Korea 1951-1953 - US Army Center of Military History

KOREA1951–1953

byJohn Miller, jr.

Owen J. Curroll, Major, U.S. Armyand

Margaret E. Tackley

Center of Military History

DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY

Library of Congress Catalog Card Number: 56–60005

Facsimile Reprint, 1989, 1997

CMH PUB 21–2

For sale by the Superintendent of Documents, US. Government Printing Off iceWashington, D.C. 20402

FOREWORDTo the 1997 Edition

The fiftieth anniversary of the Korean War gives both the Army and the nation an oppor-tunity to honor those veterans who served in that bitter conflict. This volume, a companionto a similar work treating the first six months of the war, was prepared shortly after the warended. Despite the passage of time, it still provides a valuable summary of more than twolong years of combat through its text, photographs, and maps. Keeping this material in printfor the commemorative period provides a new generation of soldiers with the opportunity tobetter understand that struggle and the sacrifices made by so many for a cause that was cen-tral to the international security policies of the United States. I am thus pleased to release thisnew printing of a classic photographic collection.

Since the source of every photograph is noted at the back of this book, it is the Center ofMilitary History’s hope that various commands and offices throughout the Army will findthis work useful also as a catalog of available photographs as they develop their own projectscommemorating the anniversary of the war. Finally, I am mindful of the fact that as we honorthose who served in the Korean conflict, we are also recognizing by extension those soldierswho continue to serve in Korea today, doing their own part in preserving freedom in a sig-nificant part of the world.

Washington, D.C. JOHN W. MOUNTCASTLE11 Oct 1996 Brigadier General, USA

Chief of Military History

Foreword

In Korea the American soldier, with his Korean and United Nationsallies, fought with bravery and skill against his communist foe and metthe test in accordance with the best traditions of the service. His valorand determination defeated the communist aggression and stabilized thebattle along the present demilitarized zone. The location of this linelargely above the 38th parallel is historic evidence that in Koreaaggression did not pay.

MAXWELL D. TAYLORGeneral, United States ArmyChief of Staff

Preface

This volume records brief ly, by text and photograph, the Koreanconflict from January 1951 to the cessation of hostilities in July 1953.Like its predecessor, Korea 1950, it attempts to provide an accurateoutline of events in order to show the U.S. Army veteran of the Koreanconf lict how the part he played was related to the larger plans andoperations of th United Nations forces. For this reason Korea 1952–1953focuses on the o rations of the United States Army but summarizes theachievements of the sister services and of the other United Nations troopsin order to make clear the contributions of all to the successful resistanceagainst armed aggression. It does not purport to be a final history. Fuller,more detailed histories of all phases of the Korean conflict are now beingprepared by this Office. Two of these have already appeared in print:Captain Russell A. Gugeler’s Combat Actions in Korea and Captain John G.Westover’s Combat Support in Korea, both published by Combat ForcesPress in Washington, D. C.

The text, which is based upon records and reports of the Far EastCommand, the United Nations Command, and the Eighth Army, waswritten by Dr. John Miller, jr., and Maj. Owen J. Carroll, using, in part,drafts prepared by Capt. Robert K. Sawyer and 1st Lt. Walter K.Lukens, Jr.

The photographic sections of this volume were prepared by MissMargaret E. Tackley.

The maps appearing with the text were prepared under the super-vision of Mr. Wsevolod Aglaimoff. Those inside the front and back coversare from Army Map Service.

A. C. SMITHMajor General, U.S. ArmyChief of Military History

Contents

1 JANUARY–21 APRIL 1951Chapter Page

I. THE ENEMY HIGH TIDE: 1–24 January 1951 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3

II. ATTACK AND COUNTERATTACK: 25 January–28 February1951 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13

III. CROSSING THE 38TH PARALLEL: 1 March–21 April 1951 . . . . . . . . 21

IllustrationsSection

1. l–24 JANUARY 1951 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29

2. 25 JANUARY–28 FEBRUARY 1951 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 51

3. 1 MARCH–21 APRIL 1951 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 79

22 APRIL–12 NOVEMBER 1951Chapter

IV. THE ENEMY STRIKES BACK: 22 April–19 May 1951 . . . . . . . . . . . . . 103

V. THE UNITED NATIONS RESUME THE ADVANCE: 20 May–

24 June 1951 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 109

VI. LULL AND FLARE-UP: 25 June–12 November 1951 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 115


4. 22 APRIL–19 MAY 1951 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 119

5. 20 MAY–24 JUNE 1951 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 131

6. 25 JUNE–12 NOVEMBER 1951 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 155

12 NOVEMBER 1951–30 JUNE 1952Chapter

VII. STALEMATE: 12 November 1951–30 June 1952 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 205

VIII. SUPPORT AND SERVICE. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 211


7. 12 NOVEMBER 1951–30 JUNE 1952 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 219

1 JULY 1952-27 JULY 1953Chapter Page

IX. OUTPOST BATTLES: 1 July-31 December 1952 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 269

X. THE LAST BATTLE: 1 January-27 July 1953 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 277


8. 1 JULY–31 DECEMBER 1952 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 285

9. 1 JANUARY–27 JULY 1953 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 303

LIST OF PICTORIAL SOURCES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 325

MapsNo.

1. Enemy Offensive, January 1951 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2

2. United Nations Offensive, 25 January–28 February 1951 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12

3. United Nations Offensive, 1 March–21 April 1951 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20

4. Enemy Offensive, 22 April–19 May 1951 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 102

5. United Nations Offensive, 20 May–24 June 1951 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 108

6. United Nations Front, 25 June–12 November 1951 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 114

7. The Last Battle, 1 January–27 July 1953 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 276

1 JANUARY–21 APRIL 1951

2

MAP 1

3

CHAPTER I

The Enemy High Tide1–24 January 1951

As the first day of 1951 dawned in Korea,weary soldiers of the United Nations bracedthemselves to withstand the expected on-slaught of North Korean and Chinesearmies. The outlook for the United Nations,though not hopeless, was far from promis-ing, for the unpredictable history of thefighting in Korea seemed only to be repeat-ing itself. Since the initial North Koreaninvasion across the 38th parallel into theRepublic of Korea on 25 June 1950, themonths had been filled with bitter reverses,gallant defenses, spectacular advances,sudden blows, and more withdrawals forthe U.N. forces.

When United States forces were orderedto Korea in July 1950, the enemy’s advancehad forced them to withdraw to a relativelysmall perimeter in the vicinity of Pusan atthe southeast tip of the Korean peninsula.Here, as several of the United Nations otherthan the United States sent in reinforce-ments, the beleaguered troops made agallant and successful stand throughout thelatter part of the grim summer of 1950.Then, on 15 September, when General ofthe Army Douglas MacArthur’s forcesmade their spectacular amphibious en-velopment at Inch’on, on Korea’s westcoast about halfway between the 37th and38th parallels, the tide of war turned

abruptly in favor of the United Nations.The South Korean capital city of Seoul wasrecaptured; the troops broke out of thePusan perimeter. As the North Koreansf led northward, the U.N. forces crossed the38th parallel in hot pursuit. They scored aseries of victories until late November 1950,when they launched an offensive directedtoward seizing the line of the Yalu River,the boundary between North Korea andManchuria, and ending the conflict.

But now the tide of war changed onceagain. Some Chinese Communist “volun-teer” troops had appeared at the front inOctober, and in late November more“volunteer” forces, crossing over fromManchuria, struck in strength. They haltedthe U.N. advance, then forced a with-drawal.

The two principal ground commands inKorea, the U.S. Eighth Army and the U.S.X Corps, had been physically separatedfrom each other when the Chinese struck.The Eighth Army was in the western por-tion of the Korean peninsula, the X Corpsin the east, with towering mountains be-tween. Both had been operating directlyunder the United Nations Command inTokyo, which was led by General Mac-Arthur, who in turn received orders fromPresident Truman and the U.S. Joint Chiefs

4

of Staff in Washington acting as executiveagents for the United Nations SecurityCouncil.

December 1950 was a period of with-drawal and reorganization. The EighthArmy and attached Republic of Korea(ROK) forces withdrew rapidly to thesouth with Chinese forces in pursuit. TheX Corps, valiantly resisting the enemy inthe bitter cold of the northeastern moun-tains, made its way to Hungnam on thenortheast coast. From there U.N. navalforces took it safely off in one of the greatestsea evacuations in all history. The corpswas brought to the vicinity of Pusan forreorganization.

Meanwhile, in mid-December, the U.N.commanders selected a defense line for theEighth Army. Lying generally along the38th parallel, it started from the f lats of theHan River delta south of the parallel, rannortheastward along the Imjin River, thenbent eastward through steep mountains tothe Sea of Japan. By the end of 1950,enemy forces estimated at nearly half amillion men were poised in the snow-covered mountains along the 38th parallel.

On 30 December, General MacArthurwarned the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff thatthe Chinese Communist forces could, if theydesired to make the effort, drive the UnitedNations forces out of Korea. The UnitedStates Government, though anxious toavoid a full-scale war in Korea, was alsodetermined to resist the Chinese-NorthKorean aggressors. Therefore, MacArthurwas ordered to defend his positions, to re-tire, if forced, through a series of defenselines as far as the old 1950 perimeteraround Pusan, to inf lict as much damageon the enemy as possible, and to maintainhis units intact. Though no one wished toevacuate Korea, MacArthur was author-ized to withdraw his troops to Japan if that

drastic measure proved necessary to avoidsevere losses. At this time, his forces forKorean operations included the U.S.Eighth Army with attached troops fromnine other United Nations, the Army ofthe Republic of Korea, the Far East AirForces, and the Far East Naval Forces.

To Lt. Gen. Matthew B. Ridgway, whoreplaced the late Gen. Walton H. Walkeras commander of the U.S. Eighth Army on26 December, MacArthur passed on theorders to defend positions, inf lict maximumdamage on the enemy, and maintain majorunits intact. Within this framework hevested Ridgway with complete authority toplan and execute operations in Korea andceased the close supervision he had formerlyexercised over the Eighth Army and the XCorps. He assigned the X Corps to theEighth Army so that for the first time sincethe X Corps landed at Inch’on the EighthArmy commander controlled all U.N.ground troops in Korea. By now fifteen ofthe United Nations-the United States,Great Britain, Australia, Canada, NewZealand, India, South Africa, France,Greece, the Netherlands, the Philippines,Thailand, Turkey, Belgium, and Sweden-had troops in Korea.

Ridgway commanded about 365,000men. The largest single contingent was theArmy of the Republic of Korea, which wasunder his control but not part of the EighthArmy. The next largest was the EighthArmy, to which certain U.S. Air Force,U.S. Marine Corps, and several UnitedNations units, including Koreans, were at-tached. The U.N. command estimated thatabout 486,000 enemy troops, or twenty-oneChinese and twelve North Korean divi-sions, were committed to the Korean frontand that reserves totaling over one millionmen were stationed near the Yalu, in Man-churia, or on the way to Manchuria.

5

In establishing the defense line along the38th parallel in late December, GeneralRidgway concentrated the bulk of hisEighth Army forces in the relatively f latcentral and west sectors because it was ob-vious that the enemy was concentratingstrong forces above Seoul. Maj. Gen. FrankW. Milburn’s I Corps held the left (west)sector south of the Imjin River; on the right(east) of the I Corps, Maj. Gen. John B.Coulter’s IX Corps held the center.1 Be-cause it was believed that the mountainousland in the east could be more easily heldthan the western portion of the peninsula, aseventy-mile mountain front was f irst as-signed to the weakened ROK II Corps andthe newly committed, inexperienced ROKIII Corps. Shortly afterward these were re-inforced by the ROK I Corps with thecrack ROK Capital Division. The U.S. XCorps, under Maj. Gen. Edward M.Almond, was reorganizing in the vicinityof Pusan. The 1st Marine Division, untilrecently a part of the X Corps, was held inarmy reserve.

At daybreak on 1 January 195 1, after anight of incessant mortar and artillerybombardment all along the line, enemysoldiers struck southward through mine-fields and barbed wire in great force. Theyattacked along the entire front but directedtheir major effort against the U.S. I and IXCorps in the west and center. SevenChinese Communist armies and two NorthKorean corps penetrated deeply towardSeoul and the rail and road center ofWonju, in the central sector.’ The onlyunits escaping the fury of the attack werethe U.S. 25th Division and the TurkishBrigade on the extreme left and the ROKCapital Division on the east coast.

As the offensive gained momentum Gen-eral Ridgway reluctantly ordered the U.N.forces to pull back to a line which ran along

the south bank of the frozen Han River toYangp’yong, thence to the Sea of Japanthrough Hong’chon and Chumunjin. Thisline included a crescent-shaped bridgeheadaround Seoul which was intended to delaythe enemy armies and deny them the HanRiver bridges. Co-ordinating their movewith the retiring ROK forces in the east, theI and IX Corps pulled back to the Seoulbridgehead line. The U.S. X Corps (the 2dand 7th Infantry Divisions) re-entered thef ight on 2 January; next day it assumedcontrol of three additional ROK divisionsin a new corps zone on the central front be-tween the U.S. IX and the ROK III Corps.U.N. forces now presented a stronger, moresolid front than they had in the tragicmonth of November 1950 when the Chinesehad struck the widely separated EighthArmy and X Corps.

With three enemy armies comprising atotal of nine divisions astride the northernapproaches to Seoul, and a division fromeach of two adjacent armies in position toexploit successes, the South Korean capitalwas imminently threatened. The enemy,evidently sure that he would not be seri-ously opposed, followed up successes muchfaster than before. And though the EighthArmy fought hard, it could not check theadvance.

In the belief that standing in place wouldinvite destruction, General Ridgway de-cided to withdraw instead of holding hispresent line. Withdrawal offered the chanceto preserve the U.N. forces and to capitalizeon the fact that the enemy’s logistical capa-bilities did not match his tactical abilities.

1 The I Corps consisted of the U.S. 25th Infantry Division,the Republic of Korea (ROK) 1st Infantry Division, theTurkish Brigade, the 29th British Infantry Brigade; theIX Corps included the U.S. 1st Cavalry and 24th In-fantry Divisions, the ROK 6th Infantry Division, the 27thBritish Commonwealth Brigade, and the Greek and Philip-pine Battalions.

2 A Chinese army is equivalent in strength to a U.S. corps.

6

This weakness had been noted in Chinawhen the Communists’ attacks against theNationalist forces had invariably sloweddown, then stalled after the f irst blow,presumably while the attacking units wereresupplied and reinforced. The Chinese at-tacks against the American forces in No-vember had followed the same pattern.Lacking complete motorized transport, andusing pack horses, ox carts, and humanbacks to bring up supply, the enemy hadoutrun his supply lines and was forced topause above the 38th parallel before con-tinuing the attack.

Ridgway’s decision to roll with the punchaccorded with MacArthur’s orders to main-tain his nits intact and to achieve “maxi-mum punishment, maximum delay.” U.N.forces would damage the enemy as much aspossible while withdrawing to carefully se-lected defensive positions. When the attackstalled, the U.N. troops could strike backbefore the enemy’s supplies and reinforce-ments came up.

As the enemy intensif ied his attacks andbegan crossing the ice of the Han Riverboth east and west of Seoul, it became clearthat the capital city bridgehead could notbe held. Ridgway ordered another with-drawal south to a line in the vicinity of the37th parallel. This line ran from P’yong-t’aek on the Seoul-Taejon highway eastthrough Ansong, northeast to Wonju, thencein a curving, irregular fashion to the eastcoast town of Samch’ok. The U.S. I and IXCorps were f irst to occupy intermediatepositions in front of Suwon, about sixteenmiles south of Seoul, to cover the removalof great stocks of supplies. Movement to thenew line began on 3 January, with bumper-to-bumper columns of vehicles jamming theroads.

With the advancing enemy hard on theirheels, the U.N. troops had no time to save

nearly 500,000 gallons of fuel and 23,000gallons of napalm at Kimpo Airfield westof Seoul. These were burned in a greatholocaust, as were barracks, hangars, andother military installations.

On 4 January South Korean governmentofficials and the U.N. troops pulled out ofSeoul as the points of enemy columnsentered it from the north. Incendiaries setto work, and office buildings, hotels, andshacks burned. Smoke swirled through thestreets as civilians who had waited until theend in the hope that the capital might besaved stumbled along in a haze of wind-whipped embers. When the civil police left,bands of looters ranged the city. All duringthe day columns of U.N. jeeps, trucks, staffcars, and soldiers poured south over twoengineer bridges that spanned the Han.Refugees clogged the single footbridge thatwas spared them. That night huge cloudsof black smoke billowed up into the bleakwinter sky as Seoul changed hands for thethird time in a little more than six months.

Once Seoul was evacuated, its port ofInch’on was abandoned. Port troops andthousands of civilians were brought safelyout, their withdrawal covered by carrier-based U.S. Marine aircraft and by gunfirefrom U.S., Canadian, Australian, andDutch warships. Docks, quays, and craneswere destroyed, all stores that could not betaken were burned, and the last two LST’swere f loated off the mud f lats as Chinesetroops swarmed into the port area.

Endless streams of refugees from Seouland North Korea f looded the roads andrailways leading south. Some of the refugeescarried only small bundles, others draggedrude carts loaded with household posses-sions, and still others had only the clotheson their backs. Many died of exposure andstarvation. Families became separated, aschildren wandered and their frantic par-

7

ents sought them among the mill ingthrongs. Crying babies were taken from thebacks of their dead mothers. Many oldpeople gave up hope and squatted besidethe roads waiting for death. Civil assist-ance authorities did their best to help, andprovided food, clothing, and shelter of asort for a large number, but there were toomany to care for them all and great num-bers of innocent victims perished.

The shifting masses endangered militaryoperations. Refugees had always presenteda problem, but now the homeless wandererstrying to reach Pusan, which was alreadyjammed, clogged vital highways and rail-roads. Finally control points were estab-lished at key road and rail junctions tochannel the people into the southwestprovinces.

At the front the U.S. I and IX Corps fellback to their intermediate positions on theP’yongt’aek-Samch’ok line after the sup-plies at Suwon had been removed and theairf ield installations were burned. Osan,where the U.S. 24th Division had begun itsheroic delaying action almost six monthsbefore, was abandoned. But now theChinese attacks in the west tapered off, theenemy pushed light forces south of Seoulbut did not follow up in force. As the U.N.units withdrew farther south, contact withthe enemy diminished sharply. Conse-quently, on 7 January, even before the Iand IX Corps had occupied their new posi-tions, the U.S. 27th Infantry (the “Wolf-hound” regiment) of the 25th Division, re-inforced with f ield artillery, tanks, engi-neers, and two air force liaison parties,pushed north from P’yongt’aek towardOsan without f inding an enemy soldier. AIX Corps patrol went as far as Ich’on, eastof Suwon, and met only scattered enemydetachments. Local patrols along the west-ern front made no contact.

But the central and eastern fronts sawheavy f ighting. The North Korean II corps,in late December, had driven through theeastern mountains to place large numbersof enemy soldiers behind U.N. lines, and asthe January offensive continued enemyguerrilla activities in these sectors increased.Obviously, these were carefully timed tocoincide with the attacks from the north.Elusive enemy groups disrupted communi-cations and raided military installations.

During the first days of January the situ-ation in the U.S. X Corps area in the centerwas obscure. Contact had been lost with theROK 5th and 8th Divisions to the X Corps’right; the ROK 9th Division was badly dis-organized, and the ROK 2d Division hadvirtually disintegrated. Thus there wereonly isolated pockets of South Koreantroops between the X Corps and the ROKIII Corps, and an estimated 18,000 enemysoldiers poured into the gap. To counter thisthreat General Ridgway formed a defensiveline facing east and northeast on the XCorps’ right f lank, and another to block theenemy’s movement to the south. But theenemy had already penetrated so deeplyand in such force that it looked as if U.N.forces would be forced to withdraw stillfarther south.

Now that Seoul had fallen, many enemyunits shifted eastward to concentrate ondriving through the rough, mountainousland along the Hongch’on–Hoengsong-Wonju axis. Success in this area would placethe enemy in position to attack southwest-ward behind the U.S. I and IX Corps.Further, this attack threatened the rail-road and highway between Hongch’on andPusan, the main U.N. north-south supplyroute. The capture of Wonju, moreover,would seriously limit U.N. movement incentral Korea. Thus when Hongch’on andHoengsong were abandoned and the U.S.

8

X Corps retired in co-ordination with thewithdrawals of the I and IX Corps to theP’yongt’aek–Samch’ok line, the enemyquickly followed up with strong attacksagainst Wonju.

Wonju was defended by elements of theU.S. 2d Division. This unit had sufferedsevere losses when it screened the EighthArmy withdrawal in North Korea in late1950. Now reconstituted and strengthenedby the French and Dutch Battalions, the“Indianheads” showed their mettle bymaking a stand on high ground immedi-ately south of Wonju and holding in theface of repeated assaults by at least two di-visions. January produced some of the worstweather of the winter, and air support wasseriously limited. On 10 January, for ex-ample, the Far East Air Force could f ly noclose-support sorties. On other days duringthis period F-80 and F-84 jets skimmed thetops of hills through snow f lurries andclouds to give what support they could.Thus lacking complete air support, andfighting in temperatures as low as 25 de-grees below zero, the men of the 2d Divisionhurled back all the enemy’s assaults andcounterattacked time and again throughknee-deep snow. But this defense was notenough. The almost total disintegration ofthe line to the 2d Division’s right forcedabandonment of Wonju. During this actionthe division was commanded by Maj. Gen.Robert B. McClure to 13 January, there-after by Maj. Gen. Clark L. Ruffner.

By 10 January large numbers of theenemy had f looded through the gap to the2d Division’s right and infiltrated the ROKIII Corps, while enemy guerrillas harriedthe supply lines. To meet this threatRidgway ordered Maj. Gen. Oliver P.Smith to move his 1st Marine Division fromthe vicinity of Masan on the south coastnorthward to prevent enemy penetration

from north of the Andong–Yongdok roadon the east and to protect the supply routesto the ROK units.

With the central and eastern sectors seri-ously threatened, the west was now com-paratively quiet. Patrols of the U.S. I andIX Corps ranged north in attempts to makecontact with the enemy. Air reconnaissancein front of the I Corps revealed a build-upof enemy troops and supplies betweenSuwon and Osan, astride the main highwayfrom Seoul to Taejon and Taegu. This,coupled with police reports of large groupsof guerrillas between Taejon and Yongdong,indicated that the enemy might soon renewhis attack along this main route to southeastKorea. But ground sightings and contactsin the I Corps sector were so few that itseemed the enemy was moving at night andavoiding roads, or that the bulk of his forceswas moving eastward.

Clearly, General Ridgway needed moreexact information about the enemy. To at-tempt to re-establish contact in the west,and to force the diversion of some forcesfrom the X Corps sector, he planned Oper-ation WOLFHOUND, a reconnaissance inforce in the I Corps sector. Accordingly, the27th Infantry was again reinforced withf ield artillery, tanks, and engineers andordered north.

The task force struck out northward inthe early morning hours of 15 January. Abattalion from the U.S. 3d Infantry Divi-sion covered its right f lank, while otherunits to the west delivered local covering at-tacks. Blown bridges and other obstaclesthat the withdrawing U.N. troops had setup were the chief impediments to the ad-vance. As the task force moved north alongthe Seoul highway toward Osan, it passedover bare, frozen hills and through desertedvillages where an occasional solitary civil-ian might be seen dimly beside his ruined

9

home. Thin wisps of smoke showed thepresence of other human beings in thisbarren land, but investigating patrols foundonly more wretched South Koreans hud-dling around small f ires. Not a singleenemy soldier was encountered until thetask force reached a point just south ofOsan, where it met and exchanged shotswith a small enemy detachment, whichthen f led.

Advancing in two columns, the task forceconverged on Suwon the next day, 16January, and met machine gun fire about800 yards south of the ancient city. But bynow the high command was satisf ied, andordered the task force to withdraw abouttwelve miles southward.

The Chief of Staff of the U.S. Army,General J. Lawton Collins, arr ived inKorea in mid-January to assay the fightingqualities of the U.N. forces and promptlysettled the question of evacuation. “As ofnow,” he announced to news correspond-ents, “we are going to stay and fight.” Gen-eral Ridgway expressed his confidence inhis troops, avowing that the Eighth Armycould readily take care of itself in its presentsituation. The Eighth Army, Collins in-formed Washington on 17 January, was ingood shape and constantly improving underRidgway’s leadership.

This optimism was confirmed by eventsto the east of the I and IX Corps. On 15January, when the WOLFHOUND forcemoved north, U.N. troops south of Wonjuhad begun further withdrawals to a shorterdefense line which ran roughly betweenWonch’on and Yongwol. The situation inthe central and eastern sectors, though stillserious, had improved by the third week ofthe new year, and enemy pressure wasgradually decreasing. Guerrillas still har-assed the rear areas, but the threat wasabating as U.N. troops contained and

hunted down enemy irregulars. The enemyarmies had suffered heavily in their effortsto drive down the center of the peninsula.In one action, for example, the NorthKorean 2d, 9th, and 31st Divisions, while try-ing to encircle the U.S. 2d Division, wereestimated to have lost one thousand menper day to U.N. infantry, armor, artillery,and aircraft. Eighth Army headquarterslater estimated that the hostile armies hadlost 38,000 men during the first twenty-sixdays in January.

Broad expanses of the Eighth Army fronthad now become quiet, but quietness didnot necessarily indicate that the enemy hadgiven up his attempts to drive to Pusan. Airreconnaissance revealed that he was build-ing up reserves or supplies and bringing upthousands of replacements to his depletedunits. It became apparent that, as the U.N.troops developed their positions along theP’yongt’aek–Samch’ok line, the enemythinned his forward elements, establishingscreening forces to maintain light contact,and concentrated the bulk of his troopsfarther north.

General Ridgway, on 20 January, issuedorders designed to exploit this situation. Hedirected his subordinate commanders tocreate opportunities for brief but violentcounteraction with armor, artillery, in-fantry, and air power with the intention ofdisrupting enemy preparations for a newoffensive. He found the moment promising.“Never have members of a military com-mand,” he told his troops, “had a greaterchallenge than we, or a f iner opportunityto show ourselves and our people at theirbest—and thus be an honor to the pro-fession of arms, and a credit to those whobred us.”

As local patrols were still making verylittle contact, the U.S. IX Corps planned areconnaissance in force on its front. For this

10

mission a task force was organized out ofelements of the 1st Cavalry Division, aRegular division which fought as infantry inWorld War II and in Korea. The force in-cluded the 3d Battalion, 8th Cavalry, the70th Tank Battalion, a battery of f ieldartillery, and a platoon of engineers. Withthe mission of conducting aggressive opera-tions in a triangular area bounded by thetowns of Kumnyangjang-ni, Ich’on, andKyongan-ni, the force struck out at 0530,22 January, and advanced northward to apoint on the Ich’on–Kumnyangjang-niroad about five miles east of the latter town.There it split into two groups. One turnedto the east and traveled as far as Och’on-niwithout encountering any opposition. Theother went west for nearly a mile, cameunder fire from a small enemy group whichdispersed under an air strike, and thenmoved north for several thousand yards.This element encountered no more resist-ance until en route back to the U.N. lines,when it met and scattered another smallhostile band.

