Leibniz's Pre-established Harmony (ca.40k word manuscript from 1997)

Unpublished manuscript (1997)

1

Leibniz’s Pre-established Harmony

(A critical literature review)

Paul Lodge Dept. Philosophy

Rutgers University (1997)


2

Contents

1. What is Pre-Established Harmony? 3 2. Leibniz's arguments for the pre-established harmony; the positive case 10 2.1 An argument from the nature of individual concepts or notions 10 2.2 An argument from the nature of substances 20 3. Leibniz's arguments for the pre-established harmony; the negative case 22 3.1 Leibniz's critique of the 'way of influence' 23 3.2 Leibniz's criticisms of occasionalism 25 (a) Inconsistency with the idea that there are finite substances 26 (b) The charge of Spinozism 27 (c) The unintelligibility of a nature without substances 27 (d) No reason to create without substances 29 (e) Occasionalism entails perpetual miracles 30 (f) Occasionalism requires that God disturb the laws of nature 37 4. Pre-established harmony and the relation between mind and body 41 4. 1. The attribution of bodies to minds 43 4.2. The appearance of interaction 44 4.3. Ascriptions of causal relations between minds and bodies 47 4.4. The intimate union of mind and body 51 5. Leibniz's contemporaries and their criticisms of pre-established harmony 57 5.1 The criticisms of Simon Foucher 57 5.2 The criticisms of Antoine Arnauld 60 5.3 The criticisms of Pierre Bayle 64 Bibliography 71


3

1. What is Pre-established Harmony? Bertrand Russell calls the pre-established harmony the ‘crowning conception of [Leibniz’s] philosophy’ and suggests it was of this theory that Leibniz was most proud (1937, p.136). These claims are supported by Russell's further observation that Leibniz 'loved to call himself the author of the system of pre-established harmony' (ibid.) in his later years. However, despite the extent to which the name of Leibniz has come to be associated with this doctrine, Leibniz never refers to pre-established harmony before the late 1690’s.1 In a recent paper, Roger Woolhouse and Richard Francks (1994) trace the origin of the term ‘pre-established harmony’ in some detail. They note that, in the second edition of his Dictionary Article Rorarius, Pierre Bayle attributes the invention of the phrase to one ‘Father Lami’ (ibid. p.77), namely the French Benedictine monk François Lamy (1636-1711). Woolhouse and Franks acknowledge that Leibniz does not speak of a pre-established harmony in print until the publication of the so-called First Explanation of the New System in 1696,2 and that his own attempts at providing a genealogy of the term ‘pre-established harmony’ are less than helpful. However, their final assessment of the situation is that Leibniz was in fact the originator of this name for his doctrine and that the most probable explanation for Lamy’s use of the term is that he came across it in the Third Explanation of the New System3 which appeared in the Journal des Savants in November of that same year (ibid. pp. 77-83). But perhaps more importantly, Woolhouse and Francks point out that the doctrine of pre-established harmony appears earlier than its name, and that prior to 1696, Leibniz had refers to essentially the same theory as his ‘hypothesis of concomitance’ and ‘theory of agreements.’ We shall consider the question of when the doctrine which came to be know as pre-established harmony first arises in Leibniz’s philosophy in the next section. But is important to bear in mind that the commentators whose accounts we shall examine of the content of that thesis, do not draw any significant difference between Leibniz’s use of the terms ‘concomitance’, ‘agreement’ and ‘pre-established harmony.’ Thus, in what follows, we shall use 'pre-established harmony' as a cover-all for the theory which Leibniz presents under each of these names unless the context explicitly requires us to do otherwise, whilst acknowledging the anachronism that this sometimes entails. As Roger Woolhouse (1986 p.69) points out, there is a popular outline of the history of seventeenth century philosophy which bears significantly upon how pre-established harmony is commonly conceived. 4 It goes as follows: Princess Elizabeth presents Descartes with the devastating question of how mind and body can interact, if they are the kinds of heterogeneous substances that he proposes (K.136-144). Descartes himself presents no satisfactory answer and it is left to his followers and critics to come up with something more tenable. To this end, Spinoza develops his monism, with mind and body as two aspects of

1Though Leibniz often talks of 'harmony' without the prefix prior to this time (cf. Mondadori (1978)

for some examples of this).

2 Iclaircissement du nouveau sisteme de la communication des substances pour servir de rJponse B ce

qui en a estJ dit dans le Journal du 12 septembre 1695 in Journal des Savants 14 (2 April 1696), pp.166-

168; and 15 (9 April 1696), pp.169-171.

3 The original title of this work is Extrait d’une lettre de Mr. Leibniz sur son HypothPse de Philosopfie

in Journal des Savants 38 (19 November 1696) pp. 451-455.

4By using the terms ‘popular’ and ‘commonly’, Woolhouse appears to mean the kind of view which

might be held by one who has a passing acquaintance with seventeenth century philosophy.


4

the same unique substance; Malebranche and the other occasionalists impose God as a direct intermediary, obviating the need for mind-body interaction; and Leibniz introduces his pre-established harmony which, as Simon Foucher points out, is little more than Malebranche’s occasionalism ‘with all the adjustments made at once’ (Foucher 1969, p.xxv). At present, we need not really question the adequacy of any of this outline, although it will later become apparent that there are a number of points at which the narrative has somewhat mythic qualities. The important aspect of this story for our present concerns is the conception of Leibniz’s pre-established harmony which it contains, namely, that it is a solution to the problem of how mind and body are related to one another. Even a cursory glance at the Leibniz literature reveals that scholars do not regard pre-established harmony solely as a solution to Elizabeth's worry. However, echoes of this viewpoint are to be found. Thus, HidJ Ishiguro (1986 p.71) claims that the name 'pre-established harmony' was only ever used in connection with the mind-body problem. And, perhaps more importantly, both Russell (1937 p.137) and Louis Loeb (1981 p. 311-12) suggest that, although it was later extended to encompass a wider range of phenomena, pre-established harmony did originate as a solution to problem of Cartesian interaction, just as the 'popular account' narrates. In contrast to these views, are Nicholas Jolley's remarks in a recent survey of Leibniz's philosophy (Jolley 1993). Jolley asserts that 'Leibniz's doctrine of pre-established harmony...has been seriously misunderstood', and that it has been mistakenly assumed 'that...[it is] merely [an]...ad hoc solution to the mind-body problem which Descartes is supposed to have bequeathed to us'. Instead, he insists that the domain of pre-established harmony is far more widespread since it is 'a general theory about the relations between finite created substances.’ (1993 p.405.-emphasis added). Jolley is perhaps more forceful than some in making this point. However, he appears to occupy the majority position. Most of Leibniz’s commentators at least acknowledge that it is a mistake to over-emphasize the relation which pre-established harmony bears to the traditional mind-body problem. It is true, as we shall see later, that Leibniz tries to utilize the pre-established harmony in accounting for the relation between mind and body. However as most commentators explicitly note, this explanation depends upon the fact that pre-established harmony is, first and foremost, an account of the relation and communication between all substances.5 So far we have seen that pre-established harmony is usually characterized as a theory of the relations between substances.6 We shall now proceed to examine the details of this theory more closely. One complication that we have already encountered, but can largely ignore, with respect to pre-established harmony arises from the different names which Leibniz used for the theory throughout his career. Another complication arises with regards to the entities with which the theory is concerned. So far we have talked of the pre-established harmony as a theory of the relations between substances and this will serve us adequately in most contexts. However, it should be noted that some commentators prefer to talk exclusively of ‘monads’ when discussing Leibniz’s metaphysics. Like ‘pre-established harmony’, the term ‘monad’ did not enter Leibniz writings until the late 1690’s. However,

5Cf., Broad (1975, pp.99-100); Brown, S.(1984, p.155); Cottingham (1988, p.109); Jolley (1993,

p.405); Kulstad (1993a, pp.96-97); Sleigh (1990a, p.138; 1990b, p.161); Mercer and Sleigh (1995, p.100).

6 As Robert Adams points out (1994, p.84), Leibniz also posits a pre-established harmony between the

‘physical kingdom of nature’ and the ‘moral kingdom of grace’. The importance of this kind of pre-

established harmony in Leibniz’s philosophy as a whole - particularly his theodicy - should not be

underplayed. However, like the harmony between mind and body, this concomitance is derived from the

more basic relations which obtain between individual substances. And it is this fundamental metaphysical

thesis which is more often, and appropriately identified as the ‘theory of pre-established harmony.’


5

unlike the former change of vocabulary, the latter is taken by some, to signal a significant doctrinal shift, from a truly hylomorphic account of substance to an ontologically sparser idealism.7 These disputes are not our concern here. However, it is important to be aware that we shall treat the terms substance and monad as interchangeable throughout this essay, unless otherwise mentioned. With these considerations in mind we shall turn to some of the formulations of pre-established harmony which are to be found in the literature. Nicholas Jolley (1993, p.392) gives what seems to be the briefest account when he describes 'The hypothesis of Concomitance (or what is later termed by Leibniz 'The pre-established harmony')' as the doctrine that 'the states of substances are harmonized by God so that they give the appearance of causal interaction.' As we shall see Jolley's account of the pre-established harmony is not only brief, but also very restricted in comparison with those presented by other commentators. This observation alone is enough to raise suspicion as to its adequacy. But it becomes even harder to understand why Jolley is so keen to restrict the application of the term 'pre-established harmony' in this way, when two further facts are taken into account: Firstly, he offers nothing in the way of support for his favored reading;8 and secondly, even more damning evidence against Jolley's account comes from the fact that, on the most straightforward reading of his 'restricted' claim, there appears to be nothing to preclude us from regarding an occasionalist such as Malebranche as one who accepts the hypothesis of pre-established harmony. As we see later, Leibniz frequently presents occasionalism and pre-established harmony as mutually exclusive theories from the late 1690's onward. Thus it seems reasonable to require that any characterization of the latter respect the fact that Leibniz saw the two hypotheses as incompatible. However, it is far from clear that Jolley satisfies this necessary condition. John Cottingham's account (1988, p.109) is slightly more complex. He states that the doctrine of pre-established harmony consists in the fact that ‘each monad, despite, its isolated and self-enclosed nature, acts in a way which is in perfect harmony with the way in which all the others act’ (loc.cit.) as a result of God’s choice of the best world. We can see that Cottingham augments Jolley's reading in several ways. As well as the idea that substances harmonize as a result of divine intervention, he links this harmony to God's choice of the best and emphasizes the fact that the harmony arises despite the fact that each substance is 'cut off' from the rest of creation. Cottingham captures a number of the most important features of the pre-established harmony. However, his account still differs from that which is advanced by other commentators, either as their own view or in attempts to capture what 'most people' mean by the term, in that Cottingham lacks any explicit reference to causality. This may be illustrated by turning to one of the most recent discussions of pre-established harmony, from a paper by Christia Mercer and Robert C. Sleigh Jr. (1995 p.100). The account they present is essentially the same as Cottingham's, except that they replace the notions of 'isolation' and a 'self-enclosed nature', with the claim that substances do not causally interact. More specifically, Mercer and Sleigh suggest that pre-established harmony is usually thought to include the following three theses (loc.cit.):9

7Cf. Garber (1985) for the classic statement of this view, and Adams (1985; 1994, pp.217-341) for an

account which recognizes much greater continuity.

8Indeed Jolley himself (loc.cit.) admits that Leibniz at least sometimes uses the term 'pre-established

harmony' to refer to a broader thesis.

9Although thesis (1) properly understood implies thesis (3), most formulations of pre-established

harmony keep the 'spontaneity' and 'causal isolation' of individual substances separate.


6

(1) Each state of an individual substance is caused by something internal to its nature. (2) The states of substances correspond perfectly with each other. (3) Substances do not causally interact, or more precisely, no state of a substance has as a real cause some state of another substance.10 Mercer and Sleigh do not claim that this interpretation of pre-established harmony is one which they would directly endorse. Its primary purpose is to serve as a standard by which to assess the adequacy of their main argument concerning the first appearance of the pre-established harmony in Leibniz's philosophy.11 Thus it is quite consistent to find that one of these two commentators, namely Sleigh, endorses something slightly richer. Sleigh's views are brought out most clearly in a paper by Mark Kulstad (1993a). Using some, so far, unfamiliar terminology he suggests that 'concomitance or pre-established harmony is the doctrine that God created finite substances in such a way that they do not causally interact but nonetheless exhibit parallelism through their own spontaneity.' (ibid. p.97) Here the now familiar suggestion that substances do not causally interact is combined with two other theses couched in the novel terms which are italicized above. However, on Kulstad's understanding of these words, the additional theses turn out to be similar to those we have encountered already. Indeed, parallelism is simply the 'thesis that the states of each creature correspond agree perfectly.' which is essentially the same as (2) above and spontaneity turns out to be the counterpart of (1), namely the claim that 'created substances, can be real causes or more specifically that each state of a created substance arises causally from its preceding state' (ibid. p.96). But there is one important difference between Kulstad's spontaneity and (1), since Kulstad, citing Sleigh (1990b p.162 and p.188 n.3) as his guide, defines spontaneity as the thesis the states of a substance are the causes of one another.12 Thus, as well as claiming the pre-established harmony requires that a substance be the cause of all its states, Kulstad builds in a further stipulation that it is the earlier states of a substance which generate the later ones. Sleigh himself is less than candid about his acceptance of this claim when it comes to his most explicit statement of what pre-established harmony or concomitance consists in. In Leibniz and Arnauld, Sleigh presents the following four theses (Sleigh 1990a p.138):

10

It is worth noting that, in addition to his own account of what pre-established harmony, Jolley also

presents a more extended characterization which he suggests is endorsed by other commentators and even at

times by Leibniz himself. It consists of the following three theses: (a) The states of all substances are

harmonized by God to give the appearance of causal interaction; (b) There is no causal interaction between

created substances; and (c) Every created substance is a causal source of all its states. And with the

exception of the explicit mention of divine intervention and slight differences in terminology ('harmonized

so as to give the appearance of causal interaction' replaced with the more economical 'correspond') it is the

same as that given by Mercer and Sleigh (1995, p.100).

11

We shall examine this more central claim of their (1995) paper in more detail below.

12

C.D. Broad (1975) gives a longer version of essentially the same account. For although his most

explicit statement of pre-established harmony (ibid. pp. 99-100), claims no more than that the states of a

substance are generated in accordance with a purely immanent causal law, an earlier discussion of

immanent causation (ibid. p.45) explicitly claims that Leibniz holds that the states of substances cause, and

are caused by, one another.


7

(5) Each created substance is like an entire world, a world apart, independent of every other substance except God. (6) The phenomena of each created substance are only a consequence of its being. (7) Each created substance expresses the whole world and/or God, and the past and future as well as the present (universal expression). (8) Each created substance accommodates itself to every other substance, thereby generating a concomitance or harmony amongst substances (universal accommodation). He then claims that (5), (6), and (8) 'yield the doctrine that Leibniz referred to in our texts [i.e., the Discourse and Correspondence with Arnauld] as the theory of concomitance or harmony, and in subsequent works as the theory of pre-established harmony'(loc.cit.). At this point is noticeable that (6) contains no explicit statement of how Sleigh thinks that the phenomena of a created substance are a consequence of its being. However examination of another part of the book (Sleigh 1990a, pp.133-134) reveals that Kulstad is quite right to claim that his views on the causal generation of the states of created substances follow those of Sleigh. Thus, it seems reasonable to hold that both would agree to Kulstad's formulation.13 Elsewhere, though, Sleigh attributes three further senses of pre-established harmony to Leibniz (ibid. p 170-71). The weakest of these consists in (8) alone. And a slightly stronger version, which accords with Jolley's favored account (1993 p.392), consists of (8) combined with an additional thesis, namely that this is brought about by God. The final version of pre-established harmony which Sleigh attributes to Leibniz is the strongest of all we have encountered so far. It consists in (5)-(8), plus the thesis that God brings these about. How then are we to decide, which of Sleigh’s four offerings to take most seriously? Thankfully it seems reasonable to ignore Leibniz's occasional use of pre-established harmony to refer to the weakest two of Sleigh's formulations: Firstly, it is hard to see how Leibniz’s harmony could be thought of as genuinely pre-established without the inclusion of the thesis that it is preordained by God; and, secondly, as we have already seen, there is no reason to think that a definition such as the second excludes occasionalism, a position from which Leibniz is keen to distance himself. However, this still leaves open the question of how we should square Sleigh's initial rejection of universal expression with his admission that Leibniz sometimes explicitly includes it as a component of pre-established harmony?14 Resolution of this issue becomes even more desirable once it is observed that something like thesis (7) is to be found in the account of pre-established harmony offered by other commentators such as Russell (1937, pp.137-8).15 More precisely, Russell suggests that pre-established harmony is the immediate result of the perceptions of monads and their mutual independence. In advancing this he makes particular reference to the following passage from Leibniz:

13

However, for a case against the causally efficacy of the states of substances see Bobro and Clatterbaugh

(forthcoming).

14

It might also be objected that the Sleigh’s account (1900a, p.138) makes no explicit mention of God

as the overall source of the pre-established harmony. However, given that (1) allows for the action of God

on creatures, it seems reasonable to assume that Sleigh intends God's role to be tacitly understood in the

earlier characterization.

15

George MacDonald Ross (1984, p.97) puts forward a similar view.


8

The nature of every simple substance, soul, or true monad, being such that its following state is a consequence of the preceding one; here now is the cause of the harmony to be found out. For God needs only to make a simple substance become once and at the beginning a representation of the universe according to its point of view; since from thence alone it follows that it will be so perpetually; and that all simple substances will always have a harmony among themselves because they always represent the same universe. (G.VII. p.412) This contains the, by now familiar claim,16 that the states of finite substances are entirely a consequence of their preceding states. However, Russell also emphasizes the fact that ‘each monad always represents the whole universe' as that which accounts for the fact that 'the states of every monad at every instant correspond' (Russell 1937, p.138). thereby committing himself to a version of (7). Sleigh begins his case against regarding (7) as a component of pre-established harmony by observing that the 'relation between [7] and [8] is much more puzzling than scholars have noted' (Sleigh 1990a p.138). But of course this is not the same as providing a reason for excluding (7) from his preferred account and so he follows this with a somewhat complex argument. To begin with, Sleigh (1990a p.170ff.) argues persuasively that universal expression among substances does not entail that they 'accommodate' or harmonize with one another (thesis (8) above), but that the converse entailment does hold. At first glance, this might seem to provide support for the inclusion of (7) in any account of pre-established harmony, rather than its exclusion. For if there cannot be accommodation without universal expression, and accommodation is an essential component of pre-established harmony, does it not follow that universal expression is part of the doctrine as well? The solution to this puzzle lies with the gloss which Sleigh gives on the term 'universal expression'. In trying to illuminate Leibniz use of this notion (ibid. p.174-75), Sleigh tells us that the nature of expression is left obscure, but that Leibniz appears to view it as an extremely weak relationship, which is something like isomorphism, but with further constraints on what can count as an adequate correspondences between the elements.17 With this in mind, Sleigh seems to wish to exclude expression from his account of pre-established harmony, not because it fails to be a necessary or sufficient condition, but because the existence of universal expression does not explain the existence of pre-established harmony, or provide a metaphysical grounding for it. Unfortunately, the relation between the views we have attributed to Sleigh on the role of expression in the pre-established harmony and those advanced by Russell are difficult to clarify.18 Russell does not explicitly countenance any entailment between expression and accommodation. and rather than insisting that there could not be a harmony amongst substances without their mutual expression, he simply states that harmony is accounted for by expression. This suggests that he thinks that the pre-established harmony of this world, depends upon, and is explained by, the fact that substances express one another, albeit contingently. For this to be the case would clearly require something stronger than Sleigh's weak definition of expression, since

16

Advanced by Kulstad and Sleigh above.

17

Cf., Theodicy sec.356; Gr. 538;540; What is an Idea? G.VII.264[L.208], for examples of such

constraints.

18

MacDonald Ross presents such a brief sketch that it seems pointless to speculate with regards to the

entailments which he would sanction.


9

we have seen with Sleigh that it is far too weak to explain or account for harmony or concomitance between substances. However, Russell introduces the term, with no further explanation, by reproducing exactly the same Leibniz passage as Sleigh (i.e., G.II.112) and he provides us with nothing else which could lead us to think that he appreciates the kinds of issues which Sleigh raises. But although it seems that we should come down on Sleigh's side and accept that the thesis of expression is explanatorily redundant with regards to our understanding of pre-established harmony, this leaves the question why Leibniz himself is at least sometimes guilty of including universal expression in his formulation of the doctrine. In order to understand this puzzle, we might do well to bear in mind the two facts: Firstly, that as a corollary of the pre-established harmony, Leibniz denies inter-substantial causal interaction; and secondly, and perhaps more importantly, that Leibniz attempts to save the appearance of causal interaction by appeal to the idea that substances stand in relations of mutual expression to one another.19 Thus, it is clear that the notion of expression is an essential part of the account of inter-substantial causal attributions, and that Leibniz thinks that such an account must to be appended to his pre-established harmony in order to save the appearance of intersubstantial causation, which it leaves unexplained. Thus, it does not seem unreasonable to think that it is due to this strong link between intersubstantial causation and the pre-established harmony that Leibniz and others sometimes speak mistakenly of universal expression as if it were a genuine component of the doctrine, rather than an essential concomitant.

19

We shall examine this in greater detail in section 6 below.


10

2. Leibniz's arguments for the pre-established harmony; the positive case Many commentators fail to find a positive argument in favor of the pre-established harmony anywhere amidst Leibniz's corpus. It is most often claimed that the main justification for this doctrine is provided by the arguments that Leibniz launches against the two theories that he perceives to be its only competitors. Although it is probably true that this 'argument from elimination' is Leibniz's favorite way of trying to win converts for his view, it is simply wrong to think that Leibniz had no positive things to say when it comes to the defense of 'the crowning glory of his philosophy.' Hence, before examining this argument from elimination we shall turn first to Leibniz's positive case for pre-established harmony. A number of scholars do recognize arguments for what Stuart Brown describes that 'which is really original in Leibniz [and] apart from [which] the doctrine of pre-established harmony would have been commonplace' (1984, p.158), namely the 'thesis of spontaneity'. As we have already seen this thesis asserts that 'every finite substance is the only finite cause of its own natural states,' and consequently implies the impossibility of causal interaction between finite substances.20 Thus, although it is clear that the thesis of spontaneity alone does not suffice for pre-established harmony, there is surely a case to be made for the claim that, if Leibniz had produced a sound argument for the thesis of spontaneity, he would have had little more to in order to justify the rest of his doctrine. After all, the harmony of substances seems to be little more than an empirical assumption grounded on the appearance of regularity among our experiences, and divine involvement follows as from the theological doctrine of creation. 2.1 An argument from the nature of individual concepts or notions Amongst Leibniz's arguments for the thesis of spontaneity, the one which is most frequently discussed is supposed to derive from his views about the nature of individual concepts, or as they are sometimes called, individual notions.21 However, as we shall see, commentators are by no means agreed as to precisely what this argument consists in. The first interpretation of this argument that we shall examine is the one offered by C.D. Broad (1975, p.45). Broad begins his account by pointing out that Leibniz claims explicitly, in the correspondence with Arnauld, that the denial of intersubstantial causation is one of the consequences of his predicate-in-notion principle (G.II.70[LA.85]).22 However, he also

20 In characterizing the pre-established harmony Nicholas Rescher seems to make precisely this claim

when he suggests that pre-established harmony does not involve a mutual causal influence as a consequence

of the fact that 'every individual substance is self-complete, and its development in time is fixed' (1967,

p.55; cf. 1979, p.65). Unfortunately, however, he does not elaborate any further in either of these two

introductory books on Leibniz.

21

As we shall see below, discussions are to be found in Russell (1937), Couturat (1901; 1902), Broad

(1975), Loeb (1981), Brown (1984), Sleigh (1990a), and Rutherford (1993).

22

Examination of the passage which the editor, Lewy, supplies reveals no claim of this kind. However,

the following page does contain the claim that 'The hypothesis of concomitance or harmony between

substances between substances follows from what I have said about each individual substance embracing

for ever the accidents which will occur to it...' (G.II.70[LA.86]). However, given that Broad is talking


11

notes that Leibniz does not tell Arnauld why he thinks that this entailment holds and so attempts to reconstruct the missing argument. A presupposition of Broad's reconstruction is the claim that, even though Leibniz rejects intersubstantial causation, he accepts immanent (i.e., intrasubstantial) causation. The difference between the two, in Broad's view, is that the former involves a constraint or interference on the development of another, whereas the latter is the causation which governs the development of a substance when it is left alone (1975, p.46). With these distinctions made, Broad tells that he 'suspect[s] that Leibniz would have argued as follows' (loc.cit.) and presents the four-steps below: (1) Every fact about the occurrence of a state of a substance at any moment in its history subsists timelessly. (2) Each substance is created with a special persistent modification corresponding to each such fact about it. (3) All that ever happens to a monad is the emergence of each these dispositions from quiescence to activity at the right moment and its subsequent reversion from activity to quiescence. Therefore: (4) No sense can be given to idea that substances are constrained intermittently to develop in a different way from that which would have occurred if they had been left alone.(loc.cit.)23 Broad sums this up follows:'[the] actual [substantial] development is prescribed in every detail by its own complete notion, and is, therefore, identical with its natural unconstrained development' (loc.cit.). However he is somewhat critical of the argument he thereby attributes to Leibniz. Broad observes that even if every state of a substance is present as a disposition from the beginning of its existence, this does not preclude the possibility of partial determination by the action of other substances. As an illustration he asks us to suppose that notion of a substance S contains the fact that it will swerve left at time t, and suggests there is no reason to think that the notion of S could not also contain the fact that this swerve will be imposed by the impact of another substance S'. Broad's basic claim is that the doctrine that every fact about a state of a substance at any time is itself timeless, entails nothing about the content of such facts. In particular, it entails nothing about causation, and is compatible with some states being uncaused, some states being caused purely immanently and some states beings caused transeuntly through the action of other substances (ibid. pp.46-7). These seem to be reasonable criticisms of the argument which Broad presents. However, one cannot help but wonder whether they are legitimate criticisms of Leibniz. Broad readily admits that he is only giving us a reconstruction of an argument which Leibniz neglects to

explicitly about the denial of intersubstantial causation, it is quite possible that he has a completely different

reference in mind.

