CHAPTER SEVEN

RELIGIOUS REASONS IN POLITICAL DEBATE:

JEFFREY STOUT AND THE TRADITION

OF DEMOCRACY

ANTHONY J. LANGLOIS

"Cultivate the virtues of democratic speech, love justice, and say what you please." -Jeffrey Stout.1

. My subject i.s the proper relationship between religion and politics in hberal democracies. My focus-the theme is much to broad to be considered coll_lprehe~siv~ly here-will be the recent work of Jeffrey Stout, made avmlable m his book Democracy and Tradition2, along with some of the d~bate that has been generated by the publication of this book. Once I have g~ven a gener~l over.view of .stout's book, I want to detail three aspects of his argument m particular. FirSt among these will be his general argument about the use of religious reasons in political debate. Second 1 will consider his account of what it means for liberal democracies to b: secular soci~ties. ~hese ~wo .~ections will be mainly expository. In my third sectiOn I will consider the hypercontext, modernity,"3 and will move from exposition to critical reflection upon Stout's argument.

Stout is based at Princeton University, and has now written three books which have all been considered by his contemporaries as major intellectual events. Both his The Flight from Authoritl and Ethics After Babet5

1 Jeffrey Stout, Democracy and Tradition (Princeton: Princeton University Press

2004), 85. , 2 Stout, Democracy and Tradition, 85. 3

Sabina Lovibond, "Religion and Modernity: Living in the Hypercontext " {oumal of Religious Ethics 33: 4 (2005): 623. '

Jeffrey Stout, The FlightfromAuthority (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1981).

Religious Reasons in Political Debate 179

engaged with the major questions of contemporary moral philosophy. In the book we consider here, Democracy and Tradition (to which bracketed page numbers shall refer), Stout links his earlier concerns much more explicitly with their consequences for our shared political life. When I speak of his contemporaries, I refer to thinkers such as Alasdair Macintyre, Richard Rorty and Stanley Hauerwas, all of whom are friends and colleagues of Stout; all of whom are also subject to his critical scrutiny in this volume. Macintyre, famous for After Virtue,6 and Hauerwas­America's leading theologian, according to no less an authority than Time magazine7 (!)-have both made their mark as strident critics of liberal democracy. Stout says Macintyre thinks of liberalism as an "obviously incoherent project" (129), and Hauerwas has argued repeatedly "that if the [Christian] gospel is true, the politics of liberalism must be false" (140). 8

In his view, freedom and justice are bad ideas-to take the subtitle of one of his popular books. Given these sorts of attitudes on the part of two of the English speaking world's most prominent religious thinkers, it is no wonder that Richard Rorty's response to the question of dialogue about politics with the religious is to call it a non-starter: "in political discussion with those outside the relevant religious community, [religion] is a conversation-stopper" (85).9

Wisely, however, Stout does not think that our capacity to talk sensibly about religion is limited to the sparring rhetoric of prominent intellectuals. While his book is concerned in large part to interrogate the objections put by Macintyre, Hauerwas, Rorty and company, it is also concerned to present a very strong case for looking at the democratic behaviour of ordinary people-the people who comprise our liberal democratic societies-people, moreover who are diversely religious and nonreligious, and who nonetheless maintain a constitutional democracy, and thereby hold to the social practices and norms of what Stout describes as the democratic tradition. Stout puts it like this:

5 Jeffrey Stout, Ethics After Babel (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2001 (1988)). 6 Alistair Macintyre, After Virtue (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1984). 7 Jean Bethke E1shtain, ''Theologian: Christian Contrarian", Time 158: 11, Monday 17 September 2001, in Time's "America's Best" series of articles: http://www. time.com/time/magazine/0,9263, 7601010917 ,OO.html. 8 Stanley Hauerwas, A Better Hope: Resources for a Church Confronting Capitalism, Democracy and Postmodemity (Grand rapids: Brazos Press, 2000), 124. 9 Richard Rorty, "Religion as a Conversation Stopper" in Richard Rorty, Philosophy and Social Hope (London: Penguin Books, 1999), 168-74.

180 Chapter Seven

My conception of the civic nation is · · on activities held in pr~g"!atzc m the sense that it focuses

common as constitutive of the lit' a1 · But the activities in question are not to be understood ?o Ic 1 commuruty. terms. They are activities in which no r . m mere y procedural as well as discussed The conuru.'t rma Ive comillltments are embedded do 0 ° ments are substantive They 'd h Iscusswn, but they are also constantly . d' . . gm e t e

not fully determinate The . . . m. Js~u~e •. SUbJect to revision, and

~han fully explicit in ·the f:r;r~;;~~i~:o~~~~~ :i~~~a~:~soning, .r?ther

0 ; ;~n~~~~s~e ~::~~ n~eto reduce them to a deter~nate sy~~~o;;t:fes~ "tradition" to bring them in!o :o:~;~o we need the historical category of

Democracy and Tradition has three arts Th fi · virtues of the A . I' p . e rrst considers the' democratic

mencan po Ity-piety 1 d h · book Stout e I h . , ove an ope. In this part of the in c~nversati~~ 0:~~ :s::~~:rs, :;~:is ~wn ~mersoh~ian perfectionism, Ellison Dewey E S y mencan t mkers-Whitman

