Maximilian I and the Holy Roman Empire

The Authority of a King of the Romans (1486-1490)

Author: P.P.A. Wanders

Student number: 4055608

Address: Wintertaling 9

6601 DZ Wijchen

E-mail: p.wanders@student.ru.nl

Course: Master Thesis Roma Aeterna

Supervisors: Dr. Goosmann

Date of submission: 16-06-2014

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Table of Contents

Introduction ................................................................................................................................ 2

Status Quaestionis ...................................................................................................................... 5

Justification ................................................................................................................................ 9

Methodology ............................................................................................................................ 10

Chapter 1: The King of the Romans and his subjects: Maximilian and the imperial states ..... 11

Maximilian’s Election and the Electors ................................................................................ 11

Ladislas, the Unwanted Elector ............................................................................................ 14

The Rhine-toll of Cologne: Conflicts between Electors ....................................................... 16

The Rhine-toll of Cologne: Maximilian’s Treaty ................................................................. 18

Chapter 2: The King of the Romans and Rome: Maximilian and Innocent VIII ..................... 20

First Request and Legitimacy ............................................................................................... 21

Reconciliation ....................................................................................................................... 24

Chapter 3: The King of the Romans and the Emperor: Maximilian and Frederick III ............ 27

Frederick III and the Election ............................................................................................... 28

Maximilian´s Absence: War with France ............................................................................. 29

Peace in the West .................................................................................................................. 31

Bibliography ............................................................................................................................. 38

Sources ..................................................................................................................................... 39

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Introduction

The title of Holy Roman Emperor is one of great importance to European history and brought

its bearer great prestige. The emperor, who was leader of the empire and protector of the

imperial states, was chosen by the electors of the Holy Roman Empire. As the de jure leader

of the empire, the emperor could potentially call upon all the members of the empire, which

encompassed a large part of the Catholic community. De facto, however, the emperor’s

influence within the empire did not always meet this potential, as it relied on the cooperation

of the local rulers. The emperor often had to negotiate with the various princes, bishops and

cities within his realm to collect taxes or gather military assistance. These negotiations could

take place in the form of a meeting between the emperor and various subjects, called a

‘Reichstag’ or Imperial Diet. These meetings, initiated by the emperor, were not always

attended by all of those he called on. This had several reasons, for example the long time it

took to travel to the assembly (thus removing them from their domains), or because they may

have had a conflict with the emperor. The Imperial Diets in the Late Middle Ages were more

a collection of meetings than a centralised assembly. Smaller states were often left in the dark

about its proceedings, which caused no small amount of discontent among their delegations.1

In the late fifteenth century the fortunes of these small states would change however, as a

result of a series of events leading to the Imperial Diet of Worms of 1495. At this Diet radical

institutional changes were proposed that altered the way the Diet functioned. Although not all

of these reforms could be implemented, the changes nonetheless signalled the growing

influence of various subjects in the empire. The Diet of Worms initiated a period of transition,

from a meeting between the emperor and his subjects into an assembly of German states.2

Leader of the Holy Roman Empire at this time was Maximilian I Habsburg (1459-1519),

Archduke of Austria. He was not emperor however, but King of the Romans, a title given to

him upon his election in 1486. At the time of his election Maximilian’s father, Emperor

Frederick III Habsburg (1415-1493), was still alive and the title of emperor could only be

bestowed on one person. The election of Maximilian I as king was not an unprecedented

event in history, there are a number of examples of fathers securing the election of their sons

1 Reinhard Seyboth, ‘Die Reichstage der 1480er Jahre‘ in: Peter Moraw,

Stuttgart (2002) 519-545.

2 Heinz Angermeier, Die Reichsreform 1410-1555: die Staatsproblematik in Deutschland zwischen Mittelalter

und Gegenwart Munich (1984) 168-178.

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in the empire in this way.3 The royal title provided more security for the imperial succession

and gave the new king a stronger voice in imperial politics. At the time of his election

Maximilian was regent of Burgundy for his son Philip and was at odds with the French

concerning the boundaries and succession of this state. This was the result of the

Maximilian’s wedding with the heir of the territories of Burgundy, Mary of Burgundy (1457-

1482). After the sudden death of her father, Charles the Bold, shortly before they married in

1477, Mary and Maximilian would rule Burgundy jointly. The early death of Mary in 1482

would cause a disputed succession, since Philips the Handsome, son of Maximilian and Mary,

was too young to rule. Maximilian had to protect his regency from the French and the cities in

Burgundy during various wars. His regency was secured in the end, but the continuous wars

had ravaged Burgundian territories. Since his reign as archduke over the Austrian territories

would not commence before his father’s death in 1493, the Burgundian territories were his

main source of income for the time being.4 Frederick III was also not able to adequately

support his son in Burgundy, since he had his own war to fight in Austria. The Hungarian

king Matthias Corvinus (1443-1490) had invaded Frederick’s territories in 1477 and was

making gains in the eastern part of Austria when the war resumed in 1482. Frederick feared

he would have to assemble an Imperial Diet, something he had always tried to avoid for fear

of the requests of reform made by the imperial states. The Imperial Diet at Nuremberg in 1474

had been the last Frederick assembled, until he would call for a new Imperial Diet in 1486, in

order to receive help from the imperial states in his war against Matthias Corvinus.5

In this light, Maximilian’s elevation to the prestigious title of King of the Romans was a

remarkable turn of events and has been subject of research for well over a century.

3 One well-known instance of this was a century before Maximilian’s election. In 1376 emperor Charles IV tried

to secure the succession of his son Wenesclaus by making him King of the Romans. Susanne Wolf, Die

Doppelregierung Kaiser Friedrichs III. und König Maximilians (1486-1493). Grundlagen und Probleme

habsburgischer Reichsherrschaft am Ende des Mittelalters Cologne (2005) 120-122.

4 Maximilian did take control over the duchy of Further Austria (Tyrol) in 1490, after deposing Sigismund of

Austria. Sigismund was in debt with the dukes of Bavaria who threatened to take control of this duchy as a

repayment of these debts. This was a threat to the Habsburg finances since the duchy had several silver mines.

After the deposition, Sigismund had to be paid a high amount of money until his death as a pension, so it would

take years before this region would become truly profitable again for Maximilian. Hermann Wiesflecker, Kaiser

Maximilian. Das Reich, Österreich und Europa an der Wende zur Neuzeit: Band I: Jugend, burgundisches Erbe

und Römisches Königtum bis zur Alleinherrschaft Munich (1971) 248-264.

5 Wolf (2005) 20-22. Seyboth (2002) 519-523.

4

This thesis will examine how Maximilian’s negotiations in the empire were influenced by his

title of King of the Romans. The sudden election of Maximilian I as king has led recent

scholarly work to argue that his father, Frederick III, was the main initiator of the election.

This has resulted in a narrative that places Frederick at the centre of the narrative and

Maximilian’s election is seen as a move to counter the ambitions of the Hungarian king

Matthias Corvinus to become Holy Roman Emperor.6 This essay will take a different

approach, focussing on Maximilian, instead of Frederick. It shall not only analyse the reasons

behind Maximilian’s election, but also its consequences. The scope of this thesis will also

lead to a timeframe which differs from that of other works. In this thesis the period from

1486, the year in which Maximilian was elected as King of the Romans, to 1490 will be

analysed. This last date is chosen for a variety of reasons. The death of king Matthias

Corvinus of Hungary started the Hungarian succession-war, which made Maximilian leave

Burgundy to support his father. Maximilian also travelled to the east at this time to interfere in

the Habsburg dominion of Upper Austria, of which he formally became the ruler in 1490.

These events changed both the internal and external situation of the empire drastically,

especially for the Habsburg family. Together, these elements lead me to the following

research question: How were Maximilian’s negotiations in the empire influenced by his title

of King of the Romans between 1486 and 1490?

The goal for this research is to analyze the potential and limitations of a King of the Romans,

in order to get a clear view on the position of Maximilian within the empire. Maximilian

would remain King of the Romans for most of his life (he was only chosen Roman emperor in

1508 and was never crowned by the pope), but the chosen period is especially important.7

During this time he had to take into account his father, who was his theoretical senior as

emperor, but also helped him in his election. However, his appointment was not sanctioned by

the pope, who was disgruntled by what he regarded as a grave infringement on papal rights.

The imperial states all had their own reasons to either support Maximilian, hoping for a

reform-minded future emperor or out of fear for Hungary, or to defy him, as was especially

the case for Bohemia which had been denied its right to vote in Maximilian’s election. These

factors all gave meaning to the title of King of the Romans and would define Maximilian’s

6 Heinz Angermeier, Deutsche Reichstagsakten unter Maximilian I; Band 1: Reichstag zu Frankfurt 1486.

Göttingen (1989) 29-79. Wolf (2005).

7 Manfred Hollegger, Maximilian I., 1459–1519, Herrscher und Mensch einer Zeitenwende Stuttgart (2005) 186-

190.

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position in the empire for the years to come.

The first part of the rest of this introduction will be the Status Quaestiones in which the debate

on the relation of Maximilian with the Holy Roman Empire will be analyzed, followed by the

debate that has developed about his election in 1486.This will be followed by a justification of

the research question and the used methodology. The first chapter of this thesis includes an

analysis of the negotiations between Maximilian and the imperial states. The two most

important subjects of this chapter are Maximilian’s election in 1486 and his involvement in an

imperial conflict, the Rhine-toll of Cologne. The second chapter analyzes another factor in

imperial politics, the pope. The negotiations between the pope and the King of the Romans

mainly consisted of the division between papal and imperial rights. The last chapter consists

of the negotiations between the emperor and the King of the Romans. Frederick and

Maximilian did not always agree on the course of action taken by the other, especially since

both rulers were at war and argued which conflict should have the priority. In the conclusion

the research question will be answered, followed by the bibliography and a list of sources.

Status Quaestionis

Maximilian I is a ruler often portrayed as a ruler balancing on the edge of the Middle Ages

and the Renaissance. His reign was not yet characterized by the religious violence that would

divide the Holy Roman Empire fifty years later, but it is seen as the beginning of a new era

for the Holy Roman Empire. Described as an energetic personality by almost all of his

biographers, Maximilian tried to enact reforms within the empire and held a great number of

Imperial Diets. One of the first historians to write about Maximilian in modern times was

Heinrich Ulmann (1884), who was strongly influenced by the writings of Leopold Ranke.8

His image of Maximilian was quite negative, since he held Maximilian responsible for the

weakness of the Holy Roman Empire in the sixteenth century and the subsequent decline of

Germany in European politics. In his account of the life of Maximilian, Ulmann argues that

Maximilian used German resources in order to further Habsburg interests in Italy and France.

