1

Addis Ababa UniversitySchool of Graduate Studies

Institute for Peace and Security Studies

LOOTABLE MINERALS AND INSECURITY: CASES FROMARTISANAL GOLD MINING IN ASGEDETSIMBLA WEREDA

LOWLANDS, WESTERN TIGRAY

2

LOOTABLE MINERALS AND INSECURITY: CASES FROMARTISANAL GOLD MINING IN ASGEDETSIMBLA WEREDA

LOWLANDS, WESTERN TIGRAY

3

By

Gezaey Desta TesfayE-mail: geze.desta@gmail.com

Advisor

Tarekegn Adebo (PhD)

A thesis submitted to the Institute for Peace and Security

Studies of Addis Ababa University in Partial Fulfillment of

the Requirements for the Degree of Master of Arts in Peace and

Security Studies

June 2010, Addis Ababa, Ethiopia

4

5

Acknowledgements

First and for most, I would like to acknowledge the priceless

contributions made by my advisor Dr Tarekegn Adebo throughout

writing this thesis. Secondly, it goes to the honorable

Institute for Peace and Security Studies/AAU for providing

financial support and access to computer lab. I am also

indebted to Angosom Agedom, a seasonal gold miner, who upon

request helped me in taking photos across gold mining sites.

Fourthly, my deeper acknowledgement extends to Mr. Hadush Haile,

whose constructive and relevant knowledge of the gold mining,

from its inception as ex-gold miner in the past and the current

dynamics as responsible body in the Wereda administration,

helped me reach to rich and right information and informants.

Lastly, I also extend my gratitude to Yrga Agedom who helped me

from material to moral supports throughout the year of

undertaking this thesis.

6

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Contents

Page

Acknowledgement------------------------------------------------

----------------------------------------IV

Table of

contents-------------------------------------------------------

------------------------------------V

List of Figures, Tables or Maps

---------------------------------------------------------------

-------VIII

Acronyms and

abbreviations--------------------------------------------------

--------------------------IX

Abstract-------------------------------------------------------

---------------------------------------------XI

7

Chapter 1:

Introduction---------------------------------------------------

------------------------------1

1.2 statement of the

problem--------------------------------------------------------

----------------------2

1.3 objective of the study

---------------------------------------------------------------

------------------3

1.4 specific research

questions------------------------------------------------------

----------------------4

1.5 organization of the thesis

---------------------------------------------------------------

--------------4

1.6 field research opportunities and

challenges-----------------------------------------------------

---5

Chapter 2: Review of Related

Literature-----------------------------------------------------

-------6

2.1 The concept of

conflict-------------------------------------------------------

-------------------------6

2.2 The Concept of Human

Security---------------------------------------------

-----------7

8

2.3 Concept, Characteristics and Postulation of

ASM-------------------------------------------------8

Mining

defined--------------------------------------------------------

--------------------------------------8

2.3.1 Defining the ASM

sector---------------------------------------------------------

-----------------8

2.3.2 Nature and Characteristics of

ASM------------------------------------------------------------

--9

2.3.3 Key Manifestations and Conjecture of the ASM

Sector-------------------------------------10

ASM is poverty-driven as well as

perpetuating---------------------------------------------------

10

ASM is a Way of

Life-----------------------------------------------------------

----------------------11

ASM is often informal, illegal and open-

access---------------------------------------------------12

ASM is Human Right/Security

Insensitive----------------------------------------------------

-----13

ASM is Conflict

Inherent-------------------------------------------------------

----------------------15

9

ASM is Antithetical to Environmental

Security---------------------------------------------------17

2.4 Environment- Livelihood - Security

Nexus-------------------------------------------------------18

2.5 Environment- Conflict- Human Security

Nexus-------------------------------------------------18

2.6 Mineral Resource Wealth and Security

Dynamics-----------------------------------------------20

2.6.1 Perspectives on the Implications of Natural Resource

Abundance----------------------20

2.7 contending views on the natural resource wealth- conflict

nexus-----------------------------26

2.8 MINING, LOCAL COMMUNITIES AND

CONFLICT-----------------------------------------------------29

2.8.1 Mining in local community -Conflict

Scenarios---------------------------------------------29

2.9 COMMUNITY-BASED APPROACHES IN THE MINING

SECTOR---------------------------------30

2.10 THE CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK IN

EXPLANATION--------------------------------31

2.11 Operationalizing Basic Terms and

Phrases-----------------------------------------------------32

Chapter 3: Research Design and

Methodology---------------------------------------------------

33

10

3.1 description of the study

area-----------------------------------------------------------

-------------33

3.1.1 Source of livelihood of the affected local

people--------------------------------------------35

3.1.2. Site

selection------------------------------------------------------

-----------------------------------39

3.2 Data collection

methods--------------------------------------------------------

-----------------39

3.2.1 Primary source of

data-----------------------------------------------------------

----------------39

Observation----------------------------------------------------

----------------------------------------40

In-Depth Interviews with

Informants-----------------------------------------------------

----------40

FGD------------------------------------------------------------

-----------------------------------------40

Case-

Studies--------------------------------------------------------

-----------------------------------41

3.2.2 Secondary source of

data-----------------------------------------------------------

-------------41

11

3.2 sampling

technique------------------------------------------------------

-----------------------------41

3.3 method of data

analysis-------------------------------------------------------

-----------------------42

Chapter 4: Nature of the Artisanal Gold Mining

Sector----------------------------------------43

4.1 Its Characteristics: Recipe for

Insecurity-----------------------------------------------------

-----43

4.2 conflict actors, context, causes and

issues---------------------------------------------------------

56

4.3 scale and intensity of

conflict-------------------------------------------------------

----------------57

4.4 human security threats of artisanal gold mining

process----------------------------------------59

4.4.1 Health threats due to mining

pollution/contamination--------------------------------------59

4.4.2 Environmental

marginalization------------------------------------------------

-----------------64

4.4.3 Death and body losses related to land wall

collapse-----------------------------------------66

12

4.4.4 Social problems incubated by the presence of

ASGM---------------------------------------69

4.5 conflict over resource access and

control--------------------------------------------------------

-70

4.5.1 Position, Interests and Needs and Fears of the Affected

Communities vs. Nomadic

Gold Miners

---------------------------------------------------------------

------------------------------71

Chapter 5: Case- studies: COMPARATIVE SPATIOTEMPORAL NARRATIVE

ANALYSIS---------------------------------------------------------

---------------------------------------------------------------

------80

Case study 1: Tabya Zengorako mineral conflict and its

dynamics--------------------------------80

Stage 1

---------------------------------------------------------------

-----------------------------------80

Stage 2

---------------------------------------------------------------

-----------------------------------81

Stage 3

---------------------------------------------------------------

-----------------------------------83

Case study 2: Tabya Hibret conflict over lucrative resources

vis-à-vis. resources for survival-

13

--------------------------------------------------------------

-----------------------------------------------85

Season---------------------------------------------------------

-------------------------------------------88

River and ponds volume of

water----------------------------------------------------------

----------89

Chapter 6: Interventions, Challenges and

Scenarios---------------------------------------------90

6.1 INTERVENTION: INTENTIONS AND ATTEMPTS

------------------------------------------------------90

6.2 Transformational

Challenges-----------------------------------------------------

------------------92

Weak/Manipulated Gold Cooperative Unions

-------------------------------------------------------92

6.3 Scenarios and

trends---------------------------------------------------------

------------------------97

Chapter 7: Conclusions and Recommendations

--------------------------------------------------98

Conclusions-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------98Recommendations-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------102

14

ResearchQuestion---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------10References

Appendices

1 Research instruments/ checklist questions

2 Populations

3 Multiple gold mining sites in the Wereda

4 Scenarios and Trends CFM Model (hypothetical postulation)

List of figures, maps and tables

Map 3.1: Political map of the study Wereda in Western

Tigray--------------------------33

Map 3.2: Placer gold occurrence in Ethiopia

---------------------------------------------------------35

Figure 3.3: Categories of basis of mixed

farming----------------------------------------------------36

Figure 3.4: Types and Number of

Livestock------------------------------------------------------

----37

Table 3.5: Tabya Hibret population size vs. clean

water supply profile----------38Fig 4.1: Local rural areas-local towns-Addis Ababa-global

market (pre-formalization years)

---------------------------------------------------------------

---------------------------------------------------50

15

Figure 4.2: Lootability of the ASGM

sector---------------------------------------------------------

--52

Figure 4.3: Spurring gold Price Index in the post- cold- war

era (sample years) ----------------53

Fig 4.4: Conflict Map of main actors in the gold commodity

chain-------------------------------55

Figure 4.5: conflict stages/progression

---------------------------------------------------------------

-58

Figure 4.6: interdependent nature of human security threat

dimensions --------------------------60

Figure 4.7: Summary of deaths and affected victims in selected

sample years-------------------61

Figure 4.8: Island/Pyramid method of conflict analysis

--------------------------------------------72

Table 4.9: Summary of different situational tactics and their

trends-------------------------------76

Table 4.10: Natural resource dependence of the local community,

landless and unemployed youth proportion summary Table

---------------------------------------------------------------

-------77

Figure 4.11: poverty- artisanal gold mining –and its

detrimental effects interlock -------------78

Table 4.12: Summary Impacts of the ASGM Sector

------------------------------------------------78

Figure 4.13: Factors for informality and not-legalized status

of the sector -----------------------79

16

Figure 5.2: three different incompatible purposes the local

natural resource wealth provides-87

Figure 5.3: de-escalation vis-a-vis escalation

factors------------------------------------------------88

Table 5.5: Emergency health service delivery (2006/7-2008/9)

-----------------------------------91

Figure 5.6: Intercepting conflict fault lines

-----------------------------------------------------------93

Fig. 5.7: Chain-of-command and organizational structure of

sample GCU in Edagahibret town

---------------------------------------------------------------

------------------------------------------------96

Table 5.8: sample mineral export

development----------------------------------------------------

---96

Acronyms, Glossary and Abbreviations

Agober- a wooden hut built by nomadic gold diggers

AMTCCP- artisanal mining transaction coordinating core process

ASGM- artisanal and small-scale gold mining

ASM- artisanal and small-scale mining

AWD- acute water diarrhea

Bado- null, zero or empty

17

Barto- a diffuse mining area away from rivers that is convenient

and manageable only in the rainy season, - rain-fed

CASM- Communities and Small-Scale Mining

CIA- Conflict Impact Assessment

CSBP- conflict sensitive business practice

Derg- a military junta which ruled Ethiopia from 1974 to 1991

Dolla- a recent gold panning instrument

Endamesheta- swa house

EIA- Environmental Impact Assessment

FDRE- the Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia

FGD- focus group discussion

FPIC- free, prior and informed consent

GCU- gold cooperative unions

Hamed- soil (in Tigrinya)

Jelin- a portable potable water container

Jiwa- a short living group formation by two or more miners with a

contract of equal revenue-sharing with the purpose of easing

backbreaking work

Kambo- gold miners’ camp made in open-air along riversides

Lottory- lottery

MoME- Ministry of Minerals and Energy

NBE- National Bank of Ethiopia

n.d.a- no date available

Quaria- a plastic glass used by miners for feeding and storing

daily semi-washed gold

Rahba- an old and smaller gold panning instrument

Swa- local alcoholic drink

18

Tabya- a fifth administrative unit down from the federal level

and second up from the kushet level

Tabyatat- two or more Tabya

Tara- sequence based on time of arrival, ethics of peaceful co-

benefiting

Tigray- region one in the federal democratic republic of

Ethiopia

TPLF- Tigray People Liberation Front

Werako- the name of gold miners symbolizing “gold harvesters”

Wereda- the lower administrative unit next to zone in Ethiopia

Abstract

19

Worldwide, particularly in the developing countries, pushed by grinding poverty,artisanal (and small-scale) mining is alarmingly being practiced. This type of mining iseither a strong predictor of large-scale mining or is another side of the same coin. Ineither or both cases, poverty, conflict and ecological marginalization are commondenominators almost over all mineral “resource blessed” countries which sooner orlater turns into “resource curse”. However, the thesis is grounded by the “resourcecurse” vs. “context matters” debate which is timely and pertinent. The purpose of thethesis is to explore and describe the artisanal gold mining and the conflict and humaninsecurity causations from the stand point of its (mineral) lootability. The studyemploys a qualitative research approach. It is viewed from the poor mixed farmersand overwhelmingly landless nomadic gold miners’ world view. Data were collectedfrom 56 participants in in-depth interviews and focus group discussions, fromparticipant observations, comparative spatiotemporal case-study narratives anddocuments analysis using purposeful snowballing sampling technique. Data wereanalyzed and presented according to the research questions. Hence the findingsindicate that the sector is primitive, excluded in periphery, inefficient, conflict andinsecurity-ridden, occupied by ever broadening hostile actors. It is mediated bynecessity, seldom materializing opportunity, steep market demand, and legal andinstitutional loopholes. Worst still, the interventions and responses miss the points ofconcern and are misguided. In a nutshell, neither the lootable mining sector nor theoccupants verge transformability primarily due to respective characteristics.

Key words: Lootable, Artisanal, ASM, not-legalized, Nomadic, Human security.

20

CHAPTER ONE1.1 INTRODUCTION

This introductory chapter highlights the problem, brief detour

to the study issue, study objective, research question, thesis

structure and fieldwork opportunities and challenges.

The genesis and evolution of the Artisanal gold mining (or ASGM)

practice in Western Tigray starts from its very nascent and

primitive stage. Prior to 1986/7 to early 1990s, gold in these

rural lowland areas was not consciously known and perhaps was

equated to simple stones. Except by few farmers who bartered gold

(for agricultural tools: ploughshare, shovel, sickle, etc.),

which they fortunately found while walking, plowing, or

harvesting, comparatively at very lower values, in that period

of time, artisanal gold mining was unknown except accidental

coming across it.

Later, however, it seems that few intermediaries might have

introduced buying such accidentally found gold at a “very low

price” (about 15 birr or so per amount of gold) weighed by

guessing and negotiating it after testing its weight throwing up

and down on their palm with no balance to measure it

accurately. Towards the mid 1990s, both ASGM mining (with

negative images as occupations of destitute and lazy men) and

monetary transactions using balance system began to develop.

With the introduction of traditional extraction/exploitation

21

techniques (pans), introduction of balance equating a unit

(gram) of gold with previous one Ethiopian birr, raising awareness on

economic value (income generation from ASGM sector) with very

low or no legal or moral concern for the resource tragedy- nor

a curse yet a kind of blessing, ASGM began to exponentially spur

as an activity. Consequently, many, old and new, rural townships

began to mushroom stimulated by this gold economy. However,

the local mineral market has been a price- taker not a price

setter, obviously predatory market.

What is a point of focus here is that gold price, size of

miners and unemployment or employment shifts, stimulation to

local economy, conflict, social and environmental insecurity

seem to concomitantly spurring. An unsophisticated survey by

the Wereda concerning the number of gold miners operating in

the Wereda multiple sites in nomadic behavior, excluding the home-

based ones, only in 2010 goes beyond 90 thousand. They

incorporate all sections of society from all directions of the

Tigray Region as well as from beyond.

Gold price has similarly shown a steep rise. For instance, in

the past thirteen to fourteen years it varied from 60 birr

/gram to nearly 550 birr/gram till March 2010. This steep

increment in gold price in turn caused mass employment shift

trends or propensities to the ASGM posing (or escalating) huge

human and environmental insecurity threats on the communities,

and no less to the miners too. As far as the conflict and

22

social instability is concerned, this research has undertaken

case-studies in two gold sites. These sites are purposely selected

depending on the objectives and questions of the research (see

chapter 3). Hence, these two study sites can represent the rest

26/27 multiple gold mining sites in the Wereda. However, all

the 26 gold sites Tabyatat share similar trends and potential

risks with vast gold exploitation sites across Western Tigray

(see map1 in chapter 3).

At country level, artisanal mining has been practiced for long since

the old Ethiopian civilization where heritages are carved by

thousands of artisanal miners. Today the artisanal mining

sector is the main producer. Precious minerals (gold,

platinum, tantalum, opal, ruby, etc) semi-precious gemstones

and other construction minerals are produced alike and in

combination with large- scale mined contribute about 5% to the

national economy (AMTCCP Brochure 2009).

Excluding Harari and SNNP Regional States, the people engaged

in the ASGM range from about ½- 1 million artisanal miners to

4-6 million informal artisanal mining communities in

respective order. They engage in the sector as source of

livelihood in remote rural areas. These mining communities are

characterized, according to the AMTCCP source, as uneconomic,

unproductive, uncontrolled and working in conventional and

haphazard environment.

1.2 STATEMENT OF THE PROBLEM

23

The North Western Zone of Tigray and its adjacent areas are

rich in gold deposits. And the lowland areas of this zone has

been frequently visited by rushing gold miners from the,

primarily, highlander immigrants intervening to open-access gold

plots, and obviously stepping onto farm lands adversely

abused, damaged and marginalized the environment and natural

capital and consequently violently confronted with the

indigenous communities.

The legal and policy mechanisms have been naïve as the

government has until very recent times remained reluctant towards

ASGM considering this sector as insignificant and non-policy

or nonpublic matter. Accordingly, it shows a clarion call as to gain

responsive measures capable of releasing the human and

environmental insecurity feeding, in a cyclic way, one another

in a complex pattern with poverty and its antecedent

challenges of unemployment due to absence of alternative

sources of local livelihood.

Poverty and scarcity pushed immigrants lucratively attracted

by subsistent exponentially inflating gold income continued to

incur massive human and environmental security challenges on

the local farmers making them physically, psychologically and

ecologically unsafe. The absence of transformational

mechanisms which could have been tuned to turn the curse to blessing for

sustainable development at the grass-roots levels and state

revenue generation by mainstreaming ASGM sector to alleviate

24

human vulnerability, by and large, remained with no or less

optimism. In general, rudimentary extractive techniques,

absence of training, awareness, responsibility, alternative

sources of income, policy mainstreaming, (or weak)

associations/cooperatives, and reluctance of relevant

stakeholders to halt or transform the sector continue to add

fuel to the fire in a crosscutting manner.

1.3 OBJECTIVE OF THE STUDY

The research sets out with six objectives. These are;

To understand the nature of intervention, extraction and mineral

resource conflict on ASGM in the study area;

To see how the push and/or pull factors do mediate or shape the

problem and with what institutional roles, cultural and socio-

economic forces, legal and policy mechanisms do they interact;

To highlight the actors, parties/stakeholders and what

correlative interests, positions, needs, issues and scenarios are involved

in;

To examine the nature and scale of human and environmental risks/effects of

the ASGM sector;

To document a case of ASGM challenges on human security and

lootable mineral resources conflict and refer directing questions for

further research in the future.

To search what policy, legal and institutional options might be

forwarded to constructively inform the ASGM sector for

transformational actions.

25

This study is thus, devoted to further examine the poverty-

ridden gold rush conflict and resulting ecological insecurity

challenges in light of the inadequacies of the ruling agency,

hostility between immigrant miners and the sedentary farming

communities; the mushrooming of various actors with

incompatible interests and positions; gender and human right

violations related to trends of resource possession and labor

issue, and the local sustainable resource management and

development chimera.

1.4 SPECIFIC RESEARCH QUESTIONS

What are the nature of intervention, extraction and mineral

resource conflict on ASGM in the study area?

What are the nature, typology and scale of human and

environmental risks/effects of the ASGM sector?

Who are the actors, parties/stakeholders (intervening,

vulnerable and responsi (ve) ble body), and what correlative

interests, positions, issues and emergent/scenarios are

involved in?

What push and/or pull factors do mediate/shape the problem

and with what institutional roles, cultural and socio-

economic enforcements, legal and policy mechanisms do they

interact, and

Finally, what policy, legal and institutional options might

be forwarded to inform the ASGM sector for transformational

actions?

26

1.5 ORGANIZATION OF THE THESIS

The thesis is organized into seven separate chapters. In

respective order, the first chapter outlines the introductory

part, statement of the problem, objective of the study,

research questions and field research challenges and

opportunities. The second one discusses the literature review

and theoretical background. Chapter three explains the

research design and methodology applied. It also describes the

study area(s). Chapter four exposes the nature and

characteristics of the ASGM sector with due emphasis on

conflict and insecurity causation. Chapter five narrates the

spatiotemporal case- studies in comparative ways. The sixth

one is devoted to intervention, challenges and scenarios

thereof, and the last chapter comes up with conclusion and the

way forward sections.

1.6 FIELD RESEARCH OPPORTUNITIES AND CHALLENGES

First and foremost, memories from my young age about gold

miners in Western Tigray continued to stir my thoughts which

latter pushed me to undertake this research. One nomadic gold

miner thanked: “God creates a ladder while creating a cliff”–but,

with the passage of time, the cliff (poverty) kept on widening

and deepening while the ladder (gold mineral) inevitably

exhausting. The dilemma is INSPIRING.

27

The opportunities my field research offered were part of my

field work success. I worked with my former gold mining

colleagues, with whom I used to work in the lowlands until

2002/3, from the river mining sites to the local towns. Some,

of my fellow, previous gold miners currently in local

government positions were also part of the opportunity. My own

life experience as home-based gold miner during my childhood and

immigrant seasonal gold miner during high school break season was

crucial to travel easily to the jungle areas, to locate the

relevant stakeholders and sites. And even identifying the

research problem without my native background to the area

would have been less successful.

The real challenges I experienced were, however, the

precarious and up and downs on foot travel to the river areas

no clean drinkable water, the nomadic and busy nature of

miners, the dry season which reduced potential miners, the

suspicion by affected communities and sensitivity. However,

these challenges did not render to failure.

CHAPTER TWO

28

2 LITERATURE REVIEW /THEORETICAL BACKGROUNDThis section reviews the related basic concepts of conflict

and people’s security, nature and manifestations of the ASM

sector, the livelihood-security-environment link, factors that

render the sector lootable and the pertinent theoretical

debates that underpin the mineral resource wealth and its

security implications.

2.1 The concept of conflict

Conflict is the opposing action of incompatible or divergent

ideas, interests, or persons. Conflicts, typically emerging

from a complex mix of causal factors, are caused by (a)

insecure or inequitable access to resources, (b) competition

between social groups for political power, or (c)

incompatibilities between groups with distinct value systems.

Conflict plays a vital transformative role: an opportunity for

the redistribution of resources, the redefinition of political

rights and the resolution of competing value systems (Switzer

2001:7). Conflict can be violent, latent or non-violent.

conflict expresses a direct or indirect relation between two

or more actors in which they undermine the interests of one

another, often through the instrumentality of violence- as

Johan Galtung notes direct violence are expressed in

physical, psychological and counter value violence against an

opponent whereas structural violence involves conditions of

exclusion, deprivation and poverty (Ibeanu, 2004:10).

29

David J. Francis (2004:20) argues that despite conflict

remains intrinsic and inevitable part of human nature, violent

conflict is an anomaly. More specifically, conflict is noted

as having “ontological basis in human needs and it is the

denial which causes violent conflicts”. For instance, (basic)

human needs scholars Rosati et al 1990; Burton 1979; Azar 1994;

Gurr 1970 (in Faleti, 2004:51-53) contend that the denial and

frustration of such basic human needs by other groups or

actors affects them causing at the end conflict.

Relational theory scholars also argue that different groups sharing

common natural resource can enter into conflictual (negative)

relationships when tendencies develop to eliminate, neutralize

or injure the “other” or monopolize the resource commonly used

(Ibid: 54).

Conflict as having contextual backgrounds and dynamics with

differing stages and phases of change and transformation for

conflict is expressive, dynamic and dialectical as J. Paul

Leaderach referred in Best (2004:65) notes. Accordingly, in pre-

conflict stage, goals are incompatible, conflict is hidden and

communication is undermined; in confrontation stage there exist

open or manifest conflict, occasional fighting, low levels of

violence; in polarization there is search for allies, resource

mobilization, and strained relations; crisis stage is peak of

conflict, war and intense fighting, use of SALW, large scale

population displacement; in conflict outcome there exist win-

lose, ceasefire, surrender, third party intervenes, while in

30

post- conflict stage, Violence is ended or reduced, the root are

causes addressed or it may resume/re-erupt.

Conflict interpretation and transformation requires conflict

analysis using a set of methods including the pyramid /Island

method, the ABC method, the onion method, conflict tree and

mapping. Accordingly, the former method is shown below for

this end.

In this image as the islands project above sea level, they

look separate both in terms of positions and interests yet

beneath the sea are the fears and needs of the parties with

common grounds thereby separating the underlying causes of

conflict form their interests and positions (Best, 2004: 68-

76; Canan and Klein 2008)

2.3 The Concept of Human Security

The origin of human security is traced back to the UNDP human

development report of 1994. The objective of human security,

according to Sabina Alkire (2005:22-23), is to safeguard the

vital core of all human lives from critical pervasive threats,

in a way that is consistent with long-term human fulfillment.

31

Position A Position B

Interests Interests A B

Needs and

Fears

Put differently, its objective is to guarantee a set of vital

rights and freedoms to all people, without unduly compromising

their ability to pursue other goals. The human security agenda

has been subject to criticism on its vagueness,

breadth/incoherence- all encompassing and arbitrary.

Threats to human security can be deliberately or intentionally

caused by a group or another (direct security threat) or

structural threats are actions by groups or system or

institutions whose threat to human security is a by-product of

an action taken for a different primary purpose such as mining

policy that may have dark environmental consequences that

erode communities’ subsistence (Ibid: 29).

In relation to poverty and violence threats, Selim Jahan

(2005:4-5) states “human security may be termed as the freedom

from certain deprivation as well as freedom from specific

perceived fears”. He further expresses that the notion should

focus on five basic characteristics that human security is

people-centered, is a universal concern, can be local,

national or global, its components are interdependent and is

easier to ensure via prevention rather than via intervention.

