Local non-State actors & The Evolution of Rules & Institutions that underpin Pluralist Political...

Costantinos Berhutesfa Costantinos, PhD School of Graduate Studies, College of Business & Economics, AAU

Abstract Political culture development can be explained with reference to political organizations and rules.

The central hypothesis is that the relative strength of political organizations determines the rules of the political game that are installed. Democratization requires a plural set of political organizations, which promote and protect nonviolent political involvement and contest. Plural organizations and conventions of accountability ensemble ensure control of the state executive. In taking institutional perspective, we assume that the actors in the political system express preferences through organiza-tions vary in strength according to their resource base. The relevant organizations are found both in the society, where they represent and aggregate individual interests, and in the state, where they check and balance executive authority. Hence the focus of the study is, using case studies from Ethiopia’s recent elections, to develop a framework for African civil society emergence to promote political culture that ensure dynamic participation of the African populace that have been rendered vulnerable, poor and at the other extreme, displaced within their own lands.

Key words: CSOs, PCS, political culture, political organizations, rules of accountability, nonviolent political contest, plural organizations,

Restricted draft for publication

1 | Non-State actors & The Evolution of Pluralist Political Culture – BTC 2012

1. Introduction In contemporary development discourse, civil society organizations have become flag bearers of

political and social freedoms and empowerment of the poor and, marginalized, as well as champions of the process of democratization in the third world countries (Abdelrahman, 1991). The growing interest in civil society is frequently explained in relation to the decreasing role in the necessity and usefulness of the state as an agent of development. The crisis of underdevelopment and the failure of state-driven development project are largely explained in terms of the inadequate societal en-gagement for which the state is accountable.

According to Booth and Seligson (1993), there are two main elements of democratic political culture. One is from the civic culture tradition that emphasizes a mixture of participation in politics with more passive roles. The key tests have come to involve the degree to which citizens express support for the right to organize civic groups, work for political parties, protest and vote. The second involves citizens' willingness to extend civil rights issues to unpopular causes. Tolerance is a critical element of political culture.

Political culture development can be explained with reference to two institutional factors: political organizations and political rules. The central hypothesis is that the relative strength of political organizations determines the rules of the political game that are installed. Democratization requires a plural set of political organizations, which pro-mote and protect political participation and competition. Together, democratic institutions (plural organizations plus rules of accountability) ensure control of the state executive. In taking institutional perspective, we assume that the actors in the political system express preferences through organizations vary in strength according to their re-source base.

The relevant organizations are found both in the society, where they represent and aggregate individual inter-ests, and in the state, where they check and balance executive authority. Different kinds of organizations play a leading role during different phases of transition. Popular protest against a regime may be initially driven by a few resentful agent provocateurs or the independent Press as a critical element. As a political momentum accumulates, the organizational strength of the opposition becomes a more critical variable; mass membership organizations like CSOs, unions and faith based groups step into sustain and direct protest. (Costantinos, 2007:245-247) In a dynamic political environment, the need for the involvement and partnership of various

stakeholders in accelerating governance and socio-economic development of a given state is a highly desirable element of progress. It is predicated on the ever-increasing demands and expectations of citizens for timely, sufficient and quality human development services. Hence, the objective of the study is to assess the nature and level of state-organized civil society partnership in contributing to political culture development programs. The specific objectives of the study are to identify the type of partnership that exists between State and organized civil society, opportunities that create favora-ble condition for the existing partnership between state and civil society and suggest ways of en-hancing partnership between state and civil society that enable them to mobilize scarce resources towards the development of political culture.

Hence, the research augurs on the organizational and structural requisites for political culture development and the regulations and decision-making processes that may influence the potential for the development of successful partnerships, the strengths of whom can boost to overcome the weaknesses engrained in tough regulations. 2. Statement of the Problem, Research Question and Methodology

While assessing the level of partnerships between the state and civil society, this study will ex-plore the factors contributing to and affecting the development of partnerships between them. The state-NGO partnerships hold potential for increasing the involvement of NGO in political culture development, there are a number of factors that still hinder such partnerships. While working in partnership, the state and civil society need to understand that there are factors, which can have im-pact on their relations. First, partnership will not work unless there is explicit commitment and wil-


lingness from both sides. Mutual understanding of the goals of partnership and the means for achieving those goals must be clearly stated. Collaborations work better when partners believe that by uniting their efforts they will achieve more. Mutual understanding between state agencies and civ-il society of their relative strengths and weakness and their ability to assist one another tends to sti-mulate collaboration.

Second, when the state and civil society can view each other as competitors rather than partners, this sense of competition can hinder the development of cooperative relations. Even though, the state recognizes the value of civil society’ contributions to the socio-economic development of the country, there are still factors that have adverse impact on state-NGO relations and cooperation. The state is a strategic actor for development overall, whereas civil society are likely to deal only with certain limited development issues. Moreover, the fact that civil societies are smaller allows them to be more adaptable and flexible, whereas, the state is larger and more bounded by bureaucratic regu-lations and decision-making processes. Differences in objectives, strategies and action plans between the state and civil society and the resulting regulations and decision-making processes that may in-fluence the potential for the development and success of partnerships notwithstanding, the strengths of one actor can help to overcome the weaknesses of the other.

The knowledge gap this research addresses is focused on the real impact of state legislation and administrative fiat that hinder the full involvement and engagement of civil society in the develop-ment of political culture in Ethiopia.

Research Questions In light of the above problem statement, there is a general view to look at problems that hinder

partnership between state and civil society with respect to the following basic questions. Given the synergy the state and civil society can create in development of political culture, does such partner-ship exist between state and civil society? What is the nature and level of partnership that exists be-tween the state and civil society in addressing development of political culture? What are the oppor-tunities that contribute to enhance the partnership between state and civil society for the develop-ment of political culture?

Objectives of the study Methodology of the study

The study employs the survey method and utilizes qualitative and qualitative methods to analyze the data from primary and secondary sources. Figures, Charts, Tables, Graphs are used for data presentation and the descriptive method is utilized for the data processing. Relevant data are col-lected from primary as well as secondary sources. Primary data are collected through questionnaires. Moreover, primary data were obtained by conducting structured and semi-structured interviews and discussions with both selected government and NGO staffs in the zone. Questionnaires and inter-views are the main data collection tools used by the researcher to obtain the necessary primary data for the study. Secondary data were gathered by reviewing various published and unpublished mate-rials such as journals, organizational policy and strategy documents, proclamations, regulations, di-rectives, reports, and other on line materials.

