Is Rasa an Illusion?A Study in Mahimabhatta's Aesthetics

f;-

C. RAJENDMN

IS RASA AN ILLUSION ? A STUDY INMAHIMABHATTA,S AESTHETICS

Mahimabhatta (11th century) is known as a critic of

the dhvani doctrine, but he deserves the attention of

students of Indian poetics for his positive contributions

to aesthetic theory as well. It is but natural, though un-

fortunate, that aspects of his poetic theory are relegated

to the background in discourses concerning him, both

ancient and modern, which often project his objections

to the dhvani theory, the mainstream in Indian aesthetic

thought, mostly to refute them. This unbroken tradition

probably begins with Ruyyaka himself (12th century),

who uses the major part of his commentary Kavyd-

lamknra on Vyaktiviveka to answer Mahimabhatta's ob-

jections to the dhvani theory' But a close reading ofVyaktivivefta would reveal that Mahimabhatta (hereafter

MB) has not only conceived of an all-comprehensive

aesthetic and linguistic theory but also articulated it inthe course of his discussions of the defects of the

dhvani theory. Of particular interest is his notion ofrasa, whtch he considers as the hallmark of all poetry'

MB here gives shape to,an aesthetic theory which

is very similar to that of Sankuka (9th century), but

which is also complementary to it in several respects,

that is, it discusses certain issues related to poetic

222 THE ADYAR LIBRARY BULLETIN 2004-06

creation and the transcendental nature of the aesthetic

experience, as well as the notion of the metaphysical

dimensions of the aesthetic experience which we do

not find in the former. This paper is an attempt to findout the characteristic features of MB's rasa theory in

all its ramifications.

MB maintains that without rasa, there can be no - -

poetry worth the name at all. In support of this view,

he repeats the arguments adduced by earlier poeticians

like Kuntaka (10th century) who claim a special status

for poetry in view of its pedagogical function. The

very aim of poetry according to MB is the moral in-

struction in injunctions and prohibitions intended forpeople like princes who, being dull-witted, cannot be

taught scientific treatises (iastra-s), which are tough in

form and content. Poetry pleases people through rasa

and thereby renders moral instruction easy and pleasant

like a bitter medicine coated with sugar.' In MB'sview, there is no substantial difference between crea-

tive literature (kavya) and scientific discourses (.{astra)

since the function of both alike is moral instruction.

Only the mode of instruction differs.' But in poetry and

drama, the instruction becomes possible only through

rasa and hence for the very fulfilment of its aim, po-

etry requires rasa. This position of MB is an improve-

ment over that of Anandavardhana, the staunchest

votary of rasadhvani, who even when conceding

that a composition devoid of rasa is a misspelt word

from the poet, nevertheless concedes the theoretical

i&

---. ,

IS RASA AN ILLUSION ? 223

possibility of citraknvya 'ptctorial poetry' in deferenceto the practice of poets to compose poems without anyaesthetic emotion at all.r Keeping in view his stubborninsistence on the necessity of rasa, MB even definespoetry as the 'function of the poet consisting of the

I- co-ordination of vibhava etc., invariably resulting in the

! manifestation of rasa'.

In MB's concept, it is only rasa which is sought tobe communicated by the poet through a poem or a

play. But here, like any other aesthetic theoretician, hehas to confront a number of difficulties. The mainproblem hinges on the reality of the aesthetic experi-ence. Here MB makes a demarcation between real lifeand art, and maintains that the technical terminologyused in aesthetic discourses consisting of words likerasa, vibhdva, anubhava and vyabhicaribhava is rele-vant only in the imaginary world of life. In the realworld, there are no vibhava-s and the like; there areinstead only causes (of the emotions), and the like.sThe actual causes and effects and concomitant emo-

" tions in real life are different from their artistic repre-sentations in the imaginary world which are known- through the technical terms like vibhdva, anubhdva andvyabhicaribhava. MB concedes that real emotions in-ferred on the basis of real causes and the like in life donot give rise to any aesthetic delight at all, i.e. whenpeople infer emotions like somow basing on their exter-nal symptoms there is not even an iota of pleasure inthe person who makes such an inference.'On the other