This reconnaissance, and OperationWOLFHOUND, further demonstrated that theenemy did not occupy any positions close tothe front lines of the U.S. I and IX Corps in

strength. Therefore Ridgway scheduled astill larger operation, THUNDERBOLT, for 25January. THUNDERBOLT was to be anotherreconnaissance in force, with each U.S.corps authorized to use one U.S. divisionand one ROK regiment. Since the terrainin the coastal sector was f latter and the roadnetwork denser, the I Corps planned to usefive columns of infantry and armor, whilethe IX Corps employed but two. Theoperation was to be a methodical, co-ordinated advance designed to push throughthe area south of the Han River and seekout the enemy.

The two-day period preceding Opera-tion THUNDERBOLT was unusually quiet,even in the zones of the U.S. X and ROKIII Corps. The 1st Marine Division had theonly contact with strong enemy forces—guerrillas to the south. Heavy snow im-peded movement along the east coast, butactive patrolling by ROK elements failedto locate any large enemy concentrationswithin f ifteen miles of the front. In this set-ting, combat reconnaissance units of the Iand IX Corps went forward on the night of24 January to the line of departure forOperation THUNDERBOLT. The pendulumwas swinging north again.

12

MAP 2

CHAPTER II

On the f irst day of THUNDERBOLT (25January) six of the seven participatingcolumns proceeded against scattered resist-ance. Only the Turkish Brigade east ofOsan encountered stiff opposition. By night-fall elements of the U.S. 35th Infantry,25th Division, were on the south edge ofSuwon, and in the U.S. IX Corps zone acolumn reached Ich’on and took up posi-tions north and east of the town. U.N. airunits meanwhile co-ordinated their closesupport missions, armed reconnaissance,and interdictory attacks with the fire andmovement of the advancing ground ele-ments. General Ridgway requested U.N.naval forces to intensify their offshore pa-trolling along the west coast in order to pre-vent any amphibious inf iltration of thearmy’s left f lank.The support furnished by the air forceswas most effective during this period. WhenEighth Army foot elements f lushed elusiveenemy soldiers into the open, U.N. aircraftclosed in to destroy them. Air strikes sof-tened up points of resistance almost as fastas they developed. Most important was thedamage being inf licted upon Communistsupply lines by air power, which, accordingto air intelligence estimates, kept as muchas 80 percent of the enemy’s supplies fromreaching his front lines. The enemy now

had to move not only ammunition but fooddown from the north, for local rice stock-piles had been removed or destroyed bywithdrawing U.N. forces or burned duringthe fighting, and he could no longer live offthe countryside.

During the rest of the month the U.S. Iand IX Corps advanced slowly as all unitsproceeded cautiously and methodically,ridge by ridge, phase line by phase line, toclear out every enemy soldier. U.N. taskforces advanced a limited distance eachday. The tanks, “quad .50’s” (multipleantiaircraft machine guns mounted on half-tracks), and f ield artillery would cover acertain number of hills with fire; and the in-fantry, under this cover, would sweep thesame ground clean. Each pocket of resist-ance was wiped out before the next co-ordinated advance was made. The EighthArmy commander insisted that U.N. forcesmaintain a solid front, for an attempt to ad-vance only in roadbound columns wouldsurely invite the enemy to drive down theridgelines between roads to U.N. rear areas.

During the f irst days of THUNDERBOLT

the enemy launched a few small nightcounterattacks, but in general fought onlyoutpost actions. Prisoners of war reportedthat only two divisions of the Chinese Com-munist 50th Army occupied a front of nearly

Attack and Counterattack25 January–28 February 1951

14

thirty miles, a strong indication that it hada screening mission.But by 30 January resistance had stif f-ened, and the enemy began launchingcounterattacks in battalion strength. Hos-tile machine gun, mortar, and artillery f irenorth and northwest of Suwon increased,and in some sectors Chinese, armed onlywith grenades and sticks of dynamite, at-tacked. But the enemy still fought a delay-ing action. The U.S. 3d Division had joinedthe battle on 27 January, and as the oper-ation continued it developed from a recon-naissance in force to a full-scale attack.Eighth Army troops were not only findingand destroying the enemy but were takingground and holding it.

Then came indications that the extendedfrontage of the Chinese Communist 50thArmy was being greatly reduced. Identifiedfrom west to east across both corps’ zoneswere the 148th, 149th, and 150th Divisions ofthe Chinese Communist 50th Army, theNorth Korean 8th Division and the 112th,113th, and 114th Divisions of the ChineseCommunist 38th Army. U.N. air observerswarned of numerous freshly dug enemyfoxholes along the Inch’on–Yongdungp’ohighway, and on the last day of January theU.S. I Corps advanced less than one mile,with some units engaging in hand-to-handfighting. Nevertheless, U.N. armored spear-heads probed aggressively toward Seoul,their way paved by massed Eighth Armyartillery, bombing and napalm attacks, andnaval gunf ire that included the 16-inchrif les of the U.S. battleship Missouri. DuringOperation THUNDERBOLT, the Eighth Armywas for the first time able to bring the fullweight of two major weapons—armor andartillery—to bear on the Chinese enemy. Inreturn, the enemy increased the size andstrength of his counterattacks. Columns ofU.N. tanks and other vehicles found roads

heavily mined, and defensive mortar andartillery fire dropped into U.N. lines withmounting intensity.

The enemy resisted vigorously until 9February, then abruptly gave way. Patrolsthat penetrated to a point three miles eastof Inch’on reported no enemy activity.Other patrols raced north through a heavysnow storm, past abandoned foxholes andfrozen rice paddies, to the Han River with-out contact. Task forces from the U.S. 25thDivision made an 11,000-yard advance thefollowing day to secure Inch’on and KimpoAirfield without firing a shot. By nightfallon 10 February, the U.S. I Corps closed upto the south bank of the Han River andU.N. troops looked across at the capitalcity.

Although no massive amphibious inva-sion had been necessary to recaptureInch’on, the U.N. demolitions during theJanuary evacuation were so complete thatthe port looked as if it had suffered an-other such destructive operation. The citywas three-quarters destroyed. Piers weresmashed and battered; barbed wire en-tanglements and twisted metal blocked thestreets; buildings were blackened and de-serted. At Kimpo hundreds of charred 55-gallon gasoline drums, which withdrawingU.N. troops had set afire, still littered thebomb-pocked runways, and the hangarswere now but gaunt skeletons.

On the central front, meanwhile, U.N.armored patrols reached Wonju, now de-serted except for a few civilians. Since therewas little activity in the center and east atthe end of January, Ridgway ordered theU.S. X Corps to create diversionary effortsto the north. Elements of the corps. accord-ingly pushed toward Hoengsong along theWonju–Hoengsong road, and captured thetown on 2 February against light resistance.But presence of the North Korean II and VCorps in the vicinity foreshadowed stiffer

15

opposition to a farther advance northward.The time now seemed ripe for more am-bitious efforts. Ridgway instructed the XCorps and the ROK III Corps to initiate anattack similar to that being so successfullycarried out in the zones of the U.S. I and IXCorps. The plan called for the ROK 5thand 8th Divisions of the X Corps to spear-head enveloping attacks on Hongch’on inorder to disrupt the regrouping of NorthKorean forces south of the town. At thesame time ROK III Corps units would ad-vance in the central-east zone to protect theX Corps’ right f lank.

This attack, called Operation ROUNDUP,began on 5 February, and all units movedforward without opposition on the first day.By nightfall on the sixth, however, theROK 5th and 8th Divisions were bothmeeting resistance. The former, on theright, found the going particularly difficultnortheast of Hoengsong. Moreover, ROKIII Corps units to the east could not keeppace with the advances in the central zone,and by 8 February strong North Koreanforces were hitting the right f lank of theU.S. X Corps. The ROK 5th Divisiontherefore took up blocking positions alongthe exposed f lank, and the ROK 3d Divi-sion was given the mission of continuing theenvelopment of Hongch’on from the east.

For several days pressure on the U.S. XCorps increased steadily and signs pointedto a large enemy build-up on its front. U.N.troops encountered mine fields and booby-trapped foxholes. Although the enemy wasdefinitely on the defensive he began launch-ing stronger counterattacks all along theline. In some cases the enemy seemed to betrying to entice U.N. troops into attacking.Air observers reported the presence of largeenemy groups north of the boundary be-tween IX and X Corps and of other groupsmoving south and east above Hoengsong.In addition, U.N. intelligence thoughtit probable that the enemy had shifted the

bulk of his forces in the west to the west-central zone, and the threat of a counter-offensive there became more likely as U.S.I and IX Corps closed up to the Han River.

This threat materialized on the night of11–12 February, when elements of theChinese Communist 40th and 66th Armiesand the North Korean V Corps struck vio-lently in subzero weather against the ROK3d, 5th, and 8th Divisions, north of Hoeng-song. Signaling his attack with bugle calls,whistles, and the beating of drums, theenemy made immediate penetrations andforced the ROK divisions to withdrawrapidly. Large enemy groups moved south-east through the snow-clogged, ice-glazedmountains in the battle zone, and airobservers reported numerous enemy roadblocks behind U.N. lines. The three ROKdivisions attempted to build a defensive linejust north of Hoengsong, but the situationhad already deteriorated to a point wherean organized defense was impossible. Onlyremnants of the ROK 5th and 8th Divisionsremained. One regiment of the ROK 3dDivision north of Hoengsong was sur-rounded, U. N. units became disorganizedand individuals streamed southward, fight-ing desperately to break through the roadblocks. Hoengsong was abandoned on 13February, as Eighth Army troops battledtheir way south toward Wonju.

At nightfall on the 13th, the enemy at-tacked in strength at Chip’yong-ni, on theleft hinge of the U.S. X Corps zone north-west of Wonju. This tiny village, no morethan a few thatch-roofed huts clustered in avalley surrounded by snow-covered rockypeaks, happened to be the junction of sev-eral roads, and as such was a keystone ofthe central zone. If it fell the entire EighthArmy front might be endangered. The 23dInfantry of the U.S. 2d Division and theFrench Battalion formed a defensive perim-eter on a ring of low hills immediatelyaround the town, and by mid-morning of

16

the 14th they were surrounded by a forcelater estimated to have comprised threeChinese Communist divisions. For threedays the stalwart U.N. troops f iercely de-fended the Chip’yong-ni road junctionagainst repeated assaults as enemy f irepoured in on them from the surroundingmountains.

U.N. air forces dropped food and ammu-nition to the beleaguered men and de-stroyed hundreds of enemy troops withstrafing and napalm attacks. Even at night,aircraft were able to give a measure of sup-port by using magnesium f lares to illumi-nate the battlef ield. American and Frenchground troops were fighting gallantly whenan armored task force from U.S. 5th Cav-alry Regiment ran the gantlet of enemy fireto join them. The following day whenweary American and French soldiersclimbed out of their foxholes they foundthat enemy pressure had melted away.For its extreme bravery in this action theFrench Battalion, commanded by Lt. Col.Ralph Monclar, a Foreign Legion veteranwho had given up his four-star rank ofGénéral de Corps d’Armée to take a battalion toKorea, was awarded the American Distin-guished Unit Citation as were also the U.S.23d Infantry and attached troops. The de-fense of Chip’yong-ni proved to be the turn-ing point in the enemy advance.During the action at Chip’yong-ni, sometwelve miles of front had lain totally un-defended between Chip’yong-ni and apoint southwest of Wonju. Two units of theU.S. IX Corps, the ROK 6th Division andthe 27th Commonwealth Brigade, hurriedlymoved to f ill the gap. Although the time lagin getting them to their assigned sectorscould have been exploited by the enemy, heapparently was more intent on driving onthe road junctions at Chip’yong-ni andWonju, and the IX Corps f illed the holebefore he could act.

While U.N. soldiers were thus bitterlydefending in the central and central-westsectors, strong North Korean forces had at-tacked northeast of Wonju in an attemptpresumably to recapture P’yongch’ang.This attempt was believed to be an effortsecondary to the major thrust in the U.S. XCorps zone, but the North Koreans soonmade a deep penetration east of Wonju anddrove to within ten kilometers of Chech’onto expose the right f lank of the X Corpsonce more. General Ridgway had to musterall his resources to contain the enemysalient. Elements of the U.S. 7th Divisionand remnants of the recently disorganizedROK 3d and 5th Divisions hastily formed adefensive line north of Chech’on. The situ-ation was unstable for several days, but theenemy’s southward surge near Chech’onwas at least temporarily arrested.

At the same time the U.S. I and IXCorps were gradually taking all the groundup to the Han River in their zones to thewest. Some I Corps units were in positionalong the south bank west of Seoul. Herethe action was confined largely to patrollingand duels between U.N. tanks and enemyself-propelled guns located across the river.Several ROK patrols attempted to slip overto the north bank, but were driven back byartillery and mortar fire. The South Koreancapital was reported to be bristling withenemy troops, and it was estimated that theChinese Communist 50th Army, numberingapproximately 18,000 men, was in the cityitself, while the North Korean 8th and 47thInfantry and 17th Mechanized Divisions, total-ing about 19,800 men, were in the vicinity.

The enemy still retained a sizable foot-hold south of the Han, generally betweenSeoul and Yangp’yong. Although he de-fended it resolutely, troops of both U.S.corps were steadily narrowing it down. Onthe night of 13–14 February, a powerfulenemy counterattack from the bridgehead

17

pushed between two U.N. units andplunged into I Corps near areas towardSuwon. This counterattack, probably in-tended to divert attention from the enemy’smain effort in the central regions, wasquickly contained. During the next day,U.S. troops searched out the hostile forceand, by actual count, killed 1,152 and took353 prisoners. The remaining enemy troopsf led to the north.

Meanwhile, far to the south, guerrillasand remnants of the North Korean II Corpscontinued operations in the rear area. Al-though these forces were scattered through-out the entire southern Korean peninsula,large concentrations between Andong andUisong posed a constant threat to the U.N.supply routes. No truck convoy was safefrom the marauders. All attempts to destroythe guerrilla groups by attacks from a singledirection had failed. The enemy simply fellback and disappeared. The U.S. 1st MarineDivision, which fought them until the mid-dle of February, soon learned the mosteffective technique: first, surround the hos-tile bands to prevent their escape; then, at-tack with the support of mortars andartillery.

Gradually the guerrillas became lessactive, less eager to fight, and prone to dis-perse after short skirmishes. It was estimatedthat U.N. counteractions had reduced thestrength of these forces to about 18,000 bythe end of February, a decline of approxi-mately 15 percent during the f irst twomonths of 1951.

The last two weeks of February, however,saw the enemy strengthen his forces consid-erably on the f luid central front. Elementsof nine Chinese divisions had been identi-fied in the enemy offensive in the centralzones, as well as elements of the NorthKorean II and V Corps, with the NorthKorean III Corps attached. In addition, onemore Chinese Communist army was knownto be immediately available.

The enemy attack at Chip’yong-ni hadfollowed the expected pattern. Within aweek after the initial blow the offensive hadslowed down, and the enemy thinned hislines in the west-central area and aroundWonju. The penetration by North Koreantroops in the east-central zone had con-tinued to move toward Chech’on, but themomentum of the thrust abated and it de-generated into infiltration. Two factors hadapparently forced the enemy to suspend hisoffensive: tremendous casualties and theneed to pause for resupply and reorganiza-tion.

When the Chinese Communists attackedin November, they had been fresh, confi-dent, and unhurt. By the time their mid-February attack died down, they had beenweakened by U.N. air and ground action,and had suffered cold, hunger, and disease.The cold, in particular, had affected theChinese much more than the U.N. forcesfor most of them were inadequately clothed.Moreover, they did not have, by Westernstandards, proper medical facilities. As fewtowns were left standing, they could notf ind buildings to protect them from thefreezing weather. When they did, U.N. air-craft wiped out the buildings along with theenemy soldiers. Frostbite and trench footwere taking their toll within enemy ranksand, if prisoners of war were to be believed,they were plagued by typhus, that age-oldscourge of armies. Fighting 260 miles southof the Manchurian border, the Chinesefound the situation quite different from thatin November when they had had theirbases to their immediate rear.

At 0745 on 18 February, Maj. Gen.Bryant E. Moore, who had assumed com-mand of the U.S. IX Corps on 31 January,reported to Ridgway that one of the regi-ments in the sector of the U.S. 24th Divisionhad found no opposition before it. The en-emy’s foxholes were empty, and abandoned

18

weapons and cooking equipment lay strewnabout. Eighth Army headquarters passedthis information to the U.S. I and X Corpswith the request that combat patrols be sentout to gain contact. The army commanderwarned that any withdrawal by the enemymight be a ruse, but f indings of the patrolsconfirmed the fact that enemy forces alongthe entire Eighth Army central front werebeginning a general retreat. General Ridg-way immediately ordered U.S. X Corps toattack eastward to destroy the NorthKoreans on its eastern f lank, near Chech’on.At the same time, he directed the IX Corpsto seize positions running from Hajin toYangp’yong, and thence northwest to theintersection of the U.S. IX Corps boundarywith the Han River. These moves met verylight, scattered resistance and disclosed evi-dence of hasty retreat. By 19 February theinitiative all along the front had passedfrom the enemy into U.N. hands.

General Ridgway was determined to givethe North Koreans and Chinese neither restnor opportunity to reorganize. On 21 Feb-ruary, he inaugurated a general advance(Operation KILLER) by both the U.S. IXand X Corps to deny important positions tothe enemy and to destroy as many hostiletroops as could be found. The objective wasa line which ran generally eastward fromYangp’yong on the Han River east of Seoulto points north of Chip’yong-ni and Hwang-song-ni, and thence eastward so as to securethe east-west portion of the Wonju–Kang-nung road between Wonju and Pangnim-ni. In order to include the U.S. 1st MarineDivision in KILLER, the boundary betweenthe two corps was shifted eastward so thatWonju and Hoengsong fell within the IXCorps zone. The Marine division was re-lieved of its antiguerrilla mission and com-mitted near Wonju as part of the IX Corps.

During the f irst week of OperationKILLER the U.N. troops advanced up to ten

miles in the Chip’yong-ni area, and by 24February the 1st Marine Division hadseized the high ground overlooking Hoeng-song. That same day General Moore, theU.S. IX Corps commander, died of a heartattack following a helicopter accident inwhich he and his pilot crashed into the HanRiver. General Smith, commander of theU.S. 1st Marine Division, assumed tempo-rary command of the corps pending the ar-rival of Maj. Gen. William M. Hoge whotook command on 5 March.

Advances in both corps zones were slowand unspectacular, for South Korea wasjust beginning to thaw. Swollen streams andmud greatly hampered military operations.In the X Corps zone thaws coupled withextremely mountainous terrain made eachday’s advance a test of endurance for bothmen and equipment. Heavy rains turnedfrozen rice paddies into treacherous brownslime, and men stumbled and slithered indeep mud. At night, U.N. troops scrapedthrough sodden sand and muck to hack outfoxholes in the frozen ground beneath.Though opposition in front of the U.S. IXCorps was heavy, enemy tactics along theentire central and central-east fronts weremuch like those encountered by OperationTHUNDERBOLT a month before. Enemygroups contested U.N. advances, but theirmission was plainly one of delay.

As U.N. troops began moving back intothe areas lately occupied by the enemy,they found evidence of the effectiveness oftheir attacks. The hills around Wonju andChech’on were littered with enemy dead.Many more had been buried in shallowgraves on the bleak mountain sides. Appar-ently the Chinese and North Korean in-vaders had been even more severely mauledthan had been imagined. The Eighth ArmyPsychological Warfare Branch went intoaction, and shortly thereafter the Fifth AirForce began dropping leaf lets to the retreat-

19

ing enemy with the terse invitation: “Countyour men!”

In the I Corps zone the Han River be-came a formidable obstacle shortly after thebeginning of the thaws. Behind this obstaclethe Communist defense of Seoul and otherareas on the north bank was apparentlybeing conducted with a reduced number oftroops. The port of Inch’on was again inlimited use, but many weeks would pass be-fore piers, cranes, tidal gates, and other portinstallations could be fully restored. KimpoAirf ield would not again be operationaluntil May.

In eight days U.N. forces had advancedto their assigned objectives in the central

and central-east zones. Operation KILLER

was nearly completed. Its success had beendue in large measure not only to continuouspressure against an enemy who appearedunable to launch a major counterattackunless granted time to organize, but also tothe strict observance of the basic tacticaldoctrine of co-ordinated movement.

On 28 February, after weeks of ceaselesshammering by U.N. forces, the Communistfoothold south of the Han River collapsed.By 1 March the entire Eighth Army frontwas relatively stable. For the first time, theU.N. line had no gaping holes, no soft spots,and no enemy salients threatening to tear itin two.

20

MAP 3

21

CHAPTER III

Operation KILLER—the advance by theIX and X Corps—had not fulfilled all ofGeneral Ridgway’s hopes for it, for the en-emy had managed to withdraw whilewretched weather was disrupting Alliedroad and rail movement. But in large partthe recent losses had been recouped and thegeographical objectives were attained by1 March. The U.N. line, situated abouthalfway between the 37th and 38th paral-lels, swung in a concave arc from south ofthe Han River in the west throughYangp’yong and Hoengsong, then curvedgently northeast to Kangnung.

With MacArthur’s approval, Ridgwaydetermined to continue the offensive with anew attack, Operation RIPPER. He plannedto attack northward in the central andeastern zones to capture Hongch’on andCh’unch’on and seize a line, designatedIDAHO, just south of the 38th parallel.RIPPER’S purpose was, again, to destroyenemy soldiers and equipment, to keep uppressure that would prevent the mountingof a counteroffensive, and to split the Chi-nese from the North Korean forces, most ofwhich were posted on the eastern front. TheU.S. IX and X Corps were to advance inthe center through successive phase lines toIDAHO while the ROK units in the eastcovered the right f lank with local attacks

and the I Corps in the west maintained itspositions south and east of Seoul. The driveby the IX and X Corps would create abulge east of the capital city from whichU.N. forces could envelop it.

Operation RIPPER began on 7 Marchwhen, after one of the most tremendous ar-tillery preparations of the war, the U.S.25th Division crossed the Han River nearits conf luence with the Pukhan and estab-lished a bridgehead on the north bank.Simultaneously, the ROK 1st Division de-livered a diversionary thrust northwest ofKimpo Airfield, and the U.S. 3d Divisiondemonstrated along the Han River south ofSeoul in an attempt to draw attention fromthe 25th Division. At f irst the enemy vigor-ously contested the bridgehead, but afterthree days of heavy fighting retired in dis-order. In the central and eastern zones,U.N. forces made substantial gains on thefirst day, and thereafter moved steadily for-ward. Opposition to the drive took the formof a series of small unit delaying actions, atactic well adapted to the rugged terrain.Wherever the land was least favorable toattacks, wherever roads were lacking, slopesprecipitous, and natural approaches few,there the enemy held most stubbornly. Forthe next six weeks a grinding type of war-fare prevailed. Nevertheless, by 11 March

Crossing the 38th Parallel1 March–21 April 1951

22

elements of the U.S. IX Corps had reachedthe first phase line. Other units reached itin the next two days, and the attack to thesecond phase line began on the 14th.

As intended by General Ridgway, theadvance in the central and eastern zoneshad threatened the enemy’s control of thecapital. To search out the positions that stillbarred the way, a patrol from the ROK IDivision crossed the Han River west ofSeoul and proceeded northward for severalmiles before running into enemy fire. An-other patrol probed the outer defenses ofthe city, found them almost deserted on thenight of 14–15 March, and U.N. troopsmoved in. Thus Seoul changed hands forthe fourth time. Within a matter of hoursthe Republic of Korea f lag was raised overthe National Assembly Building.

Heavily blasted by U.N. and enemybombardment, some of its principal build-ings the scenes of previous f ighting, Seoulshowed both new and old scars. The BunChon shopping district, untouched whenU.N. troops had withdrawn in January,had been f lattened. United States Ambas-sador John J. Muccio’s off icial residencehad taken two more direct hits. The greatbrass-studded red gates of the embassycompound were leveled and buried inrubble. No utilities were in operation.Streetcar and light wires dangled frompoles. Of the city’s original population of1,500,000 only some 200,000 ragged civil-ians remained. By the end of March, how-ever, a city government was once morefunctioning in Seoul.

During the next week the enemy foughtonly delaying actions. In the X Corps zone,some of the worst terrain yet encounteredproved to be more of an obstacle than theenemy. The mountainous country consistedof high peaks and narrow valleys, and U.N.troops were constantly either descending

sharp slopes or climbing steep heights to at-tack enemy positions that were sometimesabove the clouds. Each enemy position was,in effect, a strong point which had to be ap-proached, enveloped, and carried by as-sault. The early spring’s rising temperatureswere turning battlefields into quagmires.All supplies had to be hand-carried, andusually only the barest essentials reachedthe front lines. Prompt action by air rescueand evacuation units saved many woundedwho otherwise would have died, for it some-times took two days to carry the woundedout to litter jeeps. Far East Air Forces cargoaircraft contributed by dropping food andammunition, and thus gave the groundforces greater f lexibility. Despite the enemyand natural obstacles, Operation RIPPER

ground slowly forward.About this time Ridgway ordered the

ROK I Corps in the east to complete thedestruction of remnants of the North Ko-rean 10th Division in the Chungbong Moun-tains southwest of the coastal town ofParhan-ni. This enemy division, currentlyharassing the South Korean forces engagedin Operation RIPPER, had infiltrated south-ward in January through the mountainsfrom the 38th parallel to within twentymiles of Taegu. Relying on the countrysidefor food and clothing and on captured ma-teriel for ammunition, it had been able tomake itself the full-time concern of at leastone U.N. division plus ROK security forces.It had suffered constant attack and heavylosses. Because it had no medical facilities,only the fittest survived. Yet the North Ko-rean 10th Division managed to maintain theform of a military organization.

As early as 13 March, what was left ofthe division had made its way as far northas the Chungbong Mountains, where thesurviving elements continued their oper-ations. During the next few days, four ROK

23

regiments harried the North Koreans in aneffort to wipe them out. Though the 10thDivision casualties were high, many musthave survived to escape: the major activityin the sectors of the ROK 3d and 9th Divi-sions, on 17 and 18 March, consisted off ighting enemy groups that entered U.N.areas from the rear, fought their waythrough, and disappeared to the north.

With this threat eliminated, other ROKforces in the east were able to move to LineIDAHO by 17 March. The U.S. IX and XCorps neared their third phase line in thecentral zone and, Hongch’on having beensecured, U.S. marines advanced towardCh’unch’on. The enemy in this sectorfought vigorously from bunkers which werelittle affected by aircraft and artillery at-tack. In many instances enemy soldiers hadto be dislodged by the bayonet. SinceCh’unch’on was an enemy supply and com-munications center, and it seemed probablethat the city could be taken only after ahard fight, the 187th Airborne RegimentalCombat Team (RCT) was alerted to makea drop there on 22 March. By the 19th,when U.N. armored patrols entered theCh’unch’on basin, it became apparent thatthe progress of Operation RIPPER and thewithdrawal of the enemy had been so rapidthat an airdrop would not be profitable.The project was canceled.

Once Seoul had fallen I Corps troopstook up positions on a line from Yong-dungp’o through the capital’s northernsuburbs, thence northeast. Ridgway thenenlarged RIPPER to include a move by the ICorps westward to the Imjin River, and thecorps began its attack on 22 March.