His constant requests had weakened the princes of the empire and their needs were all but

ignored by Maximilian. Kurt Kaser (1912) offers a different view on Maximilian’s intentions

for the empire and he disagrees with Ulmann on Maximilian’s priorities. Kaser argued that the

empire was not used solely for dynastic purposes and that Maximilian’s main goals were to

8 Heinrich Ulmann, Kaiser Maximilian I. Stuttgart (1884).

6

restore imperial authority in Italy and to oppose foreign threats.9

In a biography by Christopher Hare (1913), a rare English contribution to this debate, an

analysis of Maximilian’s personality is provided. According to Hare, Maximilian was a

charismatic person and a strong military commander, but he also had a ‘fickleness of temper’

which prevented him from completing any of his plans.10

The only significant scholarly work

after the Second World War which dealt with the person of Maximilian in the English

language was the analytical biography by Gerhard Benecke, but he ignores the German debate

on Maximilian in relation to the empire and mostly describes Maximilian’s local

administration and domestic power (‘Hausmacht’).11

Hermann Wiesflecker, in his series of books on the life of Maximilian (1971-1986), has put

together a more extensive research on the life and aims of Maximilian. While he is praised for

his use of a great number of sources, his work is not without its flaws. His critique of Ulmann

and others, whom he calls ‘kleindeutsche Historiker’, is clear throughout his works, in which

he emphasises the good intentions Maximilian had for the empire.12

According to Wiesflecker

Maximilian wanted to renew the empire and he spent every penny he had on the empire’s

safety. His main opponents were the princes of the Holy Roman Empire, who stubbornly

refused to help with these endeavours. Maximilian’s plans were continuously foiled by their

refusal to pay any sort of tax, even if a fixed amount had been agreed upon earlier.

Wiesflecker’s continuous assaults on the negative attitude of the princes towards the king

have led to some critique by contemporary scholars, but because of the vast amount of

sources used in his work, Wiesflecker’s study is still considered to be the standard-work on

Maximilian I.

The reign of Maximilian has had the special interest of some scholars due to his joint rule

with his father. In the first years of his reign as King of the Romans, Maximilian had to take

his father, the emperor into account. Their relation is often described as a conflict between

generations, with the old emperor as a conservative man of principals and the young king as a

dynamic and pragmatic man.13

Ulmann (1884) was the first to contribute to this debate,

9 Kurt Kaser, Deutsche Geschichte zur Zeit Maximilians I. Stuttgart (1912).

10 Christopher Hare, Maximilian the dreamer: holy Roman emperor 1459-1519 London (1913) 250.

11 Gerhard Benecke, Maximilian I (1459-1519): an analytical biography London (1982).

12 Wiesflecker (1971) 15-23.

13 Ernst Bock, Deutsche Reichstagsakten unter Maximilian I; Band 3: 1488-1490. Göttingen (1972) 46. ‘Man

konnte vielleicht, allerdings ziemlich vereinfachend und vergröbernd, ihre Politik etwa dahin charakterisieren,

7

stating that the emperor did not want his son to become King of the Romans and even used

his powers to try to prevent the election. The emperor believed his son to be too incompetent

to have a role in the empire and wanted to preserve his own power. Maximilian’s eventual

election was a result of the support of the electors, who hoped that Maximilian (i.e.

Burgundy) could bear the costs for the imperial contribution in the Hungarian war. The bribes

for the electors were all paid by Maximilian. Adolf Bachmann (1890) disagreed with Ulmann

on the question of the imperial election and argues in his study that Maximilian had the full

support of his father in the election.14

According to Bachmann, Frederick saw the title of

emperor as a necessity for the survival of the Habsburg reign in Austria. Frederick’s support

for his son was not driven by fatherly concerns, but by dynastic considerations. Frederick was

cautious in his proceedings for his strained relationships with the electors made the election of

his son uncertain. The emperor had thus not wanted to oppose an election, but merely wished

to wait for the most optimal time to have his son elected. In the end, Frederick’s hand was

forced by events in Austria, where the Hungarians had besieged Vienna. Ulmann (1900)

defended his position by claiming that Bachmann misinterpreted the sources.15

He criticises

Bachmann for only looking at the sources from the viewpoint of fatherly love. According to

Ulmann, the slightest hint was enough for Bachmann to assume that the election was planned

and approved of by Frederick.

Ernst Bock (1958) returned to this question. By then more source material was available. He

argued that it cannot be proven that Frederick disliked Maximilian.16

Bock argues that while

most of Ulmann’s theses can be discredited on the basis of newly uncovered sources, his

points still have merit. According to Bock, Frederick did try to avert Maximilian’s election

and argues that the personalities of both Habsburgs were so different, that the split between

father and son was insurmountable. Various issues within the empire would during the first

years of their joint rule divide father and son even further, with the king infringing upon the

imperial rights which the emperor jealously guarded. During the final years of their joint rule,

daß die des alten Kaiser im wesentlich statisch und doktrinär, die des jungen Königs hingegen mehr dynamisch

und sachlich gewesen sei.‘

14 Adolf Bachmann, Zur Deutschen Königswahl Maximilians I. Vienna (1890).

15 ´es passiert ihm [Bachmann] oftens, mehr zu sehen, als dasteht´. Heinrich Ulmann, ‘Kaiser Friedrich III.

gegenüber der Frage der Königswahl in den Jahren 1481-1486’ Historische Zeitschrift 3 (1900) 413.

16 Ernst Bock, ‘Die Doppelregierung Kaiser Friedrichs III. und König Maximilians in den Jahren 1486-1493. Ein

politisch-historisches Generationsproblem’ in: Hermann Heimpel, Aus Reichstagen des 15. und 16.

Jahrhunderts: Festgabe Göttingen (1958) 283-340.

8

the emperor would give Maximilian more authority, whilst reserving final decision making

for himself.

Wiesflecker (1971) disagreed with Bock and Ulmann on the issue of the election of

Maximilian.17

He argues that there is no reason to believe that Frederick would try to prevent

Maximilian’s election. Wiesflecker argues that no sources can support this claim (excepting

one source that was written thirty years afterwards). He even claims that the source material

points to an opposite view, which entails that Frederick had not only been an active supporter

of his son’s election, but had been the main initiator of the plan. One of the main reasons the

role of Frederick is not evident, according to Wiesflecker, is Frederick’s preference to proceed

with his plans in caution. Maximilian immediately showed reforming tendencies, possibly to

show the electors that their choice was not one they were going to regret and in this way

assuring himself of the support of the important imperial states.

Heinz Angermeier (1989), in his introduction to the publication of sources on the Imperial

Diet in Frankfurt (1486) which led to the election of Maximilian I, introduced a new view.18

Both Frederick and the imperial electors were, according to Angermeier, wary of the

Hungarian king Matthias Corvinus, who had ambitions to become emperor. The election of

Maximilian should be seen as a counter to the Hungarian ambitions. Maximilian was chosen

because he was the logical choice as son of the current emperor. Angermeier argued that

Wiesflecker’s claims that the Imperial Diet in Frankfurt initiated the process of reform are

false, since the main negotiations were about the aid which was to be provided by the imperial

states for the war against the Hungarians.

Susanne Wolf, in her extensive study on the joint rule of Maximilian and Frederick (2005),

argues that Maximilian is overrepresented in historical works.19

She mostly analyses the

position of Frederick towards the election of his son and the subsequent joint rule of both

Habsburgs, keeping her focus on the events in the Austrian dominions of the Habsburgs.

According to Wolf, the election of Maximilian was not planned by his father, since in 1485

Frederick had stated that he did not want to share power with a king. Agreeing with Ulmann,

she argues that the election was first discussed in 1486 and that it had not been, as Bachmann

argued, a scheme developed long before the Imperial Diet in Frankfurt convened.

17

Wiesflecker (1971).

18 Heinz Angermeier, Deutsche Reichstagsakten unter Maximilian I; Band 1: Reichstag zu Frankfurt 1486.

Göttingen (1989).

19 Wolf (2005).

9

Justification

Studying the attitude of Maximilian towards the empire will help us to understand the way in

which kingship worked in the empire. In doing so, it will also give a more prominent role for

the way a King of the Romans functioned in the empire. Unlike recent studies, e.g. the study

by Wolf, which place Frederick in the foreground, Maximilian will hold centre stage in this

analysis. The influence of the king is hard to assess, since most sources from his time in

Burgundy have been lost in the many wars he fought, but his position in the empire deserves

just as much attention as that of the emperor. By analysing the position of the king in the

empire, we can learn a great deal about the internal struggles within the empire and the

ambitions Maximilian had with his position in the empire.

This essay will also try to avoid some of the false dichotomies that still exist in modern

writing. Not all of the emperors actions were that of an old and grey conservative and the king

did not exclusively behave in a progressive way in his many negotiations in the empire. These

stereotypes, which continue to prevail in modern studies, do not do justice to the political

considerations and decisions the emperor and the king had to make. Age and character

certainly play their role in the position of both rulers, but the great many political, economical

and diplomatic considerations of these rulers appear to have been simplified in studies that

maintain the above described dichotomy.

This is not to say that the focus on Maximilian should be seen as a confirmation of

Wiesflecker’s studies, however. In this thesis Maximilian is not a noble man who is

continuously frustrated by the leaders of the imperial states who vehemently guard their

rights, in order to prevent any loss of power to the young protagonist. Also, Maximilian’s role

will also not be explained, as Ulmann did more than a century ago, as the man who tyrannized

the imperial states with extraordinary taxes to be spent on foreign wars and the enrichment of

the Habsburg dynasty. These theses of respected scholars still seem to stem from the

‘Sonderweg’-idea according to which Germany had experienced a radically different

development of their state structures than the rest of Europe. In order to get a clearer view on

the Holy Roman Empire in the fifteenth century Maximilian should be placed in his historical

context. These questions, for example what it meant to be a king in imperial politics, can help

to move this debate from its finalistic approach.

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Methodology

To get a better understanding of the kingship of Maximilian an analysis based on firsthand

sources is necessary. Since this thesis deals with a question of politics, rather than one of

cultural memory, the sources need to come from the people making policy. This approach

makes the use of written sources made by the main actors pivotal for this thesis in order to

come to an answer of the research question. Most sources of Maximilian’s kingship prior to

his father’s death are lost in the wars that he fought however. The recent publications of

sources on the Imperial Diets in the time of Maximilian solve much of this problem. The first

three volumes of the Reichstagsakten under Maximilian I will form the foundation of this

essay.20

The sources are not without their faults, of which some will be discussed below. The

Reichstagsakten consist for the most part of letters between rulers or letters of delegations to

their rulers. The advantage for historians is that their primary purpose of these letters was

either to negotiate between rulers, or to inform them of current affairs in the Imperial Diet.