THE ADYAR LIBRARY BULLETIN 2004-06

hand, in the kavya etc., it gives rise to unparalleled

experience of fear, solrow, ill feeling, etc' to noble and

indifferent people alike.6 Hence an aesthetician has to

confront the question as to why in the krtvya alone the

vibhava etc. give rise to a pleasurable experience and

not their real counterparts in life'7

MB tries to answer this question on the basis of

what can be described as 'philosophic naturalism' (sva-

bhavavada). It is the nature of things (vastusvabhava)

that aesthetic experience takes place in the arena of art

and through the artistic representation of emotions ; in

their nature (svarupa) and range (visaya) the vibhava'

anubhava, etc. differ from their counterparts in real

life. The former are unreal while the latter are real ;

one exists in the realm of art and the other in real life.

Here lies the difference in their respective nature and

range. MB maintains that the basic mental states

(stiayibhava) are the long lasting states (sthemabhdidh)

which originally exist in the actual persons like Rama,

but which are internahzed (atmani anusamhitdh) by the

poets for the sake of artistic description. Their function

in art is to give rise to the experience of the concerned

rasa lr the minds of the readers'' In other words' they

cease to be real emotions the moment they are internal-

izedbythepoet,andthereaftertheirfunctionisonlycommunicative. The same is the case with vibhava-s,

anubhava-.s and vyabhicaribhava-s which all become

instruments for aesthetic communication employed by

thepoet'Thusthevibhava-setc.aresubstantially

I

,r-1 -i.I

1

\


different from the real causes and the like, and aes-

thetic experience is possible only from the former.

MB asserts that the emotions like love, which are

inferred by the reader or the spectator from poetry or

the performance of the play, are unreal. However, this

consideration of reality and unreality does not affectthe function of art in the least. An important point

made by MB is that'being-experienced' is the hallmarkof aesthetic experience and not the ontological exist-ence. He says:

Thus, when the difference in nature and range

between the vibhava etc., in the kavya and thecauses etc., of the emotions in the actual worldhas been established on the basis of their respec-

tive artificiality and reality as well as on the basis

of their being subjects respectively of the worldof poetry and world of actuality their identity is

also rejected. Therefore, when there occurs a

cognition of unreal emotions like love they can

be designated as 'being cognized' Qtratiyamdna)or being inferred (gamya). A reflection born oftheir understanding is what is called an enjoymentof rasa.'

This view assumes that aesthetic emotion is arr

object of direct experience. MB seems to concede thatthere may be some philosophical difficulties in main-taining that an inner mental state like love, being infer-red through poetry, is an object of direct experiencesince direct experience is a process of perception and

226 THE ADYAR LIBRARY BULLETIN 2004'06

not inference. Here he adduces a novel principle of

aesthetic charm. The more the objects are removed

from direct perception, the more charming they be-

.o*.. The more indirect the mode of communication'

the more the ensuing charm. A real object directly

perceived does not giie us the pleasure which it would

provide if presented through the words of an accom-

ifirfr.O po.i. l'.td an object presented through poetry'

if ,n"*pr"ssed and left to be inferred by the readet'

becomes more charming than when it is directly

expressed. The more indirect the presentation' the

g;ut., the aesthetic appeal' MB quotes two important

i.rr., here in support of his position without un-

fortunately ..u.alinj his source' The first verse could

be translated thus :

Emotions are not so charming when directly

.*p.ri.r..d, as when they are experienced while

,.udlng a ktutya where they are presented by.an

able poet through the technique of observing

them in himself'

[The emotion] inferred through causes etc'. is not

as charming as that which is inferred through

vibhdva etc. The expressed' meaning do.gs not

please u, -.,"h as the suggestedrmeaning''u

Of course, it is well known that this is the funda-

mental postulate of the dhvani theory itself' criticized

UV fvfg. He is in full agreement with Anandavardhana

in tt ls regard and his objection centres around the

l

IS RASA AN ILLUSION ?

technical problem whether the so-called suggested

meaning is inferred or suggested. MB quotes the

following passage from the Dhvanyaloka in support of

his position :

The quintessential sense revealed without being

expressed directly by words is the cause ofexcessive charm."