Next day the 187th Airborne RCT andtwo Ranger companies parachuted frommore than 100 twin-tailed “Flying Boxcars”onto drop zones at Munsan-ni about 20miles northwest of Seoul. An armored task

force from the I Corps then rolled forwardthrough mine fields and quickly made con-tact with the paratroopers. But the jump,which had been designed to block enemymovement along the Seoul–Kaesong axisand trap large numbers of enemy troops,failed to achieve these results. The enemy,here and elsewhere during OperationRIPPER, had elected to withdraw, rollingwith the punch and trading space for time.His prompt withdrawal made the advanceto the Imjin River rapid and very nearlybloodless.

This advance placed Eighth Army troopson the west f lank of the enemy. The U.S. ICorps commander quickly ordered the187th RCT to attack due east to capturethe commanding ground behind the enemytroops facing the U.S. 3d Division. Thismove would allow the latter to attack andhammer the enemy against the anvilformed by the airborne regiment. But foulweather and all but impassable roads—supporting armored elements were forcedto return to Seoul—slowed the eastwardmovement of the 187th RCT. By the timethe objective was reached the enemy hadwithdrawn.

By the last days of March, as RIPPER

came to a close, Ridgway’s forces hadfought their way through rain and mudgenerally to the 38th parallel. In the eastthe ROK III and I Corps had pushedpatrols more than twelve miles north of theparallel, and by 31 March South Koreantroops were in control of the roads leadingwest and south from Yangyang on the eastcoast. In the west, an American armoredcolumn probed over the line north ofUijongbu above Seoul. The enemy hadpulled back and broken contact in manyareas across the front. All U.N. forces werein position on Line IDAHO, and all geo-graphical objectives had been taken. But

24

the main body of the enemy had slippedaway and escaped destruction. RIPPER wasthus a qualified success.

Throughout February and March, U.N.naval forces played an important role inthe Korean conf lict. Ships from the naviesof the United States, Australia, Canada,Great Britain, the Netherlands, New Zea-land, the Republic of Korea, and Thailandconstantly harassed the enemy. A blockad-ing force had initiated a continuous bom-bardment of Wonsan and Songjin that wasto surpass the Civil War record establishedwhen Federal ships shelled Vicksburg forforty-two consecutive days. Both Wonsanand Songjin were communications centersfor the road and rail networks along theeast coast, and the blockade and bombard-ment were designed to keep the supplyarteries severed. By the end of March thesiege was in its forty-third day.

In addition, South Korean units raidedWolsa Peninsula, about forty-f ive milessouthwest of P’yongyang, kil led andwounded a number of the garrison, andwithdrew with a bag of prisoners. Similarraids were delivered at Inch’on, and ROKmarines hit far up the east coast in thevicinity of Wonsan. The U.N. commanderslaunched these operations for several pur-poses: to inf lict physical damage on the en-emy; to net prisoners who could furnishvaluable information; and to force the en-emy to keep garrisons in areas where suchraids might be expected.

When the main enemy forces had pulledback before RIPPER, it was to a line north ofthe 38th parallel which had apparentlybeen built before the North Korean on-slaught of June 1950. This line was proba-bly the strongest position in enemy terri-tory. The most stalwart portion of this linelay in the center, where a series of fortifica-tions, built in solid rock and reinforced by

logs and concrete, protected the road net-work and supply and assembly areas in thepopularly termed “Iron Triangle” boundedby Ch’orwon, Kumhwa, and P’yonggang.

Sending U.N. troops in force across the38th parallel was not an undertaking to beentered into lightly. A northward advancewould lengthen their communication lineswhile correspondingly shortening the en-emy’s, and eventually a point would bereached where U.N. air superiority wouldbe nullif ied. General MacArthur had re-ported that his forces could successfullyproceed for one hundred miles over theparallel before they reached this point, butin the United States and among the otherparticipating United Nations, it was all tooeasy to remember the debacle of late 1950after the first U.N. crossing of the parallel.On the other hand, the enemy armies couldnot be allowed to regroup and reorganizeunmolested for a counterattack which in-telligence sources considered inevitable.To complicate matters, the forthcomingMarch–July rainy season would limit themobility of armored and mechanized forces.The decision whether to cross the parallelor stand pat was a vital one. PresidentTruman considered it a tactical decisionwhich should be made by the responsiblecommander. The choice was made byRidgway. With MacArthur’s approval,he elected to continue the advance withthe hope of achieving maximum destruc-tion.

In making their plans, U.N. command-ers were sure that the enemy was engagedin a full-scale buildup of troops and maté-riel not far to the north. While U.N. tacticaladvances were taking place, they gave care-ful consideration to the expected ChineseCommunist spring offensive. That it wouldcome was a foregone conclusion, and theonly elements that remained in doubt were

25

the time and the place of the attack. Theenemy was still generally on the defensive,but there were definite offensive overtonesin his actions. He was building no new posi-tions farther to the rear. The Chinese werebelieved to have moved their XIX ArmyGroup (consisting of the 63d, 64th, and 65thArmies) close to the Eighth Army’s westernfront. If so, they could be expected to attackin the west and west-central zones overopen, comparatively f lat land, the only ter-ritory along the existing line where armorcould be used advantageously. That armorwould be used seemed certain, for air ob-servers had reported the presence of theequivalent of one armored division and pos-sibly two armored regiments in enemy rearareas. And on the central and central-eastfronts, additional Chinese and North Ko-rean troops had moved to within striking.distance of the line.

By the end of the f irst week in April,U.N. intelligence officers reported that nineChinese Communist armies had been posi-tively identif ied, and ten more tentativelyidentif ied, together with eighteen NorthKorean divisions and six brigades. Thecombat efficiency of three of the armies haddoubtless been reduced by the recent offen-sives, but the other armies were a formi-dable force.

The possibility that the enemy, might usehis increasing air strength—now believedto be a minimum of 750 aircraft of alltypes—was a cause for concern. Numerousreports and air photographs left little doubtthat the North Koreans were making air-fields ready for immediate use. In some in-stances runways were being lengthened toaccommodate jets or bombers. In P’yong-yang the enemy was readying a street toserve as a runway by demolishing adjacenthouses. It was reasonable to assume that allthis was intended to permit use of air power

in conjunction with a ground offensive.In the face of these potential threats, it

was better for the U.N. forces to move for-ward than to stand still. Thus on 5 AprilRidgway followed RIPPER with OperationRUGGED, a general advance toward a newobjective line called KANSAS. Runningalong commanding ground north of the38th parallel, KANSAS was approximately115 miles in length, including fourteenmiles of tidal water on the left f lank and, inthe center, the ten-mile water barrier of theHwach’on Reservoir, which was Seoul’ssource of water and electric power. The ter-rain on the right f lank of this line wasrough, nearly devoid of roads and thereforediff icult for both U.N. and enemy units.But by shortening and strengthening theirline, the U.N. commanders could use thewater and terrain barriers to establish astronger defense in depth. They could alsomake KANSAS the base for later operationsdesigned to seize the Iron Triangle.

By 9 April, all units in the U.S. I and IXCorps and the ROK I Corps on the eastcoast had battled their way against f luctu-ating enemy resistance to positions on LineKANSAS. Although the U.S. X and ROKIII Corps, in the central and central-eastsectors, had been delayed by rugged, terrainand hampered by the lack of adequate sup-ply routes, they were steadily drawing up.On the same day, 9 April, the enemyopened several sluice gates of the dam thatcontrolled the water passing from theHwach’on Reservoir into the lower Puk-han River. The Pukhan, originating in themountainous country to the north, f lowedsouth to the reservoir and thence southwestto its conf luence with the Han River east ofSeoul. Within an hour the water level hadrisen several feet; one engineer bridge wasbroken, and IX Corps Engineers wereforced to swing a second one back to the

26

banks. To prevent the enemy from openingall eighteen sluice gates and f looding thePukhan, a task force from the 7th Cavalryand the 4th Ranger Company was hastilyorganized and sent to seize the dam, closethe gates, and immobilize the gate-openingmachinery.

This raid failed for a variety of reasons:lack of enough landing craft, poor visibility,diff iculty of movement over the almosttrackless terrain, and stubborn enemy re-sistance. But the enemy’s opening of theHwach’on gates, while dramatic, had lesseffect on U.N. operations than originallyfeared and the task force was recalled aftertwo days.

While the U.S. X and the ROK IIICorps drew up to the KANSAS line, the U.S.I Corps and left-f lank units of the IX Corpscontinued the advance by attacking towardCh’orwon, the southwest corner of the IronTriangle, with the intention of seizing a linedesignated UTAH which was in effect anoutward bulge of KANSAS. As UTAH’S

northernmost point lay just south of Ch’or-won, this move would place the U.N. forcesin position to strike at the Triangle. Themain body of the IX Corps remained inposition and patrolled, and on the east coastthe ROK I Corps advanced by column ofdivisions.

Meanwhile U.N. forces continued toedge forward, although the enemy burnedoff large areas of his front to create densesmoke screens that reduced the effectivenessof close air support. The Hwach’on Damfell on 16 April, and on the east coast SouthKorean forces took Taep’o-ri. Other ROKtroops north of Seoul sent patrols across theImjin River and far to the northwest. By 17April the Eighth Army’s front-line unitscould not make contact with the enemy andU.S. IX Corps units not already movingjoined in the advance north from LineKANSAS. Thereafter the general progresstoward Line UTAH was virtually unop-posed. Even as the advance continued,however, evidences of enemy preparationfor counterattack continued to be reportedto Van Fleet.

The enemy had long boasted in his pressand radio releases that his offensive wouldbe designed to force a military decision byeither driving the U.N. forces from Koreaor destroying them in the f ield. Van Fleetforesaw different results. His army had im-proved during the winter campaign. U.S.soldiers had become highly skilled in themonths since they had entered the war asgreen occupation troops. Van Fleet decidedto meet the expected attack by continuingthe doctr ines developed by his prede-cessor—those of “maximum punishment,maximum delay . . . .” The U.N. forceswould, if compelled, buy time with space,and conduct a co-ordinated withdrawal todefensive positions well south of the 38thparallel, maintain contact with the enemyat all times, and inf lict maximum losses onhim by utilizing superior U.N. fire powerfrom the ground and the air. When theoffensive had run its course the EighthArmy would counterattack, cut the enemy’ssupply lines, and endeavor to destroy allhosti le troops in the forward areas.

During this period came a dramaticchange in command. On 11 April, after aseries of public utterances revealed sharpdifferences over national policy and mili-tary strategy, President Truman relievedGeneral MacArthur of all his commandsand replaced him with General Ridgway.Lt. Gen. James A. Van Fleet was dispatchedposthaste from Washington to take com-mand of the Eighth Army and attachedforces. He arrived and assumed commandon 14 April.

27

The U.N. campaign in Korea bore astriking resemblance to the Duke of Well-ington’s campaigns against Napoleon’sarmies in Spain and Portugal. Wellington,like U.N. commanders, was pitted againstenemy forces that were capable of receivingsteady overland reinforcements, while histroops, like those of the Eighth Army, weresupplied chief ly by superior sea power.Wrote the Duke, describing his war ofmaneuver: “If they advance against me Ishall retire before them, accepting battle ifthey give me a favorable opportunity, forthe . . . action of my lines is superior tothe shock action of their columns . . . .”

To anticipate an enemy offensive did notmean to sit and wait for it. By 19 April, all

U.S. I and IX Corps units were in positionalong Line UTAH and preparing to continuethe advance to Line WYOMING, an eastwardextension of the UTAH bulge. After con-solidating their gains for two days thesecorps started northward again. If this at-tack proved to be successful, U.N. forceswould be on the high ground overlookingCh’orwon at the base of the Iron Triangle.But during the daylight hours of 22 Aprilenemy activity across the whole frontsharply increased, and the U.N. offensivehalted abruptly. Their lines alive withmovement, the Chinese and North Koreansabandoned cover and concealment andmoved boldly into the open. The expectedenemy spring offensive was at hand.

SECTION 1

l–24 January 1951

33

CONGESTION ON THE HONGCH’ON–WONJU ROAD, central sector, 3 January 1951

35

BUILDINGS BURNING IN SEOUL as South Korean government off icials and U.N. troops leave the cityfor the second time, 3 January.

AMMUNITION DUMP ON FIRE AT KIMPO AIRFIELD

36

TROOP-LOADED TANKS MOVING

BABY-SAN WAITING FOR PARENTS to arrange pas-sage out of Inch’on.

37

SOUTH after crossing the Han River.

LAST TROOPS TO LEAVE INCH’ON HARBOR boardingan LST, 4 January.

38

RAIL BRIDGE ACROSS THE HAN RIVER is demolished by engineer troops. Both photographs weretaken on 4 January.

39

PONTON BRIDGE SPANNING THE ICY HAN is blown up after last of the U.N. forces evacuate Seoul,4 January.

40

HORDES OF REFUGEES FLEEING FROM SEOUL clogging a dike across rice paddies, 5 January.

A SEEMINGLY ENDLESS COLUMN OF SOUTH KOREANS plodding

41

through the heavy snow south of Kangnung near the east coast.

TWO KOREAN MOTHERS pushing a cartload of their younger children.

42

2D DIVISION VEHICLES IN MOUNTAIN PASS south of Wonju, 10 January. In this sector enemy troopsf looded through the gap to the right of 2d Division positions and ROK III Corps lines.

43

SUPPLY CONVOY HELD UP by accident on icy highway. Temperatures reached 25 degrees belowzero during the f ighting for Wonju, attacked by Communist forces 7 January.

44

A 25-pounder F ield Gun-howitzer. Ar ti l ler y-men of the 29th British Brigade prepare to supportthe Turkish Brigade f ighting in the west sector, 19January. Both brigades were attached to the 25thDivision.

ROK 3d DIVISION TROOPS ADVANCING to the mountains southeast of Yongwol on the centralfront, 20 January.

45

Moving Out over the frozen ground, X Corpsarea. Note rocket launcher in foreground.

25TH DIVISION TROOPS MOVING UP TO OSAN, 23 January. Operation THUNDERBOLT, a reconnais-sance-in-force designed to seek out the enemy, was scheduled to start on 25 January.

46

GEN. J. LAWTON COLLINS, CHIEF OF STAFF,U.S. ARMY, stopping for a conference inJapan before going to Korea, is greeted byGeneral of the Army Douglas MacArthur.

GEN. HOYT S. VANDENBERG, CHIEF OF STAFF,U.S. AIR FORCE (left), confers with Lt. Gen.George E. Stratemeyer, Commanding Gen-eral, Far East Air Forces.

ARRIVING IN JAPAN afater turning over their commands, Maj. Gen. David G. Barr (left) com-manded the 7th Division and Maj. Gen. John H. Church the 24th Division.

47

GENERAL MACARTHUR VISITING NEAR THE FRONT LINES, north of Suwon, 28 January, He isaccompanied by his military secretary, Maj. Gen. Courtney Whitney, 2d from left, and Lt. Gen.Matthew B. Ridgway, Commanding General, U.S. Eighth Army, wearing his character isticgrenade. Maj. Gen. William B. Kean, Commanding General, 25th Division, is behind GeneralMacArthur.

49

“WESTERN JAMBOREE,” Special Services road showplaying in the 25th Division area.

SECTION 2

25 January–28 February 1951

54

U.N. AIRCRAFT GIVING CLOSE SUPPORT to the 1st Cavalry Division near Ich’on, 26 January.

96TH FIELD ARTILLERY BATTALION WINDING ITS WAY THROUGH THE MOUNTAINS to the 1stCavalry Division area, 26 January.

55

FOUR CHINESE CAPTURED BY ROK 1ST DIVISION north of Ansong.

ADVANCING WEST OF SUWON on 27 January, U.N. troops pass a small village recently vacated bythe Communist forces.

56

PR E PA R I N G BOX E S O F C R AT I O N S T O B E

AIRDROPPED

LAST-MINUTE INSPECTION OF CARGO BEFORE

TAKING OFF

C-119 FLYING BOXCAR LOADED WITH CARGO f lying

57

RE C OV E R I N G A N A I R D RO P P E D 55-G A L L O N

DRUM OF GASOLINE

over jagged mountains to a drop zone, January 1951. KOREAN LABORERS ASSEMBLING AIRDROPPED

C RATIONS

59

LINEMAN REPAIRING TELEPHONE LINES between Tanyang and Chech’on. Railroad is part ofSouth Korea’s main rail system from Pusan to Seoul.

60

MEMBERS OF THE 187TH AIRBORNE REGIMENTAL

COMBAT TEAM f iring the 75-mm. recoilless r if le,5 February.

25TH DIVISION MEN OBSERVING WHITE PHOSPHORUS falling on enemy positions near the smallvillage of Ansan.

61

ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF THE ARMY EARL D. JOHNSON (center) with General Kean (left) andGeneral Ridgway watching the 25th Division advance.

5TH INFANTRYMEN PATROLLING IN RUGGED TER-RAIN near the Han River, 5 February.

63

BACK FROM CAPTIVIT Y. Two American and fourAustralian soldiers in the 24th Division MedicalClearing Station after reaching U.S. lines.

65

15TH INFANTRYMEN f ighting their way to the HanRiver, 13 February.

67

CROSSROAD AT CHIP’YONG-NI, central Korean front.On 13 February the 23d Regimental CombatTeam, 2d Division, and attached French Battalionwere surrounded by three Chinese Communistdivisions. For three days this U.N. force defendedthe road junction against assaults by the enemyentrenched in the surrounding mountains.

68

SUPPLIES COMING IN at the X Corps command post airstrip, Wonju, 12 February.

GREEK SOLDIERS SHARING THEIR WARMTH with an adopted Korean orphan.

69

AT CHIP’YONG-NI, 23 February. From left: General Ridgway; Maj. Gen. Charles D. Palmer,Commanding General, 1st Cavalry Division; Col. William A. Harris, Commanding Off icer, 7thCavalry Regiment; and Col. John Daskalopoules, Commanding Of f icer of Greek Battalionattached to the 7th Cavalry Regiment.

70

WALKING WOUNDED HEADING FOR AID STATIONS. Canadian infantryman is helped along by a fel-low countryman, left; a 2d Division casualty is supported by an Australian soldier, r ight.

71

ARMY NURSE OFF DUTY

72

INFANTRYMEN OF THE 27TH REGIMENT CAUTIOUSLY MOVING UP A MOUNTAIN near Kyongan-ni,southeast of Seoul in the west sector, 17 February.

73

MEN OF THE 17TH INFANTRY TAKING COVER BEHIND A STONE WALL, 20 February. On 18 Febru-ary the 17th Regimental Combat Team, 7th Division, attacked northwest from Chech’on in thecentral sector.

7TH DIVISION TROOPS TRUDGING UP HILL 675 after crossing the snow-covered valley (back-ground). On 20 February Chuch’on-ni was secured.

74

All Hands Join in To Fight a Raging Fire, 2dLogistical Command, Pusan, 19 February.

77

CATCHING UP ON NEWS FROM HOME, 23 Feb-ruary. Men are from the Belgium–Luxem-bourg Battalion, which arrived in Korea on31 January.

BRINGING IN ENEMY PRISONERS, 1st Cavalry Divi-sion area, 27 February. On 21 February OperationKiller was launched along sixty miles of centralKorean front to annihilate enemy forces and re-establish U.N. line east of Wonju.

SECTION 3

1 March-21 April 1951

80

WHITE PHOSPHORUS SHELLS FALLING ON ENEMY

POSITIONS north of the Han. The 3d Division at-tempted to divert enemy attention from the 25thDivision south of Seoul. Operation Ripper waslaunched on 7 March to take Ch’unch’on, anenemy supply and communications center, andoutf lank Seoul.

81

M4 TANK S OF THE 89TH TANK BATTALION, 25thDivision, crossing the Han River near its conf lu-ence with the Pukhan River, 7 March.

82

COMPANY K, 32D REGIMENTAL COMBAT TEAM, NEARING THE TOP OF ANOTHER HILL. Smoke isfrom white phosphorus shells.

83

7TH DIVISION TROOPS moving north (above) rest their weary feet during a break along the road-side (below) near P’yongch’ang, east central sector.

85

REMAINS OF A HANGAR AND MAINTENANCE

SHOP

SE O U L TWO DAYS AF T E R IT WA S RE TA K E N BY

U.N. FORCES, 17 March.

86

AFTER CROSSING THE HONGCH’ON RIVER, men of the 5th Infantry tackle another enemy-held hill,central sector, 19 March.

87

CROSSING AN ENEMY-MADE FOOTBRIDGE. The 24th Division advanced to positions northwest ofCh’ongp’yong-ni by 23 March.

ENEMY SOLDIERS BAGGED BY THE 5TH INFANTRY are escorted south, 24 March.

88

187TH AIRBORNE REGIMENTAL COMBAT TEAM PRACTICE-JUMPING FROM C- 119’s, the twin-tailed“Flying Boxcars.”

P R E PA R I N G T O L OA D F O R T H E A I R D R O P A T

MUNSAN-NI, designed to block enemy movementalong the Seoul-Kaesong axis and trap large num-bers of enemy troops, 23 March.

89

LOADED “FLYING BOXCARS” heading for the drop zone.

90

187TH IN POSITION EAST OF MUNSAN-NI. Afterparachuting in, the troops were ordered tocapture the commanding heights behind theenemy troops facing the 3d Division.

3D DIVISION INFANTRYMEN CLIMBING UP THE TRAIL

to their objective near Uijongbu, 23 March. By theend of the month the enemy had pulled back to aline north of the 38th parallel.

92

TANK-INFANTRY RECONNAISSANCE PATROL moving through a war-torn street in Hongch’on.

93

A BATTALION STAFF OF THE 1ST MARINE DIVISION observing artillery f ire, central front, 17 March.

94

MEDIUM TANK M26 GRINDING ALONG A NARROW MOUNTAIN ROAD, central sector. On 23 Marchthe 1st Marine Division advanced to positions north and east of Ch’unch’on.

95

CONVOY CROSSING THE SOYANG RIVER. By 8 April the 7th Division put two battalions across theSoyang River, and by 19 April U.N. forces were in position along Line UTAH.

96

MA R S H A L I N G YA R D O N T H E MA I N R A I L LI N E leading south from Wonsan undergoing a f ier ynapalm bomb attack by B-26’s of the 452d Light Bomb Wing, Fifth Air Force. Both Wonsan andSongjin were enemy communications centers for road and rail networks along the east coast ofNorth Korea.

97

FIVE KNOCKED-OUT ENEMY BRIDGES over the Ch’ongch’on River near Sinanju.

99

ROLLING OUT THE RED CARPET AT OAKLAND, CALIFORNIA, for the f irst marines rotated home.

22 APRIL–12 NOVEMBER 1951

102

Map 4

CHAPTER IV

By the light of a full moon in the earlyevening hours of 22 April, three ChineseCommunist armies attacked the U.N.forces following four hours of artillery bom-bardment. The initial attack, a secondaryone, was delivered through the KwandokMountains in the Yonch’on–Hwach’onarea of central Korea. By daybreak theenemy was in motion across the wholepeninsula.

Delivering his main effort against theU.S. I and IX Corps, the enemy attempteda double envelopment against the westsector to isolate Seoul, coupled with thesecondary thrust in the Yonch’on–Hwach’onarea and a push against the eastern part ofthe line near Inje. Radio P’yongyang an-nounced that the ultimate objective—de-struction of the U.N. command—would bereadily accomplished. Of an estimated totalof 700,000 available troops in Korea, theenemy commanders employed about halfin the offensive, but they used little artillery,few tanks (contrary to U.N. expectations),and no close air support. Their tactics—as-saults by a “human sea” of massed in-fantry—were the same as before, and againbugle calls and f lares co-ordinated nightattacks in which small units infiltrated theU.N. lines. When dawn came the enemy

broke contact and, using camouflage andnatural and man-made features, soughtcover and concealment against artillery fire.

The U.N. lines held firm against the firstassaults everywhere except in the centralsector held by the IX Corps, where theROK 6th Division was defending the centerwith the U.S. 24th Division on the left andthe 1st Marine Division on the right. Herethe enemy struck the ROK division in theNamdae River valley south of Kumhwaand drove it back. As the division with-drew in confusion south of the UTAH line,the enemy attempted to exploit his ad-vantage by moving into the gap betweenthe 24th Division and 1st Marine Division,which refused their exposed f lanks and heldon.

With his line cracked, General Van Fleetordered the I and IX Corps to retire step bystep to KANSAS while the infantry, sup-ported by artillery and aircraft, slowed theenemy. Thus was lost the ground gained inthe recent U.N. offensives. Task forces builtaround the U.S. 5th Cavalry and the 27thCommonwealth Brigade darted into the gapleft by the ROK 6th Division, struck the ad-vancing Chinese south of the 38th parallel,and stopped the exploitation. On the rightthe 1st Marine Division retired southward

The Enemy Strikes Back22 April–19 May 1951

104

from the Hwach’on area to take up newpositions before Ch’unch’on. When anenemy thrust cut the Seoul–Ch’unch’on-Kansong highway near Kap’yong on 26April, Van Fleet pulled the IX Corps backto the Hongch’on River.

Meanwhile, although the enemy did notthrow his full weight against Seoul untilafter the Seoul–Kansong road was cut, theI Corps was heavily engaged in the west.Fording the waist-deep Imjin River aboutmidnight of 22 April, Chinese infantrymenestablished shallow bridgeheads on thesouth bank between Korangp’o-ri and Ma-jon-ni. Other enemy troops cut south alongthe Ch’orwon–Seoul highway, but the ICorps slowed the attacking Chinese as it re-tired to the KANSAS line until the morningof 23 April, when the enemy drove theROK 1st Division south of the KANSAS line.This setback exposed the left f lank of the 1stBattalion, The Gloucestershire Regiment,of the British 29th Brigade. During the nextfew days this unit gallantly held its positioneven after it was isolated and virtually over-run. Only a handful of soldiers from theGloucestershire battalion were able tomake their way back to the main U.N.line.

Once the enemy had cut the Seoul–Kan-song highway on 26 April, he put his weightinto a strong attack against Seoul. Next dayhe outf lanked Uijongbu and the U.S. 3dDivision pulled back to positions four milesfrom the outskirts of Seoul while the ROKtroops withdrew down the road from Mun-san-ni. Van Fleet directed the establish-ment of a new transpeninsular line to haltthe enemy in front of Seoul and north of theHan.

On 29 April U.N. pilots strafed an esti-mated 6,000 enemy soldiers when they triedto ferry the Han and attack down theKimpo Peninsula to outf lank Seoul from

the west. The survivors were never able tooffer a serious threat to the peninsula’s de-fenders, the ROK 5th Marine Battalion.

The enemy also attempted to outf lankSeoul to the east in the V-shaped area be-tween the Han and the Pukhan Rivers, butthe 24th and 25th Divisions checked thismaneuver and held the enemy on the northbank of the Han in the vicinity of Kum-gong’ni and Punwon-ni. On the east-centralfront North Koreans attacked the ROKunits in the Yanggu–Inje area, made severalgains, and captured Inje, but by 29 Apriltheir drive had been halted.

On this day General Van Fleet estab-lished a new line, not named and thereforetermed NO-NAME-LINE which extendedfrom north of Seoul to Sabangu, thencenortheast across the 38th parallel to Taepo-ri on the east coast. Because the majorweight of the enemy’s attack had struck inthe west, Van Fleet reshuff led his units toput more American divisions there. As-signed to the I Corps, on the left, were theROK 1st Division, and the U.S. 1st Cavalryand 25th Infantry Divisions, with the U.S.3d Division in reserve. Holding the KimpoPeninsula was the British 29th Brigade.The IX Corps, on the I Corps’ right, hadthe 28th Commonwealth Brigade (thiswas the redesignated 27th CommonwealthBrigade), the U.S. 24th Division, theROK 6th and 2d Divisions, and the U.S.7th Division in line, with the U.S. 187thAirborne RCT in reserve. In the center theX Corps, consisting of the U.S. 1st Ma-rine and 2d Infantry Divisions and theROK 5th and 7th Divisions, held the line,and the ROK III and I Corps defended theeastern sector.