These sources can quite accurately portray the proceedings of the Imperial Diet and were not

written for propagandistic purposes. On the other hand, there are also reasons to be cautious

when using the Reichstagsakten. The editions are always the result of the selection made by

the editors. The editors did not have the space to include every source related to the Imperial

Diets and cannot always include sources from non-imperial rulers that discuss the

proceedings. The focus of the Reichstagsakten is for this reason limited to the preparations

and proceedings of the Imperial Diet. The selection of sources by the editor thus plays an

important role in our understanding of the Imperial Diet. This seems especially true for the

Reichstagsakten on the Imperial Diet of 1486, edited by Heinz Angermeier (1989). The

inclusion of a large number of Hungarian sources, to emphasise the role of Matthias Corvinus

as a potential candidate for Holy Roman Emperor, seems to be closely related to

Angermeier’s viewpoint that Matthias Corvinus was a very real threat for the electors of the

Holy Roman Empire. In this way, the selection of sources seems to play an important role in

20

Heinz Angermeier, Deutsche Reichstagsakten unter Maximilian I; Band 1: Reichstag zu Frankfurt 1486.

Göttingen (1989). Reinhard Seyboth, Deutsche Reichstagsakten unter Maximilian I; Band 2: Reichstag zu

Nürnberg 1487. Göttingen (2001). Ernst Bock, Deutsche Reichstagsakten unter Maximilian I; Band 3: 1488-

1490. Göttingen (1972). If the introduction of one of these works is referred to, the name of the editor and the

year of the edition will be mentioned, coupled with the part of the Reichstagsakten they edited, followed by the

number of the page (p/pp). If the annotation refers to sources, the part of the Reichstagsakten will be followed by

the number of the sources (no). The division into numbers is an addition made by the editors of the

Reichstagsakten.

11

the development in the debate on the election of Maximilian. In recent studies, for example

that of Susanne Wolf, the Hungarian king Matthias Corvinus is a more central factor in the

debate than ever before. Notwithstanding these remarks on the selection of sources by the

editors, the three editions of the Reichstagsakten will be the cornerstone of this research. The

thorough investigation of German and Italian archives by the editors (Angermeier, Seyboth

and Bock) and the subsequent disclosure and publication of sources which were known to

only a few scholars, has helped this debate tremendously.

Chapter 1: The King of the Romans and his subjects: Maximilian and the imperial

states

As a King of the Romans, Maximilian had improved his status in the empire. No longer just a

duke of Burgundy and heir of the archduchy of Austria, the imperial states had to take

Maximilian into account in imperial decisions. By bringing Maximilian into the heart of the

empire, the electors present at the Imperial Diet of 1486 hoped that Burgundy could bear the

cost for the defence of the Holy Roman Empire, especially in the war between the Austrians

and the Hungarians (fought between Maximilian’s father Frederick III and the Hungarian king

Matthias Corvinus).21

Even though Maximilian had to fight a war with the French, which

caused him to be absent at the Imperial Diet of 1487 of Nuremberg, he was remarkably active

in imperial matters. In this chapter, the most important of his exploits in the empire in relation

to the electors shall be analysed. Starting with the election of 1486, Maximilian entered into

negotiations with the imperial electors in order to become King of the Romans, These

negotiations reveal how he combined his election with the resolution of long-lasting conflicts

within the empire. This is shown in his correspondence with the imperial electors and the

promises he made in this correspondence. However, this election would in turn lead to a

conflict between the electors, which was peacefully resolved only after long negotiations.

After this, one of the most relevant displays of Maximilian’s kingship will be subject of

analysis, his role in the conflict of the Rhine-toll of Cologne.

x ’ Election and the Electors

The election of Maximilian to King of the Romans is still a subject heavily debated in

German historiography, as was explained in the Introduction. The first decision made in the

21

Wolf (2005) 43.

12

Imperial Diet of 1486 at Frankfurt was the election of Maximilian. It was decreed shortly after

the Imperial Diet had assembled, as several historians have rightly stressed.22

The archbishop

of Mainz had assembled the electors in line with the Golden Bull of 1356. However, the

absence of the elector of Bohemia would cause a legalistic conflict between those electors

who were present and the elector of Bohemia, who complained that the rules of the Golden

Bull had been violated.23

The election seems to have been an exchanging of gifts between

Maximilian and the electors. The electors were to give Maximilian his title of King of the

Romans in exchange for monetary gains and, in some cases, the affirmation of their rule over

their domains (as was agreed upon with the Palatinate and other electors). This process, which

has been viewed as an expression of the ‘do ut des’ principle, might in that case also be seen

as part of Maximilian’s attempt to strengthen his position in the empire, as will be argued

below.

The archbishop of Mainz, Berthold von Henneberg, played an important role in the

negotiations on imperial reform in 1495. His role in the empire in the fifteenth century is

controversial. Some historians attributed him the role of a progressive reformer, whereas

others see him as an enemy of the Habsburg imperial power.24

His role in the Imperial Diet of

1486 is seen as less ambivalent and he would support Maximilian in his ambition to become

King of the Romans. His support was not won with idle promises, however, as he had

received concrete gains from his support. Before the archbishop would officially assemble the

electors in order to elect the King of the Romans on the 13th

of February 1486, Maximilian

had corresponded with him in order to gain his support for the upcoming election.25

This

correspondence entailed the annulment of the debts Berthold had and would remove any

conflict between Maximilian and Berthold. Maximilian would also pay Berthold 25000

22

Angermeier (1989), RTA I p 35. Wolf (2005) 101.

23 Patrick Geary, Readings in Medieval History Ontario (1997) 633-639. Geary includes the Golden Bull in

English translation. The electors were the archbishops of Mainz, Trier and Cologne, and the princes of

Brandenburg, Bohemia, the Palatinate and Saxony.

24 Angermeier (1984) 184-191. Wolf (2005) 295-307. Hermann Wiesflecker, Kaiser Maximilian. Das Reich,

Österreich und Europa an der Wende zur Neuzeit: Band II: Reichsreform und Kaiserpolitik, 1493-1500.

Entmachtung des Königs im Reich und in Europa Munich (1975) 208-217. These characteristics are not mutually

exclusive, but the emphasis on one factor or the other will lead to a completely different narrative (strengthening

of the empire in the case of Angermeier and Wolf versus self-empowerment by Berthold of Mainz in the case of

Wiesflecker).

25 RTA I no 181.

13

florins as a result of earlier negotiations.26

After the call for assembly by the archbishop,

Frederick III invested the Berthold with his title on the 15th

of February.27

A day later the

election would take place and Maximilian was chosen King of the Romans.28

This quick

succession of events indicates an organised planning and a preconceived process. The day of

the election itself having been reduced to a mere formality, with the outcome being

determined before the actual vote was cast. The archbishop of Mainz was thus able to secure

important promises from the future emperor, including the promise not to institute new tolls

on his domains.29

Annulment of outstanding debts was not all Maximilian had to offer the imperial states, as his

agreement with the Elector of the Palatinate (Philip) demonstrates. The relations between the

Palatinate and the emperor had been strained at best, since Frederick had refused to officially

invest Philip in his realm.30

The promises made between the elector of the Palatinate and

Maximilian have been passed on to us in two documents, one signed by the elector and the

other by the future king.31

Both documents have the same date (the 6th

of June 1486), so it is

likely that these documents confirmed the outcome of previous negotiations. It is interesting

to mention here that there is no hint of a possible bribe. The main concession by Maximilian

is the affirmation of the prince-elector in his domain, which had been denied by Frederick for

legalistic reasons. This does not, as Wolfe argues, only show Maximilian was willing to defy

his father’s wishes in imperial matters.32

These documents, which have been seen, pending on

the historian, as a pragmatic or cynical exchange of favours, can also be seen as an attempt by

Maximilian to get rid of the bad blood between the Habsburgs and the Palatinate.33

The ruler

of the Palatinate had been a staunch opponent of the Habsburgs for years, especially because

he came from another important dynasty in the Holy Roman Empire. The Wittelsbach dynasty

also consisted of the rulers of Bavaria. Frederick and Maximilian feared this dynasty could

26

RTA I no 176. Bock (1958) 285. Wolf (2005) 107. On the 15th

of June, the archbishop confirmed that he had

received the money. RTA I no 231.

27 RTA I no 183 and 184. Berthold of Mainz was not officially invested in his title before.

28 RTA I no 187.

29 RTA I no 221.

30 Bock (1958) 286.

31 RTA I no 171 and 172.

32 Wolf (2005) 107-111.

33 Maximilian invested Philip in all his territories, even those that were acquired in recent times, after his

election. RTA I no 208. His father, Frederick III, would oppose this decision, as is described in the third chapter

of this thesis.

14

possibly join the Hungarians in the war. This threat was increased by the various territorial

disputes that existed amongst the two families.34

The compromise agreed upon in these

documents would not only give Maximilian the support he needed to become King of the

Romans, which might have been accomplished by means of bribery alone, but also made the

potentially dangerous Hungarian-Palatinate alliance less likely to occur. This arrangement

also reveals to the other electors that the new ruler of the empire held no grudges against the

enemies of the emperor (i.e. Frederick III) and that their support resulted in tangible rewards.

Ladislas, the Unwanted Elector

As mentioned above, the elector of Bohemia was not present at the Imperial Diet of 1486.

Bohemia, at this time, was closely connected with Hungary due to a peace treaty and as a

result of this peace treaty it served two kings. The first, Matthias Corvinus, king of Hungary,

was considered an unacceptable candidate to sit at the Imperial Diet, both in the eyes of the

imperial states and in those of the emperor, since his war against Austria made him quite

unpopular. The other king of Bohemia, Ladislas (1456-1516), was not trusted either, since he

was too dependent on Matthias Corvinus for his position.35

On account of his absence, the

elector of Bohemia was excluded from the process of election. This was in direct violation of

the Golden Bull, which stated that the elector of Bohemia should have been escorted to the

city by the archbishop of Mainz before the election could begin.36

The announcement of the

coming Diet, dated at the 16th

of February 1486, did not mention that the elector of Bohemia

would be present, as opposed to all the other electors, indicating that there was not any

intention to have the Bohemian elector participate in the election.37

The rules of the Golden

Bull were not forgotten, since violations of protocol caused a conflict between the electors of

Cologne and Trier after the election.38

In the request by the electors (except Bohemia of

course) to Emperor Frederick to accept their election of Maximilian as King of the Romans

they defined three threats to the empire: the Ottomans, the pressure on Livland and the

invasion of Austria. The threat of the Hungarians and the Ottomans to the empire is

34

Angermeier (1989), RTA I pp 62-75.

