LESSONS  LEARNED?  A  LOOK  AT  FEMA’S  PUBLIC  AFFAIRS  

COMMUNICATIONS  DURING  HURRICANE  KATRINA  AND  IMPLICATIONS  ON  FUTURE  DISASTERS  

       

     

Holly  K.  Latimer      

         

PR  History  in  the  Modern  World  Dr.  Andrea  Weckerle  Kent  State  University  

Aug.  5,  2012  

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LESSONS  LEARNED?  A  LOOK  AT  FEMA’S  PUBLIC  AFFAIRS  COMMUNICATIONS  DURING  HURRICANE  KATRINA  AND  IMPLICATIONS  ON  FUTURE  DISASTERS  

   

Abstract  

This  paper  looks  at  the  historic  

implications  of  the  Federal  

Emergency  Management  Agency’s  

(FEMA)  handling  of  Hurricane  

Katrina,  the  costliest  natural  

disaster  to  strike  the  United  States.  

Looking  at  scholarly  writing,  this  

paper  will  note  the  weaknesses  in  

communication  to  the  public,  lack  

of  preparation  and  how  these  

actions  damaged  the  agency’s  

public  image.    

Additionally,  this  paper  looks  

beyond  Katrina  at  some  changes  

made  within  the  structure  of  FEMA  

due  to  the  Post-­‐Katrina  Emergency  

Management  Reform  Act  of  2006  

(also  known  as  the  Post-­‐Katrina  Act).  The  paper  also  asks  the  question  as  to  whether  

changes  made  since  Hurricane  Katrina  have  better  prepared  the  agency  for  future  

catastrophic  disasters  and  whether  the  changes  have  improved  the  agency’s  public  image.  

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Background  on  FEMA  

The  Federal  Emergency  Management  Agency  

began  in  1979.  According  to  Leo  Bosner,  a  retired  

FEMA  employee  who  worked  for  the  agency  from  

1979  until  his  retirement  in  2008,  the  agency  was  set  

up  in  an  “effort  to  give  states  a  sort  of  one-­‐stop  

shopping  at  the  federal  level  in  case  of  disaster.”  

(Bosner,  2011)1  

Adamski,  Kline  and  Tyrrell  said  the  agency  has  undergone  many  transformations  

during  its  brief  history.  (p.  3)  Beginning  as  an  agency  during  the  Carter  administration,  

FEMA  housed  several  divisions  of  agencies  directed  at  helping  Americans  after  a  natural  

disaster.  Through  various  presidencies,  the  focus  of  the  agency  changed  somewhat  to  also  

include  Cold  War  and  terrorism  threats  in  addition  to  helping  with  recovery  from  natural  

disasters.    

During  the  Clinton  administration,  the  agency  was  promoted  to  a  Cabinet-­‐level  position  

with  its  focus  being  solely  disaster  recovery,  assistance  and  preparation.  In  the  George  W.  

Bush  administration,  the  agency’s  stock  fell  when  it  dropped  from  cabinet-­‐level  position  to  

being  encompassed  in  the  Department  of  Homeland  Security.    

According  to  Adamski,  Kline  and  Tyrrell,  “FEMA’s  assimilation  into  DHS,  which  merged  

more  than  22  government  agencies,  was  marked  by  immense  skepticism  and  controversy.  

Opponents  of  this  transition  feared  that  revocation  of  FEMA’s  independent  status  would  

severely  hamper  its  ability  to  quickly  respond  to  disasters.”  (Adamski,  Kline  and  Tyrrell)  

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Background  on  Hurricane  Katrina  

Hurricane  Katrina  made  landfall  in  Plaquemines  Parish,  Louisiana,  on  Monday,  Aug.  29,  

2005  as  a  Category  3  storm.  Continuing  to  move  north,  the  storm  covered  portions  of  

Louisiana  before  its  eye  came  ashore  near  the  

mouth  of  the  Pearl  River  in  Mississippi.  By  1  p.m.,  

the  storm  had  decreased  to  a  Category  1  

hurricane  and  six  hours  later,  it  was  downgraded  

to  a  tropical  storm.  Before  its  downgrade,  

Hurricane  Katrina  produced  storm  surge  in  

Mississippi  and  Louisiana  up  to  27  feet  high.  