A point to be made at this stage is also that human

development and human security are mutually reinforcing in

that while the former refers for the state of widening the

range of people’s choice, the later shows exercising such

choices safely and freely.

32

2.3 Concept, Characteristics and Postulation of ASM

Mining defined: mining is the extraction of non-renewable (metals

and minerals) resources from the ground. Mining operation

include open- pit (surface mining) and underground mining,

large- scale mining as well as ASM (Amoah, 2003:13).

2.3.1 Defining the ASM sector: “‘The most primitive type of mining,

characterized by groups or individuals exploiting deposits-

usually illegally with the simplest equipment’ ” (d’ souza

2009:1 as quoted from MMSD). The ASM sector has different

names1 in different countries. ASM has been debated to define.

Experts’ debate on the area so long continued without reaching

a compromise. Regardless a range of international conferences

and workshops held to forge universal working definition; no

one criterion sufficiently reduced it from complication

(CBNRMNET, 2003 D’SOUZA, 2002:45; MMSD Global Report on ASM,

2002:4; Shoko2003).

Differing definitions are used in different countries.

Nevertheless, they often depend on certain criteria, such as mineral

type, use of machinery, number of workers, production, depth

of operational reliability, sales volume, size of mine

1Ninjas in Mongolia, Zama-Zama in South Africa, Pork-knockers in Guyana, Pirquineros in Latin

America, Pocket Miners in the Phillipines, Galamsey in Ghana, Panners in Zimbabwe, Nyonga

/Ubeshi in Tanzania, Warare in Ethiopia, Diggers in Sierra Leone, Cresseurs in DR Congo,

Orpailleurs in many Francophone Africa and Garimperios[wild cat] in Southern Lusaphone countries

(D’ Souza, 2009:1). And Gurandils’ of Indonesia means ‘people who leap from cliff

to cliff’ or ‘people who dig holes like rats’

33

claim/concession, quantity of reserves, capital investment,

duration of mining cycle, labor productivity, operational

continuity (d’souza, 2002:45, 2009; MMSD Global Report on ASM,

2002:5).

A broad distinction also exists between ‘Artisanal ‘mining and

‘small-scale’ mining which the former stands for an activity

involving only individuals or families and is purely manual

whereas the later is stated as more extensive and usually more

mechanized (Ethiopian Mining proclamations, 1993-98). Yet the

above criteria dissect these broad distinctions and conveniently

in a collective manner the acronym ‘ASM’ is used. Accordingly, in a

broader conception ASM refers to ‘mining by individuals,

groups, families or cooperatives with minimal or no

mechanization, often in the informal (illegal) sector of the

market”. ‘small-scale’ mining in some west African counties is

distinguished from ‘Artisanal’ mining “by the presence of

permanent, fixed installations established once the existence

of an ore is confirmed” (MMSD Global Report on ASM, 2002:4; d’

souza, 2002:45, 2009).

With reference to gold mining ASM can also be defined as the

extraction of minerals by miners working in small or medium

sized operations, using rudimentary techniques and simple

practices with little economic investment (module 3, n.d.a:4).

There are also, on the other extreme, cases of industrialized

courtiers, many so sophisticated and mechanized small-scale

mining operations.

34

2.3.2 Nature and Characteristics of ASM

The basic characteristic of ASM is the impossibility to define

it according to any universally accepted parameters. Avila

(2003:15) summarizes the efforts made, counter-productively

according to him, to use characterizing aspects2 different

across countries.

According to the MMSD Global Report on ASM (2002:15) (see also

Avila 2003; CBNRMNET 2003) ASM is characterized as an artisanal

activity by a range of parameters: mostly working without

legal mining titles; lack of social security; insufficient

consideration of environmental issues; low level of

occupational safety and healthcare; great amount of physically

demanding work/no or very reduced degree of mechanization;

deficient qualification of the personnel on all levels of the

operation; inefficiency in the exploitation and processing of

production (low recovery of values); exploitation of marginal

and/or very small deposits; unexploitable by mechanized mining;

low level of productivity; low level of salaries and income;

seasonal operation by local peasants or according to the

market price development; chronically lack of working and

investment capital. Avila (2003:15) and d’ souza (2009) well

put the founding characteristics of small-scale mining/ ASM

quite in-depth.

2Volume of production (Colombia), the amount of capital invested (Argentina and Thailand), the number of workers involved (Chile, Pakistan and the United States), or the granting of mining title or ownership (Ghana, Zambia and Zimbabwe) … volume produced underground or at the surface (Colombia).

35

2.3.3 Key Manifestations and Conjecture of the ASM Sector

ASM is poverty-driven as well as perpetuating- mostly the development of

ASM is directly related to the economic indicators of a

country- strongly poverty related. The causing factor for the

existence of ASM in Africa is simply “abject poverty and

dwindling livelihood choices with over 40% of Africans living

below the poverty line and Vulnerable to a great variety of

natural and man-made forces” (d’souza, 2002:46). In the case

of the African continent, the macro-factor that causes

Africans turn to ASM is primarily poverty in its various

forms. In many parts of Africa subsistence farmers supplement

their meager income by seasonally mining: at times of economic

recession. Obviously, war causes poverty. Evidently, the over

25 armed conflicts since 1963 in Africa which affected more

than 60% of the population, ASM become the last resort for

many people. This was common in Sudan, DRC, Angola, Sierra

Leone, and Liberia.

Natural disasters and environmental shocks like the volcanic

activity in the DRC and in Cameroon, floods and cyclones that

devastated Mozambique, severe draughts affected Eastern and

Western Africa countries also force people to ASM. Therefore,

ASM is an operation often in subsistence basis that struggle

to survive from day to day focusing on immediate concerns

rather than long-term consequences (d’ souza 2002; CBNRM NET,

2003:2, 6; MMSD Global Report, 2002:15; Avila, 2003:19).

36

ASM places sustainable livelihoods at stake only providing

emergency poverty relief and daily subsistence (Hoadley and

Limpitlaw, 2004:1-3). ILO estimation 1998 argued that given

the mutually reinforcing nature of poverty and ASM and the

spurring poverty in sub-Saharan Africa ASM dependants have

increased significantly, and will have been continued to do

so. Worse still, ASM remains with only to have value as a

disaster-coping mechanism in the midst of spurring global

poverty, recurrent natural disasters due to global warming and

higher stockpiles of unemployment and reduced opportunities

for traditional livelihood activities effected by civil wars

and internal strife finally incubating huge number of miners.

M. Hoadley and D. Limpitlaw (2004:3) contend that in

developing countries ASM appeared to be the most pertinent

economic response to poverty and crisis, there are often few,

and at times no alternative to ASM and many people are forced

into ASM because of poverty and dim employment opportunities.

ASM sustains negative circles of trapping poverty where both

the sector and the government are caught in negative cycles

and circles of cause and effect. Kevin pcj d’souza (2002:47)

explains that a poverty trap results from a denial of choices

and opportunities whilst living in a marginal and vulnerable

environment. the genesis of gold mining in Burkina Faso as

intimately linked to drought periods in the 1980s taking as a

“last resort in regions where the soil could no longer be

cultivated and many cattle had died,” (Werthmann, 2006: 123).

37

ASM is a Way of Life- Artisanal and small-scale mining is more than

simply an industry with the potential to contribute positively

to foreign exchange earnings and employment, it is a way of

life. For instance the ILO has conservatively estimated that

“between 11 and 13 million in habitants of the developing

world, including downstream industry employees, dependent

families and associated servicemen, depend upon its existence

for their livelihoods.” (CBNRM NET, 2003:2). As to the actors

involved in production, according to this community- based

natural resource management network (CBNRM NET), ASM operators

include seasonal subsistence farmers, rural community

dwellers, retrenched large scale mine workers and nomadic

peoples.

With regard to Africa, despite its inaccurate estimates due to

many of the miners work causally, seasonally or informally, across the

continent between 3.2 and 4 million people are directly

involved in ASM. ASM in Africa also affects the livelihoods of

a further 16 to 28 million. The worrying fact is that experts

claim that the number of people seeking to work in this sector

in many parts of Africa (d’souza, 2002:45) is expected to

triple over the next 10 years.

Shoko (2003: 1-4) similarly contends that in the Zambezi basin

of the SADC region, the estimation that people have directly

or indirectly benefited small-scale and alluvial panning of

minerals reach up to 2 million. Accordingly, the labor

38

intensive nature of this sector provides income and employment

to large number of people who are in broader term “uneducated,

poor and live in remote areas where no opportunities exist for

formal employment”. In the southern Africa region alone, ASM

sector employ up to 10 million people directly and in the SADC

countries too, mining is the single alternative for

agriculture and its employment figures spurs during the

recurrent drought. In this region, women and children

constitute more than 50% of the employed forces. Similarly, up

to 15 million people in China are estimated to be involved in

this sector.

ASGM (gold mining) involves still underestimated, 10-15

million miners of which women and children constitute 4.5 and

1 million in respective manner. As a way of life hence in over

55 countries at least 100 million people depend on ASGM for

its income and is also believed that this sector produces 20-

30% of the world’s gold- 500-800 tonnes of gold per year

(Module 3, n.d.a:2-4). In South Africa more than 30,000 miners

are involved in ASM. Furthermore, across countries, women

proportion varies from 50-75% (Hoadley and Limpitlaw 2004:1).

ASM is often informal, illegal and open-access- in many countries ASM

remained, and continued to be, informal sector. This is mainly

because either the government does not recognize the ASM

sector or lacks means to control the compliance to laws and

regulations or both3. 3 Local traditional and cultural behavior; lack of knowledge of the legal requirement; little incentives

of the government to operate legally; high tax burden; limited access to mining title; demanding

39

The lack of political will to formalize or legalize the ASM

sector can be stimulated by possibility for corruption and

money laundering and related illegal practices in the womb of

personal interests (Global Report on ASM 2002).

Mikael Ross (2003b) argues that illegal substances such as

“blood diamonds” command high price in the global market since

they are illegal and hence groups with such criminal networks

benefit more from such trades. The “lootability” and “non-

obstructability” nature of such “diffuse resources” poses

problematic since their exploitation is hard to control by the

central government. Accordingly, alluvial diamond production

in DRC and Sierra Leone is more suitable for looting and

smuggling out (Basedau, 2005:25).

Another dimension of ASM is its open-access, non-property regime,

nature where communities see no justification for involvement

in the management and control of the activities as there are

no direct benefit streams from the sector (Shoko, 2003:3).

ASM despite too illegal, for instance, in Mozambique (95%),

Niger (95%), Brazil (90%), and 80% in China, Guinea,

Philippines , India, and 70% in Colombia, it overwhelmingly

contributes to the recognized gold production, like in

Colombia contributing about 90% (Avila, 2003:17-18). In Ghana

bureaucratic procedures to gain and remain formal; limited danger of sanctions in combination with

the possibilities to evade the imposition of the law by corruption

40

too, 80% of diamond comes from ASM (MMSD Global Report on ASM

2002:12).

ASM is Human Right/Security Insensitive- the human rights and security

hardly flourish in such an informal, illegal and primitive

artisanal sector.

As to child labor, the MMSD Global Report on ASM (2002:23-25)

summarizes the child labor issue: causes, effects and trends.

Children start washing gold from 3 years on; from 6 years on they can

be seen breaking rocks with hammers or washing ore. Children as

young as 9 can be observed underground, and at 12 boys are

widespread working underground in many countries and do the same

work than adults. In the Cerro Rico in Potosi, Bolivia half of the total

amounts of 8000 miners are children and adolescents.

That report list causes for child labor poverty being grand of

which: specifically low family income, lack educational

infrastructure, lack of parents’ interest to educate their

children, lack of parents awareness for the risk of children

in mining, lack of orientation concerning their children’

future, lack of legislative, enforcement and labor inspection,

and culture. These adversely affect the children: drop-out of

school, physical or psychological development problems, health

problems due to mercury pollution or heavy loads and

incalculable accidents.

Regardless ratification of the ILO convention on the rights of

the child by most African states, due to abject poverty, AIDS

41

orphanage and lack of monitory means, there exist considerable

gaps for children exploitation. Due to lack of efforts to stop

it, to improve the sector, to provide regular employment or

incentive to go to school and enforce laws, these children are

not only exposed to immediate risk but they are also

jeopardizing their long term development both physically and

mentally (d’ souza, 2002:51).

From gender perspective, 45-50% of all ASM workers in Africa

are women (varying from 5% (Gabon and RSA), 35 (Guinea), 45%

(Ghana and Burkina), 50% (Mali) and 75% (Zimbabwe). This wide

range of women involvement in ASM in Africa is associated with

family based responsibilities. In Africa despite women’s

better management of these sectors, they are more constrained

to get financial, legal and technical support (d’souza,

2002:50).

The participation of women in ASM is not confined to only

mining but also a range of activities including food, drink

and tools supply, gold trade and sexual services. Due to

combinations of lack of collaterals for loan and negative

attitudes towards them, a UNIFEM study found that only 6% of

women miners had been able to obtain a loan to invest in their

mining operations (Ibid: 22).

Further, obstacles and constraints related to gender issues in

this sector in African countries include the fact that women

are faced by host of traditional challenges, against asserting

42

their rights, like illiteracy, insufficient technical

knowledge, chauvinist attitudes, patriarchal views, social

taboos and family responsibilities. Women are not part of the

decision making process, are deprived of their property

ownership, even from their mining lands by companies or by

officials denying them mining licenses. Women are engaged in

illicit mining for subsistence far away from equity (CSO,

n.d.a:10).

Women involvement in ASM is generally high as compared to

large scale mining. For instance in Guinea, women comprise 75%

of ASM followed by 50% in Madagascar, Mali and Zimbabwe and

40% in Bolivia and in the Gaova region of Burkina Faso the

exploitation and selling of gold has traditionally been a

female-only activity (MMSD Global Report on ASM, 2002:21).

Importantly, mainstreaming gender issues to mining polices

help alleviate poverty since they often spend their income on

family needs as contrary to male counterparts who tend to be

rather frivolous and irresponsible (d’souza: 50-51; Global

Report on ASM, 2002:21-22)

Regarding Human Right violations (of civil, political,

economic, social and cultural rights), United Nations Human Right

Team Group Discussion paper on mining and Human Right in Mongolia (2006:1-

15) has reviewed human right/security threats for herders: a)

their right to subsistence (farming and animal husbandry) has

been violated for pastureland and surface water resource have

been destroyed. For instance, since gold mining require large

43

amount of surface and ground water and often use it

inefficiently, “according to Mongolia’s 2003 water census

report, more than 3000 rivers, streams, lakes, ponds, springs

and mineral water sources have completely dried up”; (b) when

local economic opportunities are destroyed, they will be

denied of the right to sustain and improve their lives; (c)

polluted, contaminated, destructed and depleted (unsafe and

unhealthy) environment has violated the right to live in

safety (d) denial the right to participate in decision-making

regarding their lands minerals; (f) as the herder have to

forcefully move out of their lands, their rights to education,

health care and social welfare services are denied; (g) they

have been denied the right to participate in monitoring and

rehabilitation of their damaged lands and resources, and (h)

the forced abandonment of their traditional life style due to

mining on their lands denied their right to preserve their

culture and way of life.

The absence of providing Artisanal miners information on how

to protect their rights (as the sector might be so peripheralized)

perpetuate the all sorts human rights and security violations

primarily the right to (a) life, live in a healthy and safe

environment, food and adequate nutrition, health care,

education, vote and participate in civic affairs, etc (Ibid:9)

ASM is Conflict Inherent- Moira Feil and Jason Switzer (2004: 3) on

their work Valuable minerals and conflict address the tinderbox nature

of mining in the sense that conflict can arise over land claims

44

and access to resources with the entry of any type mining.

Communities may be relocated so that companies can reach the

valuable minerals beneath the soil. The dispute can intensify when

locals are offered insufficient compensation, excluded from

decision-making processes, and find their livelihoods threatened.

The heart of conflict here lies on the dynamics created by

sudden gold digging fortune seekers that influx onto the

communities’ land illegally. Massive influx of gold diggers

threaten the environmental and economic resources of local

agricultural communities complicated by the belief that land

and gold are considered natural as well as supernatural

resources (Werthmann 2006:120). The question of land and gold

belonging generates competition between these stakeholders. L.

Obara and H. Jenkins (2006: 6) appeared to argue that another

bone of contention raised by local communities and NGOs point

to ASM and companies as lacking compatible, clear and

legitimate right of access to resources. As are commonly

reported conflicts between artisanal miners and police,

companies, license holders, local citizens and local

authorities are pervasive (UNHR Team Group, 2006:9-10). The

local population seems to have at least three options that is

toleration, negotiation or expulsion (Werthmann, 2006:132).

Another conflict dimension in this sector is among ASM miners

themselves and against large-scale mining companies, between

the license holders and illegal ASM: constant competition over

plots of land overlying rich mineral deposits, ASM miners

commonly encroach onto the land concessions awarded to large

45

scale mining companies by miners yet relying it for

subsistence, reopening of suspended operations, prospects of

new sites and reluctance to giveaway, and relocate from, their

ancestral lands, absence of alternative source of livelihood,

ASM miners are considered as an unpaid ‘geologists’ that after

they effectively find the gold potential for companies, they

are expulsed as illegal intruders or trespassers, they

mutually mistrust and resent for ASM consider companies as

depriving of their lands and livelihood (Hilson, 2001:18-20;

Obara and Jenkins, 2006:5-7; d’souza, 2002:53, 2009; Feil and

Switzer 2004).

In similar treatment, ASM is conflict inherent, particularly

when it takes the form of ‘gold rush’ (or sudden rush) - when

large size of new miners arrive, it is frequently observed to

come into conflict with the local people. It too attracts

local residents to leave their farms and after the rush is

over they see few lasting benefits.

Further, conflict causation between ASM and large scale-mining

companies is that the former have often congregated around the

later taking advantage of their best access and perhaps re-

mining their waste (d’souza, 2002-53). ASM is conflict-ridden

because of its informal and illegal nature that sustains illiciting

compounded by low or no control; it perpetuates rebel

activities like in DRC, Angola and Sierra Leone (Ibid). This

might flame and entrench war economy and rent-seeking.

Finally, in areas where ASM developed to associations and

46

cooperatives have proven conflictual failing to define shared

objectives and long-term vision as members prioritize their

interest (Avila, 2003:24-25).

ASM is Antithetical to Environmental Security- A combination of lack of

awareness, lack of information about affordable methods to

reduce impacts and lack of incentives to change contributes to

environmental tragedy. Among the plethora of ASM related

environmental impacts include : land degradation and soil

erosion damage, landscape destruction, mercury pollution,

cyanide pollution, direct dumping of tailing and effluents

into river, threats from improperly constructed dams, river

damage in alluvial areas, river siltation, and acid mined

drainage (AMD) ( d’souza, 2002:52-3, 2009; Feil and Switzer

2004).

D’souza (P.53) argues two critical challenges escalate the

environmental tragedy: (a) subsistence (short-term survival

strategy) nature of the ASM operation and (b) (African)

governments “no” commitment or lack the capacity to control

and monitor the operation- which is too remote and

inaccessible.

In short, due to the informality of the sector, seasonal

operations, lack of official statistics and definitional

problems, the actual number of people employed in this sector

is conservatively underestimated and is inaccurate. Yet it is

crystal clear that ASM is undertaken extensively worldwide

47

(Africa, Asia, Oceania, and central and South America)

particularly in developing countries. The MMSD country

research studies has identified Ethiopia among the 45 relevant

ASM countries list4

Not less mentioned, ASM is associated with deteriorated quality-

of-life; operate rudimentarily; is neglected sector; can

potentially alleviate poverty; usually operates on fluid basis

with extreme mobility; is correlated with cultural tradition/

knowledge; is short- term survival strategy; and it lacks

communal objective.

2.4 Environment- Livelihood - Security Nexus

In relation to impacts of ASM on the sustainable livelihood

approach, Hoadley and Limpitlaw (2004:2-4) contend that the

sector fails to promote sustainable livelihood in interrelated

areas: does not improve community’s ability to cope with

/recover from shocks and stress rather is a hand-to-mouth

activity; not improving economic effectiveness rather the

patrimony of the community is consumed for short-term

individual gains; not promoting ecological integrity but

irreversibly degrade natural resources/ecosystem; precludes4 CAR, Congo, Guinea, Kenya, Madagascar, Namibia, Nigeria, Niger, Sierra Leone, Uganda in Africa,

Laos, Malaysia, Myanmar, Thailand and Vietnam in Asia, and Chile, Colombia, Dominica Republic,

French Guyana, Guyana, Mexico, Nicaragua, Surinam and Venezuela in Latin America and the

Caribbean(MMSD Global Report on ASM, 2002:10-11). Furthermore, this report revealed Burkina Faso,

Ghana, Malawi, Mali, Mozambique, South Africa, Tanzania, Zambia, Zimbabwe, China, India,

Indonesia, Papua New Guinea, Philippines, Bolivia, Brazil, Ecuador and Peru as most important ASM

countries.

48

other economic activities/agriculture, and do not enhance

social equity rather reduces options for others/ now or in the

future.

UNEP (2005) outlines conditions that make violent

environmentally induced conflicts possible: inevitable environmental

conditions (survival dependent on degraded resources), lack of

regulatory frameworks and poor state performance

instrumentalizing the environment, opportunities to build

organizations and find allies and spillover from a historic

conflict; regions structurally more vulnerable to conflict: marginal

vulnerable areas: arid plains, mountain areas with high-land-

low land interactions and transnational river basins, at

intra-state levels; and the patterns of conflict causation or typical

causal pathways to conflict: dependency on natural capital,

environmental scarcity (supply-induced, demand-induced or

structural scarcity), environmental discrimination that causes

marginalization and resource capture, ecological

marginalization caused by unequal resource access and

population growth which results in degradation of renewable

resources.

2.5 Environment- Conflict- Human Security Nexus

The environment (exhaustible and renewable natural resources)

is a key to enhance people’s capacity and opportunity as well

as broadening their choices. Human security “security of jobs

and income, food security, health security, personal security

49

and so on” is therefore analytically linked to environment in

this sense (Jahan, 2005:2).

Jahan (2005:2) sketched the above figure to show the following

essential points:

1) The two-way mechanism of environment-human security and

environment-conflicts represent that for instance

environmental degradation make, particularly poor, people

vulnerable and insecure in terms of income, jobs and

health in turn human insecurity incurs environmental

degradation as an option for survival. Furthermore, these

trends cause fights over scarce common natural resources

leading to conflict that finally complicates the pathway.

2) The two-way relationships between conflicts and human

security also indicates that any form of conflict

generates human insecurity and vice versa and,

3) In conflicts and human insecurity situations, there

exists no peace.

50

Environment

Conflicts Human security

Peace

Environment in terms of its various dimensional reflections

such as a) resource scarcity (physical, geographical, socio-

economic), environmental damages (degradation, population, and

waste disposal), b) environmental commons (water sources,

pasture lands, forests) and any shortfall, deprivation or

destabilization of these dimensions can cause conflict and its

attendant problems. In relations to this, among the prominent

causes of environmental conflict are “the quick disappearance

of environmental resource common and the unclear notions of

ownership of environmental resources” where traditionally in

developing countries each community members depend on

community resource and assets (Ibid: 3).

The environment-human security nexus in relation to poverty

and violence is that people feel insecure and threatened when

something hurts severally and suddenly and the freedom from

certain deprivation as well as freedom from specific perceived

fears can be actually deprived of freedom from income poverty

and hunger (Ibid, 2005:4)

The environment- components of human security link are direct

and clear in that (a), for instance, land degradation and

deforestation are directly linked to peoples’ income,

livelihood and job security; (b) agricultural biodiversity

constitute livelihood of the rural poor; (c) water pollution

and contamination deteriorates human wellbeing particularly

for the poor; (d) unsafe drinking water and poor sanitation,

and air pollution have the most immediate impact on human

51

security- all of which leaves very little alternatives for

people but to deteriorate the environment for mere survival..

Finally, the existence of conflicts, human insecurity and

their mutual reinforcement caused or escalated by

environmental degradation adversely affects peace at all

levels (Ibid: 6 -7).

2.6 Natural Resource Wealth and Security Dynamics

2.6.1 Perspectives on the Implications of Natural Resource

Abundance

The mineral resources related to peace, conflict and security

in Africa are timely and pertinent in the post-cold war era.

The issue of “resource curse” (Auty 1993) and the “paradox of

plenty” (Karl 1997) is unlike resource scarcity gaining

prominence over time and linked to violent conflicts and

development particularly in countries with resource dependent

economy, abundant and poor governance (Basedau, 2005:6).

The relevance of natural resources to a country’s socio-

economic and political development is contextualized by country-

and-resource-specific conditions like resource type, level of

abundance, revenue management and involved stakeholders

(Basedau 2005). This author argues that natural resources in

sub-Saharan Africa continued to spur its relevance pointing

new indicators for its ever-growing concerns.

52

The US government officials declaring African oil an issue of

national security, China’s interest in the continent, the

World Bank and national and international oversight bodies

related to such resources’ revenue claiming for special

management regime: the “Publish what you pay” campaign and the

“Extractive Industrial Transparency Initiative”, the

“Kimberley process-” UNSC Resolution 1173 and 1176 designed to

eliminate the direct or indirect export of unofficial Angolan

conflict/‘blood diamond’ that fuelled civil wars in Angola and

Sierra Leone are taken up as evident footsteps.

