Local organizations involved in the conservation of crop genetic resources:

conditions for their emergence and success in Ethiopia and Kenya

John Mburu1,* and Edilegnaw Wale21Center for Development Research (ZEF), University of Bonn, Walter-Flex-Stra�e 3, D-53113 Bonn,Germany; 2Department of Agricultural Economics, Alemaya University, P.O. Box 138, Dire Dawa, Ethiopia;*Author for correspondence (e-mail: jmburu@uni-bonn.de; phone: +49-228-731915; fax: +49-228-731869)

Received 25 November 2003; accepted in revised form 27 August 2004

Key words: Conditions for success, Crop genetic resources, Driving factors, Ethiopia, Kenya, Localorganizations, On-farm conservation

Abstract

Local organizations comprising of farmers, local formal and informal institutions, and public conservatorscan potentially be relevant options to confront the challenges of conserving indigenous crop varieties indeveloping countries. Although property rights and market failure problems experienced in crop geneticresources (CGRs) are different from other natural resources such as forests, wildlife, etc., such localorganizations, and contractual arrangements within them, can be very instrumental in enhancing on-farmconservation. However, empirical investigations of such local organizations in order to determine thedimensions of their feasibility have been scarce. Against this background, this paper analyzes interactionsof stakeholders in these local organizations and then explores the conditions for their emergence andsuccess. The paper discusses field cases of on-farm conservation of traditional cereals and pulses fromEthiopia and indigenous vegetables from Kenya. It points out that local organizations conserving CGRscan be classified into different categories of contractual arrangements depending on certain driving factorsthat influence interactions of stakeholders and devolvement of decision-making authority. The paperfurther argues that these driving factors, which include accessibility to markets, presence of collective actionor self-organizational capacity and provision of relevant CGRs conservation policies, form some of the keyconditions determining the success of the case study organizations. The paper concludes by outlining policyimplications on the structuring of such local organizations and the importance of certain factors in facil-itating their emergence and success.

Introduction

The principal managers of crop genetic diversity indeveloping countries are farmers and particularlythose living in marginal areas. Driven by survivalmotives involving issues far from simple profitmaximization, these farmers make decisions on thechoice of crop and varieties to plant, and produce

seeds and select them for storage and planting(Bellon 1996; Brush 2000). Further, they are oftenconfronted with a diversity of interests and, withthe absence of a single variety that they can fullydepend on for their multiple needs, they manage arange of varieties using a diversity of selectioncriteria (Maxted et al. 2002). Moreover, the seedsproduced are usually exchanged with other farm-

Genetic Resources and Crop Evolution (2006) 53: 613–629 � Springer 2006

DOI 10.1007/s10722-004-2683-1

ers from within and outside their communities andthereby new varieties are obtained, and lost ordegenerated ones are replaced. By producing adiverse set of crop varieties, these farmers practicea form of crop development and maintain cropgenetic diversity through on-farm conservation,which is a subset of in situ conservation of cropgenetic resources (CGRs). Thus, as past studies onon-farm conservation of CGRs1 acknowledge,farmers are a major stakeholder group involved inmaintaining traditional varieties (Bellon 1996;Thies 2000; Maxted et al. 2002).

Despite uncertainties concerning the extent andrate of diversity decline in CGRs (Virchow 2003),their conservation is taking place in a number ofdeveloping countries through ex situ and in situapproaches. Although ex situ conservation is stillthe dominant approach, in situ conservation hasrecently entered the stage for conservation of in-tra-species diversity. Taking ex situ and in situ tobe complementary conservation strategies (Menget al. 1998; Maxted et al. 2002), the latter is morepreferred due to its dynamic feature to allow thegenetic resources to adapt themselves to the nat-ural and socio-economic environment (Evenson etal. 1998). However, the level of crop diversity thatfarmers produce in situ is less than what societywants to have mainly because each farmer makesindependent decisions based only on observablecharacteristics of the varieties. For this reason,there could be landraces of no direct or immediateinterest to any farmer, resulting in possibleextinction, and also landraces of interest to thou-sands of farmers, resulting in redundancy.

Although farmers play an important role in theconservation of CGRs through managing diversityand maintaining it in their production systems,governments and other stakeholders such as non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and privatecompanies also make important contributions.Success of CGRs conservation initiatives cannot,therefore, wholly depend on farmers’ conservationactivities alone (Rajanaidu and Ramanatha Rao2002). Moreover, due to imperfect markets (Bellon1996) and transaction costs, the social and privatemarginal benefits are not identical and thereforethe level of conservation is sub-optimal. This calls

for creation of institutions or institutionalarrangements that, by creating new incentives orimposing new constraints, would enable stake-holders of CGRs to transcend these limitations.Contracts involving NGOs, research institutionsand farmers (other stakeholders may also be in-volved) in CGRs conservation initiatives could beregarded as a good example of such institutionalarrangements. These contracts are notably infor-mally created but, in a few cases, they may also beformal.

Empirical analyses of institutional arrangementsfor on-farm conservation of CGRs in order todetermine their characteristics and dimensions oftheir feasibility have remarkably been scarce. Indesigning institutional arrangements of on-farmconservation of CGRs, it is particularly importantto consider essential determinants of their effec-tiveness, for example, capacity for collective actionand other important socio-economic characteris-tics of farmers, driving forces such as accessibilityto markets and the capacities of the public insti-tutions. Against this background, this paperexamines local organizations2 involved in CGRsconservation in Ethiopia and Kenya in order tocharacterize the institutional or contractualarrangements within them and determine theconditions for their emergence and success, andfactors affecting farmers’ capacity for better cropdiversity outcome. Addressing these issues ishoped to shed light on some of the incentives thatlocal organizations create to improve the non-optimality of conservation through harmonizationof farmers’ variety choice criteria with nationaland international CGRs conservation strategies.For the national governments, such knowledgewould be important in the setting up of policy andinstitutional frameworks that have to be applied inclose cooperation or partnership with the farmers.

The paper is structured as follows: The nextsection provides a theoretical exploration of howdifferent contractual arrangements can be designedand classified. The third section describes the studyareas and presents the methods used to collect thedata. This is followed by the fourth section, whichdiscusses the roles and interests of the participat-

1 Plant genetic resources include farmers’ varieties (cultivated

traditional species) and non-cultivated species from other plant

species. CGRs in this study refer to farmers’ varieties.

2 The term ‘local organizations’ in this paper represents the

association of different groups of stakeholders operating at the

community level for the purpose of promoting production of

indigenous varieties.

