MATTHEW ARNOLD AND NATITRE

Man must begin, lmow this, where Nature ends;

Nature and man can never be fast-friends.

Few ofN{atthew Arnold's lines could so readily inflame the sensibilities of today's environmental

activists, who, living in a generation fearful that the bounty of nature is finite and vulnerable to the

depredations of man, have taken a protective view of the natural world as man's sole source of

support. By their line of reasoning, man's survival is dependent upon his ability to live in harmony

with nature, and the immediate needs of man must be carefully weighed against the long-term needs

of the natural world. Manr relies upon the health of this world for the production of his food, the

renewal of his atmosphere, and the freedom of his environment from life-threatening toxins.

Yet to the Victorians, the natural world was only beginning to emerge as a nurturing force and

a source of inner contentment and peace, as, prior to the last half of the nineteenth century, it had

posed more threat than solace. With disease, freenng winters, crop disasters brought about by

drought or floods, shipwrecks in Sormy seas, eatthquakeq volcanoes, and dangerous animals, nature

in its fury had often not been seen as a friend to man. Only when its wilder manifestations had been

subdued or attenuated by the scientific and industrial revolutions and their attendant increase in

personal security, could man afford to look appreciatively or even protectively toward nature.

The intellectual link between that world, and that of modern environmentalists - who

conceptualize the struggle for the natural world's health as a pitting of its protectors and

appreciators against those who would exploit it for short-term profit - appears in the intellectualized

explorations of Arnold. It was through Arnold, and not the romantic poets celebrating the scenic

glories of the natural world, that Victorian concepts of nature took shape. In his work, nature, as

it encompasses all living things, comes to be perceived as more than a compilation of physical and

chemical laws, but as little less than an animate entity'

While Arnold's statement above could seem hopelessly archaic in concept, a reflection of

nineteenth century insensitivity to the aspect of nature that encompasses all life, his harsh judgment

in the above lines would now be rejected, and his pitting of man against nature would be seen as a

non-survival strategy, contrary to the best interests not merely of mankind, but of a broader definition

of life one could describe as the "biosphere." These lines also appear to represent a contrast of

paradigms between Arnold's Victorian world and contemporary society, and the sonnet from which

they are quoted, ,'To an Independent Preacher who Preached that we should be'In Harmony With

Nafure'," could appear to represent a harsh indictment'

'In harmony with Nature?' Restless fool,

Who with such heat dost preach what were to thee,

When true, the last imPossibilitY -

To be like Nature strong, like Nature cool!

Know, man hath all that Nature hath, but more,

And in that more lie all his hopes for good.

Nature is cruel; man is sick of blood:

Nature is stubborn; man would fain adore:

Nature is fickle; man hath need of rest:

Nature forgives no debt, and fears no grave;

Man would be mild, and with safe conscience blest.

Man must begin, know this, where nature ends;

Nature and man can never be fast friends.

Fool, if thou canst not pass her, rest her slave!

Unlike some ofArnold's poetry there is nothing syntactically prolix about this outburst, nor does

an analysis of its meaning present a challenge. As Stange (p.116) observes, Arnold here echoes

Goethe's ,,Das Gottliche" in his suggestion that all man's hopes for good lie in a nobility that sets him

apart from the rest of creation. Arnold maintained this view throughout his life; yet he gives some

reason for one to suppose that there was initially something he found unsatisfactory about the poem.

While it first appeared in the 1849 volume of his works, published when he was twenty-seven years

old, itwas omitted from subsequent volumes of 1853, 1854, 1857, and 1869 (Tinker and Lowry, p.

30). Its reappearance, in the volume of 1877, with no changes other than in punctuation, suggests

that, after mature reflection, Arnold still adhered to his original vision.

