LEGAL EQUALITY AND EQUAL PROTECTION OF THE LAWS CLAUSE: TRANSLATIONS OF THE CATEGORIES OF THE...

LEGAL EQUALITY AND EQUAL PROTECTION OF THE LAWS CLAUSE: TRANSLATIONS OF THE

CATEGORIES OF THE BRAZILIAN AND AMERICAN LEGAL CULTURE

May 29th, 2015Seattle-WA

RESEARCH GROUP

First of all we would like to share our ongoing research project that is being conducted in the research group called "Center for Legal Studies, Citizenship, Procedure and Discourse", located at Estácio de Sá University, Rio de Janeiro, Brazil. Applying the semiolinguistic methodology of discourse analysis and the method of comparison by difference, borrowed from Antropology, we aim to provide a description for native and /or theoretical categories of the Brazilian legal culture in contrast with American legal culture, in order illuminate the idea that legal systems cannot be translated/verted straightforwardly as a mere lexicon translation challenge. There is much more about it that relates to meaning and understanding that surpass the linguistic problem. That is what we intend to convey with our effort.

THE FOUR STEPS OF OUR RESEARCH

We intend to carry on this project in four basic steps: 1st – the theoretical aspect of the work;

2nd – a description of the meaning of legal equality (principio da igualdade jurídica) in Brazil;

3rd – a description of the meaning of the equal protection clause in the US;

4th – a comparison by contrast between both legal features.

OBSERVATIONS

• On this oral presentation we are dealing basically with the first and second steps only.

• We hope to have the whole paper finished for the next year meeting.

FIRST STEP: building up a theoretical framework

Our observations may be arranged in four sets of ideas: a) the understanding of Law as a set of

local discourses and practices; b) the utility of the theoretical category

"legal sensibilities" by Clifford GEERTZ (1983);

c) the recognition that culture interferes in socialization and social efficacy of Law when people translate legal categories.


In particular, we call attention to a speech by Professor Daniel dos Santos, an Angolan sociologist at the University of Ottawa, when we met him at the "Seminário Brasil-Angola: Estado, Direito e Sociedade" (Seminar Brazil-Angola: State, Law and Society), back in 2009, in Rio de Janeiro/Brazil. The sociologist said back then, that Law ultimately is a set of discourses and practices - and, of course, we can ask ourselves: which discourses and practices? And here again we refuse to accept the challenge of pointing out what the criteria for granting the status of legality would be, since, somehow, it escapes the topic proposed for reflection.


Anyway, the important part of this statement is that it leads us to the place of social relations and its web of meanings, helping us to appreciate the extent of the practices, rituals and representations that directly impact Law. Thus, we allow ourselves to think that law is a cultural product, despite its universalist normative nature.


If we assume that part of these failures can be attributed to the inability of the legal concepts of bearing unambiguous meanings for different people (and here we recall records that point to the difficulty/need that international normative instrument need to face to "negotiate" the adherence to moral clauses, such as equality), the idea of "legal sensibility" seems to be quite operative. The category points towards a path of mutual understanding, of approach to each other, understanding it as different, member of ANOTHER legal culture.


It is, therefore, a key concept for understanding Law as a manifestation of a culture. And this key concept can prevent possible uncritical transplantations of legal categories that ultimately result in "inventions out of place" with low capacity to interfere with reality and to shape behaviors or that involve the application of practice imposed by force.The American anthropologist Clifford Geertz was the one who proposed the category of "legal sensibility" as a way of explaining the cultural bases of law, making it necessarily a local product.


“That determinate sense of justice I spoke of – what I will be calling, as I leave familiar landscapes for more exotic locales, a legal sensibility – is, thus, the first object of notice for anyone concerned to speak comparatively about the cultural foundations of law. Such sensibilities differ not only in the degree in which they are determinate; in the power they exercise, vis-à-vis other modes of thought as feeling, over the process of social life (when faced with pollution controls, the story goes Toyota hired a thousand engineers, Ford a thousand lawyers); or in their particular style and content. They differ, and markedly in the means they use – the symbols they deploy, the stories they tell, the directions they draw, the visions they project – to represent events in judiciable form. Facts and law we have perhaps everywhere, their polarization we perhaps have not.” (GEERTZ, 1983:175).


