UP

1730-35 666/UP 666/UP 841/UP 841/UP 290/UP 841/UP 624/UP 202/UP 624/UP 624/UP666/UP 666/UP 202/UP 202/UP624/UP 624/UP202/UP 202/UP

1735-40 128/UP 128/UP 318/UP 318/UP 569/UP 569/UP 379/UP 1078/UP 318/UP 650/UP 650/UP 650/UP 650/UP 318/UP 318/UP 1078/UP1078/UP 379/UP 318/UP 613/UP 650/UP 708/UP 708/UP 650/UP

318/UP 613/UP 1078/UP 708/UP 128/UP 778/UP613/UP 1078/UP 1078/UP 1078/UP1078/UP575/UP627/UP

1740-45 139/UP 139/UP 752/UP 752/UP 139/UP 139/UP 139/UP 752/UP 1032/UP 139/UP 757/UP 752/UP 139/UP 139/UP 139/UP 139/UP 752/UP752/UP 752/UP 527/UP 456/UP 752/UP 752/UP 752/UP 246/UP 752/UP 497/UP 246/UP 752/UP 757/UP783/UP 527/UP 783/UP 497/UP 676/UP 206/UP 355/UP 206/UP 757/UP 497/UP 497/UP 497/UP

517/UP 246/UP 502/UP 456/UP 355/UP 355/UP 502/UP 502/UP429/UP 783/UP 497/UP 502/UP 497/UP 783/UP 783/UP212/UP 517/UP 527/UP 502/UP456/UP 502/UP 783/UP 527/UP497/UP 527/UP 1032/UP516/UP 1032/UP 783/UP502/UP 783/UP527/UP894/UP510/UP

1745-50 697/UP 473/UP 843/UP 473/UP 473/UP 473/UP 473/UP 199/UP 473/UP 473/UP962/UP 1104/UP 1139/UP 577/UP 199/UP 199/UP

1136/UP 1138/UP 843/UP 843/UP199/UP577/UP649/UP1139/UP1138/UP

1750-55 847/UP 1120/UP 1120/UP 1015/UP 1120/UP 988/UP 1120/UP 1120/UP988/UP 1120/UP 988/UP

988/UP223/UP

1755-60 739/UP 191/UP 191/UP 706/UP 340/UP 205/UP 706/UP340/UP739/UP1128/UP224/UP

Hoards with silver coins from Ahmad Shah’s mints deposited in the area of U.P. in the years 1748-1760 (by pentads) Pentad Farrukhabad Bareli Shahjahan- Akbarabad Ilahabad Balwantnagar Banaras Muhammad- Kora Islamabad Arkat

abad abad Banaras 1745-50 649/UP 1139/UP 843/UP

1138/UP 1750-55 1120/UP 1015/UP 988/UP 847/UP 988/UP 950/UP

988/UP 1755-60 739/UP 739/UP 1128/UP 791/UP 340/UP 205/UP 706/UP

297/UP 224/UP 773/UP 706/UP

Hoards with silver coins from Alamgir II.’s mints deposited in the area of U.P. in the years 1755-1760 (by pentads)Bareli Shahjahan- Muradabad Balwantnagar Banaras Muhammad- Kora Najibabad

abad abad Banaras

1755-60 739/UP 683/UP 739/UP 791/UP 191/UP 205/UP 706/UP 1128/UP224/UP 224/UP

374/UP


Incidences of silver coins from the Ahmadabad mint with monthly dates: Akbar, r.y. 38-50, Jahangir, r.y. 2-12 Regnal years Farwardin Ardibihisht Khurdad Tir Amardad Shahrewar Mihr Aban Azar Dai Bahman Isfandarmuz