Arnold never provided an explanation for the sonnet's exclusion and later restoration to the main

body of his poetry, but the poem's apparent negative evaluation of nature could immediately be

interpreted as inconsistent with apart of Arnold's work that expounds upon natural beauty. While

he was never quite so rhapsodic in his praise as Wordsworth, for example, he composed a large

number of poems in which he revealed himself as finely tuned to the glories of nature. In "A Wish,"

for example, he says of the natural world:

tlt] . . never was a friend of one,

Nor promised love it could not give,

But lit for all its generous sun,

And lived itself, and made us live.

In ,The Scholar Gipsy" Arnold describes the landscape of the Cumner country near O>dord,

lavishing upon it an a lyrio enthusiasm.

Through the thick corn the scarlet poppies peep,

And round green roots and yellowing stalks I see

Pale pink convolvulus in tendrils creep:

And air-swept lindens Yield

Their scent, and rustle down their perfumed showers

Of bloom on the bent grass where I am laid,

And bower me from the August sun with shade;

As Duffin observes (p. 38), 'The lesson of 'The Scholar Gipsy' and'Thyrsis'is that life with and

according to nature can still constitute an uplifting ideal'"

Upon encountering urch apparently conflicting attitudes toward nature, one must wonder whether

they are truly as inconsistent as they appear. As Lionel Trilling (p. 94) notes: "We have said that

Arnold n€ver set great store by philosophic consistency in his poetry, conflicting views of nature

appear in each of the two early volumes and seem to have been held simultaneously."

Although taking an opposing view himsele Carroll (p *i) states: "One of the few points on which

there seems to be something approaching critical consensus is that Arnold is not regarded as a

systematic thinker." T. S. Eliot (p. 431) expresses an even dimmer view:

Arnold had little gift for consistency or definition. Nor had he the power of connected

reasoning at any length: his flights are either short flights or circular flights. Nothing in his

prose worlg therefore, will stand very close analysis, and we may feel that the positive content

of many words is very small.

When an essayist is criticized because of his inconsistency from one work to the next, the

assumption is that the writer himself harbors some confusion about his thoughts. Yet one may

reasonably see Arnold as honestly ambivalent about nature - as, indeed, was the Victorian age - and

that amajor focus of both his poetry and prose involved an effort to explore and define a new attitude

toward the natural world at a time when man's relationship to it was changing more rapidly than ever

before.

Thus the observation that two apparently contradictory views of nature exist side-by-side in

his work does not necessarily undermine their validity nor call into question Arnold's sincerity.

Indeed, poetry as an adjunct to prose would appear suitable for expressing a kaleidoscope of

transitory feelings - at times contradictory - rather than weighty conclusions reached through

intellect,al processes that leave them less exposed to constant questioning. One may also recognize

that these apparent contradictions occur in Arnold's poetry, where he could express feelings without

rigorous intellectual justifi cation.

If one were to consider only Arnold's nature poetry, however, the "inconsistency," while

permissible, still requires some explanation. Part of this explanation for the poem under consideration

must relate to its purpose. In his instructions to an "Independent Preacher," who spoke in praise of

being in ,,Harmony with Nature,,' Arnold assumed the harsh tone more conrmon in critical essays than

in his poetry. Here he becomes a partisan in a debate around which he has mixed feelings. Thus, in

his choice offorceful language, he charges aheadwith descriptions of nature as "cruel," "stubborn,"

and "fickle." As he shows so often in his didactic, instructive mode, he is intent upon crushing the

preacher,s views with a thunderous outburst that labels his nameless opponent as a "fool." Often

Arnold sounded impatient and even strident in his essays, particularly when criticizing what he

perceived to be religious excesses.

While Arnold thus summons strong language toward nature for use in furthering his argument,

one may observe also that the word itself is used in a manner inconsistent with its appearances

elsewhere in his work. Trilling @.28g) mentions Arnold's discomfort with the word. In Dissent and

Dogma (page 389) Arnold rails eloquently:

Let us retutn to Nature! Ah, what pitfalls are in that word Nature!Let us return to art and

science, which are a part of Nature; yes. Let us return to a proper conception of

righteousness, to a true use of the method and secret of Jesus, which have all been

denaturalized, yes. But, T-et us return to Nature;'- do you mean that we are to give full swing

to our inclinations, to throw the reins on the neck of our senses...?