According to empirical and theoretical studies (Tadjoeddin,

2007; Samset n.d.a; Basedau 2005; Le Billon, 2008; Ross, 2006;

Pedro 2004, Snyder and Bhavnani 2005), the debate on natural

resources and conflict in poor third world countries is likely

to endure with gaining momentum. Even though cases from

Botswana, Canada, Australia, Norway and Namibia find no

automatic linkage that turns resource abundance in to “curse”,

mineral rich Sub-Saharan African countries have been locked in

the category of highly-indebted-countries. The political economy of

these resources is far complex.

The differing types and characteristics of natural resources

(both renewable as well as non-renewable) may cause

deterministic implications whether and how socio-political and

economic phenomena are affected by resource scarcity,

dependence and abundance (Basedau 2005).

53

On this typology, Rick Auty (2001) and P. Le Billon (2001)

contend that resource concentration or dispersion (“point” vs.

“diffuse” resources) as well as from the stand point of the

central government- “proximate” or “distant” - easily accessible

and easy to control resources matter in conflict dynamics. Enriching

this typology, Ross (2003) (in Basedau 2005 and Samset n.d.a)

argue that “obstructability” (whether their trade can be

blocked by opponents) and/or legality and “lootability”

(diffuse resources conducive for looting than point ones)

matter crucially. In line with these typologies, Le Billon

(2005) referred by Samset (n.d.a: 5) adds other dimensions of

the resulting effect as, the table (construction mine) shows,

under:

Resource typology … centers of state

power

Results in

point resources

close to struggle over state

powerdistant from secessionism

Diffuse resources

close to mass rebellion distant from war lordism

Table: resource characteristics - location from state power centers - effect

54

Päivi Lujala (2003: 13) in his natural resources classification scheme

develops the following diagram. As to it, the list of criteria

below makes a given natural resource lootable.

The point with lootability –insecurity nexus is here critical.

According to Collier and Hoeffler (1998, 2004), and De soysa

(2000) cited in Snyder and Bhavnani (2005) recent studies of

contemporary civil war have found a strong and positive relationship

between lootable wealth and conflict. Snyder and Bhavnani (2005)

in their revenue-centered framework argue that lootable5 resources

generates large artisanal miners and sector, low economic barriers

to entry, hard-to-tax artisanal miners, difficulty of monopoly over

these resources, internal discipline problems and costly security and

monopoly investment over such resources due to high- value –to

weight-ratio. In other words, their dominant mode of

5 the risk of state collapse, and, hence, civil war, in countries rich inlootable resources is lowest whennonlootable resources are the dominant source of wealth in the economy. Thisis because nonlootable resources provide the most favorable revenueopportunities for rulers. By contrast, the risk of state collapse and civilwar is highest when lootable resources are the main source of wealth, and thedominant mode of extraction is artisanal. This is because artisanalextraction of lootable resources provides the least favorable revenueopportunities for rulers. Finally, the combination of lootable resources andindustrial extraction generates an intermediate risk of state collapse andcivil war (Snyder and Bhavnani, 2005: 569).

55

extraction, resource profile, and revenue spending issues are

the anatomy of the framework.

According to Basedau and Mehler (2003), there exist three

potential characteristics of natural resources which give birth to

their strategic aspect: (a) lucrative resources (open up ample opportunity

for income), (b) resources for survival (natural resources like water

and fertile soil are crucial for survival), and (c) externally

sensitive resources (oil or metals are key in industrial production-

attracting outsiders). These strategic resources are arguably

linked to scarcity that ferment social problems though

scholars continue to contend that abundance rather than

scarcity is more likely to engender and endure violence more

detrimental to socio-economic and political development (in

Baseadu 2005).

It is also argued that abundance do not produce the expected blessings

but a wide range of causal mechanisms/ transmission channels

turn out to be “curse”: abundant natural resources causes,

triggers, aggravates and prolongs violent conflicts. The

“resource curse” thesis does not strike overnight nor its

detrimental effects are independent; and entail direct and

indirect, potential and actual, short, mid and long-term

effects (Basedau 2005).

As to the detrimental effects of the ”resource curse” thesis on

peace and security dynamics, natural resources provide the motive

for violence and the means to exert it.

56

In the first case, Collier/Hoeffler (2004) suggest that in

“greed and grievance”- the later shows a situation when people

feel deprived of the resource-related income benefit on their

region while carrying the environmental pain of produce and

ends up in taking up arms. Such feeling of deprivation triggers

violent secessionism the likes of the Niger Delta in Nigeria,

Cabinda in Angola or copper rich Katanga in the 1960s. “Greed”

(of both internal and external actors) causes violent conflict

over resources “quarrels over their prize as booty” (Basedau,

2005:17) - narrow ambitions by individuals which is not correlated to

perceived inequality (rather rebel groups in DRC for instance,

have been fighting over state power to capture the resources

not to seek secession. So does in Angola, Liberia, Congo-

Brazzaville and Sierra Leone).

The mineral wealth can also prolong conflict even those caused originally

by other aspects. Here, Baseddau, among others, mentions four

principal cases: (1) the intervention of neighboring countries

forces to DRC was primarily political. But later these forces

(Rwanda, Uganda and Zimbabwe) acted like multinational

companies or mercenaries to take “their return in the form of

prospecting rights for diamonds, gold and coltan,” (2) the

North -South Sudan political conflict forged a new resource

dimension since the 1994 oilfields development, (3) until

1997, in Liberia tropical timber prolonged the conflict, and

(4) sales of diamonds financed the civil war in Angola and

Sierra Leone by funding UNITA and RUF rebel operations for a

long time. The “greed” over natural resource at regional or

57

international levels is also noted for causing and/or sustaining

violent conflict. For instance, especially in the post-cold

war era, actors within (as well as into) the African continent

(from (a) the border conflicts over natural resource rich

regions between Nigeria and Cameroon- Bakassi Peningula, (b)

‘the first African world war’ in DRC motivated by its huge

minerals, to (c) the cold war era and beyond, western

countries and MNCs supported pro-western regimes and warring

factions) to gain or continue control over externally sensitive raw

resources in Africa (2005:18)

Natural resources like oil, diamonds and coltan provide means

and opportunities for the motives for violence. Berdal and Malone

(2000) treated “war economies” on natural resources as

systemic interacting among (a) warring actors, MNCs and arms

dealers generating profit from lawlessness; and (b) profiteering or

looting is lucrative given resources are easy to exploit (skill and

equipment) like timber and if resources are easy to handle (ideal

for smuggling) such as diamonds or if location of a resource (is

vulnerable and targetable) creating opportunity for rebels

(Lujala 2003; Ross 2003 and Samset n.d.a; Tadjoeddin 2007).

Secondly, natural resources wealth (1) damages other tradable

sectors impeding of economic development (2) stimulate poor economic policies

and (3) expose the economy to external shocks (Tadjoeddin, 2007: 4-10;

Lay and Mahamoud 2004 cited in Basedau, 2005:10). Accordingly,

(1) the decline of other sources of development effect of

natural resource abundance is argued that natural capital crowds-out

58

human capital as resource-rich countries are made “blinded” by

resource abundance they neglect developing their human capital

and the low skilled labor requirement for this resource sector

reinforce it, (2) unlike manufacturing sectors, natural

resources based sectors (-mining), lacks positive side effects

(externalities) or economies of scale; have an enclave character (no

linkages to the rest of the economy) which gives birth to

poverty, (3) a “Dutch disease”-where a resource boom accompanied by

real appreciation which causes manufacturing and tradable sectors

to shrink whereas non-tradable ones to expand finally with

negative long-term effects on economic growth, (4) resource-

rich economies develop no diversification but dependence resulting in

high macroeconomic vulnerability, (5) declining terms of trade shocks -such

resources exhibit lower income elasticity of demand (demand

and prices fall with rise in income), suffer from boom and bust

cycles and steadily declining prices that (6) might be worsened

by inadequate policy responses.

Thirdly, the effect of natural resource abundance on human

rights, and the prospects for democracy deal with Mickael Ross’ (2001)

distinguishing aspects between a modernization effect, a

rentier effect and a repression effect.

a) Modernization involves a range of social changes (occupational

specialization, higher level of education and urbanization)

that are lacking in natural resource rich countries for the

source of wealth in such countries spring from a small and

isolated economic sector and the absence of such socio -

cultural changes impedes the formation of social capital as

59

well as a vibrant civil society on which human right

promotion and democracy lies (Pedro 2004; Samset n.d.a;

Basedau 2005; Switzer 2001).

b) with the rentier effect ( Tadjoeddin 2007: 4-10; Basedau 2005:16)

argue that, broadly speaking, natural resources revenue

reduces accountability of state elites with a “taxation effect”-

government becomes less likely to tax the public with

sufficient revenue from raw materials sale and the citizens

in turn in a situation of “no representation without

taxation”- the idea of carrots.

c) According to the repression effect elites use sticks and their

huge spending on military and security apparatus may be due to natural

resource induced civil unrest. This phenomenon further deteriorates

human rights and democracy. Finally, externally sensitive

natural resource capture the national interests of both

domestic and external powers making human rights and

democratization less realistic midst external rivalries in

zones of influence (conducive to war) (see also Tadjoeddin

2007: 4-10; Basedau 2005).

A fourth effects of natural resource abundance/wealth raises

the quality of political institutions (such as property rights for

instance) and state bureaucracy (Tadjoeddin 2007: 4-10; Pedro

2004; Samset n.d.a; Basedau 2005; Lujala 2003). In line with

this institutional and bureaucratic explanation, Matthias

Basedau (2005) citing Lay /Mahamoud (2004) and M. Ross (2003)

contends that the fact that resource wealth exists might negatively fashion

the evolution of institutional arrangements.

60

Commonly, “prebendal politics” or the “predatory state”

describe the Sub-Saharan political systems labeled after

transmission channels such as adverse colonial legacy and

rentier state fuelling extreme corruption, clientelism and neo-

patrimonialism that weakens state institutions and causes poor

economic policies. This has been, for instance, the case in

Angola, Nigeria and the former Zaire (Basedau, 2005:13-14; see

also Pedro 2004; Switzer 2001).

Apart from that transparency, efficient and fair allocation of

natural resources revenues and non -harmful, participatory

implementation of policies (all actors and affected

communities) enthrone good-governance. In the case of rentier

economy, however, that is not the case, elites divert natural

resource revenues to their pockets and citizens engage in

consuming and distributing rent (Ibid). The foregoing literature can

be depicted as under:

61

Economic disruption (Dutch disease) (sect oral imbalance/disincentive to entrepreneurship)

Resource dependence

Institution failure (low accountability) (less representation) (non democracy)

Conflict(Feasibility) (Greed)

(Grievance)

Growth failure

‘Augmented’ resource curse adopted from Tadjoeddin, 2007 P.6

Note that in the above figure there are interdependencies and

reverse causalities among various variables and mechanisms.

As Tadjoeddin (2007:7) indicates in the conflict channel

above, motivate highlights individual or group level grievance

(sense of injustice/denial of their region’s resource wealth)

and greed (acquisitive desire/motivating crime) while feasibility

highlights the share of primary commodities in GDP, the

proportion of young males in the population and mountainous

terrain as respective key proxies. The succeeding section

reviews the natural resource wealth-conflict link briefly.

2.7. CONTENDING VIEWS ON THE NATURAL RESOURCE WEALTH- CONFLICT

NEXUS

Another study on the natural resource wealth and violent

conflict nexus was Ingrid Samset’s analysis. This writer

assesses that in the recent past wars have taken place in

many resource-rich countries (from Cambodia and Colombia,

through west and central Africa, to Indonesia and Iraq) and

the resource wealth link in ending or lingering it (n.d.a:

abstract; see also Switzer 2001).

62

As mentioned earlier, the natural resource wealth-violent

conflict nexus was found to be strong, according to Paul

collier and Anke Hoeffler (2004) which, however, this

assumption later was criticized by Fearon (2005) claiming that

except for oil and conflict, the availability of natural resource is unrelated

to conflict. The broad conception of natural resources as primary

commodities is not causal factor for war onset (Ross 2004 in

Samset). Though mineral wealth predicts conflict strongly, the broader

category of natural resource is, the lesser related to civil

war outbreak (De Soysa 2002).

Ross (2006) argues that the initial assumption that resource

wealth causes violent conflict is challenged that with growing

instability the down scale of industrial and service sectors

give birth to raw materials export be a mainstay thereby conflict

causing resources get more importance financing the violent conflict

and not vice versa. Another critique is that even if the

causal link exist between oil/minerals and conflict, the

quality of data that drive from a smaller number of country

cases (fewer of which had civil war)- who export or dispose

such minerals- questions its validity.

Ingrid Samset (n.d.a.:2) on her part comes to conclude that

“natural resources and violent conflict- both broadly defined- do

not clearly connect.” But natural resource wealth or mineral

resources (oil, gas, gemstones, metals and timber) and civil war

connects.

63

Why some resources link up to some aspects and types of

collective violence? Three perspectives are reviewed: (1)

general frameworks, (2) narratives about the effects of

resources at the macro level of structures/micro level of

agency (3) and narratives about historical contingency and

specificity (Samset n.d.a).

By the general framework (Le Billon 2008) (1) the resource curse (:

negative effects of resource wealth at the country level (a)

low economic growth, corruption, authoritarianism associated

with resource abundance, (b) crowding-out of the non-resource

sector, rent-seeking, resource volatility of commodity prices,

boom-and-bust cycles, all (c) combined with global

peripheralizaiton of such economies become breeding ground for

conflict, (d) weak states characterized by low per capita

income, declining economic growth and political regimes in

transition where majority of the people is poor, natural

resource wealth dependent economy, citizens with few economic

opportunity out of this sector are all traits of vulnerability

to conflict), (2) resource conflicts (: grievance- due to actors’

attempt to control the finite resource bases) consist (a)

livelihood conflicts on renewable resources and (b) national or

military resource security on non-renewable oil and strategic

minerals which in both cases conflict manifest due to

incompatibility of interests on these resources perceived to be

important), and (3) conflict resources (: those constitute an

opportunity for enrichment of individuals and organizations

(civilians, military, state agents, outsiders- that engage in

64

taking up arms, encouraging or forcing others to fight on high

value natural resources) are pointed factors.

Second perspective provided by Samset is the effects at both macro

and micro levels. In relation to the macro level, it raises the

conflict link to (a) renewable vs. non-renewable resources in which

case she suggests non-renewable resource are linked to large-scale violence

despite scarcity of renewable resource with lower value are

also equally important to abundance of non-renewable

resources. Though scarcity of resources is linked to conflict

according to Homer-Dixon (1999) and Kahl (2006), other

scholars refuted it. Conflict on renewable resources may be a

kind of at a lower level of violence and might be much tied to

distribution than scarcity and yet consensus lacks (de Soysa

2002 cited in Samset, n.d.a:3); (b) regarding resource abundance

and dependence studies show that countries which experience both

resource abundance (a high production per capital of the

resources) and dependence (the resource constitute a high

proportion of the country’s export) are more peaceful than merely

dependent ones (Basedau/Lay 2009 in Samset n.d.a; Switzer

2001).

(c) If the extractive sector is monopolized by the state

(rentier state in this case) rent seeking, other than risk

taking entrepreneurship reigns, authoritarianism enthrones,

institutions weakens and they remain poorly equipped to settle

conflict. The mineral wealth ownership is fundamental in

conflict and rentier state link; and lastly, at the micro level

65

resources may provide incentives for peaceful or violent behavior where (d)

investors vs. consumers behavior rely on patterns related to resource

endowment, for instance, individuals can join to be recruited

by, or stay out of, rebel groups-and activist rebellions

attract ‘investors’ (ready to make sacrifices so that gain in

the long-term) while opportunistic rebellions attract ‘consumers’

(motivated by quick returns) to the economic endowments (see

Weinstein 2007 cited in Samset; Switzer 2001; Pedro 2004).

The third, final narrative, kind of explanation to the

resource-conflict link, is that Historical Experiences in World

Politics. Accordingly, in the post-cold war era new wars tend to

emerge primarily on economic agendas fashioned by the changes

spawned by the globalization process and advent of China and

India as a new economic power (that enhanced fierce global

competition over certain raw materials): a) big demand for raw

materials for the increasing global consumption under liberal

borderless trade; b) belligerent groups lost financial support

from allies but easily find natural resources buyers, and (c)

increasing importance and relevance of natural resources in

regional and global politico-economic sectors, especially with

the rise of China and India as economic blocks. Conclusively,

Lujala et al (2005) argued that diamond in the post-cold war

era strongly linked to conflicts than earlier and similarly

Ross (2006) found that oil fuelled civil war more importantly

in the late 1990s than the early 1970s.

66

Generally, countries dependent on export of primary commodity

for their GDP are dramatically more at risk of conflict and

decelerating economic growth, and mining projects often fail

to materialize the benefit of affected communities. And the

absence of critical factors needed to translate the mineral

abundance into widely shared peace and development are due to:

inequitable distribution of benefits and consequences,

overreliance on single commodity, sustenance of regime against

opposition and fuelling corruption, and rent-seeking by armed

gangs (Switzer, 2001:7-9).

2.8 MINING, AFFECTED COMMUNITIES AND CONFLICT

2.8.1 Mining In Local Community -Conflict Scenarios

According to Jason Switzer (2001:10-14), (1) conflict can emerge

over the control of the resource or resource- area. Some instances on this

issue include (a) attempt to evict a group of small-scale

miners from a concession (b) over gold reserves access which

these deposits represent a lifetime employment for the poorly

educated locals, (c) conflict ignites where control of the

resource is under contest as a result of two incompatible

uses, (d) incompatible uses of the same resource-space- a

protected area, a basis for practices of traditional

livelihoods. (2) conflict can emerge over the right to participate in decision-

making over management of a resource and to share in the benefits of its

exploitation, (3) conflict can emerge as a result of the process of mineral

production, whether due to environmental or social impact with a range of

pathways to conflict such as (a) community health and livelihoods

67

affected by environmental contamination, (b) widespread and

severe impact on landscape and traditional livelihoods that

raises violent attacks and rebellions (c) another pathway is

that rapid influx of workers escalate group tensions, diseases

and prostitution- even grievances and secessionism (d) and

lastly, unanticipated consequences of new infrastructure

(roads, electricity etc) on the environmental source of

livelihood (plants and animals), for instance, an increase in

slash and burn agriculture; (4) mining can cause conflict as a result of

the means used to secure mining assets and personnel in the face of an unstable

social environment.

Similarly, mining (1) or natural resource extraction can

finance (directly/indirectly) conflict (or the repressive

efforts of one group against another). The war, civil as well

as involvement from outside, in DRC is one instance; (2) or

companies in the extractive sector can benefit from conflict

situation; (3) or natural resource extraction can be a

conflict target so that combatants or marginalized communities

can gain political voice and decision makers –targeting mine

site personnel and equipment; (4) supplies minerals to those

who profit from conflict (Ibid). By that argument mining for

coltan (Colombo tantalite) is alleged to fuelling conflict in

DRC. It is used in microchip manufacture as a valuable

hardening agent for metals and as a result of its fuelling

role it was called upon MNCs in the west not to purchase

coltan coming from mining sites in the DRC.

2.9 COMMUNITY-BASED APPROACHES IN THE MINING SECTOR

68

Regarding participatory monitoring and evaluation to ensure

sustainable local development benefits from extraction of resources, Governance

and Social Development Resource Center (GSDRC) (2009:7-8) sets

out the tools and mechanisms for this purpose which include

participatory planning, good neighbor agreements, community

forums, community suggestion boxes, participatory budgeting,

citizen report cards, and community scorecards.

Similarly, Free, Prior, and Informed Consent (FPIC), as key elements

of an effective right to it, incorporates the need to legally

establish this right to broadly define the community to be consulted, the

right to participate in monitoring and enforcement, and the right to veto mining

development. The FPIC is effective “if and only if it is defined

and applied in a manner that guarantees the sustainable

development of local communities” (Ibid: 9). FPIC is being

increasingly recognized as a model for equitable and effective

community engagement in natural resource management as a (a)

right of communities to be informed concerning mining

development, (b) right to dictate the terms and conditions of

mining development, (c) right to veto mining development on

community lands.

Besides, international instruments (legally binding treaties

and non-binding guidelines and declaration) “have recognized

the rights of affected communities, particularly indigenous

communities to participate in mining-related decision-making”

(Ibid; for details see Miranda et al 2005). However, community

engagement via “consultations that do not resolve a

69

community’s reasons for opposition or achieve consent will

provide little assurance against potentially costly and

disruptive conflict” (GSDRC, 2009:10).

Importantly, FPIC need the following principles for

implementing consent procedures: (1) information (sufficient

information, support and time to make informed decisions) (2)

inclusiveness (all interested community members taking part

in) (3) dialogue (formal, continuous, inclusive) (4) legal

recognition (legally recognizing via binding negotiated

agreements) (5) monitoring and evaluation (opportunities for

appropriate and independent community monitoring and grievance

processing) and (6) corporate buy-in (project proponents

should view FPIC as an inherent and necessary cost of project

development) (Ibid).

2.10 THE CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK IN EXPLANATION

Artisanal gold mining

Effects

Raising social costs

Raising environmental

costs

Increasing macro-economic

costs

Difficul Difficulty of control

Factors

Lootable

Not-legalized

unobstructabl

e

Effects

Increasing

contribution to

sustainable

development

Adapted and modified from MMSD Global Report on ASM 2002, P.55

70

(Adapted from Chupezi et al 2009)

2.11 Operationalizing Basic Terms and Concepts

The following basic terms and phrases as appear in this thesis

are contextualized for easy conception and capture.

“Insecurity”: The term insecurity in this thesis title refers

to Conflict and Human Security threats.

71

"Conflict": conflict is defined as a situation of incompatible or adverse

interests, in which one or more parties pursue, or threaten to

pursue their interests via sporadic violent means.“Human Security”: the interdependent dimensions of human

security mentioned in the 1994 UNDP human development Report

crafted by Mahabub Ulhaq (i.e., personal, environmental, economic,

political, community, health and food security: safety from chronic

threats such as hunger, disease and protection from sudden and

hurtful disruptions in the patterns of daily life(in jobs, in

“ASGM”: the acronym ASGM/ASM refers to the hitherto onlyindividual-based artisanalgold mining in constant mobility, informal and not-motorized production and“smuggler” transaction.

72

CHAPTER THREE

RESEARCH DESIGN AND METHODOLOGYThis chapter highlights the study profile and methods used.

3.1 DESCRIPTION OF THE STUDY AREA

Tabya Hibret, and Zengorako are located in the Asgedetsimbla

administrative Wereda in the North Western Zone of National

Regional State of Tigray or in Western Tigray. The nearby small

town in the Tabya Hibret/Emboy locality is called Edagahibret which

serves as local authority seat and urban life. This area is

remote from the zonal as well as from the Wereda administration.

Map 3.1: Political map of the study Wereda in Western Tigray

The geographical landscape of this area is lowland where fully

agrarian communities used to live in harmony with one another and

with no man-induced human and ecological security threats.

Source: Statistical Authority of Ethiopia 1994W- WesternE- EasternC- Central

Sedentary farming and livestock as the only primary economic

activities are strongly enter twined with one another in a life-

giving reciprocity- where their surrounding natural environment

the land and its natural capital are the life sustaining wealth

of this poor community.

These sedentary communities have open-access land resources where

everyone can use it at its disposal. Being a national policy

direction the government has absolute prerogative of land possession

–peasants only with use right of land and its resources- short of

free hold( FDRE Constitution 1995).

Western Tigray and its adjacent areas in general have been known

for its widespread traditional sub-surface gold mining catching

yet a scant policy attention for sustainability and security

concerns from any relevant stakeholder but pulling the eyes of

profit- hungry mineral companies like the recently advancing Ethio-

Chinese private joint company which has been drumming and knocking, for

instance, at the doors of the remote homesteads of the poor

villager peasants of the Mereb Terer communities(Tkmt 8/2002 EC

Reporter Gazeta) or the Ezana Mining Enterprise Plc in Maili,

river Maikoho area in that zone.

These communities are thus in grave insecurity and stress mainly

due, obviously, to (1) the widespread proliferation of this ASGM

across the zone(s), (2) reluctance of the responsible agency to

reconcile the scarcity pushed- yet lucrative gold pulled

immigrants encroaching onto the peasants irreplaceable, with no-

substitute life -sustaining farm plots manifested in violent

conflicts, (3) the inherent nature of mining as short–term

profit-stricken but with sustainable multiplier adverse human

security impacts, and (4) finally, with no local economic returns

and investment rather only short-term individual subsistence incomes

putting the days and lives to come on jeopardy.

According to the authorities in the Wereda, currently it appears

they are taking steps towards legalizing and formalizing the

sector. It is acknowledged that the Wereda has been conditionally

delegated to manage the sector by the Federal Government and

accordingly, and mainly due to stressful challenges, in 2008/9 a

conference has been held at grass roots level. In principle, the

objective of the legalization or formalization of the ASGM sector

is (a) national revenue generation or curbing down illiciting,

(b) creation of job opportunities, and (c) promoting

environmental rehabilitation. To this effect, the parties to the

conference were representatives of all stakeholders operating in

the sector: (a) (Federal to Local) Government authorities, (b)

miners (c) local people, (d) buyers (individuals and

“cooperatives”), (e) experts and so on.

In this conference a range of issues were raised by these

stakeholders among whom prominently (a) security problems, (b)

proliferation of small and light weapons (SALWs) and related

crimes, (c) health and environmental safety challenges, and so

forth were discussed. My survey with notable local key informants

(authorities, farmers, intermediaries, and miners) shows that

mineral/land conflicts and human security challenges are intense

and pervasive as are discussed in the succeeding chapters.