Thus by the end of April the U.N. infan-trymen, strongly supported by artillery andair (U.N. airmen f lew 7,420 sorties duringthe last eight days of the attack), had halted

105

the enemy short of Seoul and the Han, andheld a strong, continuous defense line. Theenemy had fallen far short of his announcedintention of destroying the U.N. forces.U.N. intelligence officers, reasoning on thebasis of information gained by air recon-naissance, concluded that he would startanother offensive soon.

While the Chinese and North Koreansregrouped and brought supplies forward,General Van Fleet decided to capitalize onthe lull and take the initiative. During thefirst week of May regimental patrol baseswere established almost eight miles in frontof NO-NAME-LINE, and armored patrolsranged ten to twelve miles into enemy terri-tory to harass the enemy troops that werewithdrawing from NO-NAME-LINE. U.N.forces cleared the Kimpo Peninsula. TheROK 1st Division fought its way up theMunsan-ni road. Uijongbu fell to the 1stCavalry Division on 6 May, and a 25thDivision task force drove northeastward upthe Seoul–Sinp’al-li highway. In the west-central sector an armored patrol regainedcontrol of the Seoul–Kap’yong road for theUnited Nations, and on 7 May U.S. ma-rines dug North Koreans out of camou-f laged bunkers on the Wonju road and cap-tured Ch’unch’on. A task force consistingof the French Infantry Battalion, the U.S.1st Ranger Company, one company of theU.S. 9th Infantry, and the U.S. 72d TankBattalion probed northeast of Chaun-ni.On the extreme right the ROK III and ICorps also advanced northward. GeneralVan Fleet then planned a general offensivebased on NO-NAME-LINE designed to carrythrough to KANSAS, but increasing evidencethat the enemy was preparing to resume theoffensive forced the Eighth Army com-mander to postpone his plan.

The signs were unmistakable. After 10May enemy resistance to local attacks stiff-

ened. Airbase construction was still increas-ing. U.N. intelligence placed enemy airstrength at 1,000 planes, with fifty new air-bases being pushed to completion. Supplycolumns moving southward were reporteddaily, and air patrols noted heavy troopmovements north of the IX Corps.

To cripple enemy air strength before thenew offensive, the Fifth Air Force and the1st Marine Aircraft Wing stepped up theirattacks. A good example of their effortscame on 9 May when a total of 312planes—F-80 Shooting Stars, F-84 Thun-derjets, F-86 Sabres, F9F Panthers, F4UCorsairs, and F-51 Mustangs—struck atSinuiju airbase on the south bank of theYalu and reported demolishing fifteen en-emy jets and over 100 buildings.

During the first ten days of May, when itlooked as if the enemy would concentratehis attack west of the Pukhan River againstSeoul, General Van Fleet had strengthenedthe western portion of his line. But between10 and 15 May, according to intelligencereports, the Chinese had moved five armieseastward and deployed them in front of theCh’unch’on–Inje area held by the U.S. XCorps and the ROK III Corps. Becausetime was short, Van Fleet decided not toshift his forces from the west, but he alertedthe U.S. 3d Division, in I Corps reserve, tomove out on his order. The rough andmountainous Ch’unch’on–Inje area gener-ally favored the defender, but it would pro-vide the attacker with some security fromair and armor.

The daylight hours of 15 May saw all theusual signs of impending enemy attack, in-cluding an increased number of enemyagents trying to slip through the lines. Airpatrols reported more bridge construction,and enemy probing attacks grew morenumerous. Van Fleet’s command madeready to stand firm.

106

By 14 May NO-NAME-LINE had beenconsiderably strengthened. The U.N. forceshad laid mines, registered artillery, estab-lished bands of interlocking machine gunfire, and strung over 500 miles of barbedwire. Interspersed among the mine f ieldsand barbed-wire networks were 55-gallondrums of gasoline and napalm, ready to bedetonated electrically. General Van Fleetresolved not to yield ground, but to hold hisline with all the weapons and power at hisdisposal. As he phrased it, “We must ex-pend steel and fire, not men. . . . I wantso many artillery holes that a man can stepfrom one to the other.”

After darkness fell on the night of 15–16May, an estimated twenty-one Chinese di-visions, f lanked by three North Korean di-visions in the west and six in the east, struckdown the center of the peninsula againstthe U.S. X Corps and the ROK III Corpsin the Naep’yong-ni-No-dong area. The XCorps held a thirty-seven-mile sector ofNO-NAME-LINE from the high ground westof Hongch’on northeastward to Inje. TheU.S. 1st Marine Division held the left partof the corps line on the jagged terrain over-looking Ch’unch’on plain. To the right wasthe U.S. 2d Division, with the ROK 5thand 7th Divisions on its right, and the ROKIII Corps to their right. Chinese unitscrossed the Pukhan River west of Ch’unch’-on, and on 16 May other units struck hardagainst the ROK 5th and 7th Divisions.The patrol base regiments fell back to NO-NAME-LINE, and by 1930 hours of 16 Maythe two ROK divisions were heavily en-gaged along a twenty-mile front in thevicinity of Han’gye-ri, a village ten milesnortheast of Inje. The two divisions heldtheir ground for a time, then fell back, dis-organized and broken.

On the left (west) shoulder of the enemysalient, the U.S. 2d Division, including the

French and Dutch Battalions, withstoodresolute enemy attacks until 18 May, andthen, together with the 1st Marine Division,moved right to fill the gap left by the twoROK divisions. The IX Corps extended itsfront to the right to cover the area left bythe 2d Division and the marines. Van Fleetraced the 15th RCT of the U.S. 3d Divisionfrom Seoul to bolster the west face of thesalient, and sent the 7th and 65th InfantryRegiments to blocking positions at thesouthernmost part of the penetration. Theswarming columns of Chinese and NorthKoreans soon almost surrounded the 2d Di-vision, pushing against its front, right, andrear. The Chinese even blocked the 2d’smain supply route, but a co-ordinated at-tack by the U.S. 9th Infantry drivingnorthward, and the U.S. 23d and 38th In-fantry Regiments attacking southwardalong with their French and Dutch contin-gents, regained control of the route. The 2dDivision stood fast and punished the enemyheavily. The 38th Field Artillery Battalion,firing in support, threw 12,000 105-mm.rounds in twenty-four hours.

It was this kind of monumental artillerysupport which helped to create the so-calledammunition shortage that later was thesubject of public debate and a Congres-sional investigation in the United States.All U.N. artillery units were firing the “VanFleet load,” which was f ive times largerthan the ammunition allowance previouslyin use. The Van Fleet load, together with ashortage of motor transport and the diffi-culties of supply inherent in mountain war-fare, was largely responsible for the much-publicized shortage.

Lt. Gen. Edward M. Almond, com-manding the X Corps, ordered the 2d Divi-sion back to a new line south of Han’gye-rion 18 May. The division, commanded byMaj. Gen. Clark L. Ruffner, successfully

107

withdrew. During its defense it lost 900men—killed, wounded, and missing—andestimated enemy casualties at 35,000. Dur-ing this period, while the Seoul sector wasrelatively quiet, the divisions of the ROKIII Corps, on the X Corps right, were heav-ily engaged, broke, and pulled back to theP’yongch’ang–Kangnung road. The ROKI Corps, on the coast, withdrew fromTaep’o-ri to Kangnung.

While the battle raged on the central andeastern fronts, the enemy struck in the west-ern sector held by Lt. Gen. Frank W. Mil-burn’s I Corps and the IX Corps. On thenight of 17 May, an enemy force estimatedat 25,000 men struck down the PukhanRiver toward the Han, but the U.S. 25thDivision and the ROK 6th Division

stopped this drive just south of Masogu-ri inthree days of violent action. A weak attackdirected against Seoul by some four NorthKorean battalions was quickly halted.

By 20 May the U.N. troops had broughtthe enemy’s offensive to a standstill. The XCorps stabilized its front. The U.S. 1st Ma-rine Division still held its portion of NO-NAME-LINE, and the U.S. 2d Division, withthe 15th Infantry attached, prepared towrest the initiative from the Chinese andretake its positions on NO-NAME-LINE.Having thus stopped two major enemy of-fensives in as many months, and with twomore U.N. battalions about to join theEighth Army, General Van Fleet decidedto take the offensive again.

108

MAP 5

CHAPTER V

General Van Fleet opened his new offen-sive with a series of local attacks designed torelieve enemy pressure on the U.S. XCorps. On 18 May he ordered the U.S. Iand IX Corps, and the U.S. 1st Marine Di-vision, the left f lank element of the X Corps,to send out strong patrols and prepare toattack a phase line (TOPEKA) about halfwaybetween NO-NAME-LINE and KANSAS. Thenext day, after bolstering the U.S. 3d Divi-sion by attaching to it the newly arrivedCanadian 25th Brigade, he enlarged thegoals of his offensive by directing the I, IX,and X Corps to advance to enemy supplyand communications areas near Mansedari,Hwach’on, and Inje. The ROK I Corps, onthe east, was to advance and conform to themovements of the X Corps’ right f lank. TheROK III Corps, which had recently brokenunder enemy attack, was deactivated. To-gether with part of the old ROK III Corpsfront, the ROK 9th Division was given tothe X Corps, and the ROK 3d Divisionand its front were given to the ROK ICorps.

The new offensive, Van Fleet hoped,would deny the enemy any chance to gatherhimself for another counterstroke, threatenthe enemy supply route in the Hwach’on

Reservoir area, and eventually result in thecapture of the Iron Triangle. He shiftedboundaries to place the western third of theHwach’on Reservoir in the IX Corps zone,leaving the remaining two thirds the re-sponsibility of the X Corps. Once the XCorps had taken its objectives, he hoped tosend it in an enveloping move northeast-ward to the coast to block the enemy whilethe ROK I Corps attacked northwestward.As he put it, “The 38th Parallel has no sig-nificance in the present tactical situation.. . . The Eighth Army will go whereverthe situation dictates in hot pursuit of theenemy.”

Once more, as the enemy pulled back,the United Nations forces rolled forwardagainst generally light resistance. On 19May units of the ROK 1st Division recon-noitered the Seoul highway toward Mun-san-ni. Within the next few days I Corpstroops reached the Imjin River north ofMunsan-ni and entered Uijongbu andSinp’al-li. Elements of the IX Corps pushedtoward Kap’yong, drove the enemy acrossthe Hongch’on River, and moved towardthe Hwach’on Reservoir.

In the X Corps zone, while aircraftexecuted a continuous series of close sup-

The United Nations Resumethe Advance

20 May–24 June 1951

110

port missions, the American divisions madeready to trap or destroy the enemy soldiersthat had burst through the lines in the of-fensive just halted. Using tank-infantry taskforces as well as regular formations, Gen-eral Almond planned to employ the U.S.1st Marine Division, on the left, in theYanggu area to push the enemy backagainst the Hwach’on Reservoir while tothe southeast the U.S. 3d Division struck atthe farthest point of enemy penetration. Atthe same time, the 187th Airborne RCTwas to drive northeast along the Hongch’-on–Kansong highway to cut the enemysupply route at Inje, east of Yanggu, whilea task force composed of American and Ko-rean infantrymen covered the right f lank.The ROK 8th and 9th Divisions were in re-serve; the ROK 5th and 7th Divisions werereorganizing.

The 1st Marine Division attacked towardYanggu at 0800 on 24 May, while the 187thRCT started out for Inje. One battalion ofthe airborne regiment broke loose andcrossed the Soyang River the next day tohold a bridgehead pending the arrival ofthe 23d Infantry of the U.S. 2d Divisiontwo days later, when the 7th Marines alsoreached the Soyang. Almond formed a taskforce of the 187th, the U.S. 72d Tank Bat-talion, and other elements to drive to thecoastal town of Kansong in accordancewith Van Fleet’s orders.

Although rain, mud, and enemy resist-ance slowed the offensive on 27 and 28May, and in many instances permitted theenemy to withdraw with his supplies, the187th had taken Inje by the 27th) the ma-rines were making a final push toward theHwach’on Reservoir and Yanggu, and the17th Infantry of the 7th Division, in the IXCorps, had taken Hwach’on. At the end ofthe month the X Corps was deployed alongthe Soyang River. Its f lanking drive to

Kansong proved unnecessary, for that townfell to the ROK Capital Division of theROK I Corps.

The Eighth Army had scored a signifi-cant advance which had brought it justabout back to the Kansas line. The frontnow ran from Munsan-ni through Yong-p’yong, Hwach’on, and Yanggu, dippedsouthward sharply, and then swung northand east to Kansong. Except in the westwhere it slanted southward to take tacticaladvantage of the Imjin River, the line laynorth of the 38th parallel. South Korea wasvirtually cleared of the enemy.

Enemy casualties for the last half of May,Eighth Army headquarters reported, in-cluded 17,000 counted dead and 17,000prisoners of war. Its own casualties for theentire month numbered 33,770. The SouthKoreans had lost the most; American lossestotaled 745 dead, 4,218 wounded, 572 miss-ing, and 6,758 nonbattle casualties, most ofwhich were caused by disease.

What should be done next? General VanFleet’s statement about the hot pursuit ofthe enemy did not mean that he intendedanother advance to the Yalu, for the JointChiefs of Staff had prescribed that theEighth Army was not to go beyond the gen-eral vicinity of Line KANSAS. General Ridg-way, however, had authorized local ad-vances to gain better ground. In any event,it was clear that the U.N. forces were notnumerous enough to encircle and destroythe enemy in large-scale maneuvers, butwould have to stabilize along a strong de-fensive line. In addition to KANSAS, therewere other transpeninsular lines—theYesong River–Wonsan line, and theSukch’on–Wonsan line north of the 39thparallel—that were relatively short; butthey possessed less defensible terrain thanKANSAS, their road systems were poorer,and to seize them would lengthen the U.N.

111

communications lines while shortening theenemy’s Clearly, then, the best policy ap-peared to be to defend KANSAS, meanwhiletaking advantage of Ridgway’s authoriza-tion to conduct local advances to morefavorable ground.

On 1 June, therefore, Van Fleet directedreserve elements of his forces to clear outall civilians and to strengthen KANSAS bystringing barbed wire, clearing fields of fire,laying mines, constructing shelters withoverhead cover, establishing trail and roadblocks, and plotting artillery concentrations.He hoped thus to make the line virtuallyimpregnable. Meanwhile the I and IXCorps were to continue their advancetoward Line WYOMING, the bulge north ofKANSAS that ran from the Imjin River tojust south of Ch’orwon and Kumhwa,thence southeast. With this order Van Fleetlowered his sights slightly, for his earlierplans had aimed at capturing the IronTriangle rather than stopping short onWYOMING.

This advance, dubbed Operation PILE-DRIVER, was carried out with comparativeease except along the approaches to theIron Triangle where the enemy resistedstoutly. Except for a range of hills, the Tri-angle was a low-lying area surrounded bysaw-toothed mountains. It was the terminusof a main highway from Manchuria andwas interlaced with dirt roads and twosingle-track railroads. It served the enemyas a supply and communications area. Ele-ments of both the I and IX Corps foughttheir way toward the WYOMING line nearthe Ch’orwon–Kumhwa base of the Tri-angle, and the enemy fought back hardfrom defenses arranged in depth. As hap-pened so often, heavy rains in the first fewdays of June limited direct air support andturned the roads into veritable quagmires.But the Eighth Army edged forward. The

1st Cavalry Division pushed from Uijongbutoward Ch’orwon against hard-f ightingChinese, as sweat-soaked engineer partiesmoved ahead of creeping tanks to probe forwooden box-mines. Infantrymen of theU.S. 3d and 25th Divisions used f lamethrowers against mud and log bunkers. By10 June, aided by drier weather that madepossible round-the-clock air support, the 3dDivision, with the ROK 9th Division andthe 10th Philippine Battalion, attacked andgained the high ground south of Ch’orwon,while the 25th Division and the TurkishBrigade fought their way to within threemiles of Kumhwa. Next day at 1330Ch’orwon fell, abandoned by the enemy;two hours later the Turkish Brigade enteredKumhwa, from which the enemy had alsodeparted.

Now firmly in control of its portion ofLine WYOMING, the I Corps sent out taskforces to pursue the enemy. On 13 June twotank-infantry task forces, from Ch’orwonand Kumhwa, reached P’yonggang, whichthey found deserted. When they discoveredthat the enemy held the dominating groundnorth of the city, however, the two taskforces quickly returned. Units of the IXCorps pushed northeast toward Kumsongand found the enemy present in strengthand obviously establishing a defensive line.As the Triangle was dominated by the sur-rounding heights, neither side attempted tohold it in strength thereafter, althoughChinese troops struck back at the I and IXCorps and reoccupied P’yonggang on 17June.

On the east-central front, meanwhile, theX Corps had pushed through mountainstoward its sector of the KANSAS line, whichextended over a series of ridges from theHwach’on Reservoir northeastward to thelower lip of the “Punchbowl,” an aptlynamed circular depression north of Inje.

112

Using three divisions, the ROK 7th, theU.S. 1st Marine, and the ROK 5th (whichhad relieved the U.S. 2d Division), the XCorps ground forward against the NorthKorean II and V Corps. The enemy, welldug in on the ridge tops and amply sup-plied with machine guns, mortars, andartillery, fought back hard. Marines andSouth Koreans assaulted successive bunker-studded ridges to push the enemy out, andon 16 June elements of the 1st Marine Divi-sion reached KANSAS, while on the right ofthe X Corps the ROK I Corps advancedfrom Kansong toward Kosong.

Thus by mid-June the Eighth Army hadlargely attained the principal terrain objec-tives of PILEDRIVER, although the enemyhad again managed to get away. Action forthe rest of the month, except in the Punch-bowl area where the 1st Marine Divisionfought a violent battle, was confined to de-veloping the KANSAS and WYOMING lines,

and to patrolling and local f ights which,although fierce and bloody, did not mate-rially affect the dispositions of either side.

As the first year of the Korean conf lictcame to an end, the United Nations couldlook back on their accomplishments withconsiderable satisfaction. South Korea hadbeen cleared of the invading enemy, andthe U.N. forces, after receiving and deliver-ing severe batterings, had pushed north ofthe 38th parallel and successfully executedthe missions that were within their power toaccomplish. Thus, when on Sunday eve-ning, 23 June, in New York City, JacobMalik, Deputy Foreign Commissar of theUnion of Soviet Socialist Republics and hiscountry’s delegate to the United Nations,proposed cease-fire discussions between theparticipants in the Korean conf lict, his pro-posal, while it may have been made for theconvenience of the Chinese, came at afortunate time for the Eighth Army.

114

MAP 6

CHAPTER VI

After Mr. Malik made his proposal, thePeiping radio followed his lead and indi-cated that the rulers of Communist Chinafavored a truce. President Truman thenauthorized General Ridgway to conductnegotiations with the enemy generals. TheU.N. commander at once sent radio mes-sages to his opposite numbers in the enemycamp, and after some argument both sidesagreed to meet in Kaesong, a town nearKorea’s west coast about three miles southof the 38th parallel and between the oppos-ing armies’ front lines. After liaison off icershad made preliminary arrangements, thenegotiations opened on 10 July with ViceAdm. C. Turner Joy, the Far East navalcommander, acting as chief delegate for theUnited Nations. Lt. Gen. Nam Il led theenemy delegation.

Both sides agreed that hostilities wouldcontinue until a truce was signed, butneither side was willing to start any large-scale offensives while the peace talks werein progress. All along the front—which nowextended from the Imjin River to Ch’or-won, paralleled the base of the Iron Tri-angle, swung southeast to the lower edge ofthe Punchbowl, and then ran north andeast to the Sea of Japan above Kansong—the fighting died down. U.N. troops busiedthemselves improving their positions andconsolidating the ground they had just won.

Action was characterized by artillery fireand air strikes, plus a continuing bombard-ment of Wonsan. Combat patrols went outregularly; enemy attacks were repulsed.Offensive action consisted chief ly of limitedregimental or battalion attacks designed toseize more favorable terrain, capture prison-ers, and keep the enemy from nosing tooclose to the U.N. lines. With the exceptionof the f lare-up in the fall of 1951 that fol-lowed the breaking-off of the truce nego-tiations in August, this general pattern wasto prevail until just before the signing of thetruce in 1953.

Enemy policy appeared to follow thesame lines as that of the United Nations,whose intelligence officers concluded thatthe Chinese forces were being strengthened.New Chinese units were identified north-east of the Iron Triangle, in front of the IXCorps below Kumsong, and in the vicinityof the Punchbowl. The enemy, like theU.N. forces, appeared to be holding a mainline of resistance with screening units infront rather than relying on defense bymaneuver.

Throughout the summer months therewas continuous, though local, fighting forlimited objectives, and no day passed with-out casualties. In general the front lines re-mained stable except in the Iron Triangleand the Punchbowl. The Triangle action

Lull and Flare-up25 June-12 November 1951

116

focused on the low Sobang Hills which theChinese had reoccupied after being drivenout during Van Fleet’s June offensive. On1 July tank-infantry task forces from theCorps tried to eject the Chinese but failed.Repeating the attacks through Independ-ence Day, tanks and infantry f inally pushedthe enemy entirely from the area betweenthe Triangle’s base and P’yonggang, thenwithdrew to the main U.N. line. At thesame time I Corps patrols crossed the Imjinto harry the enemy, and the X Corpsbombed and shelled positions in the Punch-bowl where North Koreans appeared to beconcentrating artillery and mortars.

Later in July Van Fleet ordered a north-ward advance in the X Corps zone toshorten the line, prevent the enemy fromfreely observing the KANSAS line, and forcethe enemy to pull back his mortars and ar-tillery. The specif ic objective was a 3,890-foot-high mountain, designated Hill 1179or Taeu-san, at the southwest edge of thePunchbowl which ROK marines had un-successfully attacked. It was defended bywhat was estimated to be a regiment (1,700men) of North Koreans. Elements of the 2dDivision, strongly supported by aircraft andartillery, took over and after a four-day as-sault secured the crest of Taeu-san.

In August the strength of all forces underVan Fleet’s command numbered 586,769 attheir peak. This figure included, in additionto 229,339 in the Eighth Army proper,357,430 from the Republic of Korea, theU.S. Marines, the Fifth Air Force, and theseventeen other U.N. contingents. By nowthe Colombian Battalion had reached Ko-rea to join in alongside the men from theUnited States, the Republic of Korea, Aus-tralia, Belgium, Canada, Ethiopia, France,Great Britain, Greece, India, the Nether-lands, New Zealand, Norway, the Philip-pines, Sweden, Thailand, Turkey, and theUnion of South Africa.

Action was focused again in the zone ofthe X Corps and the ROK I Corps to theeast. Both corps, the latter supported bygunfire from warships lying offshore, ad-vanced their fronts to gain more favorableterrain to the northeast and west of thePunchbowl, and the U.N. units on thewestern portion of the line sent out raidingparties and combat patrols to divert the en-emy reserves. The X Corps and ROK ICorps offensives were carried out almost ex-clusively by South Koreans under Amer-ican command and supported by Americanunits. But on the night of 27–28 August,when a unit of the ROK 5th Divisioncrumpled under an enemy counterattackdelivered against a newly captured hillmass (“Bloody Ridge”) west of the Punch-bowl, the U.S. 9th Infantry Regiment of the2d Division was committed. It was unableto retake the lost ground.

Late in August, after the truce negotia-tions had been suspended, Van Fleet deter-mined to resume the offensive in order todrive the enemy farther back from theHwach’on Reservoir (Seoul’s source ofwater and electric power) and away fromthe Ch’orwon–Seoul railroad. Success ineach of these enterpr ises would alsostraighten and shorten the U.N. front, givegreater security to the KANSAS line, and in-f lict damage on the enemy. Therefore,when the 9th Infantry’s attack failed, theU.N. commanders determined to put fortha major effort in the X Corps zone, usingall f ive divisions in that corps to continuethe ridge-top and mountain actions in thePunchbowl area.

The U.S. 1st Marine Division, withROK marine units attached, opened adrive against the northern portion of thePunchbowl on 31 August. Two days laterthe 2d Division attacked northward againstBloody and Heartbreak Ridges in the vicin-ity of the Punchbowl’s western edge and

117

Taeu-san. Both assaults, delivered uphill byburdened, straining infantrymen, met withinitial success. By 3 September, the two di-visions had reached their f irst objectives.Van Fleet ordered them to continue the ad-vance as far north as the northwesterly legof the Soyang River above the Punchbowl.

On 11 September the 1st Marine Divi-sion attacked again. After seven days ofheavy f ighting, with the enemy resolutelydefending each ridge top from mutuallysupporting positions and yielding only afterrepeated counterattacks and seesaw strug-gles, the marines secured their objective on18 September.1

Meanwhile the 2d Division, on Bloodyand Heartbreak Ridges west of the Punch-bowl, was engaged in the f iercest actionsince spring. Like the marines, the 2d Divi-sion infantrymen, often carrying 60-mm.mortar or 75-mm. recoilless rif le rounds aswell as their own ammunition and equip-ment, crawled hand over hand up tower-ing, knife-crested ridges to assault the hard-f ighting enemy who would yield a ridgeonly in desperation, then strike back in vig-orous counterattack. The same crest oftenchanged hands several times each day.

By 19 September the X Corps front wasstabilized except in the 2d Division’s zone.Supplied by airdrop and by sturdy Koreancarriers with A-frames strapped to theirbacks, and heavily supported by aircraftand artillery, the 2d Division fought on bit-terly. In one instance it delivered, withinthe space of twenty-four hours, no less thaneleven separate assaults, all unsuccessful,against one ridge. The battle raged intoOctober. Finally, on the 14th, after the en-emy seemed to be willing to reopen thetruce talks, the last ridge was secured andthe 2d Division consolidated its hard-wongains.Along the western portion of the front,action in September was characterized by

local attacks, counterattacks, and combatpatrols which culminated, in the easternportion of the Triangle, in a series of success-ful raids by tank-infantry task forces fromthe IX Corps. Once these were accom-plished, the f ive divisions-the ROK lst,the 1st British Commonwealth, the U.S. 1stCavalry, 3d, and 25th Divisions—strucknorth across a forty-mile front from theKaesong area to Ch’orwon to advance thefront three or four miles, establish a newline, JAMESTOWN, and thus protect theCh’orwon-Seoul railroad. By 12 OctoberJAMESTOWN was secured. The IX Corps, tothe right, followed with aggressive patrol-ling toward Kumsong. By 21 October the24th Division had seized the commandingheights just south of Kumsong. The success-ful advances of August, September, andOctober gave the U.N. forces possession ofcommanding ground along their entirefront, and may have inf luenced the enemyleaders to decide to sit down at the peacetable once again.

General Ridgway had attempted to per-suade the enemy to resume negotiating on4 October, while the 2d Division was fight-ing hard west of the Punchbowl. Six dayslater liaison officers met again, this time atPanmunjom, a tiny village on the Seoulhighway north of the Imjin River. Theirdeliberations were interrupted by a mis-directed U.N. air attack near Panmunjomthat brought from the enemy a violent pro-test. It was 22 October before the liaisonofficers met again, and three days later theplenipotentiaries once more resumed thenegotiations that were to continue for manyweary months. Meanwhile, for the soldierat the front, the war went on.