It is in this context that MB makes an important

statement on the ontological stature of pbetry' He

maintains that the essence of poetry and the like lies in

the way they are experienced. It does not matter if the

world presented by poetry is a make-believe world

devoid of reality, so long as the poem results in an

experience. It is the experience which counts and not

its essence. MB here avers that poetry addresses itself

to those who are to be shown the right path in life and

thus enables them to acquire erudition in their duties oflife, the injunctions and prohibitions through the expe-

rience of rasa.

In this context, MB adduces two interesting dicta

in support of his position, one from an anonymous

source and the other from Dharmakirti's Pramdna-

varttika. The first quotation runs like this : 'Even illu-

sory knowledge is in a way a form of valid knowledge

whln associated [with the desired result]."' The second

quotation could be translated thus :

The notions of two persons who march towards

the lustre of a jewel and a lamp, mistaking them

228 THE ADYAR LIBRARY BULLETIN 2004.06

for the reai jewel, have actually no difference as

far as their inherent nature of falsity is concerned.

Yet, viewed from the point of view of generatingfruitful activity, there is difference.''

This verse occurs in the Abhinavabharati text also

while referring to the view of Sankuka, with regard tothe interpretation of the rasasfrtra. Sankuka, like MB,was an advocate of the theory of inference thoughnowhere in the Vyaktiviveka does he make an explicitreference to him. From this, one would hazard the

suggestion that both Sankuka and MB were somewhatinfluenced by the arguments of Acarya Dharmakirti intheir exposition of their respective theses of the rasa

experience. We can assume that the concept of rasaoccurring in Sankuka and MB bears striking resem-blance to the notion of illusion seen in the philosophyof Dharmaklrti.

Reviewing the concept of knowledge in laterBuddhistic schools, Hiriyanna shows that if for the

M5dhyamika-s, both perception and inference are ofprovisional value, inference is even more so forall the other schools as well, the Sautrantika-s, the

Vaibhdsika-s and the Yogacara-s alike, 'because ac-

cording to the Buddhistic doctrine, relations are allfalse and inference which is based upon a supposed

relation between the two terms cannot therefore be

valid'.'o Moreover, inference always has a referenceto the ideal mental constructs (samanyalaksana), theessence of things in themselves (svalaksana) being


experienced only in direct perception' Dinnaga even

,nuintuins that the whole process of inference refers to

'what is imposed by thought and has no relation to

external ,.uiity'.'' Thus the theory of knowledge in

Buddhistic philosophy is in a very precarious position'

In the words of Hiriyanna, 'knowledge may have value

for life, but its metaphysical significance is next to

nothing;. The criterion for truth hence is not absoiute

conformitywithreality,butautilitariantest'Accord-ingly, a knowledge, which fulfils the practical expecta-

tions it raises, is deemed to be true'

Knowledge merely lights up, as it were' the path

of action ; and, so long as it does so successfully'

it is regarded as true. And the analogy is given

here of a person who sees only the luster of a

shining jewel, but mistaking it for the jewel itself

stretches forth his hand and happens to secure it.'o

It is very significant that MB, who argues using

theterminologyofBuddhisticlogicthatthecognitionof rasa is a case of inference, uses the same analogy in

supporl of his argument that whatever may be the

ortologi.ul status of the characters in poetry and

drama, what matters is the cognition of rasa as existing

in them.r' The rasa experience is a guarantee for the

successful function of art in that it can attract people

and instruct them through enterlainment' When MB

maintainsthattheessenceofartliesintheimpressionit creates, he is actually relinquishing any exclusive

claimtoitsinherentvalidityasaformofknowledge.It


is interesting to note that both Anandavardhana and his

arch rival MB, are in ful1 unison with each other in

forestalling every attempt to apply any validating tool

to the 'faJts' presented in poetry' Anandavardhana says:

As a matter of fact, the question of logical truth

and falsity in regard to suggested meaning .isentirely futile. Such being the case' it would be

ridicul,ous if one were to indulge in discussions

regarding different Instruments of Knowledge

apPlicable to them''*

MB echoes the same sentiment:

Hencetheconsiderationoftruthandfalsityoftheprobans and probandum is of no use for ideal

connoisseurr. in the arena of poetry, the consid-

eration of truth and falsity of the cognition of the

expressed and the suggested senses is of no use at

all and hence the verif,rcation through other means

of knowledge becomes a matter of ridicule'''

How far does MB agree with Sankuka who also

subscribed to a similar inference theory with regard-to

the interpretation of the rasasiltra ? The answer is dif-

it."ft to find since we find several gaps in the theory

oi Suaf."f.a as reproduced in the Abhinavabharati and

since MB is mysieriously silent about his indebtedness

;;;i*. Sankuka is famous for his analogy of the pic-

ture of the horse (citraturaganyaya) by means of which

he seeks to explain the relationship between the actor

and the character imitated by him, but MB does not

231

p

,{

I


la

refer to this analogy anywhere in his Vyaktiviveka.

Abhinavagupta in hrs Abhinavabharati reproduces the

criticism made by Bhattatauta on the imitation theory

of Sankuka, but MB does not refer to it either.

The whole inference theory of MB has been sub-

jected to a thorough scrutiny by Ruyyaka in his gloss

on Vyaktiviveka. Ruyyaka, a staunch advocate of the

dhvani theory and the concept of abhivyakti wtth re-gard to the rasa realization, obviously under the influ-ence of Abhinavagupta, raises certain fundamental is-

sues. First of all, he clarifies that enjoyment being the

essence of rasa, it is to be examined from the stand-

point of the connoisseur (sahrday,a) since it is he whois the enjoyer (carvayitd). Ruyyaka rejects the viewthat rasa exists in the imitated person or the imitator.

Actually rasa is cognized in a generalized form of cog-

nition in which individualistic features like space, time,

state of being, and the like are absent. Ruyyaka con-

cedes that since original characters like Rdma and the

actors impersonating them are also involved, rasa can

be described in terms of them also. However, it is notproper to restrict the rasa exclusively to the character

and the actor, since sage Bharata's dictum that the

basic mental state becomes the rasa Ls an authoritativestatement. Ruyyaka presents the rasa tlreory of the

dhvani theorist thus :

It is the basic mental state (of the connoisseur),

which develops into a pleasurable state of rasa. There

can be no aesthetic enjoyment for people without


sensibility. Hence it can be concluded that it is the

actual instinct of emotions iike love which develop into

the state of rasa'

lmportantly, Ruyyaka rejects. the contention of MB

that the basic mental states like love and the ,vibhaua-s

.i.., .utt.a so because they are comprehended in a unl-

versalized manner and which arouse these states are

unreal. Ruyyaka contends that they are very reai as

they can be vibhava-s etc'' only when cognized as real'

In direct contradiction to MB,s position, nyw,aka

p"i",t out that if they a13 coenized as unreal' they

would be only tu"t'' effects and the like' and not

vibhava-s, anubhava-s and the iike' In fact' it is pre-

cisely to bring fonn tttit idea that Bharata has used

terms like vibhdva, anubhava and vyabhicaribhava'

*ni"f, suggest their transcendental (lokottara) natule'

Inshort,itistheactual(vidyantano)andinstinctiveiraronar*a) basic mental siate like love which is mani-

fested (vyakta) witt'otlt obstacles like the memory of

the invariable relation with the vibhava-s etc'

Ruyyaka also raises certain perlinent objections to

the analogy of tf't lustres of the jewei and lamp (mani-

pradtpaprabhanyaya), especially. when MB argues that

the cognized emotion of love etc' is also unreal' lt is

proper to say that when an unreal thing gives rise to

the cognition of a real thing' there can be inference'

But how is it possible to infer an unreal object from an

unreal object Z n"yyufu contends that the criterion of

casual efficacy -(o'tL'W'ya)

is fulfilled only rf rasa rs


manifested and since here it is manifested it should be

considered as real.'o

Itseemsthatlndianaestheticshastwodiametri-cally opposite concepts with regard to the key term

,rri. Wt it. earlier commentators on Bharata like

Lollata and sankuka, and probably Bharata himself

looked upon rasa from an empirical standpoint, and

articulated notions with regard to the character of the

play and the actor impersonating the character, we find

a paradigm shift in Bhattanayaka and Abhinavagupta

who were concerned with the reader and the spectator.