Map 3.2: Placer gold occurrence in Ethiopia

Source: MoME 2009

The scanned map here above indicates that the placer gold

occurrences in Ethiopia are mainly found in Northern, Western,

South western and Southern Ethiopia. In Wollega area, 30 tones of

gold is confirmed and is being developed (TKMT 8/2002 EC Reporter

Gazeta). In Tigray, ASGM has been active for about two decades

and since it predicts large scale mining strongly, Ezana Mining

Enterprise plc has commenced its first stage activity in MEILI Maikoho

areas in my study Woreda.

3.1.1. SOURCES OF LIVELIHOOD OF THE AFFECTED LOCAL PEOPLE

Figure 3.2: Categories of basis of mixed farming

Source: Unpublished official documents of the Tabya

administration (2007/8 Survey)

The above figure reveals that the local people depend on the

natural environmental resource which sustains life. According to

that graph pasture land is a second life sustaining capital for

the local sedentary farmers for livestock rearing (see graph

below) next to crop farming. According to documents consulted in

the Hibret Tabya, village town Edagahibret is equally dependent

on farming in addition to trade services. This village town was

Arable land

Pasture land

Cliff

Classification

990

1500

3102

Hectar

established, by the TPLF fighters in 1977/8 because local people

were denied access to the marketing in the nearby highland

Endabaguna town all being prosecuted, if they appear to be there,

by the Derg military6.

Figure 3.3: Types and Number of Livestock

Source: Unpublished official documents of the Tabya

administration (2008/9 Survey)

The figure above reveals that the source of livelihood for the

local people is farming and livestock which are fully dependent

on pasture and arable land.

6 Mulgeta Gebrehiwot, former Tigray People Liberation Fighter and currently Director for Institute for Peace and Security Studies in Addis Ababa University

Sheep and goats

Cattle

Pack animals

Camel Type 29

995

45000

51000

Number of Livestock

Photo: Gold Mining and Mixed farming as source of livelihood in mining areas

The local song in box below symbolizes the value of cattle for their

livelihood, honor and social relations. The oxen are the gift of

their cows and they predetermine marriage relations serving as a

potential dowry.

Source: local farmers’ harvesting song

Table 3.4: Tabya Hibret population size vs. clean water

supply profile

My oxen, you oxen; I singing for your honor, Gift of My cow

which feed us with butter;

Get influx and alive; God bless your strength! People who have

Category Population Shallow well water

supplyFour

Rural

kushets

Male-headed

household

Female-headed

household

working Broken

1,726 59914 2

Edagahib

ret town

1,400 2 0

Source: Unpublished official documents (2008/9 Survey)

According to the 2008/9 Survey, village town Edagahibret has 1:700

Shallow well to household ratio clean water supply. Worst still, the

rural and scattered villages hardly address it. In broader

treatment, according to the same survey, the shallow well to people ratio

clean water supply in the Tabya is only 16:15, 415.

On top of this, there is local farmers’ belief on preference of

available river water stating that “ mai bunbua swa yektn eyu”-

literally means that clean pipe water severely reduces the dose

concentration of SWA (local alcoholic drink) – TURNING SWA INTO

WATER. Needless to say, swa is an energizer for the

agriculturally laboring farmers equally as important as fuel for

vehicles.

3.1.2. SITE(S) SELECTION

Based on my situation assessment and preliminary survey carried

out in the Summer of 2009 and my closer life experience for not

less than a decade, the following patterns were identified in the

study site selection process: conflict intensity and duration;

pervasiveness of human security threats; incidence of deaths,

diseases, damages and imprisonment; broadening of stakeholders

and deepening of interests; involvement of government bodies and

institutions; spatial characteristics and vulnerabilities.

Based on these guiding elements, three out of the 26 Tabyas with

multiple gold mining sites were selected for this study. These

three study sites offered a full picture of the problem in the

area. These sites could narrate the past, map out the present and

predict into the future. In other words, the selection of sample

gold mining sites was purposeful than random technique.

Accordingly, Tabya Emboy/Hitsats study sites were selected

experiencing all the above mentioned patterns whereas the Tabya

Zengorako mainly for its unique past narratives and recent gold-

rush conflict resulting in court proceedings for conflict

resolution process cases, for comparative purposes. However,

after thorough survey, I found Tabya Hitsats subsample within Tabya

Hibret and hence, to avoid redundancy, it was left out.

3.2 DATA COLLECTION METHODS

3.2.1 PRIMARY SOURCE OF DATA

In order to accomplish the objective of the research set out,

field research was conducted and data was generated from a sample

of 56 target participants from two gold mining sites. The size

includes local government officials, experts, community members,

different miners and gold buyers (including cooperatives).

a) Observation: In all study sites on-site as well as off-

site, participatory observation was conducted to build the

trust with people by stimulating informal talks, for more

than 34 persons, to get important data that would help

develop ideas for the next phase of in-depth interviews and

focus group discussions (FGDs).

To this end, gold mining site observation and taking photos

using digital camera helped broaden the data generated for

analysis. It provided a firsthand insight into the scale of

environmental deterioration: land degradation, deforestation

by cutting trees for fire and building resting huts (kambo-

literally means camp or mass huts) called ‘agober’, water

pollutions, food contamination, and resource depletion. The

precarious and poor gold mining, their archaic and

rudimentary gold mining environment of miners, their archaic

and rudimentary techniques of exploitation, poor or no

public services supply; illegal but better to say less known

and much neglected sector, highly vulnerable to all causes of death,

very individualistic and their nomadic behavior was closely

observed in a participatory mode.

b) In-Depth Interviews with Informants: Interviews were also

conducted with relevant government personnel -local and

higher level authorities, experts, key institutions/sectors

that influence the local public sphere; mining affected

community members and different gold miners. In both sites,

33 total persons were interviewed.

c) Focus Group Discussions: three groups of people (mining

affected communities and gold miners) on the two study

sites but off- site in the case of zengorko (see

triangulation below) and affected community members on

Sunday church occasions, in river areas for miners (river

Geleb Emni) were brought together for respective FGD session

constituting 6-10 (6, 7, 10) members so that they could

lead to more natural exchanges of information and to reach

more details. In all cases, a total of 23 persons actively

participated. These FGDs sessions explored the experiences

and interactions of the informants on the issues raised,

and offered more confidence among the informants and to

facilitate a deeper understanding of the information.

The venues for meeting people formally or informally in order to

gather broad range of information for this study include the

following.

Offices, churches, public gatherings/meeting, home and

rivers (for formal discussions)

River areas, camps/kambo, market areas, local drink

(swa or endamesheta) houses, café, travel (on foot)

My survey had two phases: Informal surveys were conducted since

the July of 2009 while the formal ones were carried out in Feb.

and March 2010.

d) Case- Studies: Past and recent conflict dynamics over the

two sites were narrated and compared against one another to

see spatiotemporal induced dynamics, trends and scenarios.

3.2.2 SECONDARY SOURCE OF DATA

This data gathering method involved an extensive literature

review, available government records, reports, documents and

legal and policy frameworks to certain extent. Due to either the

sector is less known, much neglected or both, the later sources

constitute smaller proportion in this thesis. Theories and

conceptual frameworks have been also put to highlight relevant

themes to the ASM sector.

3.2.2.1 Why big volume of literature?

Admittedly, the extensive volume of literature reviewed herein is

deliberate for the reason that little is known, but extensively

practiced, about the sector. More notably also the ASM sector

incorporates multiple actors with cross-cutting causes and

effects. The review was also carried out to provide a better

understanding on the nature of ASM to address it in the near

future. As only (a) few literature works on the sector are

available in this country, the thesis intensively relies on

internet website sources.

3.3 SAMPLING TECHNIQUE

It employed a snowball sampling strategy for target selection.

Sample frames were selected both purposely as well as randomly. A

total of 56 sample population, 15 in the case of Zengorako and 41

in Tabya Hibret study site are used.

Triangulation: At the end, for validity, reliability and

objectivity purposes, 8 purposely selected groups of some 3 local

affected people from both Tabyatat and 5 gold miners who

permanently operate year- round and experienced over these two

sites for long years were put to form a group for FGD in

Endabaguna.

3.4 METHOD OF DATA ANALYSIS

Employing, descriptive exploratory, qualitative methodology, data

were recorded; notes were taken for accuracy and then categorized

to different topics. The next step was triangulation so as to

achieve interpretation, validity, verification, objectivity and

reliability. For the inexhaustibly fluid nature of the sector,

observation extensively used to complement and compensate it.

Finally, it was developed and typed to the existing thesis form.

CHAPTER FOUR4. NATURE OF THE ARTISANAL GOLD MINING SECTOR

4.1 ITS CHARACTERISTICS: RECIPE FOR INSECURITYThis chapter presents the vulnerable, hazardous, marginal and

informal nature of the sector.

Data gathered from in- depth interviews and close observation on

the gold mining sites show that illegally operating miners in

individual as well as groups (Jiwa) basis exploit gold deposits

over wide scale of area employing very archaic, rudimentary and

primitive techniques. In their language the gold miners are

called ‘Werako’.

Photo: deteriorated jungle- based camps/kambo of gold miners

According to data gathered from key-informants incorporating all

sections of the society (authorities, miners and local resident)

there are two types of miners. The first category of miners is

permanent. These types of miners operate throughout the year in a

nomadic manner from one riverside area to another. The key drivers

for their movement include fluctuation of volume of water,

exhaustion or discovery of gold deposit prospects and

inaccessibility to regulatory bodies and expulsion. Sometimes

these permanently operating in a nomadic behavior are also forced

back by bandits in the very remote jungles like the jungle of

Meesere surrounding the monastery of Waldba. These bandits claim

that the mining areas around the Monastery are holy and the

practices are unholy. However, the victimized nomadic miners, in

all focus group discussions stressed that though the bandits in

the aforementioned forest area seem to articulate the issue of

the holiness of the monastery, they rather were very concerned

with the fear of leaving necked in the midst of dwindling forest

coverage and their need is to preserve themselves by defending

any access to theirs. Besides, the declining trend of these

actors is an emergent opportunity even though the monastery might

push their role and position stating its holiness.

A group of discussants of miners (seasonal as well as permanent)

in an FGD respond that the conflict with the monastery of Waldba

is inevitable as these nomadic gold miners disregard the

foundations of the religious (ethical) principles. For instance,

miners operate the whole week including Sunday as they wish. In

relation to this, bandits and criminal gangs attribute the issue

of the Monastery to rob the miners in an anarchic fashion in the

mid-night times.

Another type of miners is the seasonal ones. According to in-depth

interviews with key informants from the local to the Wereda

administrative officers, these seasonal mine operators can

further be subdivided into home-based and jungle-based gold miners.

“Jungle” is contextualized as mining away from home areas for days,

seasons or more.

The home-based gold miners travel from home to the mining sites in

the morning. They work the whole day using simple techniques. And

in the evening they return back home. These home- based gold

miners are characterized by children, women and elder group who

cannot travel to remote jungle areas because they are weak and

vulnerable. Majority are barehanded. They neither have technical

knowledge of exploitation of gold deposits nor are strong enough

to dig for big and deep holes. Obviously, their gold production

or income is very unviable with less than $1 per day and almost

absent in the dry season. But they incur incalculable

environmental loss. The conflict over resource, resource area or

impacts of process of production is rare for the fact that their

operation is conflict- aware and concerned to their community

(see photo below).

Photo: home-based artisanal gold miners except one (sitting) with a green pan

(“dolla”) the rest hold “rahba”- the earliest panning tool which contains only 1/4th of the

current “dolla”

The second sub-division is the jungle-based seasonal gold miners.

This group of miners is dominated by young men at the age of 20s-

30s, and children and seldom women under the strict leadership of

fatherhood. These jungle-based seasonal miners are relatively far

better equipped with mining equipments, knowledge and skill of

exploiting potential deposits than the home- based ones but are

also relatively less compared to the whole-year/permanent nomadic

operators.

According to the data triangulated from the key-informants and

FGD with the seasonal and permanent ‘Werako’, the income and

investment is different accruing to the later group. On average,

their daily income is about $ 7. The jungle- based seasonal miners are

overwhelmingly subsistent farmers operating to supplement the

income for survival. Their number rises in the July- August

months. These farmers immigrate to the mining sites along with

their family members to one or more gold site area(s) based on

the information spread across the highlanders about where the

gold rush it taking place. This type of operation stays only for

less than a month ranging from a week to two or so. The hurry

return is because they are farmers. This type of miners may

become semi-permanent miners in the dry season staying from a

month to three or so in the jungle to repay their farm inputs

indebted in the wet season.

Photo: Jungle-Based Artisanal Gold Miners in their residence

In relation to the profile of the gold miners in the research

area, except the intensity of conflict, the rest issues are

common to nearly all mining areas. It was easily observable that

while fresh miners reach to, old miners leave from mining areas-

clearly showing their seasonal and nomadic behavior.

The in-depth interviews and FGD with key individuals and group of

gold miners (both types) reveal that the common denominator which

causes them engage in the sector is necessity not opportunity. The

seasonal miners reached a broad range of understanding in the FGD

session that the income generated from their one week or so gold

mining is to supplement their livelihood necessities. A common

anxious factor for their engagement in the precarious mining

activity is to repay their debt- the cost of fertilizer to the

government- as the crops produced never pays it. A next factor

pushing them away from home to gold mining areas is their daily

consumption: salt, coffee, sugar, clothes and children teaching

expenses (such as house rent, textbook, uniform etc; see box

below).

Photo: the deforestation factor: firewood consumption and

kambo/agobers building in Jungle-Based Artisanal Gold Miners

Each or majority able bodied student (esp. grade 7 and above)

influx into the mining areas in the break season. Randomly

sampled discussants and interviewees commonly point that they

mine primarily to ensure their education in the upcoming new year

and secondly to support their family or dependent. Overtime,

their source of income terminated only to gold mining in the

break season covering year- round educational expenses.

One old man with a glance and smile at me concluded the

discussion saying “our belly and farmland are addicted with

sugar; we cannot drink coffee without sugar and our soil

Another group of gold miners (seasonal as well as permanent) is

full of younger group. Most of them are with farming and 8th/10th/

12th grade complete background. The majority are 10th grade

complete but failed to pass the national exam. This phenomenon is

rising overtime. Put differently, the miners were predominantly

illiterate but with the expansion of education they are

outbalancing by new literate young group.

The data gathered from individuals and group employing in-depth

interviews and FGDs show that majority of the seasonal, semi-

permanent and permanent gold miners are those with farming and

educational background who have no alternative source of

livelihood. Those from farming family explain that due to land

shortage/ over fragmentation, they have no alternative source of

income. Those educated gold miners are similarly grieved against

the government for they find neither employment opportunity nor

land plot as citizens. In any case, however, they are grieved

they intend and work permanently to save money so that become

traders: shops, gold intermediary, etc. Yet almost all young

miners operate in an extravagant environment and style.

A common concern for almost all miners sampled in the FGD and in-

depth interviews was that except for some fortune makers, the

income generated from gold mining especially for who have

dependent families is only from hand-to-mouth and for all is

uncertain. Very archaic and primitive way of extraction of gold,

extreme poverty, influx of mass fortune seekers (congestion of

miners) and precarious working environment all make the income

less and uncertain. The discussants and interviewees seem to view

the operation both as a necessity and “opportunity” to which one

participant to the FGD expressed this scenario saying “God

creates a ladder while creating a cliff” (see circle of poverty below).

Another intermediate factor that welcome the poverty pushed mass

influx of gold miners is the absence of entry barriers. The data shows

that gold mining, especially with the recently spurring gold

price in the market, is quite lucrative compared to the rest of

rare sources of livelihood in the rural areas. Discussants and

key- informants also demonstrated that ‘get rich quick’ mentality

is flourishing among fortune seeking young men. Especially with the

recent skyrocketing gold price market, tendencies and trends of

de-agriculturalization among some young male-headed households become

observable.

Discussants from all types of miners and in- depth interviewees

raised the absence of alternative source of income for

subsistence as the key factor in locking them in the ASGM sector.

Even they go up to arguing that they are by far becoming gold

mining dependent for supplementing subsistence. Indebtedness

throughout the supply chain is commonly mentioned feature. Most

miners, especially seasonal farmers are debt-bonded for mining

expenses and hence are tied exploitatively to their financing

gold buyers. Their financiers and buyers are in turn tied in an

exploitative alliance to their general purchasers who supply and

are debt bonded to their clients in Addis Ababa.

The data gathered from all across the mining encounter vividly

inform the exploitative supply/value chain extended and networked

from the rivers and farmlands of the poor farmer in the remote

areas in western Tigray in these study areas to Addis Ababa and

its destination beyond. This can be illustrated in a schematic

representation as below (arrows show influence pathway whereas

broken lines show little or no relation):

Fig 4.1: Local rural areas- local towns- Addis Ababa- global market (pre-

formalization years)

Source: fieldwork data, 2010

Another critically discussed theme among FGD and interviewees was

the lootability of the gold minerals. Different sample frames’

(authorities, miners and local peoples) ideas, experiences, and

experts’ views and researcher own close and deep observation in a

triangulated manner are presented for this end. The gold reserve

is wide spread across the lowlands of the western Tigray National

Regional State (see appendix3). Documents in the Asgedetsimbla

Wereda administration show that 26 out of 27 Tabyas in the Wereda

are rich in gold mineral reserves. My survey all over the Wereda

substantiates it. Gold reserve is diffuse, distant and unobstractable

(for production and smuggling) mineral in my research areas. As a

result of this, home-based as well as jungle-based miners operate in

a nomadic behavior from one alluvial/placer mining to another. In

my tour observation, there is no permanent mining site, people

move here and there derived by gold discoveries, prospects, news

spread about fortunes made and water access. There exist too many

multiple sub-site gold mining areas across these 26 Tabyas. In the

morning “no one knows where exacting is going for mining gold”.

Local gold buyers

Grand gold buyer(s)

General gold buyers/

exporter

Government/NGOs

Gold miners

Mining site communities

Destination

They all are derived by the above stated contextual issues. In

relation to the diffuse nature of the gold reserves across the

Wereda, key- informants expressed the concern over the difficulty

to control and formalize. A second point highlighting the

lootability of the gold reserves put for discussion and interview

was the ease to explore, ease to mine, ease to store and ease to transport/smuggle.

It was too easy to understand the lootability of the gold mineral

from these mentioned aspects /criteria. For them, the

alluvial/placer gold is easily explored using necked- eye to

differentiate potential gold deposits from non- potentials.

Potential gold soil is paned in water ponds. ASGM miners in this

research site responded for this purpose has never heard geologists

in their operation. Another criteria highlighting lootability widely

discussed and observed was the fact that unskilled labor and simple

techniques of exploitation make mining easy. Artisanal miners do not

have/need machine or technical competence to exploit gold

deposits. Even in some areas minerals usually occur on the

surface and are spotted with minimal effort or found by accident.

Thus, the sector is 100% labor intensive and cost for entry is

almost zero.

In this study area, gold is exploited by massive unskilled labor

force using very rudimentary technology and equipments. The labor

force range from child to elders predominantly illiterates and the

techniques of extraction and equipments include those used in

agricultural households (shovel, plusher, pan and axe). Tools are

archaic and self- made (see photo below).

Photo: rudimentary tools of mineral exploitation; miners are ‘prisoners of hope’ for

making

fortune at every digging, panning and walking steps

Gold is not perishable resource and requires no special storage place.

According to the discussants, and key- informants and my own

close observation, gold only needs secure and hidden place before

sale due to its extremely high value. And every miner put the

gold in his/her secure pocket- well locked and frequently visited. These

pockets are untouchable or “no go zone” by others (extremely

sensitive pockets).

Figure 4.2: Lootability of the ASGM sector

Another point of discussion was its ease to transport/smuggle. The

storage and transportation issues also consider for buyers. As

far as transportation is concerned, gold is often transported by

individuals placed in their pockets, in their socks/shoes,

bag/baggage, plunged in liquid and powder items such as butter,

honey, etc. Smugglers (non-miners) often use the later two items

to hide and deliver to potential buyers. According to key-

informants from local buyers who supply gold to the capital city,

though gold can be smuggled using multiple modes of

transportations, it can also be looted during the transportation.

Gold fields are “distant”, inaccessible and unobstractable by

authorities, especially, in the rainy season - “soil smiles at

with golden teeth”

Photo: Lootable/concealable / ideal to smuggle gold

Gold is refined by panning using running water available in the

mining sites. The fact that refining gold does not need beyond

simple methods and locally available resources, the sector it

remained extremely vulnerable to looting. Another criterion put for

discussion among local gold intermediaries as to whether the

mineral is lootable or not was its strategic/rareness at the global

market and its transparency or secrecy. It is sensitive and inherently

secrete in market chains.

Another point raised to discussants and interviewees was

stability of the gold price and its value- to- weight ratio. The

discussants and respondents unanimously expressed that gold has

ever- rising high value- to- weight ratio due to widening export

consumption. As a result of this, stakeholders to this gold

supply/ value chain are broadening. The stable and spurring gold

price from the global market to the river gives more expected

revenues (see price index depicted below).

Figure 4.3: Spurring gold Price Index in the post- cold- war era

(sample years)

Source: Fieldwork result (of 1992- 2010)

Another point put for investigation and in- depth interview was

the integration of the sector to policy mainstreaming, its legality and

formality. Key-informants from the Wereda authorities and informal

conversation with local experts that influence the policy

mainstream state that ‘no’ one has adequate and accurate

statistical data about the sector. Even some discussants disregard

the sector coining it ancillary, periphery, nomadic occupied by

‘wild men’. Officers in the Wereda expressed their dismay that

the sector is quite problematic even to recognize and control.

One security official argues that “the sector is as difficult as

knowing and regulating the birds and wild rats across the

jungles”.

1992

1994 1997 2003 2006 2010

70

Barter

550

<40

Price (birr) per gram

Year

P1

P2

P3

P4

P1-4 show price changes

According to them, the sector is extensively occupied by different

stakeholders but has been less known and less policy issue. In

other words, it has been excluded, neglected, marginal and

informal. Its legal status was recently discussed by the Wereda

administrative bodies. It was found to be “illegal” due to the

grave concern expressed by the mining communities: invasion of

farmlands, watershed pollution and health problems, deforestation

and soil degradation, security problems; and conflict over the

resource area. Since every able bodied operate freely across the

Wereda mining areas it has been unthinkable to label gold miners

“illegal”.

The discussants contend that there was no legal framework put in

place to hold one gold miner legal while others illegal. In this

case, three distinct views are presented. Firstly, the sector is

less known, denied, misperceived and hence excluded from the

policy arena. The local government body has been so skeptical

about it. “No knowledge, no policy, no budget, no law, no

license, no tax but we are getting the headway” – one official

says. The sector has been less known because it was very remote

and inaccessible, insignificant, serving a poverty-relief and

secrete in destination. But recently, the sector has begun to be

a headache due to high gold price stimulating fierce influx,

competition, greed-and-grievance and conflict among large number of

stakeholders. Mining affected communities/ farmers begun to

Expulsion Woreda

administration

Miners

Exporter

Community

Local buyers

Resource

Global Market

GCU

NBE

Legality

demonstrate violently. This scenario posed huge transformational

or intervention assignment to the government from the federal

down to the river level. Fig 4.4: Conflict Map of main actors in the

gold commodity chain

Source: Fieldwork result, 2010

Secondly, focus group discussants from the mining affected

communities and in-depth-interviewees with farmers whose

farmlands were invaded by gold mining fortune seekers view that

mining on their land as well as on their community is neither

tolerable nor negotiable- at any cost, the affected people cannot

allow whatever legal status the miners might achieve. The

affected community members believe that they are the sole legal land

possessors. One “poor” elder peasant aggressively expresses his

grievance as follows (see the box below).

I will die for my land, my soil, my tree, my river and my

grass. We noticed the government that we will defend our life,

our food, our blood. In the early stages of mining, we were

fooled that the practice would not have such deadly effects.

Our drink water is polluted, we have no water to drink, we

have no soil to grow bread, we have no tree to shelter, and we

have no wood to fuel. No one is responsible for our death, no

Source: interview with local farmer, March 2010

Thirdly, gold miner discussants in two FGD predominantly believe

that they are” legal” because they are “not illegal”. Even the legal

vs. illegal distinction with regard to gold mining is new or

emergent. Initially, participants were confused with the issue of

legality. But every gold miner wondered and responded that they

do not know what and why license is (issued). There is no special

owner of gold reserve. No one has fixed mining site. Everyone is

nomadic miner. Gold miner participants in the discussion session

convinced of the unethical and irresponsible step onto the farmlands and

equally fresh crops. It is admitted that gold is very greed-

inherent mineral that make ethical miner unethical and

irresponsible. No one miner keeps sit-down while gold is easily

being looted. What matters is money- gold. One farmland might be

owned by one farmer that cannot defend successfully the huge

fortune seeking gold miners. Even it is too often not unusual

digging and looting gold rich soils from farmlands in the night

time.

The discussants from gold mining have no time for rest or to

spent even a spare of time for they imagine (get rich quick

mentality) making a big fortune at every digging and panning steps. After

rain, every miner as well as family member from the home- based

ones move here and there throughout the plain and river areas to

make ones fortune. This is also another mode of gold mining via

picking gold exposed to the surface by accident.

Gold miners have proverb that express their happiness and anxiety

with regard to success or failure to discover gold (to make

fortune) (see the box below)

4.2 CONFLICT ACTORS, CONTEXT, CAUSES AND ISSUES

Werki,

Entrkeb dinki,

Entsaan chinki! (Tigrinya)

This literally meant that gold if foundis congratulation (pleasing), unless it is (anxiety)bothering! (translation)

One old miner explained the tenet of this proverb as (1) miners

depend on gold mining for income; it determines ones security

and livelihood a lot. It is simply way of life varying from

subsistence to capital making. Every miner expects being big man

tomorrow. Similarly, in very ironic expression of the fact

that miners are “illiterate geologists” who work out gold

In brief, the main conflict actors are local farmers vs. nomadic

miners; intra-mining affected (based on resource proximity

claims); miners vs. security forces; cooperative unions vs. private

gold buyers; licensees vs. non-licensees; potential actors:

transregional states (Amhara /Oromo) citizens/ Central Government/

Eritrean immigrants.