Let us consider a case narrated by GEERTZ (1983) that is highly instructive for understanding that there are different conceptions of justice (legal sensibilities) and that law is always necessarily local. Geertz compares three distinct worldviews (Islamic, Indic and Malay), which explicit three different forms of administration of justice and conceptions of fair and unfair. We refer to this text because it is where Geertz narrates an empirical case occurred in 1958 in Bali, when one of the inhabitants of this island called REGREG goes mad because of the local application of a Law that was considered socially legitimate, but that, for him, individually, seemed too unfair. REGREG's problem begins when his wife runs off with a man from another village. REGREG, furious, demands the village council some measure to be taken to bring her back.


Although all shared REGREG's feelings, they could not decide the case. In Bali, private matters were resolved within the kinship groups, not in the village, so the issue was outside the jurisdiction of the local village council and, therefore, they could not intervene. Life went on, and months later it was REGREG's turn to take office as one of the five masters of the council, according to local rules. Because of the previous disappointment, due to the fact that the council took no action on his behalf when his wife escaped the village, REGREG refused to accept the office to which he was bound by local regulations. In summary, the breach of the local rule led him to lose his homeland, his political rights, his hereditary position and access to the village temples. Even his closest relatives were forced to abandon him.


REGREG wandered through the village, rummaging through piles of garbage for scraps of food, until he completely lost his mind and went crazy. The case illustrates that there are different notions of fair and that the local legal sensibility cannot be ignored by a member of that culture.


Thus, in his reading on the subject, Geertz proposes that the anthropological challenge lies in the fact that the coexistence circumstance of a uniform conception of man and a culturalist perspective makes it very difficult to draw a distinctive line between what is natural, universal, and what is conventional, local and variable. Moreover, it problematizes the idea that classifying oneself in one group or another does not help understanding the concrete social issues that are facing us. In his reflective proposal, Geertz helps understanding that, instead of us being finished beings, we are beings dynamically reconstructed by culture.


There is no use in identifying the universal code if the cultural patterns involved in the construction of this man are specific. According to himself, “[...] just like culture has shaped us in a single species - and no doubt it is still shaping - it shapes us the same way as separate individuals. This is what we really have in common - neither an unchanging subcultural being, nor a cross-cultural consensus established [...] here, human being is certainly not Any Man; is to be a particular species of man and, undoubtedly, men differ [...]”.(GEERTZ, 1983:3738).


To GEERTZ (1983), seeking generality will not help finding it. On the contrary, it is while seeking for specificity, in the anthropological perspective of analyzing the different ways of "being a man", in particular, it is in the concrete sphere that we will consolidate a systematic analysis of these different ways.


If classifying law as a branch of knowledge that must be interpreted in light of the "local knowledge" is not new among anthropologists, it is still a pretty impressive relativistic dimension for classical jurists in Brazil. The idea that the formulation of general rules is only meaningful when derived from a proper individualized context can be very innovative from the legal point of view but fairly prosaic for anthropology, the branch of knowledge that has always lived with the escape from ethnocentrism and from the dimension of law receiving different senses according to the legal sensibilities of the society in which it applies (GEERTZ, 1983).This is the theoretical background that we must keep on mind.

SECOND STEP: The meaning of princípio da igualdade jurídica (legal equality principle) in

BrazilIt is broadly said in Brazil that literal translations between legal concepts and categories of different places are possible and feasible. For instance “due process of law” or judicial review” would be the same in English and in Portuguese, as if the words would only need a proper and accurate translation exercise.


