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Australian Journal ofContemporary American Studies

ISSUE 1 APRIL 2OOO

EDITOR

Anna-Mantza Byrne

ASSISTANT EDITORS

Jiin-\7en Ewe

Australian Journal of contemporary American Studies

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Issue 1April2000

Editorial

. ANNA-MARITZA BYRNE"""' """"""""""""' v

ArticlesRebuilding Communities: Robert Kennedy in

1

Bedford-Stuyvesant' 1'9 66 " " " "'STEPHANIE CLARKE

Art For the Masses: The Depression and New Deal in

American Art..-...""' """"""' 9

IIN-VEN EWE

Fighting for the Fallen Nation: The Historical Roots of

Pro-Life Violence in America """""""" 1'9

ZOEJACKSON

JFK: The Myth and the Man """"' ""':39LUCINDAMASON

China and US: Is'Sfar Inevitable?

SALLY YOUNG

I-egitimation by Association: The Mainstreaming of

r# nigtt, Ideoiogy in America """"""" 59

STEPHANIE MCLEAN

Martin Luther King, Jr and the Civil Rights Movementt nn

A Reappraisal """""" """"' / r

MICHAEL C. KELLY

America and the Education Dream """' 87

CUIRE SMIDDY

‘Martin Luther King Jr and the Civil Rights Movement: a Reappraisal.’

ABSTRACT

When evaluating the contribution of Martin Luther King Jr to the Civil Rights Movement, one must first consider the goals and nature of the movement itself. In the initial period, 1955-65, the emphasis was essentially on the legal and constitutional rights of African-Americans, particularly in the south. In this period King played an important, though not exclusive, role in disseminating a philosophical strategy for the movement and undermining the segregated social and political system of the south. His contribution was important, yet the results were somewhat mixed. In the second period, from approximately 1965, the nature of the movement had changed to an attack on the socio-economic conditions of African-Americans, particularly in the northern ghettoes. King struggled to adjust his philosophy and campaigns to the new challenges facing African-Americans and ultimately he failed to make an impact in the urban north.

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Martin Luther King Jr and the Civil Rights Movement: a Reappraisal. For many people, Martin Luther King Jr epitomised the essence of the American Civil Rights Movement of the late 1950s and the 1960s; in certain circles he is regarded as the mythical figure of the Civil Rights Movement. Any analysis of his contribution to civil rights, however, cannot overlook the fact that King, the man, and King, the myth are not wholly compatible. The Civil Rights Movement itself was neither monolithic nor unchanging. In fact, there was constant development within the movement which can be roughly divided into two distinct phases. During the initial phase, from the mid-1950s until approximately 1965, activists struggled to overcome legal and constitutional barriers and deficiencies which impeded the social and political aspirations of African-Americans, particularly in the segregated south. Martin Luther King Jr played a significant role in influencing the direction of the movement during this period. His importance is tempered, however, by several key factors, particularly the role and influence of other civil rights activists. Furthermore, any impartial evaluation must conclude that the gains made by King and the Southern Christian Leadership Conference (SCLC) were never more than partial. The second phase of the movement, from around 1965, until King’s death (and beyond), saw a distinct change in the character of the goals of African-Americans. Equality came to mean much more than desegregation of public facilities; rather it became the equalisation of the socio-economic condition between black and white America. The battleground itself shifted from the segregated south to the urban north, particularly the ghettoes. During this phase of the movement King struggled to maintain his position as a recognised leader of civil rights, and for many, he became an increasingly irrelevant figure. By the time of his death, he had failed to make any significant impact on the plight of urban African-Americans of the north. The initial phase of the Civil Rights Movement was dominated by the attack on segregation in the south. Perhaps King's greatest contribution during this phase was in disseminating the philosophy of nonviolent direct action within the Civil Rights Movement. King stressed two key elements. First, the message to ‘love your enemies...’ was echoed from the earliest days of the Birmingham bus boycott1 and emphasised the notion of working within the system towards integration between African-Americans and whites. Second was the strategy of provoking violence from white segregationists, thus highlighting the injustice of the segregationist position.2 King also believed that nonviolent resistance ‘may develop a sense of shame in the opponent...’3 which would lead to the granting of concessions to African-Americans. King accurately assessed this aspect of the situation in the south, as it was white reactionary violence which paved the way for limited success there. The bomb attack against King’s Montgomery home on 30 January 1956 strengthened the position of the Montgomery Improvement Association.4 1 Martin Luther King Jr, Stride Toward Freedom: The Montgomery Story, Harper and Row Publishers, New York, 1958, p. 62. 2 Martin Luther King Jr, The Trumpet of Conscience, Harper and Row Publishers, San Francisco, 1967, p. 5. 3Martin Luther King Jr, Stride Toward Freedom: The Montgomery Story, p. 99. 4 Lerone Bennett Jr, What Manner of Man, Pocket Books Inc., New York, 1965, p. 67.