Data collection methods & Sampling procedure In order to obtain necessary primary data both interview and questionnaires were employed

by the researcher. Interview questions were developed and used to collect various data on part-nership between various government offices. In order to gather the necessary primary data of the study, questionnaires were distributed to all civil society and government departments that have work interaction with civil society. Moreover, structured and semi-structured interview schedule were conducted with selected representatives of both government organizations and civil society were designed to elicit their views and experiences related to partnership. Purposive sampling method is used to identify and contact most relevant respondents on the issue. Thus,


from civil society the sampling refers to those civil societies that have development interven-tions. Moreover, various departments of government organizations in the zone were identified based on the work contact they have with civil society operating in political culture development. For the purpose of interview schedule, the sample of selected civil society is based on the quanti-ty of project interventions they run and amount of budget they utilize.

Scope and limitations of the Study State-civil society partnership can take various forms with different motives. Hence, the

study is concerned with and limited to assessing challenges and opportunities of state-civil socie-ty partnership on development of political culture issues. The aim of this research is not to cover all aspects of partnership between the state and civil society. Rather it focuses on areas where collaboration exists between state and civil society on aspects of development intervention.

3. Understanding of Non-State Actors Local Non-State Actors (organized civil society) take different organizational terms and names in

different countries. This diversity of terminologies challenges any single definition of civil society. However, most authors and authorities agree that the term civil society include a wide variety of groups and institutions that are entirely or largely independent of government and characterized primarily by human development and human security objectives. (Costantinos, BT, 1996, 2006) Some of the terms used to describe civil society is third sector, independent sector, volunteer sector, civil society, grassroots organizations, transnational social movement organizations, private volunta-ry organizations, self-help organizations and civil society’.

In its broadest sense, the Asian Development Bank (ADB) states the term NGO as ‘organiza-tions (1) not based in government; and (2) not created to earn profit’. Hence, this definition embraces a large number and wide range of organizations that are unrelated structurally and functionally, the term NGO refers more to what an organization is not, rather than to what it is. According to Riddell et al (1995: 28), civil societies are agencies or groups, which are different from government bodies. However, civil society are distinctive in containing a voluntary component and because they do not operate for profit.

This include groups of trade unions and employers’ organizations (‘social partners’); nongovernmental or-ganizations; professional associations; charities; grass-roots organizations; organizations that involve citizens in local and municipal life with a particular contribution from churches and religious communities.

As per the Charities and Societies Proclamation (CSP) No. 621/2009, the Federal Government of Ethiopia classifies Civil Society Organizations (CSOs) in to two broad categories: Charities and Societies. The new law envisages three forms of legal establishment of charities or societies, which may vary depending on their place of registration, source of income, composition of members’ na-tionality, and place of residence. The three forms of association include: ‘Ethiopian Charities’ or ‘Ethio-pian Societies’ are Charities or Societies formed under the laws of Ethiopia and whose members are Ethiopians, generate income from Ethiopia and are wholly controlled by Ethiopians. However, they may be deemed Ethiopian Charities or Ethiopian Societies if no more than ten per cent of their funds received from foreign sources. ‘Ethiopian Residents Charities’ or ‘Ethiopian Residents Societies’ are Charities or Societies that are formed under the laws of Ethiopia and consist of members reside in Ethiopia, and who receive more than ten per cent of their funds from foreign sources. ‘Foreign Chari-ties’ are Charities that are formed under the laws of foreign countries, or consist of members who are foreign nationals, or are controlled by foreign nationals, or receive funds from foreign country sources.

According to Article 14 of CSP (621/2009), Charity means an institution, which is established exclusively for charitable purposes and gives benefit to the public. Article 55 of the same Proclama-tion defines Society as an association of persons organized on non-profit making and voluntary basis for the promotion of the rights and interests of its members and to undertake other similar lawful purposes as well as to coordinate with institutions of similar objectives.


4. civil society and democratic political culture 4.1. What is democratic political culture? Political culture determines the type of government institutions, how authority is vested in gov-

ernment, who is given authority and power in society and government, who is allowed to participate in policy- and decision-making and how citizens hold their leaders accountable (Lane, 1994). Wheth-er the political culture is democratic or not will have an impact on how citizens experience the entire political system (the executive, legislatures, bureaucracy, judiciary, political parties and civil groups), the political process (the behavior of parties, groups and individual citizens) and the policy-making process (Gross, 2002).

Although a democratic political culture is not easy to define, its obvious characteristic is that it sets ethical norms and standards of behavior for governments, organizations and individuals. Lane (1994) argues that political culture ‘consists of widely held shared, fundamental beliefs that have po-litical consequence’. ‘It constrains the actions of politicians and public officials: even if inclined oth-erwise, they usually refrain from taking positions or from implementing policies that blatantly violate the elements of the political culture’.

4.2. The Role of civil society in the development of democratic political culture Civil society exist for a variety of purposes, usually to further the political or social goals of their

members, which include improving the state of the natural environment, encouraging the obser-vance of human rights, improving the welfare of the disadvantaged, or representing a corporate agenda. However, there are a huge number of such organizations and their goals cover a broad range of political and philosophical positions.

One cannot have a democratic political culture unless there is a vibrant, diverse and critical civil society. Civil society is important, not only in helping the government to deliver social services, but in providing criticism as one of the checks and balances in the system of government. They help keep the government accountable. Even more so, they give citizens experience in the art of political association, increase their civic competence, stimulate participation in electoral politics, recruit and train new political leaders, generate democratic norms and values, and accumulate social capital. By making government responsive and accountable, and decision- making more inclusive, a diverse and critical civil society actually builds the democratic state. Furthermore, an independent, critical civil society can provide alternative information, to enlighten citizens to make their participation in the democratic process more effective, and to influence the agenda of the government. Especially if par-liament becomes the rubber stamp of the executive, it is important that opposition voices outside parliament – of civil groups, community groups and local leaders – should not be ignored or even intimidated by the state (Diamond, 1997).