At no point did Arnold actually sort through all his different usages of the word Nature, although

it appears in a number of diverse contexts. Most traditional is its use in reference to beautiful hills,

rivers, lakes, flowers, birds, and clouds. This is probably Arnold's least common usage of the word'

The essays make use of the terms "natural law" - at times apparently synonymous with "natural

moral law," and a differing concept of "laws of nature." In the latter Arnold appears to refer to those

presumably immutable laws of physics, mathematics, and astronomy by which the material world

maintains its stability. The term natural law,however, is apparently more applicable to the animate

world, and it often appears in a context of asserting man's superiority to the lower animals based

upon his recognition of a code of behavior that is both ethical and "natural'"

perhaps central to the role of nature is the question of man's place in the natural world. Is man

to be seen as merely a part of the natural world, or as distinct from and superior to it? The belief in

man as merely another animal was seen as insulting by many of Arnold's contemporaries, and the

concepts of man's "animality" or "animal nature" were taken as pejorativeS'

Arnold's inquiries often centered around questions ofman's nature and whether it is innately good,

evil, or neutral. This lead to the related question of whether nature itself is good, neutral, or

malevolent. To see nature as inherently either malign or benign, one must, to some extent, lend it

animation, as if it possessed a consciousness and will. The pathetic fallacy of Wordsworth and other

Romantic poets represents an extreme form of this animation, in which Nature not only speaks but

reveals a fulIrange of human emotions.2

In "The youth ofNature," Arnold gives to nature a voice, and the message is quite different from

that of Wordsworth. As Buckler (p. 97) observes, the tone,

is one of stern rebuke rather than maternal reassurance. Man's apocalyptic response to the

death of a great poet - his torturing conventionalized despair - is the result of a stubborn,

sentimental, elegiac resistance to an obvious but awful truth - that nature does not live for

man...

While Arnold provides no reason why inanimate nature should be seen as a malign force, he is

more clear about the part of man's nature he describes as the lower or baser part. This Arnold

consistently criticizes, with little concept of a natural nobility of man or an innate altruistic nature.

As he emphasizes many times, conduct remains the major test as to how thoroughly man has

overcome his lower nature. Conduct is viewed as requiring the development of an inner process by

which the results of one's behavior may be assessed. Good conduct, in Arnold's view, does not come

naturally, but is achieved through constant effort.

What Arnold and some of his contemporaries labeled as man's baser or more animalistic instincts

and behaviors are still recognized as problematic by modern society, although the values placed upon

them have undergone substantial change during the 20th century. Among the "natural" expressions

of human impulses, the negative value judgments toward violence and aggression have changed little,

although moral judgments toward expressions of sexuality have changed dramatically.

With the advent of sciences of the mind and behavior, the whole concept of what causes,

influences, or motivates human behavior has also changed. Paradigms as to what constitutes human

nafure - and how various aspects of it should be evaluated - are substantially different. Arnold took

a pessimistic position, where the modern sciences of behavior assume attitudes less judgmental and

more inclined to consider the developmental antecedents of behavior, the previous life experiences

that predispose one to certain actions'

yet the thread that runs through the entire body of Arnold's work is a goal just as meaningful now

as it was during the last century. Arnold wished for no less than to construct a naturalistic theory of

life that would lead toward the kind of inner realizations resulting in a sense of rightness and peace.

As Shafer (p. l9Z) clearly described Arnold's goal: "... despite all vagueness and inconsistencies,

Arnold's aim was, plainly enough, the spiritual perfection of humanity."