In Birmingham it was a combination of Police Commissioner T. Eugene ‘Bull’ Connor’s use of naked force, particularly against children during 3-4 May 1963;5 Governor Wallace’s use of State Troopers;6 and Ku Klux Klan bombings and the ensuing race riots which shocked and enraged America and finally forced President Kennedy to intervene.7 In Selma, during the 1965 campaign for voting rights, Sheriff Clark provided the violence needed to inflame public opinion.8 Interestingly, King admits that his greatest failure of the early period, in Albany, Georgia, was due principally to the nonviolent, non-inflammatory policing methods of Police Chief Laurie Pritchett.9 Only where reactionary white violence occurred did the movement meet with some success. It was this provocative, though nonviolent, philosophy which King disseminated successfully within the Civil Rights Movement. King further contributed to the early phase of the Civil Rights Movement by engendering in southern African-Americans a renewed sense of pride and self-respect. King himself asserted this on several occasions. He believed that this was the greatest lateral effect of the Montgomery bus boycott of 1955-56,10 and further, that the achievements in Birmingham and of the 1963 March on Washington were also instrumental in bringing about a psychological change in African-Americans.11 King’s charisma added greatly to this sense of pride.12 Moreover, King was instrumental in influencing the young generation of African-Americans who would become the vanguard of the Civil Rights Movement. At the tender age of fifteen, John Lewis, the first chairman of the Student Nonviolent Coordinating Committee (SNCC), was inspired by King’s role in the Montgomery boycott.13 The SNCC, although more militant than King, would initially adopt King’s tactics of nonviolence.14 The Montgomery boycott also inspired the Tallahassee and Atlanta bus boycotts of 1959.15 According to Bob Moses, King’s action in Birmingham in 1963 was directly responsible for mass action in Jackson, Mississippi, led by Medgar Evers of the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People (NAACP).16 This was one of 1,412 demonstrations which took place in the south following Birmingham.17 Finally, King’s influence was felt through the rigorous training sessions in nonviolent techniques held by the SCLC for participants in demonstrations.18 5 Martin Luther King Jr, Why We Can’t Wait, Harper and Row Publishers, New York, 1963, p. 106. 6 Taylor Branch, Parting the Waters: America in the King Years, 1954-63, Simon and Schuster, New York, 1988, pp. 797-8. 7 Martin Luther King Jr, Why We Can’t Wait, pp. 114-5. 8 James A. Colaiaco, Martin Luther King Jr, St. Martin’s Press, New York, 1988, p. 121. 9 Martin Luther King Jr, Why We Can’t Wait, p. 67. 10 Martin Luther King Jr, Stride Toward Freedom: The Montgomery Story, p. 188. 11 Martin Luther King Jr, Why We Can’t Wait, pp. 120-1. 12 Richard P. Young, Roots of Rebellion: The Evolution of Black Politics and Protest Since World War II, Harper and Row Publishers, New York, 1970, p.126. 13 Joan and Robert K. Morrison, From Camelot to Kent State, Times Books, New York, 1987, p. 26. 14 Kenneth B. Clark, ‘The Civil Rights Movement: Momentum and Organisation’, in Young, Roots of Rebellion, p. 288. 15 Bennett Jr, What Manner of Man, p.80. 16 Branch, Parting the Waters, p. 818. 17 Colaiaco, Martin Luther King Jr, p. 70. 18 ibid., p. 61.

