Irresistibly In Love With God: Reconciling The Tension Between God’s Grace and Free

Will In The Thought of Augustine

Divine causation and human free will are both affirmed by St. Augustine. He often says

God’s grace is necessary for us to will what is good, but nevertheless it is us who do the willing. For

example, in De gratia et libero arbitrio Augustine argues “it is certain that we will when we will, but

He makes it happen that we will what is good, about which it was said [that]…, the will is prepared

by the Lord.” For Augustine, when humans will to do good, it is necessary to affirm the effectuality 1

of both divine and human agency.

Other texts also point to Augustine's affirmation of both. In Ad Simplicianum, he remarks:

“the effectiveness of God’s mercy cannot be in the power of man to frustrate, if the man does not

will to have it. If God wills to have mercy on men, he can call them in a way that is suited to them,

so that they will be moved to understand and to follow” ; In this passage, Augustine argues God’s 2

grace is irresistible for the human will, because the will is moved to obey God’s grace—Augustine

seems to suggest—out of necessity. However, if God’s grace is not possible for human to frustrate,

there seems to be not much room left for genuine freedom. Fortunately, Augustine himself is aware

of this tension, as Stump astutely observes:

“Nonetheless, Augustine also wants to maintain that human beings have free will… his attitude is summed up well in De spiritu et littera where he argues at length that the will of faith is caused by grace. ‘Are we then doing away with free choice through grace?’ he asks; and he answers with vehemence, ‘God forbid!’ (“absit”). 3

1 Augustine, De gratia et libero arbitrio, 16, 32, pp. 162­164, translation and emphasis by Tianyue Wu 2 Augustine, Ad Simplicianum, I, 2, 13, (translation taken from http://www.romancatholicism.org/jansenism/augustine­simplician.html) 3 Eleonore Stump, The Cambridge Companion to Augustine. Cambridge, (UK: Cambridge University Press, 2001), 138.

It is clear, then, Augustine is also insistent on the genuineness of our free will. Although grace can

move our will irresistibly, human will is indeed free. In De libero arbitrio, Augustine maintains that

the will must be voluntary, or else sin would not be blamable: “However, we charge the mind with

sin when we find it guilty of abandoning higher goods to put lower goods first for its enjoyment…

We admit that it is a movement of the mind and that it is voluntary, and therefore blameworthy.” 4

Consequently, it is apparent Augustine wants to hold 1) that God can move the human will out of

necessity, and 2) that the human will is voluntary. But how is this possible?

Someone may argue that, over the course of debating with the Pelagians and Julian,

Augustine evolved to a point where the free will he affirmed in De Libero Aribitrio is no longer

possible. However, Stump puts forth a strong challenge of the above argument: “In the

Retractationes, when he is willing enough to retract earlier views… he stands by his theory of free

will in the early treatise. Rather than retracting his earlier theory of free will when he emphasizes the

view that the will of faith comes from God, he struggles instead to find some way of reconciling the

two.” If Stump is right that Augustine always seeks to reconcile free will and irresistible grace , then 5 6

our problem stands: how can they be reconciled?

My goal in this paper is to offer an solution to this tension in the thought of Augustine. To

achieve this goal, I will 1) spend a section on Augustine’s description of delight that moves the will,

2) describe Plato’s concept of falling in love, and 3) argue Augustine is able to affirm both grace and

freedom by drawing from Plato.

4 Augustine, De Libero Arbitrio 3.1.2.10­3.1.2.11, 74 (translation taken from Cambridge Texts in the History of Philosophy, ed. Peter King) 5 Stump, Eleonore. The Cambridge Companion to Augustine. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2001. 137. 6 By irresistible grace I do not mean the concept has been defined in Calvinism. What I mean by this term is simply: the special kind of grace from God that moves the will in an irresistible mannar.

Augustine On Saul’s Conversion

Before giving the solution of this question, it is appropriate to pave the road with

Augustine’s own comments on Saul’s conversion. In Saul’s encounter with God on the Damascus

road, Saul’s will directly opposed to God, yet what happens to Saul is a complete change of heart.