This was not the same goal defined by traditional Christian beliefs, the loss of which, expressed

by Arnold in "Dover Beach" and other poems, seems to have remained a source of pain. Yet to

maintain a commitment to the spiritual per ction of man, which he saw as a process not for

individuals but for mankind atluge,required a belief in human progress. This was not cast so much

in terms of material and technological advances, but in a deepening of human perceptions, a

sharpening of tastes. This perfection was seen as strictly an internal process, and here, again, one

finds Arnold excluding the realm of nature, which to some of his contemporaries loomed as a part

of man,s enlightenment. Spiritual fulfilment to Wordsworth, for example, would have necessitated

more of a partnershiP with nature.

With such a lofty goal, and one by its nature an internal process, the focus of Arnold's essays

became mankind just as much as the natural world surrounding man. Thus nature came to be seen

as something to be overcome, a force associated with a lower self rather than the righteous clarity

ofthought and purity of purpose ofthe higher self Especially with the Darwinian culrents of thought

circulating through Arnold's world, it became, for defenders of traditional values, more important

than ever to maintain the barrier between man and nature, perhaps even to define new intellectual

barriers.

With the undermining of faith in the supernatural and the traditional Christianity of Arnold's

forefathers, it also became important to construct a rationale for maintaining Christian values without

the formalities of the religion itself. Arnold's time was thus a period of diligent restructuring that in

Dissent and Dognta occasionally sounds strained. If man were not created by God to rule an

earth-centered universe, then a new rationale must be constructed to separate him from the natural

world and the animal kingdom.

The alternative of a social order with only relativistic values - with behavior dictated only by

natural laws - would have appeared unthinkable to many Victorians. Arnold's response, which

became something of a defence of the old values if not entirely of the old order, seems to have

vacillated from the gloomy pessimism of "Dover Beach" to the later acceptance of "Palladium."

Although it was never stated with complete clarity, what he was apparently working through to his

own satisfaction - and for the enlightenment of his age - was a rationale for believing that his ideals

of truth, beauty, and absolute justice could be realized within the limitations of mortal existence.

This task seriously challenged Arnold's rhetorical skills, as the premise is opposed by most

observations ofthe natural world. Experience suggests that, indeed, injustice rules and that there is

little fairness inthe distribution of wealth, health, beauty, and good fortune. Good people canbe

afilicted with lives of misery and privation, while the greedy and aggressive may acquire riches and

acclaim. Good deeds are ordinarily not rewarded by any supernatural force, and spiritual peace seems

to accrue neither to the worthy nor the unworthy.

Arnold's approach toward religion evolved throughout his life. Eventually he came to reject the

outward, supernatural trappings of Christianity, but maintained a devout belief in the behavioral

tenants it encompasses. While this compromise represents the essence of modern secular humanism,

and in some respects appears to be its origin, it was not quickly accepted in Arnold's society, in

which it was still evolving.3

Arnold could thus write critically of Christianity, as in Culture qnd Anarchy, with its direct

admonitions on the harm done by too much religion. He could also develop a highly intellectualized

personal religion, based not so much on faith as upon plausibility. Arnold could not allow himself

l0

to believe in miracles or events that seemed to him inconsistent with the natural order. The unity of

his traditional faith once questioned, he spent the rest ofhis life constructing a new and logical creed,

based upon what to him were rational deductions about the nature of God and rightness.

While this Chrisianity-based creation seemed more consistent with the newly developed scientific

methods of obtaining and testing knowledge, one could realistica\ surmise that it probably did not

meet the same emotional needs for Arnold that traditional Christianity had long met for far less

probing minds. Although Arnold's gloom appears to have retreated in his later life, he seems at no

time to have become a particularly joyous or optimistic man. During his childhood, it is likely that

Arnold showed dour qualities, as his family nicknames, "Crab,u "Crabby," and "Emperor," (Honaq

p. a2lall zuggest a solemnity that appears consistently in his work. Even toward the end of his life,

Arnold revealed a lack of contentment, a sense of grimness in his assessment of the world around him.