King also managed to focus national and international attention on the Civil Rights Movement. His advocacy of nonviolent techniques provided positive press coverage for the movement. 19 King, as spokesman for the Freedom Rider Coordinating Committee,20 played a peripheral role to the SNCC and the Congress of Racial Equality (CORE), but was nevertheless able to gain sustained media coverage due to his mass appeal and especially his media appeal. He had a genius for propaganda. His ‘Letter from Birmingham Jail’ was released in response to negative press reports of the Birmingham campaign.21 This was a shrewd publicity move as it resulted in more positive press coverage and established the philosophical credentials of King and the SCLC. Furthermore, his introduction of children in the Birmingham demonstrations not only filled up the jails, but also the newspapers and television screens of America.22 Similarly, it was not direct action, but an image which immortalised King as a civil rights leader; his ‘Dream’ speech during the March on Washington contributed to King's stature within the Civil Rights Movement, yet this was due to his oratorical skills alone.23 Essentially the civil rights demonstrations built the momentum for the 1964 Civil Rights Act and the 1965 Voting Rights Act,24 and despite his other failings, King’s ability to mobilise national attention to these demonstrations was most important. King’s final contribution to the early period of the Civil Rights Movement was his ability to open a dialogue with liberal whites and convert this into financial contributions. It was especially King’s espousal of nonviolent action and his theories of integration which enabled him to articulate African-American concerns to a white audience.25 His ‘Letter from Birmingham Jail’ was aimed at allaying the fears of white moderates,26 which in effect widened the legitimacy of the Civil Rights Movement in white America. His opposition to the ‘black power’ slogan during the 1964 Meredith March at Greenwood, Mississippi was a direct result of his fear that the movement would be alienated from liberal white supporters.27 This support was important financially for organisational costs, but even more so for a bail bond fund. The extent of that support can be seen in King’s 1963 Easter meeting with Harry Belafonte and representatives of Mayor Wagner and Governor Rockefeller to raise funds for the upcoming Birmingham campaign.28 The meeting raised funds of over $475,000.29

19 Clayborne Carson, ‘Martin Luther King Jr: Charismatic Leadership in a Mass Struggle', in ‘A Round Table: Martin Luther King Jr.’, Journal of American History, vol. 74, 1987, p. 449. 20 Bennett Jr, What Manner of Man, p. 110. 21 Branch, Parting the Waters, p. 737. 22 Martin Luther King Jr, Why We Can’t Wait, p. 102. 23 Branch, Parting the Waters, p. 887. 24 Young, Roots of Rebellion, p. 255. 25 Carson, 'Charismatic Leadership', p. 452. 26 Colaiaco, Martin Luther King Jr, p. 89. 27 Martin Luther King Jr, Where Do We Go from Here: Chaos or Community?, Harper and Row Publishers, New York, 1967, p. 31. 28 Martin Luther King Jr, Why We Can’t Wait, p. 51. 29 David L. Lewis, Martin Luther King: A Critical Biography, Allen Lane. The Penguin Press, London, 1970, p. 176.