23

Here we can see that Broad not only attributes an argument for a version of the thesis of spontaneity

to Leibniz, but also appears to takes this to be equivalent to the denial of intersubstantial causation.


12

formulate. Thus, the fact that the reconstruction which Broad presents is so readily open to criticism, may be evidence not so much for the claim that Leibniz does not have a good argument for spontaneity based on his predicate-in-notion principle, but rather for the fact that Broad's argument is not the one that Leibniz has in mind. And this is further borne out by the existence of a number of other attempts to formulate Leibniz's intent. Stuart Brown (1984, p.158) also suggests that, in the Discourse period, Leibniz wishes to argue for the spontaneity of finite substances via the application of the inesse principle to individual substances and their notions.24 However, he offers more in the way for concrete references to the correspondence in backing up this claim (cf. G.II.47 [LA.52-3];G.II.57ff.[LA.64ff.]). Brown notes that Leibniz holds that: it is the nature of an individual substance, or complete being, to have a notion so complete that it is sufficient to contain, or render deducible from itself, all the predicates of the subject to which this notion is attributed. (Discourse sec.8[LG.12- 13]) He suggests that it is this claim that underlies Leibniz’s inesse principle argument which is simply the following: Individual substances are ‘wholly spontaneous because everything that is true of them can be deduced from their individual natures’ (Brown 1984 p.159). Brown tells us that he finds this argument ‘neither clear nor compelling' because 'it seems to trade on a residual fund of good will for essences in nature.’(loc.cit.) combined with Leibniz's ‘nominalist tendency’(ibid., p.160). He suggests that, although Leibniz enthusiastically follows modern philosophy in rejecting the idea of general essences in natural philosophy, he does not think there were good reasons to reject individual essences and natures in metaphysics. Citing section 33 of the Discourse as support, Brown notes that Leibniz extends the traditional inesse doctrine to include individual essences, and consequently regards the properties of individuals as derivable from, and determined by, their natures just as the properties of gold etc. had previously been taken to be derivable from and determined by theirs (loc.cit.). Assessing Brown's 'criticisms' of Leibniz's argument is by no means an easy task. For, although he is surely correct when he claims that in many ways ‘the Discourse is a fundamentally Neo-Scholastic work.’ (ibid., p.160-61), and that the argument from spontaneity rests upon ‘the application to individual substances of a principle formerly applied to sorts of substances’ (ibid., p.160), Brown never tells us what he thinks is wrong with Leibniz's extension of this scholastic doctrine to the realm of individual substances. Thus, although it may be true that Brown's version of Leibniz's argument is 'neither clear nor compelling', it is surely just as true that Brown's criticisms provide 'neither clear nor compelling' evidence against what Leibniz says. Louis Loeb (1981, p.277 ff.) provides what is by far the most extended treatment of this family of Leibnizian arguments based on the concepts of individual substances. He begins with a discussion and criticism of what he calls the 'Russell-Couturat' thesis. This is the claim, made by Bertrand Russell25 and Louis Couturat,26 that Leibniz thinks there is a way to argue from the existence of individual concepts to the causal sufficiency of substances, on the basis of a subject-predicate theory of truth.27 This is followed by Loeb's own efforts to

24

I.e., the principle that in every true proposition the predicate is contained in the subject.

25

Russell (1903, p.373; 1937, pp. v, 10-11; 1945, pp. 592-3).

26

Couturat (1901, p.209; 1902, pp.19-26).

27

The subject-predicate theory of truth is essentially equivalent the inesse principle (cf., n.6 above).


13

discover the real argument which Leibniz has in mind when he considers the relationship between individual concepts and the spontaneity of individual substances. Loeb begins his discussion of the Russell-Couturat thesis (ibid., p.277) by conceding that there is prima facie support to be found for their claim in works such as First Truths (1680-84?),28 The Discourse on Metaphysics (1686), and the Correspondence with Arnauld (1686-87), with perhaps the clearest example in Correspondence: ...when I refer to the concept I have of every true proposition, I find that every necessary or contingent predicate, past present or future, is included in the concept of the subject...The proposition in question is of very great importance and merits a clear demonstration, for it follows that every soul is like world apart, independent of everything except God. (G.II.46-47[LA. 50-51])29 Loeb proceeds to note (1981, p.278) that, on the basis of this and other passages, Russell and Couturat try to spell out the connection between Leibniz's subject-predicate theory of truth and the denial of causal interaction. He suggests that 'perhaps the most relevant passage[s]' which must also be considered are the following; from First Truths: The predicate or consequent therefore always inheres in the subject or antecedent...This is true, moreover in every affirmative truth, universal or necessary or contingent...the complete or perfect concept of an individual substance involves all its predicates, past present, and future. For certainly it is already true now that a future predicate will be a predicate in the future, and so is contained in the concept of a thing...It can be said that, speaking with metaphysical rigor, no created substance exerts a metaphysical action or influence upon another For... it has already been shown that all the future states of each thing follow from its concept.(C.518[L.267]) and from a draft to Arnauld: Therefore, since our thoughts are only the consequences of the nature of our soul, and are born in it by virtue of its concept, it is useless to require the influences of another substance (G.II.69[LA.84]) With these passages in mind, Loeb points us to one of Russell's statements of what he regards as Leibniz's argument: Thus to say, all my states are involved in the notion of me, is merely to say, the predicate is in the subject. Every predicate, necessary or contingent, past, present, or future, is comprised in the notion of the subject. From this proposition it follows, says Leibniz, that every soul is a world apart; for every soul, as a subject, has eternally, as predicates, all the states which time will bring it; and thus these states follow from its notion alone, without any need of action from without. (Russell 1937, pp.10-11)30

28

As we noted above (cf. Kulstad 1993a, p.98) watermark evidence which emerged after the publication

of Loeb's book now provides a more probable date for this paper of 1689.

29

Also see G.II.56-57[LA. 63-64] and Discourse secs. 8-9[LG.12-14].

30

Also cf. pp.43-44, 133-34. Loeb does not provide any corresponding passages from Couturat,

however the citations initially provided do seem support his contention that there is a 'Russell-Couturat'

thesis here.


14

Loeb (1981. p.278) refers to the argument here as the 'surface argument' and suggests that it goes as follows: Since the complete concept of a substance S contains all the predicates that will ever be true of it, all the predicates of S follow from its complete concept alone. Hence all the states of S causally depend only on S alone. He also provides a more detailed exposition of the surface argument in six steps (ibid. p.279): (1) In every true proposition, the concept of the predicate is explicitly or implicitly contained in the concept of the subject. Therefore, (2) In every true proposition about an individual substance, the concept of the predicate is contained in the concept of the subject.31 (3) If at some later time it will be true that an entity has a property, then it is already true that that entity will have that property. (4) The complete concept of an individual substance contains all of the substance's predicates, past, present and future.32 Therefore, (5) All states of an individual substance follow from its complete concept alone And, (6) All the states of an individual substance causally depend only upon itself. Loeb thinks there are significant problems with attributing the surface argument to Leibniz. Firstly (loc.cit), following Broad (1975 pp.45-7), he claims that the move from (4) to (6) is fallacious. Loeb illustrates this by applying the argument mutatis mutandis to a physical particle (where particle's state at time t is exhaustively characterized by description of momentum and spatial location). He claims that if we construct the analogous argument we get the following: (3') If it will be true at some later time that the particle has a particular momentum and location, then it is already true that it will have these. (4') The complete concept of the particle will contain all of its predicates. Therefore, (5') All the states of the particle follow from its concept alone.

31

Cf., Discourse secs. 8,13 [LG.12-13, 19-22].

32

Cf., Discourse sec.13[LG.19-22]; G.II.17, 43, 69 [LA.12,47,84].


15

Therefore, (6') All the states of the particle depend causally only on itself. But, Loeb insists, (6') is false since the momentum and position of the particle may depend upon causal interaction with other particles. Loeb considers two possible replies here (ibid. p.279-80). It might be objected that the particle's complete concept illegitimately include causal relational properties which invoke other particles. However, as Loeb notes, (4)-(6) and (4')-(6') are arguments from the mere fact that a complete concept contains all the predicates to causal independence. If 'causal predicates' can undermine this, it would have to be shown first that there are no such predicates which would be to beg the question. Loeb considers it 'more plausible' to object that, unlike substance's, particles do not have complete concepts, leaving (4') false and destroying the analogy. However, he wonders what the basis can be for denying this. Presumably, there are true propositions about particles, and if so the subject-predicate theory of truth surely applies to particles as subjects. And there must also be true propositions about the future properties of particles. Thus, the truth theory applies to these future propositions and the concepts of all future predicates are included in the concept of the particle. Loeb contends that the surface argument cannot handle this fallacy charge and suggests that this provides good grounds for refusing to attribute this argument to Leibniz. However, there are reasons to think that Leibniz might not be persuaded that he is committed to the fallacy exposed. In order to rebuff the second objection above, Loeb relies on the claim that there is no basis for denying that 'subjects' such as particles have complete concepts. However, the following passage seems to suggest that Leibniz thinks otherwise: Substantial unity requires a complete indivisible and naturally indestructible entity, since its concept embraces everything that is to happen to it, which cannot be found in shape or in motion (both of which embrace something imaginary as I could prove) (G.II.76[LA.94]) Here Leibniz seems to claim that nothing which has shape (i.e. extension) is substance, due to the fact that it contains 'something imaginary'. But, furthermore, he seems to imply the exact opposite of what Loeb assumes, namely that no such entity has a complete concept. Thus, there is reason to think that the analogy cannot go through; extended things such as particles are not 'real' subjects at all, and they do not have concepts which 'embrace everything which is to happen to them.' But without this assumption, Loeb's second criticism of his attack on the surface argument goes through unabated. But although there are difficulties with the objections raised so far it must be noted that Loeb's also presents a 'serious internal objection' to the surface argument which he regards as clinching the case against this interpretation (1981, p.281). He points out that, although Russell and Couturat note that the concept of any individual substance S contains all its predicates, they fail to see that, for Leibniz, the concept must also contain the predicates of every other substance S'.33 But with this in mind, Loeb claims, it can be seen that the surface argument is clearly too strong.

33

For evidence of this claim Loeb points us to the following passages: C.518[L.268-69];G.II.41; 51; 53-

4[LA.44; 57;60]; G.II.224-25[L.524]).


16

The argument requires that it follow from the fact that concept of S contains all S's predicates that the states of S depend causally on S alone. But, Loeb observes that, given this, and the fact that the concept of S contains all the predicates of S' (distinct from S) it must surely follow that all states of S depend causally on S', and that that S and S' causally interact. Here, Loeb seems to provide a more serious objection to Russell and Couturat's interpretation. Thus, even though there is room to doubt Loeb's claim (1981, p.282) that the surface argument is fallacious, it seems reasonable to accept that it is too strong and cannot yield causal sufficiency of substances, and to accept his conclusion that 'It is impossible to suppose that the surface argument, beset by such difficulties, could have led Leibniz to embrace the thesis that nothing external acts on a substance.'(loc.cit.). Although Loeb denies that Leibniz adopts the surface argument, he does not deny that there is a Leibnizian argument from individual concepts to the thesis of spontaneity. However, this requires an alternate reading of the passages from which the surface argument is derived. Loeb (ibid. p.283) suggests that a better understanding of the notion of containment should help our understanding of the inadequacies in the Russell-Couturat reading. To this end, he examines Russell's account of conceptual containment for complete concepts of individuals, which he refers to as the 'list view' (Loeb 1981, p.283).34 According to Russell, containment is the inclusion of a concept in the complex conjunction which constitutes the individual's complete concept, where the concept is to be thought of as a list such as the one below. S1 is in perceptual state 1 at t1 (, and) S1 is in perceptual state 4 at t2 (, and) S1 is in perceptual state 7 at t3 (, and) ....... Loeb points out that on this reading of conceptual containment the problems we have already seen with the surface argument clearly remain. However, he thinks there are other reasons for doubting the adequacy of the list view (ibid. p.284). Firstly, Loeb notes that Leibniz asserts his theory of truth in terms which seem inappropriately vague if the list view is correct. In the General Characteristic and On Freedom, both of which date from approximately 1679, Leibniz says the concept of the predicate is 'in some way' contained in the concept of the subject. (L.226; 264). Loeb claims that the inclusion of such vagueness is unintelligible if Leibniz thinks of individual concepts as lists. On such a straightforward view there is no obvious reason why the 'way' of inclusion could not be specified. In addition, Loeb points to the fact that sections 7 and 13 of the Discourse, include talk of the demonstration and deduction of predicates from the concept of the subject. Loeb admits that this is not inconsistent with the 'list view', however, he suggests that it would be a rather inflated way of referring to conjunction elimination. Aside from these negative claims, Loeb presents positive evidence for an alternate reading. He claims that, as of 1679, Leibniz holds that the concept of the subject of a true proposition need not contain concept of predicate in itself. Support for this is found in a paper from that year entitled Elements of Calculus in which, speaking of general propositions, Leibniz says:

34

Cf., Russell (1945, p.591). Nicholas Rescher (1967, pp.23-25) presents essentially the same account.


17

the concept of the subject, either in itself or with some addition, involves the concept of the predicate...For example, some metals are gold...In an affirmative particular proposition it suffices that the inclusion is successful when something is added to the subject. The concept metal, viewed absolutely and in itself, does not contain the concept of gold; something must be added to involve it. (L.236-37) And Loeb suggests that a comparison of the draft and final versions of section 8 of the Discourse supports this further. Here Leibniz states: the nature of an individual substance or of a complete being is to have a notion so complete that that it is sufficient [in itself] to comprise and to allow the deduction from it of all the predicates of the subject to which the notion is attributed. (LG.13) Here the square brackets indicate that 'in itself' was deleted from the first draft. Loeb claims that this is because Leibniz realized that to say that the complete concept of an individual substance contains all of the substance's predicates is an abbreviated (and misleading) statement of his view that the complete concept of an individual substance, either in itself or with some addition, contains all the substance's predicates. With these considerations in mind, Loeb offers his alternative to the list view, 'the enriched interpretation'. We have just seen that Loeb suggests Leibniz's view allows for, and requires, additions to the complete concepts of individual substances before deductions of their predicates are possible. Furthermore Loeb suggests that section 13 of the Discourse provides an account of the required addition (Loeb 1981, p.285). Here, whilst discussing the demonstration of predicates such as 'crossed the Rubicon' from the complete concept of Caesar, Leibniz says: it would be found that this demonstration of this predicate of Caesar, is not as absolute as those of numbers or of geometry, but that it supposes the sequence of things that God has freely chosen and which is founded on the first decree of God, the import of which is always to do what is most perfect, and on the decree which God made (following the first) with regard to human nature, which is that man will always do (although freely) that which appears to him best. (LG.21) Although it is by no means obvious that this is the correct reading, Loeb suggests that in the passage above, Leibniz is claiming that the universal generalization that persons always do what appears best to them is required in addition to Caesar's complete concept, in order to demonstrate that he crossed the Rubicon. And he concludes, more generally, that universal generalizations appear to be what is needed in addition to complete concepts of individual substances for the deduction of all their predicates. Loeb finds further development and some modification of this position in the Correspondence with Arnauld. Here case against the list view is re-affirmed: As before, we find Leibniz saying that concepts are contained 'in a sense' (G.II.56[LA.63]) and that predicates are 'deduced' or 'inferred' from complete concepts (G.II.41;44[LA 44,48]). But Loeb also points to the following passage (Loeb 1981, p.285): all the predicates of Adam depend or do not depend upon other predicates of the same Adam. Setting aside, therefore, those which do depend upon others, one has only to consider together all the basic predicates in order to form the complete


18

concept of Adam adequate to deduce from it everything that is ever to happen to him. (G.II.44[LA.48]) which he takes this to show, both that the complete concept need not contain all the predicates of Adam but only a proper subset of basic ones, and that something is required over and above the basic predicates to get the nonbasic predicates. Loeb observes that the Discourse supports the view that complete concepts plus universal generalizations are sufficient to demonstrate all the predicates of a substance. However, he points out that in the Arnauld correspondence a significant change occurs (Loeb 1981, p.286). Without providing specific references, Loeb tells us (loc. cit.) that 'All the materials for [his] interpretation...are to be found in item IX of the correspondence - 'Remarks upon M. Arnauld's letter' of May 13 1686.'(G.II.37-47[LA.39-52]), and informs us that the contents of the interpretation are as follows: Individual concepts come to include the laws as well as basic predicates so that all the predicates of a given substance are deducible from its concept alone. Thus, Loeb claims that the complete concept of an individual substance contains all the predicates of a substances in the following sense: All the predicates are deducible from the basic set of predicates and the laws which constitute the complete concept of that individual. Among the virtues which Loeb claims for his interpretation of conceptual containment is that it entails that states are determined in a specific way, i.e., spontaneously. Loeb suggests that we know the following three things: '[1] The complete concept of a substance includes the laws of its universe...[2] for every individual substance there is an 'internal principle' , 'indwelling law' , 'law of order' or 'law of succession' which moves the substance from state to state35...[3] Leibniz regards an individual substance's law of succession as a causal law'36 (1981 p.287). Loeb admits that the notion of an 'internal principle' etc. is not included in the Discourse or the Arnauld Correspondence. But he claims that the concept is 'clearly present in theses works' (ibid. p.288) and cites a number of passages as evidencing this.37 Thus, he feels is it legitimate to attribute to Leibniz an 'enriched interpretation' on which the complete concept of a substance includes certain basic predicates and the laws of its universe, including its own causal law of succession. And furthermore he suggests that 'it is natural to suppose that the basic predicates characterize the initial perceptual state of [a] substance' since 'all the predicates of a substance can be deduced from its complete concept.' (Loeb 1981, p.288). Finally, Loeb offers an account of how spontaneity follows on this enriched interpretation. Thus, we are presented with a version of Leibniz's argument for this component of the pre-established harmony (loc.cit) as follows: From 1) a statement of the initial perceptual state of a substance and 2) a statement of the causal law of succession for that substance,38 we can deduce 3) statements of all the perceptual states of the substance. And this in turn means that a substance's initial perceptual state alone is causally sufficient for

35

Evidence from this is found in the Clarification of the New System of 1698 where Leibniz says it is

the nature of an individual substance: 'to follow perpetually the same law of order or of succession, as in a

certain scale or series of numbers (L.495)

36

Here Loeb's argument is a follows: 'For [Leibniz], everything that exists, including the states of

substances, has a sufficient reason or cause. The states of a substance have no external cause. Therefore,

they must be caused by other states of the substance. So the law of succession must be a causal law.(Loeb

1981, p.287-88).

37

Cf., Discourse sec.14[LG. 23];G.II.58-9;114;115;126;135-6[LA. 65;146;147;161;170].

38

1) and 2) are both included in the complete concept of the substance.


19

its subsequent perceptual states.39 Loeb concludes that, on his enriched interpretation, Leibniz has a valid argument to the conclusion that nothing external acts on a substance which follows from the fact that it has a complete concept. And he adds that, if we waive causal overdetermination -- as Leibniz does40 -- 'we see that all the states of a substance depend causally only on itself' (Loeb 1981, p.289). But although Loeb believes that he has produced a Leibnizian argument that establishes the conclusion of the surface argument, he is not entirely enthusiastic about it, suggesting that it is 'not cogent.' (loc.cit.). For, as he points out the notion of complete concept which does the work on his enriched interpretation is itself very enriched. The claim that substances have individual concepts, which was a trivial assertion and could therefore act as a premise in the surface argument has turned into claim which is loaded with metaphysical commitment. Thus whether the enriched interpretation yields an argument for spontaneity or not, this cannot be as a simple consequence of the inesse principle. Thus, validity is achieved only at the price of sacrificing the initial argumentative strategy, and relying on metaphysical claims about the natures of substances rather than logical claims based on the concepts of the substances. Loeb considers one further issue before his discussion is complete; whether the fact that Leibniz claims that complete concepts contain the predicates of all substances, which posed such a difficulty for the surface argument (see above), is a serious worry on the enriched interpretation (ibid., p.289-90). He suggests that the answer here is ‘no’, since among the laws which are contained in the complete concepts of substances will be non-causal laws of co-existence. Loeb admits that 'Leibniz did not explicitly 'enrich' concepts to this extent' (ibid., p.289). However, he sees no obstacle to this move, without which the objection is unavoidable. But although Loeb is generous in this respect, it should be noted that he repeats the charge of lack of cogency once this revision is made. Reviewing his overall treatment of the argument from complete concepts to the spontaneity, Loeb presents the following conclusions (ibid. p.290). The surface argument fails both because it is fallacious41, and because it fails to explain why the states of a substance causally depend on one another, rather than on those of another substance.42 Therefore, charity demands that it should not be attributed to Leibniz. Instead, Loeb advocates an 'enriched interpretation' of complete concepts which emerges gradually in Leibniz's writings. Initially deductions of predicates from individual concepts require 'additions' such as principle of the best. But subsequently the laws of the universe get incorporated into the individual concept, among which the law of succession emerges as the chief law which is included. At this point it becomes possible to attribute to Leibniz a valid argument from the complete concept of an individual to its spontaneity. Pace Russell and Couturat, we cease to have an analytic entailment, instead a metaphysical argument emerges based on the nature of individual substances. Indeed Loeb suggests that it was perhaps for this reason that Leibniz abandoned this argument in his later work. (ibid. p.291).

39

It is worth noting again that if we reject the claim that Leibniz believes that 'states' of substances can

be causes this conclusion is not wholly adequate. Furthermore, Loeb neglects to acknowledge that nothing

in a creature is wholly causally sufficient for the production of its states since divine concurrence is always

required.

40

Cf., G.II.69;71[LA.84;87]; L.269;623.

41

We have seen that there are reasons to think that if he were an advocate of the surface argument,

Leibniz need not take this particular charge too seriously. However, Loeb's other criticism is harder to

refute.

42

Again Loeb's talk of states as causes should be read with some caution.


20

2.2 An argument from the nature of substances As well as these variations on Leibniz's argument for spontaneity which are based on the concepts or notions of substances, other commentators have found an argument for spontaneity which is based on Leibniz's metaphysics of substance.43 Stuart Brown (1988, p.161 ff.) points out that, in New System sec.14 (L.457), Leibniz claims that the impossibility of substantial interaction is based, at least partially, on the consideration that substances must have ‘real unity’. Brown thinks that it is far from clear how the spontaneity of substances is to be inferred from their unity, but he suggests that Leibniz may be relying on an idea which is found, some twenty years later, in the Monadology. Brown points out that the early sections of this work are dominated by the claim that monads, or simple substances, are indivisible, and, that from here Leibniz infers their indestructibility and autonomy from rest of creation (ibid. p.161). In particular Brown points out the following passage: There is also no means of explaining how a monad can be altered or changed within itself by any other created thing, since it is impossible to displace anything in it or to conceive of the possibility of any internal motion being started, directed, increased, or diminished within it, as can occur in compounds, where change among the parts takes place. (Monadology sec.7 [L.643]) Brown suggests that here Leibniz claims that if there is no way that a simple substance can be modified from without, it follows that the changes which take place must all ‘come from an internal principle’ (Monadology sec.11[L.643-44]). Thus, '[s]pontaneity... seem[s] to follow in large measure from unity, understood as a requirement of atomic simplicity and indivisibility' (1984, p.161). C.D. Broad also considers this Monadology argument (1975, p.48). However, unlike Brown, he expresses reservations.44 The most interesting of these is the observation that Leibniz's argument only works if it is conceded that one substance can influence another only through moving the whole of the substance that is acted upon or through moving a part of it. This claim is one which Broad can see no reason to accept. In trying to persuade us of this he notes that a mind can change its states as a result of an internal alteration, e.g., when a desire causes an experience of active exertion which, in turn, causes feelings of tiredness. And Broad proceeds to ask ‘Why should it be impossible to suppose that some such change in one mind might be caused telepathically by the action of another mind?’ (loc.cit.). It is hard to know what to say in response to this objection. In the Arnauld correspondence, Leibniz explicitly states that 'a soul effects no change in the course of another soul' (G.II.71[LA.87]) and, although he does not give a reason for this, Leibniz would almost certainly claim that we have absolutely no idea how a mind could interact with another telepathically, if this is to be understood as involving real causation. Broad’s objection perhaps makes more sense if it is remembered that he views monadic intrasubstantial change as a causal relation between one (mental) state and another (mental) state of the same substance. Given this view, it is not immediately apparent why mental

43

Admittedly, this argument might perhaps be construed instead as an argument against the 'way of

influence' (cf. section 4.1 below).

44

The first of these is that Leibniz's argument presupposes that all substances are monads but it is clear

that we cannot even begin to address this concern here.