1 Several days later the marines tried the first troop lift byhelicopter in a combat zone. During September they movedcompany-sized units, and in October managed to move awhole battalion.

SECTION 4

22 April–19 May 1951

122

U.N. FORCES WITHDRAWING UNDER THE WEIGHT

OF THE ENEMY OFFENSIVE. Top, Belgian Battalionheading south; middle, British 29th Brigade rest-ing along the roadside; bottom, 24th InfantryDivision moving to new defensive positions.

123

Top, 65th Infantry, 3d Division, moving down avalley road; middle, M46 Patton tank towing acrippled mate through Uijongbu; bottom, battal-ion commander calling in the position of his mennear Uijongbu.

124

F-80 SHOOTING STAR BOMBING ENEMY POSI-TIONS south of Ch’orwon.

“LONG TOMS” OF THE 204TH FIELD ARTIL-LERY BATTALION f iring north of Seoul.

25TH DIVISION MEN IN THE HILLS south of Ch’orwon expecting an enemy attack, 23 April.

125

INFANTRYMAN OF 24TH REGIMENT SQUEEZ-ING ONE OFF, west central sector.

CLEANING OUT ENEMY EMPLACEMENTS. NoteHant’an River in background.

ESCORTING A WOUNDED 25TH DIVISION INFANTRYMAN down the hill to an aid station, 22 April.

126

F-9F PANTHERJETS RETURNING TO THE CARRIER USS PRINCETON (left center) after a bombingmission. USS Philippine Sea is in the right background.

127

AD SKYRAIDER on the deck of the USS Princeton lowering its wings as it swings into take-offposition.

TH E HWAC H’O N DA M U N D E R A T TAC K by Navy AD Skyraiders us ing aer ia l tor pedoes .

128

RAILROAD BRIDGE ACROSS THE TAEDONG RIVER, south of Tokch’on, is blown up by Superforts ofthe Far East Air Forces, May 1951.

129

MARSHALING YARD NEAR YANGYANG on east coast undergoing a bombing attack by B-26 lightbombers of the Fifth Air Force.

SECTION 5

20 May–24 June 1951

133

MARINE PATROL CLOSING IN ON A KOREAN HUT. Note feet of enemy casualty in the doorway. U.N.of fensive, opened on 18 May, was slowed by heavy rains, mud, and stif f enemy resistance.

17TH INFANTRY, 7TH DIVISION, TAKING TIME OUT

along a road near Chungbangdae-ni, south of theHongch’on River, 22 May.

134

HIGH-LEVEL CONFERENCE. From left, Maj. Gen. William M. Hoge, Commanding General, IXCorps; Maj. Gen. Blackshear M. Bryan, Commanding General, 24th Division; Lt. Gen. JamesA. Van Fleet, Commanding General, U.S. Eighth Army; and General Ridgway.

135

31ST INFANTRY REGIMENT, 7TH DIVISION, on a hill near Ch’unch’on, 24 May. Note 57-mm. re-coilless rifles in photograph above. A casualty (opposite page, bottom) receives emergency firstaid. On the 25th, elements of the 7th Division moved north of Ch’unch’on.

136

SUPPLIES FOR THE 187TH REGIMENTAL COMBAT TEAM dropping near Umyang-ni, south of Inje.

AIRDROPPED SUPPLIES NEAR THE MAIN SUPPLY ROUTE south of Inje. On 27 May, the 187th droveinto Inje.

137

MOVING OUT UNDER ENEMY FIRE, 26 May.

ROK 8TH DIVISION MEN ON THEIR WAY FORWARD passing combat-worn troops resting on theirway to the rear.

138

ROK 16TH REGIMENT ADVANCING to positions held by 7th Infantry.

EVACUATING 2D DIVISION CASUALTIES across the Soyang River.

139

M4 TANKS OF 1ST CAVALRY DIVISION fording the Imjin River,

ENEMY-MADE FOOTBRIDGE used by 7th Infantry, 3d Division, in withdrawing from the front lines.

140

CHINESE PRISONERS captured north of the Imjin River by 1st Cavalry Division.

PUERTO RICAN INFANTRYMEN, 65th Infantry, 3d Division, in an enemy-made trench, 1 June.

141

COMPANY I, 5TH CAVALRY REGIMENT, moving across rice f ields before starting the climb up Hill513, north of Tokchong, 1 June.

142

F-80 SHOOTING STAR on a straf ing mission north of Inje, 1 June.

O B S E RVAT I O N P L A N E S E A RC H I N G T H E R U G G E D

PEAKS for information on enemy positions to relayto ground troops.

143

ENGINEERS PROBING FOR ENEMY MINES ahead of a creeping tank south of Ch’orwon, 10 June.

MEDIUM TANK M4A3 FIRING at enemy positions inthe hills north of Inje, 4 June.

144

MINE EXPLOSION CASUALTY AWAITING EVACUATION BY HELICOPTER. Above, medical corpsmenadminister plasma to one of f ive marines wounded in the explosion. Right page: top, a Sikorskyhelicopter approaches a marker placed as a landing guide; bottom, marines hold down thehelicopter after it lands on the windy slope.

146

HAULING IN A “PIG” aboard the mine sweeper USS Mocking Bird. This device, properly termed aparavane, is used in minesweeping operations.

147

U.S. NAVY HOSPITAL SHIP Haven docked at Pusan. Denmark, India, Italy, Norway, and Swedenalso furnished special medical elements for the U.N. ef fort in Korea.

148

USS NEW JERSEY FIRING OFF THE EAST COAST

OF KOREA. Below is a close-up of the 16-inch gunsaboard the ship. Enemy-held east coast is barelyvisible in background.

149

“MEN FROM MARS” FIRING ROCKETS AT ENEMY-HELD WONSAN. The men are wearing one-piecesuits, with hood and gloves, made of plastic-coated glass fabric designed to give head-to-toe pro-tection against back blasts of fuming acids.

150

MARINES PUSHING FORWARD. By 9 June the 1st Marine Division had advanced north of Yanggu,east central front.

RECOILLESS RIFLE CREW, 7th Cavalry Regiment, f iring near Ch’orwon.

151

TRYING TO WARD OFF THE DEAFENING BL AST OF a 75-mm. Recoilless Rif le.

152

DIRECT HIT ON AN ENEMY WAREHOUSE IN WONSAN

153

B-26 INVADER OVER A TARGET IN NORTH KOREA

NAPALM BOMB ATTACK ON AN ENEMY INDUSTRIAL CENTER

SECTION 6

25 June–12 November 1951

158

RIFLEMEN OF THE 7TH INFANTRY, 3D DIVISION,M OV I N G O U T T O A T TA C K H I L L 17, sout h o fP’yonggang in the Iron Triangle, 3 July.

160

UNITED NATIONS DELEGATION AT KAESONG. From left: Maj. Gen. Laurence C. Craigie, USAF;Maj. Gen. Paik Sun Yup, Commanding General, ROK I Corps; Vice Adm. C. Turner Joy, FarEast Naval Commander (acting as chief delegate for the U.N.); Maj. Gen. Henry I. Hodes,Deputy Chief of Staff, U.S. Eighth Army; and Rear Adm. Arleigh A. Burke, U.S.N.

161

CONFERENCE SITE IN KAESONG. Photograph was taken 10 July 1951, the day negotiations opened.

ENEMY DELEGATION AT CONFERENCE SITE. From left: Maj. Gen. Hsieh Fang and Lt. Gen. TengHua, Chinese Army; Lt. Gen. Nam Il, chief delegate for the Communists; Maj. Gen. Lee SangCho and Maj. Gen. Chang Pyong San, North Korean Army.

162

SIGNAL CORPS MEN REPAIRING COMMUNICATIONS LINES in a mountain pass south of Hwach’on.

163

F-86 SABREJETS READY TO TAKE OFF FOR “MIG ALLEY,” an area in North Korea where Russian-built MIG-15 jets were frequently encountered.

ARRIVING AT X CORPS HEADQUARTERS FOR A LIAISON VISIT, July 1951. Lt. Gen. Harold R. Bull(left), Commandant of the National War College, and Maj. Gen. Orlando Ward (center), Chiefof Military History, talk with Maj. Gen. Clovis E. Byers, Commanding General, U.S. X Corps.

164

GENERAL BYERS VISITING A COMMAND POST in the 2d Division area.

ENGINEERS REPAIRING ROAD DAMAGE caused by heavy rain near Inje, 21 July.

165

TRUCKS HEADING FOR INJE along newly repaired road, 1 August.

166

STRETCHER-BEARERS ACCOMPANYING TROOPS UP HILL 1179, southwest edge of the Punchbowl.

167

WALKING WOUNDED FROM 38TH INFANTRY goingdown Hill 1179 to an aid station. On 30 July ele-ments of the 2d Division seized Taeu-san (Hill1179).

ENEMY SOLDIERS CAPTURED IN THE PUNCHBOWL

AREA are searched at command post of the 2d Bat-talion, 16th Infantry, ROK 8th Division.

169

ORPHANED KOREAN CHILDREN received money, clothing, food, and toys contributed by thousandsof Americans.

170

LST LOADED WITH BOXCARS moving into Pusan harbor, August 1951.

KOREAN LABORER CARRYING EMPT Y SHELL CON-TAINERS on an A-frame. Because of poor roads andhil ly ter rain, the A-frame, an ancient nativewooden pack carrier, became indispensable forsupplying many forward units.

171

CRANE UNLOADING A BOXCAR AT PUSAN

172

F-84 THUNDERJETS, securely anchored aboard a carrier, en route to Japan for action over Korea.

173

GIANT CRANE loading a mobile crane onto a barge for shipment to Korea.

174

PONTON BRIDGE IN 3D DIVISION SECTOR washed several hundred yards downstream by f lashf loods. During August heavy torrential rains bogged down lines of communication to the front.

MEN OF THE 23D INFANTRY trying to save equipment in the swollen Soyang River.

175

AID STATION housed in bunkers along the side of a mountain.

OBSERVATION POST, 36TH REGIMENT, ROK 10TH DIVISION, 20 August. One week later the 36thRegiment abandoned its positions, returning to Worun-ni, south of Hill 1179.

176

KOREAN LABORERS helping to carry 75-mm. recoil-less rif les up to 2d Division troops.

WEARY SOLDIERS OF THE 9TH INFANTRY REGIMENT

moving to new positions near Yanggu. In lateAugust the 9th Infantry fought at Bloody Ridge,west of the Punchbowl.

177

GUN CREW OF BATTERY C, 204TH FIELD ARTILLERY BATTALION, f iring a 155-mm. self-propelledgun at enemy positions north of Yonch’on.

178

CLOUDS OF SMOKE FROM PRECISION BOMBING of enemy marshaling yards after a surprise attackby thirty-f ive B-29 Superforts, 25 August. The yards are at Rashin, seventeen miles south of theUSSR boundary on the northeast coast of Korea.

179

HELICOPTER LANDING ON FLIGHT DECK of the USS Boxer after an air-sea rescue mission.

REFUELING IN SEA OF JAPAN. A Navy tanker (center) is servicing a destroyer (left) and a cruiser(right).

180

UP THE STEEP SLOPE OF HILL 940 trudges Com-pany F, 9th Infantry.

182

NEAR THE CREST OF BLOODY RIDGE. This position changed hands several times during September.

RIFLE TEAM FIRING AT AN ENEMY POSITION

with a 57-mm. recoilless r if le.QUAD .50’s giving support to the 9th Infantryf ighting for Bloody Ridge.

183

HILL 983, crest of Bloody Ridge.

184

FIRING AN 81-MM. MORTAR at enemy posi-tions on Hill 931, 13 September.

185

FRENCH TROOPS USING PACK ANIMALS to carry supplies.

186

FIRE DIRECTION AND CONTROL TEAM of the 23d Infantry within view of Hill 931, crest of Heart-break Ridge in background.

187

COMPANY E, 23D INFANTRY, ON ITS WAY TO HILL

931 to relieve Company C, which had been f ight-ing on the ridge for nine days. One of the men restsnear an enemy casualty, below.

188

FRENCH BATTALION TROOPS ATTACHED TO 2D DIVISION occupying Hill 931, 23 September.

189

CASUALTIES OF FIGHT FOR HILL 931 receiving medical attention at an aid station in 2d Division area.

190

M4 TANKS f iring in support of the 2d Division, north of Pia-ri near Hill 1179, 18 September.

105-MM. HOWITZER MOUNTED ON GUN MOTOR CARRIAGE M7 f iring in support of the 1st MarineDivision, 22 September.

191

PLOWING THROUGH MUD NEAR KUMSONG, 21 September. Leading vehicle is a multiple-gunmotor carriage M16, better known as Quad .50’s.

192

ENEMY CASUALTY NEAR BUNKER overrun by 7th Marine Regiment. Note trees sheared off byartillery f ire.

GU N CR E W LOA D I NG A CA M O U F L AG E D 105M M.HOWITZER used in suppor t of the 7th Mar ineRegiment.

193

SIKORSKY HELICOPTER HOVERING OVER HILL 884 with supplies, 20 September. During Septem-ber the marines moved company-sized units by helicopter; in October they moved units the sizeof a battalion.

194

POSITIONS ON THE MAIN LINE OF RESISTANCE occupied by the Colombian Battalion, attached tothe 24th Division, near Chup’a-r i overlooking the Kumsong Valley.

195

SUPPLIES AND REINFORCEMENTS FOR THE ROK 21ST REGIMENT in a cove near the Hwach’onReservoir.

BRIDGE OVER UNDERCUT ON ROAD BETWEEN INJE AND YANGGU, Engineers removed bridge afterf illing the undercut area to road level.

196

GENERAL OF THE ARMY OMAR N. BRADLEY, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, at 7th Divisionheadquarters area. From the left: Lt. Gen. William M. Hoge, Commanding General, IX Corps;General Bradley; Maj. Gen. Ira P. Swift, Commanding General, 25th Infantry Division; Maj.Gen. Frank F. Everest, Commanding General, 5th Air Force (shaking hands with GeneralBradley).

197

GENERAL RIDGWAY, Commander in Chief,United Nations Command (left), with Maj.Gen. Claude B. Ferenbaugh, CommandingGeneral, 7th Infantry Division, 2 October1951.

M A J . G E N . C L OV I S E. B Y E R S ( le f t , fore-ground), Commanding General , U.S. XCorps, with Brig. Gen. Min Ki Sik, Com-manding General, ROK 5th Division, on theway to a training demonstration.

198

LOADING A DUKW FROM A VICTORY SHIP, Inch’on harbor, 3 November. The DUKW will trans-fer its cargo directly to railroad cars.

199

CARGO NET FILLED WITH TURKEYS for Thanksgiving Day dinner.

KOREAN WORKERS LOADING GONDOL AS with artillery ammunition for the front.

200

USS NEW JERSEY along the North Korean coastf iring all nine of her 16-inch guns, November 1951.

12 NOVEMBER 1951–30 JUNE 1952

CHAPTER VII

As the year 1951 drew to a close thecharacter of the conf lict returned to that ofJuly and early August. Fighting tapered offinto a monotonous routine of patrol clashes,raids, and bitter small-unit struggles for keyoutpost positions. By the end of the year alull had settled over the battlefield with theopposing sides deployed along defense linesthat spanned the breadth of the peninsula.Not until the early summer of 1953 was thefighting resumed on a larger scale, and thenonly brief ly.

The lull resulted from General Ridg-way’s decision to halt offensive ground op-erations in Korea. Two factors inf luencedhis decision: the cost of further major as-saults on the enemy’s defenses would bemore than the results would justify; and thepossibility that peace might come out of therecently reopened armistice talks ruled outthe mounting of any costly large-scale of-fensive by either side. His orders to VanFleet, therefore, issued on 12 November1951, were to cease offensive operations andbegin an active defense of the EighthArmy’s front. Attacks were to be limited tothose necessary for strengthening the mainline of resistance and for establishing anoutpost line 3,000-5,000 yards forward ofthe main positions.

The line to be defended was manned by

three American and one South Koreancorps and extended from the Yellow Sea ina great arc eastward for 155 miles to theshores of the Sea of Japan. Defending thearmy’s left wing, the U.S. I Corps, nowcommanded by Lt. Gen. John W. O’Daniel,occupied the sector originating at the con-f luence of the Imjin and Han Rivers andextending northeast to a point midway be-tween Ch’orwon and Kumhwa. On theU.S. I Corps right f lank the defenses ofMaj. Gen. Willard G. Wyman’s U.S. IXCorps began, bulging northward towardKumsong and east to the Pukhan River,which formed the corps’ right boundary.East of the Pukhan the U.S. X Corps,under Maj. Gen. Clovis E. Byers from 15July to 5 December and thereafter underMaj. Gen. Williston B. Palmer, extendedits lines eastward over the mountainousspine of the peninsula to the Nam River,to meet the left boundary of the ROK ICorps. This latter corps, commanded bythe ROK Army’s Maj. Gen. Paik Sun Yup,defended the Eighth Army’s right wing; itszone extended due north along the Koreaneast coast from the Nam River to Kosong.

Action on the Eighth Army front duringthe last two months of the year was limitedmostly to patrol clashes and repelling lightenemy attacks. Blanketed by U.N. harass-

Stalemate12 November 1951–30 June 1952

206

ing artillery fire, the enemy moved only atnight, and his own artillery was restrictedby the liberal use of U.N. counterbatteryfire. In the U.S. I Corps sector the ROK 1stDivision mounted a series of tank-infantryraids against enemy positions in the areasouth of Panmunjom, but after 16 Decem-ber these small-scale actions gave way oncemore to patrolling.

The third week of December saw a seriesof changes on both sides. The U.S. 45th Di-vision, the f irst National Guard division tofight in Korea, arrived from Japan and re-placed the 1st Cavalry Division north ofSeoul in the I Corps sector. The 1st Cav-alry Division returned to Japan for a well-earned rest. Following up this change theU.S. 2d Division, which had been in IXCorps reserve, relieved the U.S. 25th Divi-sion on the line.

On the enemy side, Eighth Army intel-ligence reported, the North Korean I Corpshad moved from its positions on the westernsector of the enemy battle front to reservepositions in the eastern sector. As a resultthe Chinese now defended the entire west-ern and central parts of the enemy line.This concentration of the North Koreanforces in the rugged eastern sector, wherethere was little likelihood of a major U.N.thrust, indicated that the North KoreanArmy might be suffering from a manpowershortage.

The air conf lict over Korea continued ata slower pace as snow, fog, and heavy cloudcover reduced visibility, but sorties averaged700 daily. Enemy pilots seemed reluctantto close with American Sabres. Either theirlosses had begun to tell, or a new group wasbeing pushed through a jet training cycleand the enemy f lyers were not ready to dobattle with the Sabres. U.N. bombers andfighter-bombers continued their interdic-tion campaign, Operation STRANGLE,

against railroad tracks, bridges, and high-way traffic.

At sea, naval units of nine nations tight-ened their blockade around the coast line ofNorth Korea. Naval planes from the fastU.S. carriers Antietam and Valley Forgebombed the rail systems around Yonghung,blasted bridges, and blew up boxcars. Alanding ship, equipped with 5-inch rockets,joined in the bombardment of the northeastport city of Songjin. Two thousand rocketsfell on the harbor area to destroy a largesupply point, shunting yards, and bridgeswhile coastal roadways were raked withshell fragments. United States destroyerscontinued to bombard Wonsan while thecruiser Saint Paul, supporting the ROK ICorps at the eastern extremity of the front,fired on targets of opportunity. Off the westcoast, south and west of Chinnamp’o, theBritish light cruiser Belfast, the U.S. de-stroyer Eversole, and the British frigatesMounts Bay and White Sand Bay scored directhits on three enemy gun emplacements andblew up a small arms supply depot.

On the ground, patrols from both sideswere out in force. As expected, the enemyjumped off in a series of small-scale attacksduring Christmas week. The initial thrust,delivered by about a battalion, came in theX Corps sector deep in the eastern moun-tains. Covered by 82-mm. mortar and artil-lery fire, the enemy captured an outpost ofthe ROK 3d Division. Two counterattacksfailed, but on 28 December a battalion ofthe ROK 3d restored the outpost positionand enemy attacks stopped. That afternoonaction. erupted on the far left f lank of theotherwise quiet front. A Chinese battalion,its members wearing white parkas in thesnow-covered terrain, lashed out at a com-pany-held outpost of the ROK 1st Divisionthat served as a patrol base for the division.A forty-minute pitched battle ensued in

207

bitter, subzero weather before the ROKcompany fell back. Two days later, tank-supported elements of the ROK 1st wonback 900 yards of the ground the companyhad lost but failed to recapture the outpostitself. The high ground was secured by thelast day of the year in spite of bad weatherand heavy enemy resistance that cut shortthe attack.

Although the decision by General Ridg-way to discontinue offensive operationschanged the Eighth Army’s mission to oneof defense, he had not implied that allaction should cease. His order did not pre-clude raids, attritional warfare, or locallimited offensives under favorable condi-tions. Therefore in December 1951, VanFleet directed his corps commanders tomake their attacks against enemy positionsas costly to the foe as possible. Later, at ameeting with the corps commanders, he di-rected them to begin attacking with artil-lery and air strikes to impress the Chineseand North Koreans with the tremendousfire power of the Eighth Army. As the newyear began, the Eighth Army made readyto carry out these instructions.

The 155-mile front remained generallyquiet in the opening days of 1952, althoughpatrols were regularly dispatched to gainprisoners and information. The most signif-icant activity during the first month of theyear occurred in the western extremity ofthe I Corps line. When light counterblowshad failed to dislodge the Chinese from aROK 1st Division outpost, the divisionopened a co-ordinated attack on the heighton 3 January. After a five-day struggle, theinfantry succeeded in seizing and securingthe hill and adjacent positions. The Chineselost heavily in this action, suffering an esti-mated 4,000 casualties and the destructionof a considerable amount of precious equip-ment and supplies.

In January 1952 the Eighth Armyopened a month-long artillery-air cam-paign against enemy positions. The artilleryunits of the four corps f ired on remuner-ative targets, and on alternate days U.N.aircraft struck at others with high explosivesand fire bombs. Thousands of rounds of ar-tillery shells and bombs fell on the targetsduring the month. No doubt this artillery-air attack discouraged enemy of fensiveaction, but the strength of the enemy’s posi-tions and his skill in camouf lage minimizedits effect.

The superiority of U.N. air and artilleryfire forced the Chinese and North Koreansto dig in deeply. Simple emplacements be-came dirt and log fortifications with over-head cover that varied from four to f ifteenfeet in thickness. It was common practice toplace primary defense positions on the for-ward slope of a hill and dig personnel shel-ters, artillery emplacements, commandposts, and supply points, all well-camou-f laged, on the reverse slope. Tunnels orcovered trenches connected the f ightingpositions with the shelters. Thus enemytroops could move to the shelters when at-tacked by aircraft or artillery, then returnto their positions when the fire lifted. Allpositions afforded cover from high-anglefire and provided good fields of f ire.

U.N. artillery and the infantry’s recoil-less weapons, employing direct f ire, neu-tralized many of the positions on the for-ward slopes of hills but were less effectiveagainst enemy fortifications on the reverseslopes. Many times the shells would fall intothe valley below rather than on the target.The aerial fire bomb was no more effective.Only a direct hit from a 500- or 1,000-pound bomb would destroy these emplace-ments.

Sporadic, light ground action continuedto mark the fighting during the remainder

208

of January and February of 1952. Patrolswent out daily to feel out the enemy, cap-ture prisoners, and locate enemy positions.The newly arrived 45th Division carriedout a number of tank-infantry raids nearthe end of January to destroy enemy posi-tions and seize prisoners. Various rusesaimed at luring the enemy out of his posi-tions met with little or no success.

While the spring rains and mists thatcloaked Korea in March and April limitedair and ground operations, Van Fleet shiftedhis units along the front to give the SouthKorean Army a greater share of responsi-bility for defending the battle line and toconcentrate American f ire power in thevulnerable western sector.

By 1 May the 1st Marine Division hadmoved from the Punchbowl area in theU.S. X Corps zone to replace the ROK 1stDivision in General O’Daniel’s I Corps.Here the marines’ amphibious training andequipment could be utilized to conductsmall raids across the Imjin River. TheROK 1st Division, after nine weeks train-ing, replaced the U.S. 3d Division in thecorps’ right center sector. General O’Danielnow had the 1st Marine Division on the leftwing, the 1st British Commonwealth andthe ROK 1st in the center, and the 45th onthe right.

General Van Fleet made more extensivechanges on the central front. He erased theU.S. I Corps–U.S. IX Corps boundary andredrew it farther west. At the same time healso had the right boundary of the lattercorps moved west. With this shift GeneralWyman’s IX Corps, by 1 May, consisted ofthe ROK 9th Division on the left, the U.S.7th Division in the center, and the U.S.40th Division on the right. The 40th, thesecond National Guard division to fight inKorea, arrived in late January 1952. As-signed to the IX Corps, it relieved the U.S.

24th Division, which returned to Japan. Onthe IX Corps’ right f lank, into the gapcreated by the shift in boundary, Van Fleetmoved the reactivated ROK II Corps. Thenew corps’ battle front, defended on the leftby the ROK 6th Division, in the center bythe ROK Capital, and on the right by theROK 3rd, extended eastward from Kum-song to the X Corps boundary.

Only two changes occurred on the eastcentral and eastern fronts. In GeneralPalmer’s X Corps, the ROK 8th replacedthe 1st Marine Division. General Palmer’ssector now had the ROK 7th Division onthe left wing, the U.S. 25th in the center,and the ROK 8th on the right wing. Onthe eastern front, the ROK 11th Divisionmoved up from its training area and tookover defense of the left half of the ROK ICorps zone, while the ROK 5th assumedresponsibility for the right sector on the Seaof Japan.

Ground action had continued to be lim-ited to patrols in March and April, but theenemy became bolder in May. He increasedhis probing attacks and patrols, intensif iedhis artillery f ire, and aggressively inter-cepted U.N. patrols. The increased enemyactivity was most pronounced in the U.S. ICorps sector, where the Chinese executedthirty probing attacks, all unsuccessful, dur-ing May against the ROK 1st Division. ButChinese thrusts in the 45th Division sectorovershadowed all other action across theentire front. When the Chinese made threeraids against the 45th, the U.S. divisioncountered by sending nine tanks of the245th Tank Battalion and a ROK infantryunit to raid the town of Agok, eight mileswest of Ch’orwon, on 25 May. That nightthe Chinese launched an unsuccessful at-tack against one of the division’s patrolbases. Three nights later two Chinese com-panies intercepted a patrol from the 279th

209

Infantry Regiment, on the division’s right.Cut off, the patrol engaged the enemy withsmall arms and automatic weapons fire andradioed for assistance. Although theChinese fired nearly three hundred mortarand artillery rounds on the main line of re-sistance, a relief platoon started out im-mediately and reached the besieged patrolthree hours later. When aircraft illumi-nated the battle area with f lares, theenemy’s f ire lessened. Finding the patrolreinforced and the battlefield light as day,the Chinese broke off the engagement andwithdrew.