The context of the research areas here are summed up indicating a

nature of preconditioning to conflict sparkplug dynamics: nature

dependent subsistent economy, overpopulation to land resource

proportion ratio, fully mixed farming agrarian communities, a

gold market with a steep rising price, a nomadic mineral sector

in a periphery, strategic and supplementary mineral resource,

multiple actors at multiple levels, simmering consciousness and

insecurity risks and hazards, highlanders- lowlanders

interactions, season- based economic activities operation,

historical resource claim spillover, greed -inherent sector

mediating champions into spoilers, marginalized environmental

resource base(war and drought torn region) are among the salient

ones.

As to causes of the conflict, grinding poverty in terms of

landlessness and unemployment- question of basic needs absence of

legal framework as well as consciousness and weak regulatory

capacity institutional and policy gaps, natural resource

dependence, scarcity and valuable mineral resource abundance

overlap escalating threats and risks of loss of livelihood are

underlying. Similarly, mass influx of gold miners, in, rainy

season, gold rush, closeness to cropland and communities, and

theft (cattle rustling) and abusing local people are precipitating

conflict causes. Whereas humiliating insults against one another

like “Awdna kostirkum kem zeimetsakum…” literally means “you

survived on our rumps in the days of occupying our lands” in the case

of highlanders and “adkum atsetsikum adna aytetsetsyun!”

literally means “we do not allow you impoverish our lowlands too” in the

case of the lowlanders are commonly stirred as triggers.

Finally, the conflict and security issues in brief are: resource control

and use issues, effect of process of gold production issues,

missing rights to decision- making and benefit- sharing issues-

no compensation, no rehabilitation, no Free, Prior and Informed

Consent (dialogue and consultation), no Conflict Sensitive

Business Practice, no Environmental as well as Conflict Impact

Assessments and no monitory, accountability and transparency in

the mining (area) sector.

4.3 SCALE AND INTENSITY OF CONFLICT

The nature of conflict varies from latent to sporadic (seasonal)

violent confrontation. It is Sub-emergent and wide spreading

(broadening), dormant and flexible on spatiotemporal basis. The

simmering nature of the small- scale violent conflict

specifically in the one case- study of Kushet maichew in Tabya Hibret

is depicted below. It shows that the conflict has been

manifested in confrontation stages between 1991/2 to 2007/8 for

over a decade and half. The lowland areas are in the past

encroached by outside “settlers” which had been “woferzemet”

arable lands for highlanders on ones disposal which today seem to

have communal tenure sentiments behind it in history. Small-scale

sub-emergent violent conflicts are hence registered as part of daily

patterns in the mining affected local people. Now the conflict

situation is in an impasse- neither dormant nor transformed but

very sporadic.

Figure 4.5: conflict stages/progression

Conflict stages or process in the case of Kushet Maichew in Tabya Hibret (till 2007/8)

In this case, Kushet Maichew requested the government to relocate

the Emboy river gold mining site community unless keeps invaders

1991/2

2007/8

Years

confrontation

Woferzemet Vs. encroachment

Pre-conflict

The broken line dawn ward parabola predicts the potential simmering conflict stages which in case-study 2 has recently dwarfed by mobilized militia forces via deterrence. Zigzag

line indicates the seasonally spora-dic confrontation

future

at bay via coercion. This community has been in sporadic lower

scale violent conflict with the nomadic miners from 1991/2-

2007/8 mainly constantly sustained by lucrative gold prospects

and year round water availability.

In 2007/8, the community recruited ten militia for defensive and

expulsion, four of them recently armed for that, purpose with the

confirmation of the Wereda leadership. The militias are paid

20,000 birr per year by the local people. Fear is escalated by

historical encroachments in the drought periods (from Zana, Rama adi

arbaete, Entcho, Aksum, Adiet and beyond) and 'woferzemet’ (plowing

into the lowlands on no one’s land –shifting cultivation).

This fermented latent conflict over history to trigger with the

resource access propensity in the post cold war era. In this

Tabya conflict is also structured at intra and inter (vertically

and horizontally) kushets upon resource proximity claims.

According to Tabya Hibret chairman Haile Tareke and my

participant observation in the mining river, the village township

–Edagahibret is being dug by the Town-Based gold miners where the

practice continued to instigate confrontation with the Urban

Development Office thereof.

4.4 HUMAN SECURITY THREATS OF ARTISANAL GOLD MINING PROCESS

The process of producing gold poses human security threats. The

behaviors (style of hut building and firewood consumption, nomadic

and seasonal character with constant shift to multiple mining

sites) of the miners incur and endanger traditional source of

livelihood- deforestation and depletion. So far, the actual and

potential threats of gold production processes are presented below.

Figure 4.6: Interdependent nature of human security threat

dimensions

4.4.1 HEALTH THREATS DUE TO MINING POLLUTION/CONTAMINATION

Since the August of 2005, AWD epidemics plagued the mining sites

and local people. This contagious disease is so acute and lethal

within 3hrs (for instances of its severity see box below).

Tabya Hitsats, Berhe Tesfay’s family (with all 7 members) seriously

affected due to their humane treatment for an AWD victim gold

miner they found lost in the jungle along their sidewalk.

A second instance, Tabya Hibret administration head Haile Tareke

narrates that in 1999 EC, “in one day seven gold miners dead

while they were trying to reach clinic on foot and I ordered

people to pick three others seriously affected that fell near the

rivers”. Especially in August 1999EC, due to the alarming rate

of AWD contiguity, local leadership warned people leave dead

bodies in their kambo.

Source: interview with Tabya Hibret administration head Haile

Tareke, March 2010

Why such diseases? According to health officers (Desale and

Solomon) in the Wereda, the main causes of the AWD epidemics are:

Contamination, crowd from different regions, some common tools

Tabya Hitsats, Berhe Tesfay’s family (with all 7 members)

seriously affected due to their humane treatment for an AWD

victim gold miner they found lost in the jungle along their

sidewalk.

A second instance, Tabya Hibret administration head Haile Tareke

narrates that in 1999 EC, “in one day seven gold miners dead

while they were trying to reach clinic on foot and I ordered

for panning and feeding (kuaria, dolla, bretdsti); and miners are

exposed and conducive for such diseases (see the different photos

for the precarious mining environment making them vulnerable).

Photo: drinkable water from running river water (people and livestock), 2009

The figure below shows number of affected and dead people due to AWD

in 2005/6- 2008/9, people summary dead in sudden land wall

collapse in 1997/8- ‘0/01.

Figure 4.7: Summary of deaths and affected victims in selected sample years

(Note that all years in the figure below are in EthiopianCalendar)

Source: interview result, 2010

Victims’ key- Informants, however, argued that including those

who affected and dead without seeing a doctor are estimated to

triple the figure.

Photo: contaminated/polluted river upon which local lives depend for survival

My field data collected from the Wereda documents shows that only

those who see doctors in the health centers, in August 2005/6,

170 citizens were seriously affected while 29 dead. In similar

treatment, in the summer of 2006/7, 116 citizens were affected

for such diseases related to water and food pollution and

contaminations. Besides, 36- 50 local citizens (miners and

residents) were dead of this pollution between 2006/7- 2007/8

rising the total citizens affected by mining related pollution to

illness and death to 152- 168.

Photo: children miners in their contaminated/polluted river, 2009/0

Generally speaking, therefore, it is safely arguable that the

corollary impacts of mining on livestock and environment, on

which the communities live on for survival, is incalculable. A

clue for trans- communities mining pollution, for instance, worth

mentioning is that River Hutsui crosses at least six administrative

Tabyas (or Tabyatat) where these all communities depend on it for

themselves and their herds’ subsistence.

The AWD Health risks, causes, victims and responses –Tabular

SummaryYears/

E.C

Highly affected

Tabyatat sites

Responses Risks

1998-

2002

with a

partic

ular

season

in

July-

August

- Emboy/Hibret

- Hutsui

- Adiwahbela

- Maihumer

- Maytselabadu

- Lowamin

- Grat Aboyzgoi

- Frequently in Hutsui

No. 7, 8, 9, 12

- Dedebit

- Hltsats

- Maili

- Adi Mehamodai

- Rahwa

- Only since 2006/7

- Health education

for about 3

months to: use

toilet; use

underground drink

water; Provide

with “mai Agar”

- A five year

follow-up

assignment which

are all too ideal

given the status

quo nomadic ASGM

sector.

- The AWD kills

within 3 hours-

contagion rate

- The rivers and

mining sites

are still

contaminated

- Trans-community

rivers

- The cause of

the AWD are

still there

with only

cosmetic attempts

to address

- At least 5 year

closer follow-

up is

Source: unpublished official documents and interviews March 2010

Finally, according to health officers there, there exists another

new simmering LIVER DISEASE that has reached a crisis stage

ALLOVER the Wereda in study. Despite constant research team

mobilization from Mekelle University to the area, no scientific

evidence is found to identify the real causes of the

contamination that gave birth to this storm. The long lasted gold

mining process is, according to my survey, among the fore

estimations next to the civil war contamination, estimated by

government, during the Derg periods. The grave concern lies on the

fact that there is no possibility of recovering once affected- no

medicine.

4.4.2 ENVIRONMENTAL MARGINALIZATION

Soil losses are directly linked to the rudimentary extraction techniques

applied where fortune seeking gold miners search gold deposits

only via “Testing and re-Testing” the surface soil. In due

course, some might find while others still re-Test their fortune. A

miner digs for soil assumed to have gold prospects using a

function of plowshare and shovel; then upload to the river or

rarely to ponds and finally, after washing the fertile soil (yet

rather better to say dumping it in literal sense) one may or may

not find gold for which are then, in the later case, functionally

coined by the miners’ language “bado”- zero/yet no fortune made. All

miners both continue driving their fortunes hence spent the day

regularly operating in this fashion. The extraction technique

incurring huge damage to the environment and its resource base is

a gravely missed concern.

Another incidence commonly factor for busy huge soil dump is

locally called “lottery” that is when irregularly sizable or

relatively bigger gold is found- inevitability of fortune making is

envisioned- after many unavoidably “null- fortunes”. During this event,

Fig. Factors for environmental insecurity in artisanal gold mining

inherently a kind of gold- rush is rampant and when some

“lotteries” are found it escalates for restless backbreaking

“Fortune re-Testing” cycle- where the missing concern for huge

environmental tragedy deeply enthrones in every miner. Such

incidences are also conflict stricken in an anarchic environment

- an expectation for quick big return endangering social

relations and environmental sustainability.

Photo: arable land disturbance with no rehabilitation obligation or concern

In line with this, a crude estimation of fertile soil loss in

Quintals within only three months (June to August) is drawn to be

(based on the in- depth interviews with miners and critical

observation) an average miner dumps 0.4Q soil per “dolla” –the

pan for carrying and washing soil and on average 25 times/dolla per

day and 28 days per month. In other words, one miner dumps

280Q/month, 840Q/June - August, and 33.6 - 42 million Q fertile

soil only in the (June to August) summer season by the 40 - 50

thousand miners. In a linear calculation, according to the office

of police and security in the Wereda, the current figure, in

March 2010, of miners estimation is over 90 thousand excluding

the home- based gold miners ensuing over 70 million Q loss of

fertile soil from June to August only.

Photo: marginalization of arable land after exit

As these miners exploit the minerals permanently as well as seasonally

(the farmers and students) that all fully rely on forests cut

down for cooking food and ever –renewable resting camps (short

living as miners occasionally shift sites with gold rush), one

may not need borrowing philosophers’ mind to understand the huge

deforestation and related land degradation.

4.4.3 DEATH AND BODY LOSSES RELATED TO LAND WALL COLLAPSE

As the ASGM sector is neglected and peripheralized by the ruling

agency, for this purpose, here are only some illustrative cases

presented. Though while digging for soil from holes, land wall

collapse related death and injuries are so commonly extensive,

the section 4.4.1 above shows only partial. All death figures

indicated in each year in that column shows summary deaths only

in four days of, not totally in, four years.

Photo: precarious and poor mining practice: necessity or opportunity?

From my field study from the in- depth interviews conducted,

which is widely known, among range of stakeholders, for its

traumatic effects in 1997/8, in Rahwa/Debresahle area while miners

were digging 15 meter horizontally deep into the mountain it

collapsed and 41 miners died on the spot. Its traumatic incidence

is that let alone their life, even the dead body of these victims

was impossible to find out. A year later again in similar

traumatic event in the same gold site 15 victims was dead of

sudden land wall collapse on the spot. To express this common

traumatic incidence of summary death where neither life nor dead

bodies are savable or findable, respectively, so that buries in

proper areas, gold miners coined operationally the gold site as a

typical graveyard. Accordingly, they called “ADEY KBETSNI” (in

Tigrinya conveying the state of stepping into LAND OF NO TURN) -

named after the once –for- all, UNAVOIDABLE, grand death

vulnerability (photos below may be illustrative).

Photo: Stepping into state of land of no turn: coincidence of necessity

and reality

In 2000/1 too, 10 miners (8 in River “Maihibei”, 2 in River

“Hutsui”) died of land collapse. Thus, only in three years

(1997/8 – 2000/1) sudden land wall collapse threats in these

three, out of the 26 mining sites in the Wereda, river areas is

crudely recorded to consume not less than 66 miners. Separate deaths

and body losses are obviously incalculable. In general terms,

what is more sadly believed is that these deaths and injuries in

the very remote precarious gold sites are unknown or if

fortunately known, not mainstreamed to preventive or corrective

measures from the government.

Photo: Miners in risky and hazardous underground

4.4.4 SOCIAL PROBLEMS INCUBATED BY THE PRESENCE OF ASGM

A pervasive social problem linked to ASGM in the study areas broadly

include (1) proliferation of child labor, (2) school drop outs, (3)

alcoholism, prostitution and (4) weakly integrated shift of lifestyle

from farming to mining. In the later case my survey obtained wider

inclinations towards abandoning household responsibility by

husbands/fathers drowning into status of neither villagers nor

urbanners –all night drunkards –leaving their family risk

vulnerable.

Photo: Jungle-based gold miners preparing food in their kambo; landless are

homeless

Today, these shanty gold site townships are stockpiling the marginal

(poor and illiterate) section of the society with “no” HIV/AIDS &

STD awareness. Accordingly, Wereda authorities in my survey

interview regretfully responded that those shanty gold site

townships IMPORT, if not more, as bigger beer consumption as the

Wereda and zonal administration seats. It is further predicted that

the threats might be complicated by such factors as (a) obsessive

alcoholism, (b) adulthood, (c) duty boundlessness, (c) lucrative

income, (d) illiteracy, (e) low awareness and cultural/moral

degradations disbursed by –poor illiterates’ skewed worldview.

They are trapped in the domains of STDs/HIVAIDS: no condom, no

awareness- “Deki Bereka” (overwhelmingly from rural to jungle, then to

bars).

Photo: home-based children artisanal gold miners in hazardous and marginal

mining sites

4.5 CONFLICT OVER RESOURCE ACCESS AND CONTROL

Two inseparable issues are embedded in the mineral/ land control-access

conflict in the area. The first one is the right to control- access to

land and gold minerals. The second issue is right to decision – making on

such resources and benefit from ones resource. However, the later

question of benefit - stream to local people is less articulated

since the sector is fully “illegal” and peripheral.

The affected community “knows nothing” whether they have

compensatory benefit rights, and to determine the mining sector via

ultimate decision-making power or not. Despite low knowledge for

well articulated expression of it, the affected communities keep

on advancing their opposition and seasonal violence asserting

their fears and position once and again.

Photo: Jungle-based “barto” gold miners looting farmland, the skeleton of the

conflict (standing, waiting for shovel)

In the discussion section, I briefed them the legal rights and

principles any mining affected community has. This was an eye-

opener promise for them. They expressed that the community has

been articulating the same position, interests and fears.

4.5.1 Position, Interests and Needs and Fears of the

Affected Communities vs. Nomadic Gold Miners

The solid position of the mining affected communities is that the land and

land resources are their sole property; the common lands and

forest are theirs; the rivers, lakes grasses and watersheds are

their “indigenous” resources; the environment /ecology in their

community is life-sustaining capital; the government have the

duty to forcefully drive out the invaders; the affected community

have the right to defend its life-giving resource.

The interest of the mining affected community is that they have the right

for safe and secure environment; they have the right to preserve

their source of livelihood; they have the right to life by

protecting their soil; they need to protect their rivers and

watershed from pollution and depletion; they need peace and

empowerment for their community; they need enabling political and

legal environment that provide opportunities for freedom from

fear and deprivation via opportunities for sustainable

community.

The fear of the mining affected community is that mining is a “curse” for

them, may be a blessing for nomadic miners; they are uncertain over

their environmental sustainability/security; mining creates water

pollution, depletion and food contamination; mining escalates

deforestation and land disturbance; mining pose pervasive health

threats and loss of bio-diversity; mining is a threat for their

peace and harmony; mining depletes pasture for cattle and starves

them; agriculture dependent on oxen and land is threatened by

water and pasture depletion and ecological marginalization;

mining poses long-term food insecurity and loss of livelihood;

mining weakens social cohesion and discourages traditional ways

of life; mining distorts community culture of environmental

conservation; mining generates conflict via marginalization and

vulnerability threats; mining have short-term- benefits only for

nomadic miners but lasting costs for affected communities. To

transform the problem sketched below, it necessities focusing on

the shared underlying needs and fears of both parties than on

what they publicly state as solution and what to achieve in

respective sides.

Figure 4.8: Island/Pyramid method of CONFLIC ANALYSIS

Island/Pyramid method of CONFLIC ANALYSIS showing Position, interests, needs

and fears of main conflict Actors

Similarly, the nomadic gold miners express their position, interests and

fear/need as well. In fact, the nomadic miners presumed to be

conflict parties to the mining affected communities are not

permanent. The reason that gold miners are seasonal and nomadic in

behavior, the enemy of the affected communities is (are) only

Miners Affected community

Supernatural mineral

Free access to mining areas

Survival (need) loss of survival strategy (fear)

Local resource tenure/identityExclusive

resource use

Secure

sustainable

livelihood

(need)

Loss of

livelihood

(fear)

Interest

Position

F&N

those who visit their lands and water resources. The challenge for the

research is this seasonal, nomadic and identification problems.

Miners seldom form groups which is very conditional and short

lived. There is no agreement or contract among the gold miners.

In normal conditions, nomadic miners exploit gold deposits in

common- a typical to the mode of food gathering in the state of

nature or primitive communal society. In such environment, disorder is

natural while legality and formality in this sector are missing

elements.

The nomadic gold miners have enmity neither with government nor

with the affected communities. What occasionally turn them into

conflictual relations with affected communities and intervening

security forces is looting- their interest. Their position is a

quest for continuation of open-access artisanal gold sector lootable via

nomadic fortune seeking. Their position, interest, fear and needs

are outlined below.

However, the position of the nomadic artisanal miners is not clearly

articulated and expressed. Firstly, the nomadic artisanal gold invaders

are coming from remote and different highlands. Secondly, they

have the habit of looting wherever gold exists- not who their

enemies are; neither have permanent enemies nor they operate

permanently there. Their nomadic behavior is like a dog affected with

rabbis. Even a son under his father’s supervision rushes away from

his father and search the alluvial gold all the day. They turn-up

rocks uproot trees and open up the surface. If no gold discovered

in that area that day, they search for information about good

news, and consult with one another with which one assumes to (or

must) leave. Finally, they disperse to all directions. Their hope

is to catch-up areas where good fortune is being made. Caused and

inspired by similar issues, miners reach from all direction to

the less promising gold site from which others are leaving.

At such confluences and moment in time, they exchange hopes or

desperation/frustration and wish one another for good luck. They

depart or go together to catch- up. Commonly used questions and

answers for information exchange in such situations are (see box

below):

Source: Participant observations and interviews that underlie

their nomadic character

As the above illustrative conversation shows, the miners have no

permanent mining area and therefore they have no identifiable and

MR (reaching miner) = Hi friend, we traveled away from site ‘X’ because everyone there got so desperate andfrustrate. What about you here?

ML (Leaving miner) = so bad to heart that! Here is also the samething and we are just leaving.

MR = Do you have good news for destination? ML = A friend of mine told me yesterday that site ‘Y’ has been

lucrative this week. Ten gram of gold is average for each miner per week.

targetable opponent. In normal expression, their strategic

position is illusive- loot-and-run. When the government mobilizes force

against them, the miners’ strategy is running away. When the

community and government forces comeback home, the strategy of

miners is returning back, usually in the night and loot ‘hamed’ –

literally means gold potential soil.

Put differently, gold miners’ position is loose and shy accompanied

by loot- and- run strategy. At times when encircled by mobilized

community as well as security forces with no space to escape,

nomadic miners enter into violent clashes against forced

expulsion. The violent conflict is characterized by both

community and security forces, acting, : initially and

peacefully, they warn and insist on gold miners to stop their

unethical and irresponsible invasion and to unconditionally

leave; next, and if not, they march armed with guns, firing

bullets, axes, swords, knives and sticks against ‘illegal’ gold

miners insulting, humiliating, abusing, expropriating,

intimidating, torturing, imprisoning (hand-cuffing) and injuring

and even killing any gold miner indiscriminately.

In such violent confrontation, gold miners use a range of tactics

most often exit-option and seldom counter-attack but reversing trend. The

death accidents are usually associated with the later tactic of

fighting back. The former tactic is used when early warning elements

indicate or remind the gold miners that ‘forceful expulsion’ is

inevitable and advancing. Such early warning signals include:

community members gatherings and mobilizations at farmers’ rest

days and evenings; government security forces mobilization

towards the mining sites and widespread fear and insecurity

enthroning among the miners.

In such situations gold miners use the tactic of shifting their sites or

location to inaccessible and strategic topography to spy and defend

any advancing force against them. Some times their tactics are

successful when mobilized forces go back. However, since the

community and security forces soon get disperse to accomplish

their respective daily business, the nomadic gold miners

immediately encroach back. It continues to be uncontrollable sector.

Even if the mobilized forces continue pushing the miners out,

they have multiple alternative gold sites and shift their location

easily. What is surprising and head aching is yet this freed and

being kept site continue to be plagued by fresh and late comers

from any direction.

In the seldom deliberately used counterattack as a tactic triggered by

encirclement and consequent intimidation, insults and tortures by

the mobilized forces, miners face their opponents using axes,

plowshare, shovels, knives, stones as well as sticks. Discussants

narrate that when conflict spark in the night, miners often use

flaming fires as they cook dinner, light and heat their bodies

that time. In such sudden encirclement and violent conflict,

miners form common front and alliance. As a result, the violence gets

intense and damages become traumatic. As such instances and painful

clashes spread over the whole region, nomadic gold miners stop

flocking to that area for at least two to three weeks or so.

Data gathered from informants who experienced such intense and

traumatic violent conflict narrate that in 2003/4 in Emboy (Tabya

Hibret) gold mining site community mobilized forces under the

leadership of local militia and policemen encircled all miners in

the morning. A few numbers of miners had early moved out because

they got early warning indicators. Everyone lost colleagues, all

properties and all fellows in the midst of disorder. When gun

barrels begun to vomit bullets, everyone loots what he finds useful

and run away to any direction.

When nomadic miners go far away from their resting grounds-

‘Kambo’, the live persons narrate, in the morning, mobilized

forces encircled them; they crushed miners’ feeding, panning and

resting shelters into pieces; they forcefully gathered them and

then ordered to handover what they had; miners who refused

expropriation of their ‘wealth’ begun to be hand- cuffed and

those who refused to be hand-cuffed, poured fuel to the fire. Then,

finally, violent conflict broke out. Miners who were moderate and

non-challenging were released barehanded. Yet they were surrendered

by the civilian community members who had encamping in the second

and relatively outer- layer of the conflict area against

fortunate escapees. To this end, different situational tactics and strategies

used by conflict parties, ‘shadow’ parties excluded, and their

trends are summarized below.

Table 4.9: Summary of different situational tactics and their trends

Tactics and strategies employed in mineral area control/access conflict

Tactics used Context Encounter TrendExit –option Early warning

indicators

Miners

vs.

farmers

shrinking

Counter- attack expulsion farmers

vs.

Miners

emergent

Negotiation force-induced Miners

vs.

farmers

surfacing

Adjudication consciousness Miners

vs.

chiefs/

and

farmers

vs.

Miners

getting

momentum

Triangulated data results show that the needs of the nomadic gold

miners (“wild men” functionally coining) are: securing subsistence

via nomadic and precarious engagement; a get rich quick whim;

absence of alternative source of livelihood to supplement meager

income and their fears include, among others, that unemployment,

loss of alternative source of income, landlessness, destitution,

and grinding poverty.

Almost all young nomadic gold miners are landless and unemployed.

The Wereda administration authorities consider the artisanal mining

sector as a necessity and employment opportunity but at the same time a

sort of “curse” for the affected communities.

A government communication office head of the Wereda Hadush Haile

views the sector, if not successfully transformed, an infection and

time bomb long- term scenario for the region. He says “the artisanal

gold sector pours salt to the wounds”. It meant that the region is

structurally a tinder box for environmental conflict. The degree

of natural resource dependence of the community, landless and

unemployed youth proportion is summarized below.

Table 4.10: Natural resource dependence of the local community,

landless and unemployed youth proportion summary Table

Landless in the Wereda = 21,000 (1999 EC/2006/7 survey) with an

exponential increase annually. The land

size is already fixed but the youth force

is increasing variable. The rest sectors

continue to vomit extra unemployed force.