BrazilHowever to show that this correspondence is tricky and dangerous, using the comparative approach by contrast we have selected one category to put into description and analysis in the Brazilian and latter on in American legal cultures which are the categories of legal equality (igualdade jurídica in Brazil) and the equal protection of the laws clause (in U.S.).


BrazilAs a way of stating our point of view instead of choosing the “American legal word” for equality (which would be equal protection of the laws) that would give our non Brazilian reader a certain sense of familiarity, our we have purposefully decided to use the Portuguese expression (princípio da igualdadejurídica) with a literal English version in brackets to stress the difference of meaning that exists between both.


BrazilBriefly legal equality in Brazil if one might be asked would be understood as the axiom of Rui Barbosa, who was very famous Brazilian lawyer and scholar from the late 19th century, early 20th. In his "Prayer to the Young Men", a speech intended to be delivered in a law school graduation, in 1921, he said that one shall treat equals and unequals unequally in the measure of their inequalities.


BrazilBut the Brazilian academic debate about the theme, on the juridical field, is not vigorous and does not even face this relational aspect of equality (DUARTE, 2001). Actually, the aspect that catches most attention is the “logic of repetition” of authors which is built apart from real life. (The logic of repetition means that Brazilian authors as a matter of habit copy and repete each other oftenly without a reflexive approach, as shown by IORIO (2009).


BrazilThis debate integrates a conventional wisdom, marked by, at least, two “streams of thought”. As they reinforce the lack of agreement about equality, they also build a juridical semantic, and reduce the issue to a simple argumentative term. They are:

I) the inequality discourse, simply understood as equality;

II) the equality discourse as a special treatment.


BrazilIn the inequality discourse simply understood as equality it is claimed that denying equality does not necessarily mean its violation. Based on the lessons learned with Rui Barbosa, already mentioned above, it is believed that the dimension of equality is the inequality that integrates it and which is incorporated to conventional juridical knowledge. Inequality is therefore made natural, not causing repudiation.


BrazilUntil today it is constantly said that “[...] the opposite of equality doesn`t denied it, instead many times reinforces it. That is the paradox of equality. The inequality is not always the opposite of the equality. [...]” (LOBO TORRES, 1995: 261-262). It reflects an ethics of a hierarchical society that considers e naturalizes inequality as a synonym of dissimilarity.


BrazilHere we recall the work of Roberto da Matta, in his book called “Carnavais, malandros e herois” (1979) about Brazilian society and its dilemma of dealing with equality and hierarchy as a part of the basic structures of Brazilian society.


BrazilIn the equality discourse as a special treatment there is a subtle distinction. Inequality is no longer mentioned, however it is understood that the principle does not demand identical treatment, under any circumstances, to all people. Inspired by the foundation of the North American Supreme Court under the Equal Protection of the Laws Clause (CASTRO, 1983 e SILVA, 2001), since the laws, under functional aspect, classify situations, telling them apart, to then submit them to the discipline of these or those rules, it is mandatory to question which are the juridically intolerable discriminations and which are the ones protected by the jurisprudence, in order to investigate the violation of the juridical equality principle.


BrazilThus, the constitutional principle of equality implies a duty of equality for the State, which is unfolded into equalitarian treatment if the considered situations present equal circumstances but it authorizes special treatment if the situations are diverse.


BrazilFor instance, the Brazilian Criminal Procedure Code, in its article 295 states that special prison (which means being apart from the others inmates) shall be provided to certain people such as: judges, jury members, lawyers policemen, priests, school teachers, people with a graduation degree, military personnel, etc… At least a dozen of other statues give this privilege to other different kind of people. Many scholars complain about to whom this kind of prison is entitled to such as people with a graduation degree, but few of them argue the abolishment of the privilege at all (REIS, 2010).