The enemy’s increased aggressivenesswas greatly aided by his growing strengthin artillery. In July 1951 the enemy hadfired an estimated 8,000 artillery and mor-tar rounds, but in May 1952 an estimatedtotal of 102,000 rounds fell on the EighthArmy’s positions. Furthermore, the firingwas more effective. The Chinese and NorthKoreans showed ability to mass eight to tenguns on a target, and to place counter-battery f ire accurately. They fired widelyspaced alternating guns and moved theirartillery pieces frequently. In May theChinese also moved artillery forward towithin 2,000–6,000 yards of the EighthArmy’s defenses.

As a result of increased Chinese groundactivity at the hinge of the Eighth Army’sline west of Ch’orwon, Maj. Gen. David L.Ruffner, the 45th Division commander,planned an operation to establish elevenpatrol bases across his division’s front. If hisplan succeeded these bases would screenthe division’s main line of resistance moreadequately by denying the enemy their use.This operation, known as OperationCOUNTER, began on 6 June when the twofront-line regiments of the division launcheda series of attacks to occupy the eleven ob-jectives. By 7 June all but one objective had

fallen to the assault units of the division.The enemy followed up with a series ofcounterblows during the next f ive days, butthese were successfully repulsed.

Seven days later, 13 June, the 45th Divi-sion opened Phase II of COUNTER to seizethe last objective, a hill which the 45th hadabandoned in March. It lay at the southerntip of a T-shaped ridge line eight miles westand slightly north of Ch’orwon. The strugglefor the height began with an air strike anda preparatory artillery bombardment. The2d Battalion of the 180th Infantry thencrossed the line of departure and engagedthe Chinese at close quarters. American in-fantry repulsed four company-size Chinesecounterattacks. Next day the regiment’s 3dBattalion relieved the 2d and secured theobjective. U.N. aircraft f lew f ifty-eightclose-support missions during the first eight-een hours, and U.N. guns f ired 43,600rounds during the forty-eight-hour battle.At noon on 14 June, Phase II of PlanCOUNTER ended with the new chain ofpatrol bases one half to two miles in front ofthe main line of resistance secure in thedivision’s hands.

The Chinese immediately launchedcounterattacks along the entire front of the45th Division. They first expended abouttwo battalions in futile efforts to retake Hill191. Then, on the night of 20–2 1 June, theyopened a regimental assault, supported by5,000 rounds of artillery and mortar fire,against Hill 255, southwest of Hill 191.When this failed they struck at outpost posi-tions on the western anchor of the division’soutpost line, climaxing their efforts on thenight of 28–29 June with an unsuccessfulattack that lasted four and a half hours.Throughout June the 45th sustained 1,004casualties, but the Chinese lost an estimated5,000 men, including thirty captured.

Patrol clashes and light probing attacks

210

by the enemy marked the action elsewhereon the front during May and June. Strongpositions and the mountainous terrain actedas deterrents to any large-scale action onthe central and eastern fronts.

If ground action waned during the firsthalf of 1952, so did air action. Enemy jetpilots had f lown 3,700 sorties in January1952 but only 308 in June. Even though theChinese and North Koreans put fewer andfewer operational aircraft into the air, theycontinued to expand their air potential.U.N. intelligence estimated that they had atotal of 1,000 planes, including 400 jets, inManchuria and China during May 1951,but twelve months later they were reportedas possessing 1,800 planes, including 1,000jets, in the same areas. The enemy alsotightened his night air defenses. Over adozen of his cannon- and rocket-f iring jetsattacked ten B-29’s on the night of 10–11

June as the U.N. aircraft were carrying outa bombing raid on the Kwaksan railroadbridge south of the Yalu River. Assisted byradar-controlled searchlights, the jets shotdown one bomber and caused a second tomake a forced landing.

Throughout the f irst half of 1952, then,the U.N. forces waged a war of contain-ment. U.N. infantry units parried enemythrusts and launched attacks of their own,while naval units blockaded the coasts ofNorth Korea and established an anti-inva-sion patrol to protect ROK partisans hold-ing offshore islands. Sabrejets successfullylimited hostile aircraft to the area north ofthe Ch’ongch’on River line, and friendlybombers interdicted hostile supply lines.The front-line soldier continued to watchfor enemy assaults while hoping that thearmistice negotiators would soon reachagreement.

Support and ServiceThe prosecution of the war in Korea

called for a tremendous administrative andlogistical effort on the part of the EighthArmy. Decisions in Washington and Tokyorequired that the army not only carry on itstactical mission but operate the supply lineswithin the peninsula, administer the rearareas, give relief to the disrupted civilianpopulation, and run the prisoner of warcamps until August 1952—tasks normallycarried out by the theater headquarters.1

In addition, the Eighth Army had to inte-grate the multinational forces f ighting inKorea within its command structure. Mul-titudinous problems arose in carrying outthese various responsibilities.

To integrate the ground contingentsoffered by member countries of the UnitedNations most eff iciently, the U.N. com-mander’s plan was to assign them, accord-ing to their size, to American units withinthe Eighth Army. Thus the Turkish Brigadecame under control of an American divi-sion. The United Kingdom’s two brigadesand the one from Canada were placedunder army control until July 1951, whenthe 1st British Commonwealth Division wasformed and assumed control of all Com-monwealth forces in Korea. This division,in turn, came under operational control ofan American corps. Since all other groundcombat units were of battalion size, they

were attached to U.S. infantry regiments.A number of problems required imme-

diate solution. Language barriers, differentstandards of training, divergent tacticalconcepts, variations in dietary habits, dis-similar religious and national customs, andother discrepancies had to be reconciled.Some were resolved with little or no diffi-culty; others required extensive planningfor solution.

The diff iculties experienced when thefirst U.N. contingents came to Korea ledthe Eighth Army to organize the UnitedNations Reception Center. The center be-came responsible for clothing and equip-ping U.N. forces upon their arrival in Ko-rea and for providing them with familiar-ization training in American arms andequipment. As the newcomers went throughthe reception center, American off icerscould evaluate their prof iciency. Theseofficers soon learned that some of the unitswere not so well trained as advance reportshad indicated and that some lacked aggres-siveness. As a result, the familiarizationtraining programs were expanded.

Training and other factors inf luenced theassignment and subsequent role of the U.N.contingents, although the most desirable

1 In August 1952, the Eighth Army was relieved of thesetasks when the Far East Command organized the KoreanCommunications Zone, under its direct control, for thispurpose.

212

course of action was to employ all U.N.units exactly as similar U.S. units were em-ployed. Those units whose training did notapproximate U.S. standards and who didnot develop satisfactorily received addi-tional training while on line of communica-tions guard duty before being committed.Troops not naturally aggressive and underpoor leadership were not given an assaultrole in the attack. Those lacking in soldierlysteadfastness did not receive key defensemissions. But most U.N. units were consid-ered capable of executing any tacticalmission appropriate for a similar U.S. unit.

In assigning the U.N. units and in givingthem missions U.S. commanders had toreckon with divergent staff and tacticalconcepts and techniques. One unit pre-ferred organizing the high ground when onthe defense, whereas American doctrinefavored organizing the forward slopes toobtain maximum effect with grazing andinterlocking fire from automatic weapons.Another unit considered reconnaissance inforce and combat patrols wasteful in thatcasualties were suffered without the com-pensatory gain of a physical objective. Someunits did not think in terms of massed firepower to the degree U.S. forces did. Therewere other minor variations, but generallythe non-U.S. units endeavored to patterntheir actions after those of their Americancounterparts. Most of the U.N. officers fromother countries, particularly staff off icers,had attended various U.S. service schools.They were thus familiar with Americantactical doctrine, and their military con-cepts and practices were generally in accordwith it.

With so many nationalities operatingunder a unified command in Korea it wasonly natural that language dif f icultiesshould develop. Although the languageproblem was never completely solved, it

did not interfere with the army’s tacticaloperations. English was the off icial lan-guage, and all orders, directives, and in-structions were issued in that tongue. Thetask of translation fell on the non-U.S. con-tingents for they had enough men thatknew English well, whereas the Americancommands to which the contingents wereattached had too few soldiers that werecompetent in a language other than theirown. The integrated U.N. units also fur-nished liaison officers to these same Amer-ican commands.

In theory it would have been desirable tohave each U.N. country furnish the neces-sary logistical support for the men whom itsent into the conf lict in Korea. In practice,however, it was simpler to have the UnitedStates furnish the support on a reimburs-able basis. Thus the Eighth Army, whichhad the responsibility for supplying all ofthe units integrated into it, could do the jobvia a single line of communications insteadof many. Nonetheless it encountered anumber of difficulties.

National differences in customs and tastesled to many complications in supplyingU.N. forces with rations. Because of Mos-lem religious restrictions, the Turks couldnot eat pork or pork products. The Hindusof the Indian contingent could not eat beefbecause of similar restrictions. The Turkswanted strong coffee, spices, and butter in-stead of margarine. The Hindus had tohave rice, curry powder, and strong spices.Thailanders and Filipinos required rice,strong spices, and strong tea and coffee.The Dutch missed their milk and cheese,and the French their bottle of wine. Nearlyall of the Europeans wanted a great dealmore bread than the American ration pro-vided. The Japan Logistical CommandQuartermaster modified the ration to meetthese various requirements.

213

Types of provisions furnished to partic-ular countries changed from time to time,but in May 1952 only three countries—Canada, Norway, and Sweden—were ac-cepting the complete American ration withnothing taken away or added. British Com-monwealth forces, other than the Cana-dians, received all food supplies exceptperishables from British Commonwealthsources. All other units depended fully onthe United States for their food supplies,with the rations modified to suit their tastesand customs.

Items of American clothing generallywon the favor of the U.N. troops from othercountries, though many of them were notconvinced that two layers of light clothingwere better for winter than a single layer ofheavy clothing. The major problem was inmeasurements. Western Europeans are ofabout the same size as Americans; so arethe Greeks and Turks, though their widerfeet made f itting of shoes difficult. Orientaltroops such as the Thailanders and Filipi-nos, on the other hand, are considerablysmaller and their clothing had to be cutdown. For them too, fitting of shoes was aproblem, especially for the Thailanders.

Supplying the integrated units was partof the generally difficult task of the EighthArmy in carrying out its overall logisticalmission. The logistical responsibility heldby the army involved operating the portsand railways, receiving and classifying theincoming supplies and equipment, and for-warding them to the battle front. To organ-ize and control this logistical effort, theEighth Army formed the 2d LogisticalCommand. This command also took overthe job of administering the rear areas.

Logistical support of an army in the f ieldis an arduous task, even under ideal condi-tions. In South Korea, conditions were farfrom ideal. The country has only one

port—Pusan—considered adequate tohandle incoming military supplies. Themountainous east coast and the extremetidal range of the west coast prohibit con-struction of adequate ports. Inch’on, theport for Seoul, and several smaller ports onthe west and south coast were available, butdeep-draft vessels had to remain offshoreand have their cargoes lightered in. HencePusan became the major port for the EighthArmy and received nearly all supplies.

There were disadvantages in using Pusanas the chief port. It is located at the extremesoutheast tip of the peninsula. As the EighthArmy moved northward its supply line wascorrespondingly extended. The lack of ade-quate railroads and highways from Pusanto the battle front added to the burden ofmaintaining the supply line. Moreover,concentrating the bulk of supplies at oneport provided an excellent target for enemyair attack.

To move supplies and equipment for-ward from Pusan to the front the 2d Logis-tical Command utilized the Korean rail-roads as the chief means of transportation.But the Korean rail system left much to bedesired. Its 3,500 miles of track are concen-trated mostly in the western half of the pen-insula, because the mountains prevent con-struction of lines in eastern Korea. Anothercomplication is that the system’s maintrunk lines, one double track from Pusan toSeoul and a single track from Pusan toCh’unch’on, have very few feeder lines. Theforces in eastern Korea therefore had totruck supplies from the main lines overgreat distances.

The problems of rail support increased asthe Eighth Army advanced northward andtrack mileage under its control lengthened.The rail system had suffered a good deal ofdamage in the fighting, and a shortage of

214

rolling stock developed. Air and artillerybombardment had destroyed tracks androlling stock, yards and repair shops, rail-road bridges and tunnels, and a lack ofenough skilled workers hindered the resto-ration of the damaged lines although theEighth Army’s engineers worked constantlyat the job. The army’s transportation sec-tion instituted a system of movements con-trol to help overcome the shortage of rollingstock. It insisted that every car be fullyloaded before shipping and unloadedquickly at its destination. The transporta-tion section also obtained some rolling stockfrom Japanese sources and the UnitedStates, including locomotives. Despite all ofthese measures, a shortage of cars and mo-tive power persisted throughout the courseof the conf lict.

As for the highway system of Korea, itwas not built to support modern militaryoperations. The roads are narrow, badlydrained, and poorly surfaced. Snow and icecover them in winter, and spring thaws andsummer rains make them impassable.There were few laterals to connect with themain highways, and in many areas roadsdid not even exist or were merely ox-carttrails. Because supply agencies had to relyheavily on truck transportation, the EighthArmy’s engineers spent a great deal of timeand effort in improving and maintainingthe existing roads and in constructing newroads.

Yet the tremendous improvements madeby the engineers in South Korea’s landtransportation facilities were not enough toget the supplies to the combat troops. Trainsand trucks brought the supplies from theports to forward supply points. But fromthere to many sections of the front, food,clothing, ammunition, and other battlefieldneeds had to be hand-carried over therugged terrain, a process that required a

large number of men. Since combat troopscould not be spared for such a task, theSouth Korean Government, at the requestof the Eighth Army, organized the KoreanService Corps to carry supplies to the frontlines. Laborers of this corps, using A-frames,daily toiled up the slopes of steep hills car-rying needed supplies to the companies andplatoons. They also assisted the front-linetroops in building and improving fortifica-tions.

As its principal means of communicationin the Korean conf lict, the Eighth Armyused wire and very high frequency radio.Because the telephone and telegraph sys-tems of South Korea had been seriouslydamaged by the war and were in a badstate of disrepair, the army’s signal sectionbuilt its own wire system extending fromPusan all the way to the front. The radionetwork supplemented the wire system toinsure rapid and constant communicationbetween all echelons of command. The in-genuity and hard work that went into theconstruction of the wire and radio networksproduced in the end what was probably thefinest communications system that any fieldarmy ever enjoyed.

Another problem posed for the EighthArmy was maintaining the supply of am-munition. When the conf lict began, a greatamount of ammunition left over fromWorld War II was available for the supportof the army. Transporting this ammunitionto the front placed an additional burden onthe inadequate rail and highway system ofSouth Korea. As hostilities extended intothe summer of 1951, ammunition levels inthe depots began to approach the absoluteminimum needed to sustain combat opera-tions in Korea. The ammunition affectedwas shells for light and medium artilleryand for mortars. A rationing program fornormal combat operations was adopted to

215

solve the problem. This program helped torelieve the strain on transportation facilitiesand insured that the army’s guns wouldhave all the ammunition necessary to stopan enemy drive or to support offensive oper-ations.

Besides giving logistical support to theSouth Korean Army, the Eighth Armyaided the civil population with relief sup-plies. From the very beginning of the con-f lict the Republic of Korea required civilassistance for its population. As the fightingspread over the whole country, the destruc-tion of homes and fields, economic disloca-tions, and threats of disease and starvationimper iled the new nation. The SouthKorean Government did not have themeans to cope with the problems of its tensof thousands of homeless refugees. Unlesssomething was done, civil unrest wouldseriously impair the military effort of theU.N. forces in Korea. Thus civil relief be-came a military problem, at least while thefighting continued.

When the U.S. Army received responsi-bility for providing civil assistance to theRepublic of Korea, it moved quickly. TheFar East Command shipped food, clothing,and medicine from its supply depots to carefor the refugees. Other relief items werepurchased from Japanese sources. TheEighth Army organized the United NationsCivil Assistance Command (UNCACK)to provide relief. Working with the SouthKorean Government and U.N. representa-tives, this command supervised the organi-zation of refugee camps, distributed foodand clothing, and established medical facil;ities for the civil population. To prevent thespread of communicable diseases, morethan three fourths of the population re-ceived inoculations against smallpox, ty-phoid, and typhus. Aircraft dusted citieswith DDT to kill disease-bearing insects

while teams dusted millions of SouthKoreans.

Thousands of children who had lost theirfamilies wandered with the refugees. Or-phanages within the country rounded themup and cared for them, receiving aid fromthe Civil Assistance Command. In addition,thousands of American soldiers voluntarilycontributed money to support homes forthem. Many units of the Eighth Army“adopted” orphanages, supporting themwith money, clothing, food, and othernecessities.

Another objective of the civil relief mis-sion in Korea was to assist the country inrebuilding its economy. The Civil Assist-ance Command helped to rebuild and ex-pand the agricultural economy by provid-ing technical guidance and material aid. Atthe same time the South Koreans werehelped and encouraged to build factoriesfor the production of war materiel and con-sumer goods, and the nation’s governmenttook steps to reduce inflation. This economicprogram was reinforced by the EighthArmy’s employment of thousands of Ko-rean workers and the rebuilding and im-provement of the railroads, highways, ports,and airfields of the country.

Another problem bristling with diff icul-ties arose from the large number of enemysoldiers held by the Eighth Army. Whenthe North Korean forces collapsed near theend of 1950, the Eighth Army had wellover 100,000 prisoners of war on its hands.These prisoners were held on the island ofKoje-do, situated thirty miles southwest ofPusan. The camp consisted of four barbedwire enclosures each subdivided into eightcompounds, with each compound capableof holding 6,000 prisoners.

The camp administration carried out theprinciples of the Geneva Convention of1949 regarding prisoners of war. Guards re-

216

ceived instructions in these principles, andrepresentatives of the International RedCross inspected the compounds frequently.The captives were permitted to engage inathletics, and classes of instruction in agreat variety of subjects were offered tothose who wished to attend.

Camp authorities also instituted a screen-ing program to separate South Koreancivilians from the real prisoners of war.These civilians had been forced to fight orto work as laborers in the North KoreanArmy when it overran the Republic of Ko-rea during the first months of the war. As aresult of the screening program 38,000 cap-tives were reclassif ied as civilians duringNovember and December 1951. Then, inJanuary 1952, the camp commander begana second screening cycle to correct mistakesmade in the first one. Communist leaderswithin the compounds resisted this screen-ing because it meant that they would losecontrol over the anticommunist prisonersand that the guards could keep a closerwatch over antagonistic groups.

During the early months of the camp’soperation disorders occurred often, butrioting did not break out until late in 1951.Evidently a core of tough communists hadbeen organized in each compound with theobjective of seizing control over the anti-communists among the prisoners. Gangs ofthugs cowed those who would not conform,and kangaroo courts sentenced leaders ofthe opposition to death. This attempt toseize control of the captives within eachcompound led to factional strife and anumber of deaths.

Violent opposition to screening began inearly 1952, when the inmates of Compound62 attacked a battalion of troops from theU.S. 27th Infantry Regiment. The battal-ion had entered the compound to keeporder while the Republic of Korea screen-

ing committee performed its duties. Theprisoners attacked the Americans withrocks, pick handles, homemade knives andaxes, tent poles, and barbed wire f lails. Thesoldiers threw concussion grenades to stopthe attack, but the mob continued to moveforward. The American commander or-dered his troops to fire, and the prisonerswere forced back. When the melee ceased,200 inmates of the compound were casual-ties and one American had been killed andthirty-eight wounded.

As a result of the riot the guard strengthwas increased and a new screening andsegregation program instituted. The newprogram called for separation of thoseprisoners and civilian internees who desiredrepatriation from those who did not and forconstruction of new prisoner of war campson the mainland and the island of Cheju-do.

As the new screening program began, inApril 1952, it met with increasing hostilityfrom the communist prisoners. Mass meet-ings, f lag raisings, and other acts of defiancetook place. The climax came in May whenthe prisoners seized the commander of theprisoner of war camp. General Van Fleetimmediately moved reinforcements to theisland, including f lame-throwing tanks.Upon release of the camp’s head, Brig.Gen. Haydon L. Boatner took over com-mand and proceeded to bring the situationunder control. General Boatner had allcivilian residents of the island moved off,reorganized the staf f, and ordered hisguards to enter forcibly any compound dis-playing slogans or f lying North Koreanf lags. Engineers began rebuilding the com-pounds to reduce their capacity to 500 men,and the army commander sent the 187thAirborne Regiment to reinforce the guardstrength of the camp.

The communist leaders prepared to f ightagainst any removal of the prisoners. They

217

secretly fashioned weapons, f illing crudegrenades with hoarded cooking gasoline.The inmates of one compound dug a waist-deep trench before the main gate on the as-sumption that the guards would enterthere.

On 10 June the camp commander pro-ceeded to move the prisoners to the newcompounds. The leader of Compound 76,where the trench had been dug, was or-dered to form his men into groups of 150 inpreparation for the move. He failed to doso, and General Boatner ordered the com-mander of the 187th to move two battalionsinto the compound. The troops did notenter by the main gate. Instead engineerscut through the barbed wire in rear of thecompound while tanks patrolled outside ofthe enclosure. Then the troops, wearing gasmasks, advanced through the cut in thewire and threw tear gas grenades into theunruly mob. The grenades ignited gasolinehidden in the compound, and the inmatesbroke before the American troops. Somelocked themselves in the barracks of the en-

closure while others jumped into the ditchnear the main gate. The troops began amethodical job of cleaning out the barracksand ditch, herding the captives toward thecenter of the compound. In one and a halfhours it was all over. Nearly 6,000 NorthKoreans squatted in the center of the en-closure while the compound’s buildingswent up in f lames. Over 150 inmates werekilled and injured; the Americans had onekilled and thirteen wounded. Shortly after-ward the prisoners were moved to the newcompound while their leader was led off tosolitary confinement.

With the collapse of the prisoners’ revoltin Compound 76, the remainder of thescreening program was carried out withrelatively little difficulty. The noncommu-nist prisoners were separated from the com-munists, and the latter moved into the 500-man compounds. Incidents on the islandcontinued, but guards used tear gas to stopdemonstrations and riots and to maintainorder and discipline among the unrulyinmates.

SECTION 7

12 November 1951–30 June 1952

222

STATION GYPSY, near Hwach’on. Operations van from which programs were broadcast (left) con-tained two short-wave receivers, two dual-speed turntables, an amplif ier for live broadcasts, atransmitter, console, microphone, tape recorder, and library of over 35,000 song hits; administra-tive van is on the r ight.

223

378TH ENGINEER COMBAT BATTALION constructing a treadway bridge across the Pukhan River,ROK 6th Division sector of IX Corps area, November 1951.

224

PATTON TANK ON THE MAIN SUPPLY ROUTE, 3dDivision sector, I Corps area, 17 November 1951.

226

WINTRY WASHDAY in the 24th Division area, 24 November.

8-INCH HOWITZER in action, 25th Division area.

227

CLEARING SLUSH from a 24th Division landing strip.

GUARD DUTY. Snow-covered vehicle is a halftrack, Quad .50.

228

VICE-PRESIDENT ALBEN W. BARKLEY, right foreground, is welcomed to the 24th Division area bythe Colombian Battalion Commander; Maj. Gen. Blackshear M. Bryan, Commanding General,24th Division, is at r ight.

229

WET AND CHILLED, cavalrymen huddle around a small can of burning gasoline.

230

LITTER BEARERS OF THE 7TH DIVISION, moving cautiously over ice and snow, bring in a woundedman.

231

ENEMY PRISONER, captured by a 7th Division soldier, is on his way south for the winter.

232

SELF-PROPELLED 155-MM. GUN lights up the nightin the 25th Division area, 26 November.

234

FLYING BOXCAR C-119 DISGORGING MAIL for APO 24, Ch’unch’on.

235

ROLLS OF BARBED WIRE AND MAIL on the way up to Company E, 21st Infantry.

PATTON TANKS PINCH-HITTING FOR MAIL TRUCKS carry Christmas mail to front-line troops.

236

RIDGERUNNER, so called because of its maneuverability on the roadway above running along theridge line. The tank shown above is credited with having destroyed eighteen enemy bunkers inone afternoon.

INSUL ATED CONTAINERS OF HOT FOOD being carried up to hilltop positions, 24th Division area.

237

TANK COMMANDER crouching behind the turret after giving the order to f ire.

ENEMY BUNKER AND CONNECTING TRENCH,Hill 770.

ENEMY KITCHEN on Hill 770 near Kumsong.

238

CABLE CAR, built by 3d Engineer ConstructionBattalion. Starting point is at foot of Hill 770, left;the car nears the platform at the top of the hill, be-low. Engine from a discarded 3/4-ton truck suppliedpower for the car, which traversed a distance of1,530 feet from bottom to top. At several stages ofits journey the car dangled as much as 200 feet of fthe ground.

239

COMPANY E, 21ST INFANTRY, preparing for a longwinter, near Kumsong. Koreans help with con-struction of bunker, r ight. Assistant squad leadersattend a class on the use and operation of grenadeadapters, below.

240

Some troops see Santa.

241

Some troops do not.

242

Now I lay me down to sleep. . . .

243

REPLACEMENTS for the 1st Marine Division disembarking from an LST.

244

WHITE-CL AD RECONNAISSANCE PATROL from 2d Division moving out, 1 January 1952.

L-20 PREPARING TO TAKE OFF. Seated in front with the pilot is Maj. Gen. Williston B. Palmer,Commanding General, X Corps.

245

NEW YEAR’S DAY DINNER on its way up to Company L, 21st Infantry, near Kumsong.

247

Celebrating New Year’s Day

248

PLOTTING CORRECTIONS ON A MAP in the fire control hut before the next heavy mortar rounds arefired, west of Ch’orwon, 4 January

249

SERVING A HOT MEAL to the 179th Infantry Regiment, 45th Division, along a mountainside. The45th Division arrived in Korea during the third week of December.

250

JANUARY 1952. In this month the Eighth Army opened a sustained artillery-air campaign againstenemy positions.

251

DESTROYING AN OLD ENEMY BUNKER WITH TNT,NEAR KUMSONG, 11 JANUARY.

252

40TH DIVISION INFANTRYMEN preparing to debark at Inch’on harbor, January 1952. The 40thDivision was assigned to the IX Corps to relieve the 24th Division.

253

24TH DIVISION TROOPS aboard the USS George Clymer headed for Japan.

COFFEE BREAK for 40th Division men on their way to the front lines two days after arriving inKorea.

254

UNCACK Representative Presenting a Jeep-Type Fire Engine to a Korean public safetyofficer, Taejon, October 1952.

Partially Contructed Family Housing Units, Taegu, July 1952.

255

UNCACK CHIEF NURSE WITH KOREAN WOMEN examining American women’s uniforms donatedto hospitals, August 1952.

The United Nations Civil Assistance Command(UNCACK), in providing relief for the civil popu-lation of South Korea, distributed food and cloth-ing, reconstructed communities, and furnishedmedical facilities.

CEMENT DONATED BY UNCACK was used tomake well casings and pipe, July 1952.

256

FRENCH BATTALION TROOPS ON MANEUVERS, shown in positions along the electric railroad trackat Kumgong-ni.

257

INSTALLING A FIELD TELEPHONE at the 160th In-fantry regimental command post.

LEAVING WARMING TENTS to carry out a f ire mission. The men above are from Battery B, 37thField Artillery Battalion.

259

MEDIC TREATING INJURED 2D DIVISION INFANTRYMAN, 14 February 1952,while a wounded ROK soldier is helped up the steep bank to await his turn.

260

ALL-PRISONER CAST of a play staged for the entertainment of the POW camp, Koje-do, March1952.