King can therefore be considered to have made substantial contributions to the early phase of the Civil Rights Movement by disseminating a philosophy of nonviolent action which provoked increasingly violent reactions from white segregationists; by helping to restore pride and self-respect in African-Americans, influencing the thoughts and actions of other civil rights activists, particularly the young, by focusing national and international attention on civil rights causes in the south and opening a channel of dialogue with white liberals, which in turn was converted into financial support for the Civil Rights Movement. King’s overall importance prior to 1965, however, has been somewhat overstated. As a result, the role of other civil rights leaders, especially at the local level, has generally been overlooked. An examination of this role reveals that the Civil Rights Movement was not a coordinated national ‘movement’ led by King, but a series of locally led and inspired independent actions with local goals.30 The Montgomery bus boycott, which propelled King to prominence, was possible, by King’s own admission, because of the atmosphere for social revolution created by Montgomery Baptist pastor and activist Vernon Johns and veteran NAACP organiser E. D. Nixon at the local level.31 The very idea of the boycott belonged not to King, but to the Women’s Political Council of Montgomery,32 which had been pressuring Montgomery to reform segregated transportation since 1953.33 The student sit-ins of 1960, while perhaps inspired by King, were spontaneous local actions totally independent from the SCLC, and by 1961 had provoked two hundred cities to desegregate diners.34 King himself stressed that the sit-ins gained more for desegregation than any other protest action.35 Similarly, the Freedom Rides of 1961-62 were coordinated by the CORE, with King playing only a peripheral role. James Farmer of the CORE was convinced that it was these Freedom Rides which prompted Federal intervention in the south,36 not the sole action of King, as is widely believed. Activism in Albany began in 1961 with Charles Sherrod and Cordell Reagon of the SNCC.37 King’s later involvement in Albany actually divided the SNCC over the issues of localism versus charismatic leadership.38 The SNCC’s Bob Moses and Amzie Moore were active in the south on a voter registration program as early as 1961.39 The groundwork for the Birmingham campaign was also locally inspired in 1962 by Miles College students and Rev. Fred Shuttlesworth (an SCLC affiliate) more than a year before King’s arrival.40 Even the March on Washington, which immortalised King, was the inspiration of Asa Randolph, not King.41 It is clear that much of the civil rights

30 Clayborne Carson, ‘Civil Rights Reform and the Black Freedom Struggle’, in Charles W. Eagles (ed.), The Civil Rights Movement in America, University Press of Mississippi, Jackson, 1986, p. 24. 31 Martin Luther King Jr, Stride Toward Freedom: The Montgomery Story, p. 39. 32 Lewis, A Critical Biography, p. 52. 33 Colaiaco, Martin Luther King Jr, p. 5. 34 ibid., p. 30. 35 Martin Luther King Jr, Why We Can’t Wait, p. 33. 36 Colaiaco, Martin Luther King Jr, p. 38. 37 ibid., p. 40. 38 ibid., p. 42. 39 Branch, Parting the Waters, p. 330. 40 Martin Luther King Jr, Why We Can’t Wait, p. 44. 41 Lewis, A Critical Biography, p. 214.