Does God’s grace coerce Saul’s will to make such a conversion take place? Or Does Saul’s free will,

despite its opposition to God, still play a kind of role in his conversion? This passage from Ad

Simplicianum provides a few key insights to these questions:

who is able to believe unless he is touched by some sort of call… Who has it in his power that such a presentation would touch his mind and by that presentation his will would be moved to faith? Who with the mind embraces something that does not delight him?... Therefore, when those things delight us by which we may progress toward God, this is inspired and offered by God’s grace… But the will itself cannot in anyway be moved unless something occurs that delights and beckons the mind. But that this should occur is not in the power of a human being. 7

For Augustine, God’s grace is something that touches the mind, makes the mind delight in God and

therefore beckons the mind. This is a rather crucial point to appreciate the reason why Augustine 8

wants to affirm both voluntary free will and irresistible divine grace. If the grace moves the will

through attracting the will by making the will delight in God, then all Augustine needs to do is to

argue that the divine grace is so attractive that the will cannot but choose to follow God. This move

is able to reconcile the tension of grace and freedom, because it is indeed possible for someone to be

so attracted to something that she simply cannot but pursue it, while at the same time having her

own free will uncoerced, so that she pursues it irresistibly but voluntarily.

7 Augustine, Ad Simplicianum, I, 2, 13, (translation taken from Napier, Daniel Austin, En Route to the Confessions: The Roots and Development of Augustine's Philosophical Anthropology, 156.) 8 Peter Brown, Augustine of Hippo: A Biography, (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2000), 148.

Imagine a grand desert where a lost traveller has not drank a drop of water for over three

days. She walks deliriously in the boundless sands, desperately needing a miracle to save her life.

Suddenly she sees, above the despair of the endless brown, an oasis! Her heart bouncing like a

rabbit, she uses all her remaining strength to reach the streams in the oasis. She kneels down the

bank, holds up a handful of water, and is ready to drink.

Would she drink? Of course she would, and she would drink it irresistibly, being thirsty for

three long days. Is she coerced by the water then? No, she drinks it voluntarily, because she herself

decides to walk to the stream and drink from it. Her voluntary will is so attracted by the water that

she simply cannot do otherwise. The water, therefore, moves her will irresistibly, but her will itself

voluntarily chooses to drink the water.

It is my aim, therefore, to argue God’s grace also has this attraction that moves the will

irresistibly without compromising its voluntariness. To achieve this goal, I will first give an overview

of the Platonist idea of falling in love, and then explain how this Platonist idea can help us

understand God’s grace as a irresistible force that does not violate the freedom of the will.

Falling In Love in Plato 9

Phillip Cary, commenting on Ad Simplicianum, insightfully argues:

What these texts show, I think, is the weight of opposition in Augustine’s own mind… to the notion that our will can be directly moved by God contrary to its own inclination without violating our freedom. The Platonist psychology of the inner teaching of faith helps him overcome this opposition, since it means that God turns the resisting will not by external force but by the sweet inner compulsion of delight

9 This entire chapter is a variation of what Phillip Cary has argued in: Phillip Cary, "Platonist Grace: Inner Help to

Love," In Inner Grace Augustine in the Traditions of Plato and Paul, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008).

and desire. Who, after all, can resist a grace that causes us to fall in love with nothing less than our eternal happiness? 10

Cary reminds us that we need to connect the notion of delight with the Platonist psychology that has

fundamentally shaped Augustine’s philosophical and theological thoughts. To elaborate on this

connection is the job of this section.