Edwards and Hulme (1996:6) note that in recent years the level of official funding for civil socie-ty in development efforts has increased dramatically. This expanded funding forms an integral part of the neoliberal ‘New Policy Agenda’. This agenda has the primary aims of (1) strengthening civil society for the purposes of achieving political pluralism and democratic forms of governance; and (2) achieving greater efficiency by subjecting social programs to market forces. Civil societies are awarded a key role in the democratization process by bilateral and multilateral agencies, as witness recent policy statements from the World Bank (1994) and the Overseas Development Administra-tion (ODA, 1993) among others. They are seen as an integral component of a thriving civil society and an essential counterweight to state power, opening up channels of communication and partici-pation, providing training grounds for activists, and promoting pluralism. From the literature it is possible to identify a growing involvement by grassroots organizations in representation, lobbying and (in some situations) formal party politics: and by civil society in mediation, advocacy, training and civic education (Fowler, 1991). For obvious reasons, these roles are more highly developed in relatively democratic political systems (Edwards and Hulme, 1992). The engagement of civil society in advocacy, governance, rights based approaches until the early 1990s was limited due to regressive


legal framework. After the downfall of the Dergue, the constitution guaranteed the establishment of independent associations and a number of civil society/CSOs flourished. Gradually, civil socie-ty/CSOs, in addition to service delivery, began to advance rights based approaches, to work on poli-cy and advocacy and good governance.

4.3. Government-civil society relations in Africa Civil society is considered as an important role players in the socioeconomic and democratic de-

velopment process. Thomas (1992: 133) states, "The aim should be to empower ordinary people to take charge of their lives, to make communities more responsible for their development, and to make government listen to their people." Fostering a more pluralistic, institutional structure includ-ing civil society is a means to these ends”. Clarke (1991) attributes three roles to civil society. Hade-nius and Uggla (1996), from their perspective, see civil society as having two main functions. In their relation with the state, Clarke (1991) presents the liberalist view that civil society can fulfill three roles: complementing, reforming and/or opposing the State.

The idea of the complementing is one of the roles of civil society as service providers and imple-menters of development activities. In this case, civil societies fill in the gaps left by public services. By the 1990s, the prevalent ideology among donors was to see the State as an enabler rather than a provider. The reforming role of civil society is related to civil society as agents of advocacy and contri-butors to policy dialogue. Civil society can represent the interest of the people they work with and, hence, ensure that policies are adapted to real life. In this way, policies are legitimized. Civil society can also contribute to generating informed public judgment. Finally, civil society can oppose the State, by acting as watchdogs and holding it accountable, directly through lobbying or indirectly by sup-porting groups that are adversely affected by government policy.

Hadenius and Uggla (1996) see civil society, hence civil society, as having two functions: the plu-ralist and the educational. The former refers essentially to the external and mutual relations of organ-izations while the latter looks at their internal life. The pluralist function concerns the distribution of power in society and political life. The idea is that by organizing themselves, people obtain power resources. The outcome of a multiplicity of well-developed associations with access to channels for popular influence is a balance between power centers, interests and opinion. This ensures the best possible coherence between individual preferences and collective choices. The pluralist function is closely related to Clarke’s second and third role.

The basic idea behind the educational function is that the spiritual support for democracy’s fun-damental principles can only be created through the experience gained from repetitive participation in democratic structures. This is socialization into democratic norms through a process of learning by doing. By being part of a democratic association, people can develop a procedural democratic culture, i.e. get used to confronting divergent and contradictory views, and gain the logic of shifting majorities. They become more tolerant and better at managing conflicts. It is believed that under favorable conditions, it can contribute to a convergence of opinions, and hence their integration into a common system of norms. An extended public spirit is thus created. This is the process of build-ing social capital. Consequently, civil societies are seen as important implementers of development activities as well as contributors to the consolidation of democracy. The roles and functions are at-tributed to the NGO sector on what is perceived as its strengths. Even if civil societies are impor-tant actors per se, they are not a system on their own operating in a vacuum, but part of a wider en-vironment (Bratton, 1989: 581). Dialogue between the two is essential. According to Hadenius and Uggla, total independence is virtually incompatible with political influence and the State needs civil society to achieve its objectives. Hadenius and Uggla take this further by arguing that the State has the ability to strengthen civil society. They define a continuum of five stages from a situation in which the State is hostile to civil society to one of benevolence.

Stage 1: The State does not tolerate independent civil activity Stage 2: States accept autonomous organizations, but do not provide a space for it


Stage 3: A space for independent activity exists, but the practice of governance does not pro-mote autonomous organization

Stage 4: The State provides favorable structures, but no active support Stage 5: The State actively promotes autonomous organizations 4.4. State-CSO Partnership Although there is no single authentic way of defining the term partnership, as many scholars and

writers have differing definitions, the term refers to an approach that incorporate a range of issues. These include the voluntary nature of relationships, cooperation among the wide range of partici-pants (the community, the private sector, local, regional and national government bodies, civil socie-ty, Community Based Organizations (CBOs), and CSOs, and the need for strategic alliance; pulling of resources and sharing of risks. Stratton (cited in Osborne, 2000) defines partnership as collabora-tion among business, non-profit organizations, and government in which risks, resources and skills are shared on projects that benefit each partner as well as the community. Likewise, Bennett and Krebs (cited in Osborne, 2000) emphasized on the joint objectives of the bodies and defined part-nership as cooperation between actors where they agree to work together towards specified eco-nomic-development objectives. Partnerships between two or more organizations can be effective vehicles for achieving important public goals, which might be provision of services including educa-tion, health, water, and so on.

Partnership is seeking and establishing genuine and harmonious relations with the governments, people, amongst civil society, CBOs, and other CSOs to ensure sustainable development in socio-economic transformation (ODPPB, 1999). The work of Ghobadian et al (2004) supports this point by looking at it as partnerships are simply contracting out arrangements with a few bolt on elements to make it look less ‘servant/master’ and often the partners are in a ‘marriage of convenience’ rather than having genuinely shared beliefs and goals. Deakin (Quoted in Ghobadian et al 2004) further described partnerships as formal relations between the state at national and local level and organized civil society. He acknowledges that, in practice, the concept of partnership can cover a wide variety of different forms of organization. A typology of partnership for development, according to Gho-badian et al (2004) encompasses stakeholder participatory schemes involving central government agencies, civil society, CBOs, civil society groups and private sector organizations, such as local commercial banks […] all in a bid to tackle the root causes of poverty. The key factors in a partner-ship are information provision, cooperation on matters of mutual benefit are among the main areas of cooperation, consultation, coordination, collaboration , mutual trust and respect, pooling of time, efforts and resources together, sharing of experiences, common or shared mission or purpose, letter of agreement, clarity of purpose and accountability (Bennet, 1997). 5. Data Presentation and Analysis

As indicated in the methodology section of this research the researcher intends to collect prima-ry data through questionnaires, interviews and document analysis. Seventy questionnaires were dis-tributed to twenty-four CSOs engaged in the development of democratic political culture in Ethi-opia. In addition, five donor agencies, three government organizations and four key informants were interviewed to collect necessary data to answer research questions. Out of the total questionnaires distributed to executives of CSOs, forty-two were properly completed out and used for analysis. Document analysis was also another methodology employed for collecting the required data. From those documents researches, reports, publications, broachers were the major ones.