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ing stakeholders, identifies the different factorsinfluencing emergence of the local organizationsand characterizes the different kinds of contractualarrangements that are created. In the fifth section,the outcome or success of the case study localorganizations is assessed in terms of efficiency,equity and sustainability criteria, and the condi-tions or factors determining it are examined. Fi-nally, the sixth section draws some conclusionsand policy implications.

Contractual arrangements for the conservation of

CGRs

Design of contractual arrangements

We argue in this paper that farmers, in theirefforts to enhance production of indigenous vari-eties, relate with other stakeholders (Figure 1) inthe local area leading to the formation of a localorganization. The farmers may be individuals or

organized in groups e.g., women groups, self-helpgroups and work groups. The stakeholdersinvolved enter into a relational contract or insti-tutional arrangements which structures how theyare going to relate with each other in the long-term. These stakeholders can be classified intoorganizations or groups according to the activitiesthey carry out to promote on-farm conservationof CGRs. Whereas some stakeholders may bespecializing in a single activity, e.g., the marketinggroups being involved in a marketing activity,others like the NGOs conduct multiple activitiessuch as advocacy, marketing, research andextension.

The creation and maintenance of local orga-nizations, and contractual arrangements withinthem, is expected to be dependent on a widerange of factors (see Figure 1) including thepolitical environment and policy frameworkconditions, economic factors, organizationalcapacity and other socio-cultural aspects of thefarmers, and nature of crops being conserved

Figure 1. Interactions among different stakeholders in a local organization conserving crop diversity.

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(Bellon 1996; Smale and Bellon 1999). It is alsoexpected that these factors will affect the internalorganization of individual stakeholder groupsand their capacities to participate as members ofthe local organizations. Environmental factorsare particularly important for the farmers in thatthey can be the sole determinant of the choice ofthe varieties that can be maintained in theirfarms. For instance, through their indigenousknowledge farmers have learnt to maintain cer-tain traditional varieties of cereals that do wellwith low rainfall or short rainfall seasons, andrequire low level of management and inputs(Bellon 1996). Largely, it can be hypothesizedthat the factors shown in Figure 1 are keydeterminants of the incentives created for stake-holders’ participation, and the emergence andoverall outcome or success of the contractualarrangements. This outcome can be analyzed interms of efficiency, equity and sustainability (seethe section on ‘Conditions for success of localorganizations’).

Types of contractual arrangements

Depending on their objectives, one can identifytwo categories of contractual arrangements:

(1) arrangements whose sole objective is to pro-mote utilization of CGRs and hence ensure theirconservation (Wale et al. 2003), and(2) arrangements whose primary objective ormotive is not on-farm conservation through en-hanced utilization of crop diversity (Wale et al.2003; Thies 2000).

The latter arrangements are often adopted inparticipatory crop improvement breeding ap-proaches, e.g., participatory varietal selection,and are often tailored to involve farmers in thetesting of the adaptability of varieties in theirlocalities, conducting seed production activities,and sometimes extending new crop varieties orsupplementing agricultural extension services.For example, in India and Nepal the participa-tory approach has been successfully applied inenabling farmers to identify existing local varie-ties that they greatly prefer but had never hadthe opportunity to try them (Witcombe andLenne 1999).

Drawing on Oakley’s (1991) criteria for identi-fying typologies of participation3, contractualarrangements within local organizations conserv-ing CGRs could further be classified according tothe levels of farmers’ participation and benefits(mainly in terms of power) drawn from varietytesting and crop utilization activities. Thus, we cansubsume three broad groups of contractualarrangements, which are likely to be presentwherever farmers are involved in the choice andpromotion of certain crop varieties. Seen from theperspective of the government agencies (mainlyresearch and extension agencies), these three typesof relational contracts can be termed as consulta-tive, interactive and informative arrangements.

Under consultative arrangements, the role of thefarmers is to answer questions from extractiveresearchers (e.g., crop breeders, agronomists, etc.)and extension agents. Farmers are told of the use-fulness of the genetic materials but they are notable to influence their analysis or use since there areno structures for making common decisions. Thesecontracts are also referred to as ‘take or leavecontracts’ since the farmers do not have the pos-sibility to negotiate (Salanie 1997). The interactivecontractual arrangements are characterized byresearchers and farmers co-operating in makingdecisions on the analysis of varieties to be grown orconserved on-farm. Thus, farmers have a stake inmaintaining their traditional farming practices,e.g., keeping existing landraces, or adopting newones (Witcombe and Lenne 1999). An extreme caseof the interactive arrangements is characterized byfarmers mobilizing themselves and adapting cer-tain crop genetic materials in their localities due totheir high capacity for self-organization and otherdriving forces such as market access, risk, resourceendowment and change of consumer behavior. Werefer to these kinds of arrangements as informative.They are however not common in CGRs conser-vation activities initiated by government agencies.

The consultative, interactive and informativetypes of contractual arrangements would beexpected to have different levels of achievement of

3 Since the broad concept of participation has diverse meanings

and interpretations, we wish to redefine participation to reflect

its application in this paper. In this case we regard participation

as a process where farmers not only take an active role in

contributing their own resources (farmland, farm inputs, labor,

local know-how, etc.) in CGRs conservation activities but also

are actively involved in the decision making process.

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CGRs conservation; and their application dependsmainly on the local conditions and the set objec-tives. Though they may exist in the form of simpleformal or informal agreements involving researchinstitutions, extension departments and farmers,complex arrangements that as well involve univer-sities, seed producing companies and NGOs couldoccur. It can be hypothesized that the level of on-farm conservation of CGRs and chances of successwill be the lowest with consultative contracts andthe highest with the informative contracts since themajor determinant is the level of farmers’ involve-ment in the decision-making process. On the otherhand, participation of farmers in decision-makingprocesses would largely depend on the capacity forself-organization or collective action (as a result offarmers being in small groups, being homogenous,possessing social capital, having able leadership thataid self-organization, etc.) within the farmingcommunities (Meinzen-Dick and Knox 2001).

Description of study areas and data collection

procedures

Description of study areas

In Ethiopia, data used in this study was collectedfrom the districts where the Global Environment

Facility (GEF)-sponsored ‘a dynamic farmer-based approach to the conservation of Ethiopianplant genetic resources’ project operated. Throughthis project, the Institute of Biodiversity Conser-vation and Research (IBCR) has established 12community seed/gene banks in 6 different regions(Table 1). Agro-ecologically, the regions with thesecommunity seed banks are characterized by high-land, mid highland (midlands) and lowland zones.The area covered by each of these agro-ecologicalzones varies considerably from one region to theother. For instance, the Bale region has 17% of itsarea classified as highland, 31% midland and 15%lowland, while the corresponding areas in KeffaSheka region are 70, 10, and 20% respectively. Thealtitude of the regions ranges from 700 to 4300 mabove the sea level (Demissie and Arega 2000).Rainfall is bimodal in most regions and the annualamount increases with altitude. In the highlands,crops such as barley, wheat and oats are betteradapted, but one can also find tef (Eragrostis tef),highland maize, highland sorghum and linseed.Crops which are better adapted to the mid high-lands are maize, sorghum, tef and millets, whilemost of the legumes perform better in the low-lands. Beef cattle and goats are mainly found inthe lowlands, while most of the dairy cattle andsheep are kept in the highlands and midlands.