21

states should be limited so that they cannot affect states which inhere in other substances. However, if, as I believe, Leibniz really has a radically different picture of intrasubstantial change, with all the states of a substance emanating from it over time, the gap between intersubstantial causation and intrasubstantial causation is significantly wider. On this view, substances have causal powers to bring about their own states, but the states themselves are impotent. Thus, the possibility of a Broad-type telepathy where a state of one substance affects a state of another, is not just hard to envisage, it is inconsistent with the nature of the causal powers of creatures.


22

3. Leibniz's arguments for the pre-established harmony; the negative case (via the elimination of alternatives)

In addition to his positive arguments for the thesis of spontaneity and the pre- established harmony, Leibniz often advances what Bertrand Russell refers to as a proof of pre-established harmony, 'via elimination' (1937, p.137). By way of illustration of this strategy, John Cottingham (1988, p.145) draws attention to the following famous passage: Imagine two clocks or watches which are in perfect agreement. This agreement can come about in three ways. The first consists of a natural influence...The second method [the way of assistance] would be to have the two clocks continually supervised by a skilled craftsman who constantly sets them right. The third method is to construct the two clocks so skilfully and accurately at the outset that one could be certain of their subsequent agreement.(Explanation of the New system G.IV.499 [P.131]) As Cottingham indicates these three options are supposed to represent a mutually exclusive and exhaustive set of options for explaining the mind-body relation which consists of; (1)the way of direct causal influence; (2) the way of assistance i.e., occasionalism; and (3) the pre-established harmony. With this tripartite division in place Leibniz proceeds to provide arguments against (1) and (2), thus leaving the pre-established harmony as the only viable option. Cottingham cites a passage in which Leibniz's primary concern is the mind-body relation. However, as Stuart �Brown (1984, p.164) is quick to point out, Leibniz appeals to the elimination of alternatives as a means of justifying pre-established harmony in the wider sense, namely as a theory of the relations between all substances. It is also worth noting that although Leibniz makes frequent use of this tripartite division, he is rarely consistent with respect to the terminology that he invokes. But thankfully, Eileen O'Neill (1993, p.28) provides a catalogue of the places in which the division is mentioned, and the range of names that Leibniz uses for the three theories. Thus, (1), the common hypothesis of influx or physical influence (cf. NE.135; Theodicy sec.59) is also referred to as the way of influenceÌ(L.460; 494 ;574), the hypothesis of impression (L.338) and the transmission of species or qualities (L 457); (2), occasionalism is called the hypothesis of occasional causes (L.269; 338; 457; 494;) and the way of assistance (L.460); and (3) Leibniz’s own pre-established harmony, is referred to as the hypothesis of agreement (L.458; 494), the Hypothesis of concomitance (L 269; 338) and the hypothesis of the correspondence of substances (L 338). In this section our aim is to review the literature which deals with Leibniz's attempts to discredit the alternatives to pre-established harmony that are recognized in the tripartite division. In the interests clarity of we shall refer to these as (1) 'the way of influence'; (2) 'occasionalism'. However, it should be noted that we shall not be concerned with arguments against (1) or (2) considered specifically as theories of the mind-body relation. Thus, although Leibniz offers considerations against 'Cartesian interactionism', we shall consider those in a separate section, rather than as a sub-set of the arguments against (1). Let us proceed then in illustrating the 'argument from elimination' by examining Leibniz's arguments against 'the way of influence' and 'occasionalism' in turn.


23

3.1 Leibniz's critique of the 'way of influence' As we have already seen, there is clearly room for the suggestion that Leibniz's arguments for spontaneity are at the same time arguments against the 'way of influence'.45 However, we have chosen, somewhat arbitrarily, to treat these as part of Leibniz's positive case for the pre-established harmony rather than as components in his 'argument from elimination'. Therefore, in this section we shall deal just with the criticisms which Leibniz launches directly against the 'way of influence' which can be roughly and somewhat metaphorically, characterized as the view that genuine causal interaction occurs between substances and that this involves one substance 'transferring' or 'passing on' something of itself to another. So much of the discussion of Leibniz’s attack on the 'way of influence' centres upon section 7. of the Monadology that it is worth quoting this short section in full, though I shall divide it into two sections for ease of reference below: (7a) There is likewise no way of explaining how a monad can be altered or changed internally by any other creature, since nothing can be transposed in it, and we cannot conceive in it, as we can in composite things among whose parts there may be changes, that any internal motion can be excited, directed, increased, or diminished from without. (7b) Monads have no windows through which anything could enter or depart. Accidents cannot be detached from substances and march about outside of substances as the sensible species of the scholastics once did. So neither substance nor attribute can enter a monad from without. (G.VI.608[L.643]) Two distinct arguments have been recognized in this passage for the claim that it is inexplicable how one finite substance could interact as the 'way of influence demands' another given certain metaphysical presuppositions. They are to be found in (7a) and (7b) respectively. Loeb (1981, p.271) and Broad (1975, p.48) suggest that we read (7a) in conjunction with sections 1 and 3 of the Monadology where Leibniz asserts that monads are simple substances, and that something is simple just in case it has no parts.46 Thus, they claim that in (7a), Leibniz proceeds from the fact that substances lack internal structure, to the observation that they have no parts which could be transposed, and finally to the conclusion that nothing external could act upon them. Neither of the commentators are impressed with this argument. Broad observes that it 'presupposes that all substances are monads, i.e., unextended mental substances.' (loc.cit.).47 Although, it he admits that the legitimacy of this claim is one which can only be assessed by considering at the monadological theory as a whole, which is beyond the scope of our present endeavour. However, both Loeb and Broad cast aspersions on another feature of

45

For example, cf., Rescher (1967, p.55; 1979, p.65), Brown (1984, p.100), and Sleigh (1990a, p.143). 46

Loeb expresses this claim using the conditional 'something is simple if it has no parts'. However, in section

1, Leibniz says 'Simple means without parts' (G.VI.607[L.643]) which clearly invites a biconditional

reading. 47

Leibniz's assumption is surely the waeker claim that all substances are simple and thus have no parts.


24

this argument, namely Leibniz's lack of justification for his assumption that one substance can influence another 'only by moving it as a whole or altering the existing motion of some part of it' (loc.cit.; cf., Loeb 1981, p.271). Especially in light of the fact that Leibniz wishes to preserve of intra-substantial causation by appeal to a different model. This second objection is somewhat hard to assess. We shall briefly address the question as to why Leibniz assumes that interaction requires some kind of 'influx' from one substance to another below. However, here it is worth noting that Loeb and Broad both attribute a view of intra-substantial causation to Leibniz which embodies the idea that states of substances cause each other. Given this, it is perhaps natural to wonder as to how different states can cause one another if different substances cannot causally interact. However, as we have already seen Clatterbaugh and Bobro (forthcoming) present a convincing case for the claim that Leibniz has a radically different view of intra-substantial causation in mind. Therefore, it seems reasonable to think that the prima facie case against Leibniz is weaker than Loeb and Broad would have us believe since it is far from clear that Leibniz advocates any genuine causal activity which would readily transfer to inter-substantial causation. Loeb not only thinks that the argument from Monadology sec.7 'to this point is unimpressive' (1981, p.272) he also claims that Leibniz realizes that (7a) does not present cogent reasons for believing that only inter-monadic interaction requires change in internal structure since he supplements the argument with 'an entirely new consideration' (loc.cit.). This argument, which is probably the most often cited, is the one we find in (7b). As Loeb (ibid., p.272) and other commentators48 note, in (7b) Leibniz relies on the idea that the way of influence embodies the transmission accidents from one substance to another, and proceeds to insists that it is metaphysically impossible since any accident needs a substance in which it inheres and cannot become 'detached'. However, Loeb (loc.cit.) and Broad (1975, pp.47-8) both contend, that it is far from obvious that the characterization of causal interaction on which this argument depends is a plausible model. Loeb concludes that it is 'interesting, but unfortunate that section.7 of the Monadology contains the most explicit argument Leibniz has to offer that nothing external acts upon a substance' (1981, p.272). However, Broad is slightly more vitriolic. He claims that this argument is 'valid only as against [this] very crude imaginative picture' (ibid.) and that, at best, such an ‘accident transfer’ view is a picture (and only that) of what happens in some cases of intersubstantial causation. Broad suggests that, though this metaphor may help in illuminating instances of causation such as the heating of a cool body by a hot one, in others such as the explosive ignition of a flammable liquid by a spark it is 'hopeless'. Thus he can see no reason to regard Leibniz's case against the way of influence as persuasive. However it seems the criticisms of Broad and Loeb really miss the point. Leibniz does not suggest that 'accident transfer' is a plausible model, he merely claims that it is a view which is widespread and tries to show why any prima facie acceptability is illegitimate when metaphysical scrutiny is brought to bear. Despite their complaints, Loeb and Broad both to provide any positive alternative that gives expression to the intuition that one substance can genuinely affect another. It may well be that they both think that a post-Humean analysis is more appropriate. But if this is the case then Leibniz has surely no objection to answer. After

48

cf. Broad (1975, pp.47-8); Ishiguro (1986, pp.65-66); Cottingham (1988, p.147). Miller (1988, p.24) also

gives essentially the same argument without providing an explicit reference to (7b) and MacDonald Ross

(1984, p.86) presents a version of this line of reasoning, which he does not attribute explicitly to Leibniz,

where causal interaction is construed in terms of the transfer of force between bodies.


25

all, he is not claiming that there is no alternative explanation of our attributions of 'causal interaction' amongst substances, merely that a faithful cashing out of this locution, is metaphysically absurd. Thus unless an analysis which involves 'influence' in some 'real' sense can be provided we can probably agree with Macdonald Ross when he suggests that Leibniz's thesis is that 'it is a serious misconception to think of causation simply in terms of a chain of influences passing on from one individual to another' (1984, p.86). Lois Frankel (1989, p.59) also discusses the early sections of the Monadology in connection with Leibniz's attitude toward what she refers to as 'transfer' models of causation, according to which the cause, in communicating something its effect, parts with what it gives. But although, she appears to place greatest emphasis on Leibniz's claim 'that monads cannot interact because they have no ‘windows’ through which parts or accidents might pass.' (loc.cit.) when it comes to the argument against what we have called 'the way of influence' her reading is much the same as the one above,49 and she voices the complaint which we have already seen that Leibniz does not provide reasons for his assumption that causal interaction between finite substances requires some kind of 'transfer' between them (ibid. p.60). Unlike Loeb and Broad, Frankel does at least gesture toward an alternative model when she wonders whether substances could interact in a manner which is analogous to God's act of creation. After all, God is non-physical and yet 'is supposed to be able to act on its creation, to communicate something of itself to them.' (loc.cit.). This is clearly an interesting point that Frankel raises. However, her own enthusiasm for this alternative is short-lived. For, rather than embarking on a quest for significant disanalogies between divine and creaturely actions, Frankel resorts, without substantiation, to the claim that the completeness of individual concepts is the source of 'monadic non-interaction' (loc.cit.). 3.2 Leibniz's criticisms of occasionalism Over the centuries a great deal of ink has been spilled in connection with Leibniz's criticisms of, and relation to, occasionalism. As we shall see later (cf., section 9 below), contemporaries such as Arnauld and Bayle, struggled to distinguish the pre-established harmony from the views of Malebranche and others who advocated this explanation of natural causation.50 But, despite the uncertainty of his critics, Leibniz himself is adamant that his views are quite distinct from occasionalism, and indeed that they must be distinct if we are to make sense of the moral lives of human beings and develop an adequate theodicy. It is the criticisms that provide the basis for Leibniz's attempt to distance his views from occasionalism that that we shall examine in this section. As Donald Rutherford notes (1993, p.135 ff.), Leibniz raises three prominent objections to occasionalism; (1) that it is inconsistent with the idea of finite substances; (2) that it presupposes 'perpetual miracles'; and (3) that it requires that God 'disturb the laws of nature'. In addition, we shall also consider two more of Leibniz's concerns that have been pointed

49

Though it should be noted that Frankel also suggests (1989, p.60) that we we might perhaps read the

opening of the Monadology not as an argument against monadic interaction at all, but as a 'way of

explaining that monads are not to be understood on a physical model, that their accidents are not like

physical parts which can be detatched and passed on to another source.' (loc.cit.). 50

Leibniz often directs his criticisms of occasionlism at Malebranche in particular. And, although there are

differences between the views of the seventeenth century occasionalists (cf. Radner. 1993 passim), we shall

follow Leibniz's practice of treating Malebranche's views as representative of occaisonalism more generally.


26

out by Robert Sleigh Jr. (1990b, p.169ff.). Unlike the previous worries, which attack the doctrine of occasionalism directly, these are difficulties which Leibniz raises for the arguments that God is the sole cause which are used to motivate the adoption of occasionalism in the first place. (a) Inconsistency with the idea that there are finite substances As Donald Rutherford (1988, p.138) observes the theories of substance adopted by Leibniz and the occasionalists contain significant differences. In particular, Rutherford claims that Leibniz appears to hold that spontaneity is a metaphysically necessary condition for substantiality,51 and consequently that every substance must have an 'internal force of action...from which phenomena are born in order.' Rutherford observes that this has a significant bearing on Leibniz's attitude toward occasionalism since the latter denies power to finite substances and emphasizes the absolute dependence of created beings on God. He notes (ibid. p.139) that, for Malebranche, this means that beings continue to exist only where God wills this to be so, and that there is no genuine distinction between creation and conservation. Furthermore, this dependence extends beyond mere existence to the conservation of particular modalities, so that creatures are not just essentially dependent upon God but completely dependent upon him for the production of all their states and effects.52 With these remarks in place, Rutherford proceeds to explain how Leibniz criticizes occasionalism on the basis of his views about finite substances. The basic problem that Rutherford raises is that, on the occasionalist view presented above, the only being that satisfies Leibniz's conditions for substantiality is God. As Rutherford notes (1993, p.139), in section 8 of On Nature Itself Leibniz appears to make precisely this point when he claims that, without a force of some duration:

no created substance, no soul would remain numerically the same, and thus, nothing would be conserved by God, and consequently all things would be vanishing or unstable modifications or phantasms, so to speak, of the one divine permanent substance. Or what comes to the same thing, God would be the very nature or substance of all things. (G.IV.508-9 [L.502])53

But, although it is clear that the occasionalist ontology outlined above does not contain a commitment to Leibnizian substances, we have yet to see why Leibniz regards this as a reason for rejecting the theory. However, Leibniz does say a number of things which are supposed to persuade us of the error of following the occasionalist path and we shall examine three of these below.

51

As support for this Rutherford cites NE.65; and a letter to Bayle (G.III.58). 52

Rutherford appeals to Thomas Lennon (LO. 809ff.) and Robert Sleigh Jr. (1990b) as providing further

support for this reading. 53

Rutherford also points to the following passages: ML.421; G.IV.515, 567-68[L.507, 583].


27

(b) The charge of Spinozism A number of commentators54 suggest that Leibniz's primary line of attack here is to claim that, since the occasionalists account for the appearance of causal interaction between finite substances by denying the existence of these substances, they lapse into an unacceptable Spinozism. As is well known, Spinoza's views were almost universally condemned in Leibniz's day. And, as such, Russell (1946, p.563ff.) at least implies that Leibniz's distaste for Spinoza may have been no more than a smoke screen designed to cover up the great similarities between the views of the two men. However, this view is probably unfair. After all there are clear differences that between an ontology that recognizes substances and one which does not. For instance, as Catherine Wilson notes it is this component of Spinoza's philosophy that gives rise to pantheism, i.e., the denial of the world's independent reality from God (1987, p.166). As Richard Miller notes Leibniz recognizes that pantheism represents 'an unsatisfactory departure from common sense and perhaps Judeo-Christian orthodoxy’ (1998, p.249). However it seems unlikely that this is sufficient to account for his distaste for Spinoza's views.55 As Robert Sleigh Jr. (1990a, p.162) observes Leibniz far more concerned with the lack of spontaneity (or self-motion) possessed by the entities which Spinoza substitutes for finite substances (i.e., modifications of divine attributes). And this in turn is fueled by his views on human freedom. Leibniz's definition of freedom includes spontaneity as a necessary condition. Given this, Spinoza's pantheism and any other ontology which does not accord the status of genuine spontaneous substances to human beings cannot accommodate their freedom (cf. G.IV.510[L 502-3]).56 As is clear from many writings throughout his career, human freedom was one thing which Leibniz wished to preserves at all costs.57 Thus, we can at least understand why Leibniz regarded Spinozistic ontologies as unacceptable. Though it should be noted that it is clear that this consideration alone cannot amount to a justification for rejecting such ontologies.

(c) The unintelligibility of a nature without substances Donald Rutherford (1993, p.140) draws attention to a second objection that Leibniz presents against occasionalism based upon its lack of intrinsically active substances. He notes that, in On Nature Itself, Leibniz examines Johann Christopher Sturm's claim that the motion of bodies occurs solely 'by virtue of the eternal law God once set up' and suggests that this can be read one of two ways (G.IV.506-7 [L.500]):

54

Cf., Wilson (1987, pp.165-66); Sleigh (1990a, p.132ff., p.162); Rutherford (1993, p.140). 55

Woolhouse (1985 p.208) also suggests that Leibniz rejects occasionalism, partly because it makes God

the 'executor of his own laws' (cf. G.IV.563[L.580]) which is unworthy of him. However he gives us no

clearer idea of the sense in which this is to be regarded as ‘unworthy’. Thus, it is hard to know whether this

Woolhouse is attributing an objection grounded in revelation or reason.

56

But cf. Sleigh (1990a p.36 ff.) for a brief account of Malebranche on freedom. 57

For a useful discussion of many of the issues which surround Leibniz's views on freedom see Parkinson

(1970 passim.).


28

(1) Everything comes about due to a single original command or 'divine law that...bestowed a mere extrinsic denomination... on things' (2) The divine command confers 'some kind of enduring impression [on things]and inherent law [legem insitam]...from which both actions and passions follow.' Leibniz strongly attacks the first, which he takes to be constitutive of Sturm's occasionalism, since it destroys the possibility of an intelligible link between God’s will and the course of events (G.IV.507[L.500]). And he claims that only the second, with its commitment to finite substances, presents a metaphysics which contains a coherent way of understanding things. As Rutherford points out (1993, p.141) as it stands, there is an obvious problem that arises for this objection if it is seen as a rebuttal of all occasionalists. For it is far from clear that an occasionalist need accept that God acts simply in virtue of an initial command. Rutherford suggests two possible alternatives; either (1) God acts by continuous series of particular acts of will; or (2) he acts by an a-temporal, eternal or timeless will. Furthermore, Rutherford claims that Malebranche, the most famous of all occasionalists adopts the second of these views (loc.cit.).58 However, it should be noted that Rutherford does not proceed to explain exactly how these two options allow occasionalism to escape from the charge that it makes nature unintelligible. Catherine Wilson (1987, p.165) makes a similar point in her reading of De Ipsa Natura where she claims that Leibniz is pointing to an inconsistency in the claims of Malebranche, Boyle and Sturm that matter is essentially inert, but that God brought about its motion, in accord with the laws of nature, by instantaneous and permanent fiat. She points to the following passage in particular: It is not enough to say that in creating things, in the beginning, God willed that they would observe a certain law in their progression, if His will is imagined to have been so ineffective that things were not affected by it and no durable result produced in them...if, on the other hand, the law set up by God does in fact leave some vestige of Him expressed in things, if things are so formed by the command that they are made capable of fulfilling the will of Him who commanded them, then we must grant that there is a certain efficacy residing in things, a form or force, such as we usually designate by the name of nature and from which the series of phenomena follows according to the prescription of the first command. (De Ipsa Natura G.IV.p.507[L.500]) Wilson claims that four points emerge here; ‘(1) some vestige of God is ‘expressed’ in created things; (2) these things are made ‘capable’ of ‘fulfilling’ the divine commands; this capability (3) takes the ‘form’ of ‘force’ and (4) is to be identified with the term ‘nature’ in its old, maligned sense’ (Wilson 1987, p.165). For were it not the case that there were substances endowed in this way, either God’s original command would have to influence things across space and time in a ‘magical way’, or it would have to be supposed that God produces only instantaneous results.

58

Though, as Rutherford concedes, this view of Malebranche is not uncontentious. For example, Nadler says

otherwise in 'Occasionalism and the General Will' pp.20-1(1993).


29

Wilson says no more about the problems which attend those versions of occasionalism that require a 'magical action' of God.59 However, she does tell us that Leibniz regards the latter solution as consistent, but unacceptable. The reason she offers for this is that God's production of 'purely instantaneous results' is inconsistent with temporally extended products, which in turn requires abandoning the possibility of a natural science, due to the lack of objects for scientific enquiry. Unfortunately Wilson does not really say enough to make it clear what she is attributing to Leibniz. If her point is simply that God's constant action would not give rise to 'natures' for science to investigate, then it is far from clear that this would have to be regarded as a disaster. Provided God's will were sufficiently stable, many of the features of scientific enquiry could be retained. Law-like generalizations could still be produced which described temporal sequences of similar phenomena even if they could not be regarded as 'full-blown' substances with natures or essences that determined their motions. (d) No reason to create without substances One further objection based on the inconsistency between occasionalism and the existence of finite substances which are spontaneous is mentioned by Robert Sleigh Jr. (1990a, pp.168-69). Sleigh suggests that Leibniz regarded such a denial of spontaneity as theologically improper as can be seen by his reply to Lamy's suggestion in De la connaisance de la soi-meme, that, unlike occasionalism, concomitance was inconsistent with dependence of creatures on God: But you do not indicate why and in what respect my supposition is contrary to these doctrines. In order for a creature to be weak and dependent, must it be without power? And in order for the Creator to be supremely powerful, must He alone be powerful and active? Because God is infinitely perfect, would He allow no perfections in creatures? You would prove in the same way that because He is the supreme Being, He is the only Being, or at least the only substance. I agree that God acts on creatures at every moment by conserving them; but if he alone acts, what perfection has he given them? I really wish that you would specify it, because you will find none of them that does not indicate some action. And if He has given them no perfections, His work would be unworthy of Him. (G.IV.586-587) Sleigh does not provide any further explanation of this passage. However, it seems that, rather than providing evidence of the theological impropriety of the denial of spontaneity, Leibniz has a more philosophical objection in mind here. Leibniz insists that without spontaneous activity, there is nothing in creatures that can be regarded as a perfection, and that, there can be no justification for attributing the creation of something entirely lacking in perfection to the divine craftsman. We can perhaps see this as implying a heterodox view of God’s motives in creating. But it seems more likely that it is the violation of the principle of sufficient reason which counts against occasionalism here. Leibniz is surely claiming that:

59

Nor is it clear whether action by an 'a-temporal, eternal or timeless will' such as Rutherford describes

(1993, p.141) is to be regarded as magical in this way.


30

(1) Unless there is perfection in creatures, there could have been no reason for God to create rather than to not create (2) There is no perfection in anything which is not a spontaneous substance; Therefore (3) The existence of a created world implies the existence of spontaneous substances. (3) implies that a metaphysical system such as occasionalism conflicts with the principle of sufficient reason and could not be the consequence of divine wisdom. Thus, to the extent that Leibniz is engaging in a theological dispute, it is firmly entrenched in this natural theology and the principles of reason that inform it. (e) Occasionalism entails perpetual miracles This objection is probably the most discussed of all. It was a source of disagreement between Leibniz and Arnauld as early as the 1680's (see section 9 below) and has continued to generate controversy ever since. For this reason it will occupy much of the remaining space that we shall devote to Leibniz's criticisms of occasionalism. Both John Cottingham (1988, p.146) and C.D. Broad capture the spirit of Leibniz's objection from perpetual miracles but without providing much elaboration. Thus, Cottingham tells us that the ‘way of assistance’ is rejected as an ad hoc solution to the problem of mind-body interaction, since it requires the bringing in or a Deus ex machina for the explanation of an ordinary thing. And Broad (1975, p.121ff.) tells us that Leibniz objects to the fact that occasionalism involves continual miracles, even in the most mundane situations, because it requires a special action of God on particular occasions, rather than a general reference to the natures maintained in things by God since creation. Similarly, Roger Woolhouse (1985 p.208) notes that Leibniz rejects occasionalism because it involves miracles, which are unnecessary. However, in a later paper (Woolhouse,1988) he returns to the issue in greater detail. Woolhouse points out (ibid., p.167) that, by the time of the Discourse, Leibniz thinks ‘it is unreasonable to simply to have recourse to the extraordinary operation of the universal cause in so ordinary and particular thing’ (Discourse sec.33, G.IV.458 [LG.56]). However, he suggests that it is not until the correspondence with Arnauld, that we find this objection expounded in any detail. Here Leibniz claims that occasionalism 'introduces a sort of constant miracle' and is 'not worthy of God' and more precisely, that it requires that God is: constantly changing the laws of bodies, on the occasion of the thoughts of minds, or changing the regular course of the thoughts of the soul by arousing in it other thoughts, on the occasion of the movements of bodies (G.II.57-8 [LA.65]) rather than merely maintaining a substance in existence according to 'its [own] course of action and in the laws established for it' (loc.cit). However, it is in the Theodicy (secs. 257, 338) that Woolhouse finds 'perhaps the clearest statement of what lies behind this objection to occasionalism.' (Woolhouse 1988, p.169).