Surge  waters  flooded  as  far  as  12  miles  inland  in  

Mississippi.  Storm  surge  waves  of  more  than  10  

feet  were  seen  as  far  as  Mobile  Alabama.  (The  

White  House,  p.  2).  

The  storm  killed  more  than  1,300  people  and  injured  thousands.  According  to  the  

White  House  report,  entire  coastal  communities  were  obliterated.  Major  interstates  and  

highways  were  closed.  Communications  infrastructures  were  destroyed.  In  New  Orleans,  

sections  of  the  roof  of  the  Superdome  were  ripped  away  as  people  sheltered  inside.  Levees  

were  overtopped  and  some  were  breached  throughout  the  city’s  350  miles  of  levees.    As  

levees  and  floodwalls  gave  way,  approximately  80  percent  of  New  Orleans  will  filled  with  

water  up  to  20  feet  deep  turning  the  situation  into  a  “catastrophe  within  a  catastrophe.”  

(The  White  House,  p.  3-­‐4)    

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FEMA’s  Response  to  Hurricane  Katrina  

When  Hurricane  Katrina  struck  Louisiana,  Mississippi,  Florida  and  Alabama,  FEMA  was  

an  agency  not  prepared  to  respond  to  natural  disasters.  Instead  of  having  funding  to  

prepare  and  mitigate  for  natural  disasters,  FEMA’s  new  direction  took  it  into  security  and  

terrorism  preparedness.  

Roberts  said  in  “FEMA  After  Katrina,”  “People  had  not  always  looked  to  the  federal  

government  for  help  during  disasters,  but  during  the  twentieth  century  the  level  of  

assurance  expected  from  the  federal  government  before  and  after  a  disaster  ratcheted  

upwards.”  (Roberts,  p.  4)  He  cited  media  photos  of  FEMA  worker  rushing  to  disaster  sites  

and  FEMA  relief  workers  helping  communities  rebuild.    

Because  of  the  views  presented  to  survivors  and  others  across  the  world,  FEMA  was  

expected  to  provide  substantial  help  to  hurricane  survivors.  However,  Barnes  noted  in  her  

case  study  that  FEMA’s  relationship  with  the  media  was  a  threat  to  its  success.  She  stated  

the  media’s  coverage  and  commentary  on  the  agency’s  qualifications  threatened  citizen  

confidence  in  the  agency.  By  not  clearly  communicating  with  or  working  with  the  media,  

Barnes  said  FEMA  opened  itself  to  reporters  exposing  flaws.  (Barnes,  2008)  

Throughout  the  research,  FEMA’s  response  was  criticized  for  being  too  slow,  for  being  

disorganized  and  for  even  having  a  lack  of  action.    

Barnes  analyzed  the  releases  issued  by  FEMA  in  conjunction  with  news  stories  from  

the  Times-­‐Picayune,  Washington  Post  and  New  York  Times.  The  first  time  frame  of  articles  

analyzed  showed  that  all  papers  used  information  FEMA  released  about  the  impending  

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storm.  However,  one  week  into  the  coverage  as  FEMA  talked  about  the  progress  made  by  

the  agency,  the  Washington  Post  criticized  the  agency  without  mentioning  any  of  the  

positive  information  from  the  FEMA  release.  News  media,  locally  and  nationwide,  also  

failed  to  mention  the  positive  aspects  of    FEMA’s  operation  and  only  highlighted  questions  

or  citizen  discontent  with  the  agency.  (Barnes,  2008)  

 As  is  customary  throughout  the  disaster,  FEMA  releases  information  about  the  amount  

of  grant  and  loan  money  issued  to  disaster  survivors  and  governments  and  nonprofit  

groups.  In  addition  to  this  information,  FEMA  releases  tips  for  registering  for  assistance,  

returning  to  and  repairing  property,  flood  insurance,  mitigation  information  and  disaster  

recovery  center  information.  Local  media  uses  some  of  this  information,  but  often  does  not.  