BrazilFor those who share the special treatment representation, it is understood that the criteria which shall guide the acceptance and adoption of special legal treatment must observe three basic lines of direction, according to BANDEIRA DE MELLO (1993): a) A constitutional decision for equal

treatment, if there isn’t a constitutional authorization for special treatment;

b) demanding special treatment presumes the existence of essentially different situations;c) the special treatment must be in harmony with the plenitude of constitutional order.


BrazilAccording to Brazilian legal culture (DUARTE, 2001), it is the role of the interpreter (mostly the judge) of the law to establish when there is or there is not a situation that demands equal treatment which so far does not sound very specific about Brazil. But there are local differences to be stressed.


BrazilIf there is not a reasonable justification for the use of special treatment, it is assumed that the principle of equality was violated, consequently maintaining the juridical inequality (in the case of the special prison, for instance, scholars do not recognize formal education as valid cause for special treatment, although judges in general grant it. See Brazilian Supreme Court, HC 109129 SP, Min (Justice). MARCO AURÉLIO, on 08/05/2012).


BrazilBut there are no previous standards to inform when it is reasonable or not to treat people differently. There is no link to different levels of scrutiny nor to the type of interest that would be met by the statute. It is the interpreter according to his own particular view of the case that will decide when the situation demands or not equal treatment. Each case is decided in an isolated fashion (we must bare in mind that Brazil is part of the civil law tradition), which is not enforceable to other judges unless there is a legal command about it. (DUARTE and IORIO, 2010 and 2014).


BrazilThe key of the argument lies on the thought of justified special treatment, that has to be justified to the judge, according to his own legal sensibility, and when it is evoked, breaks the possibility of comparison among equals, because it alludes to the idea of difference or inequality (according to the two streams of thoughts), and, therefore, it withdraws possibility of attesting juridical inequality. But it is the judge´s own view, which has to be based on norms, but as he reads and give them meaning, whom does not have to follow the legal doctrine necessarily nor the upper Courts decisions (unless there is a legal statue saying so such as in the case of art. 103 A of the 1988 Constitution “Article 103-A.


BrazilThe Federal Supreme Court may, ex-officio or upon request, upon decision of two thirds of its members, and following reiterated judicial decisions on constitutional matter, issue a summula (restatement of case law) which, as from publication in the official press, shall have a binding effect upon the lower bodies of the Judicial Power and the direct and indirect public administration, in the federal, state, and local levels, and which may also be reviewed or revoked, as set forth in law”).


BrazilThe empirical data about this can be verified in some of our previous works where we have dealt specifically with judicial decision making as well as case decisions such as DUARTE (2007a); DUARTE an IORIO FILHO 2007b, 2010, 2011; IORIO FILHO (2009).


BrazilThe argumentative subtleness informed by both “streams of thought” confirms that the juridical equality problem is not easily solved neither in the discourse level nor in the judicial representation’s level. If the effort of legitimation of the inequality discourse simply understood as equality is dismissed, as a violator prima-facie of the equality commandment, it is recognized as legit the equality discourse as a special treatment. However, the dilemma remains to be solved.


BrazilIf the lack of semantic determination of the value of equality makes it a subject to criticism that ends up confusing and questioning the legitimation of the jurisdictional activity reasoning effort, put to practice in the cases involving the equality principle, it is also noticeable that the non characterization of the violation to the principle should be thoroughly examined using the concrete fact which has been presented and the factual/real circumstances which involve the subjects, leading us to a high degree of judicial leeway, based on elements which are strictly argumentative, and it offers a chance for the particularization, individualization in the application of the law, which should be for all, universal, and not for only some.


BrazilTherefore, on one hand, the aprioristic criteria are limited in outlining the indication of potential aggression, which will become evident after the actual judicial exam of the chosen legal treatment, of its consequences before the constitutional ordering and of its relation to the personal quality of the subjects involved - which are, however, not always seen because of the naturalization of inequality as it occurs on hierarchical societies, such as Brazil.