Table 1. Community seed banks: distribution, membership, crop varieties and their seed outputs.

Region District Targeted farm familiesa

in a district

Membership (no. of farmers in CCAs) No. of crop

varieties

Quantity of seed (MT)

Male Female Total % of targeted

farm families

East Shewa Lume 800 200 (0.20) 1000

Ghimbichu 240 60 (0.20) 300 4 3.63

Bale Agarfa 31,178 86 12 (0.13) 98 0.31 3 3.17

Goro 19,469 82 19 (0.19) 101 0.52 5 1.95

Keffa Sheka Decha 170 56 (0.25) 226 5 1.30

Chena 268 29 (0.10) 297 6 1.47

North Shewa Ankober 70 18 (0.20) 88 2 2.36

Insaronawayu 60 6 (0.09) 66 5 1.32

South Wollo Kallu 168,831 206 17 (0.08) 223 0.13 3 8.67

Woreilu 34,998 311 51(0.14) 362 0.82 8 9.82

East Tigray Hawzen 270 30 (0.10) 300 11 7.00

Genta Afeshum 270 30 (0.10) 300 9 2.44

Total 2833 528 (0.16) 3361 68 (22) c 46.76

Source: Data derived from the project reports of the IBCR and documented by Tanto and Arega (2000), Demissie and Arega (2000),

Tanto and Demissie (2001), and Tsegaye (2003).aData on total number of farm families targeted by the project was lacking from reports of eight of the seed bulking sites.bMen and women entered in the table are from different farm families/households. Figures enclosed in parantheses represent the

proportion of women members out of total membership of CCAs.cThere were a total of 22 different crop varieties handled by the seed banks.

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The objective of establishing the communityseed/gene banks was to arrest the rate of loss ofcrop genetic resources in farmers’ fields. Prior tothe establishment of these seed banks, serious ge-netic erosion had been occurring due to marketforces, and policy and human-related factors(Tsegaye 2003). The most threatened crop was thedurum wheat (Triticum durum Desf.), which hadbeen completely replaced by improved breadwheat varieties in some localities. Besides aimingat containing this loss of crop diversity, the projectwas to develop a sustained capacity for CGRsconservation in the country, and strengthenextension and market services that would promoteutilization of local varieties. In addition to theestablishment of community seed banks, the pro-ject had different specific objectives or tasks ineach of the regions. These tasks were all gearedtowards enhancement of farmers’ on-farm con-servation efforts. The project was to analyze agro-morphological characteristics of local and im-proved wheat varieties of wheat and barley in Bale;analyze ethno-botanical features and market out-lets of durum wheat and barley in North Shewa;and study the impact of market incentives onfarmers’ on-farm conservation efforts in EastShewa. In Tigray, the project was to evaluate yieldpotential of farmers’ varieties of different crops(tef, maize, barley, wheat, pea, faba bean andlentils); while in South Wello and Keffa Sheka, itwas to analyze the diversity of Enset (Enset ven-tricosum [Welw.] Cheesman), sorghum, wheat andbarley varieties and the associated indigenousknowledge of the local farmers (Tanto and Arega2000). The number of farmers participating asmembers of these community seed banks andthose targeted to benefit out of this initiative areshown in Table 1, and are further discussed in thesection on ‘Groups organized by research organi-zations.’

In Kenya, data on indigenous leafy vegetables(also called African leafy vegetables, ALVs) wasgathered from the western part of the country,which, administratively, comprises of Western andNyanza provinces, and some parts of the RiftValley province. Districts known for ALVs pro-duction in this region include Nakuru, Transmara,Kericho, Kisii, Siaya, Busia, Butere-Mumias andBungoma. The region, covering almost an eighthof the country, is agro-ecologically consistentowing to the influence of Lake Victoria. It was

chosen as the study area because it has a highdiversity of ALVs and exhibits a closed and acommon culture of leafy vegetable usage, quitedistinct from other parts of the country (Maunduet al. 1999). It has an altitude range of 500–3100 mabove the sea level and is characterized by humid,sub-humid and semi-humid agro-climatic zones.The amount of annual rainfall ranges from 900 to2000 mm (Maundu et al. 1999). Due to thediversity of climatic, topographic and soils condi-tions, the region has diverse crop and livestocktypes and species. Cash crops grown in the regioninclude cotton, rice, sugar cane, pyrethrum, coffeeand tea, while the major food crops include maize,beans, ALVs, exotic vegetables, cassava, peas anddifferent kinds of fruits. The production of maizeas a food crop in the region is closely associatedwith the utilization of ALVs as the flour meal ofthe former has to be served with vegetables.

It is estimated that about 1000 ALV species areutilized in Africa and about 200 of these are usedas leafy vegetables in Kenya. Only 4 species out ofthe 200 have been fully domesticated, while about15 species are semi-domesticated and the rest arewild. Most of the domesticated and wild speciesare found in the study area (Maundu 1995). Kemeiet al. (1995) document that both the domesticatedand wild vegetable species in the study area havebeen grievously neglected and are threatened bysevere genetic erosion. This is mainly becauseCGRs conservation policy in Kenya has to a largeextent focused on genetic species of the exoticvegetables and it is not until quite recently that theimportance of the ALVs in enhancing calorie in-take of average Kenyan and alleviating povertywas highlighted (Maundu et al. 1999). To over-come this threat of genetic erosion through in situconservation initiatives, several organizations andgovernment institutions have been promotingALVs production through activities such as mar-keting of vegetables, seed collection, seed pro-cessing and storage, seed multiplication, andregeneration and characterization of species. Theseorganizations and institutions include the KenyaAgricultural Research Institute (KARI), Depart-ment of Extension Services in the Ministry ofAgriculture, NGOs and bilateral donors. Severalfarmers’ groups have also organized themselvesand, with donors’ support, are actively partici-pating in the promotion of ALVs on-farm con-servation. These groups target few farmers, often

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within the range of 10–500 in an administrativelocation. Unlike the farmers’ groups, the govern-ment institutions and NGOs lack clear targets andoutreach objectives. They also operate in vastareas, often combining promotions of ALVs to-gether with those of other traditional and exoticcrops, and medicinal plants, and encompassingactivities of the farmers’ groups. This made itdifficult to assess the targeted farmers that specif-ically fall under programs promoted by thesestakeholder organizations or even those partici-pating without having affiliations to other mobi-lization agents.