In the Allegory of the Cave, Plato described a group who has been living in a cave. They are

chained in a way that they can only see what is in front of them. Behind them is the entrance to the

cave, and outside the entrance is an elevation, where many people walking around with different

kind of objects. Behind those people are a fire that shines on the people on the elevation,

formulating shadows in the cave. The people in the cave only only see the shadows of peoples and

the things they carry. If one of these people is liberated, he turns around and sees the people and the

things as they really are. Moreover, looking farther, he will see the light of fire through which he sees

the people. He will be dazzled at first, but eventually he will realize what he sees by directing his gaze

to the light is more real than the shadows he formerly saw. When his vision is finally well adjusted,

he will be able to see the light of the sun, then “he would felicitate himself on the change, and pity

[those who are still chained]”. 11

Although Plato’s description of the liberated prison’s psyche is rather bland, the irresistibility

of the light is still apparent. The prisoner is chained from his birth and had never seen the light,

therefore he experiences painful dazzles that takes him a while to be adjusted. However, when his

eyes are prepared, he avariciously treats himself with all kinds of visions: “then he will gaze upon the

light of the moon and the stars and the spangled heaven… he will be able to see the sun, and not

10 Phillip Cary, Inner Grace Augustine in the Traditions of Plato and Paul, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008), 109. 11 Plato, The Repulic, Book VII, (translation taken from http://classics.mit.edu/Plato/republic.8.vii.html)

mere reflections of him in the water, but he will see him in his own proper place.” The true light 12

liberates him from the shadows. By seeing what is more real, he no longer regards the confused

images displayed on the cave wall. In pitying those who are still unable to see the sun, he abandons

his own upbringing and tradition, and converts to the true light. The point is also that he cannot do

otherwise. After seeing where the shadows come from, it is impossible for him to go back to the

cave and pretend they are still real. The true light irresistibly converts him, but he converts

voluntarily.

Granted, the purpose of this allegory is to point us to the Form of the Good, but the idea is

the same: a powerful force attracts the voluntary will in a irresistible way. We were souls originated

from a different world, a non-bodily, eternal and unchangeable realm, where only Forms reside.

Thus, even when we (souls) are chained to a corruptible body, we still yearn for returning home. We

can know what that heavenly realm looks like by turning inward. When we turn our gaze away from

bodily things, we will “ascend to the vision of eternal things willingly, longingly, because the

reflection of such Beauty in the transient beauties of the earth leads us upward”. We fall in love 13

with the Form of the Good immediately, because we are souls that are created to love the Good:

“He [Plato] teaches us that we yearn for the ultimate Good and Beauty as lovers sigh for their

beloved”. 14

If we keep in mind these Platonic influences, Augustine’s comments on Saul’s conversion in

Ad Simplicianum will become clear. The Augustinian delight is simply a different way of putting the

Platonist falling in love. When we fall in love, our hearts are so delighted that the object of our love

12 Ibid. 13 Phillip Cary, Inner Grace Augustine in the Traditions of Plato and Paul, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008), 15. 14 Ibid.

irresistibly demands our pursuit. In the divine presentation to Saul, God “touches his mind” makes

his heart delighted so that he can “progress toward God”. 15

This is precisely where the Allegory of the Cave comes into the picture: God is the true light

that sets free Saul who was living in the darkness. When Saul sees God, he simply cannot but fall in

love with that which is most real. His “fierce, savage, blind will” was abandoned, because he realized

what he deemed to be lovable, namely the integrity of Pharisaic laws, is nothing but shadows

compared to the unchangeable Law of laws, the eternal Logos himself that appears to him. That

which Augustine and Monica only “touched the edge of it by the utmost leap of [their] hearts” is

graciously given to Saul on the road to Damascus. Therefore, the ultimate Good, by presenting 16

himself, irresistibly causes Saul’s conversion, yet at the same time Saul is free, because he is in love

with God, and as a lover he voluntarily chooses to pursue his love that gives him the utmost delight.

Sinful Pleasure and Godly Delight

However, one strong challenge awaits Cary’s account of the Platonist falling in love and my

appropriation of this Platonist concept in Saul’s conversion. Cary, in his book, states:

Platonist love… does not work like rational assent… [O]nce we are in love, we freely assent to what love desires, because our loving has become the center of our will. Falling in love determines rather than is determined by our free choice, and every happy lover welcomes this and finds it to be an enhancement rather than an impairment of human freedom.