activism of the early years was independent of King and the SCLC, with them playing merely a peripheral role. In many cases King did not initiate campaigns, but rather joined existing movements. At times this led to a virtual takeover. At Atlanta University in March 1960, King made a speech, capitalising on publicity generated by a completely locally organised protest.42 The fact that these local efforts have been largely overlooked, has artificially inflated the image and the perceived influence of King. At times, King’s habit of ‘hijacking’ local movements even created friction within the Civil Rights Movement as a whole and threatened goals. Tension between the SNCC and the SCLC in Albany, Georgia over leadership struggles and methods led to winning only limited concessions. King eventually abandoned Albany and the local needs went unmet.43 Similar tensions existed in Selma between the SNCC and the SCLC. The SNCC, which had continued a voter registration campaign there since 1963, suspected King of stealing the glory and funds from their groundwork when he moved to Selma in 1965.44 This type of criticism undermines the image of King as undisputed leader in the early years of the Civil Rights Movement. Furthermore, it must be stated that while King was chiefly responsible for the dissemination of nonviolent action, he was not the initiator of the strategy. In fact, there was a long tradition of nonviolent civil disobedience within the Civil Rights Movement. Frederick Douglass used sit-ins and ride-ins as a means of black protest from 1845 to 1895.45 The CORE established nonviolent direct action as early as the 1940s. In 1943 they initiated a sit-in in a Chicago restaurant and in 1947 held a freedom ride to test interstate desegregation.46 Asa Philip Randolph formed a national civil disobedience movement against army segregation in 1947.47 King’s tactical program during the Montgomery bus boycott also drew on tradition. The car pool organised by King was based on Theodore Jemison’s Baton Rouge bus boycott of 1953, and King even contacted Jemison for organisational advice.48 Moreover, nonviolence was inherent in the black southern Christian religious experience49 and was therefore well adapted to the south. King’s role as Baptist preacher exposed him to this tradition, a factor that was critical to his adoption of the nonviolent philosophy. Even within the Montgomery Improvement Association, and then the SCLC, King did not play the critical role in the development of this philosophy. The MIA’s doctrine of nonviolence was heavily influenced by outsiders Bayard Rustin and Glenn Smiley of the Fellowship of Reconciliation.50 Within the SCLC, James Lawson was responsible for nonviolent training and had been expressly drawn into the organisation by King to help develop a nonviolent strategy – King was, at this stage, still a novice of Ghandian techniques.51 Essentially, King played the 42 Branch, Parting the Waters, p. 302. 43 Lewis, A Critical Biography, pp. 151-2. 44 G. Hodgson, America in Our Time, Vintage Books, New York, 1978, p. 218. 45 Bennett Jr, What Manner of Man, p. 22. 46 Clark, 'The Civil Rights Movement', p. 283. 47 Bennett Jr, What Manner of Man, p. 39. 48 Martin Luther King Jr, Stride Toward Freedom: The Montgomery Story, p. 75. 49 Nathan Irvin Huggins, ‘Martin Luther King Jr.: Charisma and Leadership’, in ‘A Round Table: Martin Luther King Jr.’, Journal of American History, vol. 74, 1987, pp. 480-1. 50 Lewis, A Critical Biography, p. 72. 51 Branch, Parting the Waters, p. 205.

predominant role of spokesman. Even as late as 1963, many of the tactical decisions of the SCLC, whilst often mistakenly credited to King, can be attributed to others within the organisation. The use of children in the Birmingham demonstrations proved to be the key element in the success of the campaign, but it was James Bevel who initiated the idea, not King.52 The fact that King has been erroneously identified as the sole initiator and developer of nonviolent direct action in the Civil Rights Movement has falsely exaggerated his contribution to the early stages of the Civil Rights Movement. His actual role was to disseminate the philosophy among his followers, and even here his gains were limited. He failed to gain mass support for nonviolent struggle as a way of life, rather than simply as a tactic.53 This would account for the SNCC’s abandonment of nonviolence at a later stage in the movement’s development. This failure would lead directly to King's loss of relevance as a leader in future years. An examination of the use of legal recourse further diminishes King's role in the early years. It was the legislative victories of the NAACP, particularly the 1954 decision on school segregation, which launched King’s career by establishing a precedent of victory in the face of overwhelming oppression.54 The pressure of the Montgomery boycott notwithstanding, it was the court action sponsored by the NAACP that led to the November 1956 Supreme Court decision which gave victory to the MIA.55 The NAACP continued to advise King on Federal and State legal systems through its Legal Defence Fund Inc. thereby enabling King to use the legal system to challenge laws in the US Supreme Court.56 This work, though not as spectacular as direct action, made enormous contributions to civil rights victories in the late 1950s and early 1960s: a fact often overlooked in favour of King’s activities. A further factor affecting any assessment of King’s contribution to civil rights is the amount of influence he was able to exert on Washington; particularly as regards Executive action. From the early days it appears that King struggled. The Supreme Court decision in favour of the MIA was followed by a wave of bombings. King appealed to both Eisenhower and Nixon for policy statements but was rebuffed.57 By 1959 King’s continual appeals to Attorney General William P. Rogers for Federal enforcement of law in the south had fallen on deaf ears.58 King had little more success with the Kennedy Administration. Although Kennedy won the 1960 election with 75 percent of the African-American electoral vote, King’s pressure was unable to prevent Kennedy from appointing ardent segregationists to the Federal Bench in the south59, nor from preventing Kennedy from announcing that his Administration had no intention of seeking new civil rights legislation.60 Neither Birmingham nor the March on Washington affected the