Survey methods and data

The evaluation of the stakeholders’ interactionsand dimensions of feasibility of different localorganizations conducted in this paper is basedmostly on qualitative data. However, some quan-titative data was also collected from the studyareas in the two countries.

In Ethiopia, both qualitative and quantitativedata on on-farm conservation of traditional cere-als and legumes, and the organizations involvedwas collected through two surveys in 2001 and2003. The surveys focused on gathering data onon-farm conservation activities of sorghum,wheat, tef, barley, maize and pulses. During thesurveys, the community seed bank sites were vis-ited and informal discussions and interviews wereconducted with farmers within the districts cov-ered by the project. In addition, technical staff ofthe local NGOs, the IBCR, and the EthiopianAgricultural Research Organization (EARO), andmultilateral and bilateral donors involved directlyor indirectly in the seed banking activities wereinterviewed. Data collected during the surveys in-cluded participation of farmers in the project,interaction of farmers with other stakeholders,crops cultivated and genetic resources conserved,marketing problems, farmers’ perceptions of theproject and constraints faced by the stakeholders.Moreover, data on the costs and achievementswere gathered from secondary materials in theIBCR offices.

In Kenya, a survey targeting individual farmers,groups (mainly women groups), local NGOs, localresearch and extension departments involved inon-farm conservation of ALVs was conducted in

2003. Methods used for data collection includeddistrict rapid rural appraisals which were followedby informal stakeholders’ interviews (guided by achecklist), joint field visits with the members ofdifferent stakeholder groups and participantobservation in pocket areas known for ALVsproduction. Market surveys were also conductedin the regional cities and big towns in order tointerview the marketing agents and middlemeninvolved in the vegetables’ business. Data collectedincluded marketing information (market avail-ability, prices, agents, etc.) and utilization ofALVs, problems associated with production ofALVs, types of membership, history and capacitiesof the local organizations, benefits achieved andconstraints faced when participating in the localorganizations. In addition, information on thetypes of ALVs grown in the study area was gath-ered. These vegetables4 include theamaranths(Amaranthus dubius, A. hybridus, A. cruentus, andA. graecizans), Ethiopian kale (Brassica carinata),cowpeas (Vigna unguiculata), spiderplant (Cleomegynandra), jute mallow (Corchorus olitorius), thesunnhemps (Crotalaria ochroleuca and C. brevi-dens), pumpkin leaves (Cucurbita maxima/mosch-ata), and the African nightshades (Solanumamericanum, S. scabrum, S. villosum, and S.eldorettii) (Maundu et al. 1999).

Different stakeholders and their local organizations

Stakeholders’ roles and interactions

In both Ethiopia and Kenya, local organizationsinvolved in the conservation of CGRs can beclassified depending on the type of the organiza-tions mobilizing the farmers and the factors ordriving forces leading to their emergence (seeTable 2). Whereas in Ethiopia all the farmers’groups were mobilized by the IBCR, in Kenya thiswas accomplished by different kinds of stake-holders. Hence only one type of local organization,the community seed banks, was found in Ethiopia.

4 Vegetables in western Kenya are produced mainly in four

zones: (1) Molo/Elburgon/Kabarak (mainly serving Nakuru

town), (2) Ainamoi (mainly serving Kericho town), (3) Kilgoris/

Magena/ Nyangusu (mainly serving Nairobi and Kisii towns),

and (4) Vihiga, Butere and Luanda (mainly serving Kakamega

and Kisumu towns).

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Another major divergence in the on-farm conser-vation strategies being applied in these two coun-tries arises from the structure of the localorganizations: all the community seed banks inEthiopia have a similar structure whereas inKenya the local organizations are designed indifferent forms and have different structures. Thelatter have been formed mainly to establish net-works5 for the exchange of seed and knowledge onimportant ALVs, how they can be marketed andhow production can be enhanced through seedmultiplication. In the following section, we look athow stakeholders interact with one another andthe kinds of incentives they create for one an-other’s involvement in on-farm conservation ofCGRs. We also identify various driving factorsthat led to the emergence of the local organizationsand classify the stakeholders interactions accord-ing to the types of contractual arrangementsdiscussed earlier in the second section.

Groups organized by research organizationsIn areas with community seed banks in Ethiopia,key stakeholders participating in on-farm conser-vation of traditional crop varieties include the

farmers and the IBCR, and a national NGO, theOrganic Seed Action (OSA). During the time ofthis study’s survey, all the targeted 12 communityseed banks in Ethiopia had already been estab-lished. The initial major task of IBCR was toconduct demonstrations of the local varieties to beconserved on-farm, and collect and buy the seedfrom the farmers in order to reduce farmers’ vul-nerability to seed shortage during the beginning ofthe crop season. Simultaneously, the IBCR wasorganizing the farmers into Crop Conservators’Associations (CCAs)6, which were to take up theownership and management of the seed banksafter the expiry of the project period.

The seed banking organizations function ascommunity-based seed supply networks for locallyadapted crops and enhanced farmers’ varieties.They have two major components; a seed store or agermplasm repository for local crop improvementand a marketing element through which farmers’varieties are bought and sold. Willing farmers areprovided with free seeds of their choice for plantingbut are expected to contribute to the seed bank anagreed upon amount of seeds7 (i.e., repay in kind)during the harvesting period. This borrowing ofseeds is particularly important to farmers during

5 In Kenya, knowledge on important types of indigenous veg-

etables, their cultivation and cooking techniques is still with the

local farmers and especially those who are above 50 years old.

The NGOs, researchers and extension agencies have been going

for this knowledge and the indigenous seeds from the farmers.

On the other hand, farmers gain knowledge of improved tech-

niques of cultivation after on-station and on-farm trials have

been conducted by the researchers.

Table 2. Types of contractual arrangements within local organizations involved in on-farm conservation in Ethiopia and Kenya.

Organization mobilizing

farmers

Key driving forces Examples of local organizations Type of contractual

arrangements from

governments’ perspective

IBCR Conservation and research

objectives (related to policy)

Community seed banks’ groups Interactive

KARI Research objectives

(related to policy)

Farmers–researchers’ groups Consultative

Traders (marketing groups) Market access Farmers–traders’ groups Informative

Collective action

(due to homogeneity)

Farmers (self-mobilization) Market access Farmers’ groups Informative

Collective action

NGOs Donor funds Farmers–NGOs’ groups Informative

Market access

Source: own table.