, , merson. tout argues th t · '

~~~:rs~:~ls~m;:ic:0~o1Iitdicalftcommuni~y-p;tic~;:~n~:~sea~~~sli~~ . . e e a er a social contract- "' ff' · histoncal and sociological, Th . . . are msu Iciently h " . . . · us, m pursmt of Amen can self understandin a~t~~~;s :a~~~r:~e ~~hg:~st vAisions. and perfectionist projects that ha!

. . s mencans... only then tr · philosophical account of the romise . . . ~ons uctmg a culture" (21). p and dangers Implicit m our political

whor;e ;:c~~~psar~thof the book di~ .its c?re. Here Stout addresses those e new tra ItiOnahsts" d b Macintyre 11 Sta 1 H 12 -represente Y Alastair

, n ey auerwas and John Milbank 13 E h f h authors has put forward a co f . · ac o t ese criticisms of liberal democrac~u;h~y 7~:k~n:~ch are excoriating in t~eir atomizin~ force, one which spells the do;m of ~~~~:~~~t~: ~estruct!ve, ~hus setting up a democracy/tradition dichotomy. Modernityy li~! b~mg, d::~~~~c~to~!l t~~~~: ~~~t t~~r :::c~~~~i~~~~~ltosgiarcael wrmo~em~~~s Ih~~

ong m t eir

10 Stout, Democracy and Tradition 5 11 ' 0

Macintyre After Virtue; Alistair Maclnt Wh . . . f~otre Dame: University of Notre Dame Pr:S:~ 198~{.e Justzce, Whzch Ratwnality

Stanley Hauerwas, A Better Hope· Resourc Capitalism, Democracy and Postmode. 'ty (G ~ fo~ a Church Confronting Stanley Hauerwas The Hauerw R rnzd ran rapids: Brazos Press, 2000); sartwright (Durha~: Duke Univer:~y p;:sserzo~f) John Berkman and Michael

John Milbank et al Rad' l 0 h d ' · Milbank, Theology and Social ~:eoryrtC:Xf~~: ~~~~d:~{l, ~~~~~dge 1999); John

Religious Reasons in Political Debate 181

analysis, and he fears that their influence, particularly within the strong and vibrant Christian community that exists in the USA, could be corrosive for American democracy. In close and supererogatory immanent criticism of these three authors, Stout tries to show us and them that the democratic tradition of the American polity is not a threat, but in fact may be imagined as fulfilling the virtues of the religious traditions the new traditionalists aspire to preserve.

In the third part of the book, Stout articulates, in terms derived from the American pragmatist tradition of philosophy (especially, now, through the influence of Robert Brandom, 14 a democratic traditionalism which he hopes can make sense, for a diverse and pluralistic citizenry, of the way in which as citizens we hold each other responsible for the reasons we give about matters ethical and political. The democratic traditionalism which Stout conceives is an exercise in expressive rationality. It is, he says, "a matter of making explicit in the form of a claim a kind of commitment that would otherwise remain implicit and obscure" (12)-but nonetheless, a commitment Stout argues that we are constituted by as we practice democracy, and a commitment which is objectively ethical and essentially linked to fully fledged truth claims (14).

It is worth noting, as David Reidy has, that in his book Stout models the three virtues which he argues exemplify the American democratic tradition: piety, love and hope. His engagement with Whitman, Ellison, Dewey and Emmerson is one of piety. With Macintyre, Hauerwas and Milbank

1. The Use of Religious Reasons

The democratic tradition in America-as in most liberal democracies­has led to the institutionalisation of certain rights and freedoms. Two of these which are central for our purposes are the right to freedom of expression and the right to freedom of religion. It seems odd then, on the face of it, that the most prominent political theorist of recent decades, John Rawls, should hold that the claiming of these rights in the context of political discussions is in some sense unethical-a demeanor that may only be excused if one's religious reasons can at some later date be backed up by non-religious ones. Stout argues that this oddness is compounded by

14 Robert B. Brandom, Making It Explicit: Reasoning, Representing, and Discursive Commitment (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1994); see also Jeffrey Stout, "Radical Interpretation and Pragmatism: Davidson, Rorty, and Brandom on Truth" in Radical Interpretation in Religion, ed. Nancy K. Frankenberry (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002).

182 Chapter Seven

the historical reality that much of the great oratory and speechifying which have been "instances of exemplary democratic reasoning" in America have been firmly based in religion- key references here being to the Abolitionists, to Martin Luther King Jr. (69) and to Abraham Lincoln (70). "Something is very wrong here," says Stout:

The speeches of King and Lincoln represent high accomplishments in our public political culture. They are paradigms of discursive excellence. The speeches of the Abolitionists taught their compatriots how to use the terms "slavery" and "justice" as we now use them. It is hard to credit any theory that treats their arguments as placeholders for reasons to be named later (70).

Stout's concerns are not merely with historical accuracy. He is also concerned about the present. Contrary to the expectations of many secular liberals, America has not lost its enthusiasm for religion, as much of Western Europe has. Indeed, Western Europe is very much the exception to the norm when it comes to the role of religion in society-one only needs to look at Asia or Africa to see this. But Stout in concerned with America, and as his focus on the new traditionalists makes clear, these public intellectuals and their religious followers have no patience whatsoever with the view that they are not to speak their minds and hearts about politics. Stout's concern is that the prevalence of the Rawlsian account of liberal democracy has set up a significant ambivalences, even hostility, among American Christians about whether democracy is a good thing. Stout's concern is about the viability of democracy, and more specifically, about its viability if the majority of Americans who have religious inclinations become alienated from democratic procedures­something which would seem inevitable if they are being told that they must leave their religious identity at the door of the town hall. As Stout says,

Liberalism, according to Hauerwas, is a secularist ideology that masks a discriminatory program for policing what religious people can say in public. The appropriate response, he sometimes implies, is to condemn freedom and the democratic struggle for justice as "bad ideas" for the church. Over the next several decades this message will be preached in countless sermons throughout the heartland of the nation (76).

Stout is no advocate on the part of religion-as he says in a response to one of his interlocutors about the book, he left theism thirty years ago. But he is a keen advocate of democracy, and he thinks the religious have a point-or at least, he sympathizes with their frustration over Rawls'

Religious Reasons in Political Debate 183

H uotes from Calvinist philosopher rendering of liberal!Sdemocracy.d ecaie of democracy-to this effect: Nicolas W olterstorff -also an a vo

. . . . f a ood many religious people in our It belongs to the religious convictl~n~~cisi;ns concerning fundamental iss~es society that they ?ugh~ t? base th~lr. ns The do not view it as an optlOn of justice on theu religious conv~ctlo .. f y that they ought to strive for whether or not t~ do. it. It i~ th~~ t~~~rvll~:~s~ that they ought to allow the wholeness, integnty, mtegratlOn 1 h the command and example of Jesus, Word of God, the teachin~s of. the Tor:s 'a whole, including, then, their social or whatever, to shape their .exist~~ce . t for them about something other and political existence. Th~~r rehgi~n l~;.o lt is also 'about their social and than their social and poli~cal existen .' f them that they not base their political existence. Accordmgly, t~ reqm~~· oal issues on their religion is to dec~sions. and .dibsc1ussi~~~e cFr~~:~~~~s~~f ~~eir religion (72). 16 infnnge, meqmta y, o