52 Colaiaco, Martin Luther King Jr, p. 64. 53 Carson, 'Charismatic Leadership', p. 449. 54 Clark, 'The Civil Rights Movement', pp. 284-5. 55 Martin Luther King Jr, Stride Toward Freedom: The Montgomery Story, p. 152. 56 Colaiaco, Martin Luther King Jr, p. 144. 57 Branch, Parting the Waters, p. 199. 58 Lewis, A Critical Biography, p. 106. 59 Colaiaco, Martin Luther King Jr, p. 33. 60 Branch, Parting the Waters, pp. 376-7.

Administration’s stance on Federal intervention in the south. Kennedy was unable and unwilling to pressure Birmingham officials in a 1963 White House meeting,61 and Senators Hubert Humphrey and Jacob Javits didn’t believe that the March on Washington changed any Congressional votes on the Civil Rights Bill.62 In fact, while King attempted to gain allies in the Kennedy Administration, the FBI was conducting a secret campaign to discredit King and the SCLC.63 This antipathy would have long lasting repercussions; even as late as 1965, civil rights activists complained of the reluctance of the FBI to intervene in violent situations in the south.64 The situation did not improve with the Johnson Administration. In 1968 King claimed that neither Kennedy nor Johnson had worked for civil rights,65 although King had appealed to them for intervention throughout their terms in office. It would therefore seem that King’s influence in Washington was more apparent than real. Finally, an analysis of the gains that King and the SCLC achieved would suggest that they were, at best, partial. The principal dilemma was that although King had contributed to the end of dejure segregation in the south by 1965, African-Americans still faced poverty, ghettoes, sub-standard housing and segregated education. Between 1948 and 1964, the relative gaps between African-Americans and whites in unemployment, median income, poverty and infant mortality had all increased.66 King himself recognised that despite the pressure of the legislative changes and direct action, by 1963 desegregation of schools had affected less than two percent of black children.67 King also stated that 'We want a share in the American economy, the housing market, the educational system and the social opportunities.'68 It was evident that by 1965 none of these goals had been achieved. Even King’s anti-segregation gains were somewhat limited. Both the Civil Rights Movement and the American media adjudged King to have failed to achieve any substantial concessions in Albany in 1962.69 In Birmingham in 1963 it must be noted that the victory of the SCLC was followed by a backlash of white violence, and the 10 May accord between the city of Birmingham and the African-American community guaranteeing desegregation of public utilities and nondiscriminatory employment practices was never put into effect.70 In 1968 King also admitted that the White House Conference on Civil Rights had gained nothing tangible71 and that both the 1964 Civil 61 ibid., p.898. 62 Colaiaco, Martin Luther King Jr, p. 74. 63 Branch, Parting the Waters, p. 679. 64 Elizabeth Sutherland (ed.), Letters from Mississippi, Mcgraw Hill, New York, 1965, in Henry Steele Commager (ed.), The Struggle for Racial Equality, Harper and Row Publishers, New York, 1967, p. 203. 65 Martin Luther King Jr, ‘A Testament of Hope’, in James Melvin Washington (ed.), A Testament of Hope: The Essential Writings of Martin Luther King Jr, Harper and Row Publishers, San Francisco, 1986, p. 320. 66 L.B. Johnson, ‘Address on Civil Rights at Howard University, June 4, 1965. A White House Release’, in Commager, The struggle for Racial Equality, p. 247. 67 Martin Luther King Jr, Why We Can’t Wait, p. 6. 68 Martin Luther King Jr, ‘Nonviolence: the Only Road to Freedom’, in Washington, Testament of Hope, p. 58. 69 Branch, Parting the Waters, p. 631. 70 Martin Luther King Jr, Why We Can’t Wait, pp. 122-3. 71 Martin Luther King Jr, ‘Remaining Awake Through a Great Revolution’, in Washington, Testament of Hope, p. 274.