The  information  is  also  posted  on  the  FEMA  website,  www.fema.gov.    

As  Keyse  noted,  “Public  agencies,  however,  do  not  enjoy  as  much  freedom  when  it  

comes  to  public  relations  work  as  private  organizations  do.  There  are  laws  in  place  that  

have  restricted  how  these  agencies  spend  money  on  publicity  and  these  laws  have  

prevented  the  utilization  of  proactive  communication  strategies  that  would  help  these  

agencies  improve  their  images  with  their  publics  before  a  crisis  situation  occurs.”  (Keyse,  p.  

3)  

FEMA  primarily  communicated  with  the  public  during  the  hurricane  through  public  

service  announcements  and  news  releases.  Without  funding  for  advertising  or  media  

campaigns,  the  agency  depended  on  the  media  to  get  the  facts  to  the  public.  Because  of  

initial  bad  media  relations,  the  progress  made  by  FEMA  did  not  reach  the  public,  only  the  

negative  stories.  

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Although  the  media  and  survivors    may  blame  FEMA  for  many  of  the  problems  

surrounding  Hurricane  Katrina,  Cole  and  Fellows  (p.  224)  note  that  apathy  by  residents  of  

New  Orleans  was  another  key  to  crisis  in  the  city.    

“…  a  general  sense  of  apathy  minimized  the  realism  of  and  attention  provided  to  that  risk.  As  Hurricane  Katrina  moved  closer,  the  messages  communicated  about  the  risk  to  individuals  living  in  the  region  did  not  effectively  reach  all  audiences.  When  the  risk  of  levee  failure  became  more  salient,  messages  disseminated  to  remaining  residents  provided  confusing  recommendations  from  sources  not  typically  trusted.”    

Cole  and  Fellows  said  that  message  preparation  prior  to  a  disaster  is  key  and  that  it  is  

to  little  avail  if  it  inadequate.  Cole  and  Fellows  said  the  spokespeople  who  tried  to  get  the  

message  out  to  the  residents  of  the  city  were  not  credible  to  the  people  therefore  the  

message  was  not  heeded.  They  suggested  having  community  and  religious  leaders  join  in  to  

spread  messages  of  possible  crisis  in  the  community.  These  spokespeople  are  trusted  

within  the  community  where  a  government  official  might  not  be.  

The  apathy  of  the  residents  combined  with  the  lack  of  preparedness  and  messaging  by  

FEMA  led  to  a  public  relations  nightmare.  Although  Hurricane  Katrina  brought  about  a  

negative  situation,  it  brought  to  light  problems  within  the  agency  that  were  addressed  in  

the  weeks  and  months  after  the  hurricane.  

Following  Hurricane  Katrina,  FEMA  became  subject  to  the  Post-­‐Katrina  Emergency  

Management  Reform  Act  passed  by  Congress  in  2006.  The  act  gives  FEMA  some  autonomy  

within  the  Department  of  Homeland  Security.  The  agency  is  tasked  to  lead  and  support  the  

nation  in  a  risk-­‐based,  comprehensive  emergency  management  system  of  preparedness,  

protection,  response,  recovery,  and  mitigation.  (Jenkins,  2008)  

   

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Changes  to  FEMA  since  Hurricane  Katrina    

Five  years  after  Hurricane  Katrina,  current  FEMA  Administrator  Craig  Fugate  spoke  to  

the  House  Committee  on  Homeland  Security  Subcommittee  on  Emergency  Preparedness,  

Repsonse  and  Communications  providing  an  update  on  agency  changes  and  challenges  

following  the  nation’s  most  costly  disaster.2  

One  of  the  primary  changes  Fugate  addressed  was  the  change  from  federal-­‐centric  

approach  to  the  Whole  Community  approach.  “…instead  we  must  collaborate  and  engage  

with  partners  at  every  level  of  government  as  well  as  the  nonprofit  and  private  sector.”  