BrazilOn the other hand, the total absence of a guideline suggests a low rationality system, where it is not possible to clarify the choices made by the judge, and so it strengthens or weakens the possibility of social control, therefore being useful as a way of perpetuating situations of privilege, reinforcing again, on a judicial ground, the naturalization of inequality.

SOME CONCLUSIONS

This perception allows that legal inequalities in law and in law enforcement in the Brazilian legal culture subside as a natural feature of the system. While in contrast the equal protection clause, for the Americans, provides that equality is to treat citizens as the same, assuming that all are equal, which implies at the same point that people´s differences cannot be hold as a way of preventing the exercise of a right that already belong to them. Soon these categories do not behave the same way neither they share same meanings or senses as we intend to investigate better in the future.

SOME CONCLUSIONS

Inside a constitutional republican regime, intensified by a lack of agreement between the Courts and their social functions, the naturalization of inequality not only intensifies the perverse effects of the mentioned Brazilian dilemma , but also sustains the creation of new paradoxes, such as, the admittance of a tutorial State, which “compensates” social inequalities, and which holds up the fundamental rights that should be given to the citizens, who are considered free and equal by the same institutions which defend them, and which weakens the responsible practice of the subjects autonomy, as the holder of reciprocal rights and obligations.

SOME CONCLUSIONS

At the end, this situation prevents new forms of social relations to be engaged in society, given that there is no favorable place for disruption and changes. In this way the inequality is endured and repeated in our society, expressed by privileges and exclusions.

REFERENCES

BANDEIRA DE MELLO, Celso Antônio. O conteúdo jurídico do princípio da igualdade. 3. ed. São Paulo: Malheiros, 1993.BERMAN, Harold. La formación de la tradición jurídica de ocidente. México: Fondo de Cultura Econômica, 1996.BICKEL, Alexander. The least dangerous branch: the Supreme Court at the bar of poli tics. 2.ed. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1986. BOURDIEU, Pierre. O Poder Simbólico. trad. Fernando Tomaz. Rio de Janeiro: Bertrand Brasil, 1989.____. A força do direito. Elementos para uma sociologia do campo jurídico. In: Pierre Bourdieu. O Poder Simbólico. Rio de Janeiro: DIFEL, 1989, p. 209-255.

REFERENCES

____. A Economia das Trocas Simbólicas. São Paulo: EDUSP,1992.____. Questões de Sociologia. Lisboa : Fim de Século, 2004.____. Campo Intelectual e Projeto Criador. In: Problemas do Estruturalismo. Rio de Janeiro: Zahar Editores, 1968.___. Sociologia. São Paulo: Ática, 1983.BRINKS, Daniel. M., “Faithful servants of the regime. The Brazilian Constitutional Court’s Role under the 1988 Constitution”. In: GRETCHEN, Helmke, RIOS-FIGUEROA, Julio. (Orgs.). Courts in Latin America. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2011, p.128-153.

REFERENCES

CASTRO, Carlos Roberto de Siqueira . O princípio da isonomia e a igualdade da mulher no direito constitucional. Rio de Janeiro: Forense, 1983.CASTRO, Marcus Faro de. O Supremo Tribunal Federal e a Judicialização da Política. Revista Brasileira de Ciências Sociais. São Paulo, vol. 12, nº34, junho de 1997, pp. 147-156. ____. “The Courts, Law, and Democracy in Brazil”. International Social Science Journal, v.49, n.152, 1997b, p.241 - 252. CHARAUDEAU, Patrick. Discurso Político. São Paulo: Contexto, 2006. ____. Uma teoria dos sujeitos da linguagem. In: MARI, H.; MACHADO, I. L; MELLO, R. Análise do Discurso: fundamentos e práticas. Belo Horizonte: NAD/FALE/UFMG, 2001. p. 23-38. ____. MAINGUENEAU, Dominique. Dicionário de Análise do Discurso. São Paulo: Contexto, 2004.