Rights Act and the 1965 Voting Rights Act had been either ignored or were not implemented in the south.72 Therefore King’s successes, and those of the Civil Rights Movement in general, had almost no impact on socio-economic issues and only a limited impact on segregation in the south. Thus it becomes clear that King’s contribution to the Civil Rights Movement should not be overstated. King was only one of several civil rights leaders active in the south and many local initiatives were independent of him. He often joined existing movements, and at times his efforts created tensions within local organisations. King was not responsible for initiating the philosophy of nonviolent direct action, but only for its dissemination. Legal action, often initiated by the NAACP, continued to play an important role in advancing civil rights. King had little influence in Washington, especially with the Executive branch. Finally, King’s efforts did nothing to improve the socio-economic position of African-Americans and only gained mixed success with the destruction of segregation in the South. During the second phase of the Civil Rights Movement, after 1965, King became increasingly irrelevant for many African-Americans, especially as the struggle had moved from the south to the urban north, and the emphasis had changed from legalistic rights to economic parity. King first encountered difficulties in the north between the working and middle classes. King’s middle class approach blunted his appeal and reduced the influence of his tactics in northern ghettoes.73 His position was further undermined by the ineffectiveness of his nonviolent approach. In the south, where he had encountered blatant oppression and a violent white backlash, his strategy had met with success; but in the north, where racism was equally entrenched but less visibly oppressive, King experienced failure. The Chicago Movement of 1966 was undermined by Mayor Daley, who promoted concessions which, while only minor, attracted publicity and detracted from King’s campaign against slums.74 The ‘Summit Agreement’ between the city of Chicago and the SCLC was later rejected by Mayor Daley; consequently, King’s tenants’ unions, rental strikes and political organisation all collapsed.75 As King stated, ‘there cannot be nonviolence and tranquillity, without significant reforms...’76 When reforms failed to emerge in Chicago, the people turned to violence. Riots had begun two summers before in Harlem, where King had been met with anger from residents who viewed him as an unwanted ‘outsider’.77 In Watts, after the riots of 1965, King had encountered similar sentiments from local residents78 and exacerbated the situation with the comment 'I strongly deplore the violence. It is absolutely wrong,

72 Martin Luther King Jr, ‘A Testament of Hope’, in Washington, Testament of Hope, p. 320. 73 Edward C. Banfield and James Q. Wilson, ‘Negroes in City Politics’, in Young, Roots of Rebellion, p.216. 74 Colaiaco, Martin Luther King Jr, p. 157. 75 Lewis, A Critical Biography, p. 366. 76 Martin Luther King Jr, ‘Negroes Are Not Moving too Fast’, in Washington, Testament of Hope, p. 180. 77 Lewis, A Critical Biography, p. 245. 78 Frederick J Hacker and Aljean Harmetz, ‘What the McCone Commission Didn’t See’, in Young, Roots of Rebellion, p. 187.