35 Wolf (2005) 129-135. The emperor was also afraid that Matthias Corvinus would show up if the elector of

Bohemia was asked to attend. Wiesflecker (1971) 189. Depending on preference, one can also use Vladislav or

Vladislaus instead of Ladislas, this last form is used in the Oxford Dictionary. Gordon Campbell, The Oxford

Dictionary of the Renaissance Oxford (2003).

36 Geary (1997) 636-638.

37 RTA I no 187.

38 RTA I no 222.

15

emphasised, but mentioning Bohemia is carefully avoided.39

Ladislas protested against the

election of Maximilian and sent letters to electors to file his complaints. He demanded

compensation for the denial of his rights and threatened with violence if the other electors

would not pay a fine.40

Although the elector of Saxony sent a letter denying they had willingly

excluded Ladislas, the archbishop of Mainz sent a letter to the other electors asking to

convene in a meeting in which they would discuss how to respond to the allegations of the

Bohemian elector. They defended themselves against Ladislas by saying that the election of

the King of the Romans was unsuspected and that only the unexpected circumstances of the

Imperial Diet led them to elect Maximilian as king, without inviting Bohemia because the

election could not be delayed.41

Safe to say that this did not sit well with Ladislas and he sent

a furious letter to his brother in law, the elector of Brandenburg, in which he accused the

electors that they had deliberately excluded him from the election.42

The threat of war became

very real now, and the emperor stepped in to prevent this. Only after the 15th

of April 1488

the quarrel between Bohemia and the other electors would begin to move towards a

resolution, after negotiations between Albert of Saxony and Ladislas. On May 21st, 1489, the

electors and Ladislas reached a compromise.43

Ladislas had good reason to come to good

terms with the empire again, since his relations with Matthias Corvinus had soured again.

Ladislas had been trying to undermine the position of Corvinus, because the Hungarian king

had taken territories from him in a previous war. This did not go unnoticed by Corvinus, who

now threatened to start a war against the other Bohemian king. The Habsburgs were able to

exploit this conflict between the Bohemian kings, resolving a long conflict in the empire

regarding Maximilian’s legitimacy and because they gained another potential ally in the east

against the Hungarians.44

The series of threats made by Ladislas did, however, indicate that

imperial peace was fragile, and imperial princes would not hesitate to ask for help from

powers outside the empire. The return of Ladislas to the empire was one step to secure peace.

What is remarkable is that the Habsburgs only had a limited role in the resolution of the

39

RTA I no 190. Maximilian had also not been able to convince the electors of the threat the French could pose

for the empire, since they were not mentioned in the request.

40 RTA I no 236, 237 and 246. Matthias Corvinus would help Ladislas in a war if his demands were not met.

RTA I no 252.

41 ‘die sach kein aufslag, weyter vertragung, oder gewunliche form leyden mogen’ RTA I no 248.

42 RTA I no 251.

43 RTA I no 285 and 293.

44 Wolf (2005) 134-135.

16

conflict. Frederick did play a role in the de-escalation, but the negotiations and eventual

outcome of the dispute was largely the result of the compromise between the electors

themselves. Furthermore, the limited role of Maximilian was likely the result of his disputed

election. He was not the king of the Romans for Ladislas, but the duke of Burgundy and in

that guise, he can even be seen as a mere regent. The interference of Maximilian in the affairs

of the electors would probably have offended the Bohemian kings. In this particular case, it

was Maximilian’s absence that has helped the resolution of the conflict more than his

presence would have.

The Rhine-toll of Cologne: Conflicts between Electors

The election of Maximilian was thus coupled with the distribution of titles to the participating

electors, and the resolution of conflicts between the electors. In these steps Maximilian only

seems to have played a limited role, but they were not the only steps taken to resolve lasting

conflicts in the empire. One of these conflicts, which was about the Rhine-toll of Cologne, is

well documented and will serve as an example in this chapter. The toll was given to Cologne

in 1475 by Frederick III, as a reward for their support against Charles the Bold. The nearby

imperial states of Mainz, the Palatinate and Trier were dependent on their own tolls and trade

on the Rhine and tried to circumvent the toll of Cologne.45

At the Imperial Diet of Nuremberg in 1487, at which Maximilian was not present as a

consequence of hostilities with the French, the conflict was discussed by the affected rulers

and the emperor. Frederick III supported the elector of Cologne in his aim to keep the toll in

effect, not in the last place because Frederick received his share of the toll.46

The electors of

Trier, the Palatinate and Mainz sent Frederick a letter to address their complaints and

proposed Frederick would annul the Rhine-toll. They took the liberty of drafting a concept of

Frederick’s statement in which he would cancel the Rhine-toll and denounce anyone who

would be involved in it from then onward.47

They also sent an emissary to the elector of

Cologne, in which they stressed the consequences of the toll for merchants, who were ruined

by the toll and would look at other places to make their money. This would, according to the

three electors, harm the trade on the Rhine, including the trade in the domains of the elector of

Cologne himself. The envoy was to threaten the elector of Cologne with stringent measures

45

Bock (1958) 300.

46 Seyboth (2001), RTA II p 605 note number 2.

47 RTA II no 436 and 437.

17

taken by the three electors if their demands were not met.48

It became clear in the Imperial Diet of 1489 in Frankfurt that these measures had their effect,

The steps taken by the three electors were also one of the reasons that the Imperial Diet of

1489 was not held in Speyer, as originally intended, but in Frankfurt. The entry into Palatinate

territory had been denied to Cologne and Frankfurt was easier to access for the electors. The

elector of Cologne had been barred entrance from the Rhine from the end of March 1488 and

merchants on their way to Cologne were stopped and their goods were confiscated.49

This

conflict also had its effect on the rulers downstream from the Rhine, among them Maximilian.

The Rhine was an important line of supply in his war against the French influence in

Burgundy, it was an important source of fresh troops. Maximilian would benefit from a quick

solution of the conflict to restore the accessibility to new recruits.50

In the meantime the elector of Cologne, archbishop Hermann IV of Hesse, was looking for

ways to limit the damage done by the restrictions set in place by the three other electors. He

looked for support at the landgrave (‘landgraf’) of Hesse, William III the Younger and sent

him a letter on the 5th

of February, 1489. The measures were taking their toll on Cologne so

archbishop Hermann of Hesse wanted to make sure William would not join the three electors

in their complaints. The electors had earlier sent the landgrave a letter to ask him for his

support, for his aid would have been a disaster for the economy of Cologne, since this would

also limit the possibilities to redirect trade from the east. The landgrave of Hesse was asked

by Hermann to aid him in his struggle or at the very least to stay out of the conflict.51

The

archbishop also asked for an assembly with the three other electors to settle their disputes.52

This assembly would eventually take place in Oberwesel with in the presence of Maximilian,

but was not the success the elector of Cologne had hoped for. The elector of the Palatinate did

not even attend the assembly and the elector of Cologne complained to Frederick III in a letter

on the 18th

of March that the other two electors had an uncooperative attitude. The personal

interference of Maximilian, who according to the elector of Cologne went through great

lengths to see the matter resolved, did not change this attitude.53

A month later Frederick

48

RTA II no 440.

49 Bock (1972), RTA III p 846.

50 Bock (1972), RTA III pp 847-849.

51 RTA III no 224a. He would fail in his intentions, the landgrave of Hesse supported the claims of his father in

law, Philip of the Palatinate, in the Imperial Diet of Frankfurt. Bock (1972), RTA III p 990.

52 RTA III no 224b and 224c.

53 RTA III no 226e.

18

would order the three electors to stop with their blockade of Cologne. The presence of

Maximilian in the conflict was appreciated by the elector of Cologne, because Maximilian

seemed to follow his father in this conflict. The elector of Cologne thanked Maximilian

personally and requested Maximilian to aid him in the likely struggles he would have to come

to the Imperial Diet in Frankfurt. He asked him to use his influence to make sure the electors

of Mainz, Trier and the Palatinate would allow him free passage through their lands, in order

to be present in Frankfurt.54

Maximilian thus played an active role in the negotiations, although the conflict over the

Rhine-toll did not seem to be the main reason for this. His intentions were still the recruitment

of troops for his war in Burgundy and the acquisition of money to finance these campaigns.

He managed to secure military and monetary support on the 14th

of March from Cologne in

his conflict, but there was a condition which was included in this promise for aid in

Burgundy. In the condition for the loan the council of Cologne stated that they could not aid

Maximilian as long as the Rhine was closed off.55

Maximilian’s support at the assembly of

Oberwesel was no charity, but a payment for the loans given to him.

The Rhine- C : x ’ T y

Maximilian had the opportunity to further his influence in the conflict when the Imperial Diet

of Frankfurt (1489) met. Frederick was not present at this Imperial Diet and had given one of

his advisors, William of Eichstätt and Maximilian a mandate to gather support for aid in his

stead. The wars both father and son fought were one of the main reasons to assemble the

Imperial Diet, since they wanted to acquire imperial aid in their conflicts.56

The first difficulty

for Maximilian was the absence of the elector of Cologne. The archbishop and his envoys

were still denied access to the territories of the Palatinate, so they were afraid they would not

be able to attend. The archbishop of Cologne would write to Philip of the Palatinate on the

20th of April, 1489 and again at the 29th of May with the request for free passage for his

envoys.57

With the Imperial Diet intended to start at the 7th

of June, this could become a

serious problem that would not help with a peaceful resolution of the conflict. The elector of

Cologne would write Maximilian to resolve this problem on the 14th

of June and a week later

Maximilian would answer that the envoys of Cologne were given access to the territories of

54

RTA III no 226f.

55 RTA III no 224n.

56 RTA III no 239e and 239f.

57 RTA III no 235, 246a and 246b.

19

the Palatinate.58

The negotiations did not start off well however, with the division between the three electors

and the elector of Cologne becoming larger. The electors decided they would uphold the

restrictions until the toll was abolished and strengthened their ties with the landgrave of

Hessen.59

Maximilian tried to come to a compromise on the 28th

of July with the states in the

conflict. The envoys of the three electors of Mainz, Trier and the Palatinate, the elector of

Cologne and the landgrave of Hessen participated in these negotiations. Here Maximilian met

more difficulties, for both the envoys of Cologne and Maximilian himself did not have the

right mandate to negotiate a treaty. Despite these adversities Maximilian was able to negotiate

a treaty under the condition the right mandates would be acquired. The king would call for an

assembly, to be held on or after the 11th

of November 1489, in which the dispute would be

settled. The measures taken against Cologne would be annulled, but the toll could also not be

raised for the time being.60

The three electors got what they wanted in this way, until the

assembly would meet. This solution was also beneficial to Maximilian, since travel on the

Rhine was possible again and the toll of Cologne would not tax trade with Burgundy.