Mining affected communities are inevitably dependent on the fragile

and degraded environment for survival.

They are fully mixed sedentary farmers.

Moreover, the shanties nearby townships

are also equally dependent.

Number of Nomadic gold miners rose from 40,000- 50,000 (in

2006/7), to over 90,000 (in 2010).

However, this figure is conservatively

Landless force is 136.2% of the total population size of Tabya Hibret in 2001

Source: Unpublished documents in the Wereda, March 2010

The gear below indicates that artisanal gold mining in the study

area is mainly caused by poverty/necessity and it in turn

inflicts lasting insecurity.

Figure 4.11: poverty- artisanal gold mining –and its detrimental

effects interlock

This artisanal mining force is 583.8% of the total population size of Tabya Hibret in 2001 EC

Table 4.12: Summary Impacts of the ASGM SectorDetrimental Environmental Impacts

Landscape destruction, watershed dry-up,

Contamination/pollution, deforestation (for building hut,

firewood), land collapse/river siltation, diversion of water

flows, fertile soil degradation (only June to August, >70

million Q of soil loss is estimated), pasture depletion, Loss of

biodiversity, waste contaminated areas, unsustainable resource

use

Detrimental Community Impacts

Mass influx/overcrowd, Instability/disorder/proliferation/

circulation of SALW, rampant contagious diseases (AWD), Child

labor/school dropouts,

inflation/wealth disparity, conflict on resource use/control

(skeleton of the conflict anatomy),cultural disturbance,Positive Impacts

Alternative/supplementary source of livelihood,

Foreign income generation

Public income (from export tax, royalty tax , license tax,

etc- very recent),

Infrastructural services for locals (road/health centers),

Stimulation of local economy (urbanization, shops, hotels,

transport service, agricultural inputs)

Figure 4.13: Factors for informality and not-legalized status of the

sector

CHAPTER FIVE

CASE- STUDIES: COMPARATIVE SPATIOTEMPORAL NARRATIVE ANALYSIS

To the mineral sector induced insecurity causation, two

illustrative case studies are mapped out in the succeeding

sections. Case study one presents the temporal narrative

explaining changing dimensions of intervening factors: people,

institution, market, resource and greed-and-grievance.

CASE STUDY 1: TABYA ZENGORAKO MINERAL CONFLICT AND ITS DYNAMICS

Stage 1: The genesis of exploiting gold reserves in these areas

specifically called ‘Endakuada/Tekuada’ is traced back to a

decade and half or more. In the early stages of the artisanal

sector, in the Wereda in general negative perceptions and images had

continued to characterize it-stereotyping the gold deposit

exploiters as mafia groups and lazy in agricultural works. In

fact, in the early dates, the price of the gold market (see chapter 4) was

not rewarding and attractive which steadily grew to 30- 40 birr

per a gram of gold. It might have been manipulated at the grass-

roots level that time even the direction of gold destination was,

and is still, unknown.

The areas in exploration continue so congested. Late 1990s, for

security purposes people overload from influx of fortune seekers,

miners had begun to register one after another based on their

sequence of destination- ‘Tara’. Then after, miners are called on their

names and exploit the hole (- gold rich layer of soil) for 15-20

minutes long then leave the hole for the next digger/miner. That

system was developed or planned by the artisanal miners to proactively

avoid any violent conflict causation by greed- and- grievance

among themselves. That time, the government was a virtual outsider

party. And rather government gold buying cooperatives were launching.

But as sooner as their emergence, miners boycotted them for

several reasons mainly: unlike government gold buying

institutions, private buyers(smugglers’) market price was

comparatively higher and flexible; private smugglers do not use

acid to refine gold which reduces the weight; kinship and cliental

relations were strong between miners and private smugglers, they

host, even provide them with heat water for leg wash, and guide them

to save money and train them how to buy gold in the jungle

including where to spent the night while buying gold across the

jungles equipped with necessary arms; governmental cooperative taxes

them as royalty and so on.

Consequently, the government gold buying cooperative soon dead out and

replaced overnight by flourishing and mushrooming private smugglers

from the towns down to the river areas.

Fortune seeking influx and congestion had been a security threat.

Fortunately or unfortunately, however, the gold reserve path “terminated

or disappeared” and then people went back. This particular

narrative was a typical case of gold rush. Such gold rush events

are violent conflict-ridden but it was contained, among others,

by: amicable proactive conflict prevention mechanism; peoples’ lower

consciousness and acquisitive desire may be due to negative images and

perceptions to the sector, and termination and/or disappearance of

the gold deposit layer.

In that point in time, it is safe to argue that artisanal gold mining (AGM) was less lootable and less conflictual because it wasless source of livelihood.

With less continuation of peacefulness, that area has been pray

to nomadic artisanal gold miners with a slight boom and bust cycles

until recently. In the summer of 2009, however, a similar and

relatively large- size gold rush over that area ‘Maitnkleet’ was

occurred accompanied by complex interest incompatibilities cross-

fueling conflict among several actors.

Stage 2: After about fifteen years, the conflict over gold mineral

in that area developed the following trends: greed-and-grievance,

community against outsiders, manifested; people become very conscious

and adequately get involved; peoples’ perception and acquisitive desire

closely changed; proactive conflict prevention mechanisms lost

relevance or missed; local government actively involved to resolve

it and security forces spoiled it via looting; affected communities

benefit-sharing and right to control become emergent issues; use of force to

loot and use of power to grab was observed against a farmer for his

land and against ‘jiwa’(group of) miners by nomadic fortune seekers

and by local security forces respectively; even the community who

again expropriated the looters (gold miners) from a farmer’s land,

forcefully in both cases, observed to be plagued by greed while

expropriating it with an attribute to budget it for their community

infrastructure to repair old school; and the conflict over

resource area (land) triggered the need to control the resource

(gold) -inseparability.

In the above mentioned trends inflated gold price (550 birr per a gram

until the time of fieldwork) and dwindling sources of livelihood are

among the pull and push factors intervening to the scenario.

As have been stated in earlier sections, the following seem to

equally intervening to the causal pathways: landlessness and rising

unemployed youth force; lucrative sector for unskilled and

uneducated force; broadening of stakeholders to the supply/ value

chain due to the post-cold war era expanding market on minerals;

missing legal framework to reconcile the raising interests among

multi-stakeholders; “point” or concentrated minerals is easy to control

but in an environment where legal framework and responsible body is missing, it

causes violent conflict over its easier control.

The local government (Wereda) played a reactive crisis management

role. The issue put to court proceeding in 2009 is discussed as

under based on available documents and in-depth interviews

undertaken. The following issues are intertwined in a complex

pattern therein: the farmer was forced by the miners to contract out

his farm land to them and they in turn pay him considerable

compensation- 1000 birr per hole- forceful compensation ‘agreement’;

local militia and security forces in turn expropriated the ‘jiwa’

miners’ collected gold rich soil (50- 60 Quintal) and purely refined

gold (350gram)i.e., 192, 500 birr ; one policeman among the

security force looted/cheated them and disappeared from the Wereda;

the local community leader called on the community to pan(- wash)

the expropriated gold-rich-soil so that the income will be streamed

to community school building budget; however, the community

members plagued by individual(or personal) greed and while panning

the soil in water every one picked(or spotted) the gold bar and put

into ones pockets and mouth with only a little income 10,000 birr to the

proposed community school- which in next days the policeman

siphoned it off and disappeared from the Wereda.

In this regard, every actor /stakeholder appeared to be

unethically and irresponsibly behaving from the individual farmer to

the community and its leadership. Finally, the government

compensated, another farmland, for the farmer whose farmland and

mineral resource was invaded. In sum, at this stage, AGM became

more lootable and conflictual because it became more lucrative

source of livelihood.

Stage 3

Peace and security risks sequel

Immediately after the previously narrated case of zengorako was

put to court processing, another phase of farmland invasion was

opened. The case was in the same Tabya, kushet of Hadush adi in

Lewamin gold mining site. The farmland licensee asked the local

militia/Tabya chairman to push out the illegal miners invading his

farmland. The chairman initially turned his back to the petitioner-

the farmer- attributing that he was arrested for the mere fact that

he defended community land and gold resources.

Consequently, the peasant used another option. The option was to

negotiate and tolerate the invaders in a way that selling out his

farmland soil commonly 20 birr per a 50kg sack (fertilizer

container) i.e., 40 birr for a Quintal of farmland soil. In doing

so, Shishaye Woldenchael (the farmer) mobilized local militia and

hired them in his negotiated soil selling to keep peace and security.

Similarly, nomadic gold miners agreed with Shishaye and security

militia to respect the terms of “agreement”. This was very

emergent issue developed from toleration-invasion to negotiated benefit-

sharing agreements in the absence of third party. For over a month,

this “illegal” and primitive practice was carried out without any

government intervention and even “understanding”.

Generally, in that encounter: laws were missing, and if any was

trespassed; greed and force were balanced leading to negotiated

agreement; huge profit or fortune making mediated all the dynamics (for

illustration see the box below). In this stage, it is understood that,

given development stage 2, lootable artisanal gold sector is

costly to control and monopolize.

Source: live person narratives, March 2010

Finally, the “unholy relations” was quitted for the fact that the

Tabya chairman was released free with a confirmation to forcefully

push out such illegal miners; a security force campaign to the area

was mobilized; and water depletion mainly due to dry season as a

window of opportunity at least until the next rainy season.

The conflicts which have been more recurrent and prolonging or at

least in stalemate- are in Kushet Maichew river Emboy and Hitsats gold

mining sites in order of their intensity. The insecurity pathways in

these areas differs from the pathways narrated above in: are mainly caused by

control over resource area and less on gold mineral (resource); are mainly

caused by human security threats posed by the process of mining

(unintended effect of gold production processes) which are latent

A woman bought about 15 kg of soil for 5 birr. She panned it and

found 100 birr worth gold- generating 95 birr net profit. Similarly,

within three days in that negotiated agreement encounters, one “Jiwa”

(a group of miners), constituting three colleagues, panned

purchased soil from that farmland and generated 17,000 birr

worth gold as a gross profit.

Farmer Shishaye, in his part, collected 45- 85,000 birr from his

farmland soil sale and deposited it on bank account. A

confrontation among the hired security militia and Shishaye was

aroused on issues of profit (rent) sharing.

grievances on the other; local community and its leadership did

not involve in benefit-sharing as such but very aware and

networked to defend/push miners out; are located in year-round flowing

rivers that make the confrontation year-round; are intensively and

permanently mined for long years; became permanently sensitive and

conflict-prone; are more diffuse in nature and hence often lootable,

and historical incompatibility spillover negative effects.

The issues raised locally in case-study 2 below but continued

dormant in the early narrated case-study1 include: ways of miners’

gold production, feeding and living processes adversely affect

their sources of livelihood, health and environment; cutting

trees for hut -building and firewood, depletion of pasture and

watersheds/volumes, pollution threat cattle livelihood and

equally to the mixed farming affected communities; and soil

degradation combined with deforestation in a two- way mechanism

penalize the security and survival of nature dependent agrarian

community; empowerment for decision-making power, right and

vetoing intervention; and over influx of migrant miners with all

forms of social ills and local inflation.

Pollution in almost all my observations and according to the

formal and informal interviews carried out is pervasive affecting

(them, year- round): miners themselves (for drink, bath, and

pan); affected communities (for drink and bath); non-mining areas

by trans-community river flows (for drink and bath); cattle and

all lives (for drink).

In a worst-case, in majority Tabyas who have no pipe water or not

adequately treated the health threat is pervasive. A noteworthy

point in comparison to case study 2 which is inherently

characterized by resource production effect conflict (resource for survival

and income), the forgoing narrative case-study is characterized as a

resource conflict by greed-and-grievance causal patterns. Lootability,

necessity, market demand, informality and perpherality are

congruencies that dissect both case-studies.

CASE STUDY 2: TABYA HIBRET/ EMBOY AREA/ CONFLICT OVER LUCRATIVE

RESOURCES versus RESOURCES FOR SURVIVAL

As is clearly shown in chapter-3, land and water resources in

mining lowlands serve dual purpose: mixed farming and gold

mining. And yet these overlapping livelihood activities are

mutually incompatible and exclusive. Hence geared by scarcity and

“abundance”, both livelihood conflicts and “resource curse”

tendencies are embedded in the lootabe mining sector extracted

artisanally.

The resource or resource area for the affected community is

obviously source of their survival. It is irreplaceable and non- negotiable

whereas for miners the resource or resource area is source of

lucrative income or employment. However, that resource or

resource area is not the sole one. Unlike the affected community, the

miners have multiple -mining sites though they differ in their reserves

and water volume.

It is also noticeable that if all (illegal) gold sites are

controlled by respective communities, the monadic miners will be,

even more than the communities, without any source of livelihood.

Generally, the existing scenario is that affected communities

have only one source of livelihood “alternative”-mixed farming-

which is under threat. Miners have relatively only one source of

livelihood but multiple and open-access operation sites

particularly in summer season (see annex 3). Yet the formalization

and legalization process, under experiment today, is storming

them.

The market, with ever-expanding gold demand since the mid-1990s,

is monopolized by a few long-traveling smugglers, if not all,

subordinating a lot of ancillaries at grass-roots who are price

takers under one umbrella. According to the data gathered from

affected community discussants, they receive little or no local

economic investment but all forms of costs and pains. In normal

circumstance, community members on the study areas cannot engage

in mining in their community. Because this act will be considered

as a betrayal for the community to which she/he belongs. However,

there exists a tendency to spark conflict at intra-community level for

some members prefer mining in community lands. It has been common

in Tabyas not mined by outsiders, by home -based ones. Yet conflict

in such cases is almost none. In Hibret Tabya is yet formation of

conflicts at intra-and-inter -kushet as well as Tabyas taking place

at an alarming rate. This seems to be mainly caused by the huge

prospects of gold deposits diffused over these particular areas with

year round water availability.

Figure 5.2: Three different incompatible purposes the local

natural resource wealth provides

Funnel: market gold supply, employment opportunity for landless and mixed

farming overlaps (inseparability from the local water and land resource)

The huge number of landless, unemployed and lured by get rich quick

mentality drifted to the artisanal gold mining currently leads to

tentative conclusion that the mining sector might cause a crowding-

out effect on the rest sectors. Secondly, the sector continued to

have weak linkages to the predominant local sector (-mixed

farming) with an enclave character. Thirdly, both sectors are in

throe locking the natural resource dependent local people’s

livelihood in vulnerability syndrome.

In most mining operation sites in common, two things continue to

occur as windows of opportunity in de- escalating the conflict and

human security threats.

Figure 5.3: de-escalation vs. escalation factors

Season: In the summer season people who have any size of

farmland engage to cultivate it. In this time, number of

immigrants to the mining affected communities reduces

considerably. However, in the mid-of August, farmers continue to

influx into mining sites for two reasons. One reason is that for

religious reasons. Agricultural activities are quitted for about two

weeks- called “Baalat Maria”. Secondly, since the lootable gold

deposit is diffuse in nature, the heavy rainfall in July and August

promotes gold discovery prospects with lucrative return. ThisRainy seaso

time, conflict and vulnerability scale to overlarge areas.

However, nowadays since huge non-agricultural force has been

trapped in this mining sector, this premise (role of farming) is

becoming tenuous. And rather the rainy season lit fire into the

fuel (see figure below).

River and ponds volume of water: Gold panning (-or washing) is

fully water dependent. The volume of water and number of gold miners

is directly as well as inversely linked (see Figure below).

So are conflict and vulnerability with number of gold miners.

In the dry season is difficult to dig for gold and pan. The

prospects for gold discovery and return are tenuous. Accordingly,

NAM

WV

0 +

+

rd Key: “rd” refers to direct relations in rainy season whereas “di” refers to inverse relations in dry season; “WV” to water

di

Dry season

“Rain-fed” mining

“Point”mining

Artisanal mining and

Artisanal mining and insecurity

Artisanal mining and

Artisanal miningand

Fig. in artisanal mining season matters degree of lootability

nomadic miners decrease in number and out-migration for fierce

competition among nomadic miners who inevitably remain less secure

on source of their livelihood. The victims of this season are the

homeless permanent nomadic miners: landless, unemployed educated

youth and rural-urban migrants in origin. In the case of Tabya

Zengorako, gold mining inherently is “rain-fed”. Whereas in case-2 it

is both “rain- fed” as well as relatively year- round river water are

available. In respective cases, threats intensity is directly

correlated. These two cases broadly represent the rest multiple

artisanal gold mining sites in the Wereda and beyond.

CHAPTER SIX

INTERVENTIONS, CHALLENGES AND SCENARIOS

6.1 INTERVENTION: INTENTIONS AND ATTEMPTS

For this section of flimsy attempts and transformational

challenges, an artisanal mining transaction coordinating core

process (AMTCCP) documents in the MoME in addition to interview

data are analyzed. In 2006, a unit responsible for the sector

was formulated which later was designed by BPR into core process

(AMTCCP) in 2009.

The founding objectives of AMTCCP, among others, include:

promoting awareness among multi-stakeholders promoting mining

activities by providing technical, technological and training

assistance to the sector; promoting licensing activity by issuing

mineral crafting, refining licenses and issuing certificate of

competence for traders and exporters; promoting exporting

minerals to accomplish these tasks, AMTCCP collaborate with all

stakeholders, coordinate the artisanal mining communities to

formalize and legalize, adopt participatory in a broad multi-

dimensional approach to mainstream this sector to alleviate

poverty, optimal exploration of existing minerals to increase

high value minerals export, encourage legal cooperatives to

export precious minerals improve inefficient traditional

techniques and empower the mining communities; use environmental

friendly means of exploitation and promote the sector as

alternative (off) farm livelihood; gender mainstreaming, fair and

effective marketing system, delineate mineral potential areas and

financial empowerment, etc; enhance livelihood of artisanal

miners and local people by developing infrastructure, clinic and

schools, etc.

According to documents released by this core process, across six

regional states there are about 127 cooperative associations with

about 3000 artisanal miners 10 % of which are women.

Several determinant factors were raised as constraints for any

attempt to transform the sector via organizing and grouping

existing nomadic miners into cooperatives (producers, buyers and

exporters) and legalizing them by issuing license for such ends;

conferring legal rights and duties on their operation, etc.

The miners and respondents who expressed their fears raising such

constraints include primarily that water volume and gold deposit richness

variability over concessions; seasonality and mobility needs and/or

experience; the need to achieve from gold production to

transaction or exportation; the need to withdraw membership from

one site and/or group interests; bureaucratic cost and

complexity; “indigeneity” vis-à-vis non-indigeneity conflict;

their hand-to-mouth subsistence income as unenabler factor to

initialize formalization processes; debt-bondage and tax-burden

associated with legal operations; affected local people benefit-

sharing, environmental reclamation rights and/or compliance and

compensation contracts would lock previously free nomadic miners

constrained and under tight bureaucratic control; low knowledge

and skill; and land concession delineation process is only

following traditional miners’ footpath.

The above scenarios found by nomadic gold miners so expensive and

unattractive for themselves, costly and less successful for the

government, and necessary evil steps for the affected communities.

Such trends of legalizing in very multi-causal pathways to

conflict of interests seem to open fresh chapter of (violent)

conflict involving old and new, empowered and neglected, licensee

and “license denied” actors across artisanal operators. These

challenges were mentioned clearly as a stumbling blocks when the

Wereda (youth Office) in study proposed to prioritize the sector

contracting out to the unemployed (or landless young) force.

Another reactive response intervention in the health sector is to

mitigate the Acute Water Diarrhea epidemics. In Asgedetsimbla

Wereda, Rapid Responsibility Team (RRT) was organized and

mobilized for that end. Consequently, emergency healthcare

service delivered to 43,482 both miners and mining affected local

people.

Table 6.1 Emergency health service delivery (2006/7- 2008/9)

2006/7 2007/8 2008/9

1,200 wuha agar

for

514 miners

686 local people

7,846 wuha agar for

3,570 miners

4,276 local people

'wuha agar' for

9,081 miners

Source: Unpublished documents in the woreda health center and interview, March

2010

In the campaign against the AWD epidemics, all stakeholders,

government and world health organization (WHO) worked in

collaboration to take the edge off. After identifying the scaling

up causal factors of the contagious disease, in an attempt to

transform, and help with, their feeding materials the health

center requested WHO for12 thousand “Jelin” (portable potable

water containers).

A Liver Disease (related to “contamination”) continued to consume

the lives of many people for over seven years. Today, this lethal

epidemic has spread over eight Tabyas affecting over 100 local

people and killed much more. Its root cause is unknown: local

people attribute to “aggression of God”/or “sin of Debteras”

while the ruling body attribute to “historic war contamination”.

However, one clue that intercepts all victim areas, according to

my survey, is that all have been gold mining watershed sites. The

end point that binds all the estimations is yet the crisis calls

beyond simple diagnostics theatre.

6.2 Transformational Challenges

Weak/ “Manipulated” Gold Cooperative Unions

The transformational efforts planned by the Wereda mainly include:

financial supports; credits and market networks ; introducing the

sector with modern machinery for refinery; “making water flow upward,

reversing the status quo” – artisanal gold irrigation; awareness creation in

church sessions for formalization ends; establishing gold cooperative

unions (GCU) which all but the last remained paper tigers.

The ASGM sector attracted the attention of the Wereda as an

opportunity for releasing alarming unemployment tides. Upon the

mobilization of the youth office, GCU launched in 2008/9 and up

to April 2010, for that end, 19 GCU are established. They have

three distinct but overlapping founding tasks i.e., 9 GCU on

production (mining), 8 GCU on transaction (buying and sale), and

2 GCU on production & transaction (dual task) across which the

conflict fault lines lie.

Task

GCU

9

8

2P T

f

f

f

f

‘fl’ is Intercepting conflict fault lines;

Figure 6.2: Intercepting conflict fault lines

Each has 10 to 70 members with total 525 members of which 67 are

women and 438 are youth. So far, producers did not start. They

rather remained very ideal with scant interest on production due

to opportunism, mistrust, rent seeking and resentment among

members.

Transaction is, however, active as, and perhaps more than, usual.

Yet there exists no transparency and neither holistic

bureaucratic procedure is in place nor is inherently respected.

For instance, according to GCU expert in the Wereda, 1kg of gold

is “corrupted” in Edagahibret GCU in the dawn of its establishment.

Fig. 6.3: Chain-of-command and organizational structure of sample

GCU in Edagahibret town

Source: Tabya Hibret Administration, March 2010

Hayelom GCU

Ordinary Board of

Chairm Vice

SecretaAccounta

Audit

Another point worth raising here is the GCU membership criteria.

According to relevant official documents and informants in the

Wereda, unemployed or landless citizens with recommendation and/or

evidence from local chief are mobilized. However, GCU

increasingly dominated by local elites (officials/ wealthy

intermediaries). This was attributed by the fact that firstly,

ordinary and old gold miners are less interested to form or join

membership due to their mobility; and secondly, they are absolute

poor to initialize launching capital. The reality is yet that

they are neither consulted nor have the operational possibility

in the status quo mining modes. Key- informant interviewees and FG

discussants view that except reminding in public gatherings and

church areas the intention to legalize the ASGM sector, the

government did not provide them such “opportunities”. One old-

i.e., experienced, gold miner exposes the trap made upon the

nomadic miners by these GCU complaining during the FGD session

held on the end of March 2010 in River Geleb Emni (see box below)

as under.

I am landless highlander. I am 42 years old. I have 8

dependants for survival. I have been mining for 20 years long

and I have been subject to violent expulsion for 15 years

across the jungles. All colleagues in this FGD have been

bombarded the day before yesterday in Hitsats (mining site) by the

local militia in the mid- night. Four miners are affected for

death then. Now we all are driven out of our source of income

for survival. Government stigmatized and excluded us from

Source: FGD in River Geleb Emni, March 2010

Another conflict fault line is ‘legal conflict’ between personal vs.

GCU. It is generated by “new law imposed” which empowers wealthy

individual members to supplying status restricted within 250 gram or

more amount of gold. Complicated by all such defects and

shortcomings, GCU seem too misleading- short of transforming the

risk yet nesting it for bad.

According to experts and leadership of these unions (my in-depth

interviewees), no conflict impact assessment (CIA), no

stakeholder dialogue and consultations on mining conditions, no

agreement with local people as to compensation, reclamation,

profit- sharing are made nor they operate responsibly. Put

differently, free, prior and informed consent (FPIC) upon the

mining affected and other stakeholders are missing. This only

makes a dual- edged sword snapping.

As a result, GCU are creeping to the risk of abortion or dying out

which is similar to the case occurred since the early or in the

mid-1990s where the government had involved in gold transaction

in Endabaguna town but soon dead out due to market factors

mentioned earlier (see chapter 5).

At national level, despite the ASGM became privatized since 1991,

it became pray of smugglers and illegal occupants for no

regulatory mechanism have been put in place. Even despite the

efforts made to halt contraband chains since 1995 EC, it brought

about no fruit compromised by contrabandists’ uncontrollable and

unpredictable tactics (MoME report 2009).

As far as the challenges on the GCU in mining area is concerned,

the Ethiopian ministry of mines and energy had undertaken a

survey on gold contraband chains in Guji and Borena Zones in April 2009 and

finally came up with a report in Amharic. The report found out a

set of factors which, are crosscutting in my study areas,

challenged the legalization and formalization processes. And both

the GCU and the illegal contrabandists have intimate link due,

mainly, to: absence of transparency and accountability put in

place; GCU are personified which are placed in the mercy of

individual chiefs and loyal agents; GCU purchase gold from

different producers but amount and timing are missing; when

members of GCU enter into conflict, they easily sell gold to

smugglers( more than half of their purchased gold enter into

smuggler chains); contrabandists cultivate close loyalty with

chiefs and unions members; contrabandists avoid transport

wastages to Addis Ababa by opening their branches at the grass

roots level.