(Fugate,  p.  2)  

Fugate  told  the  subcommittee  since  Hurricane  Katrina,  the  agency  has  “completely  

overhauled  the  way  we  communicate  with  each  other  and  with  the  public  in  a  disaster  

environment.”  (Fugate,  p.  7)  In  addition  to  providing  field  communication  capabilities  such  

as  Mobile  Emergency  Response  Support  and  a  Mobile  Communications  Office  Vehicle  for  

emergency  disaster  communications,  FEMA  is  also  using  technology  to  send  alerts  and  

warning  capabilities  through  cellular  phones.  These  will  reach  disaster  survivors  “whether  

cell  phone  towers  are  jammed  or  not,”  according  to  Fugate.  (p.  8)  

Another  way  FEMA  is  communicating  post-­‐Katrina  is  through  social  media.    

“Social  media  is  an  important  part  of  the  Whole  Community  approach  because  it  helps  facilitate  the  vital  two-­‐way  communication  between  emergency  management  agencies  and  the  public,  and  it  allows  us  to  quickly  and  specifically  share  information  with  state,  local,  territorial  and  tribal  governments  as  well  as  the  public.”  (Fugate,  p.  8)  

 FEMA  headquarters  external  affairs  staff  members  currently  use  Facebook,  Twitter  and  

YouTube  channels  to  reach  out  to  the  public  with  preparedness  and  recovery  information.  

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Regional  FEMA  external  affairs  officers  have  a  dedicated  Twitter  channel,  but  can  only  post  

to  Facebook  and  YouTube  accounts  by  going  through  headquarters  external  affairs.    

The  Whole  Community  brand  of  emergency  management  has  already  enhanced  

FEMA’s  image  in  the  media.  Following  the  2011  Alabama  tornadoes,  an  Associated  Press  

article  commented  on  the  fast  response  to  tornado  survivors.    

“On  the  receiving  end  of  frantic  descriptions  of  entire  neighborhoods  wiped  out  by  last  week’s  pulverizing  storms  that  killed  342,  Federal  Emergency  Management  Agency  administrator  Craig  Fugate  urged  President  Barack  Obama  to  immediately  sign  an  emergency  disaster  declaration  for  Alabama.  The  near  immediate  response  was  starkly  different  from  past  catastrophes.”  (Caldwell,  2011)  

 The  agency  also  received  positive  reviews  for  its  preparation  and  handling  of  

Hurricane  Irene.  Prior  to  Irene’s  landfall,  FEMA  officials  worked  to  prepare  60  million  

people  for  the  storm’s  potential  devastation.  To  offer  information,  FEMA  responded  not  

only  with  press  releases,  but  also  with  posts  on  Facebook,  Twitter  and  YouTube,  Blog  

postings  and  through  text  messaging  and  mobile  phone  applications.  (Kash,  2011)  

In  addition  to  reaching  out  to  individuals,  FEMA  officials  also  reached  out  to  state  

officials  to  determine  statewide  needs.    

“Fugate  said  FEMA  began  preparing  before  the  storm  hit  by  talking  with  state  officials  about  what  they  might  need  after  the  storm.  Also,  the  Post-­‐Katrina  Emergency  Reform  Act,  which  became  law  in  2006,  gave  FEMA  more  authority  to  act  early  to  set  up  communications  centers  and  put  officials  in  place  before  an  oncoming  emergency  and  before  getting  a  state  governor’s  request  for  help.”  (Weigelt,  Lipowicz,  2011)  

 The  same  article  quoted  Maryland  Governor  Martin  O’Malley,  “Craig  Fugate  and  the  

people  at  FEMA,  Secretary  Napolitano  and  President  Obama—they  have  been  excellent  …  

They  have  been  with  us  since  Day  One  And  actually,  before  the  storm  arrived,  they  were  

here,  and  it’s  worked  really,  really  well.  This  is  a  much  better  FEMA  than  the  olden  days.”    