31

Here, we are told, Leibniz argues as follows: It is not enough that it simply be the regular course of things, for the order of things not be miraculous, how this regularity comes about is relevant too. In particular, it must not be due to 'God's action on the things he has created' but due to the actions of creatures whose 'nature it is to do what they do and which do so of their own accord.' (ibid. p.170). Woolhouse provides a significant discussion of this argument which is worthy of further consideration. However, since he appeals mainly to the criticisms which were aimed at Leibniz by Arnauld and Bayle, and which will form the subject matter of a later section we shall not consider this discussion here. Instead we shall turn to three more recent accounts of this argument presented by Stuart Brown (1984, 1988), Robert Sleigh Jr. (1990a, 1990b) and Donald Rutherford (1993) respectively. In his book Leibniz, Brown (1984 p.162) suggests that the argument we have been discussing is based on a combination of Leibniz's commitment to a version of the principle of sufficient reason and his account of miracles (ibid., p.165). He points out that in section 7 of the Discourse (LG.11-12), Leibniz introduces the idea that, although miracles cannot surpass the general order of the universe, they do exceed human understanding. Brown also claims that Leibniz came to extend his principle of sufficient reason from the principle that everything is intelligible to God to include the principle that everything in the natural order is intelligible to us (1984, p.165).Thus he suggests, Leibniz found it possible to accuse philosophers like Malebranche of appealing to Deus ex machina when they invoked the direct and unfathomable intervention of God to explain worldly phenomena. Brown, returns to Leibniz's accusation that occasionalists appeal to Deus ex machina since they requires God to perform 'perpetual miracles' which are beyond human comprehension in a later paper (1988 p.120 ff.). However, here he produces a more elaborate discussion of the issues that are involved. The first component of this is a critique of what he takes to be a common misinterpretation of Leibniz's intent. According to Brown, students of Malebranche from 17th century philosophers, such as Arnauld (cf. G.II.84), to 20th century scholars such as Ginsberg60 have commonly read Leibniz as objecting that, according to occasionalism, God intervenes in an ad hoc manner and that such 'tinkering and temporising' is unworthy of a perfect creator.61 With such a reading of Leibniz, the way is open for defenders of Malebranche and other occasionalists to assert that this objection is unfair, since everyday actions are far from ad hoc since they are included in God's general will (Brown 1988, p.120-21). Brown suggests that such charges depend upon confusions over the word 'miracle' and his use of the term Deus ex machina. He notes that, since Malebranche and the occasionalists considered miracles to be those things that occur as a result of an arbitrary intervention into the order of the world by divine fiat, the only consistent position for them to adopt is that miracles happen always or never (ibid. p.121).62 But, whatever the precise views of given occasionalists, Brown insists that Leibniz was squarely against the definition of miracles given above. Instead he defines miracle as what: 'could not be foreseen by any created mind, however enlightened'. (Discourse sec.16). Thus, as Brown notes, miracles for the Leibniz of the Discourse, are ‘a mere appearance due to human ignorance and lack any basis a parte 60

Cf., the introduction to Ginsberg's edition of Malebranche’s Dialogues on Metaphysics (1923: New

York: Macmillan). 61

Whether this is the argument that Cottingham has in mind above (cf., 1988, p.146) is unclear from the

brief account that he provides. 62

Brown points out that the Malebranche appears to take the latter course in the Dialogues on Metaphysics

(4.10) where he denies that God ever performs miracles, since he always acts in accord with his own laws.


32

rei.’(1988 p.121) and there is no reason to suppose that he thought they were arbitrary from the divine perspective.63 In fact Brown thinks that the 'real' perpetual miracles objection depends upon an account of miracles which differs from either of the two already considered. This view, which Brown describes as 'Aristotelian', requires that miracles sometimes happen, but should not be thought to happen always (loc.cit). We are told that there is evidence for this in a letter to Arnauld, where Leibniz proclaims: God performs a miracle when he does something that exceeds the forces which he has given to creatures and maintains in them. (G.II.93[LA.116]) Brown suggests that this account presupposes the existence of natural modalities, (i.e., that some things are impossible in the natural course of events) and defines the miraculous as those things which are ‘naturally impossible’. Furthermore, he claims that this stronger conception of miracle and natural powers is a distinguishing feature of Leibniz's later writings, evidenced by the fact that, at the end of the 17th century, we find essays entitled such things as On Nature Itself and On the Inherent Force and Actions of Created Things with talk of inherent forces in things which would have been quite foreign to the author of the Discourse (Brown 1988, p.121). 64 With these distinctions in mind we are in a position to understand Brown's views on the real source of Leibniz's objection that occasionalism improperly involves the miraculous. Brown insists that Leibniz does not disagree with occasionalism because of its need for ‘a meddling temporising deity’ since he was well aware of Malebranche's proper view. The departure is on grounds which are ‘methodological and metaphysical’, rather than theological, since in accord with the 'moderns', Leibniz claims a kind of autonomy for natural science to avoid Deus ex machina explanations from the 1660's onward, and eventually claims autonomy for Nature itself (ibid. p.122). But although Brown is surely correct to reject Ginsberg's version of the objection from miracles. It is not clear that he gives a genuine explanation of the views that he does attribute to Leibniz. He neither tells us why Leibniz objected to thinking of the miraculous on the occasionalist model, nor why Leibniz thought it unacceptable that the world be full of miracles on his alternative definition. Thankfully, for further elucidation of these issues we have discussions presented by Donald Rutherford and Robert Sleigh Jr. Rutherford (1993, pp.142-146) suggests Leibniz's basic points as follows: No matter how God's will is implemented (singularly, successively or even a-temporally), the occasionalists present a view which is at odds with the idea that the world was created by a wise and free God since it involves regularities which are unintelligible in natural terms i.e., 'miracles'. In other words the occasionalist world is not best of all possible worlds, and hence we know that God did not create it. In a manner which is reminiscent of Brown's discussion above, Rutherford (ibid. p.142) grounds his account of the miracles objection, at least in part, by insisting that, Leibniz holds a 'principle of intelligibility' which states that:

63

As we shall discover very soon, this does not appear to be Leibniz's considered view on the nature of

miracles. However, the important point here is simply that Leibiz does not accept the occasionalist

definition. And although his views certainly changed after the Discourse, Leibniz did not become any more

sympathetic to the arbitrariness of occasionalist miracles. 64What about Mercer and Sleigh??


33

Everything which happens must follow in an intelligible manner from the nature or essence of some created being. (G.III.519; also cf. N.E. p.66) Rutherford claims that once this principle of intelligibility is accepted, it follows that we must 'begin from the assumption that properties of things can, in general, be conceived of as modifications of attributes that partly define the natures of their subjects.'(1993, p.142). And since the occasionalist must deny precisely this, Leibniz's objection to their doctrine becomes apparent. Approaching the issue from a slightly different perspective, Rutherford suggests that the 'debate between Leibniz and the occasionalists comes down to the question of what it is to be a genuine law of nature.'(ibid. p.145). For Leibniz, the concept of a law of nature is intimately linked to the principle of intelligibility since he holds that laws of nature must allow for the conception of effects as 'explicable modifications' of the 'nature' of their subject. Laws of nature are laws of natures: exceptionless sequences of events which are explainable by the natures of types of beings. And given this, it follows that, since miracles are those things which are exceptions to the laws of nature, Leibniz construes something as miraculous if and only if it cannot be explained by the natures of created things (ibid. p.143 cf. G.IV.483). But as Rutherford explains, the situation is somewhat different for an occasionalist like Malebranche who claims that laws of nature exist simply as the result of God having willed a given regularity.65 There is no requirement that such resulting regularities be explicable in terms of the natures of secondary causes and, a miracle is simply an event which violates stands outside the regular sequence which God wills, whether we are a position to know this or not. On the basis of evidence such as this, Rutherford suggests that we understand Leibniz's basic objection in terms of the connection between intelligibility and God's wisdom in the following way (1993 p.153): We know that Leibniz's theodicy connects the wisdom of God with the choice of this world (which is the best one) and that intelligibility is linked to the rational order which influenced God's choice. Therefore, any attack on intelligibility is an attack on the divine wisdom, and occasionalism can be rejected because it is guilty of precisely this. This still leaves us with the question of why the best possible world must have an intelligible order and so Rutherford provides a 'sketchy argument' which is supposed to help explain Leibniz's insistence on the intelligibility of creation (ibid. p.157). Rutherford claims that, in the context of creation, God's wisdom is expressed in two principle ways: (E1) God creates in accord with his supremely good will so as produce world which his wisdom recognizes as possessing greatest perfection. (cf. Theodicy sec.225; H. 428). (E2) In willing existence of the world God is constrained by the principle of intelligibility, i.e., he only wills events which are explicable by natures of created things.66

65

Leibniz appears to think that such a regularity may even be arbitrary (cf., G.III 529; G.IV 594-5) 66

This second claim is surely too strong. Even the least traditional Christians of the seventeenth century

allow that God wills some miracles, which are by defintion, for Leibniz, unintelligible in terms of the

natures of creatures.


34

As Rutherford notes it is the reason behind this second constraint that is 'crucial to Leibniz's case against occasionalism' (1993, p.157) and he suggests that we can understand this as follows: (1) God's wisdom is, for Leibniz, identical with his knowledge of what is positive or unlimited in the natures of things.67 (2) God is guided by wisdom only when he wills contingent events that can be explained through 'limitations' of the perfections definitive of these natures. Therefore (3) we may assume that these are those events which can be conceived of as 'explicable modifications' of created beings. But although Rutherford's claims are suggestive, it is far from clear how he wishes to make the requisite connections here. However, on a more positive note, it must be remembered that he claims to be offering nothing more than a very brief sketch of how things might go here. And it does seem that Rutherford's suggestion that we focus on the importance of the intelligibility of creation in understanding Leibniz's objections to occasionalism may well provide a solid basis for further research of the issue at hand.68 Robert Sleigh Jr., begins his consideration of the 'argument from continual miracles' (1990a, p.163)69 by pointing out that Leibniz is perfectly aware that Malebranche; (1) defines miracles as events with respect to which God acts by a particular volition; and (2) takes this definition to imply that every divine action in accord with a general rule is natural and non-miraculous (c.f.,G.II.92[LA.115]).70 Given this, Sleigh has little interest in the simple claim 67

This claim is very obscure and unfortunately Rutherford does not make it any clearer what he intends here. 68

My own suspicion is that Leibniz views the intelligibilty as an essential component in his theodicy. Given

a commitment to the psychological law that 'everyone wills that which appears to be the best' (cf. N.E.

p.180), there is a conceptual connection between the accuracy of the beliefs which informs the decisions of

an agent and the goodness of the action she performs. Thus, unless knowledge of the world were available

to finite creatures, it is difficult to see how they could be regarded as responsible for an aspect of their

actions, including the moral aspects. The details of this argument, and support for it still require a good

deal of further investigation. However, it is worth noting that in the New Essays Leibniz tells us explicitly

that 'the more developed the understanding is the better are the choices of the will' (loc.cit.), and it appears

to follow from this that a comprehendible object is a prerequisite for good choices. Thus, to put it more

simply, I suggest that there is case to be made for thinking that Leibniz believes that unless the world were

intelligible, creatures would not have the option to do good, and God would therefore appear to be

responsible for the moral evil which exists in the world. 69

As we shall see below, Sleigh actually presents a family of arguments based on Leibniz's understanding of

Malebranche's account of miracles. 70

More preciseley, Malebranche defines God's general and particular volitions as follows: 'God acts by

general volitions when he acts as a consequence of the general laws he has established. [I feel pain when

cut] because, in consequence of the general laws of the union of the body and soul he has established, he

makes me suffer pain...God acts by particular volition when the efficacy of his will is not determined by

some general lawto produce some effect....Thus, supposing a body begins to move without being pushed by

another, or without the changes in the will of some mind, or without some other creature who determines the

efficacy of some general law, I say that God would move this body by a particular volition' (OM.5.147-48).


35

that occasionalism implies perpetual miracles. For, strictly speaking it does not.71 Instead, he points to three other Leibnizian arguments based around the notion of the miraculous which are of greater interest: The first of these claims that to act miraculously, on Malebranche's conception of miracles, God must act irrationally which would be inconsistent with the divine nature. Sleigh points out (1990a. p.157) that Leibniz raises this objection explicitly in the Theodicy as follows: I agree with Malebranche that God brings things about in the manner most worthy of him. But I go a little further than he with respect to general and particular volitions. Since God cannot bring about anything without reasons - even when he acts miraculously - it follows that God has no volitions about individual events that is not a consequence of a truth or general volition. Thus I would say that God never has a perticular volition as Malebranche understands it, i.e., a primitive particular volition.(Theodicy sec.206) Sleigh (1990a, p.157) reads this argument as stemming from Leibniz's commitment to the principle of sufficient reason. Sleigh suggests that this principle entails that to act reasonably is to act in accord with some general principle and so, to act by a particular volition would be to act unreasonably, and impossible for God. As articulated above, this argument appears cogent. However, Sleigh suggests that 'in its most subtle form, Malebranche's theory is probably immune to this criticism' (ibid. p.163). Here, Sleigh alludes to a slightly different account of the miraculous which Malebranche presents in the Dialogues on Metaphysics as follows: [W]hen God performs a miracle He does not act in accordance with general laws which are known to us, I claim He acts in accordance with other general laws which are unknown to us, or what he does then is determined at that time by circumstances which He had in view from all eternity in forming that simple eternal, invariable act that contains both the general laws of His ordinary providence and also exceptions to these very laws. But these circumstances should not be called occasional causes in the same sense that, for example, impact of bodies is the occasional cause of motion, because God did not make general laws to regulate the efficacy of His volitions uniformly on the occurrence of these circumstances. For in exceptions to the general laws, God acts sometimes one way sometimes another, although invariably in accordance with what is required of Him by that one of His attributes that is, so to speak, most valuable to him at the time.(OM 12.177[Doney 175]) Sleigh (1990a, p.157) suggests that here Malebranche distinguishes reasons and causes and claims that general laws are to be regarded as universal generalizations which are causal in character.72 Given this, it is possible for Malebranche to hold that when God acts by a

71

Of course it will turn out to be true that the occasionalists are committed to a theory which yields a

profusion of miracles if this is understood as Leibniz defines it. However, since Sleigh is interested

primarily in the substantive disputes between Leibniz and the occasionalists, he chooses to avoid

characterizations which centre around the question of whether occasionalism can classify everyday events

as non-miraculous. 72

Here the relevant notion of causation is the 'ordinary' one which Malebranche tries to capture with his

occasional causes rather than Malebranche's stricter notion of a 'real cause'.


36

particular volition, he may have non-causal, but nonetheless universal, reasons for his particular acts. Thus, it seems that, at least on this account of miracles, Malebranche can escape Leibniz's charge of the imputation of irrational action to God. The second objection to which Sleigh points (ibid. p.163) is based on the claim that Leibniz interprets Malebranche as holding that whenever God acts from general principles he is acting naturally. Sleigh suggests that, in combination with the principle of sufficient reason, this interpretation leads Leibniz to conclude that there can be no such thing as a miracle for Malebranche, if it is assumed that God acts rationally. However, yet again Sleigh doubts this objection is applicable on the more 'subtle' reading of Malebranche that he offers. He suggests that if we take note of the passage from the Dialogues on Metaphysics above, there is good reason to think that Malebranche could consistently allow for rational miracles (loc.cit.). The third, and final, objection concerns the way in which miracles are distinguished from the non-miraculous by Malebranche. Sleigh claims that Leibniz holds that, given Malebranche's views on this distinction, an unacceptable consequence follows; i.e., that 'any true universal generalization, meeting certain minimal conditions, must be a law of nature true of non-miraculous (hence natural) occurrences.' (loc.cit). He suggests that Leibniz's 'most penetrating' discussion of this difficulty is to be found in notes on for a response to Lamy's De la connaisance de soi-meme as follows: in reasoning in this way, one lacks a proper sense of what a miracle is. For following this idea, the laws of nature would be arbitrary, and those that God would have willed to establish would be the nature of things, just as exceptions to them would be miracles. Consequently the natural and the miraculous would not differ in themselves but only by an extrinsic denomination ... But it must be known that not every sort of rule or law is appropriate to constitute a law of nature, and that there is an essential difference between the natural and the miraculous, so that if God acted continually in a certain manner, He would bring about perpetual miracles. For example if God had established that a planet must always go in its own in a line curved like an ellipse without adding anything explicable that caused or maintained this elliptical movement, I say that God would have established a perpetual miracle and that it could not be said that the planet proceeded thus in virtue of its nature or following natural laws since it is not possible to explain this nor to provide a reason for this phenomenon.(G.IV.587-88)73 According to Sleigh, here we have 'Leibniz's rationalism in as naked form as we ever find it.' (1990a, p.163). For as well as insisting that only certain modes of activity are to count as natural, Sleigh suggests that Leibniz also claims that there must be a perfect fit between the natural and epistemic capacities of human intellect.74 Furthermore, he goes on to insist that, although we might assume that Leibniz is thereby providing a definition of the natural (and by implication of the miraculous), it is more appropriate to think of the unintelligibility of miracles as merely co-extensive with the more basic metaphysical definition of miracles; i.e., those thing which are beyond the natural powers of creatures to bring about.75

73

Also cf. G.II.93(LA.93); Discourse sec.16 (L.G.27-28). 74

This seems a bit too strong a way to say it. 75

Sleigh says nothing about why this coextension comes about. However, given the fact that Leibniz defines

'activity' in creatures in terms of distinctness of their perceptions (see below) we might expect the epistemic

capacities of substances and their power to act to converge in some sense.


37

As we can see this third argument is closely connected to Rutherford's discussion of miracles and the 'principle of intelligibility', although Sleigh focuses on the unacceptable conclusions which Leibniz draws from Malebranche's notion of 'natural' events. Given this, Sleigh notes that this difference between Leibniz and Malebranche's accounts of the nature of miracles may give Leibniz an advantage when it comes to distinguishing between truly miraculous events and those which merely violate the laws of nature as we know them. For, on Leibniz's view, the question of whether an event is beyond the natural powers of creatures is distinct from how it fits with the regularities which we take to adequately describe the natural world. But in Malebranche's defence, Sleigh points out (ibid. p.164) both that events do not wear their 'naturalness' on their sleeves and that for Leibniz, the natural/miraculous distinction ultimately rests on the distinction between events that are and are not 'predictable nor explicable by any created mind, however enlightened.' Given this, Sleigh can see no reason why Malebranche could not consistently adopt Leibniz's criterion without admitting genuine causal powers and natures to creatures. Indeed, he suggests that the passage that he uses in support of the more 'subtle' interpretation indicates that Malebranche has precisely this kind of distinction in mind.76 (f) Occasionalism requires that God disturb the laws of nature Both Donald Rutherford and Robert Sleigh Jr.77 provide detailed discussions of the third objection to occasionalism that we shall consider. Sleigh turns to the issue in two separate places (1990a, pp.164-69;1990b, pp.167-69)78 where he refers to it as the 'troubler argument' and the ‘intrusion argument’ respectively. He suggests that this 'favorite' argument of Leibniz's appears in a ‘pellucid and strident form’ in a draft of one of the letters to Arnauld where Leibniz states, with respect to the causal relations between mind and body, that:

76

Sleigh also considers one further argument, which though apparently different is really just another

example of this kind (1990a, p.168)). He observes that, in notes for a reply to Bayle in 1698, Leibniz points

out that, given that occasionalism appears to be committed to the temporal priority of occasional causes vis

a vis their effects, it must remain unexplained how the parallelism necessary for mind-body quasi-causal

interaction obtains. This seems to be the point Leibniz expresses when he says:

[I]t is not enough that God order the body to obey the soul, and the soul to perceive what happens in

the body, it is necessary that he give them a means to bring it about, and I have explained this means.

(G.IV.533)

Sleigh insists that, appearances notwithstanding, this is not really a new worry at all. Instead he regards it as

a repeat of the argument which was raised in the context of the discussion of miracles above. Leibniz is

simply highlighting the irrationality of occasionalism from his perspective within the context of mind-body

union. Thus, Sleigh claims it is merely another illustration of the fact that occasionalism conflicts with the

principle of sufficient reason (intelligibilty) by leaving inexplicable, yet apparently natural, events. 77

Roger Woolhouse (1988, pp.173-76) also presents a version of this objection. However he thinks that the

argument that was first aimed at Cartesian Interaction and only later explicitly aimed at occasionalism as

well and since his discussion reflects this it is not germaine for present concerns. 78

We shall follow, for the most part, the 1990b version. The account from 1990a is more detailed. However,

the issues involved are relatively straighforward, and, although intersting, the extra detail presents nothing

which is essential to Sleigh's account.


38

It does not conform...to the hypothesis of occasional causes, as if God were to intervene ordinarily in any other way that by conserving each substance in its course, and as if God on the occasion of the occurrences in the body aroused thoughts in the soul that would change the course that soul would have taken without that. (G.II.47[LA.51-52])79 In order that we get clear on the objection, Sleigh asks that we consider a case where Arnauld voluntarily raises his arm.80 He claims that Malebranche would hold the quasi- causal81 history of such an event to include a mental event (Arnauld's willing) which induces a physical change (the raising of the arm), and that the basic objection raised by Leibniz is that this causal chain is inconsistent with certain facts about the physical world (1990a, p.165).82 Sleigh rejects out of hand (1990b, p.167) the idea that this objection is based on a general rejection of quasi-causal relations between mind and body, since elsewhere Leibniz tells Arnauld that ‘one is quite right to say that my will is the cause of this movement of my arm’ (G.II.71[LA.87]). Instead Sleigh points to two other concerns of a related kind (loc.cit.). Firstly, he notes that a number of passages83 indicate that Leibniz thinks that 'mental causes' of this type would violate the principle of the conservation of force. But, although Sleigh recognizes the importance that Leibniz accorded to this objection, he suggests that since Leibniz and Malebranche 'remained at odds for some time over the correct measure of force' we should look for some more fundamental physical truth to ground the disagreement. To this end, Sleigh suggests that the more fundamental objection is that Leibniz holds that Malebranche’s scheme is inconsistent with: the great principle of physics that a body never receives a change in its motion except by another body in motion which pushes it (G.IV.541[L.587]) Thus, the problem according to Sleigh, is that Malebranche believes some physical events have as their sole immediate quasi-cause, a mental event, and that this is inconsistent with Leibniz’s ‘great principle of physics’ which requires that physical events must have physical quasi-causes (1990b, p.166).84

79

This passage is cited in both of Sleigh's discussions (1990a, p.164; 1990b, p.167). 80

In the example from Sleigh 1990a (p.165), Arnauld is described as raising his hat. However, this

difference is irrelevant to present concerns. 81

It should be noted that Sleigh refers to Malebranche's occasional causes and Leibniz's inter-substantial

causes as 'quasi-causes' since they are not genuine determinants of the course of the world in contrast with

the consequent will of God which is a 'real cause' of this kind for both Malebranche and Leibniz and and the

spontaneous natures of creatures which are real causes for Leibniz. 82

The account in Sleigh 1990b (p.167), though essentially the same, is more detailed. Here Sleigh claims

that Malebranche would have held that in such a case there is a sequence of quasi-causes (occasional

causes), all physical, leading up to the arm raising which starts with a flow of animal spirits. However, the

initial flow of animal spirits which has as a real cause some volition of God, has as a quasi-cause

(occasional cause) an act of willing. Furthermore, there is no other quasi-cause of the initial movement of

the animal spirits than Arnauld’s willing to move his arm. 83

Cf., the Letter to l'Hospital of 1695 (GM.II.298-9); the Letter to Basnage of 1696 (G.II.122);

Considerations on Vital Principles... (G.VI.541[L587]; and Theodicy (sec.61). 84

Sleigh does recogniz (ibid. p.168) that Leibniz himself held that some physical events have as their

immediate quasi-cause mental events. However, he was not vulnerable to the same criticism since, in virtue

of his commitment to the thesis of spontaneity, his ‘great physical principle’ and the idea that every real


39

Although Sleigh suggests that this 'troubler/intrusion argument' is 'Leibniz's most frequently articulated criticism of Malebranche's account of causality' (loc.cit.), he does not think that it is a 'major' criticism and offers two 'ways out' that Malebranche could take; the first involves an adjustment of occasionalism; and the second stems from a deeper reflection on the nature of occasionalism (ibid. p.168-69). Taking Sleigh's first way out, Malebranche would accept Leibniz’s ‘great principle ‘and admit that his own views on mind-body interaction were inconsistent with it. However, this would be understood as an empirical failing. Thus, it could be easily resolved by an adjustment of the system of occasional causes in order to accommodate the 'correct' empirical beliefs. But more importantly, Sleigh suggests that, reflection on the nature of occasionalism reveals a second way out which does not require that Malebranche make any adjustments in this way (ibid., p.169). He observes that occasionalism is intended primarily as a catalogue of the ways in which God acts by general volitions. And, although it is true that it may, under certain conditions, also serve as a catalogue of laws of nature, it need not perform this ancillary role in all cases. In virtue of this, Sleigh claims that quasi-causal over-determination is permissible, since a catalogue of the ways in which God acts by general volitions might be complete, in the sense of accounting for every (non-miraculous) occurrence which has a cause, and yet still be incomplete - in the sense of failing to provide a catalogue of the laws of nature. Donald Rutherford characterizes the objection with which we are presently concerned as the claim that 'on the system of occasional causes God would be guilty of 'disturbing' the respective laws of the soul and the body.' (1993, p.146) and as evidence for its occurrence in Leibniz's writings he cites the following: [R]ather than saying with [occasionalists] that God has made it a law always to produce in a substance changes conforming to those of another substance, which disturbs [troublent] at every moment their natural laws, I would say that God has given to each of them from the start a nature whose own laws bring about its changes, in such a way that in my view the actions of souls neither increase nor decrease the quantity of moving force which is in matter, nor even change its direction. (G.III.122) Before proceeding to explain his reading of this passage, Rutherford takes issue with two ways in which this passage might be interpreted. Firstly, he insists that the basis of the criticism is not the claim that occasionalists are mistaken about the laws of nature (e.g., that they ignore the conservation force);85 And, secondly he disagrees with Sleigh's reading,86 according to which Leibniz objects to the fact that the occasionalists fail to take account of 'the great principle of physics', i.e., that every physical event has a physical cause. Rutherford claims that, as Sleigh himself admits, on this reading, the problem is not with occasionalism per se, and it seems that it is for this reason that Rutherford 'see[s] the criticism as going beyond this' (1993, p.146 n.19) Instead, Rutherford suggests that in the passage above, Leibniz really objects to the fact that occasionalism requires that God arbitrarily impose laws on things which are otherwise undetermined in their effects; that on the occasionalist account, natural laws are not conceived as they should be, i.e., as the lawful expression of the natures of created things

creaturely cause is a quasi-cause, Leibniz was also committed to the existence of an immediate physical

quasi-cause for every, non-miraculous physical event. 85

But, cf.Garber (1995 p.329) for an apparently different view, and Sleigh’s more cautious appraisal above. 86

Cf., Sleigh (1990a, pp.164-68; 1990b, pp.167-68).