Whether this lack of positive emotion influenced his view of nature or whether his ambivalent

view of nature robbed him ofjoy remains unanswerable. The path taken by Arnold was not the only

one open to him, nor was it the one most frequently travelled by those of his generation- Many

essayists among Arnold's contemporaries embraced Spinoza's concept of nature as an essentially

neutral force, indifferent to mankind.

yet by the close of the Victorian era, beliefs akin to Arnold's were entering the mainstream. The

myth of an animate and benign natural order of the universe was still supported by many late 19th

century poets. But this would not becorne the overview of the age, not was it Arnold's personal path

toward fulfillnrent. It is not clear from his poetry whether the beauties of the natural world ever did

provide Arnold with spiritual sustenance. While Arnold may appear to have accepted nature as

animatg he gives more the impression ofusing this as a poetic device for insisting that man's salvation

ll

- at least as this concept applies to his inner life and outward behavior - is his own responsibility. If

man seeks answers in nature, he will be disappointed, as this cannot lead toward the spiritual

perfection of mankind.

The lirres of Arnold quoted at the beginning ofthis essay thus assume a different shade of meaning

when taken in the context of his work as a whole. The word nature itself is responsible for part of

the vagueness, as Arnold does not hesitate to use it with substantially differing shades of meaning.

yet a good case can be made that its appearance in this sonnet is entirely consistent with the main

thrust of Arnold's work and what evolved into the Victorian world-view. The jolt it would give many

modern nature-conscious readers is probably appropriate. As Arnold so forcefully expounds in, "The

Youth ofMan:"

Fools that these mYstics are

Who prate ofNature! but she

Has neither beautY nor warmtlq

Nor life, nor emotion, nor Power.

But Man has a thousand gifts,

And the generous dreamer invests

The senseless world with them all.

Nature is nothing! her charm

Lives in our eyes which can Paint,

Lives in our hearts which can feel.

t2

One should recall that, in much of Arnold's later writing, he focuses not just on the indifference

of natgre to maq but upon the differences between man and the "lower animals." To him there is a

"higher nature" associatd with the best in hurnanity and a "lower nature" no better than the behavior

of animals. These other creatures follow the dictates of their nature, which may involve acts

forbidden to civilized man. Quite apart from and superior to the animals, man has the power to

overcome his baser impulses and not only regulate his behavior, but work toward the development

of a rational view ofthe universe and a natural good taste in assessing what in the world constitutes

beauty and what constitutes truth. This process of perfection for mankind is measured by man's

choices, both in his behavior and in his aesthetic judgments. And this process takes precedence over

the mere contemplation of nature's beauties.

As Tinker and Lowry b. 3l) point out, Arnold entered into his note$ook in 1883 a sentence from

fohnson's Rasselas:, "To man is permitted the contemplation of the skys, but the practice of virtue

is commanded." Nowhere is Arnold's attitude more clearly summarized than in the dichotomy

between "permitted" and "commanded. "

Indeed, Arnold's references to the beauties of nature and the contentment associated with living

closer to nature - as he suggests in "TlE Gipsy Scholar" - were not entirely convincing as expressions

of his most serious thinking, nor is it likely that they were intended to be. While such sentiments were

an integral part ofthe poary of Arnold's day, one can scarcely find among his contemporaries a poet

who creates less a sense of nature's feel and texture than ttrc consistently intellectualizing Arnold, who

can produce felicitous lines where appropriate, as in "Thr5/sis," but who seldom approaches the sense

ofimmediacy about nature found in the work of Wordsworttq Shelley, Keats, and many other 19th

century poets. Nature, even in the sense other poets use the word in reference to flowers, trees,

t3

sunsets, and the ocean, is not here Arnold's fast-friend but an intriguing acquaintance. These

trappings, to hinl are but external manifestations of a force that is far more potent and vastly greater

than the aroma of a fresh spring breeze.