6 Farmers are regarded as members of the community seed

banks if there are members of the CCAs.7 It is the general assembly, the main decision making organ of

the community seed banks, that fixes the amount of seed to be

repaid. In most cases this was set at 115–125% of the seed

borrowed from the seed banks during time of planting.

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droughts and periods of seed scarcity. In addition,farmers are allowed to sell the rest of the seed to theseed banks at the local farmgate prices. The IBCR isthe community organizer and the monitoringagency of the community seed banks. It providesone technical staff per site who helps in organizingthe farmers. The key constraint for the long-termsurvival of the community seed bank organizationsis the lack of markets for the produce from tradi-tional crops.

Discussions held with farmers during the surveyrevealed that farmers’ attitudes towards the projectswere favorable as their seed demand had been sat-isfied. In addition, the flexibility of seed banks’operations in line with farmers’ concerns and de-mands was an incentive that enhanced participationin seed bulking activities. However, many farmersdid not enroll themselves as members of the CCAsas they had difficulties paying the membership fee(set by the main committee) and contributing theagreed amount of seed as ‘membership shares’ (inmost bulking sites one share = 25 kg of seed).Thus, although all farmers in the bulking sites couldeasily access seeds, participation as members of theseed banking organizations was quite low. Duringthe survey period, it was found that as few as 20farmers were participating as members in some ofthe seed banking organizations. It is also evidentfrom the four bulking sites which had data on tar-geted populations that membership in the CCAswas still low as the project period came to an end(Table 1). Notably, there was a gender imbalance inparticipation as in most seed banking organizationswomen membership in CCAs was less than 25% oftotal membership. This trend may be attributed tothe fact that men are the sole decision-makers in thefamilies or households of most rural areas in Ethi-opia.

Both farmers in the CCAs and the IBCR staffare organized in four types of committees thatcoordinate bulking activities: the ‘general assem-bly’, which is the main decision making body andthree other sub-committees under it. However,none of the 12 farmers’ associations or the CCAswithin these community seed banks are registeredas societies or voluntary community based orga-nizations and therefore the government does notlegally recognize their existence. Although theOSA promotes marketing of the traditional vari-eties by linking farmers with marketing agents, ithas not been formally accepted as a member of the

seed bulking organizations. This is because of themistrust that exists between the NGO itself and theIBCR8. The latter fears that the OSA can even-tually take over the bulking activities and startusing them to solicit for funds. Another keystakeholder, which also operates in the bulkingareas, is the Ethiopian Agricultural ResearchOrganization (EARO). The EARO is, however,not a member of the seed banking organizationssince it tends to promote use of improved varietiesand application of modern inorganic fertilizers andchemicals. Similarly, the Ministry of Agriculture(MOA) tends to promote the use of improvedvarieties at the expense of local ones. As such, theactivities of these two institutions are not in har-mony with those of the IBCR and the OSA.

Kenya does not have an organization like theIBCR whose sole responsibility is biodiversityconservation. Thus, conservation of indigenousvegetables is handled by the KARI, which is alsomandated by the government to promote pro-duction of the exotic varieties, e.g., the cabbage.The organization lacks incentives to promoteproduction of ALVs since the Kenyan agriculturalpolicy emphasizes on enhanced production ofexotic varieties in efforts to alleviate food shortageand poverty. As such there are very few localorganizations where farmers have been organizedby the KARI to grow indigenous vegetables. Suchgroups are normally contracted by the KARI and,without establishing structures for making com-mon decisions, are required to conduct farm trialsand exchange information on the evolving andunidentified varieties, e.g., the Solanum species.

Groups organized by marketing agentsIn these kinds of local organizations, farmers areorganized in farmers’ groups or working groupswhich relate with certain traders’ groups or mid-dlemen. No other stakeholders belong to theseorganizations. The farmers are organized in smallgroups of 10–15 persons. In an administrativelocation with a population of 300–500 farminghouseholds, for example, we found out that thereare as many as five such local organizations.Likewise, traders belonging to each local organi-zation are organized in a group of 3–5 persons.Members of both the farmers’ and traders’ groups

8 The key technical persons of the OSA are actually former

IBCR scientists who initiated the seed bulking activities.

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are women, though men, whose wives are mem-bers, also participate in the cultivation of vegeta-bles. There are no men in the traders’ groups.

The key driving force or incentive for theestablishment of these organizations is the openingup of market in Nairobi for the indigenous vege-tables and particularly the African nightshades,cowpeas and amaranths. It is the traders whomobilize the farmers to organize themselves intogroups in order to grow vegetables to sell to themin bulk. These vegetables are then taken to Nai-robi, which is about 400 km away. By organizingthe farmers, the traders are able to get agreed upontimes of harvesting the vegetables. Their interestis to get enough produce to transport to Nairobiin order to reduce operational costs of theirbusiness.

Normally, the traders set the farm gate pricesbut the farmers’ groups have the option to nego-tiate and reach an agreeable price. However, thetraders have a stronger bargaining position sincethey can threaten farmers of abandoning theirproduce and fetching other growers. Farmers whodo not belong to any of the farmers–traders’groups are forced to sell their vegetables at lowerprices since there are no prior marketing arrange-ments. The traders’ groups have the role to keepthe farmers’ groups informed of the prevailingconsumer prices in Nairobi, consumer preferencesand any other information necessary for themaintenance of the contractual arrangements. InTransmara District where these local organiza-tions are common, all the participating farmersand traders belong to one ethnic group – the Kisii.Thus, homogeneity in terms of culture and socialbackground plays a vital role in the emergence andmaintenance of these local organizations.

Farmers’ self-organized groupsIn these organizations, farmers who have alreadyorganized themselves into formal groups come torealize the gains of cultivating indigenous vegeta-ble all by themselves. Thus, the key driving forcefor the emergence of these groups is not profitsfrom vegetables, but rather other socio-economicproblems, which they had been established tohandle. However, involvement of these groups invegetable production activities was cultivated bythe demand for leaves in Nairobi and other nearbybig towns, and for seed by the local farmers. The

members of such groups are close neighboringfamilies who are homogeneous (in terms of cultureand economic endowment) and characterized byhigh levels of social capital. The groups have thecapacity to invite the research and extensionagencies to train or advise them on any technologythey desire. The training organizations are, how-ever, not allowed to participate in the decisionmaking process. The groups do not have anycontractual arrangements with marketing agentsor traders since they sell their farm produce directto consumers in big cities (including Nairobi).Such groups are quite few and one is likely to findonly a single one in an administrative district. Onesuch organization is the Technology AdoptionThrough Research Organization (TATRO) wo-men group in Siaya District, which has 20 mem-bers and is involved in the cultivation of Crotalariaspecies and spider plant leaves and seeds.