Hence the black market became spoiling center of gravity in the midst of

these efforts due to: contrabandists have financial capacity to

purchase any amount of gold as sooner as possible; contrabandists

even pay suppliers (70%) beforehand; contrabandists’ market price

is attractive compared to NBE’s due to rising underground dollar

value speculation; intimate relations of existing and boycotted

GCU members to smugglers; continued incapacitation of GCU placed

them at the verge of dying out with ground touching supply

decline effect to NBE. The following smuggler pathways were

narrated in the MoME 2009 Amharic report which confirmed to my

findings in my study area (diagram construction mine).

First contraband

chain

GCU’s chiefs and members

supply

Second contraband

chain

Rural main townships

supply

Third contraband

chain

Kenya/Somalia/Addis Ababa

Cross border destinationSource: MoME, April 2009; fieldwork 2009/10

NBE

Table 6.4: sample mineral export development (table construction mine)

TOTAL EXPORT PER YEAR ANNUAL NET EXPORT INCOME GROWTH( USD)YEAR 2005 2008GOLD 100 KG ONE TONE $ 367,518,956.7GEMSTONE 0 ONE TONE $ 300,000- 400,000SOURCE: MOME BROCHER, 2009

Is really artisanal gold mining an “effective weapon against rural

poverty” or an “island of wealth in the sea of poverty?” This

poses a debate between rhetoric and reality. The case so far is,

however, poverty syndrome in these mining areas and the exploited

miners under the predatory market networks- and perhaps under the

mushrooming black-eye-glassed gold cooperative unions. This debate

between ‘a weapon against, or an island wealth in the sea of,

poverty’ locates it in the later domain mainly due to specific

challenges: low commitment and recognition, costly and difficult to

control, misleading and inharmonious nature of GCU at political

and institutional levels; absence of legal frameworks and

incomprehensiveness of policy issues at legal and policy level;

other sectors’ low labor force adapting capacity, poorly equipped

manipulated and “lazy” GCU at economic and technological levels.

6.3 SCENARIOS AND TRENDS

In the Worst-case scenario, the influxes of fortune seekers are

rising in number. The market price is exponentially steeping. The

sector is expanding and issues are broadening. However,

acquisitive desires and feeling of local harm is emerging. The

reconciliatory legal and transformative machinery is missing or

misapplied. Sadly, the interventions are of cosmetic and flimsy in

nature which lacks the responsible and transparent mining

standards and principles. Hence the size of needy, greedy and

grieved actors seems to keep on rising concomitantly with

exacerbating human security menaces.

Middle –case scenario may prevail with entrance of large-scale mining

companies. Yet this is not full remedy because except streaming

benefits to affected people and revenues for government, the rest

dangers are existent in mining areas. That is why the best-case

scenario remains to be none. For full and broader illustration of

all scenarios with an explanatory CFM Model (mine) see appendix 4.

CHAPTER SEVEN

CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATION

Currently, the ASGM sector in western Tigray is of a clarion call

issue which pours salt to the wounds of historically torn ecology. It

matters both a mining affected communities’, and beyond, socio-

economic, environmental and security dynamics. In positive

direction, the mining sector can be a conduit to address a plethora

of development and security concerns. In the negative direction of

ASGM, it sustains grinding poverty, conflict, capital flight,

corruption and marginalization.

Two interrelated issues are here worthwhile. Firstly, the primitive

nature of the sector prepares a ground for conflict and security

risks. Secondly, the transformational efforts in dilemma are

primarily an old wine in new bottle that are short of addressing and

capturing the underpinning roots of the problem. As to the first

specter in its nature: artisanal mining is poverty-driven-and-feeding,

miners vary from (semi)permanent, seasonal, home-based/or jungle-

based, emergent “rush gangs”, a luring sector that seldom

materializes promises, complex groups (- poverty trapped prisoners of hope)

and so on.

And as to the physical and spatial characteristics of the mineral and mining

areas in insecurity causation, in strict sense, there exists no

water-tight distinction between “point” and “diffuse” minerals.

Both are water dependent. Yet “point” or concentrate mineral

resources trigger intense conflict than “diffuse”/disperse ones in

situation of greed-and-grievance alike to case-study1. Put differently,

“diffuse” mineral resources are relatively peaceful but uncontrollable than

“point” minerals. Yet in “rain-fed/barto” gold mining, “diffuse”

resources by and large escalate conflict, damage environment, widen

conflict areas, etc. “Point” minerals are mined due, mainly, to:

exhaustion of alluvial or “barto”(rain-fed) gold, dry seasons, motive

for good and quick rewards, temporary (until exhaustion) control,

inaccessibility to “barto” areas by local forces and so forth.

“Lottery” gold mineral can be both “point” as well as “barto”.

“Point lottery” gold mining is much conflict-stricken among mining

actors than “rain-fed diffuse lottery” but the opposite is true for

soil degradation and conflict with local people. “Diffuse” minerals

can be alluvial or “barto”. “Diffuse” minerals can also be

scattered “point” minerals. “Point” minerals demand physical

strength, patience and “jiwa” (group) formations. Environmental

damage and influx of miners is by far larger in “rain- fed diffuse”

minerals. Home-based miners are entirely occupied in “rain-fed-

diffuse” gold mining. “Rain-fed diffuse” gold sector becomes highly

lootable in the rainy season than the “point” mineral in the dry

season. The converse is also true in the dry season. The spatial

and physical characteristics make it so lootable.

In the second concluding point, exacerbating challenges complicated the

mineral sector: the government begun to legalize; miners do not

want to be legal due to their mobility; government allow farmers to

defend their lands, farmers have no capacity to defend the mass

influx of miners nor the government have capacity/commitment as

well as space to control them. Dilemma is ripe. Except kushet Maichew,

the rest local communities lack cooperation to defend against

invaders which in any case does not work out the underlying

problem.

Such challenges are grouped into: production-side and governance-side.

Production-side challenges or risks include that mineral production

process is uneconomic, inefficient, and unviable; no environmental

considerations, no rehabilitation and sustainability efforts and

duties; production process depletes and degrades the local natural

resources (the life sustaining capital) of the poor sedentary

farmers; mineral production process is carried out in the midst of

human and physical environment that are both conducive and exposed to

multidimensional threat and vulnerability risks; the production

process, objects and environment spark conflict and lit security

risks at three levels, i.e. resource area and mineral control,

exploitation process and benefit- sharing and long-term risks.

Another emergent issue is governance-side and transparency

problems. The ASGM sector continued to be an “island of wealth” in

the absence of legal and policy mechanisms for about two decades.

Since the sector has been out of administrative machinery with

“zero” cost of entry, poor people in the sector has been victim to

predatory smugglers and the affected people has lost and continued

to lose its goose that lays the golden egg- multi-pronged marginalization

and impoverishment risks upon the agricultural base of livelihood.

Artisanal gold miners too continued to behave and act in Wildman

fashions that survive in the rule of nature across jungle areas.

Worst still, the gold miners are unmanageable -neither capable nor

agreeable for transformation. Moreover, the formalization processes

are complicated due to manipulations and misguidance at cooperativisation

levels. This is mainly because the sector is a manifestation of

necessity rather than cause of opportunity. The scenario found to be

that grinding poverty pushing out needy and greedy actors to the

“Island of wealth” posing marginalization risks as an opportunity

cost on the local people.

The sector feeds the gold producers in the jungle from hand-to-mouth

while well enough for the predatory smugglers and perhaps for the

new “legal” associations. This is because the old smugglers continue

to monopolize the legal Unions whereas the local Customs Authority

“expropriating” their long lasting mainstay of livelihood labeling

them “illegal” and “lords of black marketing”. The 100% artisanal

mode of gold extraction, growing sack by market and local

livelihood, not-legalized, open-access, “distant”, uncontrollable status

made the sector extremely lootable and a tinderbox of insecurity.

The paradox of transparency and formalization process of the mineral

sector lies for instance in the way “Cooperative Unions” are

organized and vested with rights and duties. Firstly, some gold

cooperatives unions have DUAL task rights: producing as well as

transaction (buy and sale). Since producers and buyers at

cooperatives level are not transparent, their sale and legal

exportation is equally dim. Secondly, since gold is solely produced

by the excluded laboring individual- based nomadic miners, the source and

basis of gold market in the Cooperative- Individual miners’

Encounter is not transparent. Thirdly, since the gold production process

is precarious, backbreaking, and exploited by the market, all

Production Unions have preferred not starting. Hence, the new legal

market in place is rather better to coin “a black eye-glassed

market” which “systematizes (potential)exclusion and Rentierism”. It

in turn makes greed-and-grievance and crime ripe and perhaps

“institutional”. In other words, the transformational interventions miss

the points of concern.

Does a mere abundance of valuable mineral resources in the midst of

abject poverty inevitably ignite insecurity and risk on local

livelihood? In my finding, the concrete issue that ties the bone of

contention is not essentially the valuable mineral but the process of

making it – unintended side- effects. This manifests at three stages:

as an engagement, as a process of production and as a spillover effect. A

secondary conflict issue is, however, the valuable mineral-

strengthened by MARKET and dwindling source of livelihood. This is

the overlap of scarcity and abundance. Poverty and market trapped

increasingly joining actors in the sector. Nature and context,

seasonality, causality, difficulty and perpherality of the ASGM sector

are the most salient reasons for its informality and not- legalized

status.

With the current trends, expansion possibility of the sector

including into large scale mining is strong. Despite the status quo

formal interventions, the resource “curse” conflict and impoverishment

risks will unfold: child labor, school drop-outs, alcoholism and

STDs hazards are rampant. The vulnerable nature of the sector

entails socio-economic and political detriments: extravagant

unskilled labor force with crowding-out effect and the sector is

isolated serving only short-term consumption and debt repayment

ends. Two concurrent issues are missed: the mineral wealth is

abused and simultaneously affected peoples’ rights are violated

with alarming negative synergies on (human) security.

In comparison to other same works, similar to earlier findings

(Auty 2001), (Lujala 2003) (Le Billon 2001, 2002, and 2005), Snyder

and Bhavnani (2005) and (Ross 2003), the sector is quite lootable.

Further, as D’ souza (2002, 2009), Chupezi, et al (2009), MMSD

Global Report on ASM (2002) and World Bank/CASM Report (2005) point

out the sector is conflict prone, itinerant, necessity pushed,

mediated by exclusion, legal fault lines and ever-expanding mineral

market demand and a recipe for lasting insecurity mainly at

production areas. The “resource curse thesis” (Auty 1993) and context

matters (Basedau 2005) at macro-level are partially existent, since

ASM is a halfway to large-scale mining, with strong probability-

GCU and Ezana plc as illustrative stepping actors. A, little bit

similar, finding on Mining Cooperatives inharmonic and frenzy

nature (Avila 2003) is that they are incapable, inefficient,

uninterested and exclusive in production, misleading in

establishment, boundlessly oligopolistic and misguided.

My findings yet dispute the World Bank/CASM Report (2005) claim that

limits artisanal miners’ daily income only to about $1 which I found

to be about $1 for the home-based miners and about $7 for the

jungle-based ones. However, the difference could be due to absence

of large-scale mining which could have monopolized the rewarding

reserves and the facts that market price differ on valuable mineral,

time and country specificity.

The lootable minerals-insecurity nexus is thus well proof in the

context of artisanal mode of mining in dominance, growing

contribution, as hand-to-mouth “alternative”, to sources of

livelihood and reluctance of the by the state.

Lastly, the sector needs comprehensive policy interventions for

which end this thesis owe to forge transformative ways forward. In

broader setting, the stakeholders need to mainstream six priorities to

address: conflict, poverty, marginalization, vulnerability,

stereotyping, and “nomadism” of the artisanal gold mining.

In the fore, it is a clarion call to facilitate ASGM sector

transformation from a transitory shock coping responsive activity

into a serious business venture and to change affected and mining

communities from vulnerable and marginal enclaves of individual-

based not-legalized nomadic miners into integrated, sustainable and

resilient ones.

Secondly, ASGM should be people-centered rather than only profit-

motivated or employment opportunity and collaborations among multi-

stakeholders are of critical value. Thirdly, revenue and benefit-

streaming to affected communities/people and infrastructural

provision to both miners and mining affected areas are needed.

Fourthly, gathering relevant data (sector profile) about poverty

impacts, risks, hazards and opportunities of the ASGM sector;

identifying (and mapping) champions/spoilers at all levels, priorities

and mechanisms for intervention; set clear and feasible objectives

in constructive, consultative and participant approach in the

sector.

Fifthly, promote the sustainable livelihoods of mining affected as

well as nomadic gold miners towards diversifying the local economic

activities; enhancing the ASGM capacity to holdback the rural-urban

migrants by fostering local economic multipliers.

Sixthly, adopt pluralist, holistic and multi-pronged approach to

eliminate or reduce its isolation and sub-optimal resource

exploitation due to primitiveness, risky, hazardous and

criminalized nature of the sector. Seventhly, the transformation

process should go beyond mere legalization and formalization: need

to broaden source of income in off-mining sectors in a sisterly

mode.

Eighthly, the necessity to shift mentality and mechanisms towards

resource management (besides extraction) is crucial. The reality of

“island of prosperity in the sea of poverty” is a recipe for

“resource curse”. Hence good governance plays pivotal role in

controlling, monitoring, managing, promoting and transforming the

artisanal mineral sector becoming a blessing.

Ninthly, promoting STDs awareness creation in mining areas, adopting

CSBP and establishing early warning system and proactive mechanisms

across mining affected communities is of a timely request.

Tenthly, two well renowned frameworks are relevant in searching for

remedy of the ASGM sector. One is the Yaoundé Vision (2002) (in Pedro

2004) which underlines the mainstreaming of the artisanal mining in

poverty reduction strategic papers (PRSPs) of African governments for

which their laws and policies in the sector need to be reviewed

accordingly. The second framework is CASM’s Vision on ASM provides, in

its strategic plan (2004-06) (in Pedro 2004), essential ways:

advance integrated rural and regional development, effective and

equitable legal framework, local infrastructure and services, fair

markets and credits, complying with international standards on

child labor and occupational safety, use environmental friendly

techniques (for extraction) and establish positive and productive

relations with all stakeholders including local communities,

artisanal miners, GCU and (the emerging) “large-scale gold mining”.

A final “all” encompassing recommendation by Jon Hobbs, CASM

chairman (World Bank/CASM 2005) in seeking to achieve a productive,

profitable and self- sustaining, artisanal mining sector, I assume

a conduit to transform the sector in study, envisions 5Rs:

Reinvestment of income to improve performance; Rights protection;

Responsibilities, both social and environmental, that complement

those rights; Revenue generation within the sector; Regulatory

measures to ensure formal ASM structures. For this purpose, the

sector needs to be formalized with a FPIC laying CSBP on the heart

of legal mining.

Finally, and after addressing all my research questions, I must take-

up a research question and leave hanged on air: is the artisanal gold

mining sector in such environment an opportunity or threat to the

local people’s sustainable livelihood?

References

Alkire, Sabina (2003) A conceptual framework for human security,

Working paper 2, center for research on inequality, human

security and ethnicity, CRISE, Queen Elizabeth House:

University of Oxford.

www. crise .ox.ac.uk/pubs/ workingpaper2 .pdf (accessed on 12

Jan. 2010)

Artisanal Mining Transaction Coordinating Core Process Brochure

2009, Addis Ababa

Amoah, Antwi- Boasiako (2003) ‘Proliferation of Surface Mining in

Ghana: A Threat or a Blessing to the Poor in the Mining areas? A

Case Study of Tarkwa Mining Area’, MA Thesis

www.lumes.lu.se/database/alumni/02.../ amoah _ antwi -

boasiako .pdf (accessed on 2 Jan. 2010)

Auty, Richard M. (1993) Sustaining development in mineral

economies: the resource curse thesis, London: Rutledge.

______________ (ed.), (2001) Resource Abundance and Economic

Development, Oxford: Oxford University Press.

www.flipkart.com/.../ resource - abundance - economic - development -

richard /0199246882(accessed on 4 Feb. 2010)

Avila, Eduardo Chaparro (2003). Small-scale mining: a new

entrepreneurial approach  

www.eclac.cl/publicaciones/RecursosNaturales/4/LCL1834PI/

Lcl1834i.pdf(accessed on 11 Jan. 2010)

Basedau, Matthias (2005) Context Matters: Rethinking the resource

curse in Sub Saharan Africa, edited by the German overseas

institute, Hamburg, working papers global area studies, No. 1,

available at www.duei.de/working papers. (accessed on 7 Dec.

2010)

Best, Shedrack Gaya (2004) ‘Conflict Analysis’ in Introduction to

Peace and conflict studies in West Africa, A reader, UPEACE Africa Programme,

Ibadan: Spectrum Books Limited.

____________ (2004) ‘The methods of conflict Resolution and

Transformation’ in Introduction to Peace and conflict studies in West Africa, A

reader, UPEACE Africa Programme, Ibadan: Spectrum Books Limited

Canan, Guduz and Diana Klein (2008) Conflict sensitive approaches

to value chain development. USAID May 2008 microREPORT 101

Washington, DC: International Alert for USAID,

2008.www.international-alert.org/peace_and.../practice_note1_marc

h2010.pdf (accessed on 4 Feb. 2010)

Chupezi, Julius, Verina Ingram and Jolien Schure (2009) Impacts

of artisanal gold and diamond mining on livelihoods and the

environment in the Sangha Tri-National Park landscape, Tieguhong,

Center for International Forestry Research, CIFOR, Bogor,

Indonesia.

http://www.cifor.cgiar.org/Knowledge/Publications/DocumentDownloa

der?a=d&p=%5Cpublications%5Cpdf_files%5CBooks

%5CBChupezi0901.pdf(accessed on 4 April 2010)

Collier, Paul & Anke Hoeffler (2004) Greed and Grievance in Civil

War, Oxford Economic Papers, 56: 563–595.

www.saramitchell.org/ collierhoeffler .pdf (accessed on 4 Dec.

2010)

Collier, Paul (2000) Doing Well out of War, In Mats R. Berdal &

David M. Malone (eds.), Greed and Grievance: Economic Agendas in Civil Wars,

Boulder and London: Lynne

Rienner.www.peacebuildinginitiative.org/index.cfm?pageId=2036

(accessed on 4 Dec. 2010)

CSO (n.d.a) To mine or not to mine? Sierra Leone Diamond Company

(SLDC) trucks with gravel containing, diamonds in tefeya town,

sandor chiefdom, kono district, www.nmjd.org/report/To%20 mine

%20or%20 not %20to%20 mine .pdf (accessed on 23 Jan. 2010)

D’souza, Kevin J (2002) Artisanal and small-scale mining in

Africa: a reality checkwww.epiq2.com/pubs/sierra_leone_ mining .pdf

(accessed on 3 Dec. 2010)

__________ (2009) Artisanal and small-scale mining: the poor

relation, EBRD, mining conference 24th Nov. 2009

www. ebrd .com/oppor/ngo/new/minreport.pdf (accessed on 19 Feb.

2010)

de Soysa, Indra (2002) Paradise Is a Bazaar? Greed, Creed, and

Governance in Civil War, 1989–99, Journal of Peace Research, 39 (4):

395–416. www.svt.ntnu.no/iss/ Indra . de . Soysa /cv/cv.pdf (accessed

on 3 Dec. 2010)

Endabaguna Wereda Health Centre Profile of Affected and Dead

People (1998-2002 EC)

Faleti, Stephen Ademola (2004) ‘Theories of Social conflict’ in

Shedrack Gaya Best (editor), Introduction to Peace and conflict studies in

West Africa, A reader, UPEACE Africa Programme, Ibadan: Spectrum Books

Limited

Fearon, James D. (2004) Why Do Some Civil Wars Last So Much

Longer Than Others? Journal of Peace Research, 41 (3): 275–301.

www.silkroadstudies.org/docs/publications/2005/JPR.pdf (accessed

on 5 Jan. 2010)

___________ (2005) Primary Commodity Exports and Civil War.

Journal of Conflict Resolution, 49 (4): 483–507.

jcr.sagepub.com/cgi/content/refs/49/4/483 (accessed on 5 Dec.

2010)

Francis, David J. (2004) “Peace and conflict studies: An overview

of basic concepts” in Shedrack Gaya Best (editor), Introduction to

Peace and conflict studies in West Africa, A reader, UPEACE Africa Programme,

Ibadan: Spectrum Books Limited

Governance and Social Development Research centre (2009) Helpdesk

Research

Report: Community-based Approaches and the Extractives Sector in

Situations

of Fragility and Conflict

www.gsdrc.org/docs/open/HD636.pdf(accessed on

5Feb. 2010)

Hibret Tabya Profile Surveys (2001, 2002 EC)

Hentschel, Thomas et al, (2002) Global report on artisanal and

small scale mining, iied and WBCSD, No. 70. January 2002.

www.asmasiapacific.org/download_file.php?uid=46 (accessed on 2

Dec. 2010)

Hoadley, M and D. Limpitlaw (2004) The artisanal and small-scale

mining sector and sustainable livelihoods, 9 September,

Proceedings, School of mining engineering, university of the

Witwatersrand, Johannesburg, South Africa.

web.wits.ac.za/NR/rdonlyres/90EC1E8A.../0/ 2004 resreport.pdf

(accessed on 6 Jan. 2010)

Homer-Dixon, Thomas F., 1999. Environment, Scarcity, and Violence,

Princeton: Princeton University

Press.www.columbia.edu/~ek2570/uni361%20-%20syllabus%20-

%202010.pdf (accessed on 6 Dec. 2010)

Ibeanu, Oke (2004) “conceptualizing Peace” in Shedrack Gaya Best

(editor), Introduction to Peace and conflict studies in West Africa, A reader,

UPEACE Africa Programme, Ibadan: Spectrum Books Limited

Jahan, Selim (2005) “Environment, conflicts and human security:

Analytical linkages, evidence and policy options”. Paper

presented at the international conference on Environment, peace

and Dialogues among civilizations and cultures, organized by the

Islamic Republic of Iran and UNEP, 9-10 May 2005, Tehran

Kahl, Colin H. (2006) States, Scarcity, and Civil Strife in the Developing World.

Princeton: Princeton University Press.

www.scribd.com/.../Demography-Environment-and- Civil - Strife

(accessed on 6 Jan. 2010)

Kaldor, Mary, 1999. New and Old Wars: Organized Violence in a Global Era.

Cambridge: Polity Press/Stanford University Press.

www.sussex.ac.uk/ir/documents/ new _security_challenges.pdf

(accessed on 5 Jan. 2010)

Klare, Michael T., 2001b. Resource Wars: The New Landscape of Global

Conflict. New York: Metropolitan Books.

www.polsis.uq.edu.au/dialogue/vol-1-3-5.pdf (accessed in Dec.

2010)

Le Billon, Philippe (2001) The Political Ecology of War: Natural

Resources and Armed Conflict. Political Geography, 20: 561–584.

www.cmi.no/publications/file/3283- natural - resource -wealth-

conflict .pdf (accessed in Jan. 2010)

_______________ (2005) Fuelling War: Natural Resources and Armed Conflict,

Abingdon and New York: Routledge, for the International Institute

for Strategic Studies.

____________ (2008) Diamond Wars? Conflict Diamonds and

Geographies of Resource Wars, Annals of the Association of American

Geographers, 98 (2): 345–

372.www.geog.ubc.ca/~ lebillon /CV_ lebillon .pdf ;

linkinghub.elsevier.com/retrieve/pii/S0301420707000049 (accessed

in Feb. 2010)

Lujala, Paivi (2003) “Classification of natural resources”,

Norwegian university of science and Technology, Dragvoll Paper

prepared for presentation at the 2003 ECPR Joint Session of

Workshops,Edinburgh,

www.essex.ac.uk/ecpr/events/jointsessions/paperarchive/.../ Lujala

.pdf (accessed on 5 Jan. 2010)

Lujala, Päivi, Nils Petter Gleditsch & Elisabeth Gilmore (2005) A

Diamond Curse? Civil War and a Lootable Resource, Journal of Conflict

Resolution, 49 (4): 538–562. www.cmi.no/publications/file/3283-

natural- resource -wealth- conflict .pdf;

jcr.sagepub.com/cgi/content/refs/ 49 / 4 / 538 (accessed on 3 Jan.

2010)

Miranda, Marta, David Chambers, and Cathorine Coumans (2005)

Framework for responsible mining: A guide to evolving standards,

(October 19) available at www.frameworkforresponsiblemining.org.

(accessed on 5 Jan. 2010)

Module 3 Mercury (n.d.a) Use in Artisanal and Small Scale Gold

Mining www.chem.unep.ch/mercury/awareness_raising.../E_01-

16_BD.pdf (accessed on 6 Dec. 2010)

MoME (2009) Yework Kontraband Be Guji na Borena Zone (in April) translated from

Amharic

Obara, Louise and Heledd Jenkins (2006) Land use disputes in

Ghana’s mining communities: Developing Sustainable strategies,

The center for business relationships, accountability,

sustainability and society, Working paper series, No.

36www.brass.cf.ac.uk/.../Final_ Ghana _ Mining _ land _ Use _ Disputes _ Wor

king _ Paper .pdf (accessed on 13 Jan. 2010)

Partnership Africa Canada (2009) diamond and human security

annual review 2009www.pacweb.org/.../ annual - review s-

diamonds /AR_ diamonds _ 2009 _eng.pdf (accessed on 12 Jan. 2010)

Pedro, Antonio (2004) Mainstreaming mineral wealth in growth and

poverty reduction strategies, ECA policy paper, No. 1, Addis

Ababa, Ethiopia www.informaworld.com/index/747877940.pdf

(accessed on 4 Jan. 2010)

Reporter Gazeta, Sunday October 8, 2002 EC (Amharic)

Ross, Michael L (2001a) ‘Does oil hinder democracy, world

politics’, 53(3):325-61

_____________ (2004a) ‘Does taxation lead to representation?’

British Journal of political science 34(2):229-49.