Notwithstanding these solutions, negotiations after the Imperial Diet of Frankfurt were not

successful, instead they further escalated the situation. The three electors completely

blockaded Cologne on the 30th

of November 1489, with no-one allowed entrance on the Rhine

towards Cologne. On the other hand, the imperial army that had been sent to Burgundy as

agreed upon in the Imperial Diet of Frankfurt did not get permission to travel trough Cologne

freely. They were split up into small contingents, guarded by troops of Cologne, officially to

avoid any potential attempt to assault Cologne by the troops of the three electors.61

The

measures taken by Maximilian seem to have escalated the situation, with the electors taking

even more strong measures than before. The very reason for Maximilian´s interference, the

harm the quarrel caused for his supply lines, would also hinder Maximilian the most in

resolving the conflict. He was too dependent on the trade on the Rhine to resolve the situation

in a manner that would satisfy both parties. By opening the Rhine and temporarily annulling

the toll his impartiality could be questioned, since this was the outcome the three electors

wanted.

58

RTA III no 256a and 256b.

59 RTA III no 293a, 293b, 293c and 301b. No 293c is categorised as no 293e in the Reichstagsakten, but this is a

misprint. For sake of clarity: no 293c is on page 1146 and no 293e is on page 1147.

60 RTA III no 293e.

61 Bock (1958) 301-302.

20

Concluding, the role of Maximilian in relation to the imperial states was changed by his

election to King of the Romans. The negotiations preceding Maximilian’s election show how

he gained his position by resolving old quarrels, especially the one between Frederick and

Philip of the Palatinate. Although not all of his promises could be fulfilled before his father’s

death, Maximilian did manage to present himself as a progressive ruler who was willing to

forget old conflicts. His election would create a new conflict, but the electors settled their

differences with each other. The reconciliation of Bohemia with the empire was especially

important because it was less likely Ladislas would follow Matthias Corvinus in war. One of

Maximilian’s first actions as King of the Romans did not end so well as his election and

reconciliation with Bohemia. His intervention in the Rhine-toll of Cologne could have been

an opportunity to show his abilities as conciliatory ruler, but the uncompromising attitude of

both the elector of Cologne and the other three electors made a solution exceedingly difficult.

The personal stakes Maximilian had in the conflict would make him opt for a truce, with none

of the underlying problems solved. In this last instance he hoped for a quick solution of the

problem to make sure his supply of troops was not endangered. What is more remarkable is

that his interference in the conflict was accepted, even if he did not have the right mandate.

Maximilian’s position as judge in this conflict was not questioned, so he had gained an

important position in the Imperial Diet. Maximilian’s title of King of the Romans not only

made him the most likely successor to the imperial throne, but also gave him the position as

arbitrator over conflicts in the empire.

Chapter 2: The King of the Romans and Rome: Maximilian and Innocent VIII

A King of the Romans had more factors to take into account in imperial matters than the

quarrels amongst the imperial states. Maximilian was not only legitimised as the King of the

Romans by the imperial electors, he also needed the sanctioning of the pope. The pope was

the figurehead of Western Christianity at this time and his spiritual influence was large,

especially in the ecclesiastical states in the empire. The papacy was arguably the most

influential foreign power in the imperial government and papal legates were not an

uncommon sight at Imperial Diets, for example in 1487 in Nuremberg. Innocent VIII (r. 1484-

1492) was pope at the time of Maximilian’s election and had to give his blessing to the

election, in order to legitimise the election. Maximilian had to submit himself to the Roman

21

church and pledge obedience to the head of the church, the pope.62

Both Maximilian and

Innocent refused at first to come to an understanding about the declaration of obedience, so

this meant yet another setback for Maximilian’s legitimacy as King of the Romans. The

approval of the pope was pivotal for Maximilian’s position in the empire, because his foes

could use the lack of papal approval as evidence for his illegal election. Maximilian thus

could not be secure of his new title of King of the Romans until he could find a compromise

with the pope.

First Request and Legitimacy

When Maximilian was elected in 1486, Innocent VIII was not officially notified. This created

a misinterpretation by the pope, since at first Innocent thought Frederick had stepped down

from office in favour of his son. Innocent even wanted to sent a letter to Frederick in March to

congratulate him on his retirement as emperor.63

This error shows the unexpected nature of

the election for the papal court and indicates clearly that the pope had not been consulted in

the election and he had not been notified of it. Innocent’s error was probably made due to lack

of information from the Imperial Diet. No legate was present in the Imperial Diet of 1486, so

Innocent had to depend on information from other sources. The archbishop of Mainz would

inform the pope of the election.64

Upon gaining his new title of King of the Romans,

Maximilian also needed to pledge his obedience to the pope, but Maximilian did not do so

after his election. Innocent wrote to Berthold of Mainz that he expected this would happen

soon.65

The pope did not seem to be disgruntled by the election at first and sent letters to

arrange ecclesiastical matters in the empire, such as the appointment of an ecclesiastical office

in the Habsburg dominion.66

This lenient attitude of the pope changed radically when Maximilian, as new King of the

Romans, began to use the First Request (‘Ersten Bitten’ or ‘primarium precum’). The First

Request gave Maximilian the right to decide over the appointment of ecclesiastical offices.67

This meant an increased control of Maximilian over appointments in the empire.68

The use of

62

Wolf (2005) 137.

63 RTA I no 297.

64 RTA I no 300. Letter from Innocent VIII to Berthold of Mainz to thank Berthold for informing him.

65 RTA I no 300. Wolf (2005) 137-138.

66 RTA I no 301 and 302. Innocent was not successful in his request.

67 The First Request could only be invoked the first time an unique ecclesiastical office became available, the

second time the same office was vacant the right could not be used.

68 Seyboth (1991) 44-45, Wolf (2005) 138 (in particular note 39).

22

the First Request also lead to papal discontent. The First Request had in previous instances

been given by the pope to the newly appointed King of the Romans, but Maximilian used it

without Innocent’s permission. Archbishop Berthold of Mainz now was in a difficult position,

since he had been ordered on the 2nd

of May by Maximilian to oversee the execution of his

right and punish those who were not willing to accept the First Request.69

The new King of

the Romans was using this opportunity to expand his influence over ecclesiastical matters

frequently, but Berthold’s position as archbishop also meant that he owed loyalty to the pope.

Maximilian’s refusal to swear loyalty to the pope and his use of the First Request caused

Innocent to write a letter to Berthold of Mainz on the 23rd

of September. In this letter Innocent

urged Berthold to remind Maximilian that the First Request was not a right that belonged to

the King of the Romans, but that the pope could bestow it upon him as a privilege.

Maximilian had not shown his obedience to the pope yet, so the privilege of the First Request

should not be used by the new King of the Romans.70

The war of the Papal State with Naples

made it difficult for the pope to force his demands in the empire, since his attention was

focussed on the war. Maximilian tried to use the difficult position the pope was in to improve

imperial power over ecclesiastical matters. Maximilian seems to have rekindled questions of

authority in the empire, with his refusal to pledge loyalty to the pope and his authoritarian

way of appointing ecclesiastical offices. The papal reaction, using his spiritual authority to

sway the archbishop of Mainz in the empire, was effective however and the First Request was

denied to Maximilian.

In the meanwhile the legitimacy of Maximilian as King of the Romans would be questioned

and the pope would be involved in this struggle. Pope Innocent VIII had not questioned the

legitimacy of Maximilian at first. In his letter to the archbishop of Mainz he spoke of the

election of the new King of the Romans (‘novi regis Romanorum’).71

The new conflict over

the First Request caused Innocent to change his stance and he called Maximilian duke of

Austria and Burgundy (‘Austrie et Burgundie ducem’) in a letter to Raymond Perault on the

27th

of June, 1486.72

Innocent completely ignores the kingship of Maximilian by using this

title. The complaints about the election of Maximilian became more widespread at the papal

69

RTA I no 303.

70 RTA I no 307.

71 RTA I no 300.

72 RTA I no 304. Maximilian was not duke of Austria yet, but it was common practice to call him duke of

Austria as heir. Raymond Perault was sent by the pope to negotiate with Maximilian in Cologne.

23

court and his legitimacy was now openly questioned.73

This was confirmed by the envoy of

Brandenburg at the papal court. Maximilian was not seen as King of the Romans, since his

election was deemed illegal.74

The elector of Bohemia Ladislas, the king of Hungary Matthias

Corvinus and the French king Charles VIII (1470-1498) would all make complaints about the

election of Maximilian at the papal court.75

This was the perfect opportunity for the enemies

of the Habsburgs to both weaken Maximilian’s position in the empire and improve papal

relations.

Innocent already called Maximilian elected King of the Romans (‘in Romanorum regem

electus’) in his letter to the archbishop of Mainz in September 1486, to make his displeasure

known.76

This was the title the pope used to signify the election was not approved of by the

pope.77

Although the title of elected King of the Romans can be seen as an improvement over

duke of Austria and Burgundy, the lack of approval indicates the discontent of the pope.

The imperial states, the electors in particular (excluding, of course, the elector of Bohemia),

tried to defuse the precarious situation Maximilian found himself in. They still hoped for the

support of the pope in the war against Hungary, to effect a quick peace between Frederick and

Matthias Corvinus, which would mean the imperial states would not have to invest resources

in the conflict. They tried to convince Maximilian to end the conflict with the pope and open

negotiations with him in order to solve the problems which originated from the disputed

election.78

The attempts by the imperial states to conciliate the pope and the king were not

very successful however. The emperor, Frederick III was not willing to move his son towards

a resolution of the conflict, since Frederick himself had past difficulties with the papacy.79

Maximilian himself would not be present at the Imperial Diet of 1487 in Nuremberg, so any

hope of convincing him there was idle. It seems that the emperor and the King of the Romans

tried to prevent making the first move to resolve the conflict, since it could be seen as

73

RTA I no 305 and 306. These insights into the papal court are given by the envoy of Mantua to the papal state.

Although the envoy of Mantua was most likely not an insider in the papal court, the steps that Innocent took at

this time (such as the letter to the archbishop of Mainz of the 23rd

of September) all point to a general feeling of

outrage, the use of the First Request by Maximilian in particular was a reason for this papal attitude.

74 RTA I no 308.

75 Seyboth (1991) 45-47. RTA I no 310.

76 RTA I no 307.

77 Wolf (2005) 136.

78 Seyboth (1991) 48-50.

79 Seyboth (1991) 47-49.

24

weakness. The continuing denial of Maximilian to inform the pope of the election is a sign of

this.