. I a keen advocate of democracy; Rawls, one must hasten ~o add, lS a:: t he developed and promoted the indeed, it is because of t~l~ ~dvo~achear~ of his liberal theory. As we have idea of public reason whlc. lS ~tl e . natl'on anyway-in not inimical

. . R wls-m h1s ater mcar . th t noted m passmg: . a . ublic debate, with the key proviso a to the use of rehgwus reasons :~ p 'th non religious reasons. This can be they can be backed. up even~ua f~tWlthat the language that many people seen as a concesswn to t e 1' . al . es l·s going to be thelr first . d' USS po ltlC lSSU . instinctiVely use. ~o lSC lar But for Rawls the risk of confhct over language, the rehgwus .vern~u 1 . ical conflict, but real conflict betwe~n religious reasons- not JU~t 1 eo og His hope for the diffusion of confhct individuals and groups-Is t?o ~~a:~or basis" for our political views. and is the "quest for a co~o~ JUS~l ~ it~ potential universal appeal m a argumentation, a basis .at . m s 17

freestanding conception of JUStlce (67 /8).

-----------,-,--:--:Stout on Democracy and its Contemporary 15 See Nicholas Wolterstorff Je~f~ey E h. 33· 4 (2005); and Wolterstorff, "The Christian Critics," Journal of Relzgz~us t~ zcs f Political Issues" in Religion in the

. . · Decision and D1scuss10n o and Role ofReligwn m A d' and Wolterstorff (London: Rowman Public Square, ed. Robert u 1

Littlefield, 1997). " we should reject what liberalism tells us about Nicholas Wolterstorff, Why . . ons" in Religion and Contemporary speaking and acting in pub~ic for re(~~us~::e· University of Notre Dame Press, Liberalism, ed. Paul J. Welthman ore .

1997). " R 1 f Religion in Decision and Discussion of Political 16 Wolterstorff, The o e o

issues," 105. . . . 1. (New York: Columbia University Press, 1993). 11 John Rawls, Pollt!cal Lzbera zsm

184 Chapter Seven

The key idea in this discussion is R 1 , . Stout puts it, "The unqualified versio aw s .~d~al of Public Reason. As original clothbound edition of Poli~c~~ thl~ lde~l, put forward in the reasoning in the public for h ld Lzberall~m, held that your principles that no reasonable u;r s ou l~ppeal Strictly to ideals and agreeing to this ideal, citizens ente~~~t~~u ~e;sonably reject" (65). By we move to Rawls veil of ignorance h. s~c~~ contra~t-.and from there the priority of the right over the g d, lds pnnclples of JUShce as fairness,

B . oo , an so on ut what lS a reasonable person? "In sh "

reasonable is to accept the need :li · . ort, says Stout, "to be rea~on on the basis of it, at least :~e~ :~~~1 co~tra~t and to b~ willing to basic constitutional and political matters" (~;~tmg ~n the pubhc forum on consequence of ruling unreasonabl . This has the unfortunate Rawls project-the quest for e anyone who doubts the viability of moral and political views. A a~n c~~~n" system for the justification of sense of "socially cooperath~ , ,R o~t. To count as reasonable, in the contractarian quest for a co' aw ~ a~sumes that ~ne must find his problem," Stout continues "is~~~ ~ust,lficatory . basis plausible. My more mildly: I am not pers~aded t: t .. on t. find this quest plausible. Or 8). a lt lS gmng to meet with success" (67-

. Stout quotes from an interview that Rawls IB lt Rawls is expressing hi's h gave to Commonweal -in

. . concern t at we m t 'd rehgwus wars; he argues that the onl w u~ avm the return of be the adoption of a position like th y a~ t~ avoid them would seem to should do is turn around and sa e o~e e as developed: "See, what I solution to it? And I can't y, whhat s the better solution, what's your

. · see any ot er solut' " s . bnef, and he believes that he h Ion. tout takes this as his alternative. Part of the alternatl. as managed to come up with a viable

ve rests on a d's . about whether the offering of 1' . 1 agreement Wlth Rawls disrespectful: re Igwus reasons need be thought of as

18

Suppose I tell you honestly why I favor . . . . . reasons. I then draw you into a S . a giVen pohcy, cltmg religious seriously the obiections you . ocratJc. conversatiOn on the matter, take

" raise against my p · concerted attempt to show ou how . . r~nuses, .and make a reason t? accept my conciJsions. Al~~; ~~~lsyn~ratJc prenuses gi~e you and avoid manipulating you N I d e, take care to be smcere .... ow, o not see wh th' as a form of disrespect Yet 1·t d . Y IS would qualify · · · oes not mvolve basi · pnnc1ples that no reasonable citizen ld n~ my reasonmg on

cou reasonably reJect (72).

!ohn. Rawls, Collected Papers, d S UmversJty Press, 1999). e . amuel Freeman (Cambridge: Harvard

Religious Reasons in Political Debate 185

For Rawls, respect comes by only giving reasons that anyone would find acceptable. For Stout, this is a very limited conception of respect, and it drives the constraints of reason giving in Rawls theory. By contrast, says Stout, "Socratic questioning is a principle tool of justificatory discourse as well as a way of expressing respect for one's interlocutor as a (potential) lover of justice and sound thinking. But it does not proceed from an already agreed-on common basis" (emphasis added) (73).

So, these can be seen as Stout's two main disagreements with Rawls: Rawls' strictures on what counts as respectful reason giving, and his expectation that we must proceed on the basis of a common justificatory discourse. Stout thinks that this picture of how liberal democracy works ignores much of what goes on in actual democratic practice-where "candid expression and immanent criticism-declaration and conjecture" (73) all play a part. For Stout, Rawls' form of reasoning is so idealized that it is disconnected from what is actual, achievable and desirable in democratic practice.

For Rawls, a reasonable person is someone who proceeds on the basis of the "discursive rules of the imagined common basis on all essential matters." Stout is sceptical about the existence of such a common basis, and moreover, fails to see that it is necessary for someone to be considered reasonable. How is it, he asks in effect, that someone who is asking for and offering reasons, who takes competing views on their own terms to think them through, who engages in self-criticism and immanent criticism of others' views, who is prepared to engage with the distinctive view of individuals in society piecemeal and point by point-how is it that this person is not a reasonable person? Stout complains that the problem is with the social contractarian's failure of imagination: he or she cannot imagine ethical and political discourse proceeding dialogically. The consequence is that they end up with what Stout calls a "poor man's communitarianism": "a sort of all-purpose, abstract fairness or respect for others" (74). The conse·quence is that what would normally be thought of as "a sensible, widely shared vague ideal"-that of reasonableness-has been turned into "a clear, fixed, deontological requirement built into the common basis of our reasoning." While most, or at any rate, many people qualify as reasonable according to the vague ideal, few quality under Rawls' strict requirement. And Stout's particular worry here is that because those who don't qualify are apt to see Rawlsian accounts of liberal democracy as descriptively authoritative, these same accounts become grist for the anti-democratic mill of the new traditionalists and others. The sad irony, for Stout, is that Rawls' account is neither descriptively accurate

186 Chapter Seven

no: normatively desirable. The following long quotation from Stout articulates the nub of his argument with Rawls:

Rawls derives his idea of public reason from conceptions of fairness and respect that are in fact to be found in the political culture of modern d~mocracy. ~ut he develops this idea in a way that brings it into tension With conceptiOns ~f free expression and basic rights that also belong to the same . culture. It. IS not cle:rr why this tension should be resolved by adoptmg a Rawls1an conceptiOn of public reason. It seems more reasonable to s~ppose that one _should try to argue from universally justifiable preffilses, whenever this seems both wise and possible, while feeling free no~etheless to pursue other argumentative strategies when they seem wise. ~1s. wo~ld be t~ t~eat th~ idea of public reason as a vague ideal, instead of re1fy1~g 1t morahst1cally mto a set of fixed rules for public discussion. The ~ruth 1_n the contractarian argument for restraint is that it would indeed be zdeal 1f we could resolve any given political controversy on the basis of reasons that none of us could reasonably reject. But it has not been demon.strated_ that all important controversies can be resolved on this sort of b_asJs, so 1t seems unwise to treat the idea of public reason as if it entmled a~ a~l-purpose. principle of restraint. The irony here is that the contractanan_ mterpretatwn of the idea of public reason is itself something that many epJsteffilcally and morally responsible citizens would be entitled on the basis of their own collateral beliefs, to reject (75). '

Moreover, as the large body of work that is critical of Rawls suggests, his form of reasonableness, and his justice as fairness, in the end default into a comprehens_ive conception of the good-one of many that are, one hopes, eve!. so pohtel_Y and reasonably fighting it out in the fray of democratic politics. ~tou~ ~s not the o?ly skeptic about the possibility of establishing a comn_10n JUStificatory basis for democratic politics; nor is he the only one to pomt out tha~ Rawls' account dramatically tilts the playing field to the advant~ge of his own ~u.bstanti~~ vie~: ·:The charge being made by [Rawls ] secular an~ rehgwus cntics ahke IS that he is wrong to expect ev~rybody to_ argue In the same terms, which just happen to be a slightly ~djust~d verswns of the same terms dictated by his comprehensive secular hberahsm" (76).19

Bef~re going on to discuss the viability and desirability of the alternative that Stout puts forward, I want to recount Stout's articulation of t~e story o~ the_ se~~larization of public discourse. It is the perceived VIctory and mevitabdity of secularization that often fuels the calls for an

19 For an extended critique of Stout's reading of Rawls and for Stout's response

see Reidy, "Speaking for the State," and Jeffrey Stout, ;,Response to Five Criticai papers on Democracy and Tradition," Soundings LXXXVII: 3-4 (2004).

Religious Reasons in Political Debate 187

account like that which Rawls gives us. Stout's interpretation of the progress of secularization is crucial for understa~ding .V.:hy it is th~t his democratic reasonableness is still so comfortable with rehgwus reasomng­despite his own personal standing as a secularist.

2. Secularized Public Discourses

Stout is concerned about "theological resentment of the secular" because of its capacity to harm democracy. As we saw above, one of Stout's concerns is that the religious will take the descriptive power of Rawlsian liberalism, with its disavowal of religious reasoning, as an accurate rendering of what democracy is about, and reject it on that basis. For the religious, this account of democracy goes hand in hand with secularism, which includes truth claims which de-legitimize religious belief.

For Stout this is a further blow for democracy. He argues that while the public p~litical and ethical discourse of_ m?de~n democraci~s has become secularized, it is not secularist-secularizatiOn IS not a coffiffiltment to secularism. It in fact makes no assumptions one way or the other on the question of theological truths; nor does it require ~he ~vacuation of religious expression from the public square. Secularism IS a form of comprehensive doctrine-it is a substantive position about what w_e do or do not have a warrant to believe with respect, among other thmgs, to ethical beliefs and their derivation. By contrast, the secularized public sphere is merely a descriptive acknowledgement that th~ publi~ debate, as it takes place in democracies, is not framed by theological behefs that all participants can take for granted (93).

So, Stout says, "My account of secularization concerns what can be taken for granted when exchanging reasons in public setting~" (97): A form of discourse is, therefore, secularized, not because of Ideological beliefs which exclude religion, nor because of beliefs which may deny religion altogether. "The mark of secularization ... is rather the fact that participants in a given discursive practice are not in a ~o.sition to tak~ for granted that their interlocutors are making the same religious a~sumptions they are. This is the sense in which public discourse m modern democracies tends to be secularized" (97).

Secularization does not refer to the content of people's belief systems-to an account of what people should_ or should not bel~eve ~nd why. Rather, it refers to the fact that people beheve what they beh~ve m a pluralistic context where discourse cannot proceed on the basis of a guarantee that X down the road will have the same worldview, or the same

188 Chapter Seven

way of processing ethical questions or . . characteristics as I, in our discussio~ b praise the sam~ set of vrrtues and

There is no doubt that this chan s a out matters ethica.l an? political. means, for example that I·n t ges the n~ture of pubhc discussion: "It

' mos contexts It w·ll · I b · rhetorically speaking, to introduce ex licitl I s~mp y e .Imp~udent, argument to persuade a religiously di~erse ~:~~olog~~al premises mto an expect such premises to be accept d . IC au . Ience. If one cannot will not necessarily advance on , e or .mterpreted Ill a uniform way, it But th. . e s rhetoncal purpose to assert them" (99)

IS IS not at all the same thin as . . . religious belief should be frowned g suggest~ng ~hat m such a society As Stout says: upon, or that It will necessarily decline.

Secularized discourses, as I am definin h or produce participants who lack gli t. em, do no~ necessarily involve · · re g10us comnutment M u

cttlzens profess some sort of b r f . . s. ost .S. discourse is secularized in the sene ~~ m ~od, but thetr public ethical advantage of my account over a~~oua: trymg to s~eci~y. This is a major alleged loss of religious belief or o "d"s of :eculanz:tlon that focus on theory I offer is an account of n ts:nc antment of the world. The public discourse, not an ac~~~~ tr~s~~:s between p~ople engaging in presuppose as individuals. It has nothing t dt t~e: b~lteve, ~ssume, or world as a disenchanted universe empf do f do. "':tt .thetr ~xpenence of the meaning (98). ' te 0 tvme mtent10ns and spiritual

Stout is gravely concerned about the state f d . that people are feeling disenfranchised o emo~rac.y-he IS concerned enclaves which pander to thei b r f ' and ~e mchned to retreat into further exacerbates communica~io: ~e ~~ prejudices, an ~utcome which public life in a civic nation Hi h re . ~wn and the dechne of a vibrant are influenced by the Chri·s· t" s hope hiS t at-at least among those who

Ian c urc es-the · h" democracy (i.e., contra Rawls) and se I . . ways m w Ich he reads feel that they need not betra their cu arizatio? m~~ en~ble people to cooperating democratically wi~ th . J) ~eepe~t. Identities m the act of not mean that people may not s e~Ir f e o.w Citizens. Secularization does what they do about public polic p dod therr de~pest r~asons for believing that these reasons may not be u~da~n th em_o~ratic pra;tice does not require political and ethical matters 0 th e CIVIC nation s. great debates about precisely what democracy is .all ~bo et contrary, accordmg to Stout, this is

s ' u. touts view, then, may be summarized. hr . norms for dealing with the reason th t m t . ee pomts:-:-three implicit religious and non-religious alike ~· ~ ;e use m our political reasoning, having respect for one's fellow. ·/rs, ~ut argues that the key norm of

having to share a common justif~;a~~~~s ba~~ss ;~~ ~e!e~~~~: ~it~z~s:: f~~

Religious Reasons in Political Debate 189