It is inevitable that any notion of rasa, centred on the

character who is fictitious, and the actor who is creat-

ing a make-believe world has to be from the stand-

point that rasa is only an illusion' On the other hand' ifone is to concentrate on the reader or the spectator, one

cannot escape the notion that the rasa experience is

very real. As Bharata puts it, the whole body (of the

,p.ttutor, it seems) is infused with it like dry wood by

fire. In other words, the rasa existing in a character

like Rama or an actor impersonating him is anything

but real; but the rasa experienced by a reader or spec

tator is indeed very real. All these issues find frequent

references in the learned discussions of Abhinavagupta,

the author of the sole available commentary on the

Natyaiastra. He is emphatic that rasa rs nothing but

the innate and dormant sthayibhava existing in the

sahrdaya, aroused by the poetic presentation or

performance.

233

6

n


However, we find that Anandavardhana, the pro-pounder of the dhvani doctrine of which Abhinava-gupta is the most able defender is silent on the wholeissue of the cognition of rasa. Anandavardhana dis-cusses nowhere in his Dhvarytaloka the questionwhether rasa exists in the reader or the character.Hence it is difficult to asceftain if he believedthat rasa is an illusion or real experience, thoughit can be argued that all the subsequent elaborations ofAbhinavagupta are germinally found in his own work.However, MB is not expected to be familiarwith the philosophical elaborations and thetranscendental explanation given to the rasa theory byAbhinavagupta (c AD. 1000).

It is not, however, fully cor:rect to maintain thatMB is totally unaware of the transcendental explana-tions given to the rasa-realization. He quotes two veryinteresting verses from an anonymous source, whichdeserves to be quoted here in view of the transcen-dental nature of rasa described in them. Masson andPatwardhan translate the verses thus :

When, from the recitation and the singing of theDhruva songs, rasa reaches its peak (i.e. thespectator is filled wrth rasa), he turns his atten-tion inwards (antarmukha) for a moment, concen-trated entirely on enjoying that profusion (bharaof rasa) and becomes delighted. At that moment(tatal.t) when (he) is immersed in his own nature(svaripa), and he is unaware of any outside


F

.i

object (nirvisaya), his own deep flow (nisyanda)of joy becomes manifest, by which even yogin-sare pleased.''

The tune and tenor of the reference in Vyaktivivekasuggest that MB largely subscribes to this view thatrasa is a transcendental concept defying analysis. How-ever, we do not find in him any concerted attempt toformulate a transcendental rasa theory with inferenceas the key process. One cannot escape the feeling thatafter the paradigmatic shift in Indian aesthetics usheredin by Bhattandyaka and Abhinavagupta, from an earlierempirical concept of rasa confined to the specificity ofspace and time of the actor and the character to a tran_scendental one going beyond special and temporal dis_tinctions, the valiant attempt of MB to rejuvenate theold theory of inference was bound to fail.

Bibliography

Anandavardhana, Dhvanyaloka, chawkhamba Sanskrit Series, Benares,1940.

Bapat, L, Buddhist Logic, A Fresh Study o/'Dharmalcirti,s philosophy,Bharatiya Vidya Prakashan, Delhi, 19g9.

Bharata, Ndvaiastra, with the Abhinavabhdrali commentary of AcaryaAbhinavagupta (in four volumes), parimal publicatlons, 199g.

Hiriyanna, M., Outlines o/' Indian philosophy, Motilal Banarsidass,Delhi, 1994.

Jagannatha Pandita., Rasagaigadhara, Motilal Banarsidass, I 9g g.

Krishnamoorthy, K., The Dhvanyaloka and its Critics, Bharatiya VidyaPrakashan, Delhi, 1982.

Mammata, Kavyaprakdia, Chaukhamba Sanskrit Sansthan,I 990.