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Conclusions  

Hurricane  Katrina  was  a  changing  point  for  

FEMA.  Some  many  lessons  can  be  learned  from  

the  confusion  and  problems  the  agency  faced  

following  the  hurricane.  Although  several  

changes  have  been  made  within  the  structure  of  

FEMA  since  Hurricane  Katrina,  more  changes  can  

still  occur.  Increased  use  of  social  media  is  helpful  

to  survivors,  but  limiting  the  use  of  FEMA’s  regional  offices  to  Twitter  could  limit  the  

number  of  people  who  view  the  information.    

Allowing  the  regional  offices  to  have  a  Facebook  page  would  be  beneficial.    

Another  thing  FEMA  can  do  to  help  prepare  survivors  is  to  clearly  define  its  role  to  

people.  The  external  affairs  components  at  FEMA  need  to  make  sure  the  public  

understands  that  FEMA  has  limited  powers.  It  cannot  help  everyone  in  every  situation.  

FEMA  needs  to  make  sure  people  understand  the  agency  only  comes  into  a  community  

after  a  devastating  disaster  that  is  more  than  the  local  or  state  government  can  handle.  

I  suggest  more  research  into  the  communication  strategies  FEMA  employs  and  how  the  

agency  plans  to  move  forward  under  the  new  guidelines  that  will  begin  under  the  Post-­‐

Katrina  Act  in  2013.  The  government,  the  agency  and  the  media  have  evaluated  many  

lessons,  but  are  these  lessons  really  learned?  Unfortunately,  at  some  point,  some  disaster  

will  happen  and  the  world  will  find  out.    

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Bibliography  

Adamski,  Tonya,  Beth  Kline  and  Tanya  Tyrrell,  FEMA  Reorganization  and  the  Response  to  Hurricane  Disaster  Relief;  Perspectives  in  Public  Affairs,  Arizona  State  University,  Spring  2006.  

Barnes,  Natasha,  FEMA:  Hurricane  Katrina  Case  Study-­‐Communications  Focus,  Public  Relations  Problems  and  Cases,  Nov.  5,  2008.    

Bosner,  Leo,  Part  One:  FEMA  and  Disaster-­‐A  Look  at  What  Worked  and  What  Didn’t  From  a  FEMA  Insider.  Truthout.  Aug.  3,  2011.  

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Cole,  Terry  W.  &  Kelli  L.  Fellows,  Risk  Communication  Failure:  A  Case  Study  of  New  Orleans  and  Hurricane  Katrina,  Southern  Communication  Journal.  2008.  73:3,  211-­‐228  

Fugate,  Craig,  Five  Years  Later:  An  Assessment  of  the  Post  Katrina  Emergency  Management  Reform  Act.  Statement  before  the  House  Committee  on  Homeland  Security,  Subcommittee  on  Emergency  Preparedness,  Response  and  Communications,  Oct.  25,  2011.  

Jenkins,  William  O.,  Actions  Take  to  Implement  the  Post-­‐Katrina  Emergency  Management  Reform  Act  of  2006,  U.  S.  Government  Accountability  Office,  Nov.  21,  2006.  

Kash,  Wyatt.  Feds@Work:  FEMA’s  Craig  Fugate  Gets  Ahead  of  the  Storm.  AOL  Government.  Aug.  26,  2011.  

Keyse,  Cassandra,  Lessons  Learned  in  Public  Image  Management:  An  examination  of  public  relations  strategies  employed  by  public  agencies  during  Hurricane  Katrina,  California  Polytechnic  State  University,  Fall  2009.  

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Weigelt,  Matthew  and  Alice  Lipowicz,  Irene  helps  FEMA  prove  itself  again.  Federal  Computer.  Aug.  29,  2012.  

End  Notes  

                                                                                                               1  Leo  Bosner  conducted  a  series  of  stories  about  FEMA  appearing  in  Truthout  in  2011.    2  President  Obama  appointed  Craig  Fugate  as  FEMA  administrator.  Fugate  is  a  proponent  of  social  media  usage  during  disasters  and  even  announced  his  appointment  through  Twitter.