the arguments which we mount, or the reasoning that we present. Second, Stout suggests that one should adopt a twofold rhetorical strategy: one should express one's own reasons or one's beliefs, and one should also engage in "fair-minded, nonmanipulative, sincere immanent criticism against one's opponent's reasons." This, says Stout, is what people commonly do anyway, and is very easy to recognise in practice. Finally, Stout suggests that the virtues are key factors in successfully navigating the pitfalls of democratic civility. Again, I quote at length:

There are people who lack civility, or the ability to listen with an open mind, or the will to pursue justice where it leads, or the temperance to avoid taking and causing offence needlessly, or the practical wisdom to discern the subtleties of a discursive situation. There are also people who lack the courage to speak candidly, or the tact to avoid sanctimonious cant, or the poise to respond to unexpected arguments, or the humility to ask forgiveness from those who have been wronged. Such people are unlikely to express their reasons appropriately, whatever those reasons may be. When it comes to expressing religious reasons, it can take a citizen of considerable virtue to avoid even the most obvious pitfalls. I know of no set of rules for getting such matters right. My advice, therefore, is to cultivate the virtues of democratic speech, love justice, and say what you

please (85).

3. The Hypercontext

" ... and say what you please"? Stout is right-people do say what they please in democracies, and despite Stout's comforting words about the virtues of democratic speech and the love of justice, it is nonetheless the case that Stout also opens a veritable can of worms by disagreeing with Rawls about the possibility of a common justificatory basis for how we might deal with the broad range of things that people want to talk about in democracies. I do not have the scope in this paper to explore the full implications of Stout's disagreement with Rawls on this point. Stout sets out in the final third of his book a pragmatist account of human sociality and ethicality which is quite at odds with anything Rawls would want to endorse. I do want to argue, however, that there is a middle way between Rawls' "policing" of what people should be allowed to say, and Stout's suggestion that people can legitimately say anything they please.

When granted leave to talk, religious people say a great variety of things. Here are some examples. Many say that God created the world, that it is less than 7000 years old, and that we can know this because, as the old Sunday school ditty has it, "the Bible tells me so." There are all kinds of stories in the Bible which people believe literally and draw

190 Chapter Seven

P?l~tical and ethical conclusions about-these range from accounts of dlVlnely . mandated mass genocide, to alleged miracles like the bodily resurrecti~n of peo~le ~om the dead. More immediately for most liberal democracies, the Bible IS used to support the view that men and women are not equal and that sexuality is to be practiced in strictly hetero­monogamous _terms. As Stout says in one of his commentaries on responses to his book, "A politics of the Word can be as uplifting as the Bru:men. Decl~ati?n or as wretched as the sermons that excused the obhteratwn of Indigenous peoples in North America as a consequence of manifest destiny."20

It is clear: then that when _religious people are encouraged to say what the~ pleas~ m ~he _democratic forum, they will make a wide range of clan~s which Impmge on scientific and ethico-political discourses. Preci~ely because their religious commitments hold sway over what ~on~tltutes the love of justice, Stout's formulation that people should love JUSti_ce and say what they please plays no gate keeping function over what sentu~ents may or ~ay n?t ~e e~pressed in the public forum with respect to et~Ics. And ~her~ IS no mdicatlon that the "democratic virtues" which he also mcludes m his for~ul~t.ion ~ould have any similar gate keeping effe~t on what sort of scientific claims one might be able to make in the publ~c forum .. By con~ast, in Rawls' account, there is a very clear gate keepmg function t~at IS ~lay_e? b~ his ideal of public reason-the project of a comm~n ba~Is \or J_ustificatwn. Part of what is implicit in Rawls' a~pea~ to t~Is ~roJect Is his recognition of the hypercontext, and as part of this, his behef m the u~ity of practical reason. Rather than saying what we please, we sho~ld. strive to say what is true-and we have very good reasons fo~ believing that a lot of what the religious say is not true. Therefore It would seem reasonable or rational-here using the terms in t~e vague way that Stout wants-to require that our public political discourse _should p_roc~ed on a basis which excludes the things which some people mi~ht be mchn_ed to say but which are generally known to be unhelpful m the pursmt of those goals for which we hold democratic means to be so central: the living of a good and true life.

The relationship between the context of religious belief and the hypercontext of modernity is, I think, the key to the discussion here. Contex~ loo~s large i~ Stout's discussion of moral truth in ethics. He does not beheve m !he existence of a common morality-whether it is of a natural law variety or of Kantian inspired formalistic liberal variety. The

20 Jeffrey Stout, "Survivors of the Nations: a response to Fergussan and Pecknold "

Scottish Journal of Theology 59: 2 (2006), 232. '

Religious Reasons in Political Debate 191

resolution of moral controversy or conflict does not proceed by appealing to formal or common moral laws that we somehow know in advance; rather, it proceeds piecemeal via case by case loc~l contextu~l

adjudication. It is significantly because of Stout's co~It_ment t~ this moral pragmatism that he is so prepared to countenance religious behef as a legitimate part of our political discussions. He wants people t~ st~t where they are, and to examine the justification of their current behefs_ m an immanent fashion-rather than being told what to believe from outside by the use of reasons that make no sense to their context.

We can explore this through Stout's discussion of the work of Seyla Benhabib.21 Stout praises Benhabib for her recognition of what she terms "the situated self." The argument here is one that Stout completely agrees with-that justification of belief is contextual, that if we are situated selves the reasons we hold may not necessarily be persuasive for someone in a different situation, and so on. But Stout is very critical of Benhabib's dismissal of religion and the view of critical theorists in genera~ that the use of religious reasons shows a "rationality deficit." Stout consid~rs ~hat for many people who were acculturated into religious ways of thi~king, there are any number of different reasons why they may be considered justified to continue believing what they do. . . .

Stout puts the difference between himself and Benhabib _mcely, and m the process helps to highlight the key issue: "If we are all situat~d selves, our reasons will not necessarily carry weight with someone differently situated-not, at any rate, unless the hypercontext called "mo~ern~ty" is the only aspect of our situation that matters" (177). ~y ~~gg~stlon IS that one can go along with Stout's views of truth and JUstificatiOn, an~ ~et come out with a critically different conclusion about the role that religion should play, just to the extent that one gives the hypercontext a greater degree of importance as the "aspect of our situation that matt~rs." If the hypercontext is as pervasive and as indicative of truth related Issue~ as. I think it is then Stout is not in fact justified in making the next move m his argument' against Benhabib-a move which is not only important in his conversation with her, but also for his general conclusions about the ~xtent to which the religious should be encouraged to say what they please m the public political context. . .