5.1. Profile of Respondents This section deals with presentation and analysis of the general profile of respondents across

their position, experience, educational qualification and knowledge about CSOs and democratic po-litical culture. The analysis is based on the information provided by the respondents in the question-naire. Table 1 illustrates the general profile of the respondents. Program officers and program coor-dinators, collectively accounts to 61.9% while about 26.2% are together program managers and di-

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.0%

10.0%

20.0%

30.0%

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60.0%

70.0%

80.0%

Fig 2: Strategies used by CSOs in Promoting Public Awareness and Participation

Percentage of Response Percentage of Cases

views that it is difficult to say the government is in the right track. This group of interviewees relates their views with deficiency of government in implementing the Constitutional provisions, enacting restrictive laws and tendency of government to centralize most activities.

6. CSO contributions to the development of democratic political culture Ethiopia has made important progress in the

development of democratic political culture. However, the development of political culture cannot be established overnight and by govern-ment alone. Such a system can developed through processes and participation of different actors: the state, the private sector, academia, CSOs and the society. The contribution of CSOs in the development of democratic political culture of the country is not undermined by any means. This sub-section tries to assess the contributions of CSOs in the development of democratic politi-cal culture of the country. To assess the contribution of CSOs in the development of political cul-ture, respondents were provided with open-ended questions.

Table 4: Contributions of CSOs in the Development of Democratic Political Culture Contributions of CSOs Responses % of Cases Promotion of public awareness and participation 43 79.6 Contribution to access to justice 2 3.7 Contribution to better policies, laws and programs 6 11.1 Contribution to capacitation of democratic institutions 9 16.7 Complementing the state in democratic processes 5 9.3 Challenging the State 2 3.7 Conflict Resolution and Peace Building 2 3.7 Monitoring democratic processes, rule of law & violations of rights 9 16.7 Promoting Fair and Democratic Election 10 18.5 Insignificant 4 7.4

Hence, the nature of the question is multiple response type, there is a chance that the res-pondents have provided more than one contributions depending on their organizations area of engagement. Accordingly, the number of responses exceeds the number of respon-dents. Table 4 presents the response of 42 respondents where the most practiced ac-tivity by CSOs is promoting public aware-ness and participation and the least exer-cised is challenging the state. Based on the response collected from 54 respondents about contributions of CSOs in the devel-opment of democratic political culture of the country, ten thematic areas are identi-fied as shown in the Table. 6.1. Promotion of public awareness and

participation CSOs engaged in the development of

democratic political culture, either as core areas of intervention or as part of develop-ment activities, typically undertake awareness raising initiatives to inform public and bring concerns of their targets to public discussion

Table 3: Extent of participation & historical contribu-tions of CSOs in the Development of Political Culture

Frequency %

Extent of CSO Participation

Very Little 3 7.1 Little 14 33.3 Fair 14 33.3 Good 10 23.8 Very Good 1 2.4

Historical Con-

tribution of CSOs

Very Little 7 16.7 Little 12 28.6 Fair 12 28.6 Good 10 23.8 Very Good 1 2.4


forums. The thematic areas on which CSOs work in promoting public awareness cover a range of issues including child rights, women’s rights, the rights of PLWHA, rights of persons with disability, democracy and governance, corruption, voter education, pastoralist issues, access to justice, etc. CSOs have various strategies to promote public awareness and participation. Graph 2 shows that some of the major strategies which include awareness raising, arranging forums and debates, civic and voters education, promoting governance and democracy, enhancing culture of citizen’s partici-pation, and empowerment of marginalized groups. It also shows that awareness raising, civic and voter’s education, and promoting governance and democracy are the most common activities exer-cised by CSOs engaged in the area.

According to Dessalegn et al (2008:81-82), major strategies are deployed by CSOs to raise public awareness. These include inter alia, publication and dissemination of IEC materials; dissemination of legal and other documents such as the FDRE Constitution; conducting voter education; organizing debates and forums among contending parties; organizing training workshops on various issues of human rights and democracy; running radio programs on various governance and human rights is-sues. Apart from raising public awareness, one of the main strategy CSOs have been using to pro-mote the participation of citizens in the development of democratic political culture of the country is mobilizing and empowering grassroots, religious, community and mass based organizations and marginalized groups. Dessalegn et al., (2008: 83) have illustrated some of the interventions and achievements of CSOs in the area include the role of traditional structures of elders in South Omo zone in preventing and managing inter-clan conflicts, and Gada elders in managing natural resources and fighting HTPs are strengthened by CSOs EPaRDA, AFD, and SOS Sahel. The establishment of the school clubs on child rights, HTPs/FGM, civic education, environment, violence against girls, corporal punishment and other issues that have now been officially recognized extra-curricular structures in primary schools across Ethiopia was initiated and supported by CSOs such as ANPPCAN, EWLA...

The establishment of children’s participation structures in the community (outside the schools) such as networks of child rights clubs, children’s councils and children’s parliaments has been in-itiated and supported from the early stages by child focused CSOs including ANPPCAN and Mary Joy. Many of the existing membership organizations of the poor and vulnerable groups, including youth, women, and PLWHA associations, were established with the support of international and national CSOs whose financial and technical support has been instrumental for their engagement in governance issues. A number of CSOs have mobilized and supported idirs and other community based organizations to participate in various human rights and governance issues. These structures have created and expanded the space for the participation of communities and vulnerable groups around human rights and democracy issues of direct relevance to their situation.

6.1.1. Contributions to increased capacity of democratic institutions Table 6 shows that out of the total respondents asked about the contributions of CSOs in the

development of democratic political culture of the country, nine of them have replied as their CSOs played a role in building capacity and increasing efficiency of democratic institutions. The capacity and efficiency of democratic institutions are important factors in realizing democratic political cul-ture of the country. Even where appropriate and pro-poor policies and laws have been put in place, lack of capacity can become a critical hindrance to their implementation. These problems are more acute at the lower levels of government administration.