socially detestable and self-defeating.'79 From 1965, King grew increasingly out of touch with the aspirations and feelings of the northern ghettoes. King also lost contact with two other important allies: white liberals and the more militant civil rights activists. White liberals looked fearfully at rising African-American militancy, but King correctly identified the real problem of the African-American – white alliance. Until Selma white liberals abhorred the overt brutality of southern segregation, but when the Civil Rights Movement pressed for structural changes in American society, white liberals rejected true equality.80 King was able neither to allay white fears nor to invoke a change in consciousness. African-American militants, on the other hand, saw King as a moderate whose days were numbered. From the early sixties, Malcolm X had criticised King’s whole strategy: 'it’s the only revolution in which the goal is a desegregated lunch counter, a desegregated theatre, a desegregated park, and a desegregated public toilet...That’s no revolution...'81 Yet by 1967, even less radical activists were in agreement. The SNCC had been progressively alienated from King by the pressure to alter John Lewis’ speech during the March on Washington in 1963;82 by King’s acceptance of the compromise at the Democratic Convention in Atlantic City over the Mississippi Freedom Democratic Party crisis in 196483 and by King’s position on the ‘black power’ controversy during the summer of 1966.84 The SNCC’s Stokely Carmichael epitomised the rejection of the SCLC’s goals when he stated, ‘integration is a subterfuge for the maintenance of white supremacy.’85 Furthermore, King’s views regarding opposition to the Vietnam War led to fear within the movement that national attention would shift from civil rights to peace.86 The failure of King’s nonviolent strategy in the north, his loss of support from both white liberals and more militant African-Americans, and his anti-Vietnam war policy weakened and isolated King after 1965. Perhaps his failure is best summed up by the prevailing economic conditions at the time of his death. Between 1945 and 1970, the economic gap between African-Americans and whites failed to narrow, with African-American family income remaining only slightly more than half that of whites, with double the unemployment rate.87 It was clear that King’s assault on the socio-economic condition of African-Americans had failed.

79 Arna Bontemps and Jack Conroy, Anyplace but Here, Hill and Wang, New York, 1966, in Commager, The Struggle for Racial Equality, p. 243. 80 Martin Luther King Jr, Where Do We Go from Here: Chaos or Community?, pp. 3-4. 81 Malcolm X, ‘Message to the Grass Roots’, in Young, Roots of Rebellion, p. 351. 82 Lewis, A Critical Biography, p. 223. 83 ibid., pp. 252-3. 84 ibid., p. 325. 85 Stokely Carmichael, ‘What We Want’, in The New York Review of Books, Sept. 22, 1966 in Commager, The Struggle for Racial Equality, p. 256. 86 Nathan Irvin Huggins, 'Charisma and Leadership', p. 477. 87 Young, Roots of Rebellion, pp. 8-9.

King’s contribution to the Civil Rights Movement must be assessed within the framework of a dynamic movement. It is clear that in the early phase of the movement (1955-65) King played an important role in disseminating a philosophy and strategy of nonviolent action. He also gave African-Americans a new sense of pride and self-respect, and he certainly helped to influence the future activists of the Civil Rights Movement. Moreover, he focused American attention on issues of segregation in the south and he opened a dialogue with white liberal America. Many other activists, however, particularly at the local level, played an equally important role in the south, including the NAACP with their legal approach. King often caused tension with these local activists as a result of his strategies. Furthermore, King was not responsible for the initiation and development of nonviolent action but simply continued a tradition which was strong within the Civil Rights Movement. King was also unable to exert influence on Washington, particularly on the Executive branch. Most importantly, King’s efforts had no impact on the socio-economic position of African-Americans, and even the gains made in desegregation were limited in nature. During the later phase of the movement (post-1965) King became increasingly isolated. His strategy of nonviolence failed to achieve results and he became alienated from poor northern African-Americans, who responded with violence. His white liberal allies deserted him as ‘civil’ rights increasingly became a call for socio-economic equality and more militant activists drew further away from his moderate position. Ultimately his strategy had virtually no impact on the economic plight of urban African-Americans. In the light of this, King’s contribution to the Civil Rights Movement was positive, though limited, in the early phase, and ineffectual in the later phase.