Stout says that for Benhabib the hypercontext, modermty, IS the only aspect of our situation that matters. She is wr~ng _he argu~s, because "s_he neglects the possibility that there might be sigmficant differences, with

21 Seyla Benhabib, Situating the Self: Gender, Community, and Postmodernism in Contemporary Ethics (New York: Routledge, 1992).

192 Chapter Seven

respect to what an individual is justified in believing, among modern people who are acculturated in different ways" (177). Stout argues that modern people can be situated in such a way that they are justified in believing any number of things which on Benhabib's reading of the hypercontext most people would justifiably disbelieve.

Whereas from Stout's point of view, Benhabib seems to apply the hypercontext too universally, I think Stout makes the opposite kind of mistake. His view of justification gives him a very permissive stance with regard to what people need to take into account. On his version of the subcultures-the multiple subcultures of modern America- there seems to be a permissive acceptance of the way people cut themselves off from the broader context within which they exist when it comes to accepting their own accounts of justification. Stout is very reluctant to call in ideology critique-what he refers to as the "hermeneutical ambulance." He does acknowledge that there are times when we do need the hermeneutical ambulance: as a last resort, once all situational particulars have been charitably interpreted (177). Stout's reluctance, one might say, is honorable, because it emerges out of his intensely democratic ethos­his concern that we enter into conversation with what real people actually think, say and feel. His criticism of critical theory is that it ends up dismissing these real aspects of citizens' lives; that it ends up treating people as patients (in a hermeneutic hospital) rather than as citizens.

Stout's main objection here is that the standard of proof required of social critics is generally much higher than that which they commonly provide. He believes that social critics do not pay enough concern to context when they come to discuss the beliefs of citizens whom they believe to be in error. Indeed, he would seem to think that critics are happy to talk about citizens, rather than to talk with them. For Stout, the "talking with" option will-ideally-end in the adjustment of the epistemic positions of both parties, helping us to overcome our differences, or at least to live together more respectfully.

However, my concern here is that Benhabib and her ilk are probably more entitled to call in the hermeneutical ambulance than Stout seems willing to acknowledge. This is because, while I agree with Stout that the hypercontext is not everything, he seems to give it much less of a role to play in the discussion than it in fact merits. Stout does allow that as a last resort, when all the evidence is in, one may adopt the hypothesis of a rationality deficit for an individual or group, and proceed forthwith. But this appears to be precisely what Benhabib et al have done. They have done so because they judge that the hypercontext is of such a nature that various of its justificatory norms and procedures must be accounted for by

Religious Reasons in Political Debate 193

subcultures. Stout's contextual justification must include all ~e particularities of the context-and these include the hypercont~xt, whtch must be seen as part of the context. Citizens generally, on thts accoun~, may be permitted to call in the hermeneutical ambulanc~ wh~n thetr fellows refuse to take into account the fullness of the con~ext m "':'h~ch they

· st Stout argues that the standard of proof for rationality defic1t 1s mu~h ~~~h~r than what most critical theorists recognise-but perhaps the mam reason that he thinks this is because of the way in which he down~ lays !he role of the hypercontext. By contrast, su~h cri~ics. ':'ill take the vtew at the multiple contexts which we do inhabtt a~ mdlVld~als and groups can not in any credible way be thought of as existmg suffictently autonomously to grant the kind of hyper-context naivety that seems to be a part. of t~e story Stout tells. In what is now a thoroughly global world, eptste~c contexts of individuals and groups are continually fu~ed .together happily or unha ily-in ways which do not allow us to clmm mnocence of t~e broade/~ontexts. As Sabina Lovibond puts it in her response to Stout s

work:

It is this process of fusion, repeated irrepres~ibly ac:oss countless. disti~ct microlocations within the premodern soctal envtrom~~nt, wh1c~ as

roduced the historical condition affirmed by the cntlcal theonst-a p d. · · h. h "the hypercontext modernity" is destined to become, con tUon m w tc ' . . . . 22 for all human beings, the primary determinant of their eptstemtc sttuauon.

My argument here has been that Stout's pra~matic account of contextual ·ustification has led him to place a premmm on ~he local .contextual ~ustification of sub-cultures at the ex~ense ?f paymg attentwn to the Jh text The difference is cructally Important because of the

ypercon . . h ay not be implications that may be derived from 1t about w ~t may or m legitimately canvassed in public discourse. Interestmgly, however, Stout himself provides a key argument which in fact shows how centrally mo~t people are linked to the hypercontext-this is nothing other than h1s account of secularization, as adduced above. . .

Stout's way into the discussion was to criticize Rawl~ for res~1ct1~g the way in which people might appeal to their comprehens1ve ~octr1~~s m the public democratic debate-with particular reference t~ the1r rehgwus views. We might argue that what Rawls has tried to do 1s to render the h ercontext in a very precise and narrow way. For the reasons we saw s~~ut use above, there are significant deficiencies in Rawls' account, the

22 Lovibond, "Religion and Modernity: Living in the Hypercontext," 623.

194 Chapter Seven

most important of which, I think, is its failure to be able to account for itself using the terms it would require of other accounts.

By contrast, Stout's own account of the nature and process of secularization provides a much more capacious account of the way in whi~h we are now linked to the hypercontext; it does so in a way which avmds the traps that Rawls falls into. But also, and crucially, it seems to do s? in~ way which makes another part of Stout's project unnecessary­that IS, his attempt to provide space in the public democratic sphere for the wide range of religious (and other) voices which draw on worldviews which are not generally shared.

As we have seen, Stout's account of secularization is one which tracks the way in which what he calls "public discursive authority" has changed. Stout gives a very concrete example of this, citing the work of Christopher Hill which looks at the way in which appeals to the Bible in 17th century England went from being quite powerfully authoritative, to being of comparatively little consequence-to the point where appeals to the Bible in the House of Commons would lead to laughter and jeering (Hill 1994 ). Appeals like this failed to work, and people grew used to appealing to other sources in attempts to resolve their differences. As we saw above, people then are careful about what can be taken for granted in their reason giving. They can take it for granted that their interlocutors share the same religious (or ideological) assumptions that they do. Therefore, in order to pursue their course, they restrain themselves from using these reasons, and appeal to reasons that are more likely to be shared.

It is that sphere of "reasons which are more likely to be shared" which constitutes the hypercontext. And as the world has globalised, as modern scientific knowledge has spread, as common economic and political structures have found root in diverse geographical locales, this hypercontext has become ubiquitous.