U.N. POW CAMP, KOJE-DO. Korean village, foreground, borders the camp.

261

SEARCHLIGHT IN POSITION, west of Ch’orwon. This searchlight is mounted on the bed of a con-verted 21/2-ton truck.

TAKING TIME OUT for coffee and doughnuts, 37th Field Artillery Battalion command post.

262

SAVING AN AIRMAN

FIRING ROCKETS FROM A PT BOAT in a harassing attack against the east coast of North Korea.The boat is manned by ROK Navy men.

263

LOW-LEVEL AIR ATTACK on enemy supply center at Suan, thirty-f ive miles southeast of P’yong-yang. Note tank of napalm just released from the left wing of the F-80.

264

PL ATOON LEADER BRIEFING HIS MEN before leaving on a reconnaissance patrol, June 1952.

265

CONFERENCE IN THE RAIN, June 1952. General Van Fleet, Eighth Army commander, is on the left;next to him is Brig. Gen. Joseph P. Cleland, Commanding General, 40th Division; Maj. Gen.Willard G. Wyman, Commanding General, IX Corps, is at right.

266

Welcome home.

1 JULY 1952–28 JULY 1953

CHAPTER IX

Deadlock continued as the Korean con-f lict went into its third year in late June1952. Since November 1951 the battle fronthad been relative stable, both sides havingsettled down to an active defense of theirpositions. In the following winter and springthe f ighting dwindled to patrol clashes,raids, and small-scale attacks, but the en-emy grew more aggressive in May 1952 andaction along the entire front increased.Enemy attempts to seize key outposts andterrain guarding the approaches to theEighth Army’s main positions sparked fre-quent and intense f ire f ights during thesummer and fall of 1952. The army success-fully defended these positions, breaking upthe enemy’s attacks and killing thousandsof Chinese and North Koreans.

July began with a series of small-scale at-tacks by both sides. In the Eighth Army’swestern sector the U.S. I Corps, under itsnew commander, Maj. Gen. Paul W. Ken-dall, conducted a number of raids on Chi-nese fortifications opposite the corps’ front.On the first day of the month, infantrymenfrom the ROK 1st Division raided enemypositions overlooking the Imjin River, Inthe f ight that followed the ROK troopskilled 112 Chinese before returning to thedivision’s lines. Two days later, on 3 July,the marines, on the corps’ left wing, struckat a Chinese battalion. Supported by mor-

tar and artillery fire, two companies fromthe 7th Marine Regiment swept into theenemy positions to inf lict 200 casualties onthe surprised Chinese before retiring. Thecorps handed out more punishment when atank-infantry team from General Ruffner’sU.S. 45th Division attacked a hill massnorthwest of Ch’orwon. The tankers andinfantrymen returned to their lines afterkilling seventy-nine of the enemy on thehill.

Light action marked the fighting on theremainder of the front. In General Wy-man’s U.S. IX Corps, troops from Maj.Gen. Wayne C. Smith’s U.S. 7th Divisionraided an enemy-held hill ten miles southof P’yonggang on 3 July. The raiding infan-trymen wiped out the forty-five Chinese de-fenders and destroyed enemy fortif icationsbefore returning to their lines. The ROK9th Division followed up this raid with twoof their own against enemy positions, killingsixty Chinese and destroying bunkers,trenches, and gun emplacements. In theROK II Corps area South Korean infan-trymen struck enemy positions northeast ofKumhwa to kill sixty-five Chinese. In theROK I Corps sector North Korean troopsunsuccessfully attacked an observation postfor naval gunf ire on the enemy’s NamRiver communications line. The enemy lostan estimated 600 men in this attempt.

Outpost Battles1 July–31 December 1952

270

Torrential rains in the last week of Julyand the first week of August restricted ac-tivity along the front, but periods of clearweather brought renewed attacks by bothsides. In the U.S. I Corps zone Maj. Gen.James C. Fry, the U.S. 2d Division com-mander, sent two reinforced companiesagainst Hill 266 during the night of 31July–1 August. Determined to regain theheight that had been lost in July, the infan-trymen stormed up the slopes and drove theChinese out. Quickly digging in and organ-izing their position, the 2d Division troopsawaited the inevitable counterattack. Itcame the following night, but massed divi-sion artillery and small arms fire broke upthe Chinese assault. Enemy attacks later inthe month met with no success, and the hillremained in the hands of the 2d Division.

Heavy rains again drenched Korea inthe latter part of August to bring the fight-ing to a near halt. Then, as September be-gan, the skies cleared and the enemy re-newed his assaults on the Eighth Army’soutpost positions. These attacks were ac-companied by an increasing amount ofmortar and artillery fire support.

For quite some time the enemy hadgradually been increasing the volume ofmortar and artillery fire used in support ofhis attacks. In September an all-time highof 45,000 rounds fell on the army’s front inone day. Despite the enormous ef fortexerted by the Fifth Air Force and thenaval air arm to sever the enemy’s supplylines the Chinese and North Koreans kepttheir front-line troops supplied and evenmanaged to accumulate a reserve stock ofammunition and supplies.

Various sectors of the Eighth Army’s linecame under enemy attack in September.After unsuccessfully assaulting an outpostthat the marines had seized and establishedthe previous month, the Chinese shifted

their efforts to the U.S. I Corps’ right wing.On the night of 18 September, after theirartillery had smothered Hill 266 in the U.S.2d Division sector with 1,000 shells, an esti-mated two enemy companies, reinforcedwith tanks, swarmed up the slopes andrapidly overran the crest. The Americanswithdrew 400 yards and established newpositions, then counterattacked. But theheavy and accurate Chinese artillery f ireprevented the assaulting troops from mak-ing any headway. On the evening of 20September another American counterat-tack formed and began to envelop the hill.After slow progress through heavy enemyfire the attacking companies, reinforced bya platoon of tanks, made a co-ordinatedassault that carried them to the crest. TheChinese fell back as the attacking infantry-men swept over the hilltop and secured theposition.

In the central sector of the Eighth Armyline, the enemy struck at two separatepoints in the front of the ROK II Corps’Capital Division. On the division’s left f lankthe Chinese overran an outpost position tothreaten the main line of resistance whileanother outpost on the division’s right fellto enemy assaults. Both were soon retakenby the South Korean infantrymen.

In the eastern sector of the front NorthKoreans attacked main line of resistancepositions on the right wing of the U.S. XCorps on the night of 21–22 September.While the U.S. 45th Division was in theprocess of relieving the ROK 8th Division,elements of two enemy battalions overranthe western slope and crest of a hill servingas part of the ROK division’s main line.Driving one company back about 1,000yards, the attacking enemy then swung tothe west to widen the penetration. But thedefending South Koreans on the left of thepenetration held firm and halted the North

271

Korean attack. The next morning, 22 Sep-tember, an infantry company from theROK 8th Division, supported by tanksfrom, the 45th Division’s 245th Tank Battal-ion, managed to regain part of the hill. Atnoon of the same day, after artillery f ireand air strikes had covered the penetration,elements of the ROK 8th’s reserve regimentcounterattacked and drove the enemy back.By nightfall the main line of resistance hadbeen restored and all enemy troops drivenout. During the next two days the NorthKoreans made several weak efforts to pene-trate the division’s main line without suc-cess. Meanwhile the 45th Division contin-ued its relief of the 8th, completing it on 26September.

While the troops of the Eighth Army de-fended their outposts and main battle posi-tions against local enemy assaults, the airwar over Korea intensif ied during the sum-mer of 1952. Aircraft from the Fifth AirForce and the Far East Bomber Command,Marine aircraft, and Navy carrier-basedplanes struck at supply centers, troop con-centrations, power plants, factories, andrail and road networks. In addition to strik-ing deep into enemy territory, air units ren-dered valuable assistance to front-linetroops. Enemy bunkers, trenches, gun posi-tions, and communication lines werebombed or seared with napalm. On 29August the Fifth Air Force carried out thelargest air raid of the Korean conflict. Hun-dreds of Air Force, Marine, and Navyplanes accompanied by aircraft from Aus-tralia and the United Kingdom raidedP’yongyang, the North Korean capital. Inthis massive strike, supply installations, re-pair shops, troop concentrations, militaryheadquarters, and a host of other targetswere destroyed or badly damaged.

An increasing number of enemy jet inter-ceptors rose to challenge Fifth Air Force

Sabrejets during the summer. But the su-periority of American pilots was clearlydemonstrated by the number of enemy air-craft destroyed in aerial combat. Duringthe month of September alone, pilots fromthe Fifth Air Force shot down sixty-fourMIG-15’s at a cost of seven Sabrejets.

The Navy maintained its blockade ofboth coasts of North Korea. On the eastcoast, warships of the U.S. Seventh Fleetcontinued to bombard the enemy port ofWonsan. Ships from the f leet also continuedto provide gunfire support to friendly forcesnear the east coast of the peninsula. On theKorean west coast the U.N. f leet helpedprotect islands off the North Korean coastand assisted guerrilla units to recapture anisland that had been seized by an enemyforce.

The rising tide of enemy attacks that be-gan in May culminated in a series of as-saults in October that produced some of theheaviest fighting in more than a year. Bat-tles raged on many sections of the front asChinese and North Korean units, some-times employing their familiar human-seatactics, tried to penetrate the Eighth Army’smain line of resistance or to seize dominat-ing terrain. The heaviest fighting centeredaround two key heights, Hills 281 and 395,northwest of Ch’orwon. Capture of thesestrategic positions, astride the U.S. I Corps-U.S. IX Corps boundary, would give theChinese control of the lateral roads behindthe corps’ lines and threaten the main sup-ply route to Ch’orwon.

To herald the opening of their attacks theChinese unleashed the largest volume ofmortar and artillery f ire received by theEighth Army since the fighting began. Onone day, 7 October, more than 93,000rounds fell on U.N. positions along thefront. The Eighth Army estimated that dur-ing these attacks the enemy’s daily expend-

272

iture of artillery and mortar ammunitiondoubled to more than 24,000 rounds.

The Chinese began a co-ordinated attackagainst both hills on the evening of 6 Octo-ber after a daylong artillery bombardmentof the objectives. Two enemy companiesstruck Hill 281, the eastern anchor of the ICorps line. The U.S. 2d Division’s FrenchBattalion, defending the height, repelledthis assault, but the Chinese added twomore companies to the attacking force, re-formed, and attacked again. The gallantFrench would not yield, and as the battleprogressed the Chinese continued to buildup their attacking strength. By dawn, theyhad an entire regiment hammering awayvainly at the French. Finally, with hun-dreds of their dead and wounded strewnabout the besieged position, the Chinesebroke off the attack and withdrew. Theykept up pressure against the French-heldhill for the next few days, but on 12 Octoberabandoned further attempts to capture it.

The main enemy attack in the meantimestruck Hill 395, guarding the U.S. IXCorps left f lank. The Chinese hurled anestimated two battalions against the heightin co-ordination with the attack on Hill281. Elements of the ROK 9th Division,defending the hill, held their positions untilthe following afternoon, 7 October, whenthe enemy threw in additional battalionsand forced the South Koreans to withdraw.A counterattack restored the lost ground,but the enemy renewed his assault in regi-mental strength the next day and againforced the ROK troops to withdraw. Theyestablished a new defense line south of thelost positions and then began to counter-attack. Assisted by numerous air strikes andthe massed corps artillery, the South Ko-rean infantrymen managed after two daysof heavy fighting to fight their way to thecrest of the hill and drive the Chinese back.

An enemy battalion then attempted to pushthe infantrymen back, but the defenders,backed up by artillery f ire, stopped theChinese short of their goal.

To relieve the pressure against Hill 395 abattalion from the ROK 9th Division, sup-ported by a company-sized tank-infantryteam, seized high ground several hundredyards north of the hill. Securing this newlywon terrain, the battalion continued to ad-vance northward and by 15 October hadsecured two screening positions 1,000 yardsnorth of Hill 395. With the South Koreansnow in firm control of the disputed groundthe enemy gave up further efforts to pene-trate the IX Corps left f lank. After the bat-tle was all over, the 9th Division reportedthat the major part of a Chinese reservedivision from the 38th Chinese CommunistArmy had been destroyed. Over 2,000 Chi-nese dead were counted on the slopes ofHills 281 and 395 in the ten-day battle.

The Eighth Army countered enemy ag-gressiveness by making several attacks dur-ing the middle of the month. The primaryaim of these attacks was to strengthen thedefense of Kumhwa, the right leg of theIron Triangle and the hub of an importantroad net. Two dominating hill masses, Hills500 and 598, about four miles north of thecity were the objectives of the IX Corps’U.S. 7th and ROK 2d Divisions. Theattack began on the morning of 14 Octoberwhen two battalions from the 7th Division’s31st Regiment executed a double envelop-ment of Hill 598 from the south and south-east. Advancing under heavy enemy fire,the battalions succeeded in driving the en-emy from the hill after six hours of intensefighting. The Chinese counterattacked thatnight and forced the Americans off theheight.

The next morning, 15 October, the in-fantrymen of the 31st again attacked. Mov-

273

ing silently and swiftly through the morn-ing mists they went up the slopes of Hill598 and ejected the enemy from the crest.Two smaller heights that lay a short dis-tance from the main objective also fell theattacking troops. The Chinese then re-taliated by throwing two battalions againstthe hill in an effort to dislodge the Amer-icans. The enemy attack failed. Three dayslater, on 18 October, the American infan-trymen advanced another 1,000 yardsdeeper into enemy territory and seized keyterrain to protect Hill 598 from the north.But counterattacking Chinese battalionsforced the troops of the 31st to pull back themain hill mass. Further enemy attemptsto regain Hill 598 failed until 30 October.At that time, three days after the ROK 2dDivision had taken over the height from theU.S. 7th Division, an enemy regimentstormed up the slopes and drove out theSouth Korean defenders. Successive coun-terattacks by the 2d failed to regain the hill.

While the 7th Division had been fightingfor Hill 598, a battalion from the ROK 2dDivision streamed up Hill 500 and seizedthe crest against light enemy opposition.The usual enemy counterattack followed,and for a week the position changed handsrepeatedly. Near the end of October theROK troops f inally managed to seize andhold the height.

Meanwhile more fighting broke out theROK II Corps’ sector. Two Chinesecompanies attacked hilltop positions nearthe left f lank of the ROK Capital Divisionon the night of 6 October. The South Ko-reans made a determined stand and pre-vented the enemy from making any pene-tration of the main battle line. About 500yards east of these positions the enemy alsostruck with two companies and seized anoutpost guarding the division’s center. Thefollowing morning ROK troops counter-

attacked and managed to reach positions300 yards from the crest. The Chinese pre-vented any further advance, and as Octoberended the enemy still remained in possessionof the hilltop.

Fighting along the remainder of theEighth Army front consisted of patrolclashes and light raids by the enemy. Har-assing attacks occurred on the U.S. I Corps’front against the 1st Marine Division whenthe Chinese attacked several outposts with-out success.

With the coming of winter weather inNovember, enemy aggressiveness began todecline. Although the Chinese kept pres-sure on the central front, the severe defeatinf licted on them by the IX Corps in Octo-ber and the adverse weather evidentlydampened their desire to conduct furtherlarge-scale attacks against the EighthArmy’s battle line. For the remainder of theyear fighting diminished in intensity as bothsides prepared to meet the rigors of theKorean winter.

Although most of the front remained rel-atively quiet, in the U.S. I Corps sector theenemy tried to penetrate a part of the 1stBritish Commonwealth Division’s front lineon 19 November. The British threw backthe attack after killing over a hundredChinese. Fighting again f lared up in thecorps area when the ROK 1st Division beatback Chinese attempts to overrun outpostson the Imjin River line in December. Theenemy then tried to seize key terrain infront of the U.S. 2d Division. In a short butintense battle the Americans killed 111 ofthe enemy and captured four prisoners.The Chinese then withdrew their attackingforce.

Enemy attacks on the central front dur-ing the last two months of the year resultedin several brief but bitter fights. On the IX

274

Corps left wing an enemy battalion seizedan outpost in front of the U.S. 3d Division’slines on 6 November. Shortly after this suc-cess the Chinese made an attempt to breakthrough the defenses of the U.S. 7th Divi-sion’s Ethiopian Battalion. After a brief f irefight the enemy withdrew leaving 131 of hisdead around the Ethiopians’ positions.

On the eastern front an enemy forcestruck several positions in the U.S. X Corpscenter. The U.S. 40th Division quicklybroke up these assaults, killing 152 of theenemy and capturing seven. Farther east, inthe ROK I Corps sector, two North Koreanbattalions made a minor penetration of theROK 5th Division’s lines. Counterattack-ing South Korean infantrymen ejected theenemy and restored the positions.As ground fighting slowed to a near haltduring December, General Van Fleet madeseveral changes in his battle line. Tostrengthen the Kumhwa–Ch’orwon sectorof the Iron Triangle, the army commanderincreased the number of front-line divisionsin the IX Corps. The front of the ROK 9thDivision, on the corps’ right f lank, wasnarrowed and the left boundary of theROK II Corps shifted several miles to theeast. The ROK Capital Division then filledin the resulting gap. One other change oc-curred in the IX Corps when the ROK 2dDivision relieved the U.S. 3d Division onthe corps’ left f lank. Lt. Gen. Reuben E.Jenkins, who had taken over command ofthe IX Corps from General Wyman inAugust, now had three ROK divisions andone U.S. division, the 25th, defending hisfront.

In the western sector of the army’s battleline, the U.S. 7th Division relieved the U.S.2d Division on the U.S. I Corps’ right f lank.On the eastern front a newly created SouthKorean division, the ROK 12th, enteredcombat for the first time, replacing the U.S.

45th Division on the right f lank of the U.S.X Corps.

At the year’s end General Van Fleet hadsixteen divisions manning the EighthArmy’s battle line. Included in this numberwere one U.S. Marine, one British Com-monwealth, eleven South Korean, andthree U.S. Army divisions. Contingents oftroops from other United Nations countriesreinforced the American divisions, and aKorean Marine regiment became an im-portant adjunct to the 1st Marine Division.The army commander also had four divi-sions available as reserve forces—one SouthKorean and three American.

By giving the South Koreans responsi-bility for defending nearly 75 percent of theEighth Army’s front General Van Fleet in-dicated that he had conf idence in theability of the revitalized ROK Army tohold its own against large-scale enemy at-tacks. It was evident that the South KoreanArmy, trained and equipped by the U.S.Army, was now a fighting force capable ofeffective defense.

For over a year now a stalemate had ex-isted in the Korean conf lict. Both sides hadconstructed defense lines so powerful thattheir reduction could be accomplished onlyat a prohibitive cost. This had limited theEighth Army’s offensive operations during1952 to small-scale attacks to prevent theenemy from holding terrain features closeto the army’s main line of resistance andraids to hamper the enemy’s build-up ofdefensive positions.

During the year the Eighth Army alsoconducted a vigorous defense of its outpostpositions. These outposts, located on highground to screen the army’s main line ofresistance, became the objective of frequentenemy attack, particularly in the latter halfof the year. The Eighth Army threw back

275

the great majority of these assaults and in-f litted thousands of casualties on the enemy.Positions that did fall, owing to the weightof enemy numbers, were quickly restored bycounterattacking Eighth Army infantry-men. Occasionally an outpost position had

to be abandoned when it became clear thatthe enemy intended to seize the position atany cost. In this case the outpost lost its use-fulness as the price of holding it or retakingit outweighed its tactical value in delayingenemy attacks on the main line of resistance.

276

Map 7

CHAPTER X

As the year 1953 began, activity alongthe entire front subsided. Patrolling andsmall-scale harassing attacks characterizedthe fighting during the winter months of thenew year. Then, as spring began, the enemyrenewed his assaults upon the EighthArmy’s outpost line, attempting to seizeterrain that overlooked the army’s mainline of resistance. These attacks increased infrequency and intensity until, in July, theyapproached the scale of the enemy’s heavyattacks of May 1951.

During January 1953 General Van Fleetcontinued to make changes in the EighthArmy’s line. In the right-wing corps, he re-placed the veteran ROK 5th Division withthe newly activated 15th. In the left-wingcorps, the U.S. 2d Division relieved the 1stBritish Commonwealth Division, the f irsttime the latter unit had been out of com-bat for nearly eighteen months. In the IXCorps, in the Eighth Army’s center, theU.S. 3d Division took over the sector heldby the U.S. 25th Division, while in X Corpsthe U.S. 45th relieved the U.S. 40th Divi-sion. After these changes the army com-mander had twelve South Korean andeight U.N. divisions to defend the armyfront. The thousands of service and securitytroops that supported the combat divisionsbrought the army’s total strength to nearly768,000 men.

To oppose the Eighth Army’s twenty di-visions the enemy disposed a formidablearray of strength along his front. SevenChinese armies and two North Koreancorps, totaling about 270,000 troops,manned the enemy defense line. Anothereleven Chinese armies and North Koreancorps with an estimated strength of 531,000remained in reserve. With service and se-curity forces, the total enemy strength inKorea amounted to more than a millionmen.

The enemy employed his forces along abattle line that roughly paralleled that ofthe Eighth Army. The Chinese occupiedabout three fourths of this line; their armiesextended from the Korean west coast east-ward to the Kum River. East of the riverthe North Koreans manned the remainderof the line to the Sea of Japan—a sector, in-cidentally, where there was little likelihoodof a main U.N. thrust. Although a man-power shortage probably explains this divi-sion of responsibility, it is also possible thatthe Chinese questioned the f ighting abilityof their allies.

Other than a few patrol clashes, littlefighting occurred during January and Feb-ruary. Only in the sector of the ROK 12thDivision did the enemy make any seriousattempts to penetrate the army’s main lineof resistance, and these failed. Meanwhile,

The Last Battle1 January–27 July 1953

278

the Eighth Army carried out a number ofraids on enemy positions. Supported by airstrikes and accurate artillery f ire, raidingparties from all f ive corps struck hard atChinese and North Korean positions to killor capture enemy soldiers and destroy em-placements and fortifications.

During February the command of theEighth Army changed hands. General VanFleet, after nearly two years as the EighthArmy’s leader, turned over his command toLt. Gen. Maxwell D. Taylor and returnedto the United States for retirement.

As March began the enemy increased hisattacks on the army’s outpost line, evidentlyin retaliation for the U.N. raids of Januaryand February. The U.S. I Corps bore thebrunt of these attacks. On the first day ofMarch an enemy battalion assaulted mainline of resistance positions on Hill 355, heldby elements of the U.S. 2d Division. Al-though part of the enemy force managed toreach the foxholes and trenches of the de-fenders the attack was beaten off. TheChinese hit the hill again on 17 March witha battalion. Attacking in two elements fromthe north and northeast, the Chinesebreached the protective mine f ields andwire and drove into the trenches on thecrest. The center of the line gave way, buttwo platoons that had been previouslyplaced in blocking positions moved up tocontain the penetration. Meanwhile, on thecrest and forward slope of the hill the fight-ing was heavy. At dawn an infantry com-pany arrived to reinforce the troops on thehilltop and the Chinese began withdraw-ing. As they pulled back, U.N. artillery firehit their routes of withdrawal and inf lictedfurther casualties.

The Chinese again struck at the U.S. ICorps during the final week of the month.On the evening of 23 March an enemy regi-ment assaulted Hills 266, 255, and 191,

outposts of the U.S. 7th Division. Defendedby the division’s Colombian Battalion, Hill266 was the target of the main enemy effort.A Chinese battalion supported by artilleryand mortar f ire drove into positions on thewestern slope of the hill at 2100. TheColombians on the hill received reinforce-ments amounting to a company, but thiswas not enough to withstand the enemy as-sault and the defenders fell back to posi-tions on the southeastern slope of the height.The following morning, 24 March, a bat-talion from the 7th Division counterat-tacked and managed to gain the crest of thehill and engage the Chinese in trenches andbunkers. The struggle continued through-out the morning with both sides supportedby heavy artillery fire. The Chinese stub-bornly fought to retain their positions, andthe Americans broke off their attack, pull-ing back to the southern slope. Early thenext day another American counterattackfailed, and the Chinese still held the crest ofHill 266.

Concurrently with the attack on Hill 266two enemy battalions hit Hills 255 and 191.The battle on Hill 191 was short. As theChinese companies advanced up the slopesthe Americans called for and received re-inforcements. After a brief f ire fight withthe defenders, the Chinese broke contactand withdrew. Over on Hill 255 the Chi-nese were more successful. Supported bytanks and by artillery and mortar f ire theChinese forced the defenders to withdraw700 yards. Shortly after midnight two com-panies from the 7th Division counter-attacked up Hill 255 and drove the enemyoff the crest.

Although the Chinese had gained theirchief objective, Hill 266, the price was high.The 7th Division reported that the battleson the three hills cost the enemy 750casualties.

279

While the battle seesawed about the out-posts in the 7th Division sector, the enemyprepared for another attack farther to thewest in the I Corps sector. Early in the eve-ning of 26 March several outposts of the 1stMarine Regiment received diversionary at-tacks by small enemy forces. Then the en-emy struck three nearby outposts in regi-mental strength. Overrunning two of thethree positions quickly, the Chinese ad-vanced toward the main line of resistance.But an American blocking force, placed be-tween the Chinese line of advance and themain line of resistance, intercepted the en-emy regiment. After a vain, all-night effortto get by this obstacle the Chinese with-drew. Later in the morning of 27 March amarine battalion counterattacked and re-captured one of the lost outposts. The restof the day and all through the followingnight the marines pressed their attack for-ward. By morning of the next day, 28March, they took the remaining outpost,but shortly afterward a Chinese counter-thrust drove the Americans back 400 yards.In the afternoon the marines again regainedthe outpost. Reinforcing and digging in,they awaited the next onslaught. It camethat night when a Chinese battalion at-tacked. More marine reinforcements werepoured in while corps and division artilleryfire isolated the battlefield and preventedthe Chinese from increasing the size of theirattacking force. By the next morning theenemy had made no more headway andwithdrew.

Friendly and enemy patrols kept busy inthe I Corps sector. The Chinese, apparentlysensitive to the activities of the corps’ patrolsand raiding parties, began to establish am-bushes. One patrol of thirty-four men fromthe U.S. 7th Division fell into a trap set bythe enemy on 9 March. Surrounded bysome sixty Chinese the whole patrol be-

came casualties: twenty men were killed,twelve wounded, and two missing. On an-other occasion a thirty-four-man patrolfrom the U.S. 2d Division ran head on intotwo Chinese companies. The patrol calledfor and received reinforcements, and theresulting engagement lasted until the nextmorning when the enemy broke contactand withdrew. The Americans suffered atotal of sixty-three casualties in this f ight,twelve of them killed, forty-three wounded,and f ive missing. Two platoons from theColombian Battalion, raiding enemy posi-tions on the morning of 10 March, engagedthe Chinese in a short but intense fire f ight.Forced to withdraw under heavy enemy ar-tillery f ire, the Colombians lost nineteenmen killed, forty-four wounded, and eightmissing.

After the f lare-up of f ighting in lateMarch, activity along the battle front againsettled into routine patrolling and small-scale harassing attacks. The calm persistedthroughout April, interrupted only byEighth Army raids on the enemy’s outpostand main line of resistance positions. But asApril ended, and the armistice negotiationsat Panmunjom approached a decisive stage,there were signs that the enemy intended toincrease the size and frequency of his at-tacks. Troop movements indicated that hewas shifting his forces from the northerncoastal areas and concentrating them inmore forward areas. His artillery and armorwere being positioned in depth and histroops realigned on the front and in therear. An increasing number of contacts be-tween Eighth Army and enemy patrolsshowed considerable tightening of the en-emy counterreconnaissance screen.