The engagement of CSOs in building the capacity and efficiency of democratic institutions is quite extensive. Through training, workshops, experience sharing forums, joint planning and imple-mentation activities, and other support interventions, wide ranges of CSOs have sought to enhance the efficiency and capacity of democratic institutions to discharge their responsibilities. For instance, during 2005-10, Justice for All and Prison Fellowship-Ethiopia (JFA PFE) has undertaken several activities towards increased efficiency and capacity of democratic institutions:


training on human rights, justice, democracy and good governance given to 9,206 justice of-ficials, decision makers, duty bearers and policy makers including parliamentarians trained with the aim of improving their capacity in effective implementation in the area, leadership

training to 600 top-level government officials and gender training for 281 professionals; National level dialogue forums on democratization, federalism and consensus building, lea-

dership and management, and religious tolerance arranged for about 300 people from par-liamentarians, government officials, religious leaders, diplomats and ambassadors;

Prepared and distributed 9,206 human rights training materials. 6.1.2. Promoting Fair and Democratic Election

In the Table 6 above, 10 respondents out of the total have mentioned that their CSOs have en-gaged in election in various forms. CSOs in Ethiopia have played considerable role for the first time during 2005 election. They have involved in election monitoring, conducting civic education pro-grams, and organizing debates and forums among contending parties to ensure access to informa-tion to the public on the programs and plans of action of different parties. In this case, the role of CSOs is not only limited to contributing towards fair and democratic elections but also contributing towards the development of a democratic culture, based on dialogue, compromise, accommodation and tolerance at different levels of government administration and among public.

Muntean and Gheorghita (2005: 6-9) cited in Wond-wosen, argue that apart from routines like drafting and promoting laws, organizing strikes, contacting officials, boycotts, demonstrations or signing petitions, civil society organizations have other types of interaction with the political society. These are direct involvement in elections by mobilizing the people to participate in the election, arranging roundtable discussions, participating in election monitoring and supporting certain political parties.

For the first time in the country’s political history, civil society played a very active role in the 2005 election. The involvement of the civil society in this election has mobilized and sensitized pub-lic to be active participant in the election. The contribution of CSOs in the electoral process was by organizing public forums and voter’s education has initiated and sensitized the public to make active participation in the election as a voter, as a candidate and as an observer.

The active role of CSOs in promoting fair and democratic election has seen in 2005 parliamentary election. According to Table 7, about 27.3 million people were registered as voters and out of which 22.6 million people gave their votes. The number of

candidates for House of People’s Representatives (HPR) and Regional State Councils are more than 5,900 that exceed 2000 election by 2,656 candidates. About 12,667 people observed the election. Moreover, the number of seats taken by EPRDF-affiliated parties, opposition parties and indepen-dents in HPR is 219 of which opposition parties won 174 seats. Thus, the figures indicate that the participation of public in the election process has been increasing from time to time.

6.1.3. Monitoring democratic process, rule of law and violations of rights In the Table 6 above item, eight indicates that nine of the respondents stated that their organiza-

tions have engaged in monitoring democratic processes, rule of law and violations of rights. HRCO

Table 5: Elections in Ethiopia Candidates HPR Seats Observers

Ele

ctio

n y

ear

Registered Voters Votes

1

HP

R

Reg

ion

al S

tate

C

oun

cils

2

EP

RD

F

Oth

ers*

3

Dom

esti

c

Inte

rnat

ion

al

1995 21,337,379 20,068,508 1080 483 65 2000 21, 834,808 19,607,841 5900 2164 481 66 2005 27.3 million 22.6 million 327 219 12238 429

*Others include EPRDF-Affiliated Parties, Opposition Parties and Indepen-dents. Source: NEBE Reports on Election 1995, 2000 and 2005

Table 6: Instances of CSOs Challenge to the State

Frequency Percent 1. Yes 32 79.2 2. No 9 21.4 3. Do not know 1 2.4 Total 42 100.0


is the leading organization in Ethiopia to monitor, publicize and reports human rights violations, and fight for the people to full realization of rights under the Constitution. EWLA is another CSO in monitoring democratic process and fighting for violations of rights. It specifically focuses on promoting the rights of women and assists them to secure full protection of their rights under the Constitution of FDRE and international human rights conventions.

6.1.4. Contribution to improved policies, laws and programs: Item 3 of Table 6 indicates that CSOs have been contributing for improved policies, laws and

programs through various ways. They address the questions of marginalized and voiceless groups, which are often excluded from the decision-making processes. Exclusion and inconsideration of the poor and disadvantaged sections of society from decision-making processes affects their lives. This can best be addressed through pro-poor government policies, laws, institutions and programs. CSOs take considerable part in initiating pro-poor structural measures and promoting the needs and inter-ests of the disadvantaged in various levels of government through research and advocacy.

CSOs engage in awareness raising and advocacy work that aims at bringing about changes or re-visions in public policies, laws, and decision-making structures by directly targeting the policy and law making processes. They use various advocacy works such as public discussion, judiciary and public consultations, convincing parliament and government officials at various levels on the need for new pro-poor policies, laws and programs or review of existing ones. There are a number of cas-es, where CSOs have successfully initiated and contributed to the development and adoption of pro-poor policies, laws, structures and programs. In this regard, EWLA, Lem Ethiopia and most CCRDA members take considerable part.

According to Dessalegn et al (2008: 88), CSOs initiated and promoted policy dialogues in vari-ous areas and succeeded in making the rights of women, children, pastoralists, people with disabili-ties and other vulnerable group’s policy issues. Some of these are a number of CSOs, mostly CRDA members, have participated in and contributed to the formulation of different policies including the PRSP process within the framework of the NGO PRSP Taskforce. The National Plan of Action on Sexual Abuse and Exploitation of Children was initiated and developed within the framework of the National Steering Committee against Sexual Abuse and Exploitation of Children representing a di-verse profile of child rights actors including Forum on Street Children Ethiopia (FSCE), Save the Children Sweden, Save the Children Norway and ANPPCANE. The Women Association in Tigray region in collaboration with the Women Caucus of the regional council challenged the gender im-balance in appointments of bureau heads and this resulted in appointment of more women in key positions. The Women Association also submitted a petition challenging provisions in the draft re-gional Family Law, which was accepted and incorporated in the final law endorsed in 2007. Moreo-ver, the Association has also challenged and managed to introduce revisions in the administrative guideline for public.