40

(ibid. p.147). Rutherford claims that this point is implicit in a letter to Lady Masham from 1704 where Leibniz says: [H]aving assumed that ordinary things must occur naturally and not by miracle, it seems one can say that according to this my hypothesis is demonstrated. For the two other hypotheses necessarily make recourse to miracle... All in all one can find no other hypothesis than these three. For either the laws of bodies and souls are interfered with [troublees] or else they are conserved. If these laws are interfered with (what must come about from something outside), it is necessary either that one of these two things interferes with the other, which is the hypothesis of influence common in the schools, or that it is a third thing which interferes with them, that is, God, in the hypothesis of occasional causes. But finally if the laws of souls and the laws of bodies are conserved without being interfered with, that it the hypothesis of pre-established harmony, which is consequently the only natural one. (to Lady Masham 30/6/04 G.III,355) Rutherford draws two issues are drawn to our attention here, but wishes to emphasize the second (ibid. p.147). The first concerns the distribution of power (whether God has it all or whether there are genuine secondary causes), and the second, concerns what Rutherford the 'intrinsic intelligibility of nature' (loc.cit). We have already seen how the notion of intelligibility figures in Rutherford’s account of Leibniz’s views about miracles and it is clear that he wishes to see the ‘intrusion argument’ in similar terms. He provides further support for this perspective by citing two more considerations (ibid. pp.147-48). The first is Leibniz's attack on intelligibility of Cartesian interaction where bodies and minds must 'bring about' reciprocal changes when he tells Jacquelot: I have said to you that it is as far from reasonable to attribute to the soul an immediate physical influence on the body as to attribute to matter the faculty of thinking. My reason is that one is as inexplicable as the other by the modifications of the thing to which it is attributed. (G.VI.569; cf. 570) And the second is the observation that Leibniz holds it to be a virtue of pre-established harmony that it makes changes in body and soul intelligible since it only talks of mental (physical) effects following mental (physical) causes. Sleigh and Rutherford obviously disagree over the best way to read the concerns that Leibniz expresses over the fact that occasionalism embodies psychophysical quasi-causes. However, it is hard to know how we should regard their disagreement. On the one hand there is clearly evidence that Leibniz considered the objections that Sleigh raises, even though it is hard to believe that he took all of them particularly seriously. Thus, Rutherford may be a little too charitable when he dismisses these interpretations. But on the other hand the weaknesses that Sleigh exposes in the arguments he offers suggest that, despite the inconclusive nature of the evidence, Leibniz may have had additional concerns along something like the lines suggested by Rutherford. Yet again then, we find ourselves with an interpretative dispute that will only be resolved, if at all, through further research.


41

4. Pre-established harmony and the relation between mind and body

In section one, we saw that, in spite of popular opinion, the pre-established harmony is not primarily a solution to the Princess Elizabeth's worries over mind-body interaction in Descartes. However, we also noted that, despite this, Leibniz does use his theory to account for the relation between mind and body, and it is to this aspect of pre-established harmony that we shall now turn. Before we begin it should be noted that our discussion will presuppose the monadological ontology that Leibniz adopts most explicitly in his later writings. Given the Aristotelian view of substance that commentators such as Daniel Garber (1985) and Nicholas Jolley (1993) claim to find around the time of the Discourse, and even as late as 1704, the soul: ...properly and accurately speaking, is not a substance, but a substantial form or the primitive form existing in a substance, the first act, the first active faculty (FC.323[AG.105]). As Jolley points out, with the soul thus conceived it is 'only an element of substance' (1993, p.406). Thus, the relation between mind and body is ontologically basic and analogous to that between form and matter in Aristotelian philosophy and there is no pressing mind-body problem. In contrast, the pre-established harmony, appears to follow Descartes in assuming the substantiality of the mind, and, given this, tries to account for the appearance of a union between minds and 'their' bodies. Thus, we must say at least something about the metaphysical status of bodies in Leibniz's monadological writings before we can proceed. To adequately account for the details that commentators have provided on Leibniz's account of corporeal substances and bodies in general would probably require at least as much space as this whole essay. Thus, we shall limit ourselves to the accounts which are given by those who are explicitly engaged in the task of explaining the relation between mind and body. The superficiality of this discussion should be readily apparent, and, yet it should prove possible to understand the characterizations of Leibniz's views on the mind-body relationship which the commentators give. Though at the same time, it must be wondered to what extent this 'understanding' is merely a function of the superficiality of these accounts. We have already seen that, on the view we are considering, Leibniz regards the mind as a substance or monad. Amongst what Bertrand Russell refers to as the 'three great classes in the hierarchy of monads' (1937, p.141) two are classes of minds. The highest are 'spirits' which include human beings and other rational creatures such as angels, but 'souls', which have something akin to sensation and memory and belong to the sentient animals other than man, also counts as minds in Leibniz's scheme of things.87 As Loeb points out, in Leibniz's later philosophy, 'monads are the only reality' (1981, p.292). Thus, since Leibniz does not wish to embrace a Berkeleian idealism,88 the bodies of human beings and other 'embodied' creatures are accounted for in terms of other monads. The way in which commentators explain the metaphysics of body varies greatly. Both Nicholas Jolley and C.D.Broad appear to attribute to Leibniz the view that the body is an

87This view is in direct contrast with Descartes who notoriously held that animals were 'machines'

created by God (cf., CSM.I.139).

88

For Leibniz's own insistence on this, cf., G.II.492; AG.307.


42

aggregate of monads (cf. Jolley 1993, p.406; Broad 1975, p.122). Benson Mates also observes that 'occasionally Leibniz speaks as though bodies were aggregates of monads, in that way that a herd is an aggregate of animals' (1986, p.204).89 However, he suggests that Leibniz's considered view is that 'strictly speaking, matter is not composed of monads but results from them, since matter or extended mass is nothing but a phenomenon, like the rainbow or parahelia' (to De Volder June 30 1704, G.II.268 [L.536]),90 and he goes on to support this by noting that monads cannot be 'parts of bodies' since 'parts must be homogeneous with the whole and anyway... monads do not exist in space and time and consequently cannot be adjacent to one another' (1986, pp.204-5).91 This latter view, which seems closer Leibniz's intent, is shared by Bertrand Russell who tells us that 'the body is the appearances of an infinite collection of monads.' (1937,p.140). And this also appears to be the idea that underlies Louis Loeb's claim that on Leibniz's mature view matter is a phenomenon grounded in perceptions of monads (1981, p.292-93).92 Finally, Stuart Brown provides a similar suggestion when he notes that Leibniz ends up reducing matter generally to the level of true or 'well-founded' phenomena (1984, p.166). However, it should be noted that Brown is still prepared to say that 'bodies are in some sense constituted by an infinite number of [monads].'(loc.cit.). This clearly does not indicate Brown's attribution to Leibniz of the 'herd' interpretation of constitution rejected by Mates, but it does point to the fact that Leibniz's view permits us to say that, at a given point in time, a certain infinite, but unique, set of monads ground the phenomena that we identify as a specific spatio-temporal particular. It is in this sense then that, although phenomena cannot be physically decomposed into the monads which ground them, we can say that phenomena are constituted by monads (substances). For this reason, and for ease of expression, we reserve the right to use the term in this extended sense in the discussion that follows. We now have a general picture of how Leibniz conceives of minds and bodies given his monadological ontology. However, the question that we really wish to address is how Leibniz accounts for the relationship between the two, given that the pre-established harmony precludes the involvement of substances in causal interactions.93 At least four different aspects of the relationship between minds and bodies that have received attention in the literature, and we shall deal with each of them, though admittedly not in equal depth. They are as follows: (1) our attributions to minds of bodies that 'belong to them' and thereby constitute persons and animals ;(2) the appearance of interaction between bodies and minds, i.e., the regular and reliable correlation of mental phenomena with bodily phenomena (e.g.,

89

In support of this claim Mates points to C.13-14[P.174-75]; G.II.301.

90

Mates also cites the following in support of his claim: G.IV.559[L.577-78]; G.III.363;

G.II.118[L.343]; G.III.567n.;G.II.436; GM.II.537;A.VI.vi.434; G.II.626.

91

Here Mates points to the. Third paper to Clarke G.VII.365-66[L.683]). It is also worth noting that

Mates adheres to a rather strong reading of the relationship between bodies and monads. He insists that

since we know that bodies do not really exist on Leibniz's mature view, statements about bodies should be

somehow analyzable into statements about the perceptions of monads. Mates goes on to complain that

Leibniz says little about how such reductions would go (1986, p.206). However, it is far from clear that

Leibniz regards the relationship between a phenomena and the attributes of the infinite set of monads which

ground it are at all intelligible to the human mind, let alone susceptible to an analytical reduction.

92

Though it is worth pointing out that Loeb insists this view is not to be found until 1704.

93

Although most commentators accept that the pre-established harmony is incompatible with mind-

body causal interaction, see the discussion of Jolley's counter-claim in 7.2 below.


43

arm raisings following volitions, pains following abrasions etc.); (3) ascriptions of causal relations between minds and bodies; and (4) the intimate union of mind and body. 4. 1. The attribution of bodies to minds Aside from the thinking that minds and bodies enter into reciprocal causal interactions, a central part of our common sense view of the world is that certain material objects are bodies which 'belong to' minds, thereby giving rise to animate beings. Thus, we shall turn briefly to this phenomenon as it is treated from post-Discourse Leibnizian perspective.94 As Louis Loeb points out (1981, p.297) Leibniz claims that each monad stands in a non-causal relation of dominance to an infinity of other monads, which may be regarded as its body.95 And, although he does not go into much further detail about the nature of this relation, Loeb observes that Leibniz holds that: ...in the monads themselves domination and subordination consist only in degrees of perfection (to des Bosses, G.II.451[L.605]) and each outstanding simple substance or monad which forms the center of a compound substance (such as an animal for instance), and is the principle of its uniqueness, is surrounded by a mass composed of an infinity of other monads which constitute the body belonging to this monad.(Principles of Nature and Grace, G.VI.598 [L.637]) Bertrand Russell tries to express the same idea, with respect to the dominance of the human mind, when he says 'in my body, that monad which is myself has clearer perceptions than any of the other monads and may be said to be dominant in the body, since, in relation to other monads, it is active while they are passive' (1937, p.140).96 And the claim that a dominant monad has clearer perceptions than those it dominates is implicit in C.D.Broad's suggestion that 'Leibniz views animals as consisting of a ruling monad (one substance) and a

94

By 'post-Discourse' I intend Leibniz's monadological ontology. As we have seen, there are a number

of commentators (including Loeb (1981) and Garber (1985)) who do not think that Leibniz adopted this

view until late in his career, (typically around 1704) and that he was an 'Aristotelian realist' up to this time.

The problem of bodies 'belonging to' minds clearly does not arise if Leibniz is read as an Aristotelian for

whom souls and matter together constitute corporeal substances without there being a 'real distinction'

between them.

95

Loeb actually uses the term 'analogue body'.

96

There are at least two worries which arise over this characterization. As Russell himself points out

monads do not compose bodies in any straightforward sense. It is possible to think of monads as parts of

bodies only in the sense that they belong to an infinite collection which has the appearance of a body. But,

given this, it is hard to see how a monad that is to be regarded as a 'mind' could be thought of as being 'in' its

body. But, perhaps more importantly, Russell suggests that through having clearer perceptions a monad may

dominate another. But at the same time characterizes activity and passivity in terms of relative clarity of

perceptions. Thus, he seems to be committed to somewhat counterintuitive idea that a mind no longer

dominates any part of its body which is 'acting' upon it, e.g., a wound which subjects the mind to painful

sensations. This problem may be alleviated by some of the considerations noted above regarding the

distinction between Leibniz's metaphysical and epistemological accounts of quasi-causation. However,

Russell appears to ignore such subtleties and thus his interpretation of Leibniz invites this criticism.


44

collection of other monads though 'of a lower order of clearness and intelligence.'(1975, p.122). There is of course a good deal more that could be said about the notion of 'dominance'. However, it is largely ignored by the commentators who deal with our chief interest, namely how Leibniz attempts to explain the mind-body relation by appealing to the pre-established harmony. Thus we shall not pursue it in any depth here. However, at least two questions are worth raising. Firstly, it is far from whether the commentators above think that every monad dominates other monads, thereby constituting an animal, or whether 'bare monads' are excepted. Leibniz's metaphors of fish-pond full of fish that are in turn full of fish, and of limbs of animals that contain other living beings (cf. Monadology secs. 70-71[L.651]) suggest this is so for the monads which are subordinate to the mind of what we should ordinarily regard as animals. However, I know of no place where Leibniz makes a similar claim about the constituent monads of inorganic bodies. And secondly, given the accounts of dominance that we have examined, it is far from clear how dominance differs, if at all from quasi-causation. Thus one might wonder whether dominance is an independent component of Leibniz's metaphysics or nothing more than the quasi-causal power that is possessed by certain monads over others, a power that we somewhat arbitrarily isolate by nominal definition, because the dominating monads include ourselves. 4.2. The appearance of interaction Before we consider the view that Leibniz most frequently puts forward on this topic we should first examine Nicholas Jolley's claim (1993, p.406) that it does not follow from the fact that the pre-established harmony prohibits the interaction of substances, that one substance (a mind) cannot interact with an aggregate of other substances (its body).97 Jolley does not expand on this claim, however, it seems problematic on the most obvious interpretations. If we read Leibniz's view of bodies in something like the way that was suggested above, then it is hard to see how interaction, as Leibniz understands this term, could occur between a substance and such a phenomenal being. As we have already seen, he does not even think that the 'more easily imaginable' interaction among substances is possible. But even if Jolley has, the incorrect, herd view of aggregation in mind here it is not clear how he thinks that mind and body could interact. One might think that the problems raised for intersubstantial causation generally can be avoided in situations involving such an aggregate since it is possible for something to join or leave the group. However, it is clear that the causal relation of a mind to its body cannot be of this kind, since this kind of interaction fails to preserve the distinctness of that which joins the aggregate and yet the mind does not become part of a body that it acts upon or vice versa. Alternatively we might regard the mind and body are parts of the same aggregate. But aside from the fact that this seems un-Leibnizian, it is not particularly helpful. For although there might be changes in the internal order of the members of such an aggregate, according

97

It does seem plausible to claim that a substance could interact with an aggregate of substances by

becoming a part of that aggregate (assuming an account of aggregate identity which is consistent with this).

However, it is far from clear how a mind could be thought to interact with the aggregate which was its own

body.


45

to various parameters,98 it is hard to see how they could be described as interactions between one part of the aggregate and the others. Thus, on even the most charitable reading it seems that Jolley's suggestion the mind-body interaction is possible must be rejected.99 So instead we shall turn to those commentators who attempt to provide explanations of how Leibniz accounts for the mere appearance of this phenomenon. John Cottingham (1988, p.145) illustrates the relationship between pre-established harmony and the apparent interaction between mind and body by invoking the famous 'clocks analogy' from the Second Explanation of the New System, Imagine two clocks or watches which are in perfect agreement. This agreement can come about in three ways. The first consists of a natural influence...The second method [the way of assistance] would be to have the two clocks continually supervised by a skilled craftsman who constantly sets them right. The third method [pre-established harmony] is to construct the two clocks so skillfully and accurately at the outset that one could be certain of their subsequent agreement.(G.IV.498[MP.131])100 Cottingham's gloss on Leibniz's description of the 'third method', is that, according to pre-established harmony, a ‘divine anticipatory artifice’ guarantees in creating mind and body ‘merely as a result of mind and body each following its own laws’(G.II.499[P.131]- italics added)101 that everything comes out as if there were influence. (ibid. p.146) Nicholas Jolley also emphasizes the nomological aspects of the apparent interaction between mind and body as follows. He tells us that on Leibniz's view: Although mind and body appear to interact, the metaphysical truth of the matter is that each is simply following its own laws: the body is acting in accordance with the laws of mechanism, the mind is acting in accordance with the laws of psychology.(1993, p.407) Thus, because 'mind and my body have been so programmed by God', when, for example '[one] form[s] the volition to raise [one's] hat, [one's] arm is ready to execute the appropriate movement.'(loc.cit.).102 Both Cottingham and Jolley leave the character of these laws unexplained. However, Benson Mates (1986, p.206) provides an interesting passage in this regard from an essay entitled How the Soul Acts on the Body. Therefore, if per impossible all minds were destroyed but the laws of nature continued to hold, everything would remain the same as if there were minds, and books would be

98

An obvious parameter of this kind is spatial location. However, given Leibniz's views on the ideality

of space and the fact that minds are not spatially located, this will not serve present purposes. But the kinds

of parameters which are acceptable, such as 'adequacy of perception' and 'degree of perfection' push the

metaphor of interaction way beyond its legitimate bounds of application.

99

We have not discussed the possibility that Jolley thinks that causal interaction could involve the

transfer of some kind of entity from mind to body (or vice versa), given Leibniz's absolute prohibition on

such accounts and which was discussed above in the section on the 'argument from elimination'.

100

This is also translated by Loemker (L.459).

101

L.460.

102

The metaphor of 'programming' is unfortunate here. Given Leibniz's views on the independence of

the realm of possibilities from God's actual decrees, it is misleading to suggest that God programmed a set

of substances so that they would relate to each other. Rather he chose to actualize such a set of individuals

whose possibility contained the fact they would be related in that way if they were actualized (cf.

G.VII.302-08[L.486-91]).


46

written and read by human machines which would not understand anything. Of course we know that it is impossible that the laws of mechanics should continue to hold in the absence of minds. For the laws of mechanics are the decrees of the divine will, and the special laws governing each body (which follow the general laws) are decrees of its soul or form, directed towards its good or perfection. Therefore, God is the mind that leads everything to general perfection. And the soul is that sentient force which in each individual tends towards its special perfection. For souls came into being when God impressed on each thing a tendency [conatus] towards its special perfection in order that from the resulting conflict the maximum possible perfection should arise. Everything that occurs in nature can be demonstrated both by final causes and by efficient causes. Nature does nothing in vain; nature acts by the shortest routes, provided that they are regular...Souls do not act in bodies extra ordinem. Nor does God so act in nature, even though some things do appear to occur extra ordinem, since from the beginning reality was so constituted that the general order will involve something extraordinary in the particular case (LH.IV.vi 12ff.,15[Fasz 1,#26, p.74];cf., Gr.266) Mates finds this passage ‘puzzling and unsatisfactory in several respects.’(ibid. p.207). He notes that we are asked to consider the realm of bodies if there were no minds, but suggests that such a situation seems so self-contradictory that there is no non-trivial criterion for deciding what would follow, and thus that the thought experiment is useless. Mates also puzzles over the fact that the passage suggests that the laws governing the body of a person/entity are the ‘decrees’ of the soul of that person/entity, but that they also follow from the laws of mechanics which are decrees of God. Mates claims that this leaves us with the somewhat counterintuitive conclusion that we, as souls, must be issuing a great many decrees of which we are totally unaware (loc.cit).103 But, these worries notwithstanding, Mates does discern a view that is contained within the passage, that helps us to gain some further insight into the laws which ground the appearance of mind-body interaction. Mates suggests that, on Leibniz's view, the body goes its way in accord with ‘physicomechanical’ laws whilst the mind develops according to ‘ethicological’ laws (G.III.657). Any appearance of interaction must therefore arise from the pre-established harmony between the states of the ‘mind’ monad and the states of the monads of ‘its’ body (loc.cit). George MacDonald Ross (1984, p.96) characterizes the difference between these two kinds of law-like change in terms of the distinction between efficient and final causation.104 Thus, changes in the material world are thought to have efficient causes which follow from the laws of mechanics, whereas changes in the 'mental world' of the perceptions of substances have final causes and follow their own goal-directed laws. Unfortunately, MacDonald Ross does not say very much about how we are really supposed to think of the 'laws of final causes' that govern the changes of monads. However, he does point out (loc.cit.) that every event is governed by both sets of laws, depending on whether it is considered as material or mental.105 And he suggests that it is in virtue of this that the

103

Although Mates finds this problematic, it is not entirely clear that Leibniz would insist that all of our

decrees are such that we are consciously aware of them. In many places (e.g., cf. Introduction to the New

Essays) Leibniz affirms the existence of unconscious perceptions and appetitions, and I no of no place

where he insists that the commands of all 'practical reasoning' must be issued at the level of awareness.

104

Lois Frankel also emphasizes this distinction (cf., Frankel 1989, pp.64-65).

105

MacDonald Ross is somewhat vague here and ignores the issue of how exactly an event can be

considered as both material and 'mental'. However, there since material phenomena are grounded in the


47

correlations required for the appearance of interaction are preserved. Thus MacDonald Ross claims that, in the case of human behavior, the final causes may be discerned by introspection in terms of a 'rational progression' whilst efficient causes accessible by appeal to the causal network governing the material world. And furthermore, due to the pre-established harmony of all substances, these explanations are parallel and allow for reliable psychophysical generalizations. 4.3. Ascriptions of causal relations between minds and bodies In dealing with Leibniz's account of the mind-body relation, most commentators address this third issue. Here C.D.Broad expresses the majority view eloquently when he suggests that Leibniz's account of the mind body relation is best seen as an application of 'the general principles [of pre-established harmony] to the particular case of a ruling monad and its organism.' in order to answer the following question: What is really happening in the ruling monad and in the monads of its organism when we say that a person's mind voluntarily produces a certain movement of his body or that an event in his body produces a certain sensation in his mind? (1975, p.122) The amount of detail in the answers that commentators give to this question varies a great deal. Louis Loeb simply states that the relationship between minds and what he calls their 'analogue' bodies is just a particular case of pre-established harmony which obtains among certain special sets of monads (Loeb 1981, p.298) and, in a similar vein, Stuart Brown suggests that 'the mind-body problem...is simply part of the more general problem of how substances can communicate with one another (1984, p.166).106 However other commentators provide far richer accounts, more often than not based upon an examination of two specific psychophysical occurrences, namely voluntary movement and sensation. Broad (1975, pp.122-24) provides what is clearly the most intricate account of this kind. He asks that we imagine a situation where he wills to move his arm in a certain way and thereupon it moves as he wished. Broad suggests that if we consider the mental component of this action, then according to Leibniz's theory, the volition must be caused by something in the previous state of the soul, and its effects must consist entirely in later changes of the same soul. Turning to the bodily component; if it is remembered that the body is a set of confused monads having a certain range of points of view, then it must be acknowledged

fundamental aspects of reality, namely monads and their perceptions, there is a sense in which the two may

be identified - although the exact nature of that relation is still a matter of dispute (cf., Hartz (1992); Adams

(1994, pp.217-262)).

106

Brown in fact goes into further detail (1984, p.166). He tells us that the Monadological mind-body

relation is a relation between a ‘dominant monad’ and mass of lower-order monads, where the lower-order

monads can both resist and respond to the will of their dominating monad. And he suggests that the unity of

such an organism is like that of the universe as a whole, i.e., a kind of political unity. Here Brown points to

Leibniz’s comparison of relation between God and the universe and a dominant monad and its body (cf.

G.VII..302[PW.136]). The idea being that, as the Universe as a whole, especially the rational beings, forms

a 'republic' under God, so the body is like a republic of monads answerable to the dominant monad.

Unfortunately, this is of little help. To say that the subordinate monads 'resist and respond' is little more than

an anthropomorphic and metaphorical description of the underlying causes of the phenomena which

constitute the appearance of the mind-body relation. And the analogy with the 'divine republic' is even

further removed from the explanation which Broad's question demands.


48

that the perceived motion in Broad's arm is really just a change in the points of view of the 'arm-monads', which must, in turn, be caused by some previous state of each of those monads (ibid., pp.122-23).107 Broad then goes on to give a more complex articulation of this process. He suggests that we think of the act of deliberation d in his mind as corresponding to contemporary changes c1, c2, ... in each subordinate monad m1, m2, ... of the organism, where: change c1 in m1, causes a change in point of view from p1 to p1' change c2 in m2, causes a change in point of view from p2 to p2' etc..... Process d also causes a change in the mind which constitutes a change in its perception of the 'arm-monads' so that from appearing to be Broad's arm at s1 they appear be his arm at s2 (where s1 and s2 are different spatial locations). Thus, a purely immanent causal process in the mind leads to the change in his perceptions. At the same time, in the arm-monads, simultaneous changes c1, c2, ... lead to changes in their points of view which are perceived by Broad. And, by pre-established harmony, c1, c2, ... correspond to d, changes p1-->p1' and p2-->p2' etc. correspond to the change from Broad's perception of the monads as his arm at s1 to his perception of the monads as his arm at s2. The account that Broad sketches is based solely on the correspondence between the contemporaneous perceptions of a particular set of monads, and, as Broad indicates, the 'opposite case' where, for example a painful sensation is produced by a pin-prick, can be accounted for in a similar way (ibid. p.123). Thus, we could have equally included this part of his account in our examination of the appearance of interaction. However, Broad also notes that voluntary movement and subjection to painful stimuli are importantly different phenomena, and that this is reflected in the everyday distinction which is drawn between activity and passivity. Furthermore, it is in order to explain our ascriptions of activity/passivity to minds and bodies that he develops the previous apparatus. As Broad observes, the difference between activity and passivity poses a prima facie difficulty for the Leibnizian account presented so far.108 For if we consider voluntary motion and subjection to pain from the perspective of the one who wills or feels pain, both are caused in the same way, i.e., by previous states of the mind of that individual.109

107

Here Broad continually speaks of intramonadic causation as though it were to be explained in terms

of a series of states which have previous states as their efficient cause. For a critique of this view and a case

for the more plausible claim that substances are the direct causes of all the natural modifications see Bobro

and Clatterbaugh (unpublished). However, it should be conceded that Broad's account does not require

much revision in the light of these complaints.