Reconciliation

The stance of the pope on Maximilian’s election changed when the war with Naples was

concluded in August 1486. Innocent now wished for a crusade against the Ottomans, an

ambition for which he needed the aid of the empire.80

The pope would make the first steps

towards reconciliation. Although the pope would still limit Maximilian in his use of the First

Request, Innocent would try to convince Maximilian into accepting the need of papal

approval for the election. Especially from the beginning of 1487, the pope would sent letters

to Maximilian with a conciliatory tone, in which he called him a ‘devout and loving son’.81

This was an opportunity Maximilian did not fail to grasp. His ambition to act independently

from the pope had not been a success because he could not effectively use the First Request

without the pope’s permission. The lack of papal approval of his kingship remained a threat

and could still be used by his opponents. Maximilian thus replied to Innocent in the same

conciliatory tone on the 5th

of January, 1487, seizing the opportunity for dialogue with the

pope.82

On the 12th

of April, 1487, the pope would send an envoy with more conciliatory messages.

The envoy should praise Maximilian, the King of the Romans (‘Romanorum regem’) and

suggest further negotiations. The pope asked Maximilian for his help against the Ottomans, to

defend Christianity. The pope did ask for secrecy, indicating he did not want to ruin his

advantage and choose sides between Maximilian and his foes openly.83

Innocent wanted to

have recognition of his authority, in the form of the declaration of obedience. The pope was

not willing to recognise Maximilian openly as King of the Romans before Maximilian had

done so. Maximilian sent a delegation to the pope and in his instruction of the 10th

of October

1487, wrote that he pledged his obedience to the pope.84

On the 4th

of February, 1488,

Innocent would receive this delegation and Maximilian’s declaration of obedience for Austria

and Burgundy. The obedience did not include Maximilian’s kingship, but the pope did not

make a point of this according to Seyboth, probably because he was satisfied with the

80

Wolf (2005) 141.

81 ‘devotissimus et affectissimus filius’. Seyboth (1991) 50-51.

82 RTA II no 172.

83 RTA II no 173.

84 RTA II no 174.

25

declaration of obedience itself and his hopes for the support of Maximilian against the

Ottomans.85

The lack of the title of King of the Romans in the final declaration of obedience by

Maximilian can also tie into one of the most remarkable episodes in the question of

legitimacy, the entry of the diary of John Burckard on the 4th

of February, 1488. When the

pope received the envoys delivering the statement of obedience to the pope, he insisted

Maximilian should be called elected King of the Romans (‘electi in Romanorum regem’).86

This is a change from the recent negotiations in which Innocent called Maximilian King of the

Romans. The reason for this is obscure and recent scholars do not have a clear explanation

why this approach was taken by the pope.87

Wolf argues that it is possibly the influence of the

French king, who had threatened the pope he would support the king of Naples against the

pope. Another explanation offered by Wolf suggests that the title of elected King of the

Romans is used to signify papal authority over these matters.88

Innocent’s decision can be

seen as a continuation of the power struggle between Maximilian and him. Innocent wanted to

show that he could give Maximilian the legitimacy he needed for his title. This could mean

that Innocent did not think the obedience given to him by Maximilian was enough. Since

Maximilian did not pledge obedience as King of the Romans, Innocent wanted to underline

his power by using the title of elected King of the Romans. The real reason for Innocent’s

decision to call Maximilian elected King of the Romans remains unclear however, since

unfortunately nothing more is known than the short statement made by John Burckard.89

In order to silence complaints from several countries, such as Hungary, France and Spain, on

the illegitimacy of Maximilian’s election, the pope would openly declare in a letter that

Maximilian was the King of the Romans on the 30th

of November, 1489. Innocent would also

give Maximilian the power of the First Request, which officially ended a conflict that had

lasted for over three years.90

This newfound friendship and reconciliation with the papacy

would prove valuable for Maximilian. When he was taken captive by citizens in Bruges from

February to May 1488, the pope would offer important moral support. The imperial states

would rally behind the emperor to rescue Maximilian, especially after the pope had placed an

85

Seyboth (1991) 52-53.

86 RTA I no 310.

87 Seyboth (1991) 52.

88 Wolf (2005) 142.

89 Seyboth (1991) 52.

90 Seyboth (1991) 53.

26

interdict over the citizens that captured Maximilian. This interdict would be lifted on the 4th

of

November, 1488, when Maximilian was no longer a captive of the citizens of Bruges.91

The

interdict was lifted sooner than some states had wanted, such as Cologne, but the support of

the pope was unmistakable. Innocent would later play a role in the peace negotiations, which

he tried to encourage by lifting the interdict.92

In a letter of the 4th

of November Innocent

declared that the citizens of Bruges had heeded his warnings by releasing Maximilian

unharmed from captivity. This allowed him to lift the interdict and declare that he would aid

in the negotiations for peace.93

The pope would also help the peace negotiations by

convincing the French king of the benefits of a peace and the future role in the crusade for

Charles VIII. Innocent’s legate Raymond Perault would play an important role in the

negotiations of 1489 in Frankfurt, which would end the war between Maximilian and Charles

VIII.94

Maximilian would later thank the pope for the role Perault had played in the

negotiations. In the letter of the 6th

of August, 1489, these words of gratitude seem genuine,

since Maximilian suggests that Perault should also lead the negotiations between Frederick

and Matthias Corvinus, in order to end both conflicts which had plagued the Habsburg family

for a long time. This peace would enable the Habsburgs and the rest of the Western Christian

world to combat the Ottomans in the crusade.95

The idea of a common crusade would thus eventually bring Maximilian and Innocent

together. The power of the First Request, which was denied to Maximilian at first, could now

be used by him with crucial papal backing. The title of King of the Romans was not approved

of by the pope at first, which enabled adversaries of the election, both outside and inside the

empire, to question Maximilian’s authority. The pope had a far-reaching authority, especially

with the ecclesiastical states, states which sometimes functioned as his eyes and ears in the

empire. The lack of papal approval thus was a cause of the limited power in the empire for

Maximilian at the beginning of his reign. Papal authority was in such a way intertwined with

the empire that the two cannot be separated in the question of Maximilian’s position in the

empire. Maximilian tried to use his power in the empire without papal approval to emphasise

the independence of the empire in the appointment of offices, but was ultimately

91

Wiesflecker (1971) 215.

92 RTA III no 41.

93 RTA III no 7d.

94 Wiesflecker (1971) 222-224.

95 RTA III no 311a.

27

unsuccessful. The electors who had chosen Maximilian to be their King of the Romans tried

to resolve the quarrel, but the role of the archbishop of Mainz shows that the authority of

Maximilian as King of the Romans was not enough to follow him in the matter of the First

Request.

Chapter 3: The King of the Romans and the Emperor: Maximilian and Frederick III

The election of Maximilian as King of the Romans did not give him the highest position in the

hierarchy of the empire. Frederick III (1415-1493), archduke of Austria and Maximilian’s

father, was emperor at the time of Maximilian’s election. As emperor, Frederick was still the

leader of the empire, even though Maximilian had been elected as King of the Romans. The

distribution of power between the King of the Romans and the emperor deserves attention,

since it is crucial to analyze if Maximilian could openly disobey the emperor. The conflicts

that arose between Maximilian and Frederick over the limitations of their jurisdiction have

often inspired historians to see the quarrels in the perspective of a battle of generations. The

wise, conservative emperor was contrasted with the young, ambitious King of the Romans.

The fact that Frederick and Maximilian were father and son certainly helped this theory.96

Although some points still hold merit, the dynastic relation between Frederick and

Maximilian cannot be seen as the sole explanation of their quarrels. Father and son rarely met

as a consequence of the long distance between Burgundy and Austria and the wars both rulers

had to fight in their own domains. These wars also defined the priorities of the rulers of the

empire, as has been seen with Maximilian and the Rhine-toll of Cologne. The political

situation of both Frederick and Maximilian needs to be taken into account when analyzing

their conflicts on jurisdiction in the empire. These conflicts about the jurisdiction of both

rulers already started in the beginning of Maximilian’s reign as King of the Romans. First the

promises made by Maximilian to secure his election will be analyzed, since Maximilian’s

promises sometimes exceeded Frederick’s willingness to give. The next subject of analysis is

the Imperial Diet in 1487, which would also be the cause of a conflict, since Maximilian

refused to attend this assembly even after stern warnings by Frederick. Maximilian was still

embroiled in a war with France, so his priorities were different from his father’s, who was

trying to rally support for the war against Hungary. Both rulers would express their hope that

the other figurehead of the empire would come to their aid in their war. Frederick would be

96

Bock (1972), RTA III p 46.

28

the first to move when he went to Burgundy with an imperial army upon the capture of

Maximilian by the citizens of Bruges in 1488. This event will be analysed in order to see how

the position of Maximilian as a King of the Romans could rally support for a rescue mission.

Finally, the Hungarian question will be taken into account to see how Maximilian gathered

imperial support to defend the Austrian interests and his claim to the Hungarian throne.

Frederick III and the Election

Maximilian was elected in a quick Imperial Diet in 1486, as is seen in the first chapter.

Frederick’s opinion on this election remains a question that divides scholars to this day. On

the one hand, the election of Maximilian prevented Matthias Corvinus from becoming King

of the Romans, which would have been a major setback for Frederick’s position in the empire.

The continuation of the imperial title in the Habsburg dynasty also was an advantage for

Frederick. The election of Maximilian can even be seen as a project developed and executed

by the emperor himself, in order to keep the Hungarians out of the empire.97

On the other

hand, the election of a King of the Romans created another factor in the empire that Frederick

had to take into account. Maximilian had different goals than Frederick, focussing his

attention to the west to his wars in Burgundy. Maximilian was also more willing to make

concessions to the electors than his father was concerning his own election in 1486.98

The

contribution of Angermeier changed the focus of the debate on the election to the influence of

the threat Matthias Corvinus posed for the empire. Dynastic considerations and the emperor’s

old age (70 at the time of the election) also played a role in the election of Maximilian, in

order to prevent unrest and chaos in the empire after Frederick’s death.99

Frederick was not willing to cooperate in every concession Maximilian made. Frederick had

traditionally refused to invest rulers in their domains if they had been involved in a dubious

conquest or succession, such as Philip of the Palatinate and the dukes of Milan. Maximilian

had promised to invest Philip in his domains including the newly acquired territory of the

Alsace, but Frederick disagreed with this course of action, notwithstanding the fact that

Frederick had invested Philip in the territories he had gained by coin in the same Imperial

Diet of 1486.100

Frederick’s timing of the decision to halt the proposal by Maximilian was

remarkable however, since the election had already been completed. Frederick wanted to keep

97

Angermeier (1989), RTA I pp 37-41.