Groups organized by advocacy organizationsThese kinds of local organizations have two keymembers: the NGOs and the farmers. The latterare normally organized as women and self-helpgroups. These farmers’ groups are mobilized bythe NGOs whose key interest is the promotion ofvegetable cultivation. The key driving force for theemergence of the NGOs-farmers’ organizations isthe availability of donor funds from bilateral do-nors and international research organizations (e.g.,IPGRI). In addition, participation of farmers’groups in these organizations is enhanced by theaccessibility to ready markets for their farm pro-duce, and particularly the seed that is bought bythe NGOs and re-supplied to the farmers. As such,the NGOs relate also to the farmers as the mar-keting agents for the seed (NGOs buy and sell theseed). The research and extension agencies do nothave any relational contracts with these farmers’groups since the NGOs have the capacity to trainthe farmers and share any technical informationwith them. Normally, the NGOs set the buyingand selling prices of the seeds without negotiatingwith the farmers. However, these prices are highlysubsidized and thus serve as a key incentive forfarmers’ participation in on-farm conservationactivities. Examples of such NGOs include theRural Outreach Programme (ROP) in Butere-Mumias District and Sustainable AgricultureCentre for Research, Extension and Develop-

622

ment in Africa (SACRED Africa) in BungomaDistrict.

Following the discussion in this section and inthe theoretical framework, the various types ofcontractual arrangements found in the empiricalcases in Ethiopia and Kenya can be summarized asshown in Table 2. These contractual arrangementsare assigned to the empirical cases of local orga-nizations from the perspective of the governmentagencies. The criteria considered are mainlyinteractions of stakeholders and devolvement ofthe decision making authority, which are driven bycertain factors or conditions that also lead to theemergence of the different local organizations. Ourevaluation in Table 2 shows that most of thecontractual arrangements in Kenya are of theinformative type since the government agencies arenot directly involved. The major hindrance in thiscase is the policy, which fails to clearly spell outthe roles of research and extension agencies withregard to conservation of CGRs. In addition, theseagencies lack the capacity to mobilize farmers andestablish structures for common decision makingdue to budget limitations. Thus, the KARI is ableto establish consultative contracts only. In Ethio-pia, the IBCR has policy incentives and, being thekey decision maker in conservation initiatives, itscontractual arrangements are mainly of the inter-active type.

It can also be noted from Table 2 that theextension departments are not members of thelocal organizations. This may be because of thedifficulties they face while attempting to passconflicting messages to the farmers: one for on-farm conservation and the other for increased foodproduction by growing high yielding exotic varie-ties. Notably, the extension departments enjoyclose relationships with the EARO and the KARIin Ethiopia and Kenya, respectively, whose prior-ity is promotion of the exotic varieties. Overall,Table 2 indicates that emergence of the Kenyanlocal organizations is mostly being propelled bythe availability of markets for indigenous cropproducts. This may mainly be attributed to con-sumers’ realization that the indigenous vegetablesare more nutritious than the exotic ones (Maunduet al. 1999). Table 2 also shows that the informa-tive type of contractual arrangements emergesmostly in conditions where farmers have a capac-ity for self-organization or collective action andaccessibility to markets.

Conditions for success of local organizations

To assess the conditions for success, one is first ofall confronted with the problem of quantifyingwhether the local organizations have been suc-cessful or not as CGRs conservation organiza-tions. Thus, we develop first in this section thecriteria for assessing the success of these localorganizations. This is followed by an assessment asto how successful the case study local organiza-tions were and an analysis of the factors influ-encing this success.

Criteria for evaluating success of local organizations

Within the context of sustainable development(WCED, 19879) and the Convention on BiologicalDiversity (CBD), three broad criteria i.e., eco-nomic, ecological, and social (socio-cultural) canbe used to evaluate success of local organizationsinvolved in the conservation of biodiversity andnatural resources. However, considerations ofsuccess in a short-term perspective will entail fur-ther elaboration of the above criteria. Accordingto Hanna (1995), the most common evaluativecriteria that can be applied practically are: effi-ciency, equity and sustainability. Most of thesecriteria have been applied in assessing success ofthe local organizations or co-management orga-nizations involved in the conservation of fisheries,forests and wildlife.

Efficiency of CGRs organizations can generallybe considered in terms of cost-effectiveness, wherethe lowest costs to achieve a particular or statedlevel of benefits are determined. However, thereare also situations where flows of both costs andbenefits have to be considered (Mburu and Birner2002) in order to identify the level of conservationbenefits that is efficient (allocative efficiency). Thethird aspect of efficiency is organizational effi-ciency. This latter aspect involves comparison ofbenefits and costs in order to identify whichorganizational structure would make it possible toachieve certain objectives, for example, maximumnet benefits from on-farm conservation initiatives.

9 WCED Report (1987) (also called Brundtland Report) defines

sustainable development as development which meets the needs

of the present without compromising the ability of future gen-

erations to meet their own needs.

623

It is therefore closely related to allocative effi-ciency. An important question in this case is as towhat kinds of characteristics or conditions makesome contractual arrangements more efficient thanothers both in terms of allocative and organiza-tional efficiency. Moreover, it would be importantto consider whether transaction costs (costs ofparticipation) play any important role in influ-encing efficiency of the local organizations.

Equity refers to fairness to the stakeholdersinvolved in the local organizations or how theoutcomes of the contractual arrangements affect thelocal communities in terms of race, ethnicity, classand gender (Hanna 1995). It has four main com-ponents: representation, process clarity, compatibleexpectations and distributive effects. These are,however, not addressed in detail in this paper.Sustainability has also three components: steward-ship, resilience and governance. Stewardship isdefined as the tendency for resource users tomaintain productivity and ecological characteristicsof the resource (Nielsen et al. 1998). In evaluatingthe management process in fisheries, Hanna (1995)identifies three components of stewardship: timehorizons, monitoring and enforcement. If resourcestewardship is to be enhanced, the local organiza-tions should contain incentives to lengthen the timehorizon beyond the short-term, have adequate andpractical systems devised to monitor ecologicalconditions and human behavior, and lead to regu-lations that promote compliance and permit cost-effective enforcement. Resilience is the ability of thelocal organizations to absorb and deal with changesand shocks (Nielsen et al. 1998). The local organi-zations are expected to have rules that are flexibleenough to respond quickly to changing conditionsand at the same time be able to adapt to bothchanges in the structure of the industry and changesin the market. Governance is mainly measured interms of the level of rule compliance. Other mea-sures may include overall reduction in conflict,existence of an effective conflict mechanism, andexistence of practical and implementable enforce-ment procedures.