108

There is a certain degree of overlap between the accounts considered here and the more general

treatments of quasi-causation above. However, I have chosen to produce a free-standing account for two

reasons. Firstly, we have so far looked at the 'quasi-causal' relations between substances. Therefore, it is

safer not to assume that what is said by one commentator in this regard will carry over to the relation

between minds and bodies, given that bodies are not substances. And secondly many of the commentators

provide explanations which make essential reference to the psychophysical aspects of these causal

attributions which illustrate the issues far more clearly than would be possible through attempting to apply

their comments about quasi-causation to the issues at hand.

109

Again this only follows if we assume Broad's account of intrasubstantial causation. Though a similar

objection could be raised if the substance is thought to be the cause of states of willing and states of painful

sensing. The remainder of Broad's account clearly requires similar modification if his account of

intrasubstantial causation is abandoned.


49

However, appearances notwithstanding Broad claims that we can understand the activity and passivity of such individuals on Leibniz's view. Using the example of one who is hit by a flying stone and feels immediate pain, he notes that, given the pre-established harmony, the sensation must be wholly due to some previous state of the person's mind. But Broad also points out that such a person cannot detect this causally active state by introspection or retrospection, and that we can safely assume that there is only a very confused perception of it. Broad suggests that this is what forms the basis for Leibniz's more general account of passivity, according to which an individual is: said to be passive in any change when a distinct and noticeable change in [that person's mind] mind is caused by some factor in a previous state which is too faint or confused for [her] to detect and discriminate by memory or introspection.' (ibid., p.123)110 In order to present the corresponding account of activity, Broad considers the deliberate throwing of a stone (ibid., p.123-24). He points out that, as previously, all that can really attend this voluntary effort is the production of a change in the protagonist's perceptions. The changes in the perceived monads which constitute the stone etc. are caused by their own past states. However, unlike in the previous case, the stone thrower can introspect and discriminate the cause of the change in her perceptions, viz. her voluntary effort. In this case and in those others where the cause of changes in perception can be discriminated by a given substance, Leibniz, according to Broad, claims activity for the substance in question. (ibid., p.124) The existence of these two factors in the mind-body relation, i.e., the changes in monadic perception which account for the appearance of interaction, and the attributions of quasi-causal efficacy which account for the differences between volition and sensation, is not expressed as clearly by any of the other Leibniz commentators. Although, essentially the same features occur in other accounts,111 there are distinguishing features that make it worthwhile considering two of these in some detail. Thus, Bertrand Russell notes that, although there is no real interaction between mind and body the appearance of it results from the pre-established harmony, [since] in so far as the soul has clear perceptions, the reasons for what happens in the body are to be found in the soul; and in this sense the soul acts on the body. (1937, p.140). This account is only the briefest of sketches, but Russell does attempt to elaborate concerning some of the more important the details. As we have already seen (in section 6), Russell suggests that monads are said to be active or passive in relation to the clearness of their perceptions and that, according to Leibniz, we can 'still popularly speak of one substance acting on another...when a change in one the explains a change in another' (ibid. p.141; cf. G.IV.486[Latta.317]). Given this and the observations that: [T]he domination and subordination of monads, considered in the monads themselves, consists only in the degrees of their perfections (G.II.451)

110

Clearly then Broad's account applies only to activity and passivity in rational substances and is

inadequate to account for the mind-body relation in 'lower' animals.

111

For other, much briefer, variations on this theme cf. Stuart Brown (1984, p.168); and MacDonald

Ross (1984, p.66).


50

and Modifications of one monad are the ideal causes of those of another, in so far as the reasons appear in some monad which led God in the beginning to arrange for the modifications of the other. (G.II.475) Russell concludes that, for Leibniz, the body depends on the mind insofar as the reason for what happens in the body is found in the mind. Thus, 'insofar as the soul is perfect, and has clear perceptions, the body is subject to it, and insofar as the soul is imperfect, it is subject to the body.' (1937, p.141; cf., G.VI.138).112 As Russell observes Leibniz's theory fits comfortably with our intuitions. However he does warn that 'it would be unwise to see too close a relation' (1937, p.143). For in volition, where we ordinarily take ourselves to be active, the change in our mental state is perceived to be what it really is i.e., determined from within by our nature. Whereas in sensation, where we ordinarily take ourselves to be passive we confusedly, and wrongly, perceive ourselves as externally determined. Catherine Wilson (1989, p.111) presents a very similar account when she insists that wherever individual substances are involved in situations that would be described using via 'causal talk' e.g., voluntary motion and perception, it is important to understand what is going on in terms of Leibniz's account of intersubstantial 'activity' [i.e., quasi-causation]. Relying on the draft of the letter to Arnauld of 28 November /8 December 1686 where Leibniz says: One has good reason to say...that my will is the cause of this movement of my arm and that an interruption in the continuity of the matter of my body is the cause of the pain, for the one expresses distinctly what the other expresses more confusedly.(G.II.71[M.154])113 Wilson suggests that we understand pain (and presumably others sensations) as 'the confused expression of something distinctly expressed by the interruption of bodily continuity'; volition as that which occurs when the will 'expresses distinctly what a movement of the body expresses only approximately or indistinctly'; and, more generally, that we ascribe to ourselves 'those phenomena which we express more perfectly.' (ibid. p.112). Wilson claims that we must take this to mean that, despite the fact that, as substances, we express the entire universe, we ascribe sensations that we experience distinctly to our own persons. Unfortunately there are a number of points here which are, at best, unclear and perhaps just plain confused. Wilson suggests that when we feel the sensation of pain, we regard ourselves as quasi-causally affected on the basis of our 'confused expression of something

112

Stuart Brown (1984, p.167) gives essentially the same account of the mind-body relation. Following

(G.VII.312[P.79]) where Leibniz says 'that whose expression is more distinct is judged to act, and that

whose expression is more confused is judged to be passive...' Brown says that, according to Leibniz, in

willed actions, the subject 'acts' and not the body, because changes in expression occur in a subject which

has more distinct perceptions; whereas with sensation, the subject 'receives' impressions from body because

the changes occur in a subject whose perceptions are relatively confused.

113

Wilson's translation is taken from Montgomery (1902, p.154). The reference for the Mason

translation is LA.87.


51

distinctly expressed by the interruption of bodily continuity' (loc.cit.). But it is hard to see how the body which is a phenomena could be thought to express anything, let alone distinctly. Admittedly, the quotation she provides invites this reading. But, it is surely more plausible to think that if Leibniz regards the body as 'expressing' the universe, this is only in a derivative sense based upon the fact that the substances that ground that phenomenon are naturally expressive. In addition, Wilson's claim that we 'ascribe sensations that we distinctly experience to our own persons' is somewhat perplexing. Firstly, it is far from clear that the notion of a 'distinctly expressed sensation' makes sense at all, given what Wilson has just said concerning the distinction between voluntary action and pain. There it emerged that confused expression was constitutive of pain (and presumably other sensations). But, even ignoring this, Wilson appears to be making a contrastive point here without it being at all clear where the contrast is supposed to lie. Her point may be that we regard the more distinct of our confused expressions as our sensations rather than as the sensations of others, or she may still be trying to contrast those states that we regard as our actions from those in which we take ourselves to be patients. But whatever idea lies behind Wilson's comments here, it is clear that these issues surrounding self-ascription require more explanation than she has given them. 4.4. The intimate union of mind and body As Donald Rutherford points out (1995, pp.130-31) both the title and content of Leibniz's New System 'advance the theory of pre-established harmony as an explanation not only of the apparent communication of the [mind] and the body, but also of their union.' We have already seen a little of how Leibniz seeks to justify our claims that certain bodies 'belong to' certain minds and how he seeks to explain our ascriptions of causal relations between them. However, this notion is somewhat stronger. For, as Rutherford notes, the claim that mind and body form a 'union' is to regard them as 'together forming one entity: a single human being, plant or animal.' (ibid. p.131). And it is far from clear that either mutual quasi-causation or the 'possession' of one entity by another are sufficient grounds for such an intimate connection. The Aristotelian hylomorphism that seems to be present in Leibniz's early philosophy114 provide a ready solution to the problem of mind-body union. If the 'mind'115 is regarded as the form of the human being, plant or animal and its body as the matter, then the existence of animate substances is dependent upon and constituted by the union of both components. However, in the later philosophy, with the human mind construed as a simple substance, or monad, Leibniz is left with a different situation. For, as we have already seen, on this ontology, the relation between mind and body is a relation between one substance (the mind) and an infinite number of other substances (those which ground the phenomena which constitute the body). The problem then arises as to how such an infinite collection of substances can come to constitute one entity.

114

Commentators such as Garber (1985) and Loeb (1981) would clearly extend this unproblematic

phase much further. I confess to leaving the time frame for my attribution to Leibniz of such Aristotelian

elements deliberately vague. However, I favor the view supported by Robert Adams (1993, 1994 pp.308-

38) that by the time of the Discourse (1686) Leibniz had adopted his monadological ontology and that talk

of form and matter after this time is to be construed non-realistically.

115

Here I continue my use of the term mind for the sake of continuity, even though 'soul' is far more

appropriate when non-rational but animate beings are under discussion.


52

As Dasie Radner observes (1994, p.350), the same problem plagues Descartes earlier in the same century. As a 'solution' Descartes at least sometimes, considers the notion of mind-body union as primitive and refuses to analyze it any further. Thus, he tells Princess Elizabeth: What belongs to the union of the soul and the body can be known only obscurely by pure intellect or by the intellect aided by imagination, but it can be known very clearly by the senses.(K.141) However, it is clear that Leibniz does not wish to take this route. Thus, as Rutherford notes, in the Discourse, despite claiming that the mind has a special 'presence' in the body and that it interacts with other bodies through the 'instrumentality' of that body, Leibniz seems content to ground this by appealing to the pre-established harmony of the perceptions of the mind and the states of the body (1995, p.131). Rutherford questions the extent to which Leibniz thinks this modest claim (in fact no stronger than his account of the appearance of interaction) can 'support the thesis that the [mind] and its body together form an unum per se or corporeal substance.'(loc.cit.). However, evidence from the Arnauld correspondence suggests that at least, in the late 1680's, Leibniz does think he has provided such an account. Here Leibniz claims that the mind is 'the form of its body because it is an expression of the phenomena in accordance with their relation to its own' (G.II.58[LA.65-66]) and that this form is able to confer 'substantial unity' on what is otherwise only an unum per accidens (G.II.76[LA94]) or 'unity of aggregation' (G.II.100[LA.125]).116 However, by the time of the New System of 1695, Rutherford claims to find an 'open admission that the only true entities are unextended, soul-like forms' (1995, p.131). It is true that Leibniz continues to talk of corporeal substances, by which he means a soul-like form and an organic body. But Rutherford insists that 'there is no indication that he [Leibniz] regards such...composites as full-fledged substances' (loc.cit.). Instead, the 'soul-like form, which is a true entity, unites the plurality that is its organic body simply by representing that plurality of things as a single entity that is subordinated to it' (loc.cit - italics mine; cf., G.IV.485[L.458]). And, at the deepest metaphysical level, there is no real thing that corresponds to our experiences of persistent embodied creatures. The unity of such organism resides solely in the representative powers of minds. Robert Adams also recognizes passages in writings that date from the 1690's where Leibniz explains the union of mind and body that constitutes a corporeal substance as arising from 'relations of harmony among the perceptions of the substances involved in the union' (Adams 1994, pp.292-93).117 Adams suggests that this kind of account is exactly as we might expect, given Leibniz's idealism. However, unlike Rutherford, he does not thereby concede that 'the unity of a corporeal substances is of the same kind as the merely accidental unity of an aggregate.' (ibid. p.293). Instead, Adams claims that 'the scholastic tradition

116

As Rutherford notes (1995, p.166 n.22), Leibniz often prefers to advance his views in a disjunction

of the form 'either there are corporeal substances of this kind or bodies are mere phenomena'. However, it

should also be remarked; firstly, that human beings are held to be an exception to this, perhaps because, as

Leibniz notes, the fifth Lateran council had pronounced that 'the soul is truly the substantial form of our

body' (G.II.75[LA.93]); and secondly, that by October 1687, Leibniz appears more comfortable with the

idea that there are innumerable substantial forms (cf. G.II.118[LA.151-52]).

117

Adams cites G.IV.573 and FC.320[AG.104] in support. However, he also suggests that this account

is implicit in section 33 of the Discourse (LG.56-57) and the letter to Arnauld of 4/14 July 1686

(G.II.58[LA.65]).


53

affords Leibniz a way out of this difficulty which he seems to have envisaged at least once.' (loc.cit.). The basis for this way out is the medieval idea that a composite being can have per se unity provided that each of its components are incomplete,118 which we can see clearly in the following passage from Suarez, who counts as a certainty: regarding composite being...that there can truly and properly be a being per se and [something] one per se, as all philosophers teach regarding the substantial nature, insofar as it consists of matter and form...For since neither matter nor form per se are complete and whole entities in their kind, but are by their nature but are by their nature compose that which is immediately composed of them, the essence or nature is rightly called one per se. (MD. IV,iii,8) Here it may appear that Suarez simply adopts and Aristotelian account of corporeal substance. However, according to Adams (1994, p293), Suarez's views are importantly different from Aristotelian hylomorphism, since he regards matter and substantial form as substances that could exist apart, at least by divine power,119 but which are nonetheless incomplete given their natural aptitude for one another.120 Adams points out that this idea appears again in Descartes121 and that it is certainly available to Leibniz. And, furthermore, he claims that there are passages in which Leibniz treats mind and body as incomplete beings 'since one is never naturally without the other' (G.IV.572ff.).122 Thus, Adams believes 'the way is open' for Leibniz to regard corporeal substances, which are 'composed of' a simple substance (the mind) and an infinite collection of other simple substances (the body), as one per se in virtue of the incompleteness of the these constituents without one another, and their natural aptitude for their interrelation (1994, p.294).123 Unfortunately, Adams must concede that Leibniz never actually says that this is his view. However, Adams suggests that 'the most important text on this point does begin with the per se unity of 'the complete corporeal Substance' being closely associated with the incompleteness of its constituents.'(loc.cit.; cf., G.IV.572) And on the basis of this, he appears to favor the thesis that Leibniz at least entertains such a view, and expresses puzzlement that he does not make more use of it, given that 'it seems...the best account of the unity of corporeal substance suggested by Leibniz's writings of the 1680' and 1690's [and that] it fits elegantly both his own metaphysics and some important Scholastic accounts of per se unity.' (loc.cit.).

118

Adams suggests this idea dates back to the thirteenth century and recommends Marilyn McCord

Adams' book William Ockham (1987, pp.664-69) in this regard.

119

Adams cites Metaphysical Disputations MD.XV, v,1-2; ix, 1-3) as support.

120

Adams discusses this theory of corporeal substance in greater detail elsewhere (cf.,1994, pp.269-74).

121

Cf, AT III, 459ff.;VII,222. Adams notes that Descartes veracity in the former text (from a letter to

Regius) was questioned even in the seventeenth century. However, he also suggests that Leibniz chose to

accept the opinion as genuine, as he largely approved of its content (cf., NE.317ff.).

122

Again see Adams (1994, pp.269-74) for argument in support of this claim.

123

As Adams points out (1994, p.294), this account of the union of mind and body should not be

regarded as distinct from the one which we have already discussed based purely on the pre-established

harmony of perceptions. Instead, it should be viewed as a supplement to the 'harmony of perceptions' view

that allows Leibniz to make sense of the notion of per se unity between distinct substances, in virtue of the

fact that the relations amongst them can plausibly be seen as constituting a 'natural aptitude' for one another.


54

Even if Adams' 'supplemented version' was entertained by Leibniz, it was his 'bare' pre-established harmony account of mind-body union, that became best known to his contemporaries, largely through the publication of the New System in 1695. This view not only runs counter to common sense, but goes against what was church orthodoxy at the time,124 and particularly because of the latter, Leibniz found himself facing strong opposition in the form of the Jesuit Rene-Joseph de Tournemine some years later. In his paper Conjectures sur l'Union de l'Ame et du Corps,125 Tournemine praises the pre-established harmony as an improvement on occasionalism, but complains of the lack of an adequate explanation of the union of mind and body. He observes that no amount of harmony can provide the true unity which is required for an adequate account of the nature of human beings. Donald Rutherford describes Leibniz's response to Tournemine as 'a masterly exercise in diplomacy' (1995, p.155), and it is worth quoting at length: Father Tournemine has spoken of me so obligingly...that it would be wrong of me to complain that he attributes to me an objection against the Cartesians which I do not remember having made, an objection which can clearly be turned against me. However, I declare that if I did ever make it, I renounce it from now on, and would have made the following assertion instead, if I had not been so tardy in noticing the passage [i.e., Tournemine's complaint].126 I must admit that it would have been very wrong of me to object to the Cartesians that the agreement God immediately maintains, according to them, between the soul and the body does not bring about a true union, since to be sure, my pre-established harmony would do no better than it does. My intent was to explain naturally what they explain by perpetual miracles, and I tried to account for the phenomena, that is for the relation that is perceived between the soul and the body. But since the metaphysical union one adds is not a phenomenon, and since no one has ever given an intelligible notion of it, I did not take it upon myself to seek a reason for it. However, I do not deny that there is something having this nature. (G.VI.595[AG.196-97]- italics added) Both Adams (1994, p.295) and Rutherford (1995, p.156) express surprise, and a degree of suspicion at Leibniz's 'not remembering' that his claimed that his views account better for the union of mind and body than that of the Cartesians (i.e., occasionalists). For he says precisely this in the New System only a decade earlier. Indeed, as Adams indicates (loc.cit.), in this work, Leibniz claims that the pre-established harmony has two features that make it superior to occasionalism in this regard (cf., G.IV.482ff.[L.457ff.]); (1) the soul and its organic body are 'complete perfect and peculiarly direct expressions of each other' (Adams, loc.cit.); and (2) the pre-established harmony imposes the requirement that if either the soul or body exists then so must the other.127

124

See note 31 above.

125

This paper was published in the journal, edited at this time by Tournemaine, Memoires pour

l'Histoire des Sciences et des Beaux Artes (commonly called the Memoires to Trevoux) in May 1703

(pp.864-75). For Leibniz's account of the objection and his response cf. G.VI.595-96[AG.196-97].

126

As Adams points out (1994, p.295), Leibniz did not actually read Tournemaine's essay until some

time after its publication and probably did not sent his reply until about two years after the criticisms

initially appeared.

127

Adams suggests (1994, p.295-6) that this is an implicit appeal to the 'incomplete being' supplement

described above.


55

But whether we regard Leibniz's report of his New System view as disingenuous or not, it is clear in his reply to Tournemine, that he wishes to distance himself from the idea that the pre-established harmony provides an adequate account of the union of mind and body. Thus, we find Leibniz; (a) denying that such a union is a phenomenon; and either (b) insisting that the notion is not included in his philosophical approach to the mind-body relation, since it has not been made intelligible;128 or (c) acknowledging that there may be something in the universe (i.e., a metaphysical relation of 'union' between mind and body) which is unintelligible, and thus lies beyond the scope of his philosophy. Adams (1994, p.296) and Rutherford (1995, pp.156-57) agree that Leibniz was unwavering in his belief that there was no intelligible union of mind and body over and above their pre-established harmony. Thus, Rutherford suggests that 'The contents of the De Volder correspondence,129 strongly suggest that while Leibniz is not prepared to outright deny the existence of metaphysical union, he also recognizes no positive grounds for asserting it.' (1995, p.157). However, there is another notorious aspect to Leibniz's views on this matter, namely whether he is prepared to endorse the idea that metaphysical union is one of the class of truths which, whilst not contrary to it, are nonetheless 'above reason' (Cf., Theodicy, Prelim. Discourse sec.23). Amongst this class of truths Leibniz includes the 'mysteries' such as Creation, the Trinity, Incarnation and the Eucharist: Dogmas of religion that do not directly contradict reason and yet require faith in order that they may be believed. The question we must ask ourselves then, is whether Leibniz thinks that the existence of a metaphysical union between mind and body may be taken as an article of faith despite regarding it is unintelligible. Rutherford and Adams both point to evidence in favor of this view. In the reply to Tournemine, Adams (1994, p.296) locates the following remarks which seem to allow for the assimilation of union to the truths of religion known by faith alone: It is as in the mysteries where we also try to elevate what we cannot conceive in the ordinary course of creatures to something more sublime that can correspond to it in relation to the Divine Nature and Power, without being able to conceive there anything distinct to form a totally intelligible definition (G.VI.596[AG.197]). But at the same time, Adams suggests that Leibniz may regard this as an option open to those, such as Tournemine who feel a need for a metaphysical relation of union in order that they may preserve certain religious beliefs, without necessarily endorsing the view himself (1994, p.296). Rutherford (1995, p.157-58) provides yet further support for the claim that Leibniz held the union of mind and body to be a religious mystery, with the following passage from the Theodicy in which, according to Rutherford (loc.cit.), Leibniz comes 'very close' to asserting a metaphysical union: We also mean something when we speak of a union of the soul with the body to make thereof one single person. For although I do not hold that the soul changes the laws of the body, or that the body changes the laws of the soul...I nevertheless admit a true union

128

Adams suggests (ibid. p.296), and probably quite rightly, that Leibniz is really attempting to imply

the metaphysical absurdity of such a union, but in a tactful way. Hence, perhaps, Rutherford's praise for

Leibniz's diplomacy (1995, p.156).

129

In particular, the letter of January 19, 1706 (G.II.281-839L.538-39]).


56

between the soul and body which make a suppositum out of them. This union belongs to the metaphysical, whereas a union of influence would belong to the physical. (Theodicy Prelim. Discourse, sec.55) But although Rutherford suggests that 'on the basis of the Theodicy alone, we would have to conclude that Leibniz is, in fact quite sympathetic to the idea of a metaphysical union' (1995, p.158), he does not regard this work as providing our best guide in this regard. After all, it is largely a work of Christian apologetics. Both Rutherford and Adams appeal to the correspondences with De Volder and des Bosses in further investigating the issue of whether Leibniz really accepts a metaphysical union. However, we shall not pursue their discussions any further here largely because of the amount of space which such a treatment would require. However, we can clearly say, on the basis of what has been considered, that Leibniz recognizes a gap between the pre-established harmony of mind and body and the notion of substantial union, inherited from Aritstotelianism and adopted by the fifth Lateran council as the official Catholic view of human nature. Thus the pre-established harmony is not the only consideration which Leibniz brings to bear when he deals with the relation between mind and body. Furthermore, although we have not followed the discussions of Adams or Rutherford through to their conclusion, it is perhaps worth noting that, by the ends of these discussions, both commentators favor the idea that, despite a good deal of pondering and the introduction of his infamous vinculum substantiale (Cf. G.II.399 for its first appearance), Leibniz ultimately rejects the idea of a metaphysical. And, although Adams is certainly right when he points out that Leibniz's conciliatory aims often cloud his pronouncements on these issues (1994, p.307). As Rutherford suggests, this ultimate reduction of mind-body union to the pre-established harmony of a particular set of substances 'is exactly what we should expect given [Leibniz's] deep and abiding commitment to the ideality of relations' (1995, p.162). In this section we covered the four main aspects of the mind-body relation with which Leibniz is concerned, paying special attention to the role of the pre-established harmony. It should be apparent that a number of issues deserve further attention than we have given. Some of the more important include; the nature of monadic dominance and its relation to mind body quasi-causation; the connection between the 'ethicological' laws of the mind and the 'physicomechanical' laws of the body; the relation between physical and mental causes in psychophysical processes such as volition and sensation; and the importance of the notion of mind-body union in Leibniz's philosophy. Yet again the commentators provide us with a solid foundation with their treatment of these issues, but leave a good deal of scope for further clarification.