And nature, to Arnold, has a dark side. The animal kingdom, with its cnrelty, blood, and carnal

impulses, is part ofnature, and, lest these qualities manifest themselves in man, they must be held in

check through the behavioral control Arnold repeatedly describes as three quarters ofthe task of

living. It is to this harsh element of nature that Arnold refers in his sonnet, and in many respects his

thinking finds it counterparts in the world of contemporary ideas.

While some modern political theorists would find his attitude repellent, the6iologist Richard

Dawkins (p. 3) takes a position closely akin to Arnold's:

Be warned that if you wish, as I do, to build a society in which individuals cooperate

generously and unselfishly toward a comrnon good, you can expect little help from biological

nature. Let us try to teach generosity and altruism, because we are born selfish.

In positing culture as the foil to nature inCulture and Anarchy, Anold thus defines and

exemplifies the mainstream Victorian distrust of man's nature and of many aspects of the natural

world. As he summarizes (91) this focus upon man's transcendence of nature:

There is a view in which all the love of our neighbor, the impulses toward action, help and

beneficence, the desire for removing human error, clearing human confusion, and diminishing

human misery, the noble aspiration to leave the world better and happier than we found it -

motives eminently such as are called social - come in as part of the grounds of culture, and

t4

the main and pre-eminent part.

It is here that one finds the thread in Arnold's work that best corresponds to the thrust of late

nineteenth century thought, and it is Arnold's identification of culture as the ultimate means of

perfecting mankind that best explains his rejecting, as man's highest aspiratioq the concept of living

in harmony with nature.

NOTES

A dighAy different form ofthis essay wasl srbmitted for, and won, the Matthew Arnold Memorial

Prize in 1994 at Ordord University.

1. Throughout this essay the words man and mankind are used to refer to the larger entity of

humankind.

2. This iswell exernplified inWordsworth's, "Three Years She Grew in Sun and Shower," part iv of

tIre Lucy poems.

3. There have been many accounts of how the philosophy broadly described as modern secular

hunranism developed A particularly wide-ranging description is provided by Frank Miller Turner in

Between Science ard Religion: the Reaction to Scienffic Naturalism in Late Victorian Englard.

15

WORIG CITEI)

Arnold, M. Cuhure ard Arnrchy, intro. by J. Dover Wilsorq Carrbridge: 1932.

Dissent and Dogma, edited by R. H. Super. Ann Arbor: University of MichiganPress. 1968.

Ihe Poems of Matthew Arnold 1840 - 1867, with an intro. by A.T.Quiller-Couch. London: 1930.

Buckler, W. E. On the Poetry of Matthew Arnold. New York: New YorkUniversity Press, 1982.

Carroll, J. The Cultural Theory of Matthew Arnold. Berkeley, University ofCalifornia Press, 1 982.

Dawkins, R. The SelJEsh Gene, London: Oxford University Press, 1976.

Duffin, H. C. Arnold the Poet. New York: Barnes and Noble, 1962.

Eliof T. S. 'Arnold andPater." SelectedEswys,3rd edition. London: Faber andFaber, 1951,

Honaq P. Motthew Antold, a L{e. New York: McGraw-Hill, 1981.

Shafer, k. Christianity and Naturai'srl. New Haven: Yale University Press,1926.

Stange, G. R. Motthew Arnold: the Poet qs Humanist Princetoq Princeton UniversityPress,1967.

Tinker, C. B. and Lowry, H.F. The Poetry of Matthew Arnold, a Commentary. London:Odord Universrty Press. 1940.

Trilling, L. Matthew Arnold, New York: flarcourt, Brace, Iovanovic[ 1939.

Tunrer, E.M. Between kierrce wdReligiur: tlp Rerctiura Scientific Naturalism in l-ate VictoricnEnglard. New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1974.

l6