REFERENCES

DAMATTA, Roberto. Carnavais malandros e heróis. Para uma sociologia do dilema brasileiro. Rio de Janeiro: Zahar, 1979.DUARTE, Fernanda; VIEIRA, José Ribas. Teoria da mudança constitucional. Rio de Janeiro: Renovar, 2005. ____. et al. Os direitos à honra e à imagem pelo Supremo Tribunal Federal – Laboratório de Análise Jurisprudencial. Rio de Janeiro: Renovar, 2006.____. A construção da verdade no processo civil e a igualdade jurídica. II Seminário Internacional de Gestão em Segurança Pública e Justiça Criminal, promovido pelo NUFEP - Núcleo Fluminense de Estudos e Pesquisas da UFF, na Universidade Federal Fluminense, em julho de 2007a.____. IORIO FILHO, Rafael Mario. Por uma gramática das decisões judiciais. In Anais do XIX Encontro Nacional do CONPEDI,Fortaleza – CE, 2010. Disponível em:< http://www.conpedi.org.br/manaus/arquivos/anais/fortaleza/3281.pdf>. Acesso em 24 jun 2014.

REFERENCES

______. A impossibilidade da igualdade jurídica no Brasil. IX Reunião de Antropologia do Mercosul, Grupo de Trabalho (GT 068): Violencia y procesos institucionales de administracion de conflictos. Perspectivas comparadas Curitiba, 2011. Disponível em:< https://www.e-science.unicamp.br/gpd/admin/publicacoes/documentos/publicacao_5346_A%20impossibilidade%20da.pdf>. Acesso em 24 jun 2014. _____. Supremo Tribunal Federal: uma proposta de análise jurisprudencial – a igualdade jurídica e a imunidade parlamentar. In Anais do CONPEDI. Belo Horizonte: Boiteux, 2007b, p. 1097.____. O Supremo Tribunal Federal e o processo como estratégia de poder: uma pauta de análise. Revista SJRJ nº 19 , Rio de Janeiro, 2007, p. 109.____. Imunidade parlamentar e análise do discurso jurisprudencial do Supremo Tribunal Federal. Âmbito Jurídico, v. 94, p. 10624, 2011.____. IORIO FILHO, Rafael Mario; GIMENES, M. M. S. . Constituição, Discurso Jurídico e Decisão Judicial. Revista AJUFE, v. 23, p. 61-68, 2006.

REFERENCES

____. Princípio Constitucional da Igualdade. Rio de Janeiro: Lumen Iuris, 2001.FRIEDMAN, Lawrence M.The Legal System: A Social Science Perspective. New York: Russell Sage Foundation, 1975.GARAPON, Antoine. PAPADOPOULOS, Ioannis. Julgar nos Estados Unidos e na França. Cultura jurídica francesa e common Law em uma perspectiva comparada. Rio de Janeiro: LúmenIuris, 2008.GEERTZ, Clifford. Local Knowledge: Further Essays in Interpretive Anthropology.New York: Basic Books, 1983.____.The Interpretation Of Cultures. New York: Basic Books, 1973.

REFERENCES

GLUCKMAN, Max. The Reasonable Man in Barotse Law. In: DUNDES, Alan. Every man his way: readings in cultural anthropology. Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1968, pp. 252-275 (Prentice-Hall Anthropology Series).HART, H. L. A. The concept of Law. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1961.IORIO FILHO, Rafael Mario. Uma questão de cidadania: o papel do Supremo Tribunal Federal na intervenção federal (1988-2008). Tese de doutorado em Direito. Rio de Janeiro: Universidade Gama Filho, 2009.____. A bricolagem de Lévy-Strauss e as decisões do Supremo Tribunal Federal. In: 7º Encontro da Associação Brasileira de Ciência Política, 2010, Recife-PE. 7º Encontro da Associação Brasileira de Ciência Política, 2010.____. Duarte, Fernanda. A bricolagem da doutrina jurídica acerca da intervenção federal. Revista SJRJ, Rio de Janeiro, v. 25, p. 353-375, 2009.KANT DE LIMA, Roberto; VARELLA, Alex. Saber Jurídico e Direito à Diferença no Brasil: questões de teoria e método em uma perspectiva comparada. In: KANT DE LIMA, Roberto. Ensaios de Antropologia e de Direito: acesso à justiça e processos institucionais de administração de conflitos e produção da verdade jurídica em uma perspectiva comparada.Rio de Janeiro: Lumens Juris, 2008, p. 89-126.