6.1.5. Contribution to increased access to justice: As Table 6 above shows, CSOs have also engaged in enhancing people for better access to jus-

tice. EWLA has been providing free of charge legal aid service to women, particularly poor women who are victims of gender based violence. The services include legal advice or counseling, writing court briefs such as court charges and affidavits as well as representing clients in courts. The issues most often EWLA has been providing legal aid include rape, abduction, domestic violence, marital disputes, paternity claims, pension and other pecuniary interests. To this end, nearly 70,000 clients throughout the country have received legal aid services from 1996 till to end of 2007. EWLA also has been providing free legal aid services in nine sub-cities of Addis Ababa as of 2003.

Despite constitution recognizes access to justice and legislative measures of citizens, affordable and quality legal services are not available for most Ethiopians. This, coupled with capacity and effi-ciency limitations in judicial and administrative institutions, has made access to justice the privilege of the few. The situation is particularly dire for the resource poor and other vulnerable groups. In


.0%

5.0%

10.0%

15.0%

20.0%

25.0%

30.0%

35.0%

40.0%

45.0%

CSO advocay on rights

Percentage of Responses Percentage of Cases

response to this gap, an increasing number of CSOs are engaged in the provision of legal aid services in Ethiopia. The services of many of these organizations focus on the needs of specific social groups such as women, children and persons accused of crimes concurrently targeted by other interventions (Dessalegn et al, 2008: 84).

6.1.6. Complementing and challenging the state in the democratization process: Item five of the Table 6 illustrates that CSOs are also involved in complementing the role of

government in the democratization process. Since the government cannot involve in every democra-tization processes and development activities, civil society plays a great role in complementing the activity of the state by filling the gap where the government is short. This will help to make those services more relevant to the poor and more responsive to democratic influences. Civil societies also assist the government in identify-ing social problems, which have not been de-tected or addressed by the government.

The opinion of respondents about contribu-tions of CSOs in the development of democratic political culture of the country summarized in the Table 6 above shows that there are CSOs who are challenging the wrongdoings or reluc-tance of the government. In the other part of the questionnaire, respondents are asked wheth-er they are challenged the state while doing wrong or prefer not to challenge. They are also asked to indicate the occurrence and explain the situation if they challenged and if not to indicate why they prefer not to challenge the government while doing wrong. To this end, data collected from 42 respondents of the questionnaire is pre-sented in the Table 8. In the Table 8 about 79.2% of respondent opinion shows that, their organiza-tions have challenged government in various instances. The response of 21.4% of them reveals that their organizations have preferred not to challenge government while doing wrong. The opinion shows that CSOs have engaged in challenging the state.

The explanations of the respondents show that CSOs challenge government’s plans, policies and actions. These have negative impact on the lives of the poor, as they would deprive their rights. CSOs challenge activities, policies or programs of the government for various reasons. The common grounds for challenge include undemocratic practice, violation of rights, free and fair democratic elections and pro-poor policies, and programs. The opinion of 32 respondents about the instances that their organizations have challenged the state is demonstrated in the Fig 3. Undemocratic prac-tices, violation of rights, free and fair election and pro-poor policies are major issues that CSOs are trying to influence government in a way that favors their constituencies or target groups. They use various strategies in influencing government. These include publicizing the event, imposing pressure to government, taking the case to the court, reporting to international institutions, requesting gov-ernment to implement constitution, etc. In the item 2 of the Table 8, about 21.4% of the respon-dent’s reveals that there are no instances their CSOs challenged the government’s actions or inac-tions. Based on their explanation there are various reasons to do so. There major one includes dis-abling environment, fear for future existence, and misconception by government and CSOs empha-sis on complementing government.

6.1.7. Conflict resolution and peace building:


.0%

10.0%

20.0%

30.0%

40.0%

50.0%

60.0%

70.0%

Fig. 4 Challenges faced by CSOs in Political Culture Development


Item 7 of Table 6 indicates that CSOs directly or indirectly take part in conflict resolution and peace building of the country. Peace and development of the country are interrelated and thus, sta-bility and progress are intertwined. With this belief, CSOs are involved in resolving conflicts and contributing to bringing peace and stability in the country. CSOs use various methods such training traditional and modern methods of resolving conflicts and promoting peace and stability.

6.2. Challenges faced by CSOs in the development of democratic political culture: In this section, respondents are required to state briefly challenges their CSOs have faced in dis-

charging their duties in the development of democratic political culture of the country. Consequent-ly, the top nine factors that hinder activities of CSOs are identified by respondents and presented in the Graph 4. These major factors include misconception of the government, policy environment, lack of resources, lack of public support, external and internal influences, absence of clear demarca-tion, poor institutional arrangements, frequent turnover of government officials, and government inferences. These factors have implications for CSOs autonomy and determine the effectiveness of programs and projects undertaken by those CSOs. It is also easy to observe from the graph that policy environ-ment, lack of resources, lack of pub-lic support, and government interfe-rences are most common problems of CSOs.

Misconception by the Government: As shown in the Fig 4, about 9%

of respondents state that misconcep-tion of CSOs activities and objectives by the government is a critical chal-lenge that CSOs confronted. Thus, the role of CSOs in the development of democratic political culture of the country is regarded by government as political activity, especially when CSOs involve in criticism or expo-sure of government’s illegal acts. The misconception of CSOs and their objectives as they involve in such programs has been evident among government officials at various levels of administration. This misconception arises due to low level of awareness regarding rights and roles of CSOs and lack of self-confidence among government officials. Another reason why CSOs face hostility from government as they involve in the development of democratic political culture of the country could be the fact that democratization process recent phenomena.

Accordingly, most of the founders and leaders of CSOs intimidated some are allegedly accused of involving in political agitation and encouraging community to claim their rights. As cited in Wondwosen (2009: 86), in the post-2005 election period, the government officially accused various civil society leaders as the supporters of the opposition parties. This accusation led to the arrest of many civil society leaders and other individuals working for various CSOs.

Policy Environment About 60% of respondents in the Graph 4 perceive the policy environment of Ethiopia towards

CSOs engaged in the development of democratic political culture restrictive, centralized, and discri-minatory. Until 1991, the legal and political conditions were not conducive for the development of

15 | Non-S

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– BTC 2012

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Another reason why CSOs have little or no support of their programs is related with recent coming out from imperial and military regimes. The majority of people are not well aware of demo-cratic culture and the roles of CSOs. They expect everything from government. Thus, resists and neglects the programs of CSOs. In most parts of the country, particularly in rural areas, it is difficult it is also difficult to access target groups such as women in public meeting and conferences. Promot-ing gender equality under such circumstances and getting support from the public is very difficult. Moreover, diversity of languages in the country has created communication problems between CSOs and public. The aforementioned factors could be potential reasons for CSOs mainly focus on promoting public awareness and participation in the development of democratic political culture of the country.