Mar/Apr Apr/May May/Jun Jun/Jul Jul/Aug Aug/Sep Sep/Oct Oct/Nov Nov/Dec Dec/Jan Jan/Feb Feb/Mar Akbar 38 1 0 0 0 0 1 3 7 0 2 4 3 39 1 2 1 1 0 2 2 1 6 1 1 1 40 1 0 2 2 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 2 41 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 2 7 0 4 3 42 2 2 2 3 1 0 0 0 1 3 3 0 43 1 1 2 1 2 1 0 0 0 1 0 1 44 1 0 2 2 0 0 0 0 2 3 4 1 45 2 1 0 1 0 0 0 1 2 0 0 1 46 0 0 0 2 2 0 1 3 6 3 2 2 47 0 1 0 1 0 0 2 3 4 3 2 3 48 1 0 2 1 0 2 0 2 8 3 3 1 49 1 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 2 4 2 0 50 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 Jahangir 2 0 1 2 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 5 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 2 1 6 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 0 0 0 0 7 1 0 1 1 1 0 2 3 3 1 1 1 8 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 4 1 0 1 0 10 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 11 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 0 0 0 0 12 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 2 0 0 0 Akbar 12 8 13 15 6 6 10 20 39 24 26 18 Jahangir 1 1 3 5 1 0 3 11 8 1 5 2

Akbar+Jahangir 13 9 16 20 7 6 13 31 47 25 31 20

Incidences of silver coins from the Lahor mint with monthly dates: Akbar, r.y. 42-50, Jahangir, r.y. 6-11 Regnal years Farwardin Ardibihisht Khurdad Tir Amardad Shahrewar Mihr Aban Azar Dai Bahman Isfandarmuz

Mar/Apr Apr/May May/Jun Jun/Jul Jul/Aug Aug/Sep Sep/Oct Oct/Nov Nov/Dec Dec/Jan Jan/Feb Feb/Mar Akbar 42 2 1 0 0 4 2 0 0 1 0 1 1 43 2 0 3 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 44 2 2 1 0 3 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 45 2 3 2 2 2 2 0 0 1 0 0 0 46 2 0 2 1 2 3 0 0 0 0 0 0 47 2 2 4 1 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 48 4 2 2 3 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 49 4 4 1 2 3 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 50 1 0 0 0 1 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 Jahangir 6 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 2 0 1 1 0 7 2 0 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 3 3 8 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 2 9 0 1 2 1 0 1 1 0 2 2 2 2 10 1 0 2 1 0 0 2 2 1 2 2 1 11 1 1 0 2 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 Akbar,42.-50. r.y. 21 14 15 10 17 12 1 0 2 2 1 1 Jahangir, 6.-11. r.y. 4 2 5 6 3 2 4 5 3 5 8 8


Incidences of silver coins from the Thatta mint with monthly dates: Akbar, r.y. 38-50, Jahangir, r.y. 6-22 Regnal years Farwardin Ardibihisht Khurdad Tir Amardad Shahrewar Mihr Aban Azar Dai Bahman Isfandarmuz

Mar/Apr Apr/May May/Jun Jun/Jul Jul/Aug Aug/Sep Sep/Oct Oct/Nov Nov/Dec Dec/Jan Jan/Feb Feb/Mar Akbar 38 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 39 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 2 1 40 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 2 0 0 2 0 41 2 0 0 0 3 0 0 0 2 0 0 0 42 1 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 43 0 0 1 3 0 1 0 0 1 3 0 2 44 0 0 1 2 2 0 3 4 0 0 4 1 45 2 0 4 0 1 2 2 5 0 0 0 0 46 3 1 3 1 0 0 2 4 1 2 2 0 47 1 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 1 48 0 2 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 49 1 2 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 1 50 0 0 4 0 0 1 2 0 0 0 0 0 Jahangir 6 0 0 0 1 0 0 2 0 0 1 1 0 7 0 0 1 2 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 8 0 0 2 2 0 0 1 0 1 1 0 0 9 0 0 3 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 10 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 11 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 12 1 0 3 0 0 0 0 0 2 2 0 0 13 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 2 0 0 0 0 14 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 15 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 0 0 0 0 16 0 0 2 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 17 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 18 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 19 0 0 2 0 2 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 20 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 2 0 0 0 0 21 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 22 0 0 2 2 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 Akbar,38.-50.r.y. 11 6 17 7 7 5 12 15 6 5 13 6 Jahangir,11.-22.r.y. 2 1 12 2 2 0 2 9 3 4 1 3

Akbar+Jahangir 13 7 29 9 9 5 14 24 9 9 14 9

Monetary History of Mughal India as Reflected in Silver Coin Hoards

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