Stout's account of secularization occurs at the beginning of the first of the four chapters in that part of his book where he forensically examines those whom he has termed "the new traditionalists." In this first chapter, he reviews the work of John Milbank et al, the proponents of a theology known as Radical Orthodoxy23

. The theologians in this movement believe that in the absence of shared theological views, the ethical discourse of soc.iety must be incoherent. They have their doctrinal list of proper behefs-but, of course, there is no way to fulfill their programme: "Their proposal~ are unrealistic if pursued without resort to coercion and morally harmful If pursued coercively" (100). Or in slightly more detail:

23 Milbank, Theology and Social Theory; Radical Orthodoxy.

Religious Reasons in Political Debate 195

The practical issue is whether Christians, for th~ir o.wn theological re~sons, may join hands with others in the struggle. for JUStice-and ~o so w1t~out holding their noses in the presence of the1r comrades. If M1lbank th1~s they may, then he is implicitly granting the legitimacy of what I am call.mg a secularized political sphere, and his conclusions are much less ~ad1cal than they are made to seem. If he thinks they m~stn't, then. he has ltttle to offer besides nostalgia, utopian fantasy, and withdrawal mto a strongly bonded enclave. (105)

If it is the case, then, that Stout recognizes and supports the existence ?f the secularized political sphere, and indeed rec?gnizes. it a~ ~ spher~ m which most citizens are going to refrain from usmg their rehgwus behefs because they know that they are going to be unpersuasive for pe?ple who do not share them; and given that citizens desire to act persuasively n~t coercively because of a commitment to the processes of demo~ra~y; It needs to be wondered why Stout feels the need to simultaneously msist on his pragmatic, context dependent form of justificati~n?

4

• • .

The concern here is that rather than encouragmg and stabtl~zmg the development of the secular political sphere, which he has argued IS central the well functioning of democracy, the promotion of his context dependent justification approach would seem much mo~e likely t? give rise to a

Certain legitimacy for the kind of enclaves which, once divorced from the · . 25 St t

hypercontext, become a very real threat to democratic practice. ?u appears to give mixed messages here. On the one hand.' b~cause we h':'e within secularized societies we need to express restramt m the wa~ m which we engage with our fellow citizens if we want to further the proJeCt of living together peacefully and democratically. 0~ .th~ other hand, Stout's contextualist view of justification seems to legitimize the ~s~ of highly particularistic and specific forms of moral and rehg.w~s argumentation in the public political sphere. The. fear her~, as It IS expressed particularly well by Sabina Lov!~ond, I~ that t~Is form of contextualist justification can be used to legitimate views which-by the standards of the hypercontext-are unsupportable. Lovibond .would ~uch prefer a Kantian interpretation of the hypercontext, one ~Ith a umfied concept of practical reason which would not run the nsk of context

24 Dunn makes a related argument: that Stout's promotion of immanent criti~ism is separable from his promotion of pragmatism. Allen .Dunn, "The Temptation o;, Metaphysics: Jeffrey Stout's Account of the Limtts of Moral Knowledge, Soundings LXXXVII: 3-4 (2004), 303. " . , 25 See Robert B. Talisse and J. Caleb Clanton, Stout on Publtc Reason, Soundings LXXXVII: 3-4 (2004); but note Stout's response: Stout, "Response to Five Critical papers on Democracy and Tradition," 376-7.

196 Chapter Seven

justified enclaves in the way that she imagine . account. s IS a consequence of Stout's

But Stout is not prepared to see his account as o h. to believe what th 1 ·k · . . ne w Ich allows people induced doubt b e~; e m a manner ~hie~ Is_ prote~ted from hypercontext Th. . h h y fire-wall of a specialized discursive community,

Is IS w at e has to say about Lovibond's concerns: .

Like Lovibond, I think it is a mistake to tr ' context as a "shelter" [26] fr h heat one s own local epistemic interlocutors The onl . om t e c allenges of real or potential resulting fro~ accultur~ti::n~o:~erw~~~~Jrovide _she!ter _for beliefs

ent~le~ent to t?e people h~Iding the:U. Beingb~n a~~b~~;;e:;::~:t~!b~~ mo emtty does mdeed put us all in a position where thin . to ?ei~eve are exposed to challenges. It is true that w:~:::~e~~~~~~~ ~~~:v~~~ ~h~se th~gs unless we respon~ to those challenges responsibly. It

. o ow, ~wever, that all demzens of modernity are obli ed

abmelbtet_ve the sa~de tht~fs, especially on topics that involve high stak:s ~do guous evt ence.

~:out ~ays, "In .s~ort, I am all in favor of criticizing religious ideologies ,2s out Is no religiOus believer. The long version of this h . .

Stout does not b r th . . , owever, IS that l. . e Ieve at It IS responsible to "impugn the rationality" of

:~t~7:~~:nf~ople en Ill:as~. To quote, again, 'The notion of rational like Seyla ~~n~:b~~:~~sive_ an~ cdontext sensitive to support something

. eepmg JU gment that all modern theists-or all modern theists who express their religious beliefs in b . . suffer from a "rationality deficit" ,29 It . b f . pu he settmgs­t . th . IS ecause o this that Stout prefers o eng~ge. I~ e task o~ -~hich the central four chapters of his book are

:::n:;~~~~n~:t ~r~~Ism of p~ople who_ are arguing their case, using ti II h h . g g y speak, m the pubhc realm-the hypercontext­or a w o ave mterest to be a party to.

At stake here are two different accounts of what mi ht b hypercontext. For those exempli~ed by Rawls, Benh:bib =n~et~~:::o~~e the hypercontext has strong doctrmal content which on . ' betiore b · · e must sign up to emg giVen a membership card It · 1 d . agreeing that the dialectic from Hum~ t;n~ u es, among ot?er ~m~s, critique of religious belief, and that some K:~~~~=c:o:;~ ~~htu~7fi~~ 26 Lo "b d "R 1· · 27 vt on , e tgwn and Modernity," 622.

Jeffrey Stout, "Comments on Six Responses to Democra . . , Journal of Religious Ethics 33: 4 (2005) 713 cy and Tradition, 28 St "C ' . 29 Stout, "Comments on Six Responses," 714.

out, omments on Six Responses," 713.

Religious Reasons in Political Debate 197

practical reason must hold sway.3° For Stout, the hypercontext is not delimited in any of these ways. It is simply the context in which we put our views forward in a way which we think will be persuasive to others.

There is an ironic sense in which Stout's account of the hypercontext fulfills Rawls' description of the idea of justice for political liberalism as a "stand alone conception" much more adequately than Rawls' own account did. As Stout himself argues, Rawls' stand alone conception of justice does not function the way he wants it to because it is in fact a gloss on Rawls' actual comprehensive liberalism. By contrast, Stout's account of the hypercontext, where the only real constraint is the restraint that people adopt when, in wanting to persuade others, they use reasons that they think others will find persuasive-this account much more closely approximates the idea of a democratic conception which stands alone. But it does so not by pretending that citizens can cut themselves off from their beliefs and speak in the voice of an autonomous conception of justice (such a thing does not exist). Rather, it is a successful stand alone conception in the sense that any citizen has the opportunity to stand alone in the court of public opinion, to express her views in the context of the hypercontext, where the way in which those views will be assessed and digested is anyone's guess-is not, that is, a forgone conclusion determined by gatekeepers who have their own reasons for believing or not believing certain things.

4. Conclusion