Determining success of local organizations and itsinfluencing factors

The various types of local organizations in Table 2are evaluated in terms of the criteria discussed in

the preceding section (see Table 3). For efficiency,it was not possible to analyze the benefit/costsratios or compare costs of different local organi-zations since data on all costs and benefits werenot available. The major variables that would af-fect these costs and benefits can, however, be as-sessed from the qualitative data. For example,within a span of 3 years, the local organizationcomprising of IBCR and farmers in Ethiopia hadachieved high benefits in terms of CGRs conser-vation as seeds from 22 different crop varieties hadbeen banked, although the actual participation oflocal communities was low (Table 1). However,since the IBCR was involved in mobilizing unor-ganized farmers and did not target a specific cat-egory, it is expected that its transaction costs wereconsiderably high. Further, the IBCR had toconstruct permanent seed bulking structures, payfield workers, conduct capacity building programsand provide transport for supervisors and moni-tors. Therefore, its production costs would also beconsiderably high. Project reports from the IBCRshowed that about US$ 2.5 million had been spentfor all the project activities carried out in 1999–2001 (Tanto and Demissie 2001). Thus, comparingthis local organization with a case where farmersare capable of organizing themselves, one is mostlikely to find that farmers’ mobilization by re-search organizations is not cost-effective. More-over, without markets for the traditional cropsproduced in areas with community seed banks inEthiopia, the financial benefit/cost ratio of IBCR-farmers organization is likely to be considerablylow and even below one. With the absence of do-nor funds after the project period is over, theactivities of the IBCR may not be sustainable.Similarly, sustainability, and particularly stew-ardship, would be low with on-farm conservationactivities supported by donor funds through theNGOs and the KARI in Kenya.

Overall, it can be argued that farmers’ self-mobilized groups are the most successful as thelevel of crop diversity produced is relatively highand their production costs are likely to be con-siderably low. In addition, fairness to individualfarmers is greatly enhanced and the levels of cropdiversity, stewardship, resilience and compliancewith rules are comparatively high. For instance,the TATRO group in Kenya has been cultivatingall the eight types of indigenous vegetables men-tioned in the survey methods and data section for

624

more than 6 years and has all along maintained aconstant number of households as members.However, activities of such local organizations areoften successful due to management capacity of afew local elites and sometimes farmers’ ex posttransaction costs may be considerably high. Nev-ertheless, both financial and social benefits reaped(including crop diversity) from these local organi-zations would be expectedly higher than the costs.

The farmers–traders’ groups can be evaluated asthe least successful among the Kenyan organiza-tions due to the expected low conservation benefits(low level of diversity). For example, the farmers–traders’ groups in Transamara District concen-trate on two major varieties of indigenous vege-tables (Cleome gynandra and Solanum species) outof the eight varieties mentioned in the surveymethods and data section. Additionally, thesegroups are prone to market forces, and farmers arefaced with lack of incentives to extend productionof vegetables to the long-term.

In our analysis in Table 3, we identify factorsthat would both favor and hinder success of eachof the empirical cases of local organizations. It canbe seen from this table that most of the factorsfavoring success of the case study local organiza-tions are similar or closely related to the drivingfactors for the emergence of the same. Oneimportant factor contributing to the success oflocal organizations seems to arise from the pre-vailing economic conditions, as farmers have tohave markets for their crop produce as an incen-tive for cultivating the traditional crops. There hasto be a consumer demand for products from tra-ditional crops and farmers have to access marketoutlets and get favorable prices for these products.Thus, as has also been documented by Meng et al.(1998), access to markets can induce farmers toundertake poly-variety cultivation. However, acommon problem associated with this factor, andwhich was found within the farmers–traders’groups, is that farmers are likely to specialize inthe few varieties demanded by the market leadingto low level of diversity or uniformity of cropvarieties conserved on-farm (Smale and Bellon1999). Moreover, when farmers have access tomarkets, many of the goods and services providedby certain traditional varieties can be substitutedby alternatives that can be purchased in the marketand as a result the production of crop diversitywould shrink (Bellon 1996).

We contend that other important factorsfavoring success of local organizations arisemainly from farmers’ characteristics or the socio-cultural factors indicated in Figure 1. The farmershave to possess the capacity for collective action,and have clear and achievable objectives. Thus,drawing on our studied cases, one can deduce thatfor local organizations conserving crop geneticresources to emerge and be successful, the capacityfor collective action within the farmers’ groups is aprerequisite. The presence of collective action en-ables farmers to organize themselves, freely shareinformation with each other, reduce incidences ofopportunistic behavior, enhance collective deci-sion-making and hence reduce the costs of partic-ipation (transaction costs).

When farmers are involved in local organiza-tions conserving CGRs on-farm, it makes it easierfor conservation activities to benefit from farmers’know-how and social recognition of indigenousknowledge is enhanced. This also enhances equity(in terms of increased representation and distrib-utive effects) and increases stewardship of conser-vation projects, thereby permitting cost-effectiveness. Such benefits would however bemore apparent as decision-making authority isdevolved to the local farmers and as the interac-tion of stakeholders moves towards the interactiveand informative types of contractual arrange-ments. Thus, involving local organizations withsuch institutional arrangements in conservationinitiatives would often lead to a fair and equitablesharing of benefits of CGRs utilization, hencefulfilling the third objective of the Convention onBiological Diversity (CBD). Moreover, on-farmconservation initiatives would be made more longlasting and costs of implementing on-farmconservation projects would be reduced.

The success of some of the case study localorganizations is hindered by lack of a supportivepolicy. In Kenya, for example, the on-farm con-servation activities of theKARIwould need apolicyframework that is not predisposed to favor certaingenetic resources in order to be successful. It is ex-pected that such a policy would allow farmers tofreely make choices of the crop varieties they wouldlike to promote and maintain in their farms. Forbrevity, we just mention other factors that wouldhinder success of local organizations as evaluatedfrom our case studies. These would include relianceon donor funds, mistrust and short-term interests

625

Table

3.Evaluatinglocalorganizationsandkey

conditionsinfluencingtheirsuccess.