However, if our will is determined by our love, how is it genuinely free? To be free is to be able not

to choose something we love. Augustine’s psychology of lustful sin is a good illustration for this

15 Augustine, Ad Simplicianum, I, 2, 13, (translation taken from Napier, Daniel Austin, En Route to the Confessions: The Roots and Development of Augustine's Philosophical Anthropology, 156.) 16 Augustine, Confessions, IX, 10, 24, (translation taken from New City Press Series).

point. “In De sermone Domini”, Wu writes, “Augustine distinguishes the formation of a sinful lust

into three steps: suggestion, pleasure, and consent.” This pleasure, according to Wu, is very much 17

alike the godly delight described in Ad Simplicianum, in the sense that both describe the moment of

falling in love, albeit with very different things. However, the initial lustful pleasure is not a sin, 18

because “these movements of the soul are not blameworthy because they do not contain the explicit

consent of the will”. This implies that the will is free to assent or dissent to the initial pleasure. 19

Indeed, sin is only blameworthy because the will does not have to choose what it falls in love with:

“In the formation of sinful lust, the freedom of the will remains intact when confronted with the

temptation of the initial pleasure. Wu believes this diagram of suggestion, pleasure and consent is

precisely what happens in Ad Simplicianum: “It is reasonable to understand the delight in the

invitation to faith in Ad Simplicianum in a similar manner… the initial delight from divine

providence also does not take away the freedom of the will to consent or dissent.” If Wu is right, 20

then the initial delight that Saul experiences does not compel him to choose God; when God

presents himself to him, Saul still has the genuine freedom to choose to dissent with this initial

delight and move away from God. Saul did choose to assent with this initial delight, but it was out of

a genuine free will that could have chosen otherwise.

Before getting into the crux my response to this objection, I feel a strong need to clarify a

very important issue involved in this discussion. It is easy, especially for those familiar with debates

regarding Calvinism and Arminianism, to assume that there are only two possible modes of divine

17 Tianyue Wu, "AUGUSTINE ON INITIUM FIDEI: A CASE STUDY OF THE COEXISTENCE OF OPERATIVE GRACE AND FREE DECISION OF THE WILL," Recherches De Théologie Et Philosophie Médiévales 79, no. 1 (2012): 17. 18 Ibid. 19 Ibid., p18 20 Ibid.

interaction with the human will: either necessarily or contingently. In other words, it is easy to think

God can only 1) move the will irresistibly, or 2) attract the will to choose Him while giving the will

the capacity not to. However, this assumption that God can only work in these two ways is not

correct. St. Aquinas insightfully points out it is possible to affirm both:

… that predestination is a part of providence. But not all things subject to providence are necessary; some things happening from contingency, according to the nature of the proximate causes, which divine providence has ordained for such effects.

God can make some things happen necessarily, others contingently. Therefore, it is perfectly

possible for God to both 1) make the will necessarily choose him and 2) make the will contingently

choose him. 21

If Aquinas is right, then Wu’s objection only challenges my argument insofar it denies the

possibility of God moves the will irresistibly. I agree wholeheartedly with Wu that our will does not

always follow what one loves, especially in the case of resisting a sin. However, for Saul, it is entirely

possible for him to be so moved by God that he simply cannot resist his will. Wu’s analogy of the

initial pleasure of lust and the initial delight of seeing God does not work for Saul, because Saul did

not experience a dark impulse that always make the will reluctant because of its immorality. Instead,

what he experiences is a most compelling delight when he faces the Holy of Holies.

In order to illustrate this point, I will bring together the Augustinian idea that all people

pursue happiness and the Platonist concept that all wrongdoing is involuntary. For Augustine, all