____________ (2004) What Do We Know About Natural Resources and

Civil War? Journal of Peace Research, 41 (3): 337–356.

jpr.sagepub.com/cgi/content/refs/ 41 / 3 / 337 (accessed on 23 Jan.

2010)

____________ (2006) A Closer Look at Oil, Diamonds, and Civil

War, Annual Review of PoliticalScience,9:265–300.

arjournals. annualreviews .org/doi/abs/10.../annurev.polisci. 9 .0813

04.161338 (accessed on 12 Jan. 2010)

Samset, Ingrid (n.d.a) Natural resource wealth, conflict, and

peace building, program on states and security, Ralph Bunche

Institute for international studies, the City University of

Newyork.www.statesandsecurity.org or

www.cmi.no/publications/file/3283-natural-resource-wealth-

conflict.pdf (accessed on 19 Dec. 2010)

Shoko, Dennis (2003) Small-scale mining and alluvial gold panning

within the Zambezi Basin: An ecological time bomb and tinder box

for future conflicts among riparian

stateswww.ddiglobal.org/.../SSM%20and%20 Alluvial %20 Gold %20 Panning

%20 within %20 Zambezi %20 Basin.pdf (accessed on 14 Jan. 2010)

Switzer, Jason (2001) Armed conflict and natural resources: the

case of the mineral sector. Discussion paper for the July11, 2001

experts’ workshop,

www.iisd.org/pdf/2002/envsec_mining_ conflict .pdf (accessed on 21

Feb. 2010)

Tadjoeddin, Mohammad Zulfan (2007) A future resource curse in

Indonesia: The political economy of natural resources, conflict

and development, CRISE working paper No. 35, October 2007,

department of international development, university of Oxford,

www. crise . ox . ac . uk /pubs/ workingpaper35 .pdf (accessed on 2 Feb.

2010)

The community –based natural resource management network (2003)

Artisanal and small scale mining, CBNRM Net News Letter, No. 22,

August 2003, www.car.org.bw/.../Final%20report%20 CBNRM %20review

%20vol.%202.pdf (accessed on 5 Jan. 2010)

The Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia Constitution (1995)

United Nations Human Rights Team Group (2006) Discussion paper

for the national dialogue: “mining and human rights in Mongolia”

Prepared by Center for human rights and development,Ulaanbaatar

rimm rights .org/.../final%20 discussion %20 paper %20amended%20CHRD

%20(i).pdf (accessed on 4 Jan. 2010)

Weinstein, Jeremy M. (2007) Inside Rebellion: The Politics of Insurgent Violence.

Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,

assets. cambridge .org/97805218/60772/.../9780521860772_copyright.p

df (accessed on 5 Jan. 2010)

Werthmann, Katja (2006) “Gold Diggers, earth priests and district

heads: land rights and gold mining in South Western Burkina Faso”

in R. Kuba and C. Lenz (eds) Land and the politics of belonging

in West Africa, Leiden: The Netherlands

World Bank/CASM (2005)the millennium development goals and small-

scale mining: a conference for forging partnerships for action,

Foundation for Environmental Security and Sustainability (FESS),

Workshop Report, The World Bank, Washington, DC (June 16 -17,

2005)http://www.artisanalmining.org/userfiles/file/CASM_MDG_Repor

t_8_19_05.pdf(accessed on 20 Jan. 2010)

Yemaedn Awajoch, Dembna Memeriawoch (proclamation No. 52/1993,

53/1993, 20th April 1994, 22/1994, 23/1994, 22/1996, 23/1996,

118/1998, Sept. 2009)

Interviews

Abrahaley Fkadu, youth office head Asgedetsimbla wereda, on 27 March

2010

Acting person, woreda court head Asgedetsimbla wereda, in March 2010

Desale Mebrahtom, early warning surveillance leader Asgedetsimbla

wereda, on 28 March 2010

G/gaabiher Solomon, health officer Asgedetsimbla wereda, on 19 March

2010

Getachew Mebrahtom (Dr.) (veterinary m.) Asgedetsimbla wereda, on 21

March 2010

Hadgu Girmay, police and security officer Asgedetsimbla wereda, on

25/6 March 2010

Hadush Haile, Government communication officer Asgedetsimbla wereda,

in Nov., on 17/19 March 2010

Haile Tareke, Tabya Hibret chairman Asgedetsimbla wereda, on 29

March 2010, Tell. 0914781603

Tsegay Embaye, development agent (plant science), Zengorako

Asgedetsimbla wereda, in Nov., on 16/18/26 March 2010 (Tell

0914781581)

ZER’EU G/MARIAM, COOPERATIVE UNIONS EXPERT Asgedetsimbla wereda, on

20 March 2010

Appendix1 RESEARCH INSTRUMENTS

Instrument 1 KI interview Guidelines : Specific questions (for

conflict mapping)

This in-depth interview is to elicit information on the problems,

functioning and prospects of artisan gold mining in multiple

mining sites in Asgedetsimbla wereda. Feel free to express your

feelings and ideas. Your opinion may go a long way to suggest

solutions that meet the future needs for a politically peaceful,

environmentally sustainable and socio-economically equitable and

productive artisanal gold mining sector.

Profile

What are the political, economic and socio-cultural contexts?

What are the emergent political, economic and socio-cultural

issues?

What is the history of the conflict?

What are the specific conflict-prone or -affected areas?

Actors

Who are the main conflict actors?

Who comprise the relevant political, security, economic and

socio-cultural actors?

What are their goals, means, positions, interests and needs?

What are their relationships to one another?

What are their capacities to spoil, or support,

peace/transformation?

Causes

What pervasive political, economic and socio-cultural factors

exist in the policies, structures and fabric of the society

that can create preconditions for violence?

Which factors further contribute to a climate conducive to

violence, its escalation or recurrence?

Dynamics

What have been the main stages of conflict to date? What are the

likely future patterns?

What are the current conflict trends? What have been past

conflict trends (escalation or de-escalation, important changes)?

How are the profile, causes and actors evolving and changing over

time?

What are the windows of opportunity? Are there positive

developments? How can these be supported?

What scenarios can be developed from an analysis of the conflict

profile, actors and causes to determine possible future dynamics

(best case, middle case, worst-case scenarios)?

Instrument 2 FGD guidelines: checklist questions

1. What is the ASM sector? --characteristics

--drivers to

--barriers not to exit

--challenges

--trends or scenarios

2. What are the impacts of ASM

at different sectors?

--negative/detrimenta

l

--what makes negative

--what should be done

--any positive on local

economy

--duration (short/long

term)

3. Who are the stakeholders?

What is their…?

--claim

(position/interests/needs &

fear)

--vulnerabilities

--rights/responsibilities

--sources of livelihood

--benefits/loss

--legal status

4. Map the conflict in the ASM

sector

--causes (root/secondary)

--actors

(internal/external)

--interests

--stages and scales/dynamics

--impacts

--interventions

--outcomes/trends/scenarios

5. Why is the mining artisanal

so far?

6. can large -scale mining be

better than artisanal mining?

Why?

7. What are the real human

security threats in the ASM

sector …?

--what for whom

--actual/potential

--what should be done

8. Are there any

intentions/actions taken to

transform the sector and

associated challenges …?

--how/why

____________________________________________________________________

Survey Instrument 3 including informal talks: Checklist Questions

Why do youth /people engage in mining?

What government policy or law facilitates or bans the sector?

What are the vulnerabilities over the environment, community,

workers (mining), resource and local economy so far?

What impact, and change, did occur so far?

What sort of communication do highlanders and lowlanders show?

Artisanal gold miners vs. Community, workers vs. government, government

vs. community?

What would be the government –community nexus on the open -access

resources?

Is there any policy cause for ecological stress and

community/human insecurity in these sites?

What is the population - land cause for out push of workers?

Is there adverse impact of mining over other sectors (agriculture,

commerce, education)?

What is the effect on soil erosion, deforestation, resource

depletion and the scale?

Are there illegal dimensions of resource grabbing, robbing,

violent conflict over ones field soil or tendency to monopolize

the public resource?

How are conflicts resolved, handled and transformed?

iv

Who are the stakeholders on the problem?

What are the root, triggering and precipitate causes for the

problem?

Are there, any mechanisms and tools in place to control the

challenge?

What are the public and government awareness and concern on the

challenge?

What are the scenarios ahead?

Do the traditional/manual ways of mining exacerbate the problem?

What is the knowledge of the mining workers about the

environmental unsustainability and human vulnerability?

Why workers loot crop-field soil admittedly?

Are not they looting public resource?

Do workers (miners) exhibit refrain from intervening (looting)

private land plots? Are they limited only back in the public open

access land resource of the rivers?

What types of resources are frequently claimed, exploited, looted

and bone of contention?

Who are the actors and what form of interaction they exhibit on

what resources?

What are the responsiveness, concern, intention and awareness of

the government on the tragedy and conflict?

What measures should be taken to put the issue on remedy?

v

Is there any compensatory system in place for the resource losing

due to the unregulatory nature of the state /local authority?

What do NGOs, pubic academic institutions (higher), government or

sector offices and environmentalists say about it?

What is the direction of the government as to what will be the

fate and destiny of the community regarding on its private

resource hold (possession)?

When, how and whom, was the mining begun?

On what account does the local community tolerate the mining

practice?

Which season is to tense by and exposed to workers?

What physical and biodiversity components are threatened?

Is there any degree of any kind of pollution?

Is there water borne disease(s) specific to the gold mining

rivers?

Are there any adverse effects on pasture, and water against

cattle?

Is there any crop failure upon miners step into it?

Is there any food security problem ever since?

Is there any insecurity threats?

Is there any sectoral distortion or diversion from one form of

economic activity to another? For instance, what are the labor

impact, productivity and price relationships and dynamics?

vi

What are the forest coverage, soil erosion and ecological

vulnerabilities to flood?

What efforts, if any, were made to recover the ecological crisis?

What illegal and informal markets and merchants did it bring

about?

Have these resources been sold reasonably and at market price?

Which actors and sectors have been benefited at most and at least?

Are there any changes in the nature of actors to, their knowledge

in dealing with, concerns and techniques applied in overage?

How many comps a site have and how many, in a village, people does

a camp consist?

Where do workers sleep? What do they eat and drink from? What do

they wear and where do they wash? Where do they urinate?

How many fire woods they use per day and where do they fetch it

from?

Does the feeding and living system equally devastate the

environment?

How many hours, days and months they operate? Is there spatial and

temporal changes /variations?

How many of these miners are educated, illiterate? And what is

their sexual and age category?

Are the workers capable of reinvesting and saving the money? What

is the destination of the money?

vii

Is the money generated from the gold at the expense of the

environment at the monopoly of few local merchants or not? What is

its distribution effect?

Has mining positive, negative or no correlation with food

production, pricing, cattle raring, living standard and education?

Do miners cut down trees, and if so, for what purpose?

Are all communities in the areas vulnerable to resource and

environmental exploitation?

Which types of common resource are most vulnerable?

Are there participants in gold mining from the local people?

Do local communities communicate to each other about the issue?

Had they ever taken any action, legal or forceful, against the

workers?

What negative consequence do people (local) soon concern most? And

what at long -term?

What measure and way out are they finding out?

Can they (local residents) tolerate any furtherance or less ahead?

Which, on theirs on others or on commons, resource depletion from

miners does concern or frustrate people most?

Is the gold mining practice being ever expanding or shrinking?

Which types of land plots, landscapes and soils are most

vulnerable to looting?

Do land plot holders (peasants) keep their homestead?

viii

Do farmers want to, have they made, change to mining activity?

How many members of a family do engage in mining? Is there

workforce shift to mining? And if so how do they compensate crop

growing home?

Do they (communities) feel safe, peaceful and improving? If not

why?

Would farmers transfer their land plots upon government request?

If so are they ready to shift economic engagement or to resettle

elsewhere?

Is the water sources as usual, better or worse? Why?

What types of places do miners camp in? Can these places grow

crops now, or before?

What practical obstacles and challenges do washed lands and areas

face farmers?

Why and how government organized and mobilized militia and police

force against gold miners? And did miners comply with?

Are local communities desperate and helpless on their position?

Are mining areas/ size increasing?

How far away are the mining land plot(s) from the rivers (ponds)?

What do experts (geologists, policy framers and legal and

environmental rights activities) advocate?

What are planned state interventions, what studies, a head? And

what is the destiny of local communities?

ix

Are conflicts, unlikely or inevitable, on resource share?

Are there any early warning systems and signs?

Has the government consulted, and upon the consent, of the people

at large?

What another easily lootable resources exist?

Is any gold mining citizen enjoying ones resource use right or

violating local people’s resource rights?

Whose resources are these open access resources and whose have

been ever since?

To what extent you view the environment is damaged by the

artisanal mining practice?

Could you, in your opinion, state the cost- reward (return) ratio

of soil- gold economics? A gram of gold and the correlative range

of soil loss?

Have you ever seen any remedies for the problem so far?

How do you view the fortune seeking- insecurity nexus?

Why are legal regulatory mechanisms absent so far? Doe it imply

less seriousness or less awareness?

Would you narrate conflict dynamics on the artisanal gold mining

sector ever since the inception?

In your opinion, is the ASGM sector a curse or a blessing- for

whom? Is it opportunity?

x

Do you feel fear and constrained in the sector now or in the near

future, why so?

Do you want to be legal and member of cooperative unions?

Why mining? Could you exit in your interest or unless forcefully?

Does government or other relevant actors support miners or the

other way round?

What are the most salient benefits from gold mining and the

gravest concerns therein in your life?

What are the driving forces behind the entry into gold mining?

What are, or were, your source of livelihood and what portion

constitutes gold mining?

How many people are landless or laying unemployed across the

woreda? What can the agency can do for them?

What are the seasonal and temporal characteristics of gold mining

or miners across sites? And what correlative and differential

causal implications do they have on conflict and security issues?

What are the issues, positions, interests and fears embedded in

the sporadic confrontations across mining areas?

What are the scenarios simmering?

xi

xii

Appendix 3: NAME OF MULTIPLE ARTISANAL GOLD MINING SITES IN THE WOREDA (ONLY PARTIAL)

Adi aini ambesaAdi Eskel/Endaaboi AwoteheiAdimehamadayAdisebaaiAdiwahbelaAlbedanAlbedanAratoDaero EdagaDebremariam KordebesDedebitDeguadugugniDildil/TekezeDrmelaEkkaEmbagalaEmboyEndabeleteEndashambelFelahitGhnbGihnbGndia’e/Endaboi ArefaineGodgodaiGratabozgoiGubitGundi

HimoritHirmiHitsats HutsuiKalai chaaKalaiferesKBETSNIKeih MeretKunsla/BenakoKurdadaLewaminLoketeMaiabi rubaMaiagam Maigen’eMaigomaruMaiguboMaigudguadMaihagosMaihanseMaihbeyMaihtsaMaihumerMaikolonqualMaikorbetMaikuhliMaikuhoMaisaglaMaisasuhMaitafatMaitelMaitnkleetMaitsadkan

MaitselabaduMaizewaritMaizhulMchwiMeesereMekabr aslamMelhasoMeratoMhtsab alabuMtsaMzlal Ma’eshoR’er’eRahwaRubaaslamaiRubasnaShna’elaSmretSnkataSubtaTrkuakuaTsaadanzenaTselimoiWalahumerZengorako

Note all PREFIXES that MAI means water, KALAI means lake/pond,RUBA means River, ADI means residence, ENDA means someone’s, and etcwhich stand for the characteristics of the Artisanal gold mining dependent onwater and operated close to local people residences and farmlands.

APPENDIX 2 Participants

KEY INFORMANTSADMINISTRATIONHADUSH HAILEABRAHALEY FKADUG/GAABIHER SOLOMONHADGU GIRMAYZER’EU G/MARIAMDESALE MEBRAHTOMHAILE TAREKEACTING PERSON _______________________GOLD MINERSBERIHU EMBAYWOLDEGIORGIS TeklayAGETE ASGEDEBERIHU TEKLAYALAY TESFAYAREGEHEGN TESFAYTHEGAY EMBAYELIJEY DESTAGUESH FEREKH

POSITION GOVERNMENT COMMUNICATION YOUTH OFFICE HEALTH OFFICER POLICE AND SECURITY OFFICER COOPERATIVE UNIONS EXPERT EARLY WARNING SURVILENCE LEADERTABYA HIBRET CHAIRMAN WOREDA COURT HEAD

Note all PREFIXES that MAI means water, KALAI means lake/pond,RUBA means River, ADI means residence, ENDA means someone’s, and etcwhich stand for the characteristics of the Artisanal gold mining dependent onwater and operated close to local people residences and farmlands.

MINING EXPERIENCE 10 YEARS 6 YEARS 20 YEARS 8 YEARS7 YEARS17 YEARS5 YEARS2 YEARS19 YEARS

LEGESE GIDAY ENGDA ABRAHA

ABRAHA GUESHYESHALEM ABADILILAY ZEGEYEH

DEVELOPMENT/EXTENSION AGENTSTHEGAY EMBAYE (PLANT SCIENCE)GETACHEW MEBRAHTOM (Dr.) (VETRANARY M.)AREFAINE KAHSAY (NATURAL RESOURCE)MAESHO ZEWDU (PLANT SCIENCE)____________________________________

Note all PREFIXES that MAI means water, KALAI means lake/pond,RUBA means River, ADI means residence, ENDA means someone’s, and etcwhich stand for the characteristics of the Artisanal gold mining dependent onwater and operated close to local people residences and farmlands.

14 YEARS 9 YEARS 8 YEARS 3 YEARS 17 YEARS

Note all PREFIXES that MAI means water, KALAI means lake/pond,RUBA means River, ADI means residence, ENDA means someone’s, and etcwhich stand for the characteristics of the Artisanal gold mining dependent onwater and operated close to local people residences and farmlands.

Appendix 4 The Clockwise-Fulcrum Merged Model

(This section needs much empirical support to prove or disprove it. Hence, I do not

claim it is exhaustively developed and made proof. Rather I preferred annexing it to

presenting as a finding in the main body).

ACCORDING TO MY “CLOCKWISE- FULCUREM- MERGED MODEL” (CFMM) ON NATURAL

RESOURCES CONFLICT INTRPLAY, THE seven SCENARIOS ARE DEVELOPED IN

MY STUDY.

NOTE THAT ‘CT’ STANDS FOR CONFLICT TRAP, ‘PT’ FOR POVERTY TRAP, AND ‘DB’ FOR

DEVELOPMENT BELT AND ‘PB’ FOR PEACE BELT. BROKEN LINE ACROSS DOMAINS INDICATES

VELOCITY GEAR OF EACH AXIS WHILE THE OUTSIDER SHOWS THE PREVAILING

“RESOURCE DESTINY”: AS “CURSE” OR BLESSING. ‘F’ IS A FURCULUM.

My comparative spatiotemporal case study narratives are partially

developed into the Market demand- necessity (consciousness) Y-axis (clockwise)

Market

NECESSITY

Regulat

Rentierism

GRIEVANCEACCESS

GREEDSECURITY

1

A

2

B

3

C

4

D

F

PT

DBCT

The fourdomains reality in checkscenario1 CFM

CFM

model and the (effective) regulation- rentierism X-axis (furculum) model. To

explain the valuable natural resource destiny (into “curse” or

blessing) in the current world systemic reality, both axis work in

mergence. It might share some common premises with M. Basedau’s

(2005) context matters discourse. But my CFM Model presented to map

scenarios “mechanically” explains the valuable natural resource

destiny.

According to the (clockwise and furculum) merged model, I draw

the following essential points:

Market

GREED

GRIEVANCE

Rentierism

Regulati

1

3

2

B

A

4

NECESSITY

DACCESS

SECURITY C

CURRENT

MIDDLE-

CASE

SCENARIO2

:

(MARKET-

NECESSITY

COINCIDENC

E CFM

DB

F

1) When demand increases by 1A, fair access and security decreases

by 1A and 3C respectively and grievance and greed increase by

1A and 3C;

2) Similarly, when necessity rises to C, security and fair access

declines to C and A respectively and grievance and greed rises

to C and A respectively;

3) When (effective) regulation expands to 2B, greed and grievance

declines by 2B and 4D and fair resource access and security

widens to 2B and 4D respectively;

4) Finally, when rentierism rises from 4 to 4C, security and faire

access declines by 4C and 2A in respective manner. By the same

effect, grievance and greed increases by the same magnitude

(by 4C and 2A) respectively;

5) Fair resource access and security are enhanced and ‘guaranteed’

only via effective regulation. However, effective regulation vis-

à-vis rentierism, both are “opposite” in magnitude which both

push to ‘3’against each other for opposing ends.

6) Since valuable minerals are greed inherent, when greed expands,

regulation declines towards 2A and rentierism pushes towards 4C3

down the fulcrum/pivot.

(7)In other words, when rentierism (4) coincides with necessity (3),

and regulation (2) with market demand (1), security and fair resource

access are threatened by functions of pervasive greed-and

grievance, high rentierism, low or no -regulation where

(8)necessity and market demand are pushed to spur as an effect of

the dynamics. In that point, a new scenario develops.

In contextual sense, these models are developed according to the

local artisanal gold mining dynamics interpreted using comparative

spatiotemporal case- studies and the post-cold war market.

Firstly, when the gold market price spurs since the post-cold war

decades, competition over access to mineral/ resource area became

fierce. That trend widened greed –and- grievance alongside rising

necessity and consciousness towards the sector.

Secondly, the ASGM sector has not yet legalized and has been open

to smuggler market and rentier actors. According to the clockwise model,

with ever rising price and influx of necessity pushed miners, conflict

over access (as well as fairness) to resource became alarmingly

acute and human security remained precarious and vulnerable.

Consequently, greed-and-grievance manifested at alarming rates. The

poverty-driven mass miners creeping 3C4 and lured by lucrative

income narrowing down 1A2 put access and security domains at

stake.

Thirdly, according to the furculum model, since rentierism and effective

law push against one another along 4C3 and 2B3 to necessity, in the

absence of legal and regulatory machinery in the sector, rentierism

and smuggler market enthrone.

Here, necessity, regulation and market are subsumed in the rentier-

smuggler legal chains/networks. Again, any attempt to reduce

grievance and/or greed is accompanied by similar reduction in rentierism

towards fairness and security relapse. Conversely, when effective

regulation coincides to 3 to overcome the necessity, greed, grievance

and rentierism are addressed and fair resource access, security and

“free market” prevail. However, in reality in the study area, let

alone effective regulation, the ASGM sector has hitherto been

unrecognized and in periphery. Moreover, the sector is isolated,

inaccessible, and lootable and primitive as a result of which stayed

more or less out of the rentierism- regulation fight corridor.

If fairness decreases to A then security decrease to C. However,

fairness and security cannot be offset (or widen) by 1A and 3C

respectively because 3C is rentierism in the furculum model (see scenario

6).

When necessity and market demand continuously increase and coincide

to rentierism and regulation in respective mention, a worst-case scenario

is developed. It becomes acute when rentierism excessively drives

down the fulcrum while regulation upward. In the figure below,

regardless the continuous clockwise circulation greed- and-grievance

feed into each other continuously on equal degrees.

The worst- case scenario is a typical representation of the liberal free

market under globalization which continued to impoverish the global

masses. In the above model, market and regulation, and necessity

and rentierism coincided in respective orders. The figure below

indicates extreme worst-case scenario where excessive rentierism

Grievance

Necessity

42

Market dd

Greed

overlaps huge necessity and market demand surfacing full blown of

greed-and-grievance to which the global mass is heading.

In worst-case scenario, security and justice are placed within the

necessity/rentierism-market/regulation corridor networks. However, their

opportunity is fully surrounded by greed-and-grievance.

As to the question of market and insecurity reinforcement scenario, three

critical points in time are evident: in the primitive communal system

of social history, there had been no commodification of resources;

later, the surge for resource invasion ushered in colonialism, slave trade and world

wars; during the cold war era, the market-resource commodification induced

insecurity was relatively looser than in the globalization era

manifested in terrorism on the one end and rentier failing states on the

other. However, these claims and arguments need empirical and

theoretical support for which I (or one) needs ample time to

prove it or otherwise.

Grievance

Greed

Necessity

42

Market dd

Rentierism

Greed

Market

GRIEVANCE

ACCESS1

A

24

D

F

CFM MODEL

IDEAL-CASE

SCENARIO3:

(MARKET-

NECESSITY

COINCIDENCE

CFM MODEL)

Regulat

Extreme worst-case scenario 6Key: Black

F

GRIEVANCEGREED

CTPT

DB

PB

NECESSITY

Regulati

Rentierism

GREEDSECURITY

B

3

C

WORST-CASE SCENARIO 4:

(EXCESSIVE RENTIERISM-

NECESSITY COINCIDENCE CFM

MODEL) - REOURCE CURSE

PRYSM

ACCESS

SECURITY

Market GRIEVANCE1

2

3

4

DCT

CFM

PB

Here the effectively regulated market that causes conflict doesnot ultimately cause poverty trap (PT). The market, however, widensgrievance less of destructive effect level.

NECESSITY

Regulat

Rentieris

ACCESS

GREED

SECURITY A

BC F

PT

DBBEST-CASESCENARIO 5 CFM Model

Market

NECESSITY

Regulat

Rentieris

GRIEVANCE

ACCESSGREED

SECURITY

1

A

2

B3C

4

D

F

CFM MODEL

REGULATED

MARKET CASE

SCENARIO7

DB

PT