Organizationmobilizingfarm

ers

Valuationofsuccessoflocalorganizationsin

term

s

ofeffi

ciency

(E),fairness(F),andsustainability(S)

Conditionsfavoringsuccess

Conditionshinderingsuccess

IBCR

Exante

transactioncostscould

behigh(E)

Supportivepolicy

framew

ork

Marketsare

notavailable

Lack

ofmarketsforthetraditionalcrops’products(E)

Integrationofindigenous

Donorfundsnotalwaysavailable

Thoughdirectconservationbenefits

are

high,investm

ent

andoperationcosts(both

productionandtransactioncosts)

for

IBCR

could

be

considerably

higher

(E)

knowledge(IIK

)Most

farm

ersare

notfullyintegrated

inthegenebanks

Norulesto

governfarm

ers’activities

Mistrust

Farm

erscannotmarket

theirproducts(E):theirexpectations

are

notmet

(F)

Strictmem

bership

conditions.Theverypoormaynot

participate

(F)

Farm

ersnotorganized

inform

alorlegalgroups,no

experiencesin

organization,

rulescompliance,etc.

(S).OSA

isnotfullyinvolved

(FandS)

KARI

Conservationbenefits

are

low

dueto

theexperim

ental

nature

(E)

IIK

Framersnotintegratedfullyin

the

decision-m

akingprocess

Farm

ersare

notsure

oftheirrolesandresponsibilities(F)

Nopolicy

support

Farm

ersnotinvolved

inthechoiceofthevarietiesthey

are

togrow

(S)

Unavailabilityofdonorfunds

Marketingagents

Conservationbenefits

are

low

dueto

concentrationonfew

varietiesaccordingto

consumers’preferencesanddem

and(E)

Market

access

Farm

ersare

notintegratedin

both

productionandmarketingprocesses

Tradersexploitfarm

erssince

thelatter

are

notrepresented

inthemarketingprocess

(F)

Homogeneity

(collective

actioncapacity)

Short-term

interests

Noobjectives

forlong-term

conservation.Manyaspects

oftheorganizationdetermined

bymarket

forces

(S)

IIK

Farm

ers

(self-mobilization)

Highex

post

transactioncostsforthefarm

ers(E)

Collectiveactioncapacity

Managem

entprocess

mainly

inthehandsofthe

localelites

(F)

IIK

-Market

access

NGOs

Initialcapitalinvestm

entandex

ante

transactioncosts

fortheNGOscould

beconsiderably

high(E)

-Market

access

IIK

Donorfundsare

notalwaysavailable

Weakgroups

Women

groupslack

financial,humanandself-m

obilizationresources;

needoutsidesupport

(S)

Source:

owntable.

626

among stakeholders, weak groups without organi-zational skills, and involvement of farmers who arenot fully integrated in the decision making processand other activities of on-farm conservation.

We emphasize that in rating the factors dis-cussed in this paper in terms of importance one hasto take care of the local conditions. It would beexpected that a particular factor could be veryimportant for a certain case and less important foranother. Nevertheless, generalization at the coun-try level could be allowed as we find that thesefactors are very similar to conditions that havebeen documented as key factors favoring successof local organizations involved in the managementand conservation of other natural resources suchas forests, wildlife, water and fisheries (Meinzen-Dick and Knox 2001).

Conclusions and policy implications

The analysis of farmers and other stakeholdersinvolved in on-farm conservation activities ofcereals and pulses, and indigenous vegetables inEthiopia and Kenya, respectively, has providedsome useful insights as to how local organizationscan be structured to maximize their outputs orbenefits. It has been shown that interactive andinformative types of contractual arrangementsplay an essential role in a number of ways: first,they facilitate integration of farmers’ indigenousknowledge in conservation initiatives, second, theyenable devolvement of decision making power onthe choice of varieties to farmers, and third, theyare a means of transferring the responsibility ofmaintaining crop diversity to the local popula-tions. Thus, incentive designs for on-farm conser-vation in developing countries could target localorganizations with such contractual arrangementsso as to enhance supply of crop diversity.

The empirical cases presented in this paperprovide many different types of driving factorsthat can lead to the emergence of local organiza-tions for on-farm conservation. These include ef-forts to attain conservation and research goals,access to markets for indigenous crop products,presence of capacity for collective action andavailability of donor funds for farmers’ mobiliza-tion. Market access has emerged as an importantdriving factor and particularly in cases where thenet demanders of crop diversity (mainly conser-

vation and research organizations) are not in-volved. Accordingly, availability of markets wouldnot only have a positive effect on the mobilizationof the farmers but also on the overall success of thelocal organizations and contractual arrangementswithin them. This has an important policy impli-cation: on-farm conservation of CGRs could eas-ily be enhanced and be made successful throughprovision of markets for traditional crops’ prod-ucts. Thus, the governments need to remove anyadverse subsidies that are disincentives to mar-keting of traditional crops and invest in infra-structural developments, e.g., roads, and consumerawareness programs. Nevertheless, policies basedon market access have to be recommended cau-tiously as there is a possibility of maintaining onlythose varieties demanded by the consumers.Eventually this would lead to a lower level of cropdiversity as only few varieties would be conservedon-farm and probably fewer than what would berecommended by policy.

The paper has shown that other importantconditions, other than market access, which favorsuccess of local organizations for CGRs conser-vation, arise mainly from farmers’ characteristicsand particularly the capacity for self-organizationor collective action. In particular, it has beendemonstrated that collective action plays animportant role in facilitating emergence and suc-cess of local organizations involved in the conser-vation of CGRs. An important policy implicationrelated to this factor is that if self-organizingfarmers are targeted in conservation initiatives, themagnitude of initial investment costs for govern-ments could be relatively low and hence they couldmake savings from their tight budgets. However, ithas to be noted that self-organizing farmers couldincur considerably high ex post transaction costsand hence the need for compensation could arise.Such farmers could also end up choosing onlythose varieties whose costs of conservation arelower than their financial benefits and especiallyunder conditions where self-organization is drivenby access to markets.

Finally, to enhance participation of govern-ment agencies in on-farm conservation strategies,policies on conservation, food production andpoverty alleviation in Ethiopia and Kenya needto be harmonized to allow easier and cheapermobilization of farmers. This would also elimi-nate the difficulties faced by extension agents

627

trying to pass mixed messages to the farmers andhence enhance their participation in conservationinitiatives, which is evidently lacking in these twocountries.

Acknowledgements

The authors gratefully acknowledge the financialsupport of the European Union (EU) through theBIOdiversity and Economics for CONservation(BIOECON) project. We are also grateful to twoanonymous reviewers and the participants of theInternational Workshop on Property Rights,Collective Action and Local Conservation ofGenetic Resources, 29th September – 2nd October2003, Rome, Italy, for their useful comments.However, any errors or omissions are solely theresponsibility of the authors.

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