57

5. Leibniz's contemporaries and their criticisms of pre-established harmony

Leibniz's exchanges with his contemporaries are an enormously rich and important source of information about his ideas on many topics, philosophy included. In attempting to explain and justify his ideas to some of the most eminent persons of the seventeenth century, Leibniz frequently finds himself clarifying and modifying his views. Because of this, the correspondences with figures such as Arnauld are at least as important for our understanding of Leibniz’s views on a number of topics, as more famous works such as the Discourse and Monadology. A recurring theme in these debates is the pre-established harmony. It was subject to criticisms by a number of prominent philosophers and Leibniz expended a good deal of effort in trying to respond. For this reason we shall devote the final section of our review to an examination of the criticisms of Leibniz’s contemporaries that have received attention in the secondary literature and the replies that they received from the author of pre-established harmony himself. However, before we begin our discussion a preliminary warning should be sounded. It is unfortunate that most of the discussions which Leibniz has with his correspondents treat the pre-established harmony as a solution to problems surrounding the relation between mind and body. This gives rise to two distinct concerns. Firstly, it is far from clear that the true subtlety of Leibniz's views ever emerges in a way that allows for them to be properly examined by his able critics. But, in addition, the radical differences between the ontologies of Leibniz and his opponents sometimes make it difficult to discern exactly what is at issue between the various parties. But these worries, notwithstanding, we shall endeavor to present the debates in which Leibniz engages over the pre-established harmony and surrounding with Simon Foucher, Antoine Arnauld and Pierre Bayle as they have been treated by recent commentators. 5.1 The criticisms of Simon Foucher (a) Pre-established harmony is ad hoc According to Stuart Brown, Simon Foucher makes 'one of the most trenchant criticisms of Leibniz's New System' when he suggests that the pre-established harmony of mind and body 'ha[s] a distinctly ad hoc character.' (1984, p.162-63). Brown presents this criticism as it is found in the so-called First Explanation of the New System,130 where it reads as follows: In truth, sir, can we not see that these views are formed with a set purpose, and that these systems coming after the event, have only been manufactured to save certain principles? (G.IV.496[MP.128])

130The First Explanation is a reply to Foucher's criticisms published by Leibniz, in the Journal des

Savants, along with the original letter from Foucher (cf. G.I.426 for Foucher's letter).


58

As Brown observes, Leibniz is unable to see the force of this complaint. He tells Foucher that 'All hypotheses are formed with a set purpose...and all systems come after the event to save phenomena or appearances' and professes that he cannot see the principles in favor of which he is said to be ‘prejudiced’(loc.cit.). Brown suggests that we understand Foucher's point as based on Leibniz’s 'exaggeration of his own agreement with the 'Cartesians' (Occasionalists).' (1984, p.163). For, it is on the basis of Leibniz's account of his own view that Foucher believes both he and the occasionalists are ‘prejudiced’ in holding that mind-body interaction is impossible, since the two have 'nothing in common' (loc.cit.). In Foucher’ mind it is only such a prejudice that prevents the solution of the mind-body problem via a better understanding of interaction than that offered by Descartes, perhaps by through the development of an account that Foucher perceives as having Augustinian authority (loc.cit). From the considerations above, it is clear that the two men fail to engage with each other over the issues that Foucher is trying to raise here. But, as Brown points out, (loc.cit.) having dismissed what he sees as the most 'obvious' reading, Leibniz is not content to attribute this apparently trivial objection to Foucher. Instead, he attempts to find an alternate and more charitable account of these criticisms, after insisting that there is no real prejudice on his part (i.e., after missing the point) as follows: If this means that I am led to my hypothesis by a priori reasons also, or by fixed principles, as is in fact that case, this is rather a commendation of the hypothesis than an objection to it. It commonly suffices for a hypothesis to be proved a posteriori, because it satisfies the phenomena; but when we have other reasons as well, and those a priori, so much the better (G.IV.496[P.128]) Here Foucher, inadvertently coaxes Leibniz into making what Brown describes as 'an important methodological remark' (1984, p.163). Brown suggests that here Leibniz is claiming; (1) that certain phenomena,131 may be such that there are no a posteriori grounds for choosing between competing metaphysical theories that seek to explain them; and consequently that (2) in such domains, a priori reasons may have to be advanced in order to justify one theory over another. As Brown notes, there is nothing particularly odd about this stance. After all, many successful theories in science are ultimately preferred on a priori grounds.132 And he suggests (loc.cit.) that Leibniz regards pre-established harmony and mind-body interaction as metaphysical counterparts to competing scientific theories such as Copernican and Ptolemaic astronomy; in each case both members of the pair save the respective phenomena, but one is a priori preferable. Although it is not offered in direct response to Foucher’s real criticisms, this methodological point helps illuminate the issues that separate the two further. For although Foucher is prepared to describe Leibniz's unwillingness to entertain 'interaction' as a possible solution to the mind-body problem as a prejudice, we have already seen that Leibniz believes himself to have a number of a priori arguments that mitigate against intersubstantial

131

E.g., what we ordinarily call ‘cause’ and ‘effect’, and those relating to mind-body interaction, such as

the fact that ‘the soul has its seat in the body by an immediate presence which could not be closer than it is’

(G.IV.485[MP.123]).

132

As an example from Leibniz's own time, Brown (1984, p.163) offers the Copernican theory of the

heavens which was preferred to the Ptolemaic theory for some time on nothing other than the a priori

grounds of simplicity.


59

causation in general, and Cartesian mind-body interaction in particular. Thus, had Leibniz interpreted Foucher's criticisms correctly, it is clear that he would have had a number of things to say in response. So although he does not directly address the concern that Foucher raises, it perhaps fair to say that Leibniz provides all the information required to understand how he views this objection. (b) Pre-established harmony is counter-intuitive Following Richard Watson, John Cottingham (1988, p.146) mentions a slightly different concern that is expressed by Foucher as follows: What is the point of this complex organization between substances? [ie.pre-established harmony]. It seems that the only thing it achieves is to make us firmly believe that substances interact with each other, despite the fact that [on your view] this is precisely what does not occur.133 Cottingham suggests the problem to which Foucher draws attention here is the fact that Leibniz’s denial of causal interaction but instance on concomitance, is counter-intuitive.134 However, it seems that Foucher is really raising a slightly different point, and more interesting point. Pace Cottingham, I contend that rather than asking why we should follow Leibniz in explaining common sense phenomena in such an odd way, Foucher is wondering why God would set up the world so that it looked just as if there were interaction, without there actually being any present. To solve this interpretative issue, we need to go back to the original texts which would go beyond the scope of our present concerns. thus we shall say no more about it here. However, it seems reasonable to think that there may be more to this exchange between Foucher and Leibniz than has been hitherto realized.135 (c) Pre-established harmony is just occasionalism 'with all the adjustments made at once' For the sake of completeness, we should also mention another objection which Woolhouse (1986, p.69) attributes to Foucher. He tells us that Foucher characterizes pre-established harmony as 'nothing more than Malebranchean occasionalism with all the adjustments made at once' and suggests that 'it constitutes no real improvement over his [i.e.,

133

Cited in Watson (1987 p.137).

134

Watson appears to offer no explanation at all (loc.cit.).

135

However, it is perhaps worth speculating about a couple of issues which may surround such a worry

if it is an appropriate reading of Foucher's intent. Firstly, it would surely be reasonable for one as well-

versed in Cartesian philosophy such as Foucher, to at least wonder why God would create a world so

counter-intuitive. But at the same time there is the possibility that Leibniz might wish to respond by

insisting that, due to our finite nature, it is only through the use of the, admittedly imperfect, categories of

intersubstantial cause and effect that we can understand the world to the degree which is necessary for

leading a good life (see section 4.2 above, p.65n.41).


60

Malebranche's] occasionalism.'136 Unfortunately, Woolhouse says nothing more about this attack or whether Leibniz responded directly to it. However, since this issue was also raised by Arnauld, we shall have ample opportunity to examine Leibniz's attitude to the problem itself below. 5.2 The criticisms of Antoine Arnauld (a) Some weak arguments concerning psychophysical causes Robert Sleigh (1990a, p.147ff.) provides us with a number of criticisms that Arnauld raises against the pre-established harmony, or concomitance.137 Before moving on to the more significant complaints, we shall consider two objections which are based on Arnauld's intuitions about psychophysical causation. Sleigh (1990a, p.147) begins by outlining two examples that Arnauld uses to make his points: (E1) Arnauld is wounded in the arm (i.e., changes in his arm are accompanied by feeling of pain in his soul), he knows of the wound only through the pain, and without the wound there would be no pain at all (cf. G.II.64-65[LA.77-79]). (E2) Arnauld wanted to take off his hat (i.e., his soul had a certain wish and this is accompanied by bodily change), his arm had no cognitive mechanism to allow it to be informed about the soul's wishes (G.II.85[LA.106]), and had Arnauld not wished it to do so, the arm would not have moved (LA.65[78-79]). Sleigh then proceeds explain (loc.cit.) how Arnauld puts these examples to use in criticizing Leibniz's theory of concomitance. Beginning with (E1), Arnauld recognizes that, for Leibniz, there can be no causal interaction between body and soul and that this leaves another event in the soul as the only plausible candidate as the cause of pain. Having noted this, Arnauld asks rhetorically: But what reply can you make to those who object that it would then be necessary for the soul to know that its body is indisposed before being sad about it; whereas it appears that it is the pain that warns it that its body is indisposed? (G.II.65[LA.79]) Sleigh points out that this objection occurs in the context of a consideration of Augustine's theory of pain as a sadness of the soul in virtue of distress to its body. Sleigh points out that this was 'a familiar stalking horse in the seventeenth century' (loc.cit), and receives a limited defence from Leibniz (G.II.70-71[LA.85-88])). But he also notes that, rather than developing this intuition about the primacy of the sensation of pain in the etiology of our awareness of its causes, Arnauld's argument 'peters out' in a rather unfortunate way, especially given that

136

Woolhouse's reference is to Watson's edition of Simon Foucher: Critique de la Recherche de la

Verite (New York, 1969. p.xxv). However, since this reference is to the introduction of that book it is

unclear whether the quote is from Watson or Foucher (and I don’t have the book!). 137

This is the term most commonly used to refer to Leibniz’s doctrine during the Arnauld correspondence.


61

Leibniz has no problem with the claim that pain is caused by some preceding event in the soul. For as it stands all we have here is a bald assertion that Leibniz has violated a common sense assumption about the cause of pain. But not only is he clearly aware of this, Leibniz also has a barrage of reasons for thinking that it is only by disregarding such intuitions that we can provide an intelligible account of the metaphysics of the mind-body relation. According to Sleigh, (E2) is important for Arnauld's purposes because he takes it to imply not only that the causal history of a bodily (mental) event may include a mental (bodily) event, but that a bodily event such as an arm raising includes mental events essentially (1990a, p.148). He claims that Arnauld takes the counterfactual claim 'If I had not willed it, my arm would not have raised.' to be inconsistent with the claim that the extended causal history of an arm raising need only advert to physical events. However, Sleigh also includes Leibniz's answer to this objection, which is somewhat short and sweet. It is found in the marginal notes that Leibniz made next to the appropriate part of Arnauld's letter which state 'I believe that it is.' (LBr.70). For, contrary to Arnauld’s belief, although Leibniz's parallelism of mind and body allows for complete explanations of bodily events in physical terms, it does not preclude bodily events having mental causes (quasi-causes) as well.138 (b) Pre-established harmony is just occasionalism Roger Woolhouse (1986, p.76; 1988, p.168ff.) points to a close connection between the final objection attributed to Foucher above, and one presented by Arnauld. However, closer examination shows that they are clearly not identical. For whereas Foucher thinks that the pre-established harmony is the same as occasionalism with all the adjustments made at once, Arnauld thinks that occasionalism has all the adjustments made at once (loc.cit). Thus, for Arnauld, the real problem here is that 'when some of its metaphysical excesses are deleted, concomitance reduces to occasionalism.' (Sleigh 1990a., p.149) Woolhouse introduces his second discussion of this objection (1988, p.168) by observing that Arnauld initially claims to see no difference between pre-established harmony and occasionalism. The problem here is that the idea that: God created the soul in such a way that...what happens to... [it] is born to it in its own depths, without its having to adapt itself to subsequently to the body any more than to the soul (G.II.64[LA.78]) seems to be: saying the same thing in other words as those that claim that my will is the occasional cause of the movement of my arm and that God is the real cause of it. (G.II.84[LA.105]) Since, despite Leibniz implication, the occasionalists:

138

Sleigh also mentions Arnauld's rhetorical question from the first half of this second objection: 'since [my

arm] is without consciousness how could it know when I wanted it to move?' However, he thinks that '[t]his

is an argument we may safely ignore.' (1990a, p.149) and we shall follow his admonition.


62

do not claim that God...[causes my arm to move] through a new act of the will which he exercises each time I wish to raise my arm; but by that act of the eternal will, whereby he has wished to do everything which he has foreseen that it would be necessary to do, in order that the universe might be what he deemed it was to be.(G.II.84[LA.105-6])139 Woolhouse, does not provide any explanation of Arnauld's words, but moves directly to Leibniz's response (1988, p.168). He observes that, although Leibniz accepts Arnauld's point that occasionalism doesn't require that God make continual decisions, he insists that the occasionalists: introduce a miracle which is no less one for being continual. [Even if God acts] only according to a general rule [it does not follow that his actions are not miraculous since] for the concept of the miracle does not consist of rarity...[A] miracle differs intrinsically and through the substance of the act from a common action, and not by an external accident of frequent repetition....[S]trictly speaking God performs a miracle when he does something which exceeds the powers which he has given to creatures and maintains in them. (G.II.92-3[LA.116]) Woolhouse observes essentially the same point, in the New System, where Leibniz claims that Malebranche is correct when he says that 'there is no real influence of one created substance on another and that all things, with their reality, are continually produced by the power of God.' but wrong, since his appeals to God as 'a general cause...without offering any explanation drawn from the order of secondary causes is, [which is] properly speaking to have recourse to miracle.' (G.IV.483; L.457). Thus we see one of the primary objections to occasionalism which was discussed above (see section 4.2) emerging as a primary locus for Leibniz's distinction between this theory and his own. And furthermore a distinction that makes the pre-established harmony superior in Leibniz's estimation. Woolhouse points out a further reply to this objection in his 1986 paper. Here he notes that, as well as providing Arnauld with a number of his standard objections to occasionalism, Leibniz claims: [everything that a body does is] by virtue of its own laws [whereas] according to the authors of occasional causes God changes the laws regarding bodies on the occasion of the soul [and therein] lies the essential difference in our views. (1986, p.77) Thus, according to Woolhouse, Leibniz claims that an essential feature of pre-established harmony, the causal isolation of mind and body is violated in occasionalism and, given this, Leibniz is clear that his own theory is radically different from that of the occasionalists. Sleigh's discussion of this objection (1990a., p.149) is similar to the one provided by Woolhouse. However, he suggests that the issue arises as a consequence of concerns over the question of how the appearance of interaction ought to be explained on Leibniz's theory. As Sleigh observes (loc.cit.), Leibniz answers this by claiming that when, for example, Arnauld wills his arm to move, the preceding state of his body is such that the laws of motion gave rise to the movement desired:

139

Woolhouse indicates a similar passage in his 1986 paper (G.II.85[LA.106]).


63

since God took it [the willing] into consideration in advance, when he made his decision about this succession of all things in the universe (G.II.74[LA.91-92]) But Sleigh also points out that Arnauld cannot bring himself to accept that the causal history (excepting creation) of every bodily event contains no mental event, and so inquires about willed movements of stationary bodies. Here Arnauld observes that such objects are not caused to move by bodies striking them, and clearly cannot move themselves from rest. So he concludes:

it remains, therefore, that it is this 'consideration by God' that is the real and efficient cause of the movement of my arm. Now you yourself call this consideration by God 'His decision' and decision and will are the same thing: therefore, according to you, every time I raise my arm, it is God's will that is the real and efficient cause of this movement. (G.II.85[LA.106-7]) Thus, in Arnauld's eyes, by his admission that God has a hand in the harmony that obtains between substances, Leibniz has effectively embraced occasionalism. Sleigh does not refer us to any particular response that Leibniz gives to this objection. However, we have already seen, that Leibniz himself has a number of reasons for thinking that pre-established harmony differs significantly from occasionalism in this regard.140 Whether these are ultimately tenable is of course another issue. However, it seems clear what the spirit of Leibniz's reply would be here, namely that given the pre-established harmony, but not occasionalism, God can create genuine substances which follow laws that have been willed from the first moment of the universe without thereby surrendering their autonomy and spontaneity. (c) Problems with Leibniz's account of mind-body causation. The last of the difficulties raised by Arnauld that we shall consider is examined by Catherine Wilson (1989, p.113). Rather than an attack on the pre-established harmony per se, Wilson considers Arnauld's concerns over the account of the relation between mind and body which is sustained by this more general metaphysical theory. She tells us that 'Arnauld finds all this puzzling' and that 'He attacks the theory on two fronts, [1] as an explanation of sensation and [2] as an explanation of voluntary action' (loc.cit; cf. G.II.105[LA.203]). In particular, Wilson points to question raised by Arnauld over how a body can set itself in motion at precisely the time when the mind wills it, and how it could be that the soul has more knowledge of the movement of lymph in the lymphatic ducts than of the movements of the satellites of Saturn as Leibniz's theory seems to require (loc.cit.). Wilson (loc.cit) considers Leibniz’s responses to both of these worries. As far as the latter goes, he claims that, appearances notwithstanding, the movement of the lymph is perceived better than the movement of Saturn's satellites. Leibniz admits that the lymph is usually perceived indistinctly, however, he suggests this is only because of habituation. At the onset of illness, for example, small changes in lymphatic circulation would lead to big changes in the subjective symptoms. The satellites of Saturn, however, are known ‘only in

140

See section 4.2 above for a discussion of the issues stemming from Leibniz's attack on the lack of finite

substance and need for 'miracles' in occasionalist metaphysics, accompanied by the insistence that pre-

established harmony is not deficient in these ways.


64

accordance with a motion which is produced in the eye' and small changes here might well be undetectable (G.II.113[LA.213]). Turning to the first question, Wilson (1989, p.113-14) notes that Leibniz concedes that this is more worry is more serious, since he admits that stationary bodies cannot set themselves in motion. However, as she points out, Leibniz also claims that there are, in fact, no absolutely stationary bodies, and that it would require a miracle either to put a body into a perfect repose or to have such a repose broken. Thus, initiation of motion in a sleeper who wakes and moves their head, for example, involves an abrupt transition from repose to motion in appearance only. Really what is involved is a redetermination of tendencies to motion in an already active body (G.II.71[LA.217]). Somewhat surprisingly, Wilson says no more about these responses and quickly moves on to different issues. However, a couple of remarks are worth making here. Leibniz’s first reply probably is adequate. But this is only the case if we presuppose a number of somewhat obscure distinctions that are found in Leibniz's epistemology, and that Wilson does not invoke.141 Thus there is clearly room for further explanation here. However, the second response, seems far less satisfactory. It is true that Leibniz here addresses the question of how the will could initiate motion in a sense. But he only accomplishes this by denying that there is ever a true initiation of physical motion (excepting creation perhaps). But Arnauld seems not to be complaining about the concurrence of our will and the initiation of bodily motion, but about the concurrence of mental and bodily events more generally. And if this is the case, he would surely be equally baffled by the fact that volitions harmonize with changes in the determination of motion in the body as by the fact that they harmonize with its initiation. There may of course be responses which Leibniz could offer here, based on more general consideration of the structure of intersubstantial harmony in this, the best of all possible worlds. However, following Wilson's discussion, it appears that Leibniz neglects to engage with Arnauld adequately at this point. 5.3 The criticisms of Pierre Bayle As Thomas Lennon (1993, p.179) observes, the exchange between Bayle and Leibniz over the pre-established harmony was precipitated by Leibniz's publication of the New System in 1695. It was conducted via the two editions of Bayle's dictionary, a number of published 'replies', and two personal letters, and lasted over seven years.142 Perhaps, because of the 141

Cf. Meditations on Knowledge, Truth, and Ideas (G.IV.422-26[L.291-95]) where Leibniz explains the

term 'distinct' which applies to those concepts which allow us to make distinctions which are objectively

grounded and the terms adequate and inadequate, where an adequate concept is a distinct concept in which

'every ingredient that enters into the distinct concept is known distinctly or when analysis is carried through

to the end' (ibid. [L.292]). Given these distinctions it can be seen that our knowledge of the lymph need not

be permanently conscious in order to be distinct, provided that we have the capacity to be aware of changes

which occur there. It is also apparent how our knowledge of astronomical bodies might be regarded as less

distinct than knowledge of the aforementioned lymph, both prior to, and during the onset of pathology.

142

As Lennon points out, the exchange of ideas between the two consists of the following seven stages -

listed chronologically: (1) Leibniz 27/6/95 --New System (G.IV. 477-87; L453-59); 13/3/96 --Postscript to

letter to Beauval (G.IV. 498-500; L 459-61; AG 147-9); (2) Bayle 1697-- Dictionary 1st. ed. 'Rorarius',

remark H (Pop.235); (3) Leibniz 7/98 -- Clarification of the difficulties.... (G.IV. 517-24; L.492-7) (4)

Bayle 1702 -- Dictionary 2nd. ed. 'Rorarius', remark L (Pop.245); (5) Leibniz 1702 -- Reply to the thoughts

on pre-established harmony.... (GIV. 554-71; L 574-85) 19/8/02 --Letter to De Volder (GIII.63-64) - some


65

relation of this debate to the New System, more than the other critics we have examined, Bayle tends to think of pre-established harmony in terms of the mind-body problem. Thus, when he offers criticisms of Leibniz's theory they are always couched in these terms rather than dealing with the more general issue of intersubstantial causation. Although Lennon characterizes Bayle as an occasionalist (ibid. p.179-84), he points out that, Bayle pays little attention to Leibniz's rejection of occasionalism on the grounds that it requires a 'constant miracle.' (ibid. p.185). However, Bayle does offer a number of distinct objections to Leibniz's views. We shall examine four of these below, referring to them as; (1) Bayle’s ‘reductios’; (2) the problem of a priori implausibility; (3) the solipsistic dog problem;143 and (4) the problem of mental change, respectively. (a) Bayle's 'reductios' The first two objections mentioned by Lennon are instances of the same general strategy. For this reason we have chosen to treat them together. They are both cases in which Bayle draws out what 'he obviously takes to be a reductio ad absurdam...' when, in fact, he is simply presenting 'consequences of pre-established harmony which Leibniz himself in fact happily accepts' (1993, p.185). As such, Lennon suggests they are not objections that Leibniz would care about (loc.cit.).144 And in fact, due to their location, they are objections to which Leibniz never had the chance to reply. The first, is found in a marginal note to section L of Rorarius. Here Bayle suggests that, given the multiplicity of spontaneous substances which compose any body, 'the impression of neighboring bodies must needs put some constraint upon the natural spontaneity of every one of them.' (Pop.248). However, as Lennon suggests, far from accepting this as evidence for intersubstantial influence, Leibniz regards this 'conspiration universelle' as a virtue of his view (1993, p.185). The second of these worries is also to be found in another of Bayle's marginal notes.145 Here Bayle claims that if there is a different law for each mind,146 as Leibniz view surely entails, then; (1) no two people ever really have same thoughts; and (2) as with the Thomistic view of angels, there are as many species as individuals (Pop.254). Lennon replies to this complaint, on Leibniz's behalf, by drawing attention to the fact that 'Leibniz holds up the identity on indiscernibles as a virtue of his system deriving from his principle of sufficient reason.' (loc.cit.). But, although Lennon is surely correct to suggest that Leibniz would not have been worried by Bayle's objection, this seems a strange way to express the reason for this confidence. For it is far from clear that the identity of indiscernibles entails either of the theses that Bayle identifies. There is surely nothing inconsistent in rejecting the idea that each individual is a species whilst at the same time accepting that there can be no two individuals which share all the same properties. Instead we should probably regard Leibniz's

other stuff mentioned about this; (6) Bayle 3/10/02 --Letter to Leibniz (G.III, 64-5); (7) Leibniz 5/12/02 --

Letter to Bayle (G.III.65-9).

143

We shall also consider a variant on the solipsistic dog problem due to Robert Sleigh (1990a, p.150).

144

Although, given that both these arguments are taken from Bayle's marginalia, we must surely wonder

whether Leibniz ever got the opportunity to respond one way or the other.

145

Lennon provides the reference P.916. However, I am unable to discover which work is intended by

the letter 'P'.

146

Lennon suggests we read 'individual concept' for 'law' (ibid. p.186).


66

nominalism as a more appropriate source of his commitment to the view that there are as many species as individual concepts (cf. Discourse sec.9[LG.14]), and as many thoughts-types as thought-tokens. (b) The problem of a priori plausibility The problem of a priori implausibility is found in remark L of Rorarius (Pop.247-8). Here Bayle claims that, contra Leibniz's pre-established harmony, 'it is a priori implausible that the body of Caesar enter the senate spontaneously and produce the noises which we associate with his ambitious plans' and 'that a ship sail by itself into harbor and come to rest at a wharf.' (Lennon 1993, p.186). Such behavior would raise 'the power and wisdom of the Divine art above what can be conceived,' and Bayle maintains that, 'the actions of creatures must be necessarily proportioned to their essential state and performed according to the character of each machine.' (Pop.248-9).147 Here Lennon (1993, p.186) again comes to Leibniz's defence in absence of any direct reply. He suggests that, yet again, the author of the pre-established harmony, would accept the implausible scenarios and both of Bayle's inferences. And he claims that the key difference between the two philosophers here, is Leibniz's willingness to accept the reasonableness of the Divine art even though it is at times unintelligible to creatures with finite cognitive capacities such as ourselves.148 Leibniz's response to both of the remaining objections which are presented by Lennon, is grounded in the same principle (ibid. p.187). This being the case we shall follow him in outlining each of the objections first and then providing an account of the reply. (c) The problem of the 'solipsistic dog' The problem of the solipsistic dog is raised by Bayle in response to Leibniz's assertions that the states of a substance arise in such a way that it would have them even if there were only it and God in the world (cf. Discourse sec.14[LG.22-24]). Bayle complains: I cannot comprehend the connection of internal and spontaneous connections which would have this effect that the soul of a dog would feel pain immediately after it felt joy tho' it were alone in the universe (Pop.238) As Lennon points out (1993, p.186-87), Bayle has no problem with the idea that this might happen with a dog that was struck with a stick immediately after a hearty meal. But he is baffled as to how this could arise in the absence of a stick or some such weapon, as pre-established harmony demands on his reading.