What might we conclude, then about the appropriate role of religious reasons in political debate? In my view, Stout is persuasive in his critique of Rawls and with respect to his account of secularization. I have reservations about his pragmatic and contextual accounts of justification and truth. My worry about these matters, which have not been centrally a part of this paper, is that they may undermine the way in which we conceive of democracy as a truth seeking political form. Putting these concerns to one side, however, my view is that Stout's account of secularization of modern societies should also be read as a description of the way in which the hypercontext of global modernity functions. There is no doubt that the way in which this has been put forward by Stout may be criticized for being naive or optimistic-it is clearly the case that it is a parsimonious rendering of the state of things. But if it is read as a normative account of how religious reasoning should function in the

30 Stout, "Comments on Six Responses," 714.

198 Chapter Seven

hype~context, then it has a lot to offer. In particular, its main virtues are that It allows the democratic citizen to speak what is on her mind in the ter~s ~hich she thinks are appropriate; and, secondly, it allows for that which IS on her mind to be thrashed out in the public debate-in the hypercontext. If Stout is right, there is no need for the citizen to feel afraid that liberal democracy is really about policing what she is or is not allowed to s.ay in pub~ic. The quid pro quo, of course, is that the public may make up Its own .mmd about the veracity of what the citizen thinks. The danger that I see m Stout's pragmatism is that if the citizen does not like the public's response, Stout's contextual justification-ism makes it easier for the citizen to go into denial about the veracity of her beliefs rather than facing the music and changing her tune. It might be cold comfort but it is more than likely tha.t the religious who spurn the views of the ~ublic at larg~ ar~ even less h~ely to use Stout's pragmatism as a justification for turnmg ~nwar~ to epistemological isolation. Whatever the damage non­pragmatists might fear from Stout's epistemology, it is least likely to take root among those whom Stout is most concerned to retain within the democratic conversation. . Much more could be said about Stout's impressive book-an m~ellectual ev~nt ~o be sure. Perhaps my commendation of his work, along with my q.uestw~mg of some aspects of it, can be summarized by altering t~e quotatiOn which stands at the head of this paper to read: "Cultivate the virtues of democratic speech, love justice, attend to the hypercontext, and say what you please."

References

Be~abib, Seyla. Situating the Self: Gender, Community, and Postmodernism zn Contemporary Ethics. New York: Routledge, 1992.

Bran~om, ~obert B .. Making It E~plicit: Reasoning, Representing, and Dzscurszve Commztment. Cambndge: Harvard University Press, 1994.

Dunn, Al!e~. "The Temptation of Metaphysics: Jeffrey Stout's Account of the Limits of Moral Knowledge." Soundings, LXXXVII: 3-4 (2004)· 301-314. .

Elshtain, Jean Bethke. "Theologian: Christian Contrarian." Time 158· 11 (2001), . http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,1000859,00.html.

Hauerw~s, .stanley. A Better Hope: Resources for a Church Confronting Capztalzsm, Democracy and Postmodernity. Grand Rapids: Brazos Press, 2000.

Religious Reasons in Political Debate 199

-. The Hauerwas Reader. Edited by John Berkman and Michael Cartwright. Durham: Duke University Press, 2001.

Hill, Christopher. The English Bible and the Seventeenth Century Revolution. London: Penguin Books, 1994.

Lovibond, Sabina. "Religion and Modernity: Living in the Hypercontext." Journal of Religious Ethics 33: 4 (2005): 617-631.

Macintyre, Alistair. After Virtue. Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame

Press, 1984. -. Whose Justice, Which Rationality. Notre Dame: University of Notre

Dame Press, 1988. Milbank, John et al, Radical Orthodoxy. London: Routledge, 1999. -.Theology and Social Theory. Oxford: Blackwell, 1990. . Rawls, John. Collected Papers. Edited by Samuel Freeman. Cambndge:

Harvard University Press, 1999. -.Political Liberalism. New York: Columbia University Press, 1993. Reidy, David. "Speaking for the State," Soundings, LXXXVII: 3-4 (2004):

315-348. Rorty, Richard. "Religion as a Conversation Stopper." In Philosophy and

Social Hope, by Richard Rorty, 168-174. London: Penguin Books,

1999. Stout, Jeffrey. "Comments on Six Responses to Democracy and

Tradition." Journal of Religious Ethics 33: 4 (2005): 709-744. -. "Radical Interpretation and Pragmatism: Davidson, Rorty, and

Brandom on Truth." In Radical Interpretation in Religion, edited by Nancy K. Frankenberry, 25-52. Cambridge: Cambridge University

Press, 2002. -. "Response to Five Critical papers on Democracy and Tradition."

Soundings LXXXVII: 3-4 (2004): 369-402. -. "Survivors of the Nations: a response to Fergussan and Pecknold."

Scottish Journal of Theology 59: 2 (2006): 210-234. -. Democracy and Tradition. Princeton: Princeton University Press,

2004. -. Ethics After Babel. 2nd Edition. Princeton: Princeton University Press,

2001 (1988). -. The Flight from Authority. Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame

Press, 1981. Talisse, Robert B. and J. Caleb Clanton, "Stout on Public Reason."

Soundings LXXXVII: 3-4 (2004): 349-368. . Wolterstorff, Nicholas. "Jeffrey Stout on Democracy and Its

Contemporary Christian Critics." Journal of Religious Ethics 33: 4

(2005): 633-647.

200 Chapter Seven

-. ;'T~e t~le ~f ~eligion in Decision and Discussion of Political issues " 1~0 e~gwdn m t e Public Square, by Robert Audi and Wolterstorff 67-" . on on: Rowman and Littlefield, 1997. ,

-. ":'hy. we sh~uld reject what liberalism tells us about speakin and a~tmg In public for religious reasons." In Religion and C g Lzb_erali~m, edited by Paul J. Weithman, 162-181. ;~~:mbrar.:' Umverstty of Notre Dame Press, 1997. arne.

CHAPTER EIGHT

RELIGIOUS IDENTITY AND THE DENIAL

OF ALTERITY:

PLURALITY AND THE PROBLEM

OF EXCLUSIVISM

DOUGLAS PRATT

Australian sociologist, Gary Bouma, speaks of our "twenty-first-century postmodern and secular world where spiritualities are rife and religious diversity is an accepted feature" as the contemporary temporal locus of "a seriously multicultural society".1 Plurality rules, in virtually all things. But plurality can also be highly contentious, and that is certainly the case in some religious quarters. Indeed, on the occasion of the meeting of the government-sponsored multi-national Asia-Pacific Interfaith Dialogue in New Zealand in early 2007, the leader of the ultra-conservative Destiny Church, the self-styled "Bishop" Brian Tamaki, proclaimed his church's opposition to the promotion of religious diversity in New Zealand. Although resiling from advocating an outright exclusion of other religions, he nonetheless asserted that "alternative or foreign religions" should "not be afforded equal status" with Christianity. Tamaki's views are by no means unique. He represents an extreme conservative perspective that identifies "opening the door to a diversity of religions" with "dismantling our own Christian heritage".2 There are other Christian voices who cry "Amen". Such sentiments parallel those of so-called Islamic fundamentalists who advocate an impositional Islamic State upon an otherwise majority, largely traditionalist, Muslim society. Significantly, whether Christian, Muslim, or whatever, such exclusivist viewpoint-holders manifest no

1 Gary Bouma, Australian Soul: Religion and Spirituality in the Twenty-first Century (Melbourne: Cambridge University Press, 2006), 1. 2 Cf. Lockout sparks unholy row, The New Zealand Herald, (Tuesday, May 29, 2007), A3.

The Relationship of Philosophy to Religion Today

Edited by

Paolo Diego Bubbio and Philip Andrew Quadrio

CAMBRIDGE SCHOLARS PUBLISHING