External and Internal Influences In the Graph 4 above, external and internal influences have demonstrated as challenges that

CSOs faced in discharging their duties. According to Kassahun (2002: 128), that most CSOs in Ethiopia depend on governments and donors for financial and material resources deemed essential for carrying out activities. This makes CSOs indifferent to unpopular measures even when these run counter to their stated objectives. Hellinger (1987: 137) viewed civil society involvement in joint projects funded by governments as a threat to their independence and long-term survival. Weston (1994: 14) proved that civil society involved in such a situation failed to distance themselves from economic and social policies with negative bearings on the poor. Some CSOs even have hidden agendas. CSOs dependency on foreign funds is a threat to autonomy & accountability to the public.

Lack of Clear Demarcation The lack of clear demarcation of activities of CSOs is another challenge illustrated in the Graph

4 above. This could be possibly due deficiency of previous laws and regulations governing CSOs. Thus, depending on circumstances such availability of funds, sensitivity of issues and other factors, CSOs had been involving in various activities ranging from complementing development activities to advocacy activities.

Poor Institutional Establishment CSOs have also faced problems that may be of their own making. Very few CSOs cultivate in-

ternal democratic institutions and some have been accused of embezzling funds. Good management practices demand that obvious key management concepts and principles such as sustainability, ac-countability, transparency, clarity of objectives, which are necessary for institutionalized formal pro-cedures, are put in place. Thus, CSOs have been accused of lacking transparency and democratic internal procedures, and some even for having hidden agendas.

Lack of awareness and frequent turnover of government officials As indicated in the Graph 4 above, few of the respondents stated that lack of awareness and fre-

quent turnover of government officials as a challenge. Lack of awareness of government officials especially at lower levels of administration regarded CSOs engagement as a political activity, which has to be handled by political parties. The frequent of turnover of government officials at various levels of administration also disrupts communication and continuation of planned activities of CSOs.

Government Interferences About 15% of respondents in the Graph 4 stated government interference in the activities of

CSOs as a challenge for the achievement of their goals. Government sometimes directly or indirectly interferes in activities of some CSOs or it influences their democratization programs. In the other part of the questionnaire, the respondents are asked about instances that the government interfe-rences in activities of CSOs engaged in the development of democratic political culture of the coun-try. To this end, they are asked to choose within the dichotomies of yes or no. They are also re-quested to describe the areas and extent of interference if their answer is yes. The information taken

17 | Non-S

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– BTC 2012

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Independence from Foreign

Fund

Mobilizing Domestic Politics

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Effective Monitoring and

Evalution Mechanism

Enhances Accountability of

CSOs

Fig. 9. Positive impact of the CSP


6.5. Potential Impacts of CSP on CSOs In this session, respondents are requested to choose within the dichotomies of positive or nega-

tive with regard to potential impacts of CSP on CSOs engaged in the development of democratic political culture of the country. The opinion of the respondents is presented in the Figure 4. About 69.8% of the respondents view the potential impact of CSP on CSOs engaged in the development of democratic political culture of the country as negative and 13.2% of them view as positive. About 11.3% of the respondents also replied as CSP has negative and positive impacts.

Potential Positive Impacts The description of respondents’ positive view on the potential impact of CSP is summarized in-

to four thematic areas. The result is presented in the Fig. 9. Accordingly, independence from foreign fund, effective monitoring and evaluation mechanisms, mobilizing domestic politics by its own citi-zens and enhances accountability of CSOs are dominants reasons for anticipating the potential im-pacts of CSP as positive. In spite of the concerns of the CSOs over a number of the provi-sions in the Proclama-tion, they also note that the CSP has several en-couraging features. CSP allows Charities and So-cieties to income gene-rating activities. This helps the Charities and Societies Agency to strengthen their internal capacity and ensure the sustainability of their activities. The Proclamation also exempts Charities from income tax, which enhances their financial capacity. The government of Ethiopia has various rationales for the enact-ment of the Proclamation. Ensuring the rights of citizen outlined the Constitution including the right to association. Mobilizing citizens in politics will help to reduce foreign influence in the politics of the country and assure sustainability of democratic development.

The previous rules and regulations governing CSOs could create enabling environment for their operations because those rules and regulations were not formulated in such a way to accommodate diversity of CSOs, their operations and unique characteristics. The government’s initiative to address these gaps was both timely and eagerly anticipated. Another positive feature is the establishment of an Agency to undertake the registration and supervision of CSOs. The Proclamation also incorpo-rates specific provisions for different types of CSOs. One of the difficulties encountered under the previous rules and regulations was the lack of a provision for the legal status of CSO consortia. In this regard, CSP provides the establishment of such a consortium of Charities and Societies. Ethio-pian government argued that the CSP would help the institutions to become efficient, and avoid their shortcomings and ethical problems in the area. The government stressed that it drafted the law to promote financial transparency among CSOs and increase their accountability to the stakeholders. The opinion collected reveals that the Proclamation would entail far reaching consequences both on the existence and growth of CSOs and on the benefits they bring to the society.

Restriction Areas/Operational Activities The CSP excludes Foreign Charities as well as Ethiopian Residents Charities and Societies from

rights-based development and advocacy work. The implications of this provision could potentially restrict CSOs from undertaking rights-based, advocacy-related work, as most of these activities are


foreign funded. Most CSOs will not able to continue their interventions in mobilizing and empower-ing different sections of society to engage in governance and human rights issues and this will result in reduced participation of citizens. In other words, charities and societies seeking to pursue these purposes cannot receive foreign funding that amounts to more than 10% of their overall income. This diminished citizen's participation will, in turn, lead to less pluralism, democracy and respect for human rights in the country.

Restriction of Foreign Funding The CSP retains a ten% threshold on foreign funding, as a basis for defining Ethiopian Charities

and Societies, as being distinct from other categories of CSOs that receive more than 10% of their income from foreign sources, such as Ethiopian Residents Charities and Societies and Foreign Char-ities and Societies. The implication of this provision could limit the work of foreign-funded CSOs to largely service delivery activities, and constrain the few domestic CSOs who wish to continue to work on human rights and governance issues. The foreign funding restrictions may force the closure of many organizations, especially human rights organizations. This is of particular concern in Ethi-opia where local sources of financing are limited and CSOs are often dependent on foreign funding. As with the interview of HRCO, the Council has closed eight offices and reduced around 50 em-ployees. EWLA has also reduced around 47 employees due lack of finance.