Varanasi,

Mahimabhatta, Yyaktiviveka, edited by prof. Rewaprasada Dwivedi.

236 THE ADYAR LIBRARY BULLETIN 2004'06

Chaukhamba Sanskrit Sansthan' -Varanasi'

I 964' 1 982'

Masson, 1,', *a, 1"2#ll3: | {tr::;::{^,*{(:"y^i*{:y;;

PhilosoPhY ol

Matirar, 'Hllili'' il,Xll*1'!;ur' Language and Reatitv' MotlarrYrslrrs,

Banarsidass' Delhi' 1985'

Sankaran, A., some nri"r, ,iioro and Dhvani, university of Madras'

,,"n.r0",t?11 F', The Buddhist -Lo.s'i'j'L t["*o'olumes)' Munshiram

Manoharlal pu-Uii*t'"*' New Delhi' 1984'

Walimbe, y .s, AbbinaiZ:iiti'" Intdian Aestherics' Ajanta Publications'

Delhi, 1980'

1. VYaktiviveka' (VV)' P'

2. samdnYena ubhaYam

Notes

101-2.

api tad idstravad

phalam. kevalam ,ulukdvYandtYaidstr aruPo Yam

3, ":;:'r, citram kavindm viirnkhalag'irant rasdditdtparyam ana'

pelqva eva oui''*i*'iii;'t,,s"ua asmdbhih parikalpitam'

'(Divanyatoka' p' 49'l)' --..= -asdbhivyaktyavyabhicari

t 'kaviwdparo hi vibhdvddisanryoianatma r

-ku;r;; ucYate' (lzll' P' lol)'

5. na ca loke vibnava)iyat't Yii"a| va sambhavanti hetvddindm eva

ttatra rambhava' 6bid' L1'l - ..-: .,; bhavaiokadaurmanasyd-6';ll;":;':,2:;:; :l:'::;;;#,tr::{::;';;;iirir o uor

1. tat ko'tilayo OU"'iO"'yor nt'oiuo rasdsvddo na loke" ' (ibid)'

8. ve loke "'vua'vl ii*ii4't-ah sthemabhdidh avasthdviiesdh'kecit

"rcevakd"vdd";;;;ip'l'Znnit't'it"o'r'irTro'rl"lf #,ut'r;'::r#;samhitdh santo bhdvayanfi tAms tdn rat

(ibid. P' 71)'

g. ibid, P' 74'

10. ibid, P' 75'

ll. ibid, PP' 75-6'

12. bhrdntir api sambandhatah pramd' (ibid' p' 76)'

a

t

IS RASA AN ILLUSION ? 23',7

l.

,t,.i

13. rnanipradipaprabhayoh manibuddhydbhidhdvatoh

mithydi fidvii ese' pi ui! us' ; rthakriydm pr ati (P r amdnavdrttika' ll

p.s7).14. Outlines of'Indian Philosophyi' p' 208'.S-ee also' Stcherbatsky' F'

The Buddhist t'osi"', trrl' i'pi' r-st and Bapat' L' Buddhist Logic'

i pr"rl, Study oi'Onarmakirti's Philosophy'

Hiriyanna, oP' cit, ibid'

ibid, p.210-11.For a review of the influence of Buddhistic philosophy on

frfrni"Ufr"tta, see C' iui"na'un''Influence of Buddhist Philoso-

pnil;*ffiil;*1t.u', -y'f'aiui,d'o'

A critica.t srudv' pp' 2'7s-82'

'Divanyaloka' Ill.3 3' Krisnamoorthy's translation'

Vyaktivivettn, P. 78'

Ruyyaka, Vyaktivivekavydkhydna, p' 7 6'

Masson And Patwardhan, Sonm'o'o and Abhinavagupta's

PhilosoPhY of Aesthetics, P' 159'

r5.16.

17.

18.

19.

20.21.

ta;*

Is Rasa an Illusion?A Study in Mahimabhatta's Aesthetics

Documents

Transcript of Is Rasa an Illusion?A Study in Mahimabhatta's Aesthetics