147

Two things are worth noting here. First Lennon neglects to point out that Bayle does not think

compromising divine omnipotence. He insists that 'in denying this one is not claiming to set limits to the

power and knowledge of God. It is only intended to indicate that the nature of things does not permit the

faculties communicated to creatures to exist without certain necessary limitations' (Pop.248). But, perhaps

more importantly, it should be observed that the quotation given finishes 'according to the axiom of the

philosophers -- whatever is received is proportional to the capacity of the subject.' Thus there is reason to

wonder whether Bayle wishes to claim allegiance to this objection.

148

But as mentioned in the previous note, it is questionable whether it is Bayle who holds this view.


67

(d) The problem of mental change In presenting this final problem, Lennon simply provides us with the following quote from Bayle (ibid. p.187): [I]t may clearly be conceived that a simple being will always in an uniform manner, if no external cause hinders it. If it was composed of several pieces as a machine, it would act in different ways, because the peculiar activity of each piece might change every moment the progress of others: but how will you find in a simple substance the cause of a change of operations?149 This is accompanied by very little in the way of exegesis. However, the point here seems clear. Bayle thinks that the simplicity and indivisibility of Leibniz's spontaneous soul150 precludes the kinds of changes which must be ascribed to it. As we noted above, Lennon suggests (ibid. p.187) that in Leibniz's replies to the problem of the solipsistic dog and the problem of mental change, we can discern a common theme. According to Lennon, the basis for this, which Bayle fails to appreciate, is Leibniz's commitment to a version of the principle of sufficient reason which is at the foundation of the pre-established harmony.151 The passage in which Lennon finds this reply is from the Clarification of Difficulties which Mr. Bayle has found in the New System of the Union of the Soul and Body, where Leibniz tells us: [I]t is in [the] nature of created substance to change continually following a certain order which leads it spontaneously...through all the states which it encounters, in such a way that he who sees all things sees all its past present and future states in its present. And the law of order, which constitutes the individuality of each particular substance, is in exact agreement with what occurs to every other substance and throughout the whole universe.(G. IV.518[L.493]). With this passage in mind, Lennon tells us that, in responding to the problem of the solipsistic dog, Leibniz 'naturally enough questions whether Bayle really does understand how the dog suddenly feels pain upon being struck with a stick, pointing out to him the lengths to which the defenders of occasional causes152 must go to explain such correspondences' (Lennon 1993, p.187). Thus Leibniz's response seems to be the claim that if he needs to worry about the solipsistic dog, then Bayle ought to worry just as much about 'ordinary situations' such as the causing of painful sensations in a dog by a concomitant stick (cf. G.IV.518-9[L.493]). Turning to the other reply, Lennon observes (1993, p.187) that Leibniz regards the problem of mental change as 'an objection worthy of Mr. Bayle' (Clarification G.IV.520[L.495]) before drawing the following distinction:

149

Lennon's reference - P.911- is again unfathomable. However, essentially the same point is to be

found in Rorarius L (Pop.251-3).

150

The objection applies equally well to all substances. However, as we have already noted, Bayle's

entire discussion is couched in terms of the mind-body relation.

151

I confess that I am not entirely sure what Lennon means by this.

152

Of which, it should be remembered, Bayle was one (cf. Lennon, 1993 pp.180-84).


68

If to act uniformly is to follow perpetually the same law of order or of succession, as in a certain scale or series of numbers, I agree that in this sense every simple being and even every composite being acts uniformly. But if uniformly means similarly, I do not agree. To explain the difference this meaning makes by an example, a movement in a parabolic path is uniform in the former sense, but not in the latter, for the parts of the parabolic curve are not similar to each other as are the parts of a straight line.(loc.cit.). Lennon begins by claiming that 'we may put the same point differently by saying that, for Leibniz, every change, either in simple or complex things, is a function of some concept or law.' However, he extrapolates a little further and suggests that 'once we accept Leibniz's concept of a possible world, then everything is, by its very nature- to use Bayle's term--connected with everything else.' (1993, p.188).153 Thus, for Lennon, it is Bayle's reluctance to combine complete connectedness with the idea that something could behave uniformly without displaying behavior which was similar over time, that is the root of the difference between the two men. Instead, 'construing Leibnizian substances as metaphysical atoms, he suppose[s] that, like Epicurean atoms that uniformly change place, all their changes...have to be uniform.' (loc.cit.). (e) Sleigh's solipsistic dog variant Sleigh also considers the problem of the solipsistic dog and suggests that Bayle uses observations similar to those of Arnauld in an attempt to reduce the theory of concomitance (pre-established harmony) to absurdity. It should be noted however, that Sleigh reconstrues Bayle's objection so that it in terms the scenario from (E1) above, where Arnauld feels pain due to a bodily injury. Thus, he presents the important details of the situation as follows (Sleigh 1990a, p.150): (1) A body is cut at t; some perception of this exists at t in the soul (conscious or not). (2) The cut causes a wound (physical change) to occur at t'. (3) Some perception of the cut at t causes feeling of pain at t'. Given this preliminary, Sleigh presents the 'solipsistic dog' argument as follows (loc.cit.). Bayle claims that a cut is neither causally necessary nor sufficient for the feeling of pain, and that it follows that a counterfactual condition in which there is no cut does not remove a necessary condition for the pain. Therefore, pain with no cut is causally possible. Or, more formally, Bayle infers that the following is warranted according to Leibniz: (1') Even if the arm had not been punctured at time t, Arnauld would still have been in pain at time t'.

153

Lennon claims that the notion of a possible world as found, e.g., in Mates (1972, p.354) as a

maximal set of mutually compossible substances is the key premise here. Since the upshot of this analysis is

that no that no possible substance is in any other than one world, which can be read off from the concept of

each substance comprising it. But Lennon adds: 'Nothing like this key premise is cited here by Leibniz; nor

is there any mention of a possible world' (1993, p.188 n.29) and he speaks favorably of Margaret Wilson's

suggestion Bayle may also be concerned about the fact that the analysis of counterfactuals is left unadressed

by Leibniz.


69

But Bayle, like Arnauld takes as a datum of the case described (mutatis mutandis) that: (2') If the arm had not been punctured at t, Arnauld would not have been in pain at t'. (1') and (2') are inconsistent and, according to Bayle it is (1') that ought to be rejected, with the consequence that concomitance is false, by modus tollens. Sleigh deals with this objection in a somewhat different way to Lennon. In presenting Leibniz's reply, Sleigh first notes that the doctrine of superintrinsicalness generates a problem for Leibniz when it comes to ascribing sense to counterfactual conditionals.154 However, he also observes that Leibniz does formulate a reply to Bayle's criticism,155 which, according to Sleigh (loc.cit.) is basically as follows: Leibniz argues that concomitance plus the facts envisaged by Bayle do not imply (1'). For although Bayle suggests that it is metaphysically and causally possible, on Leibniz's view, that there could be no cut but still pain, Leibniz claims the situation is a 'metaphysical fiction contrary to the order of things...that can occur naturally' (L.493). And Sleigh (1990a, p.151) recommends that we understand the concept of a 'metaphysical fiction' by turning to what Leibniz says concerning a similar scenario, in preparatory notes which he made for the reply to Bayle of 1702 i.e., that it is 'a metaphysical possibility... that does not agree with the facts and their reasons.' (G.IV.530) Leibniz's notion of the 'nature of things' clearly does a lot of work here. For, as Sleigh observes (loc.cit.), the problematic scenario does seem possible, in a certain sense, and it appears that Leibniz uses 'the natural order' to rule out such a ‘disorderly’ arrangement of intersubstantial states, without insisting that they are metaphysically impossible.156 Unfortunately though, Sleigh's discussion of the relationship between Bayle and Leibniz ends here, without any further clarification of the issues involved. Sleigh offers the excuse that 'an investigation of the basis of Leibniz's position here would take us too far afield (1900a, p.151), given that his main concern is the relationship between Leibniz and Arnauld. And it is obvious from the comments of both Sleigh and Lennon that there is further work to be done with regard to Leibniz's views on the relevant counterfactuals. In this section, we have considered a number of criticisms that were raised by Leibniz’s contemporaries against his pre-established harmony. In several cases it is relatively clear how Leibniz wishes to respond, or at least what resources he has at his disposal in order to produces a reply. However, we also saw a number of gaps that exist in the treatments of these debates. Thus, there is clearly room for further research into the objections that we have examined. But furthermore, it is evident that only a small handful of Leibniz philosophical correspondents are represented in the discussion above. Thus, the possibility clearly exists that investigation of Leibniz other work will produce even more pertinent criticisms of this doctrine. And, where responses by Leibniz exist we can hope to find

154

Sleigh suggests we turn to Gr.358 for evidence of this. But it is worth noting that he himself

discusses these issues in Chapter 4 of Leibniz and Arnauld (cf. p.67-72 especially).

155

Two versions exist one for each edition of the Dictionary (cf. G.IV.519[L 493] for the first edition of

1698; G.IV.530-32 for the response to Bayle's remarks in the second edition of 1702).

156

Sleigh is unclear about whether Leibniz wants to allow the disorderly states as causally possible but

it seems he probably does. However, it is far from evident that this is the correct way to go here.


70

further illumination of the difficulties already encountered and other puzzling aspects of the ‘crowning conception of his philosophy.’ (Russell 1937, p.136).


71

Bibilography Works by Leibniz A Samtliche Schriften und Briefe. Darmstadt and Berlin: Berlin Academy (1923-). Cited by series, volume and page. AG Philosophical Essays. Ed. and trans. by Roger Ariew and Daniel Garber. Indianapolis: Hackett (1989). C Opuscules et Fragments inedits de Leibniz. Ed. by Louis Couturat. Paris Felix Alcan (1903). Reprint, Hildesheim: Georg Olms (1966) CB Leibniz and Dynamics. Ed. by P. Costabel, trans. by R.E.W. Maddison. London: Methuen (1973). FC Nouvelles lettres et opuscules inedits de Leibniz. Ed. A. Foucher de Careil. Paris: Auguste Durand (1857) G Die philosophiscen Schriften von Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz. Ed. C.I.Gerhardt. Berlin: Weidman (1875-90). Reprint, Hildesheim: Georg Olms (1965). Cited by volume and page. GM Leibniziens mathematische Schriften. Ed. by C.I.Gerhardt. Berlin: A.Asher, and Halle: H.W.Schmidt (1849-63). Cited by volume and page. Gr Textes inedits. Ed. by Gaston Grua. Paris: Presses Universitaires de France (1948). L Philosophical Papers and Letters. Ed. and trans. by Leroy E. Loemker. 2nd. ed. Dordrecht and Boston: Reidel (1969) LA The Leibniz-Arnauld Correspondence. Ed. and trans. by H.T.Mason with an introduction by G.H.R. Parkinson. Manchester: Manchester University Press (1967). Latta Leibniz: The Monadology and Other Philosophical Writings. Trans. R.Latta. Oxford: Oxford University Press (1898). Reprinted (1971). LBr Manuscripts of correspondence, from the Leibniz Nachlass in Hannover. Cited by Bodemann's enumeration and pagination. LG Discourse on Metaphysics. Ed. and trans. by Peter G. Lucas and Leslie Grint. Manchester: Manchester University Press (1953). Reprinted with minor corrections (1961) LH Die Leibniz-Handschriften der Koniglichen offentlichen Bibliothek zu Hannover. Ed. by E. Bodemann. Hannover (1895). Reprinted Hildesheim: Georg Olms (1966).


72

ML Leibniz et Malebranche, Relations Personelles. Ed. by Andre Robinet, Paris: J.Vrin (1955). Montgomery Leibniz: Basic Writings. Trans. by George R. Montgomery. La Salle Ill: Open Court (1902). Reprinted (1962). MP Philosophical Writings. Ed. and trans. by Mary Morris and G.H.R. Parkinson. London: Dent (1973) NE New Essays on Human Understanding. Ed. and trans. by Peter Remnant and Jonathan Bennett. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Pk De Summa Rerum: Metaphysical Papers 1675-76: Ed. and Trans. by G.H.R. Parkinson. New Haven: Yale University Press (1992) R System of Theology. Ed. and trans. by C.W.Russell. London: Burns and Lambert (1850) Theodicy Cited by section number as in the English translation by E.M.Huggard. New Haven: Yale University Press (1952). Reprint La Salle Ill: Open Court (1985) VE Vorausedition zur Reihe VI -- Philosophische Schriften -- in der Ausgabe der Akademie der Wissenschaften der DDR. Fascicles 1-9. Munster: Leibniz-Forschungsstelle der Universitat Munster (1982-1990). W Leibniz: Selections. Trans. by P.P.Weiner. New York: Charles Scribner's Sons (1951) Works by historical figures other than Leibniz AT Oeuvres de Descartes. Ed. C.Adam and P.Tannery. Paris (1897-1913). Reprinted Paris: J.Vrin (1964-1975). Cited by volume and page. CSM The Philosophical Writings of Descartes. Trans. by John Cottingham, Robert Stoothoff, and Dugald Murdoch. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press (1985). Cited by volume and page. Doney Dialogues on Metaphysics by Nicholas Malebranche. Trans. by Willis Doney. New York: Abaris books (1980). Guide The Guide of the Perplexed by Moses Maimonides. Trans. S.Pines. Chicago (1963). Cited by part and chapter. K Descartes -- Philosophical Letters. Ed. and trans. by Anthony Kenny. Oxford: Clarendon Press (1970). LO The Search After Truth by Nicholas Malebranche. Trans. by Thomas M. Lennon and Paul J. Olscamp. Columbus: Ohio State University Press (1980).


73

MD Metaphysical Disputations by Francisco Suarez. Cited by disputation, chapter and section from the Latin Disputationes Metaphysicae. In Suarez Opera Omnia, ed. Charles Bretton, vols. 25-26. Paris: Vives (1886). OD Pierre Bayle -- Oeuvres Diverse. Introduction by Elisabeth Labrousse. Hildesheim: Georg Olms (1964-). Cited by volume and page. OM Oeuvres completes de Malebranche. Ed. by Andre Robinet. Paris: J.Vrin (1958-1984). Cited by volume and page. Pass The Passions of the soul by Rene Descartes. Cited by part and section, as in CSM. vol.I. Pop Pierre Bayle, Historical and Critical Dictionary: Selections. Trans. by R.H. Popkin. Indinapolis: Hackett (1991). Prin Principles of Philosophy by Rene Descartes. Cited by part and section, as in CSM. I SCG On the Truth of the Catholic Faith (Summa Contra Gentiles). St. Thomas Aquinas. Trans. A. Pegis, J. Anderson, V. Bourke and C. O'Niel. New York (1954-56). ST Summa Theologiae. St. Thomas Aquinas. New York McGraw-Hill (1964-76). Cited by part, question and article. Bayley, Benjamin. A Collection of Some Pieces of Mr. John Toland. London (1726). Reprinted New York: Garland (1977). Clarke, Samuel. A Demonstration of the Being and Attributes of God. London (1705). Reprinted Stuttgart: Frommann (1964). Foucher, Simon. Critique de la Recherche de la Verite. New York: Johnson Reprint Corporation (1969). Malebranche, Nicholas. Dialogues on Metaphysics. Trans. M. Ginsberg. New York: MacMillan (1923). Paracelsus, P. Selected Writings. Ed. and trans. by J. Jacobi and N. Guterman, Princeton NJ. Suarez, Francisco. De Anima. In Suarez Opera Omnia, ed. Charles Bretton. Paris: Vives (1886). --------On the Various Kinds of Distinctions. Ed. Vollert (1976).


74

Secondary Sources Abbreviations of Journal Titles: AGP Archiv fur Geschichte der Philosophie HPQ History of Philosophy Quarterly JHP Journal of the History of Philosophy PAS Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society PBA Proceedings of the British Academy PR Philosophical Review SL Studia Leibnitiana SLS Studia Leibnitiana Supplementa SLSH Studia Leibnitiana Sonderheft Adams, M. McCord. (1987): William Ockham. 2 vols. Indiana: Notre Dame University Press. Adams, R.M. (1985): Predication, Truth and Transworld Identity in Leibniz, in Bogen, J & McGuire, J.E. eds.(1985) pp.236-283. ---------(1994): Leibniz. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Belaval, Y. (1975): Leibniz: Initiation a sa Philosophie. Paris: J. Vrin. Bernstein, H. (1981): Passivity and Inertia in Leibniz's Dynamics. SL.13, pp.97-114. Bogen, J & McGuire, J.E. eds., (1985): How Things Are: Studies in Predication and the History of Philosophy and Science. D. Reidel: Dordrecht. Broad, C.D. (1975): Leibniz: An Introduction. Ed. C.Lewy. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Brown, S. (1984): Leibniz. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press. --------(1988): Leibniz's Crossing from Occasional Causes to the Pre-established Harmony in A. Heinekamp (1988) ed., pp.116-123. Brown, G. (1987): Compossibilty, Harmony and Perfection in Leibniz. PR.96, pp.173-204. Brown, G. (1992): Is There a Pre-established Harmony of Aggregates in the Leibnizian Dynamics, or Do Non-Substantial Bodies Interact? JHP.30, pp. 53-75. Cover, J.A. & Kulstad, M. eds. (1990): Central Themes in Early Modern Philosophy. Indianapolis: Hackett. Couturat, L. (1901): La Logique de Leibniz. Paris: Presses Universitaires de France. Reprinted Hildesheim: Georg Olms (1969).


75

--------(1902): Sur la Metaphysique de Leibniz. trans. by R.A. Ryan in Frankfurt, H. ed.(1972) pp.19-45. de Vleeschauwer, H.J. (1975): Occasionalisme et Harmonie Preetablie--Geulincx et Leibniz. SLS.14, pp.279-92. Fakhry, M. (1958): Islamic Occasionalism and its Critique by Averroes and Aquinas. London: Allen and Unwin. Fouke, D.C. (1994): Emmanation and the Perfection of Being: Divine Causation and the Autonomy of Nature in Leibniz: AGP.76, pp.168-194. Frankfurt, H. ed. (1972): Leibniz: A Collection of Critical Essays. Notre Dame: Univ. Notre Dame Press. Frankel, L. (1989): Causation, Harmony and Analogy in Rescher, N. ed., (1989) pp.57-71. Friedmann, G., (1962): Leibniz et Spinoza. 2nd. ed., Paris: Gallimard. Gabbey, A. (1980): Force and Inertia in Seventeenth Century Dynamics in S. Gaukroger ed. (1980) pp.230-321. Gale, G. (1973): Leibniz's Dynamical Metaphysics and the Origin of the Vis Viva Controversy. Systematics 11, pp.184-207. Garber, D. (1983): Mind, Body and the Laws of Nature in Descartes and Leibniz. Midwest Studies in Philosophy 8, pp. 105-134. --------(1985): Leibniz and the Foundations of Physics: The Middle Years, in Okruhlick, K. & Brown, J.R., eds. (1985), pp. 27-130. --------(1993): Descartes and Occasionalism, in Nadler, S. ed. (1993). --------(1995): Leibniz: Physics and Philosophy in Jolley, N. ed. (1995), pp. 270-353. Gaukroger, S. ed. (1980): Descartes: Philosophy, Mathematics and Physics. Sussex: Harvester Press. Gueroult, M. (1967): Leibniz: Dynamique et Metaphysique. Paris: Aubier-Montaigne. Hartz, G.A. (1992): Leibniz's Phenomenalisms. PR.101, pp.511-49. Heinekamp, A. ed. (1988): Leibniz: Tradition und Aktualitat. Proceedings of the Leibniz Congress. Hooker, M. ed. (1982): Leibniz: Critical and Interpretative Essays. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press. Ishiguro, H. (1972): Leibniz's Philosophy of Logic and Language. Ithaca: Cornell University Press.


76

--------(1977): Pre-established Harmony vs. Constant Conjunction: A Reconsideration of the Distinction Between Rationalism and Empiricism. PBA. 63, pp. 239-263. --------(1979): Substances and Individual Notions in Sosa, E. ed., (1979), pp.125-138. --------(1986): Pre-established Harmony vs. Constant Conjunction: A Reconsideration of the Distinction Between Rationalism and Empiricism, in Kenny, A. ed. (1986). pp. 61-86. Jolley, N. (1993): Leibniz: Truth, Knowledge and Metaphysics. in Parkinson, G.H.R. ed. (1993) pp. 384-424. --------ed. (1995): The Cambridge Companion to Leibniz. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Kabitz, W. (1909): Die Jungen Leibniz. Heidelberg: Carl Winters. Kenny, A. ed. (1986): Rationalism, Empiricism and Idealism. Oxford: Clarendon Press. Kneale, M. (1972): Leibniz and Spinoza on Activity, in Frankfurt, H. ed. (1972) p.215-237. Mondadori, F. (1978): A Harmony of One's Own and Universal Harmony in the Paris Writings. SLS.18, pp.151-68. Kulstad, M. (1993a): Causation and Pre-established Harmony in the Early Development of Leibniz's Philosophy. in Nadler, S., ed. (1993). ---------(1993b): Two Interpretations of the Pre-established Harmony in the Philosophy of Leibniz. Synthese 96, pp. 477-504. Loeb, L.E. (1981): From Descartes to Hume: Continental Metaphysics and the Development of Modern Philosophy. Ithaca: Cornell University Press. Lennon, T. M. (1993): Mechanism as a Silly Mouse in Nadler, S. ed. (1993). MacDonald Ross, G. (1984): Leibniz. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Machamer, P.K. & Turnbull, R.G. eds. (1976): Motion and Time Space and Matter. Columbus: Ohio State University Press. Mates, B. (1986): The Philosophy of Leibniz. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Mercer, C. & Sleigh Jr., R. C. (1995): Metaphysics: The Early Period to the Discourse on Metaphysics. in Jolley, N. ed. (1995), pp. 67-124. Miller, R.B. (1988): Leibniz on the Interaction of Bodies. HPQ. 5, pp. 245-255.


77

Nadler, S., ed. (1993): Causation in Early Modern Philosophy: University Park, PA.: Pennsylvania State University Press. Okruhlick, K., & Brown, J.R. eds. (1985): The Natural Philosophy of Leibniz. Dordrecht: Reidel. O'Neill, E. (1993): 'Influxus Physicus'. in Nadler, S. ed. (1993). Parkinson, G.H.R. (1970): Leibniz on Human Freedom. SLSH 2. -------- ed. (1993): Routledge History of Philosophy Volume IV: The Renaissance and Seventeenth Century Rationalism. London: Routledge. Rabbe, F. (1867): Etude Philosophique, L'abbe Simon Foucher chanoine de la Sainte Chappelle de Dijon. Paris: Didier. Radner, D (1985): Is there a Problem of Cartesian Interaction? JHP. 23, pp.39-49. --------(1993): Occasionalism. in Parkinson, G.H.R. ed. (1993) pp. 349-84. Rescher, N. (1967): The Philosophy of Leibniz. Englewood Cliffs NJ.: Prentice Hall. --------(1977): Leibniz: An Introduction to his Philosophy. Oxford: Basil Blackwell. ---------ed., (1989) Leibnizian Inquiries. Lanham, MD: University Press of America. Russell, B. (1937): A Critical Exposition of the Philosophy of Leibniz. 2nd. ed. London: Allen & Unwin. --------(1945): A History of Western Philosophy. London: Allen and Unwin. Rutherford, D.P. (1993): Natures, Laws and Miracles: The Roots of Leibniz's Critique of Occasionalism in Nadler, S. ed. (1983), pp. 135-158. --------(1995): Metaphysics: The Late Period in Jolley, N. ed. (1995), pp. 124-176. Sleigh Jr., R.C. (1990a): Leibniz and Arnauld: A Commentary on their Correspondence. New Haven: Yale University Press. --------(1990b): Leibniz on Malebranche on Causality, in Cover, J.A. and Kulstad, M., eds. (1993) pp.161-194. Sosa, E. ed. (1979): The Philosophy of Nicholas Rescher. Dordrecht: Reidel. Watson, R.A. (1987): The Breakdown of Cartesian Metaphysics. Atlantic Highlands NJ.: Humanities Press International. Wiggins, D. (1971): Identity and Spatio-Temporal Continuity. Oxford: Oxford University Press.


78

Wilkerson, T.E. (1976) Kant's 'Critique of Pure Reason' a Commentary from Students. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Wilson, C. (1987): De Ispa Natura: Sources of Leibniz's Doctrine of Force, Activity and Natural Law. SL.19, pp.148-172. --------(1989): Leibniz's Metaphysics: A Comparative and Historical Study.Princeton: Princeton University Press. Woolhouse, R.S. (1985): Pre-established Harmony Returned: Ishiguro vs. the Tradition. SL. pp. 204- 219. --------(1986): Leibniz's Reaction to Cartesian Interaction. PAS.86, pp. 69-82. --------(1988): Leibniz and Occasionalism in Woolhouse, R.S. ed. (1988) pp.165-183. --------ed. (1988): Metaphysics and the Philosophy of Science in the Seventeenth and Eighteenth Centuries. Dordrecht: Kluwer. Woolhouse, R.S. & Franks, R. (1994) Leibniz, Lamy and 'the way of pre-established harmony' SL. 26, pp.76-90.

Leibniz's Pre-established Harmony (ca.40k word manuscript from 1997)

Documents

Transcript of Leibniz's Pre-established Harmony (ca.40k word manuscript from 1997)