21 One might argue that this is a wrong interpretation of Aquinas, because necessity and contingency is from the nature of the proximate cause, and the proximate cause of choosing God is the will; and the will can choose contingently. But to choose something voluntarily and necessarily is indeed a possibility for Aquinas: “God can change the will with necessity”, because God can impress “some form on the will itself… [and] from something added on to it, as grace or virtue is, the soul is further inclined to will something to which it was not previously determined by a natural inclination.”(QDV 22.8 reply) When this impression of form is complete, “it brings about a necessary inclination for that which it determines in such a way that the will is inclined by nature to desire the end of necessity.”(QDV 22.8 reply)

seek happiness: “all agree that they want to be happy… and they think a life of happiness consists of

this enjoyment. One person pursues it in this way, another in that, but all are striving for the same

goal, enjoyment.” Whatever one does, one aims toward the goal of attaining happiness. Augustine’s 22

account of sin is, therefore, one of disordered love. When one sins, she is loving something of a

lower value at the cost of a higher value. However, one must also understand the privation theory

with the Platonist account of sin as involuntary. When one has a disordered love, it is because she, 23

in a sense, wrongly understands what happiness is. When one succombs to the temptation of lust, he

is ignorant of what true joy consists of. By putting the love of flesh over above the love of God, he

fails to understand the source of joy for the jubilant Psalmist, who shouts: “O taste and see that the

Lord is good; How blessed is the man who takes refuge in Him!” (34:8). Indeed, when one abides in

God, the joy of her holy life far exceeds that of any carnal pleasure. To sin, therefore, according to a

Christian Platonist, involves a failure to know what brings ultimate happiness. Just as a kid fails to

understand why The Godfather is so much better than Transformers, so the sinner fails to

understand that the happiness of being holy far exceeds the happiness of lustful indulgence.

This bring us to Saul, whose will is so “fierce, savage [and] blind”, that he willed nothing

“but to attack, seize, bind and slay Christians.” However, Paul is not a sociopath who gets pleasure 24

only from killing. Instead, he thinks he is serving the eternal God by shedding the blood of

Christians. Saul recognizes God is the one to be served, but his understanding false and his way of

serving God cruel. In other words, Saul’s brutality results from a misunderstanding of what

happiness is. When God, Happiness itself, shows himself to Saul, there is no way that Saul would

22 Augustine, Confessions, X,21,31, (translation taken from New City Press Series). 23 J. M. Van Ophuijsen, Plato and Platonism, Washington, D.C.: Catholic University of America Press, 1999, 32. 24 Augustine, Ad Simplicianum, I, 2, 22, (translation taken from http://www.romancatholicism.org/jansenism/augustine­simplician.html)

still choose a lower good than this highest Good. Again, to sin involves a failure to understand;

when the Truth shines on his mind and blinds his physical eyes, Saul knows God as who he is. He

cannot remain in his old ways, because God has made clear to him that true happiness comes not

from slaying others for a bloodthirsty deity, but laying one’s life for the One who lays down his own

life. His knowledge of God as a tyrant is immediately thrown away, because he used to see the

shadow of God in the cave, but now he is facing the Light itself. How can he love it less than the

shadows? How can he resist the strongest desire of his heart to follow Him? He has always been

dehydrated, but he mistook poison as water to quench his thirst. Now, the true fountain of Life

appears to him with a voice: “Saul, Saul, why are you persecuting Me?” Saul, kneeling on the ground

with his hands filled with the living water, answers: “Who are You, Lord?”

Conclusion

I am aware of the fact not all of what I have described above is made explicit by Augustine

himself. What I have labored to achieve in this paper, however, is to show that if one connects the

dots—that Augustine wants to affirm both grace and free will, that he describes grace moves the will

through delight, and that he is influenced by Platonism—the interpretation of Saul’s conversion

offered above makes a lot of sense. If I am right, then there is no tension with affirming a grace that

irresistibly moves the will, and a will that is voluntary and free. God does not coerce the will; rather,

by presenting himself to the will, God makes the will fall in love with him. Depending on the degree

to which God chooses to present himself to someone, God can make a person fall in love with him

with necessity, even when that person could be very opposed to God prior to that divine

presentation. When Saul falls in love with God, his love determines his will to choose God.

Nevertheless, his will voluntarily chooses to follow the object of love, because the love of God is

not coerced on him, but comes from his own heart. As a disclaimer, I do not think God always

irresistibly moves the will. What have argued is simply the fact God can and probably has move the

will irresistibly while maintaining the freedom of the will—free in the sense of being voluntary.