Government Interferences The scope of authority of the CSA has been diluted to some degree, however it retains the final

authority to deny registration to and dissolve Foreign Charities and Societies and those of Ethiopian Residents, as these CSOs have no right of appeal under the Proclamation. The unchecked power of Sector Administrators to supervise and control the operations of CSOs remains a serious concern. In addition, the CSA has the authority to seize and reallocate assets and resources of CSOs, Con-vene meetings and nominate chairpersons of Societies’ General Assembly, institute inquiries into the internal affairs of CSOs and suspend officers and operations of CSOs.

CSOs scale down their programs or shift to development Given the lack of fundraising opportunities inside Ethiopia, most organizations rely on foreign

sources of funding. Therefore, by cutting off the sources of funding for local Ethiopian CSOs, the Proclamation would result in the closing down of many organizations or shift their programs to de-velopment. It will reduce the size of the sector, since almost the entire advocacy CSOs/civil society

.0%

10.0%

20.0%

30.0%

40.0%

50.0%

60.0%

70.0%

Fig. 10. Negative impact of the CSP



will be forced to cease their operation and most of the development CSOs/civil society (employing the rights-based approach) will be forced to terminate the advocacy/governance component of their intervention. Thus, organizations such as Council for Democracy and Human Rights Association (CDHRA), Civic and Voter’s Education Association in Ethiopia (CVEAE), Organization for Social Justice in Ethiopia (OSJE) have terminated the advocacy activities. 7. Conclusion

The African state has exhibited an enhanced degree of coercive power deployed both for con-struction and for territorial expansion. This resulted in a pervasive military ethos and the fusion of political and military titles. The same personnel were administrators and judges in times of peace and commanders when war broke out. The long ancestry of the military in African history and its pivotal place in the social fabric was attended by a high degree of militarism. To bear arms, has always re-mained a sign of manly distinction; rewarded with tributary rights over or outright grants of land gave the ingrained military ethos a solid economic basis. Military discipline and Marxist-Leninist ide-ology combined to breed a national culture of conformity and uniformity. (Costantinos BT, 1996:345-347)

Because pressure for regime transformation and transitions to democracy has come from below, outside the decrepit, authoritarian state, in civil society, society yields the spontaneous interests, de-mands and institutional mechanisms of democratic transition, the state has only a limited role to play. Its function will not be to manage society's democratic aspirations and activities, but to create the enabling conditions for their free play. Institutions and groups in civil society must form and run themselves. When they begin to address longer socio-economic and political issues beyond their li-mited sectional concerns, or to co-operate with the state on certain matters, they should be able to do so in terms of their specific interests and competence, not as mere instruments of states (Ibid).

Alternatively, the underdevelopment of civil society in Africa and the incapacity of institutions within it are seen as major barriers to democratization. The activities of some social institutions may have the salutary effect of bringing into transparency the work of government, and of opening up state institutions and practices to public suiting. Nevertheless, the overall weakness of African civil societies is often cited as a fundamental structural constraint on democratic transformation in Africa. Rather than offering agents and arenas of transitions to democracy, African civil societies are gener-ally seen as objects and problems of reform. Indicators of their weakness include low levels of eco-nomic, technological, professional and cultural development and high levels of illiteracy. On account of this view, the state assumes a large role in democratization. It is assigned the task of nothing less than "cultivating civil society" itself through political education and mobilization. (Ibid)

In reality, a rich associational life characterizes African society. Nevertheless, the richness of such forms of associational life does not imply the presence of a strong civil society as concealed here. The kinds of associations prevalent in the context of African authoritarian or hegemonic re-gimes tend to reflect the weak character of the state. Informal associations are characterized by fragmentation and disengagement from the state. In these sense, civil society in many African coun-tries is weak. While associations exist, they have not developed structures that are more formal and not openly presented themselves in the public area. The weakness of the state meant that few incen-tives existed to form autonomous organizations to engage with the state rather than prefer to remain outside the reach of the state. We have then divergent representations of civil society accompanied by somewhat conflicting conceptions of the role of the state in the passage to democracy. (Ibid)

The perception of society as producer of the spontaneous interests, demands and institutional resources of democratic change to some degree conflicts with the view of civil societies in Africa as weakly developed social and institutional structures in need of cultivation and support by the state (Ibid). The conception of the state as creator of the enabling environment for the free democratic activities of individuals and groups diverges from the view of government as political educator, mo-bilizer and democratizer of civil society. (Ibid)


Moreover, these conflicting perspectives commonly tend to confuse representations of "civil so-ciety" and "the state" as conceptual or ideal categories with actual communities and regime fuelling the transition. The categories are often conflicted into the immediate stuff of African political and social experience. This is not to deny that there are representations of civil society in current pers-pectives on democratization in Africa. However, the elements categorized as civil society are more evidently those of really existing African social formations, such as ethnic groups, tribes and clans. It is to note a disabling analytical tendency in which the actualities of African politics (tribalism, the government of individuals and groups rather than the rule of laws and so on) tend to be pre-emptied and displaced by the very conceptual categories used to describe them otherwise. (Ibid)

Indeed, organizations in civil society operate between the state and the citizenry and give struc-ture to the representation of interests of a diverse body of the populace. It is an essential prerequisite as it facilitates the opportunity for participation in the political life for the citizens at large. The con-temporary reality of Africa is that the various social and economic organizations such as self-help groups, NGOs, professional associations, etc. are very weak and generally dominated by the elite, denying them effective venues to fulfill their historical mandates as CSOs.

What does this leave for the transition to democracy -- practically nothing besides concluding that the African nation-states needed to be built and built democratically virtually from scratch. Po-litically, its past is more a liability than an asset. Because citizenship was imposed on nationalities by force, it was inauthentic and unstable, chronically beset with rebellions and civil wars. Because it contradicted the rights of people's to their own identity, culture, political life and sustainable livelih-ood security, it was undemocratic and a drag on the development of the country. The brutal military dictatorship of the Idi Amin, Mengistu, Mobutu, Said Barre, etc. which in the end brought the coun-tries they ruled to the edge of disintegration, was in essence a continuation of all kinds of previous dictatorial regimes.


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