Then, in the final week of May, the Chi-nese conducted several attacks against thearmy’s left wing. In the sector held by theIX Corps, attacks estimated to be in regi-

280

mental strength struck the ROK 9th Divi-sion. After intense f ighting the SouthKoreans stopped these assaults and forcedthe enemy to withdraw. In the ROK Capi-tal Division sector, two Chinese battalionstried to make a penetration. Although sup-ported by large volumes of mortar and ar-tillery fire, the Chinese were unable to drivethe South Koreans from their positions andhad to withdraw under punishing corpsand division artillery f ire.

The enemy’s heaviest blow struck theU.S. I Corps. On the evening of 28 Mayfive outpost positions of the U.S. 25th Divi-sion came under attack by an enemy regi-ment. These outposts, about 1,000 yardsforward of the division’s main line, guardedroutes of approach to the division’s center.Nicknamed Carson, Elko, Vegas, Berlin,and East Berlin, they were defended byplatoons from the division’s Turkish Bri-gade. Moving under extremely heavy artil-lery support, one Chinese battalion ad-vanced on Carson and Elko. At the sametime another enemy battalion, concealedby a smoke screen, attacked the center posi-tion, Vegas, while a third assaulted outpostsBerlin and East Berlin on the right. Threehours after the attack began the enemy hadreached the Turkish positions on Carsonand Elko and were engaging the defendersin hand-to-hand combat. Unable to over-come the Turks the enemy withdrew, evi-dently to re-form, then attacked again. Atoutpost Elko, the action continued inter-mittently until midmorning of 29 Maywhen the Chinese broke contact. A fewminutes later they struck again at Elko. Thefight continued about the outpost as the en-emy pressed the attack. Finally, near mid-night, the division ordered the outpostabandoned and the Turks withdrew to theirmain line of resistance.

Meanwhile, a furious f ight had devel-

oped around outpost Vegas. One half hourafter the Chinese began the attack onVegas they reinforced their attacking ele-ments with another battalion. Pushing for-ward through the artillery and mortar fireof both sides, they broke into the defensivepositions and engaged the Turks in closecombat. A Turkish company, rushed to re-inforce the outpost, found hand-to-handfights going on around the position. Twohours later the enemy began to break offthe attack, once again suffering numerouscasualties as the 25th Division artilleryraked the enemy routes of withdrawal.

Just after daylight the Chinese attackedagain with two battalions. This assault wasalso unsuccessful and the attackers with-drew. Two hours later the Turks counter-attacked enemy elements on the north slopeof the hill that contained outpost Vegas anddrove them back. The Turks now had con-trol of the entire outpost, but the Chineseseemed determined to seize Vegas at anycost. At midafternoon of the same day, 29May, another battalion struck the batteredposition. The fight raged around the out-post for the remainder of the afternoon.Then at 2300, the order to withdraw camefrom division and the defenders fell back totheir main line of resistance.

The enemy attack on outposts Berlin andEast Berlin did not last long. After a bittertwo-hour fire f ight the enemy gave up theeffort on these two positions and withdrew.

The Chinese had succeeded in occupyingoutposts Carson, Elko, and Vegas, but theypaid a heavy price. The 25th Division re-ported evaluated enemy casualties in thebattle as 2,200 killed and 1,057 wounded.In contrast the Turks reported their losses as104 killed, 324 wounded, and 47 missing.

By the first of June it appeared certain tointelligence officers of the Eighth Army thatthe Chinese planned to strike a major blow

281

soon. Their failure to follow up the May at-tacks against the U.S. I Corps indicatedthat those had been diversionary efforts toscreen their real intentions. The continuedmovement and realignment of troops on theenemy front and rear and the large build-up of supplies near the battle zone furtherconfirmed the army’s belief that a large-scale Chinese attack impended. When theenemy blow would fall or where remaineda matter of conjecture. As the f irst week ofJune passed the front remained relativelyquiet. On the night of 10 June, the Chinesestruck.

The enemy directed his efforts againstthe ROK II Corps, whose line bulged outto form a salient in the vicinity of Kumsong.Striking down both sides of the PukhanRiver with two divisions the Chinese suc-ceeded in forcing the right wing and centerof the corps back about 4,000 yards in sixdays of heavy fighting. Not since the springoffensive of April–May 1951 had f ightingon such a scale occurred.

The main enemy blow fell on the IICorps’ right wing and center. Shortly afterdark on 10 June a Chinese division attackedthe right regiment of the ROK 5th Divi-sion, whose lines lay east of the PukhanRiver. By seizing Hill 973, the dominantheight in the regiment’s sector, the enemyforced the South Koreans to fall back about1,000 yards. Counterattacks by the reserveregiment of the 5th and a regiment fromcorps reserve the following morning failedto restore the main line of resistance or haltthe enemy advance. The Chinese kept uptheir unrelenting pressure, forcing the 5thto withdraw again, and by 15 June theSouth Koreans had been pushed back to theeast bank of the river at a point where thestream cut sharply eastward. There the divi-sion formed a new main line of resistance.

In the corps center the situation was just

as critical. On the night of 12 June elementsof another Chinese division struck theROK 8th Division’s right, which rested onthe Pukhan. As the Chinese pressed for-ward they made several penetrations dur-ing the next twenty-four hours. Counterat-tacks by the reserve regiment of the 8thfailed to halt the advance, and the Chinesebegan exploiting their gains. Attacking inregimental strength early on the morning of14 June they soon enveloped the division’sright regiment. The hard-pressed SouthKoreans began falling back under theweight of the enemy attack.

While the Chinese were attacking the IICorps’ right, a smaller enemy force struckthe ROK 20th Division, on the left of the XCorps. Evidently this was a holding attack,for the Chinese did not press their assault.But the collapse of the ROK 5th Division,on the II Corps’ right, threatened the left ofthe X Corps. Lt. Gen. I. D. White, the XCorps commander, therefore narrowed thefront of the 20th Division on 16 June andcommitted the ROK 7th Division, in corpsreserve, on the left of the 20th to strengthenthat f lank. Other changes were being madeto meet the situation in the ROK II Corps.

The failure of the 8th Division’s right tohold coupled with the withdrawal of the5th east of the river opened a gap betweenthe divisions. The ROK II Corps com-mander filled this gap by committing theROK 3d Division, in corps reserve, be-tween the 8th and 5th Divisions on 15 June.At the same time General Taylor, in orderto facilitate control, temporarily shifted theboundary between the II and X Corpswestward to the river and gave the ROK5th Division to the X Corps. To replace theROK 3d, the army commander shifted theROK 11th Division from the ROK I Corpsover to the II Corps but kept it under armycontrol.

282

The Chinese continued their attacksagainst the 8th Division, this time concen-trating on the division’s right and center.Under the heavy blows of the Chineseassault the South Koreans reeled back. Acounterattack by elements of the divisionon 16 June failed to push the enemy back,and the 8th drew up on a new main line ofresistance 3,000 yards south of the originalone.

While the enemy concentrated his maineffort against the ROK II Corps, he de-livered several attacks on other parts of thefront. Two outpost positions in front of theROK 1st Division, in the U.S. I Corps, fellto the enemy near the end of June, after aprolonged attack by a Chinese regiment.Farther east, in the sector of the IX Corps,the Chinese employed forces in battalionand regimental strength in a thrust againstthe U.S. 3d and ROK 9th Divisions. Theymade minor penetrations in the lines of the3d, but counterattacks quickly restored thepositions. In the ROK 9th Division’s sectorthe Chinese failed to make a dent. In theeastern sector of the Eighth Army’s front,North Korean attacks forced a minor read-justment of main line of resistance positionson the X Corps’ right wing. At the sametime enemy forces were successful in seizingHill 351, the northern anchor of the ROKI Corps line.

By 18 June, a slackening of enemy pres-sure enabled the corps to stabilize its front.General Taylor directed the commanders ofthe ROK II and U.S. X Corps to readjusttheir forces so as to permit the relief of theROK 5th and 7th Divisions and to re-establish the boundary that existed betweenthe corps before 15 June. The enemy madeno further attacks on the II Corps frontuntil the middle of July, just before the ter-mination of hostilities.

Meanwhile a major airborne movement

brought General Taylor additional troopsfrom Japan. The 187th Airborne Regi-mental Combat Team assembled at two airbases in Japan on 21 June. In a matter ofhours the entire unit, completely equippedfor combat with vehicles, artillery, ammu-nition, and rations, was f lown to forward airbases near the front. A few days later asimilar movement took place. The 34thRegimental Combat Team (less one rif lebattalion) of the 24th Division, similarlyequipped, boarded aircraft at an air basenear Tokyo and was f lown to Pusan andTaegu.

Measured in terms of ground gained, theenemy attacks of mid-June on the ROK IICorps front were successful. The Chinesesucceeded in pushing 15,000 yards of thecorps front back about 4,000 yards. More-over, their attacks caused three ROK divi-sions to be redeployed in reinforcing andcounterattacking roles. Both sides incurredheavy casualties. The Chinese lost an esti-mated 6,628 men, and the II Corps re-ported 7,377 casualties as a direct result ofthe attacks.

Enemy attacks against the II Corps sub-sided after 18 June and by the end of themonth action along the entire army frontreturned to routine patrolling and light at-tacks. But the army commander felt thatthe Chinese would again launch an attackin strength. It was not long in coming, thistime against the left f lank of the II Corpsand the right f lank of the IX Corps. TheCapital Division, defending the IX Corpsright-f lank sector, faced northwest.

On the night of 13 July, the Chinese at-tacked the IX Corps’ right f lank with threedivisions and soon broke through the SouthKorean lines. A good deal of confusion en-sued as the Capital Division’s right andcenter fell back. Some of the troops with-

283

drew into the zone of the II Corps as unitsbecame entangled and lateral communica-tion was lost. On the division’s extreme left,things went somewhat better. There theunits fell back in an orderly fashion underthe crushing weight of Chinese attacks. Butthe collapse of the Capital Division madematters worse for the II Corps, whose situa-tion was already serious.

The Chinese had timed their assault onthe Capital Division with another attack, indivision strength, against the ROK 6thDivision, protecting the II Corps’ left. Aftervainly trying to hold back the onslaught,the South Koreans began giving way. Theirleft f lank was exposed by the withdrawal ofthe Capital Division, and the enemy wasthreatening to get into the rear of the 6thand cut it off. To prevent an enemy envel-opment the division had no choice but topull back. Retiring slowly, the 6th tooka heavy toll of the attacking Chinese whilefarther to the east the ROK 8th and 3dDivisions moved back under heavy enemypressure.

To meet the situation in the EighthArmy’s center, General Taylor directed thecommanders of the IX and II Corps toestablish and hold a new main line of re-sistance along the south bank of the Kum-song River, a tributary of the Pukhan. Inorder to restore the line in the Capital Divi-sion zone, he permitted the U.S. 3d Divi-sion to be moved from its sector in the vicin-ity of Ch’orwon to the right wing of the IXCorps. The U.S. 2d Division extended itssector to the right to cover the position va-cated by the 3d. The corps commander re-inforced the 2d by attaching to it the 187thAirborne Regimental Combat Team, whichdug in on the division’s right. At the sametime the 34th Regimental Combat Team(less one battalion) came up from Pusanand assumed the role of a counterattacking

force. It took up positions in rear of the 2dDivision.

In the II Corps the ROK 11th Division,in reserve, moved up to relieve the hard-pressed 6th. The ROK 7th Division on theleft wing of X Corps moved out of the line,and its place was taken by the U.S. 45thDivision. The 7th then came over to the IICorps. Further changes occurred in thecorps when the ROK 6th hastily reorgan-ized and moved into the sectors held by theROK 3d and 5th Divisions. The two latterdivisions went into corps reserve. After thisreorganization the II Corps counterat-tacked on 17 July with three divisions in anattempt to seize the high ground along theKumsong and establish a new main line ofresistance. By 20 July the II Corps attainedits objective and held it. No attempt wasmade to restore the original line, inasmuchas the imminence of an armistice made ittactically unnecessary to expend lives forterrain not essential to the security of theEighth Army’s front.

Enemy losses in July were tremendous.The army estimated that the Chinese lostover 72,000 men, more than 25,000 of themkilled. Out of the five Chinese armies thathad been identified in the attacks upon theII and IX Corps, the enemy had lost theequivalent of seven divisions.

While the fighting raged on the centralfront, the negotiators at Panmunjom rapidlyapproached an agreement on armisticeterms. On 19 July agreement was reachedon all points by both sides. The next dayliaison and staff off icers began the task ofdrawing up the boundaries of the demili-tarized zone. All details of the armisticeagreement and its implementation werecompleted in a week. At 1000 hours on 27July Lt. Gen. William K. Harrison, Jr., thesenior United Nations delegate to the armis-tice negotiations, signed the armistice pa-

284

pers. At the same time the senior enemydelegate, General Nam Il, placed his signa-ture on the documents. The signing tookplace at this time to permit the armistice togo into effect at 2200 hours of the same day,as required by the agreement. Later Gen-eral Clark, for the United Nations, GeneralKim Il Sung, for North Korea, and GeneralPeng Teh-Huai, for the Chinese forces onthe peninsula, aff ixed their signatures.

ment, “not peace in the world. We maynot now relax our guard nor cease ourquest.”

Despite the failure to settle the issue inKorea, the United States and its partners inthe f ight against aggression had gainedsome insight into the manner of foe that op-posed them. They learned that the com-munist adversary would use every means athis command to gain an advantage, bothpolitical and military; that he was willing,as in his use of human-sea tactics, to expendhis soldiers’ lives prodigally in order to off-set superior fire power. And, most impor-tant, they learned that the enemy, thoughpowerful, was not invulnerable.

The countries that fought under the f lagof the United Nations to prevent the con-quest of South Korea had demonstratedtheir ability to put aside differences and actin concert against a common enemy. Thatnations of highly diverse cultural, religious,and racial background were willing to placetheir forces under a single command, in thiscase the United States, was evidence thatfree men could rise above national pride intheir never-ending f ight to remain free.

The conf lict in Korea had lasted threeyears, one month, and two days. It had de-stroyed Korean homes, fields, and factories,wrecked the nation’s economy, and threat-ened the populace with famine and disease.It had consumed the lives of hundreds ofthousands of civilians and soldiers from na-tions all over the face of the globe. Manyhad died who a short time before hadknown Korea only as an exotic place nameon a map. The signing of the armisticebrought an end to the shooting; it did notbring an end to the ideological war. “Wehave won an armistice on a single battle-ground,” said President Eisenhower as thePanmunjom negotiators reached agree-

SECTION 8

1 July–31 December 1952

288

TREATING A ROK SOLDIER wounded on Capital Hill, 8 September, right.

BIRD’S-EYE VIEW OF CAPITAL HILL, dominated by enemy terrain, background.

290

QUAD .50’S adding f ire power to a counterattack on Old Baldy, 21 September.

291

BATTLE WEARY from f ighting on Old Baldy.

292

ROK MP’s TRYING TO GET WARM near White Horse, 8 October.

293

ASSEMBLY POINT for ROK 9th Division infantrymen.

WHITE HORSE (Hill 395) one of two key heightsnorthwest of Ch’orwon attacked by enemy units inOctober. Vehicle is a 90-mm. gun motor carriageM36.

294

WOUNDED ON WHITE HORSE, two ROK 9th Division soldiers head for medical treatment.

295

MEDICAL AID MEN DRESSING WOUNDS at an aid station near base of White Horse.

296

F-86 SABREJETS OVER NORTH KOREA hunting for MIG-15’s. During September pilots from theFifth Air Force shot down sixty-four MIG’s at a cost of seven Sabrejets.

297

ADJUSTING ROCKETS on the wing of an AD Sky-raider before take-off

BANSHEES returning to the USS Kearsarge after a mission over Korea.

298

WINTER 1952

T66 MULTIPLE ROCKET LAUNCHERS in action, 40thDivision sector, 26 November. Except for brief en-counters with the enemy, most of the front re-mained relatively quiet dur ing November andDecember.

299

301

PRESIDENT-ELECT DWIGHT D. EISENHOWER in Korea, December 1952. Above, the President-electis with Maj. Gen. James C. Fry, Commanding General, 2d Division. Left page above, he hasdinner with 3d Division troops, south of Ch’orwon. Below, he leaves 3d Division area by jeep;in back seat are Lt. Gen. Reuben E. Jenkins, Commanding General, IX Corps (left), and Maj.Gen. George W. Smythe, Commanding General, 3d Division.

SECTION 9

1 January–27 July 1953

306

CLEANING SNOW OFF THE FLIGHT DECK of an air-craft carrier.

TROOPS FROM THAILAND arriving at Inch’on, January 1953.

307

DESTINATION KOJE-DO. Troops from the 23d Infantry, scheduled for guard duty at the prisonercompound, board ship via cargo net.

308

INSIDE A BUNKER on Hill 200.

PHILIPPINE SOLDIERS attached to the 45th Division put on snow suits before leaving on a nightpatrol mission, north of Yanggu.

309

LUNCH PICNIC-STYLE. The men are from Company K, 15th Infantry.

NAVY MEN WORKING IN A SNOWSTORM at an emergency airf ield.

310

PATROL OF THE 35TH INFANTRY studying a map of enemy terrain. Armored vests are clearly visibleon the two men at left.

311

ENTERTAINMENT for 55th Transportation Truck Battalion, Eighth Army. The cast is from themotion picture, “The Girls of Pleasure Island.”

312

TROOPS BOARDING A HELICOPTER to be airlifted up to the line.

ENEMY TERRAIN as seen through chicken wire in front of an outpost. The wire helped to keepgrenades from coming into the bunkers; often the wire was used as a base for supportingcamouf lage material.

313

GENERAL MARK W. CL ARK, Commander in Chief, U.N. Command (r ight), at the GreekBattalion headquarters. With him are (from left) Lt. Gen. Reuben E. Jenkins, CommandingGeneral, IX Corps; Lt. Gen. Maxwell D. Taylor, Commanding General, Eighth Army; andLt. Col. George Koumanacos, Commanding Of f icer of the Greek Battalion.

314

WOUNDED 7TH DIVISION INFANTRYMAN is rushed away from the f ight on Pork Chop Hill.

315

CARTING AWAY TWO CHINESE PRISONERS captured on Pork Chop Hill, 17 April 1953.

316

U.N. AND NORTH KOREAN OFFICERS acknowledging receipt of returnees.

EMACIATED AND WOUNDED AMERICAN receiving new clothing at Freedom Village, Panmunjom.

317

LIBERATED AMERICANS are escorted down the ramp of a C-124 upon arr ival in Japan formedical treatment before continuing the trip back to the United States.

OPERATION LITTLE SWITCH, April 1953. On 11 April agreement was reached for the exchange of605 U.N. prisoners for 6,030 enemy prisoners.

318

SIGNING THE ARMISTICE AGREEMENT at 1000 hours, 27 July 1953, Panmunjom. Lt. Gen. William K.

319

Harrison, Jr., signs for the United Nations (left), and General Nam Il for the Communists (r ight).

320

7TH DIVISION POSITION just before it was abandoned, 31 July.

321

1ST MARINE DIVISION MEN after receiving word of the armistice.

40TH DIVISION TROOPS all packed and ready to leave Heartbreak Ridge.

322

FIRST SHIPMENT OF REPATRIATED MEN from Korea docking at San Francisco, 23 August.

323

MAJ. GEN. WILLIAM F. DEAN boarding a plane at Tokyo for home, 21 September.

325

List of Pictorial Sources

Page

3132–33343536–37 (top)36 (bottom)37 (bottom)38 (top)38 (bottom)39 (top)39 (bottom)40 (top)41 (top)40–41 (bottom)424344 (top)44 (bottom)45 (top)45 (bottom)46 (top left)46 (top right)46 (bottom)4748495354 (top)

Source

USAFSCSCSCSCUSNUSNSCSCSCSCSCSCSCSCSCSCSCSCSCSCSCSCSCSCStars and StripesSCSC

Number

79347 AC355931355593355566355553425403425473355563355565355547356269355576355574356475356295356682356636356696356347356713355939355940356671356736375189

(cartoon)FEC–51–4601

356902

Page

54 (bottom)55 (top)55 (bottom)56 (top)56 (bottom)56–57 (center)57 (top)57 (bottom)585960 (top)60 (bottom)61 (top)61 (bottom)62-6364 (top)64 (bottom)6566–6768 (top)68 (bottom)6970 (left)70 (right)717273 (top)73 (bottom)

Source

SCSCSCSCSCUSAFSCSCSCStars and StripesSCSCSCSCSCSCSCStars and StripesUSAFSCSCSCSCSCSCSCSCSC

Number

35689735716935740236239336213978972 AC356733356880361469(cartoon)357386357227357742357320358042358094358093(cartoon)unknown358336358494358774359414358263358159358508358624358622

The following list gives the origin of all photographs and cartoonswhich appear in this book. The photographs were selected from thosein the files of the Army Signal Corps (SC), the Air Force (USAF), theNavy (USN), and the Marine Corps (USMC). The cartoons werepublished originally in the Pacific Edition of the Army newspaper,Stars and Stripes. Further information concerning photographs may besecured from the agency of origin, Washington 25, D. C. Inquiriesshould include the number of the photograph.

326

Page Source Number Page Source Number

74–75 (top)74–75 (bottom76–777780–81 (top)80–81 (bottom)8283 (top)83 (bottom)84–85858687 (top)87 (bottom)88 (top)88 (bottom)899090–9192939495969798–99121122 (top)122 (middle)122 (bottom)123 (top)123 (middle)123 (bottom)124 (top left)124 (top right)124 (bottom)125 (top left)125 (top right)125 (bottom)126127 (top)127 (bottom)128 (left)128 (right)129132133 (top)133 (bottom)

USNUSNSCSCSCSCSCSCSCSCUSAFSCSCSCUSAFUSAFUSAFSCSCUSMCUSMCUSMCUSMCUSAFUSAFUSNUSMCSCSCSCSCSCSCSCSCSCSCSCSCUSNUSNUSNUSAFUSAFUSAFSCSCUSMC

426777426781359744359404359910359805360254360255362325361405

79951 AC362092362126362114

79676 AC79638 AC79628 AC

361980362117

A–8613A–7091A–8941A–8759

79649 AC80332 AC

708178A–7797365854365440365791365849365755365760365542365570365544365547

FEC–51–23765365537428635428637428678

79842 ACA–79842–AC

80333 AC368493368504

A–156986

134 (top)134 (bottom)135136 (top)136 (bottom)137 (top)137 (bottom)138 (top)138 (bottom)139 (top)139 (bottom)140 (top)140 (bottom)141142 (top)142 (bottom)143 (top)143 (bottom)144145 (top)145 (bottom)146147148 (top)148 (bottom)149150 (top)150 (bottom)151152 (top)152 (bottom)153 (top)153 (bottom)157158158–59160161 (top)161 (bottom)162163 (top)163 (bottom)164 (top)164 (bottom)165166167 (top)167 (bottom)

SCSCSCSCSCSCSCSCSCSCSCSCSCSCUSNSCSCSCUSNUSNUSNUSNUSNUSNUSNUSNUSMCSCSCStars and StripesUSAFUSAFUSAFUSNSCSCSCSCSCSCUSAFSCSCSCSCSCSCSC

367550368661368660368676368540368543369065368815369479368813368690369492369216368735429640368949369402370299429680429857429641430064430052429644429685429504

A–8615–A369995369801

(cartoon)80508 AC79848 AC79852 AC

428390373296372740373647372280374102374889

80703 AC375088

FEC–51–26651376086376744376719

FEC–51–27649376599

327


168169170 (top)170 (bottom)171172173174 (top)174 (bottom)175 (top)175 (bottom)176 (top)176 (bottom)177 (top)177 (bottom)178179 (top)179 (bottom)180–81182 (top left)182 (top right)182 (bottom)183184 (top)184–85 (bottom)185 (top)186187 (top)187 (bottom)188189190 (top)190 (bottom)191192 (top)192 (bottom)193194195 (top)195 (bottom)196197 (left)197 (right)198199 (top)199 (bottom)200–201

SCUSAFSCSCSCUSAFSCSCSCSCSCSCSCStars and StripesSCUSAFUSNUSNSCSCSCSCSCSCSCStars and StripesSCSCSCSCSCSCSCSCUSMCSCUSMCSCSCSCSCSCSCSCSCSCUSN

37586279336 AC

378047376996376379

80647 AC378951378054378191378612378297378289

FEC–51–30742(cartoon)

37830380805 AC

430680431295379463379465382525379470379512380915381464

(cartoon)381110381108381111381467382532380802381292380947A-9765380918

A–156727382462382556382887381452381453378205383938383177382914435681

221222223 (top)223 (bottom)224–25226 (top)226 (bottom)227 (top)227 (bottom)228229 (top)229 (bottom)230 (top)230 (bottom)231232–33234235 (top)235 (bottom)236 (top)236 (bottom)237 (top left)237 (top right)237 (bottom)238 (top)238 (bottom)239 (top)239 (bottom)240241242 (left)242 (right)243244 (top)244 (bottom)245246247248249250251 (top)251 (bottom)252253 (top)253 (bottom)254 (top)254 (bottom)

SCSCSCSCSCSCSCSCSCSCStars and StripesSCSCStars and StripesSCSCSCSCSCSCSCSCSCSCSCSCSCSCSCSCStars and StripesSCUSMCSCSCSCSCStars and StripesSCSCSCSCSCSCSCSCSCSC

385806385608386280386281385200385330385420385430385331385280

(cartoon)385790385626

(cartoon)385627385807386490386482385444386546386547386505386508389599386823386824386877386878

FEC–52–37820387033

(cartoon)388645

A–157778388736387445388474387049

(cartoon)387456388477388566388754388755392561392995390105421650405822

328


255 (top)255 (bottom)256257 (top)257 (bottom)258–59260 (top)260 (bottom)261 (top)261 (bottom)262 (top)262 (bottom)263264 (top)264 (bottom)265266286–87288289290 (top)290 (bottom)291292–93292 (bottom)293 (bottom)294295296297 (top)297 (bottom)

SCSCSCSCSCSCSCSCSCSCUSAFUSNUSAFStars and StripesSCSCUSNSCSCSCStars and StripesSCSCSCSCSCSCSCUSAFUSNUSN

421635405834390177390612390129392504399346395043397517398702

83054 AC444157

81504 AC(cartoon)

406096406069443864423081407539426124

(cartoon)408532404701418366418372418362418375418380

82042 AC448324480057

298299 (top)299 (bottom)300 (top)300 (bottom)301305306 (top)306 (bottom)307308 (top)308 (bottom)309310 (top)310 (bottom)311312 (top)312 (bottom)313314315 (top)315 (bottom)316 (top)316 (bottom)317318–19320321 (top)321 (bottom)322323

USNSCSCSCSCSCSCUSNSCSCSCSCSCUSNSCSCSCSCSCSCStars and StripesSCUSNUSNUSAFUSNSCSCUSNSCSC

449917411730411732416354416389412361416204478280426136416243424253422625415948480136419512

FEC–53–2238422077424400428313422963

(cartoon)422968633215481024

82929 AC625914431799432931626455425766435044

Korea 1951-1953 - US Army Center of Military History

Documents

Transcript of Korea 1951-1953 - US Army Center of Military History