98 Wolf (2005) 108.

99 Wiesflecker (1971) 182-183.

100 RTA I no 171 and 185.

29

levying an imperial tax in the Upper-Alsace, something which would not be possible if Philip

gained all the rights in this area. After the election Maximilian would sent a letter to the

elector of the Palatinate to state that he could not fulfil his promises, since Frederick denied

Maximilian the chance to invest Philip in his newly acquired territories.101

This letter, sent on

the 28th

of April, 1486, stated that Maximilian could not give Philip the imperial sanctioning

over his domains before the death of Frederick. Maximilian was already elected as King of

the Romans, but now retained his leverage over the elector of the Palatinate. If this was a

deliberate strategy by Frederick is hard to say, since no correspondence on this subject is

available. The behaviour of the emperor after the election to the Palatinate changed clearly

however, as is seen in the letter of the 28th

of April and a declaration he made on the 20th

of

April, warning Philip not to infringe upon the sovereignty of the archbishop of Mainz.102

Maximilian managed to keep some of his promises he made before the election. The

archbishop of Mainz, who had been given money already, as seen in the first chapter, was to

receive the promises made to him before the election. The letter of the 20th

of April saw

Frederick defending Berthold from any possible aggression from his neighbour, but there

were additional benefits for the archbishop of Mainz. Shortly before the election, Berthold

was invested in all his titles by Frederick himself and was now officially secure of his position

in the empire.103

After the election Maximilian would also solve a conflict between Frederick

and Berthold on the status of the city of Mainz. The emperor had gained a claim over the city

of Mainz in a feud in the archbishopric of Mainz, which involved the city of Mainz becoming

a part of the imperial domain, instead of the domain of the archbishop. This claim would be

annulled in a letter on the 2nd

of May, 1486, by Maximilian, in which all claims of the empire

(i.e. Frederick’s claims) on the city of Mainz were given up and Maximilian declared that the

city belonged to the archbishop.104

Here Maximilian showed the influence he could have on

the decisions of the emperor, making him an important figure in the Empire.

Maximilian´s Absence: War with France

The next opportunity Maximilian had to present himself as the new King of the Romans to the

imperial states, the Imperial Diet of 1487 in Nuremberg, was not used by Maximilian.

Although he sent a letter on the 26th

of December to his uncle Sigismund of Tyrol (who he

101

RTA I no 217.

102 RTA I no 215.

103 RTA I no 183 and 184.

104 RTA I no 220.

30

would later depose) that he had every intention to attend the Imperial Diet, Maximilian would

be absent in the Imperial Diet.105

Sigmund tried to negotiate a treaty between the French and

Maximilian, in order to allow Maximilian to attend the Imperial Diet and possibly go to

Austria to fight the armies of Matthias Corvinus there. The negotiations failed in the early

days of the year 1487 and new offensives by the French king would force Maximilian to stay

in Burgundy, since the military operations of the French inspired rebellion in Flanders.106

Frederick would repeatedly request Maximilian to attend the Imperial Diet, but the chances of

Maximilian attending were reduced by the renewed hostilities with the French. In the request

of the 4th

of January, 1487, Frederick doubted the chances of success of a treaty with the

French and said it would benefit Maximilian more to attend the Imperial Diet.107

As time

passed the requests became more severe of nature and would demand Maximilian’s presence.

A letter of Frederick of the 30th

of March sent to Maximilian underlined the advantages of

Maximilian’s presence in the Imperial Diet, both for Maximilian and Frederick.108

When it

became clear that Maximilian was not planning to attend, Frederick would sent a furious letter

on the 26th

of April, demanding Maximilian’s presence.109

The number of letters sent to

Maximilian signify that Maximilian’s absence meant a major setback for Frederick’s plans.

With Maximilian’s support, the proposal to levy imperial aid provided by the imperial states

for the war in Hungary would have a larger chance of success. Now that his own son did not

attend the Imperial Diet, Frederick would have to find allies in other rulers. The credibility of

the Imperial Diet as an institution was also affected, since the absence of the King of the

Romans, in the Imperial Diet to follow his election, would give the imperial states the chance

to remain absent themselves or to abstain from granting any aid in the war against Hungary.

The renewed state of war with France, which caused Maximilian to stay in Burgundy, would

result in a remarkable situation for the new King of the Romans. Before this time, he had

given a number of concessions to gain his title, but this new title had given him no advantage

other than his position as likely successor of the emperor and imperial arbitrator of conflicts

between the imperial states. The benefits of being a King of the Romans became clear in the

spring of 1488, when Maximilian was taken captive in Bruges from the 5th

of February until

105

RTA II no 158. The Diet was originally planned in Speyer, but it was moved to Nuremberg for various

logistical reasons.

106 Hollegger (2005) 53-54. Seyboth (2001), RTA II p 54.

107 RTA II no 159.

108 RTA II no 162.

109 RTA II no 163.

31

the 16th

of May. Maximilian had entered Bruges in order to negotiate with the citizens of the

Flemish cities about the war with the French. After a number of misunderstandings and

Maximilian’s decision to sent away his troops to another city, Bruges openly revolted and

took Maximilian prisoner.110

In smuggled messages he asked his father for help in his

precarious situation and Frederick decided to meet with other imperial states in order to

rescue Maximilian.111

After the support of larger imperial states such as Brandenburg and the

Palatinate an imperial army would quickly take form.112

The rebellious citizens decided to

release Maximilian, under increasing pressure of possible imperial interference. They made

Maximilian sign a treaty in which he promised amnesty for the rebellious citizens and he had

to make numerous concessions to the citizenry.113

The imperial states would later annul this

treaty, stating that it was made under duress and as such was not valid. The imperial army

would not be able to capture Bruges and lifted the siege 13th

of July, due to tensions between

imperial states and lack of money. This also ended the possibility of the effective use of the

imperial army, since the imperial states were not willing to provoke a war with the French.114

Arguing that the assembly of the imperial army for Maximilian’s rescue was solely

undertaken by Frederick to fulfil his imperial duties and not out of fatherly love, as Bock

does, is somewhat blunt, since dynastic considerations at the very least will have played a role

in Maximilian’s rescue.115

Maximilian remained Frederick’s only living male heir, so his

survival was essential for Frederick’s succession. But the support of the imperial states indeed

originated from the sense of imperial worth. A captive regent of Burgundy suddenly became

an imperial affair, since he was the new King of the Romans. As such, the capture was seen as

an affront to the empire and its states, rallying support in the imperial states.116

Peace in the West

The peace treaty of the 19th

of July, 1489, between the French and the Habsburgs (Maximilian

and his son Philip) did not immediately mean the end of the differing priorities of Frederick

and Maximilian. Maximilian would first gather support in the Imperial Diet of 1489 in

Frankfurt to gain troops and money to defeat the rebellious Flemish, by requesting Urgent Aid

110

Wiesflecker (1971) 208-210.

111 Wiesflecker (1971) 213-215.

112 Wolf (2005) 214-216.

113 Wolf (2005) 207-210.

114 Wiesflecker (1971) 220. Wolf (2005) 226-227.

115 Bock (1958) 288.

116 Wiesflecker (1971) 214-216.

32

(‘Eilende Hilfe’) from the imperial states.117

The conflict in Hungary was not Maximilian’s

priority at this moment, for the French king had immediately after the peace treaty intensified

efforts to capture Brittany.118

The Urgent Aid would not only be used to restore order in the

Burgundian lands, but would also pressurize Charles VIII into a lasting peace. Maximilian

wanted to focus the empire’s resources to conflicts in the west and hoped to negotiate a peace

treaty with Matthias Corvinus in the east, in order to end the conflict over the Austrian

lands.119

These decisions indicate Maximilian’s ambitions in the empire. When given the

chance, Maximilian tried to use his authority as King of the Romans to influence imperial

policy, both internal and external. Frederick was not present at the Imperial Diet and had

given Maximilian and William of Eichstätt a mandate to negotiate in his stead. In this

document, Frederick also promised not to interfere with Maximilian’s decisions.120

This gave

Maximilian the opportunity to set out the course he wanted for the empire. His policy would

strain the relationship between Maximilian and Frederick, since it was based on the priorities

of Burgundy over those of Austria. Frederick complained Maximilian used powers not given

to him by the mandate and that Maximilian was not informing Frederick on the proceedings

of the Imperial Diet. But Burgundian priorities were not the only reason for Maximilian’s

attempt to gain peace in Austria, for the idea of a crusade was still in the back of his mind.

This policy was not only favoured by the pope, but also by the imperial states.121

The negotiations between the emperor and Hungarian king would commence on the 10th

of

November, 1489 in Linz. Besides Frederick and Maximilian, envoys from Matthias Corvinus

and the electors of the Holy Roman Empire were present. Matthias Corvinus was not able to

use the differences that existed between Frederick and Maximilian. Both Matthias and

Frederick were not willing to make concessions, so the negotiations failed. Frederick used the

opportunity to influence the imperial states to aid him in his war against Hungary.122

But

Matthias Corvinus’ death on the 6th

of April, 1490, would be the decisive factor in Habsburg

foreign policy. The Habsburgs not only used the disorder following the death of the 117

Wolf (2005) 238-242.

118 Anne of Brittany, the ruler of the duchy of Brittany, was a potential bride for Maximilian and had been

married to him by proxy. The French king, Charles VIII, made every possible move to prevent the actual

marriage and would in 1491 marry Anne. Wiesflecker (1971) 323-336.

119 Wolf (2005) 242-243.

120 RTA III no 239e. This mandate was not enough, as seen earlier, to sign lasting treaties in the conflict of the

Rhine-toll, but the gathering of Urgent Aid was made possible by his position as replacement of his father.

121 Wolf (2005) 243-245.

122 Wolf (2005) 247-250.

33

Hungarian king to retake lost territories, but Maximilian also had a claim on the Hungarian

throne. Both Maximilian and Frederick acted quickly to take this opportunity to turn the tables

and recruited a large army to reconquer the territories in the hands of the Hungarians with

Maximilian at its head.123

His command was accepted because of this title and because he was

the most logical option to be the military leader in an exhaustive campaign in the Austrian

territories. Frederick was too old to lead a campaign in Austria and Maximilian had proven to

be a capable military commander in Burgundy. Maximilian cleverly converted the support in

Burgundy into support in Hungary. He sent several letters to imperial states, requesting to

send their troops promised in the Urgent Aid of the Imperial Diet of 1489 to Hungary instead

of Burgundy.124

Maximilian thus was able to use his position as King of the Romans to secure

aid for Habsburg wars. He managed to receive troops for the ending of a Flemish rebellion

and to secure his succession-rights in the Hungarian kingdom. Both the Flemish after the

peace with France and the Hungarians after the death of Matthias Corvinus did not pose a

formidable threat to the empire anymore, but Maximilian was able to use his position in the

empire to gather allies in the wars of the Habsburgs.