REFERENCES

____. Sensibilidades jurídicas, saber e poder: bases culturais de alguns aspectos do direito brasileiro em uma perspectiva comparada. Anuário Antropológico, Rio de Janeiro: Edições Tempo Brasileiro, v. 2009-2, pp. 25-51, 2010. ____. Carnavais, malandros e heróis: o dilema brasileiro do espaço público. In: GOMES, Laura Graziela; BARBOSA Lívia; DRUMMOND, José Augusto (Orgs.). O Brasil não é para principiantes. Rio de Janeiro: FGV, p. 105-123, 2000.LÉVI-STRAUSS, Claude. O Pensamento Selvagem. 2. ed. São Paulo: Ed. Nacional, 1976.LOBO TORRES, Ricardo. Os direitos humanos e a tributação: imunidades e isonomia. Renovar: Rio de Janeiro, 1995.MARSHALL, T.H. Cidadania, Status e classe social. Rio de Janeiro: Zahar, 1967.MOSCOVICI, Serge. On social representations. In: R. FARR & S. MOSCOVICI (org.). Social Representations. Cambridge: University Press, 1981.

REFERENCES

NADER, Laura. TODD JR, Harry F. The disputing process – Law in ten societies. New York: Columbia University Press, 1978.OLIVEIRA, Luís Roberto Cardoso de. Concepções de igualdade e (des)igualdades no Brasil (uma proposta de pesquisa). In: LIMA, Roberto Kant; EILBAUM, Lucía; e PIRES, Lênin (orgs). Conflitos, direitos e moralidades em perspectiva comparada. Rio de Janeiro: Garamond, 2010, p. 19-36.____. Concepções de igualdade e cidadania. Contemporânea – Revista de Sociologia da UFSCar. Dossiê Diferenças e (Des) Igualdades. São Carlos. n. 1, jan-jun. 2011, pp. 35-48.SAHLINS, Marshall. Cultura e razão prática. Rio de Janeiro: Zahar, 1979, p. 185-258.SEM, Amartya. Desigualdade reexaminada. Rio de Janeiro: Record, 2001.SILBEY, Susan S. Legal culture and cultures of legality. Access on 02/19/2014. Available at: http://web.mit.edu/anthropology/pdf/articles/silbey/silbey_legal_cu.pdf.SIMIÃO, Daniel Schroeter. Igualdade Jurídica e diversidade: dilemas brasileiros e timorenses em perspectiva comparada. In: MELLO, Kátia Sento Sé; MOTA, Fabio Reis; SINHORETTO, Jacqueline. (Orgs.). Sensibilidades jurídicas e sentidos de justiça na contemporaneidade: interlocução entre antropologia e direito. Niterói: Editora da UFF, 2013, p. 33-50.

http://web.mit.edu/anthropology/pdf/articles/silbey/silbey_legal_cu.pdf

http://web.mit.edu/anthropology/pdf/articles/silbey/silbey_legal_cu.pdf

REFERENCES

TAYLOR, Matthew. Judging Policy: Courts and Policy Reform in Democratic Brazil. Palo Alto, CA, Stanford University Press, 2008.

Fernanda Duarte, PhD - PPGD-UNESA, INCT-InEAC, UFF. E-mail: [email protected] Iorio, PhD - PPGD/UNESA, INCT-InEAC. E-mail: [email protected] you!

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