The negotiations between the emperor and the King of the Romans were defined by their

struggles on the limits of their jurisdiction. Maximilian used his new position to grant

concessions larger than the emperor would have wanted to give, which would cause a conflict

between the rulers of the empire. The election of a King of the Romans created another source

of authority in the empire the imperial states could use to receive judgement over imperial

matters. This increased Maximilian’s position in the Holy Roman Empire, for he could act as

an arbitrator over conflicts. But the judgements given by the two rulers of the Empire could

differ from each other and would result in the undermining of the positions of authority in the

empire. These differences between the two Habsburgs were exacerbated by the position they

were both in. The wars against Hungary and France would result in both Frederick and

Maximilian requesting aid in the Imperial Diet. Maximilian hoped for Frederick´s war to end

quickly in a treaty in order to have Frederick´s aid in Burgundy. Frederick aimed to have

Maximilian´s aid in Austria after a peace with the French. These contrasting priorities would

be resolved by three events; Maximilian’s captivity, the peace with France and Matthias

Corvinus’ death. The captivity of Maximilian in Bruges would force Frederick into action.

Although the mission was not a resounding success, the support in the empire for

123

Wolf (2005) 252-258.

124 RTA III no 365b, 366a, 336b, 336c, 336d, 336e and 336f.

34

Maximilian’s cause was increased by his captivity. The maltreatment of the King of the

Romans was seen as an offense against the empire and gave Maximilian the support he

needed. The peace with France would free Maximilian of the long war in Burgundy, but

would not mean an immediate focus on Hungary. His request for aid to fight the remaining

rebels in Burgundy in the Imperial Diet at Frankfurt in 1489, can be seen as an example for

this. Maximilian’s priorities were radically changed by the death of Matthias Corvinus.

Maximilian used the aid bestowed on him by the Empire to fight in the other war that had

plagued the Habsburgs for so long. Concluding, Maximilian was able to use his title of King

of the Romans to create a position of authority in the Empire, but he was largely dependent on

the emperor’s wishes. Only the absence or agreement of the emperor gave Maximilian the

opportunity to fully use the potential of his title.

Conclusion

In order to see how Maximilian’s negotiations in the empire were influenced by his title of

King of the Romans between 1486 and 1490, three important factors in the Holy Roman

Empire have been analysed; the imperial states, the pope and the emperor. The research

question already insinuates that Maximilian had to negotiate with these three groups to reach

his goals. The King of the Romans could not act as a despot and was limited by various

factors in the Holy Roman Empire. The emperor prevented Maximilian to be the highest

authority in the empire. The pope claimed his place in the ecclesiastical states in the Holy

Roman Empire and Maximilian’s powers were severely limited by Innocent VIII’s

opposition. Although Maximilian was on good terms with most of the imperial states, his

precarious position in Burgundy did not allow him to be an effective leader in the Holy

Roman Empire. Maximilian’s negotiations and status in the Holy Roman Empire developed

over time however, as his position was increasingly accepted by the different forces in the

empire. As King of the Romans he had gained additional rights and duties in the Holy Roman

Empire that could both be beneficial and a hindrance. Several of these would prove to be quite

important for Maximilian in the years to come, in particular his position as arbitrator over

imperial conflicts and his work as substitute of the emperor in the Imperial Diet of 1489.

The new position of King of the Romans would also make Maximilian the centre of a lot of

attention. He would be more involved in imperial matters than a normal Burgundian regent

would have been. Maximilian became the most likely successor to the imperial throne, which

gained him additional status in the empire. The electors and the pope would deter from

35

needlessly opposing Maximilian, since he would probably be the next emperor. Maximilian

would encounter no direct aggression in the Holy Roman Empire, which would allow him to

completely concentrate on the French threat without having to worry about possible imperial

opposition. The attempt of the electors to tie Maximilian and with him Burgundian resources

closer to the Holy Roman Empire by electing him as King of the Romans. This plan to

involve Maximilian more closely to the empire and the war against Hungary was not

extremely effective in the beginning of his reign. Eventually Maximilian would go to Austria,

but it was primarily to secure his chances for succession and it also meant that the electors

were not rid of the war yet. In his foreign politics, Maximilian seemed to be acting largely

independent from the imperial states, especially if he did not need their aid.

Notwithstanding his decisions on foreign politics, Maximilian was dependent on various

sources of authority in the empire in order to effectively be a King of the Romans. His

influence was severely limited by the autonomy of the electors, the spiritual authority of the

pope and the traditional power of the emperor. These factors disabled Maximilian from

effective rule in the Holy Roman Empire at the beginning of his reign in 1486. Although the

relations between Maximilian and the other powers in the empire would improve over time,

especially his relation with the pope, he would still be constrained by the influence of these

powers. The emperor in particular defended his rights against Maximilian, for it was

Frederick’s authority as emperor that Maximilian infringed the most upon. Maximilian’s

priorities were quite different from those of Frederick, which would result in events such as

Maximilian’s absence from the Imperial Diet of Nuremberg (1487) and his behaviour in the

Imperial Diet of Frankfurt (1489) where he preferred support for Burgundy over aid in

Austria. The contrasting priorities of Maximilian and Frederick show the difficulty the

Habsburgs had in the beginning of Maximilian’s reign as King of the Romans. Unable to

decide amongst each other which conflict deserved full attention in the empire, in the end

chance, in the form of Matthias Corvinus’ death, decided on this issue.

Maximilian’s precarious start as King of the Romans is also signified by his relationship with

the pope. Innocent was both the spiritual leader of Western Christianity and possessed a state

of his own. His spiritual leadership gave him powers surpassing that of a simple prince in

Italy. His influence in imperial affairs is not to be underestimated, especially since the bishops

in the Holy Roman Empire often possessed powerful states. Three of them were electors

(Trier, Cologne and Mainz) and these states had to take the pope into account in their

decisions in the Empire. Maximilian and Innocent seemed to be embroiled in a renewed

struggle of primacy over the empire’s church. Maximilian’s ability to use his authority of

36

King of the Romans was seriously hampered by the pope’s decision to oppose his policy in

the empire. Innocent’s decision to prevent Maximilian from using the First Request and his

ability to utilize the archbishop of Mainz for this goal are an example of this. The title of King

of the Romans thus was not earned solely in his election of 1486, Maximilian had plenty of

occasions in his reign where he had to defend his position as a figure of authority in the

empire.

Maximilian’s efforts to have his election accepted by other rulers is a sign of his early

struggles. In the empire, the elector of Bohemia, Ladislas, questioned the legitimacy of the

election. The complaints of Ladislas were quickly used by the king of France, Charles VIII

and the king of Hungary, Matthias Corvinus. This was coupled with the pope’s refusal to

accept Maximilian as King of the Romans. The King of the Romans thus did not have a

chance to start by asserting his authority, but had to defend his position against those who

claimed his election was illegitimate. The support of the electors provided to Maximilian

proved to be essential and is often neglected by historians because of the later quarrels

Maximilian had with the electors (in particular Berthold of Mainz). The resolution in the

conflict with the elector of Bohemia, which was negotiated by the electors, exemplifies the

crucial role the electors played in the acceptance of the new King of the Romans. The electors

also tried to negotiate between the pope and Maximilian in order to halt the increasing

tensions between the papacy and the empire and resolve the awkward position the archbishops

were in. Although their efforts may not always have been a resounding success, the support of

the electors and other imperial states proved to be essential in the role Maximilian played in

his early years as King of the Romans.

This support of the imperial states for Maximilian’s new position as King of the Romans

signified that he had developed into an accepted member of the Holy Roman Empire. The

imperial states followed Maximilian’s behaviour with heightened interest. The war he fought

against the French was no longer seen as a distant conflict that occurred after a crisis of

succession. Maximilian’s position was slowly but surely integrated in the empire and his

priorities became to a certain extent the priorities of the empire. As the most likely successor

of his father, the imperial states tried to remain on good terms with the King of the Romans,

since this could bring them benefits later. Although Maximilian could not always exercise the

powers he wanted, his counsel and advice was noted with heightened interest by the imperial

states. His negotiations in the Rhine-toll of Cologne show the influence he could have on the

course of a conflict. The authority he had surpassed that of a regent of Burgundy, as is

especially seen in the Imperial Diet of Frankfurt (1489). The Urgent Aid that was bestowed

37

on Maximilian shows the tremendous influence he could have on the direction of the empire,

especially in the absence of his father. The threat that Matthias Corvinus posed, who was

invading imperial territory, was dismissed, instead the aid would go to Maximilian, who was

fighting a protracted war to limit French influence in Burgundy.

The influence of the imperial states on the kingship of Maximilian certainly was high. But

Maximilian was not completely dependent on the imperial states. His independence was

guaranteed by the several services he had to offer as a King of the Romans. At his election in

1486 the distribution of privileges showed the benefits Maximilian could bestow on those

who helped him. In these distributions he was limited by the willingness of Frederick, but

most conflicts between electors and emperor would be resolved at this time. Another

important tool for Maximilian was his role as arbitrator over imperial conflicts. This position

gave him additional stature and ensured his involvement in imperial affairs. It could also bring

him monetary benefits, such as the loan he received from Cologne. As a negotiating party he

also could make sure his own interests were not harmed by ongoing hostilities. The truce

Maximilian proposed in the quarrel between the archbishop of Cologne and the other electors

that bordered the Rhine would be beneficial to Maximilian’s domains, for the toll was

annulled for the time being and the Rhine was open for trade again. His search for a quick

solution in the conflict of the Rhine-toll exemplifies how Maximilian used his position as

King of the Romans to defend his Burgundian interests.

The new King of the Romans was also an important centre of imperial self-consciousness.

This was recognised by the pope, who tried to get Maximilian on his side for the crusade he

was planning. As the most likely successor of the imperial throne, Maximilian was given

tasks surpassing those given to a normal regent or son of an emperor. The importance of the

new King of the Romans is emphasised by the reactions after his captivity in Bruges. The

pope took the opportunity to show his good will to Maximilian by placing an interdict over

the citizens of Bruges. The reaction of both the imperial states and the emperor was even

more spirited. In their eyes, Maximilian became a King of the Romans who was taken captive

by rebels and this demanded imperial response. The imperial army, led by Frederick himself,

would be the result of these feelings of imperial dignity. Maximilian’s absence in Nuremberg

also evoked strong emotions by the empire and the emperor in particular. The emperor, as

much as he disliked infringements on his sovereignty, saw the value of the King of the

Romans in negotiations with the imperial states. Indeed, it was often Maximilian’s absence

that would inspire the most responses of the emperor and the imperial states. The new King of

the Romans had in a short time made himself an indispensable factor in imperial politics.

38

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